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## Developers Are Users Too:

Designing Crypto and Security APIs That Busy Engineers  
and Sysadmins Can Use Securely

Matthew Green, Johns Hopkins University  
Matthew Smith, University of Bonn



- Three seminal '90 papers are seen as the origin of Usable Security and Privacy research\*
  - Zurko and Simon's: "User-Centered Security"
  - Adams and Sasse's: "Users Are Not the Enemy"
  - Whitten and Tygar's "Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0"
- All argued that users should **not** be seen as **a problem** to be dealt with,
  - but that **security experts need** to communicate more with users, and **adopt user-centered design approaches**.



## Evaluating Without Users

- E1 Literature Review
- E2 Cognitive Walkthrough
- E3 Heuristic Evaluation
- E4 Model-Based Evaluation

## Evaluating With Users

### Qualitative

- E5 Conceptual Model Extraction
- E6 Silent Observation
- E7 Think Aloud
- E8 Constructive Interaction
- E9 Retrospective Testing

+ Interviews,  
questionnaires,...

### Quantitative

- E10 Controlled Experiments



# 10 Usability Principles (Jakob Nielsen)

1. Keep the interface simple!
2. Speak the user's language!
3. Minimize the user's memory load!
4. Be consistent and predictable!
5. Provide feedback!
6. Design clear exits and closed dialogs!
7. Offer shortcuts for experts!
8. Help to recover from errors, offer Undo!
9. Prevent errors!
10. Include help and documentation!



# 7 Characteristics of good APIs by J. Bloch

1. Easy to learn
2. Easy to use, even without documentation
3. Hard to misuse
4. Easy to read and maintain code that uses it
5. Sufficiently powerful to satisfy requirements
6. Easy to extend
7. Appropriate to audience




- Most OpenSSL functions will return an integer to indicate success or failure. Typically a function will return 1 on success or 0 on error. All return codes should be checked and handled as appropriate.
- Note that not all of the libcrypto functions return 0 for error and 1 for success.
- There are exceptions which can trip up the unwary.
- For example if you want to check a signature with some functions you get 1 if the signature is correct, 0 if it is not correct and -1 if something bad happened like a memory allocation failure.

```
if (some_verify_function())  
    /* signature successful */
```

```
if (1 != some_verify_function())  
    /* signature successful */
```



- Far too much developer responsibility for choosing and securely composing algorithms
  - Support for unauthenticated encryption (CBC/CTR)
  - RC4!
  - Generic composition of ciphers & MACs
  - Emphasis on legacy applications



## How to Break XML Encryption\*

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- RSA with PKCS #1v1.5 encryption
  - Provided as the only mandatory padding scheme in many software devices (e.g., PKCS11 tokens)
  - It is conceivably possible to encrypt some types of data securely with PKCS#1v1.5 padding
  - Almost nobody knows how to do it (even OpenSSL has active timing vulns.)

## 17.4. RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5

### 17.4.1. Description

The "RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5" algorithm identifier is used to perform encryption and decryption ordering to the RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 algorithm specified in [[RFC3447](#)].





## CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy function

This topic has not yet been rated – [Rate this topic](#)

The **CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy** function checks a certificate chain to verify its validity, including its compliance with any specified validity policy criteria.

### Syntax

C++

```
BOOL WINAPI CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(  
    _In_     LPCSTR pszPolicyOID,  
    _In_     PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext,  
    _In_     PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,  
    _Inout_  PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus  
);
```

### Parameters

#### Return value


The return value indicates whether the function was able to check for the policy, it does not indicate whether the policy check failed or passed.

If the chain can be verified for the specified policy, **TRUE** is returned and the **dwError** member of the *pPolicyStatus* is updated. A **dwError** of 0 (ERROR\_SUCCESS or S\_OK) indicates the chain satisfies the specified policy.

If the chain cannot be validated, the return value is **FALSE** and you need to verify the *pPolicyStatus* parameter for the actual error.



- Analysis of 13,500 popular, free apps from Google's Play Market
  - 92.8 % of the apps use the Internet permission
  - 91.7 % of networking API calls are HTTP(S) related
  - 0.8 % exclusively HTTPS URLs
  - 46.2 % mix HTTP and HTTPS
- 17.28 % of all apps that use HTTPS API include code that fails in TLS certificate validation
  - 1070 include critical code
  - 790 accept all certificates
  - 284 accept all hostnames





The default Android **HTTPS** API implements correct certificate validation.


What could possibly go wrong?





# HTTPS Usage on Android and iOS

- A server needs a certificate that was signed by a trusted Certificate Authority
  - (~130 pre-installed CAs)
- For non-trusted certificates a **custom** workaround is needed
- Error handling requires **custom** code
- Additional security measures such as pinning or Certificate Transparency require **custom** code









Q: I am getting an error of „javax.net.ssl.SSLException: Not trusted server certificate“.

[...]

I have spent 40 hours researching and trying to figure out a workaround for this issue.



A: Look at this tutorial

<http://blog.antoine.li/index.php/2010/10/android-trusting-ssl-certificates>

*stackoverflow.com*



# Trusting all Certificates

```
// Create a trust manager that does not validate certificate chains
TrustManager[] trustAllCerts = new TrustManager[] { new X509TrustManager() {

    public java.security.cert.X509Certificate[] getAcceptedIssuers() {
        return null;
    }

    public void checkClientTrusted(X509Certificate[] chain, String authType) throws CertificateException {
        // do nothing
    }

    public void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] chain, String authType) throws CertificateException {
        // do nothing
    }

} };
```



“It’s all the developers’ fault!”



- Finding broken HTTPS in Android and iOS apps is good...
  - ...knowing what the root causes are is even better
- We contacted 80 developers of broken apps
  - informed them ✓
  - offered further assistance ✓
  - asked them for an interview ?
- 15 developers agreed ✓





# Novice Developers

*“This app was one of our first mobile apps and when we noticed that there were problems with the SSL certificate, we just implemented the first working solution we found on the Internet.”*



*“We use self-signed certificates for testing purposes and the easiest way to make them working is to remove certificate validation. Somehow we must have forgotten to remove that code again when we released our app.”*





# Expert Developers (kind of...)

*“[...] When I used Wireshark to look at the traffic, Wireshark said that this is a proper SSL protected data stream and I could not see any cleartext information when I manually inspected the packets. So I really cannot see what the problem is here.”*

55	16.352652	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	42836 > 10443 [ACK] Seq
56	16.534849	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	SSLv3	Application Data
57	16.534869	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	10443 > 42836 [ACK] Seq
58	16.537346	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	SSLv3	Application Data, Appl
59	16.537674	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	42836 > 10443 [ACK] Seq
81	31.540448	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	SSLv3	Encrypted Alert
82	31.540486	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	42836 > 10443 [ACK] Seq
83	31.541069	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	10443 > 42836 [FIN, AC
84	31.572562	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	42836 > 10443 [ACK] Seq
91	36.540157	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	42836 > 10443 [FIN, AC
92	36.540206	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	10443 > 42836 [ACK] Seq

▸ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 42836 (42836), Dst Port: 10443 (10443), Seq: 806, A  
 ▾ Secure Socket Layer  
   ▾ SSLv3 Record Layer: Application Data Protocol: http  
     Content Type: Application Data (23)  
     Version: SSL 3.0 (0x0300)  
     Length: 400  
     Encrypted Application Data: e5e4820b5bac7a02e0950d68ae61e430f7051bab74457210...

0040	1f dc 17 03 00 01 90 e5 e4 82 0b 5b ac 7a 02 e0	..... [Z..
0050	95 0d 68 ae 61 e4 30 f7 05 1b ab 74 45 72 10 11	..h.a.0. ...tEr..
0060	10 be f4 00 6a 56 43 dc 50 5f a8 75 5c 83 48 9a	...jVC. P.u\H.
0070	ef 7a 91 66 ba f7 88 bb f8 87 7c 5b b4 f4 a4 dc	.z.f.... .. [...]
0080	35 8c 90 f7 98 c9 b1 56 44 92 b8 3b d7 3d 75 d0	5.....V D.;.=u.
0090	78 c7 1e fd 61 16 2b 68 d6 b7 ae 1e 0f 13 af 0b	x...a+th.....



*“The app accepts all SSL certificates because some users wanted to connect to their blogs with self-signed certs and [...] because Android does not provide an easy-to-use SSL certificate warning message, it was a lot easier to simply accept all self-signed certificates.”*



VS.






- **Self-Signed Certificates – Development.**
  - Developers commonly wish to use self-signed certificates for testing purposes and hence want to turn off certificate validation during testing.
- **Self-Signed Certificates – Production.**
  - A few developers wanted to use self-signed certificates in their production app for cost, effort and customer satisfaction reasons.
- **Code Complexity.**
  - Developers described the code-level customization features of HTTPS as too complex and requiring too much effort.
- **Certificate Pinning / Trusted Roots.**
  - Developers liked the idea of having an easy way to limit the number of trusted certificates and/or certificate authorities.
- **Global Warning Message.**
  - Developers requested global HTTPS warning messages since they described building their own warning messages as too challenging.



# A new approach TLS on Android

## Changed the TLS API on Android

- Removed TrustManager extension capabilities – no overriding of errors
- Support self-signed certificates
- Support certificate Pinning
- Offer default warning / user interaction
- Integration via configuration



```
<uses-ssl>
  <pins host="securessl.com">
    <pin type="ca" comment="Verisign Root CA">
      8F:57:5A:C8:5B:09:63:B0:24:2B:90...
    </pin>
    <pin type="cert" comment="Self-Signed">
      18:DA:D1:9E:26:7D:E8:BB:4A:21:58...
    </pin>
  </pins>
</uses-ssl>
```



# 10 Rules for a good Crypto API?

1. Easy to learn, **even without crypto background**
2. Easy to use, even without documentation
3. Hard to misuse. **Incorrect use should lead to visible errors**
4. **Hard to circumvent errors – except during testing/development**
5. Easy to read and maintain code that uses it
6. Sufficiently powerful to satisfy **non-security** requirements
7. ~~Easy to extend~~ **Hard to change/override core functionality**
8. Appropriate to audience – **this means people with no crypto experience**
9. **Assist with/handle end-user interaction**
10. **However, where possible integrate into standard APIs so normal developers never have to interact with crypto APIs in the first place**

conduct developer studies





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