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Part X

Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

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Introductory note

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

The powers of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs are set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and reflected in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part X of the present Supplement covers decisions of the Council relating to field-based subsidiary organs that the Council established for the performance of its functions under the Charter and that were active during 2018. These field-based subsidiary organs, referred to herein as peace operations, can be divided into two categories: peacekeeping operations (covered in section I); and special political missions (covered in section II).

Other subsidiary organs, such as committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, special advisers, envoys, representatives and coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, are covered in part IX. Peace operations led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII, which deals with the Council's cooperation with regional organizations.

Peace operations covered in part X are presented by region and in the order in which they were established. Successor operations are listed immediately after their predecessors. The introduction to each main section includes overview tables identifying the mandates assigned to each operation (tables 1, 2, 4 and 5) and provides an analysis of the key trends and developments during the reporting period. The mandates of the operations are presented in those tables according

to 21 categories of mandated tasks which are based exclusively on the language of the decisions of the Council and do not necessarily reflect the specific structure or activities of the mission. The categories are provided only as a convenience for readers and do not reflect any practice or position of the Security Council.

Subsections provide a summary of major developments concerning the mandate and composition of each operation, reflecting the decisions of the Council adopted during the period under review. For information on the mandate and composition of missions in the past, see previous Supplements to the *Repertoire*.

I. Peacekeeping operations

Note

Section I focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of peacekeeping operations, as well as changes to their mandates and composition.

Overview of peacekeeping operations during 2018

During the period under review, the Council oversaw 15 peacekeeping operations.¹ Eight of the operations were in Africa, one in the Americas, one in Asia, two in Europe and three in the Middle East. The Council did not establish any new peacekeeping operations in 2018 and one completed its mandate.

Mandate terminations and extensions of peacekeeping operations

As it was provided for in resolution [2333 \(2016\)](#), on 30 March 2018, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) completed its mandate fourteen years after its deployment. The Council also extended the mandates of the following peacekeeping operations:

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO),
- African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),

¹ For Security Council decisions and deliberations relating to the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, see part I, sect. 26. For Council discussions concerning individual peacekeeping operations, see the respective country-specific studies in part I.

- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO),
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA),
- United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS),
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA),
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA),
- United Nations Justice Support Mission in Haiti (MINUJUSTH),
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

The mandates of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), remained open-ended and no decision was required to extend them.

Mandates of peacekeeping operations, including the authorization of the use of force

During 2018, the Council continued to highlight the need to tailor peacekeeping mandates to conditions on the ground and acknowledged and/or endorsed the recommendations of seven reviews of operations conducted by the Secretariat in 2017 and 2018 concerning the mandates of MINURSO, UNAMID, MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSMA, MINUSCA, and UNFICYP.² The

² In connection with MINURSO, resolution [2440 \(2018\)](#), twenty-seventh preambular paragraph; in connection with UNAMID, resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 2; in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), para. 57; in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), para. 3; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), thirty-seventh preambular paragraph; in

Council also expressed its intention to continue revising as appropriate the configuration and mandate of UNISFA in light of the recommendations of the Secretary-General further to the independent review of that Mission.³ Six of the strategic reviews were independent in nature, with the participation of external non-United Nations experts.⁴ The Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a new strategic review of UNAMID and a strategic assessment of MINUJUSTH in the context of the planned drawdown and exit of both operations and acknowledged benchmarks developed for this purpose.⁵

The Council reauthorized the use of force by MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSMA and MINUSCA.⁶ UNAMID, UNISFA, MINUJUSTH and UNIFIL were reauthorized to take all necessary action in fulfilling only certain elements of their mandates such as the protection of civilians, United Nations personnel and equipment and to ensure their freedom of movement and that of humanitarian workers, the protection of mission areas of responsibility, and the support and development of national police forces.⁷

connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), thirty-fourth preambular paragraph; and, in connection with UNFICYP, resolution [2398 \(2018\)](#), para. 10.

³ Resolution [2445 \(2018\)](#), para. 6.

⁴ In connection with MINURSO, [S/2018/889](#), paras. 72-75; in connection with UNISFA, [S/2018/778](#); in connection with UNMISS, [S/2018/143](#); in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), thirty-seventh preambular paragraph; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), thirty-fourth preambular paragraph; in connection with UNFICYP, [S/2017/1008](#).

⁵ In connection with UNAMID, [S/PRST/2018/4](#), tenth paragraph, resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 7 and [S/PRST/2018/19](#), sixth paragraph; and, in connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution [2410 \(2018\)](#), fifteenth preambular paragraph and para. 9.

⁶ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), para. 35; in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), paras. 7 and 9; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 32; and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), para. 32.

⁷ In connection with UNAMID, resolutions [2425 \(2018\)](#), para. 2 and [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 15; in connection with UNISFA, resolutions [2416 \(2018\)](#), para. 10 and [2445 \(2018\)](#), para. 11; in connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution [2410 \(2018\)](#), para. 14; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#), para. 19.

For peacekeeping operations, the most common tasks mandated by the Council were those related to the provision of good offices and support to peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements, as well as the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and reporting, and the protection of United Nations personnel and property and humanitarian workers. The mandate of more longstanding missions such as MINURSO, UNMOGIP, UNTSO and UNDOF remained relatively narrowly focused on the monitoring of ceasefires.

In modifying mandates, the Council placed particular emphasis on strengthening the good offices and political support role of peacekeeping operations, requesting the implementation of a more comprehensive and integrated approach to the protection of civilians, defined new language regarding the provision of operational and logistical support to national military and police forces and requested the inclusion of gender and children and armed conflict considerations throughout mission activities.

Specifically, the Council strengthened the good offices role of MONUSCO, UNMISS and MINUSCA in support of ongoing peace processes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and the Central African Republic in coordination with other international, regional and local actors.⁸ The Council further requested MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the protection of civilians by, inter alia, focusing on the physical protection on certain vulnerable groups, strengthening local community engagement and

⁸ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), para. 36(ii)(a); in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), para. 7(d)(i); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), para. 39(b)(i).

empowerment, early warning, public information, intra-mission coordination mechanisms and cooperation with United Nations country teams.⁹

MINUSMA and MINUSCA were also specifically tasked with mitigating the risk to civilians in the context of military and police operations, including those in support of national security forces.¹⁰ Moreover, as part of their efforts to support the extension of State authority in Mali and the Central African Republic, the two Missions were requested to provide operational and logistical support for the progressive redeployment of national military and police forces.¹¹

In terms of cross-cutting issues, UNAMID and UNIFIL were tasked with ensuring that gender considerations were fully taken into account at all stages of mandate implementation and to assist in enhancing the capacity of women to participate in political processes.¹² MONUSCO and MINUSMA were requested to pay particular attention to the need of women and children in the implementation of their respective tasks related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform.¹³ As part of their protection of civilians tasks, UNMISS was mandated to coordinate with and sensitize security and government institutions on issues of sexual and gender-based violence, and children and armed conflict,¹⁴ while the UNAMID police

⁹ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), paras. 36(i)(c), 44, 47 and 50; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), paras. 38(d)(i) and (ii); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), paras. 39(a)(ii) and (iv).

¹⁰ In connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 38(d)(ii); and, in connection with MINUSCA resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), para. 39(a)(i).

¹¹ In connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 38(a)(ii) and (b); and, in connection with MINUSCA resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), para. 40(a)(v).

¹² In connection with UNAMID, resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 27; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#), para. 24.

¹³ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), paras. 37(i)(d) and 37(ii)(b); and, in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 38(a)(ii).

¹⁴ Resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), para. 7(a)(vii).

component was requested to focus on, inter alia, conducting community-oriented policing including on sexual and gender-based violence and child protection.¹⁵ More broadly, in relation to the situation in the Abyei Area, while reiterating its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that effective human rights monitoring was carried out, the Council specified that this should include sexual and gender-based violence and violations and abuses committed against women and children.¹⁶

Beyond gender and children and armed conflict, the Council tasked MINUSMA, in coordination with relevant partners, to enhance its awareness of the financial sources of conflicts in Mali, including trafficking of persons, arms, drugs and natural resources, and the smuggling of migrants.¹⁷ Furthermore, in connection with UNAMID, the Council requested the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan to consider the adverse implications of climate change in their programmes in Darfur, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies. In this regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide information of such assessments in mandated reporting.¹⁸

In the context of ongoing efforts by the Secretariat and relevant stakeholders to enhance the performance of peacekeeping operations, the Council paid significant attention to measuring effectiveness, the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and the safety and security of personnel in peacekeeping operations.¹⁹ In this regard, the Council welcomed the initiatives of the Secretary-General to standardize a “culture of performance” in missions and expressed support for

¹⁵ Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para 19.

¹⁶ Resolution [2416 \(2018\)](#), para. 26.

¹⁷ Resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 31.

¹⁸ Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 47.

¹⁹ For more information discussions in the Council and decisions regarding enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, see part I, sect. 26, “United Nations peacekeeping operations.”

the development of a comprehensive and integrated policy framework that would facilitate the effective and full implementation of mandates.²⁰ Moreover, the Secretary-General was requested to implement such frameworks with respect to MINURSO, UNAMID, UNISFA, MINUSMA, UNFICYP and UNIFIL.²¹ The Council also specifically requested UNAMID, in line with the zero tolerance policy of the Secretary-General, to conduct investigations into sexual exploitation and abuse as expeditiously as possible.²² In addition, taking note of the report on “Improving Security of United Nations peacekeepers,” welcomed MINUSMA’s action plan in this regard and encouraged its swift and continued implementation.²³

Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the mandates of peacekeeping operations in 2018, showing the wide range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; and (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and reiterated by the Council during the period under review. The tables also include the tasks of peacekeeping operations with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions of previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the operations concerned.

²⁰ Resolutions [2406 \(2018\)](#), para. 16; [2409 \(2018\)](#), para. 52; [2414 \(2018\)](#), para. 15; [2416 \(2018\)](#), para. 29; [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 58; [2426 \(2018\)](#), para. 10; [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 26; [2430 \(2018\)](#), para. 17; [2433 \(2018\)](#), para. 23 and [2445 \(2018\)](#), para. 30.

²¹ In connection with MINURSO, resolution [2414 \(2018\)](#), para. 15; in connection with UNAMID, resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 26; in connection with UNISFA, resolutions [2416 \(2018\)](#), para. 29 and [2445 \(2018\)](#), para. 30; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 58; in connection with UNFICYP, resolution [2430 \(2018\)](#), para. 17; in connection with UNDOF, resolution [2426 \(2018\)](#), para. 10; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#), para. 23;

²² Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 36.

²³ Resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 59.

Table 1
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2018: Africa

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>UNMIL^a</i>	<i>UNAMID</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>
Chapter VII		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Authorization of the use of force			X	X	X	X	X	X
Ceasefire monitoring	X					X	X	
Civil-military coordination			X	X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Electoral assistance	X	X		X			X	X
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support	X		X	X		X	X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mission impact assessment				X			X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Public information		X		X			X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters		X	X	X	X		X	X
Security monitoring – patrolling – deterrence		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform		X		X			X	X
Support to military				X			X	X
Support to police	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Support to sanctions regimes			X	X		X	X	X
Support to State institutions		X	X	X		X	X	X

^a By resolution [2333 \(2016\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of UNMIL for a final period until 30 March 2018, as set out in the table.

Abbreviations: MINURSO – United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia; UNAMID – African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; MONUSCO – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA – United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS – United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan; MINUSMA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSCA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

Part X – Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: Peacekeeping operations and political and peacebuilding missions
Repertoire website: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/structure>

Table 2
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2018: Americas, Asia, Europe and Middle East

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINUJUSTH</i>	<i>UNMOGIP</i>	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNTSO</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>
Chapter VII	X			X			
Authorization of the use of force	X						X
Civil-military coordination				X			
Ceasefire monitoring		X	X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management							X
Electoral assistance							
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict	X			X			X
Humanitarian support			X	X			X
International cooperation and coordination			X	X			X
Political process	X		X	X			
Protection of civilians	X						X
Protection of humanitarian/UN personnel and facilities/Free movement of personnel and equipment							X
Public information							
Rule of law/judicial matters	X						
Security monitoring-patrolling-deterrence							X
Security sector reform							
Support to military							X
Support to police	X		X	X			
Support to sanctions regimes							
Support to State institutions				X			X

Abbreviations: MINUJUSTH – United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti.; UNMOGIP – United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNTSO – United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNDOF - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

Authorized strength of peacekeeping operations

As illustrated in table 3, during the review period, the Council modified the composition of four peacekeeping operations. The Council decreased the military components of UNAMID and UNISFA. The Council also decreased the police component of MINUJUSTH and increased its size in UNISFA.

Table 3
Changes in composition of peacekeeping operations, 2018

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Changes in composition</i>	<i>Decision</i>
UNAMID	The military component was reduced from 8,735 to up to 4,050 personnel until 30 June 2019	2429 (2018)
UNISFA	The military component was reduced from 4,791 to 4,500 personnel until 15 November 2018	2416 (2018)
	The military component was further reduced from 4,500 to 4,140 personnel until 15 May 2019 and by an additional 295 troops to 3,845 following the commencement of the deployment of increased police personnel	2445 (2018)
	The police component was increased from 50 to 345 personnel, including 185 individual police officers and one formed police unit	
MINUJUSTH	The police component was decreased from seven formed police units (or 980 personnel) and 295 individual police officers to five formed police units and 295 individual police officers from 15 October 2018 to 15 April 2019	2410 (2018)

Abbreviations: UNAMID - African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; UNISFA – United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS – United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan; MINUJUSTH – United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti.

Africa

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by the Security Council on 29 April 1991, by resolution [690 \(1991\)](#), in accordance with the settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente Polisario), with the mandate to monitor the ceasefire, provide security for the repatriation of refugees, and support the organization of a free and fair referendum.²⁴

During 2018, by resolutions [2414 \(2018\)](#) of 27 April 2018 and [2440 \(2018\)](#) of 31 October 2018, the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO twice for periods of six months, departing from the previous practice of one year, the second time until 30 April 2019.²⁵ Both resolutions were adopted with 12 votes in favor and three abstentions.²⁶

The Council did not modify the mandate of MINURSO during the period under review. By resolution [2414 \(2018\)](#), the Council emphasized the need to make progress toward a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution to the question of Western Sahara, based on a

²⁴ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, see previous Supplements.

²⁵ Resolutions [2414 \(2018\)](#), para. 1, and [2440 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

²⁶ China, Ethiopia and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on resolution [2414 \(2018\)](#), expressing concern regarding the conduct of the negotiations process and the non-inclusion of suggested language regarding the political process. See [S/PV.8246](#), p. 3 (Ethiopia), pp. 3-4 (Russian Federation) and p. 6 (China). Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Ethiopia and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on resolution [2440 \(2018\)](#), expressing similar concerns. See [S/PV.8387](#), p. 5 (Russian Federation), pp. 5-6 (Ethiopia) and pp. 8-9 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of)). See also part I, sect. 1, “The situation concerning Western Sahara”.

compromise and the importance of aligning the strategic focus of MINURSO and orienting the resources of the United Nations to this end.²⁷ The Council urged MINURSO to consider how new technologies could be used to reduce risk, improve force protection, and better implement its mandate.²⁸

By resolution [2440 \(2018\)](#), the Council considered the report of the Secretary-General which presented the findings and recommendations of the independent review of MINURSO conducted in 2018 and determined, inter alia, that the Mission performed conflict prevention functions and that there was significant scope for technical improvement in its ability to carry out monitoring and conflict mitigation activities.²⁹

Regarding reporting by the Secretary-General, by resolution [2414 \(2018\)](#), the Council modified the prior practice requesting briefings on the status of the negotiations and MINURSO at least twice a year and requested the Secretary-General to do so on a regular basis and at any time he deemed appropriate.³⁰ By resolution [2440 \(2018\)](#), the Council specified that this should include a briefing within three months of that mandate renewal and again prior to its expiration.³¹

The Council did not modify the composition of MINURSO during the period under review. By [2414 \(2018\)](#), the Secretary-General was requested to seek to increase the number of women in MINURSO, as well as to ensure their meaningful participation in all aspects of operations.³²

²⁷ Resolutions [2414 \(2018\)](#), para. 2.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 16.

²⁹ Resolution [2440 \(2018\)](#), twenty-seventh preambular paragraph. See [S/2018/889](#), paras. 72 to 75.

³⁰ Resolution [2414 \(2018\)](#), para. 14. See resolutions [2285 \(2016\)](#), para. 11 and [2351 \(2017\)](#), para. 10.

³¹ Resolution [2440 \(2018\)](#), para. 11.

³² Resolution [2414 \(2018\)](#), para. 15.

United Nations Mission in Liberia

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, by resolution [1509 \(2003\)](#) of 19 September 2003 to, inter alia, support the implementation of the Liberian ceasefire agreement and the peace process, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment, contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and assist in the security sector reform efforts of the Liberian Government. On 30 March 2018, in accordance with the Mission’s drawdown defined by resolution [2333 \(2016\)](#), UNMIL completed its mandate.³³ In his final progress report on UNMIL of 13 April 2018, the Secretary-General reported on the completion of the drawdown.³⁴

On 19 April 2018, following the completion of the Liberian legislative and presidential elections in 2017, the Council issued a presidential statement commending the assistance of UNMIL to the process and expressing its appreciation for the Mission’s important contribution to promote peace, stability development throughout its more than 14-year operation.³⁵ The Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study of the role of UNMIL in the resolution of conflicts and challenges in Liberia through the contributions of good offices, political mediation, the sanctions regime as well as other relevant factors that allowed for the successful completion of its mandate and transition to the United Nations country team.³⁶

³³ For more information on the history of the mandate, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2003-2015* and for the final drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016-2017*.

³⁴ [S/2018/344](#).

³⁵ [S/PRST/2018/8](#), second and third paragraphs. See part I, sect. 2, “The situation in Liberia”.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

The Security Council established the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) by resolution [1769 \(2007\)](#) of 31 July 2007 and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized UNAMID to take the necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of its own personnel and humanitarian workers.³⁷

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions [2425 \(2018\)](#) of 29 June 2018 and [2429 \(2018\)](#) of 13 July 2018 and issued two presidential statements concerning UNAMID.³⁸ The Council provided for a two-week technical roll-over of the Mission's mandate and subsequently extended it for 11.5 months until 30 June 2019.³⁹

Having welcomed the improvements in the security situation in Darfur and reiterating its concerns regarding the outstanding challenges, particularly those related to the necessary conditions for return of displaced persons, the Council oversaw the completion of the second phase of the reconfiguration of UNAMID commenced in 2017 and authorized a further one in 2018.⁴⁰

In the presidential statement of 31 January 2018, the Council commended UNAMID for the successful conclusion of phase one of the reconfiguration authorized by resolution [2363](#)

³⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, see *Repertoire, 2007-2017*.

³⁸ [S/PRST/2018/4](#) and [S/PRST/2018/19](#).

³⁹ Resolutions [2425 \(2018\)](#), para. 1 (providing for a technical roll-over of the mission's mandate for 14 days until 13 July 2018) and [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 1 (extending the mandate for 11.5 months until 30 June 2019).

⁴⁰ See part I, sect. 10, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

[\(2017\)](#).⁴¹ The Council requested UNAMID and the United Nations country team to closely monitor the impact of the reconfiguration on the situation on the ground and to report any adverse effects to the Council in a timely manner.⁴² The Council also expressed support for the recommendation by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General further to their joint assessment to conduct a further review of UNAMID to consider a new mission concept with adjusted priorities.⁴³

On 13 July 2018, by resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), the Council took note of the special report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and its recommendations regarding a new mission concept for UNAMID and a transition concept in collaboration with the United Nations country team over a two-year timeframe with a view towards the exit of UNAMID on 30 June 2020, provided that there was no significant change in the security situation and that key indicators were fulfilled.⁴⁴ The resolution requested the Mission to consolidate a “whole-of-system” approach to Darfur focused on peacekeeping and providing sustainable solutions to the drivers of conflict with the Mission’s current “two-pronged” approach, in order to prevent relapse and enable the Government of the Sudan, the United Nations country team, civil society, and international actors to prepare for its eventual exit.⁴⁵

Further to the recommendations of the strategic review, the Council redefined the strategic priorities of UNAMID to include: (a) the protection of civilians, monitoring and reporting on human rights, sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations against children, the

⁴¹ [S/PRST/2018/4](#), fifth paragraph.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., tenth paragraph.

⁴⁴ Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 2. See [S/2018/530](#).

⁴⁵ Ibid., para. 3.

facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; (b) mediation between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur; and (c) support for the mediation of inter-communal or other local conflict that could undermine the security situation, including through measures to address its root causes, in conjunction with the Government, the United Nations country team and civil society.⁴⁶

In pursuit of the priorities, the Council decided that UNAMID would retain its existing mandate tasks as outlined in resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#) and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, reauthorized it to take the necessary action to implement the tasks enumerated in paragraph 15(a) of resolution [1769 \(2007\)](#), including, inter alia, the protection of civilians, its personnel and equipment and ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers. The Council urged UNAMID to deter any threats against itself and its mandate.⁴⁷ The Council also refocused the Mission's mandate related to the work of its police component and added additional tasks.

Specifically, the resolution provided that the police component would focus its activities on supporting physical protection and facilitating humanitarian assistance, creating a protective environment by coordinating development and training of Government police, and conducting community-oriented policing initiatives, in conjunction with the United Nations country team, including on sexual and gender-based violence and child protection and pursued through engagement in the state liaison offices and Khartoum level.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Ibid., para. 11.

⁴⁷ Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), paras. 15 and 16. See resolutions [1769 \(2007\)](#), paras. 15(a)(i) and (ii) and [2363 \(2017\)](#), para. 15.

⁴⁸ Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 19.

In terms of additional tasks, UNAMID was requested to ensure that the necessary gender analysis and expertise was included throughout all stages of mission planning, mandate development, implementation, review and drawdown.⁴⁹ The Mission was further requested to take the necessary steps to conduct investigations of sexual exploitation and abuse as expeditiously as possible and to closely support and monitor the commitment of the parties to combat sexual violence, in accordance with resolution [2106 \(2013\)](#), including through Women Protection Advisors.⁵⁰ In connection with the Mission's exit from Darfur, the resolution called upon UNAMID to work closely with the United Nations country team to identify ways to address gaps in capabilities and to coordinate in the transfer of their responsibilities.⁵¹ As part of this transition, and specifically in the context of mine clearance, UNAMID was also requested to cooperate with the Government, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).⁵²

In accordance with the recommendations of the strategic review, by resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), the Council decreased the authorized troop ceiling of UNAMID from 8,735 to up to 4,050 personnel during the course of the current mandate unless the Council decided to adjust the scope and pace of the reduction.⁵³ The Council also decided to maintain police levels not exceeding 2,500 personnel, including individual police officers and members of formed police units.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Ibid., para. 27.

⁵⁰ Ibid., paras. 35 and 36.

⁵¹ Ibid., para. 55.

⁵² Ibid., para. 49.

⁵³ Ibid., para. 5.

⁵⁴ Ibid., para. 6.

Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General and the Chairperson, in consultation with UNAMID, to provide through a strategic review by 1 May 2019, inter alia, an assessment of progress and impact of the reconfiguration.⁵⁵ The Secretary-General was also requested to provide a clearly benchmarked exit strategy for UNAMID.⁵⁶ In the presidential statement of 11 December 2018, the Council took note of the report of the Secretary-General of 12 October 2018,⁵⁷ including the proposed benchmarks and indicators of achievement and acknowledged the progress towards their achievement would contribute towards the successful transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur.⁵⁸ In this regard, the Council requested UNAMID and the United Nations country team to ensure robust monitoring of progress against the benchmarks and encouraged them to ensure that their integrated transition activities support efforts to make progress against the benchmarks and with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the Government of the Sudan's development plans.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Ibid., para. 7 (i) to (vi).

⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 53.

⁵⁷ [S/2018/912](#).

⁵⁸ [S/PRST/2018/19](#), sixth paragraph.

⁵⁹ Ibid., seventh and eleventh paragraphs.

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was established by the Security Council on 28 May 2010 by resolution [1925 \(2010\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter, to succeed the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁶⁰ MONUSCO was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection mandate, as set out in the resolution and tasked with, inter alia, ensuring the effective protection of civilians and supporting Government stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.

During 2018, by resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#) of 27 March 2018, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO, consistent with previous practice, for a period of one year until 31 March 2019.⁶¹

By the same resolution, against the backdrop of the presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections scheduled for December 2018, the Council took note of the strategic review presented by the Secretary-General and endorsed its recommendations relating to the proposed adjustments of MONUSCO in the pre-election phase.⁶² In accordance with the recommendations, the Council reiterated the Mission's strategic priorities as defined by resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), namely, to protect civilians, and to support the implementation of the 31 December 2016 Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement and the electoral process.⁶³ The Council stressed that the mandate of MONUSCO should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks.⁶⁴ Within the framework of the strategic priorities, the Council reiterated the Mission's existing priority tasks related to the protection of civilians, supporting the implementation of the 31 December 2016 Agreement and the protection of United Nations personnel and equipment, and further elaborated some elements in this regard.⁶⁵

In connection with the protection of civilians, the resolution requested MONUSCO to undertake a comprehensive approach to physical protection adding, besides existing tasks, the

⁶⁰ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2010-2017*.

⁶¹ Resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), para. 29.

⁶² *Ibid.*, para. 57. See [S/2017/826](#). See also part I, sect. 6, "The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo".

⁶³ Resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), paras. 31(a) and (b).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 32.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 36(i)-(iii).

protection of peaceful demonstrators and a focus on violence between ethnic or religious rival groups or communities in identified territories.⁶⁶ The Council requested MONUSCO to continue to strengthen local community engagement and empowerment, as well as to bolster its protection mandate through early warning and response, including prevention, and by ensuring the mobility of the Mission.⁶⁷ The Council also requested the Mission to continue to ensure the effectiveness of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict.⁶⁸

The Council broadened the authorization to the Intervention Brigade to neutralize armed groups in the eastern side of the country to include the whole of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and specified that it would fall under the direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander.⁶⁹ The resolution further called on MONUSCO to streamline overall command and control of the Force, in order to increase efficiencies and improve coordination with the police component.⁷⁰ MONUSCO was also requested to leverage United Nations police investigation capacities and expertise as part of its tasks to arrest and bring to justice those allegedly responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and violations or abuses of human rights.⁷¹

With respect to the second strategic priority, the Council strengthened the Mission's role in supporting the implementation of the 31 December 2016 Agreement and the electoral process by tasking MONUSCO to provide good offices and engage with interlocutors across the political spectrum and to use an integrated approach throughout the United Nations making full use of the existing capacities of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes, the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA).⁷² Additionally, MONUSCO was tasked with providing elections security-related expertise and advice to the Congolese National Police in order to coordinate planning and security.⁷³

Beyond the strategic priority tasks, the Council re-authorized MONUSCO to pursue its existing tasks relating to supporting the sanctions regime and Group of Experts established by

⁶⁶ Ibid., para. 36 (i)(a).

⁶⁷ Ibid., para. 36 (i)(c).

⁶⁸ Ibid., para. 36 (i)(b).

⁶⁹ Ibid., para. 36 (i)(d).

⁷⁰ Ibid., para. 50.

⁷¹ Ibid., para. 36 (i)(f).

⁷² Ibid., para. 36 (ii)(a).

⁷³ Ibid., para. 36 (ii) (c).

resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#),⁷⁴ and added new language on tasks relating to stabilization and demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration,⁷⁵ encouraging an inclusive security sector reform with a focus on women, children and vulnerable persons,⁷⁶ support for joint army operations in compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy,⁷⁷ and the provision of gender and women protection advisers as part of support to stabilization efforts.⁷⁸

MONUSCO was further requested to strengthen its collaboration with humanitarian actors and streamline coordination mechanisms with humanitarian agencies to ensure information sharing on protection risks to the population.⁷⁹ Lastly, the Council requested that mechanisms for intra-mission coordination be strengthened to enable “whole-of-mission” efforts, particularly on priority issues such as the protection of civilians, and encouraged MONUSCO and the United Nations system in-country to strengthen integration through, inter alia, shared information and joint operational activities based on coordinated knowledge management.⁸⁰

The Council did not modify the composition of MONUSCO during the reporting period. Further to resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#),⁸¹ by a letter dated 18 July 2018, the Secretary-General provided the Council with options for a temporary reinforcement of MONUSCO in the event of the deterioration of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the run-up and aftermath of the elections.⁸²

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 37(iii). For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#), see part IX, sect. I; for information on sanctions measures, see part VII, sect. III.

⁷⁵ Resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), paras. 37(i)(c) and (d).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 37(ii)(b).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 37(ii)(c).

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 39.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 44.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 47.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 55.

⁸² [S/2018/727](#), paras. 15 and 16.

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

The Security Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by resolution [1990 \(2011\)](#) of 27 June 2011, taking into account the Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area of 20 June 2011. The Council mandated UNISFA to, inter alia, monitor and verify the redeployment of any Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei Area, participate in relevant bodies as stipulated in the Agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized UNISFA to take the actions necessary, inter alia, to protect United Nations and humanitarian personnel and property, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and ensure security in the Area. By resolution [2024 \(2011\)](#) of 14 December 2011, the Council expanded the mandate of UNISFA to include assisting the Sudan and South Sudan in ensuring the observance of their agreement on border security and supporting the operational activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.⁸³

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions [2411 \(2018\)](#) of 13 April 2018, [2412 \(2018\)](#) of 23 April 2018, [2416 \(2018\)](#) of 15 May 2018, [2429 \(2018\)](#) of 13 July 2018, [2438 \(2018\)](#) of 11 October 2018 and [2445 \(2018\)](#) of 15 November 2018 concerning UNISFA. The Council extended the mandates of UNISFA in support of the border security agreement and in the Abyei Area twice for periods of six months each, the second time until 15 April and 15 May 2019, respectively.⁸⁴ The Council also authorized a technical roll-over of the border security agreement mandate for a period of ten days.⁸⁵

While largely maintaining the mandate of UNISFA during the period of under review, the Council drew attention to specific aspects of it. In connection with the UNISFA mandate to support the border security agreement, by resolution [2412 \(2018\)](#), the Council decided that the mission's support to the Border Mechanism would remain conditioned on the ability of the

⁸³ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, see previous Supplements.

⁸⁴ Resolutions [2412 \(2018\)](#), para. 1 and [2438 \(2018\)](#), para. 1 (extending the mandate in support of the border security agreement); and [2416 \(2018\)](#), para. 1 and [2445 \(2018\)](#), para. 1 (extending the mandate in the Abyei Area).

⁸⁵ Resolution [2411 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

Sudan and South Sudan to demonstrate measurable progress on several conditions, including, inter alia, maintaining standing clearance for the mission's air and ground patrols, operationalizing four Border Mechanism team sites, convening the Joint Political and Security Mechanism and withdrawing from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, making progress in the opening of additional border crossings and in border demarcation.⁸⁶ Similarly, by resolution [2438 \(2018\)](#), the Council updated the set of conditions in this regard.⁸⁷

In relation to the Abyei Area and in the context of UNISFA's efforts to strengthen the Community Protection Committees, by resolution [2416 \(2018\)](#), the Council highlighted the need for the mission to ensure the humane and dignified treatment of suspects and other detainees.⁸⁸ Furthermore, in reiterating its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that human rights monitoring is carried out in Abyei, the Council added that such monitoring should include any sexual and gender-based violence and violations of human rights committed against women and children.⁸⁹ The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report no later than 15 August 2018 on detailed recommendations on the reconfiguration of UNISFA mandate in order to create the space for a viable political process that would also serve as an exit strategy.⁹⁰ In relation to the mission's cooperation with other United Nations entities, by resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), the Council reiterated its request for close cooperation between UNISFA, UNAMID, UNMISS, MINUSCA and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).⁹¹ By resolution [2445 \(2018\)](#), the Council emphasized the change in threat in the Abyei Area as characterized by the letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council of 20 August 2018.⁹² As in previous decisions, the Council again underscored that "all necessary means" included the use of force when required, in order to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.⁹³ In the context of the engagement of UNISFA with the local communities, the Council invited the mission to coordinate with the Juba-appointed administration in Abyei and the Misseriya administration in Muglad, using appropriate civilian

⁸⁶ Ibid., para. 3.

⁸⁷ Resolution [2438 \(2018\)](#), para. 3.

⁸⁸ Resolution [2416 \(2018\)](#), para. 18.

⁸⁹ Ibid., para. 26.

⁹⁰ Ibid., para. 33.

⁹¹ Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 28.

⁹² Resolution [2445 \(2018\)](#), eighth preambular paragraph. See [S/2018/778](#). For further information, see part I, sect. 10, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

⁹³ Ibid., para. 11.

expertise, to maintain stability, foster inter-communal reconciliation, and facilitate the return of displaced persons and the delivery of services.⁹⁴

The Council twice reduced the authorized troop ceiling of UNISFA in 2018. By resolution [2416 \(2018\)](#), the Council decreased troops from 4,791 to 4,500 until 15 November 2018.⁹⁵ Further, by resolution [2445 \(2018\)](#), the Council reduced the authorized troop ceiling further to 4,140 until 15 May 2019 and decided to reduce it by another 295 troops following the commencement of the deployment of increased police personnel.⁹⁶ The Council increased the authorized police ceiling from 50 to 345 personnel, including 185 individual police officers and one formed police unit, and expressed its intention to reduce the police ceiling as the Abyei Police Service is gradually established and effectively providing rule of law throughout Abyei.⁹⁷

Furthermore, depending on the parties ability to fulfil the conditions set by the Council in relation to the Border Mechanism and the border, by resolutions [2412 \(2018\)](#) and [2438 \(2018\)](#), the Council reiterated its intention to further reduce the authorized ceiling by another 541 troops unless the mandate of UNISFA to support the Mechanism was extended beyond 15 October 2018 and 15 April 2019, respectively.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Ibid., para. 16.

⁹⁵ Resolution [2416 \(2018\)](#), para. 3.

⁹⁶ Resolution [2445 \(2018\)](#), para. 2.

⁹⁷ Resolution [2445 \(2018\)](#), para. 4.

⁹⁸ Resolutions [2412 \(2018\)](#), para. 2 and [2438 \(2018\)](#), para. 2.

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

By resolution [1996 \(2011\)](#) of 8 July 2011, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with a mandate to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term State-building and economic development; support the Government of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and to protect civilians; and support the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations country team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish the rule of law and to strengthen the security and justice sectors. UNMISS was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection of civilians mandate.⁹⁹

During the period under review, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2406 \(2018\)](#) of 15 March 2018, [2428 \(2018\)](#) and [2429 \(2018\)](#) of 13 July 2018 concerning UNMISS. The Council extended the mandate of the Mission for a period of one year until 15 March 2019.¹⁰⁰

By resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), in the context of continued fighting across the country and the lack of progress in the implementation of the 2015 Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, the Council took note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General, based on the independent review of UNMISS, on how to adapt the Mission to the situation on the ground and to increase its efficiency, as requested by the Council in resolutions [2304 \(2016\)](#) and [2327 \(2016\)](#).¹⁰¹ The Council reiterated the Mission's mandate to protect civilians, create the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, monitor and investigate human rights, and support the implementation of the 2015 Agreement.¹⁰² The Council further re-authorized UNMISS to use all necessary means to implement its mandate.¹⁰³

In accordance with the strategic review recommendations and within the framework of the priorities, the Council made several modifications to the mandate tasks of UNMISS to

⁹⁹ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2010-2017*.

¹⁰⁰ Resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), para. 5. See part I, sect. 10, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

¹⁰¹ Resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), thirty-first preambular paragraph. See [S/2018/143](#).

¹⁰² Resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), paras. 7(a)-(d).

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, paras. 7 and 12.

protect civilians and to support the political process. The Mission's cooperation with South Sudanese police services, security and government institutions, and civil society actors in relevant protection-focused activities, would specifically focus on sensitization on sexual and gender-based violence and children and armed conflict as well as technical assistance or advice on international humanitarian law, investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence, as well as other serious human rights violations.¹⁰⁴

On the political process, the Council requested UNMISS to use its good offices to support the peace process, in particular the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) High-Level Revitalization Forum for the 2015 Agreement, and further elaborated that the Mission's support to the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism should include the monitoring and reporting of violations and overall effectiveness in identifying those responsible.¹⁰⁵ The Council further removed the previous tasks of UNMISS related to the planning and establishment of transitional security arrangements, support for the constitution-making process, the development of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy and security sector reform activities, to advise and assist the National Elections Commission and support the establishment and operationalization of the Joint Integrated Police.¹⁰⁶

The resolution provided that UNMISS would continue to include a Regional Protection Force, reiterated its existing tasks and expanded its responsibility to provide a secure environment in and around Juba to other parts of South Sudan as necessary while reiterating its authorization to use all necessary means to accomplish its mandate.¹⁰⁷ The Council also reiterated the Mission's other existing tasks related to international coordination on the peace process,¹⁰⁸ gender mainstreaming,¹⁰⁹ protection of civilians and security monitoring,¹¹⁰ support to security forces,¹¹¹ and to ensure the security of its own air operations.¹¹²

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., para. 7(a)(vii).

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., paras. 7(d)(i) and (ii).

¹⁰⁶ See resolution [2327 \(2016\)](#), paras. 7(d)(i)-(iv), (vii) and (viii).

¹⁰⁷ Resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), para. 9.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., para. 13.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., para. 14.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., para. 15.

¹¹¹ Ibid., para. 18.

¹¹² Ibid., para. 22.

While maintaining the Mission's existing troop and police levels, the Council took note of the Secretary-General's intention to conduct a military and police capability study, noting in particular the relevance of reviewing the current model for providing security to the protection of civilians sites, and expressed its intention to consider making the necessary adjustments on this basis including with respect to the Regional Protection Force.¹¹³

Finally, by resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Council reiterated the mandate of UNMISS to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts established by resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#)¹¹⁴ and encouraged the timely exchange of information between them.¹¹⁵ By resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), the Council reiterated its request for close coordination between UNMISS, UNAMID, UNISFA, MINUSCA and UNSMIL.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Ibid., para. 6. For more information about the composition of UNMISS prior to the reporting period, see *Repertoire Supplements 2010-2017*.

¹¹⁴ Resolution [2406 \(2018\)](#), para. 19.

¹¹⁵ Resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), para. 24. For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), see part IX, sects. I and III.

¹¹⁶ Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 28.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

The Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by resolution [2100 \(2013\)](#) of 25 April 2013, under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSMA was authorized to use all necessary means to stabilize population centers and support the re-establishment of State authority, support the implementation of a transitional road map, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property, assist the Malian authorities in promoting and protecting human rights, support humanitarian assistance and national and international justice, and support cultural preservation.¹¹⁷

During 2018, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2423 \(2018\)](#) of 28 June 2018 and [2432 \(2018\)](#) of 30 August 2018 concerning MINUSMA. As per previous practice, the Council extended the mandate of MINUSMA for one year until 30 June 2019.¹¹⁸

In the context of delays in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015, deteriorating security and humanitarian situations, particularly in the centre of the country, and preparations for the presidential elections scheduled for July and August 2018, the Council revisited the mandate of MINUSMA further to the outcome the independent strategic review conducted in the first half of 2018.¹¹⁹ By resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), MINUSMA retained the strategic priority to support the implementation of the 2015 Agreement,

¹¹⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2012-2017*.

¹¹⁸ Resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 24.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, thirty-seventh preambular paragraph. See report of the Secretary-General of 6 June 2018 ([S/2018/541](#)) building on the findings and recommendations of the independent strategic review. See also part I, sect. 14, “The situation in Mali”.

with a new focus on the definition of institutional architecture, the reform of the security sector and national reconciliation measures.¹²⁰ The Council requested MINUSMA to reprioritize its resources and efforts to focus on political tasks and reiterated that the Mission's mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks.¹²¹ The Council re-authorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate,¹²² and reiterated its request for the Mission to continue to carry out its mandate with a proactive and robust posture,¹²³ to anticipate, deter and respond to threats against civilians¹²⁴ and to protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment.¹²⁵

The Council reiterated existing priority tasks of MINUSMA and further elaborated on some of their elements.¹²⁶ In addition, the Council also defined, as a new priority task, MINUSMA's support to the restoration of State authority in the centre of the country through logistical and operational support of the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF).¹²⁷

Regarding the 2015 Agreement, the Council specified that the Mission's support, monitoring and supervision of the ceasefire would include the continued implementation of control measures on the movement and armament of signatory armed groups.¹²⁸ The Council refocused the operational and logistical support of MINUSMA to the redeployment of the MDSF under this

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 26.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 26 and 27.

¹²² *Ibid.*, para. 32.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, para. 33.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 34.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 35.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 38(a) and (c)-(f) .

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 38 (b).

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 38(a)(ii).

priority to the North of Mali.¹²⁹ The resolution specified that MINUSMA’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration work with armed groups would include a community violence reduction program.¹³⁰ The Mission’s tasks in support for the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures in the Agreement were modified to include supporting the operations of the International Commission of Inquiry, the work of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the effectiveness of justice and corrections officials in the North and Centre of the country and associated interim authorities, as well as providing support to Malian judicial institutions.¹³¹ Stressing the need for the upcoming elections in 2018 to be inclusive, free, fair, transparent, credible and peaceful, the Council requested the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali to use his good offices to support their preparation, conduct and conclusion.¹³²

The Council elaborated upon the mandate of MINUSMA to protect civilians under threat of physical violence, noting that such tasks would include public information, community outreach, dialogue and direct engagement.¹³³ The Council specified that, while MINUSMA should continue to take “robust and active steps” to protect civilians, the Mission’s activities aimed at stabilizing key population centers and other areas where civilians were at risk, notably in the centre and north of Mali, should also focus on mitigating the risk to civilians before, during and after

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid., para. 38(a)(iii). See letter dated 19 January 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/57](#)). For more information on the Commission of Inquiry, see part VI, sect. II, “Investigation of disputes and fact-finding.”

¹³² Resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), paras. 19 and 22.

¹³³ Ibid., para. 38(d)(i).

military operations, as well as on enhancing early warning and documentation of the impact of conflict and violence on civilians, and strengthening community engagement and protection mechanisms.¹³⁴

The Council also reiterated as “other tasks” the existing work of MINUSMA on supporting stabilization projects, weapons and ammunition management, and cooperation with the Sanctions Committee and the Panel of Experts established by resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#),¹³⁵ and excluded the task to support cultural preservation.¹³⁶ Furthermore, while reiterating its request to MINUSMA to improve operational, planning and intelligence coordination between its civil, military and police components, the Council specified that this should include the establishment of intra-Mission dedicated coordination mechanisms.¹³⁷ MINUSMA was also mandated, in coordination with relevant partners, including the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), to enhance its awareness of the financial sources of conflicts in Mali and of its implications for regional security.¹³⁸

Reiterating its request to the Secretary-General to ensure adequate cooperation and coordination and, when applicable, support, between MINUSMA, MDSF, the Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel, the French Forces and the European Union missions in Mali, the Council further requested the Mission to strengthen its communications towards all Malian

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 38(d)(ii).

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 39(a) to (c). For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), see part IX, sect. I and part VII, sect. III.

¹³⁶ Resolution [2364 \(2017\)](#), para. 22(c).

¹³⁷ Resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 28.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 31.

stakeholders and towards local populations, with the objective of enhancing awareness and understanding about the nature, impact and specificities of its mandate and activities.¹³⁹ With respect to the Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel, the Mission was requested to ensure that its support was provided in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (HRDDP).¹⁴⁰ The resolution also urged both the Mission and the Government to redouble their efforts towards ensuring the implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding on support to the redeployment of the MDSF.¹⁴¹ Finally, while taking note of the report on “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers”, the Council welcomed the action plan developed by MINUSMA to improve the security of its personnel and encouraged its swift and continued implementation.¹⁴²

By resolution [2432 \(2018\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the task of MINUSMA to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#).¹⁴³

The Council did not make any changes to the configuration of MINUSMA during the reporting period.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Ibid., para. 41.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., para. 52.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., para. 46.

¹⁴² Ibid., para. 59.

¹⁴³ Resolution [2432 \(2018\)](#), para. 3.

¹⁴⁴ For more information about the composition of MINUSMA prior to the reporting period, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2012-2017*.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was established by the Security Council on 10 April 2014 by resolution [2149 \(2014\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSCA was authorized to take all necessary means to, inter alia, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property; support the implementation of the transition process; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; support justice and the rule of law; and support the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation strategies.¹⁴⁵

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions [2429 \(2018\)](#) of 13 July 2018, [2446 \(2018\)](#) of 15 November 2018 and [2448 \(2018\)](#) of 13 December 2018 concerning MINUSCA. By resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), the Council reiterated its request for close coordination among missions in the region, namely MINUSCA, UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMISS and UNSMIL.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the Council authorized a one-month technical rollover of the Mission's mandate by resolution [2446 \(2018\)](#),¹⁴⁷ and subsequently extended it for a period of 11 months until 15 November 2019 by resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#).¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2014-2017*.

¹⁴⁶ Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 28.

¹⁴⁷ Resolution [2446 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁴⁸ Resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), para. 34. China and the Russian Federation abstained in the voting of this resolution. In their statements after the vote, the Russian Federation expressed concern regarding the conduct of the negotiations processes on the draft resolution, while China underlined the need to recognize the efforts of the relevant parties in the international community to achieve peace in the Central African Republic ([S/PV.8422](#), pp. 4-6 (Russian Federation) and p. 6 (China)). See also part I, sect. 7, "The situation in the Central African Republic".

By resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), taking note of the report of the Secretary-General which built on the findings and recommendations of the independent strategic review of the Mission conducted between June and September of 2018,¹⁴⁹ acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the Mission’s existing strategic objective to support the creation of the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to the sustainable reduction of armed groups through a comprehensive approach and proactive and robust posture.¹⁵⁰ The Council further recalled that the mandate of MINUSCA should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks and in a phased manner,¹⁵¹ and re-authorized the Mission to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate.¹⁵²

The Council reiterated the mission’s existing “priority tasks”, namely the protection of civilians, the provision of good offices and support to the peace process, to facilitate the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the protection of United Nations personnel and property, and made several modifications within this framework.¹⁵³ As part of its task to anticipate, deter and effectively respond to threats to civilians through a comprehensive approach, the Mission was requested to enhance its interaction with civilians, strengthen its early warning mechanism and increase its efforts to monitor and document human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and to strengthen local community engagement and empowerment.¹⁵⁴ MINUSCA was further requested to mitigate risk to civilians in military or police operations and to work with the authorities in the Central African Republic to

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., thirty-fourth preambular paragraph.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 36.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., para. 37.

¹⁵² Ibid., para. 38.

¹⁵³ Ibid., para. 39.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., para. 39(a)(ii).

identify and report threats and attacks against civilians and implement existing prevention and response plans and strengthen civil-military cooperation, including joint planning.¹⁵⁵ Reiterating that the Mission should fully implement its new protection of civilians strategy adopted in April 2018, the resolution also tasked MINUSCA to develop a comprehensive protection of civilians strategy involving national authorities and the United Nations country team “in coherence with its political strategy”.¹⁵⁶

MINUSCA was mandated to reinforce its role in the peace process through its participation in the African Initiative and the participation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic in the Panel of Facilitators, and a stronger convening and coordinating role of international support to the African Initiative.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, MINUSCA was requested to collaborate with the African Initiative to ensure that its political and security strategies promote a more coherent peace process that connects local and national peace efforts with ongoing efforts to advance disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, the fight against impunity, and the restoration of State authority, and that the efforts of the African Initiative are informed by political, security, human rights, humanitarian and protection developments.¹⁵⁸ Taking note of the upcoming presidential, legislative and local elections in 2020 and 2021,¹⁵⁹ the Council also mandated MINUSCA to provide good offices and technical expertise in support of an inclusive and transparent electoral process as a full part of the political process.¹⁶⁰ The

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., paras. 39(a)(iv).

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 39(b)(i).

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., para. 39(b)(ii).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., fourteenth preambular paragraph.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 39(b)(iv).

Mission's assistance to the authorities to ensure an inclusive peace process was broadened to include youth and internally displaced persons and refugees.¹⁶¹ The Council also specified that the technical assistance of MINUSCA to the Government in its regional engagement should particularly include assessment of opportunities to resolve issues of common bilateral interest, in order to improve the anticipation and prevention of possible risks to regional stability.¹⁶²

The Council also reiterated the Mission's remaining tasks related to support for the extension of State authority, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation, the promotion and protection of human rights, and support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity and the rule of law, and further made modifications to some of them.¹⁶³ Specifically, the Council elaborated upon the task of MINUSCA to support the deployment of security forces to include the provision of enhanced planning and technical assistance to the national military and police forces,¹⁶⁴ and limited logistical support for their redeployment in accordance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), without exacerbating the risks to the stabilization of the country, civilians, the political process, United Nations peacekeepers, or the impartiality of the Mission.¹⁶⁵ Under the Mission's task to provide strategic and technical advice to the authorities of the Central African Republic to implement the national strategy on security sector reform, MINUSCA was requested to coordinate closely with the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA),

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, para. 39(b)(iii).

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, para. 39(b)(vi).

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, paras. 40(a) to (e).

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 40(a)(iv).

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 40(a)(v) .

as well as with other international partners, including France, the Russian Federation and the United States.¹⁶⁶

Reiterating the additional role of MINUSCA in support of the Committee and Panel of Experts established by resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#), the Council added that the Mission should support the latter in collecting information about acts of incitement to violence, in particular on an ethnic or religious basis, that undermine the peace, stability or security of the country.¹⁶⁷ Finally, the Council also reiterated the remaining existing tasks of MINUSCA relating to managing environmental impact of its operations, child protection, gender mainstreaming, and weapons and ammunition management.¹⁶⁸

The Council also decided to maintain the existing military and police configuration of MINUSCA.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., para. 40(b)(i). For information on the mandate of the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic, see part VIII, sect. III.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., para. 41(d). For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#), see part IX, sect. I.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., paras. 54 and 56 to 61.

¹⁶⁹ Resolution [2448 \(2018\)](#), para. 35. For more information about the composition of MINUSCA prior to the reporting period, see *Repertoire Supplements 2014-2017*.

Americas

United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

The Security Council established the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, by resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#) of 13 April 2017, subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). MINUJUSTH was mandated to assist the Government of Haiti in strengthening rule of law institutions, supporting and developing the Haitian National Police, and engaging in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis. The Mission was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate in support of the Haitian National Police and in protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.¹⁷⁰

During 2018, by resolution [2410 \(2018\)](#) of 10 April 2018, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of MINUJUSTH for a period of one year until 15 April 2019.¹⁷¹ The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favor and two abstentions.¹⁷²

The Council reiterated the existing mandate of MINUJUSTH.¹⁷³ The authorization to MINUJUSTH to use all necessary means was also renewed to carry out its mandate to support and develop of the Haitian National Police .¹⁷⁴ The Council further authorized MINUJUSTH to protect

¹⁷⁰ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016-2017*.

¹⁷¹ Resolution [2410 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁷² China and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution. In their statements after the vote, China stated that the mandate of MINUJUSTH should focus on helping Haiti address peace and security challenges, rather than human rights, while the Russian Federation questioned the adoption of the draft resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter (see [S/PV.8226](#), p. 2-3 (Russian Federation) and p. 4 (China)). See also part I, sect. 15, “The question concerning Haiti”.

¹⁷³ Resolution [2410 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 14. See also resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#), paras. 12 and 13.

civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, as needed.¹⁷⁵

The Council further elaborated upon the Mission's human rights and rule of law mandates. Underscoring the respect for human rights by the Haitian National Police and the judiciary as essential elements of stability in Haiti, the Council called on MINUJUSTH to provide monitoring and support in this regard.¹⁷⁶ The resolution further specified that the good offices role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti should include close coordination with the Government for the development of a political strategy aimed at addressing political challenges to progress towards the rule of law and creating momentum for systematic progress.¹⁷⁷

In terms of the Mission's configuration, the Council decided to maintain seven formed police units and 295 individual police officers until 15 October 2018 and to decrease the police component to five formed police units between that date and 15 April 2019.¹⁷⁸

Welcoming the benchmarked exit strategy submitted by the Secretary-General further to resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#),¹⁷⁹ the Council requested him to also develop specific dates and indicators for the achievement of the benchmarks, with the goal of transitioning tasks to the Government, in coordination with the United Nations country team and to report to the Council in this regard.¹⁸⁰ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic assessment mission to Haiti by 1 February 2019 and, on this basis, to present to the Council recommendations on the

¹⁷⁵ Resolution [2410 \(2018\)](#), para. 15.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 11.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 12.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, fifteenth preambular paragraph.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 5 and 6.

future United Nations role in Haiti, including any recommendations for drawdown and exit.¹⁸¹ The Council affirmed its intention to consider the withdrawal of MINUJUSTH and transition to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence in Haiti beginning no sooner than 15 October 2019, taking into account the security conditions on the ground and Haiti's overall capacity to ensure stability.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, para. 10.

Asia

United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan

The Security Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) by resolution [47 \(1948\)](#) of 21 April 1948. The first team of military observers, who eventually formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP, was deployed in January 1949 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan established by resolution [39 \(1948\)](#). Following the termination of the Commission, by resolution [91 \(1951\)](#), the Council decided that UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the renewed hostilities in 1971, the task of UNMOGIP has been to monitor developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. During 2018, the Council did not discuss UNMOGIP or make changes to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.¹⁸³

¹⁸³ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, see *Repertoire 1946-1951* and *Repertoire, Supplements 1952-2017*.

Europe

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The Security Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by resolution [186 \(1964\)](#) of 4 March 1964. UNFICYP was mandated to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.¹⁸⁴

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions [2398 \(2018\)](#) of 30 January 2018 and [2430 \(2018\)](#) of 26 July 2018 concerning UNFICYP. In accordance with previous practice, the Council extended the mandate of the mission twice for periods of six months, the second time until 31 January 2019.¹⁸⁵

The Council did not modify the mandate of UNFICYP during the period under review. By resolution [2398 \(2018\)](#), the Council welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of UNFICYP, and endorsed its recommendations.¹⁸⁶ Accordingly, the Council expressed support for the need to improve the mission's capacity for liaison and engagement with the sides across all components, including people to people contacts, to keep stability and calm, and thereby contribute effectively to conditions conducive to progress in a settlement process.¹⁸⁷

The Council also endorsed the recommendation of the Secretary-General to reduce to the mission's actual strength from 888 to 802 military personnel, while maintaining an authorized strength of 860.¹⁸⁸ By resolution [2430 \(2018\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to increase the number of women in UNFICYP and to ensure their meaningful participation in all aspects of operations.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁴ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, see *see Repertoire, Supplements 1964-2017*.

¹⁸⁵ Resolutions [2398 \(2018\)](#), para. 9 and [2430 \(2018\)](#), para. 11. See also part I, sect. 19 "The situation in Cyprus".

¹⁸⁶ Resolution [2398 \(2018\)](#), para. 10. See also [S/2017/1008](#), para. 57.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 11.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 10. See also [S/2017/1008](#), para. 51.

¹⁸⁹ Resolution [2430 \(2018\)](#), para. 12.

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the Security Council on 10 June 1999, by resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council mandated UNMIK to carry out a range of tasks, including promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions, and organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.¹⁹⁰ During 2018, the Council did not adopt any decision relating to UNMIK and made no change to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, see *Repertoire, Supplements 1996-2017*.

¹⁹¹ See part I, sect. 20 B. “Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)”.

Middle East

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Security Council on 29 May 1948, by resolution [50 \(1948\)](#), to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine, following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. UNTSO military observers have since remained in the Middle East and have continued to assist and cooperate with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, in monitoring ceasefires and supervising armistice agreements.¹⁹² During 2018, the Council did not adopt any decisions concerning UNTSO or make changes to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.

¹⁹² For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, see *Repertoire 1946-1951* and *Repertoire, Supplements 1952-2017*.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Security Council on 31 May 1974, by resolution [350 \(1974\)](#), following the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, and to supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement and the areas of separation and limitation.¹⁹³

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions [2426 \(2018\)](#) of 29 June 2018 and [2450 \(2018\)](#) of 21 December 2018 concerning UNDOF. Consistent with prior practice, the Council extended the mandate of the mission twice for a period of six months, the second time until 30 June 2019.¹⁹⁴ The Council made no changes to the mandate or composition of UNDOF during the reporting period.

¹⁹³ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, see *Repertoire, Supplements 1972-2017*.

¹⁹⁴ Resolutions [2426 \(2018\)](#), para. 12 and [2450 \(2018\)](#), para. 13.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Security Council on 19 March 1978, by resolutions [425 \(1978\)](#) and [426 \(1978\)](#) to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.¹⁹⁵

By resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#) of 30 August 2018, the Council extended the mandate of UNIFIL once for a period of one year until 31 August 2019.¹⁹⁶ The resolution was adopted further to the letter of the Secretary-General of 31 July 2018 on the renewal of the mandate of the mission.¹⁹⁷

The resolution stressed the need to improve the management of the mission's civilian resources, including through fostering enhanced cooperation with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) with the goal of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of both missions. In this regard, the resolution requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the matter by 31 December 2018.¹⁹⁸

Whilst reiterating language used in prior resolutions with regard to some core aspects of UNIFIL's mandate such as security monitoring and patrolling and the support to the Lebanese Armed Forces,¹⁹⁹ the resolution included new language requesting UNIFIL to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate, as well as to assist the Lebanese authorities in ensuring the full and effective participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making. The Council further requested enhanced reporting by UNIFIL on this issue.²⁰⁰

The resolution also called on the Government of Lebanon to develop a plan to increase its naval capabilities with the goal of ultimately decreasing UNIFIL's Maritime Taskforce and transitioning its responsibilities to the Lebanese Armed Forces. In this regard, the Council

¹⁹⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force in Lebanon, see *Repertoire, Supplements 1975-2017*.

¹⁹⁶ Resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, third preambular paragraph. See [S/2018/750](#).

¹⁹⁸ Resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#), para. 12. See [S/2018/1182](#).

¹⁹⁹ Resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#), paras. 2, 5, 13 and 21.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 24.

requested that the Secretary-General present to the Council an assessment with recommendations within six months.²⁰¹

The resolution encouraged the Government of Lebanon's intention to deploy a model regiment and an offshore patrol vessel in UNIFIL's area of operations to advance the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and the authority of the Lebanese State and called on the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL to strengthen their coordinated actions.²⁰²

The composition of UNIFIL was not modified during the period under review.

²⁰¹ Ibid., para. 7.

²⁰² Ibid., para. 8.

II. Special political missions²⁰³

Note

Section II focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of special political missions, as well as the changes to their mandates.²⁰⁴

Overview of special political missions during 2018

During the period under review, the Council oversaw ten special political missions. Five were based in Africa, one in the Americas, two in Asia and two in the Middle East. Their size varied from relatively small missions such as the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) to larger assistance missions deployed in highly complex and volatile security environments such as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

Newly established special political missions and mandate terminations and extensions

The Council did not establish any new or terminate the mandates of any existing special political missions during the period under review. The Council extended the mandates of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), UNSMIL, UNSOM, UNAMA and UNAMI. The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) had initially been established in 2016 for a three-year period until 31 December 2019, while the mandates of UNRCCA and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) remained open-ended.

²⁰³ Special political mission described in the present part include regional offices and offices in support of political processes. Other types of special political missions such as special and personal envoys, advisers or representatives of the Secretary-General, sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels and other entities and mechanisms are covered in other parts of the present Supplement.

²⁰⁴ For information on the envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General whose mandates relate to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, other than those appointed as heads of peacekeeping or special political missions, see part IX, sect. VI.

Mandates of political and peacebuilding missions

During 2018, the Council welcomed the findings and recommendations of two strategic reviews conducted in 2017 concerning UNAMA and UNAMI, with the latter having been conducted by independent non-United Nations experts.²⁰⁵ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment of UNIOGBIS for a possible reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in Guinea-Bissau and a strategic review of UNOCA providing recommendations on possible areas of improvement including regarding the coherence of United Nations activities in the subregion.²⁰⁶

For most special political missions, the Council prioritized mandate tasks related to the provision of good offices and mediation support for the implementation of peace agreements, inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation, promoting and providing capacity-building support for good governance and the strengthening of national institutions, supporting political transitions consisting of elections and constitutional review processes, and the resolution of related political and institutional crises, as well as monitoring and reporting on human rights violations and abuses and providing related capacity-building support. Regional offices, such as UNOCA and UNOWAS, continued to support the strengthening of subregional capacities in conflict prevention, early warning, women, peace and security issues, as well as addressing cross-border and transnational security threats such as terrorism and maritime security. Larger political missions, such as UNSOM, UNAMI and UNAMA, continued to coordinate international humanitarian and capacity-building efforts in the countries of their deployment.

During the period under review, the Council made modifications to the mandates of seven out of the ten special political missions, namely UNIOGBIS, UNOCA, UNSMIL, UNSOM, UNOWAS, UNAMA and UNAMI. In modifying their mandates, the Council placed particular emphasis on ensuring that missions fully took into account gender considerations throughout their activities. For example, in redefining the mandate of UNOCA, the Council requested the Office to give due attention to human rights and gender perspectives in the implementation of its good offices role, while UNAMI was tasked with approaching gender-mainstreaming as a cross-cutting

²⁰⁵ In connection with UNAMA, resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#), para. 3; and, in connection with UNAMI, resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para. 5.

²⁰⁶ In connection with UNIOGBIS, resolution [2404 \(2018\)](#), para. 28; and, in connection with UNOCA, [S/PRST/2018/17](#), fifth paragraph.

issue.²⁰⁷ UNAMA and UNAMI were, in turn, requested to assist the Governments of Afghanistan and Iraq in ensuring the inclusion and political participation of women at all levels.²⁰⁸ Similarly, the Council requested UNSMIL to assist the Government of Libya in the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence and also welcomed the efforts by UNOWAS to work towards the systematic involvement of women in initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism.²⁰⁹

In the context of delays in the implementation of political agreements and planned elections in Guinea-Bissau and Libya, the Council strengthened the political mandates of UNIOGBIS and UNSMIL. Specifically, the Council tasked UNIOGBIS to use its good offices and political support for the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement of 2016 and the electoral and constitutional review processes, while UNSMIL was requested to do so within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement and the United Nations Action Plan.²¹⁰

Building on their existing mandates to monitor, analyze and support the addressing of a wide range of cross-border and transnational issues, the Council further tasked UNOCA and UNOWAS to support efforts to address the impact of emerging security threats such as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and issues related to transhumance, conflicts between farmers and herders, as well as the regional dimension of security crises.²¹¹ Furthermore, recognizing the adverse effects of climate and ecological change and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of the Central African region, as well as West Africa and the Sahel, the Council requested UNOCA and UNOWAS to take into account information on these issues into their activities.²¹²

Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the mandates of special political missions in 2018, showing the range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; (b) tasks

²⁰⁷ In connection with UNOCA, [S/2018/789](#), annex, Objectives 1 and 2; and, in connection with UNAMI, resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para. 2(e).

²⁰⁸ In connection with UNAMA, resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#), para. 39; and, in connection with UNAMI, resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para. 2(e).

²⁰⁹ In connection with UNSMIL, resolution [2434 \(2018\)](#), para. 4; and, in connection with UNOWAS, [S/PRST/2018/16](#), twelfth paragraph.

²¹⁰ In connection with UNIOGBIS, resolution [2404 \(2018\)](#), para. 3(a)-(c); and, in connection with UNSMIL, resolution [2434 \(2018\)](#), paras. 1(i) and (ii).

²¹¹ In connection with UNOCA, [S/2018/789](#), annex, Objective 2(a); and, in connection with UNOWAS, [S/PRST/2018/16](#), thirteenth paragraph.

²¹² In connection with UNOCA, [S/PRST/2018/17](#), ninth paragraph; and, in connection with UNOWAS, [S/PRST/2018/16](#), nineteenth paragraph.

mandated in previous periods and specifically reiterated by the Council during the period under review; and (c) tasks of missions with open-ended or multi-year mandates adopted in previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.

Table 4
Mandates of political and peacebuilding missions, 2018: Africa

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNIOGBIS</i>	<i>UNOCA</i>	<i>UNSMIL</i>	<i>UNSOM</i>	<i>UNOWAS</i>
Chapter VII					
Civil-military coordination					
Demilitarization and arms management		X	X	X	
Electoral assistance	X	X	X	X	X
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support			X		X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Maritime security		X		X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Public information					X
Rule of law/judicial matters	X			X	X
Security sector reform		X		X	X
Support to police				X	
Support to sanctions regimes			X		
Support to State institutions	X		X	X	X

Abbreviations: UNIOGBIS – United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau; UNOCA - United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNSMIL - United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM - United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; UNOWAS - United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel.

Table 5
Mandates of political and peacebuilding missions, 2018: Americas, Asia and Middle East

Mandate	UN Verification Mission in Colombia	UNAMA	UNRCCA	UNAMI	UNSCOL
Chapter VII					
Ceasefire monitoring	X				
Civilian-military coordination		X			
Demilitarization and arms management	X			X	
Electoral assistance		X		X	
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict		X		X	
Humanitarian support		X		X	
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians		X			
Public information					
Rule of law/judicial matters		X		X	
Security sector reform				X	
Support to sanctions regimes					
Support to State institutions		X		X	

Abbreviations: UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNRCCA - United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; UNAMI - United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNSCOL- Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon.

Africa

United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau

The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) was established by the Security Council by resolution [1876 \(2009\)](#) of 26 June 2009 to succeed the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau. UNIOGBIS was mandated to, inter alia, assist the work of the Peacebuilding Commission in Guinea-Bissau, strengthen the capacities of national institutions to maintain constitutional order, public security and the full respect for the rule of law, support an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process, provide strategic and technical support in security sector reform, undertake human rights promotion, protection and monitoring, and enhance cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.²¹³

During 2018, by resolution [2404 \(2018\)](#) of 28 February 2018, as per previous practice, the Council extended the mandate of UNIOGBIS for 12 months until 28 February 2019.²¹⁴ By this resolution the Council redefined the priorities of UNIOGBIS in the context of the protracted political and institutions crisis in Guinea-Bissau, delays in the implementation of the Conakry Agreement of 2016, the holding of legislative and presidential elections in 2018 and 2019 and the constitutional review process.²¹⁵ In addition to retaining the priorities provided for in resolution [2343 \(2017\)](#),²¹⁶ the Office was requested to support the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Roadmap of 2016 as well as the electoral process, through good offices, to ensure inclusive, free and credible legislative elections in 2018.²¹⁷

Beyond the priority areas and with a view to upcoming elections, the Council requested UNIOGBIS and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to support the Government, in close coordination with the Peacebuilding Commission, in the mobilization, harmonization and coordination of international assistance namely from the African Union, ECOWAS, the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and the European Union.²¹⁸ The Council

²¹³ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, see *Repertoire Supplements 2008-2017*.

²¹⁴ Resolution [2404 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

²¹⁵ See part I, sect. 8, "The situation in Guinea-Bissau".

²¹⁶ Resolution [2343 \(2017\)](#), para. 2.

²¹⁷ Resolution [2404 \(2018\)](#), paras. 3(a) and (b).

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 4(e).

reiterated the Office's other tasks relating to the strengthening of democratic institutions and capacity of state organs, assisting the national authorities in the promotion and protection of human rights, providing advice and support to combat drug trafficking and organized crime as well as to incorporate a gender perspective into peacebuilding and, and supporting the timely conduct of elections and the strengthening of democracy and good governance.²¹⁹

The resolution did not reiterate, however, language relating to the Office's strategic and technical advice and support to national authorities in connection with the national security sector reform, rule of law strategies, and the development of civilian and military justice systems.²²⁰

Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide an assessment of UNIOGBIS within nine months including options for a possible reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in the country and re-prioritization of tasks.²²¹

²¹⁹ Ibid., paras. 4(a)-(d) and 8.

²²⁰ See resolution [2343 \(2017\)](#), paras. 2(c) and (d).

²²¹ Resolution [2404 \(2018\)](#), para. 28. See Strategic assessment of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau dated 6 December 2018 ([S/2018/1086](#)).

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was established by an exchange of letters dated 11 December 2009 and 30 August 2010 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.²²² The functions of UNOCA included cooperating with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other regional partners in the promotion of peace and stability in the broader subregion, to carry out good offices roles in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region, to promote an integrated subregional approach and facilitate coordination and information exchange among United Nations organizations and partners in the subregion, and to report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance.²²³

During 2018, the Council issued two presidential statements on 30 January and 10 August 2018 concerning UNOCA.²²⁴ The Council also extended the mandate of UNOCA for three years until 31 August 2021 by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 24 and 28 August 2018, respectively.²²⁵

The Council modified the mandate of UNOCA during the period under review. In the presidential statement of 10 August 2018, while welcoming the report of the Secretary-General which included recommendations on the mandate renewal of UNOCA,²²⁶ the Council noted that the priorities of the Office would include: (a) to perform good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General, (b) to assist the countries of the subregion in consolidating peace and resolving electoral tensions from the 2015-2018 period, and to assist countries facing related institutional crises related to electoral processes; (c) to work with ECCAS to lay the groundwork for the structural prevention of election-related violence; (d) to enhance the capacities of the ECCAS secretariat in conflict prevention, early warning, women, peace and security and mediation and other areas, and (e) to work with UNOWAS to address transregional issues such as maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, conflict between farmers and herders, and combatting Boko Haram.²²⁷ The Council

²²² [S/2009/697](#) and [S/2010/457](#).

²²³ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2008-2017*.

²²⁴ [S/PRST/2018/3](#) and [S/PRST/2018/17](#). See part I, sect. 9, “Central African region”.

²²⁵ [S/2018/789](#) and [S/2018/790](#).

²²⁶ [S/PRST/2018/17](#), fifth paragraph. See [S/2018/521](#), paras. 77-79 and 91.

²²⁷ [S/PRST/2018/17](#), sixth paragraph.

encouraged UNOCA to fully take into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue in its activities and to continue to support ECCAS in its adoption and implementation of the regional action plan on resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#).²²⁸ Recognizing the adverse effects of climate and ecological change and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of the Central African region, the Council stressed the need for long-term strategies by governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilization and build resilience, and requested that such information be taken into consideration by UNOCA in its activities.²²⁹

By the exchange of letters dated 24 and 28 August 2018, the Council reiterated the existing four objectives of UNOCA, as defined in 2015,²³⁰ and made some further modifications with respect to its mandate, namely, (a) monitor political developments in Central Africa, carry out good offices and enhance subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; (b) support United Nations efforts in the subregion as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security; (c) enhance the coherence and coordination of the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security; and (d) advise the Secretary-General and United Nations entities in the region on significant developments in Central Africa.²³¹

Within this framework, the Council requested UNOCA to give due attention to human rights and gender perspectives in the implementation of its good offices role and supporting United Nations and regional and subregional initiatives.²³² Further, as part of the latter objective, the Council specified that UNOCA would promote and support efforts to address the impact of emerging security threats, including Boko Haram and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and other cross-border threats, such as issues related to transhumance, as well as the regional dimension of security crises in some States of the subregion.²³³ The Office was also tasked with supporting the African Union-led African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic.²³⁴

During the period under review, the Council also highlighted the importance of cooperation between UNOCA and United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions in the region. In this regard, the Council encouraged further cooperation, mutual prioritization and

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, eighth paragraph.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, ninth paragraph.

²³⁰ See [S/2015/554](#), annex.

²³¹ [S/2018/789](#), annex, Objectives 1-4.

²³² *Ibid.*, Objectives 1 and 2.

²³³ *Ibid.*, Objective 2(a).

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, Objective 2(b).

clear division of tasks between UNOCA and UNOWAS, MINUSCA, MONUSCO, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi.²³⁵ In this regard, the Council welcomed the support UNOCA and UNOWAS provided to the development of a joint strategy to address the root causes of the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region.²³⁶

Finally, by the presidential statement of 10 August 2018, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review regarding the scope of the mandate and activities of UNOCA and to present recommendations to the Council by 1 August 2019 for areas of improvement, including the coherence of United Nations activities in countries under its mandate, or new or refocused priorities.²³⁷

²³⁵ [S/PRST/2018/17](#), seventh paragraph. See also [S/PRST/2018/3](#), twenty-third paragraph.

²³⁶ [S/PRST/2018/17](#), thirteenth paragraph.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, fifth paragraph.

United Nations Support Mission in Libya

By resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#) of 16 September 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) with a mandate to support Libyan national efforts to restore public security and order and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, extend State authority, promote and protect human rights and support transitional justice, initiate economic recovery, and coordinate international support.²³⁸

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions [2429 \(2018\)](#) of 13 July 2018, [2434 \(2018\)](#) of 13 September 2018 and [2441 \(2018\)](#) of 5 November 2018 concerning UNSMIL. In 2018, the Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL once, for one year until 15 September 2019.²³⁹

By resolution [2434 \(2018\)](#), the Council reiterated its strong support for the ongoing efforts of UNSMIL and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and reaffirmed its endorsement of the United Nations Action Plan for Libya and the Libyan Political Agreement.²⁴⁰ In this context, the Council broadened and elaborated upon the existing mandate of UNSMIL as defined in resolution [2376 \(2017\)](#).²⁴¹ Specifically, the Council decided that UNSMIL would exercise mediation and good offices to support: (a) an inclusive political process and security and economic dialogue within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement and United Nations Action Plan; (b) continued implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement; (c) consolidation of the governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord, including support for economic reform in collaboration with international financial institutions; and (d) subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process, including the constitutional process and the organization of elections.²⁴²

Beyond these tasks, the Council reiterated, within operational and security constraints, UNSMIL's tasks to: (a) support key Libyan institutions; (b) support, on request, the provision of essential services, and delivery of humanitarian assistance; (c) human rights monitoring and reporting; (d) support securing uncontrolled arms and related materiel and countering their

²³⁸ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2010-2017*.

²³⁹ Resolution [2434 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, fourth and seventh preambular paragraphs. See part I, sect. 13, "The situation in Libya".

²⁴¹ See resolution [2376 \(2017\)](#), paras. 1(i)-(v), 2 and 3.

²⁴² Resolution [2434 \(2018\)](#), para. 1 (i)-(iv).

proliferation; and (e) co-ordination of international assistance, and provision of advice and assistance to the efforts led by the Government of National Accord to stabilize post-conflict zones, including those liberated from Da'esh.²⁴³

Furthermore, while reiterating its request to the Mission to fully take into account a gender perspective throughout its mandate and to assist the Government in the full and effective participation of women in political processes, the resolution added the task of assisting the Government in the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, in line with resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#).²⁴⁴ The Council also welcomed the progress made by UNSMIL in re-establishing a presence in Tripoli and its plans to re-establish a presence in Benghazi and other parts of Libya through a phased return, as security conditions allowed.²⁴⁵ The Council requested the Secretary-General to reassess a series of detailed objectives for the implementation of the mandated tasks of UNSMIL, to include a particular focus on the steps required to set the constitutional basis for elections and to advance the political process from its current trajectory, and to report on progress towards these objectives in his regular reporting.²⁴⁶

By resolution [2441 \(2018\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the mandate of UNSMIL to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) and its Panel of Experts.²⁴⁷ By resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), the Council reiterated the need for close cooperation between UNSMIL, UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMISS, and MINUSCA.²⁴⁸

²⁴³ Ibid., para. 2 (i)-(v).

²⁴⁴ Ibid., para. 4.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., para. 5.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., para. 3.

²⁴⁷ Resolution [2441 \(2018\)](#), para. 16.

²⁴⁸ Resolution [2429 \(2018\)](#), para. 28.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was established by resolution [2102 \(2013\)](#) of 2 May 2013. Its mandate was, inter alia, to provide good offices functions to support the Federal Government of Somalia in the peace and reconciliation process and to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and State-building; to assist in the coordination of international donor support, in particular on security sector assistance and maritime security; to help to build the capacity of the Federal Government to promote respect for human rights, women's empowerment, child protection and the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence; and to monitor, help to investigate and report on abuses or violations of human rights.²⁴⁹

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions [2408 \(2018\)](#) of 27 March 2018 and [2431 \(2018\)](#) of 30 July 2018 concerning UNSOM. The Council extended the mandate of UNSOM for a period of one year until 31 March 2019.²⁵⁰

The Council renewed the existing mandate of UNSOM, adding new language to some of the Mission's tasks, as defined by resolution [2358 \(2017\)](#).²⁵¹ Specifically, while reiterating the request to UNSOM to implement its mandate at the national and regional level, the Council specified that this should include further strengthening and maintaining its presence in all federal member states, including Galmudug and its administrative capital Dhusamareb.²⁵² In addition, reiterating the Mission's task to provide strategic policy advice on the Somali Government-led inclusive political process, reconciliation, peacebuilding and State-building, the Council specified that this should also include the review of the Provisional Federal Constitution, preparations for the 2020/2021 elections, security sector reform and the implementation of the Transition Plan.²⁵³

Underscoring the importance of UNSOM's support to the Somali-Government-led inclusive political process, including the provisions of good offices functions, the Council added that this should also focus on strengthening the rule of law and the implementation of the new policing model in line with the Comprehensive Approach to Security.²⁵⁴ Further, with respect to

²⁴⁹ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2012-2017*.

²⁵⁰ Resolution [2408 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

²⁵¹ Resolution [2408 \(2018\)](#), paras. 1 and 2. See also resolution [2158 \(2014\)](#), para. 1(a)-(e).

²⁵² *Ibid.*, para. 2.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

the elections, the Council further underscored UNSOM's support with a focus on the National Independent Electoral Commission at national and sub-national level to fulfil its constitutional mandate, in line with the Somali-led Operational Strategic Plan for 2017-2021, the goal of nationwide voter registration by 2019, and coordination of international electoral support to Somalia.²⁵⁵

On security sector reform, the Council requested UNSOM to provide strategic advice to accelerate implementation of the Comprehensive Approach to Security, including facilitating more effective coordination of international partners' efforts to support the Security Pact, priorities of the Transition Plan, National Security Architecture implementation and the New Partnership for Somalia.²⁵⁶ While requesting the Mission to continue to assist the Federal Government in coordinating international donor support to the security sector in compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), the resolution specified that this should include coordination and advice to the comprehensive approach to security structure.²⁵⁷ In addition, the Council requested UNSOM to continue to support the Government's efforts to implement the National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in order to strengthen the country's capacity to prevent and counter terrorism consistent with international obligations, Security Council resolutions and implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.²⁵⁸ Underlining the importance of strengthening the relationship between UNSOM, AMISOM and the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the United Nations country team, the Council noted that this should also include the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum.²⁵⁹ The Council also requested UNSOM to continue to work with partners to provide support and strategic policy advice for the Federal Government to fulfil its commitments to sound, transparent and accountable financial management to, inter alia, lay the foundations for inclusive and transparent elections.²⁶⁰

By resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), while extending its authorization for the deployment of AMISOM under Chapter VII of the Charter,²⁶¹ the Council encouraged continued close cooperation between UNSOM, UNSOS and AMISOM, in order to strengthen joint senior

²⁵⁵ Ibid., para. 4.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 6.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 20.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., para. 7.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., para. 9.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 21.

²⁶¹ Resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), para. 5.

leadership decision-making and ensure alignment of operational efforts with a common set of strategic priorities, and enhance coordination efforts on the ground within the Comprehensive Approach to Security mechanism.²⁶² The Council further reiterated the Mission’s task to support the federal policing model and to work with AMISOM to ensure that women and girls were protected from sexual and gender-based violence, including sexual exploitation and abuse.²⁶³

²⁶² Ibid., para. 25.

²⁶³ Ibid., paras. 42 and 44.

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) was established by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council of 14 and 28 January 2016, merging the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel into the United Nations Office for West Africa. The Council mandated UNOWAS, inter alia, to monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel, carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation capacities; enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security; support the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements; and promote good governance and the rule of law, human rights and gender mainstreaming into conflict prevention and management initiatives.²⁶⁴

In 2018, the Council adopted three presidential statements on 30 January, 19 April and 10 August 2018 in connection with UNOWAS.²⁶⁵ The Council did not renew the mandate of the Office during the period under review.²⁶⁶

The Council modified the mandate of UNOWAS in relation to several areas. By the presidential statement of 30 January 2018, the Council reiterated its full support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel and looked forward to ongoing activities undertaken by the Office in the areas of its mandate as outlined in prior decisions, while adding sub-regional and regional cooperation to address root causes, strengthening of institutional capacity and underlining the need for sustained support and adequate resources.²⁶⁷ The Council encouraged further cooperation, mutual prioritization and clear division of tasks between UNOWAS and UNOCA with a view to strengthening regional and subregional organizations to address cross-border threats, commended the engagement and assistance of UNOWAS to regional and subregional organizations to promote peace and stability in the region

²⁶⁴ For more information on the initial mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016-2017*.

²⁶⁵ [S/PRST/2018/3](#), [S/PRST/2018/8](#) and [S/PRST/2018/16](#).

²⁶⁶ The mandate of UNOWAS was renewed for a three-year period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2019 by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 27 and 29 December 2016 ([S/2016/1128](#) and [S/2016/1129](#)).

²⁶⁷ [S/PRST/2018/3](#), third paragraph.

and recognized the role of the Office in contributing to strategic and integrated analysis of the opportunities, risks and challenges in support of efforts by national and local actors to sustain peace.²⁶⁸ The Council also recognized the important role of UNOWAS in providing technical assistance to the Permanent Secretariat of the G5 Sahel, and encouraged enhanced cooperation and information sharing.²⁶⁹

By the presidential statement issued on 19 April 2018 and further to the completion of the mandate of UNMIL on 30 March 2018, the Council broadened the mandate of UNOWAS and requested the Office to make available its good offices, as necessary, to the Government of Liberia and the United Nations Resident Coordinator.²⁷⁰

By the presidential statement issued on 10 August 2018, recognizing the adverse effects of climate and ecological change and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region, the Council stressed the need for long-term strategies by governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilization and building resilience, and requested that such information be taken into consideration by UNOWAS in its activities.²⁷¹ The Council also welcomed the efforts by UNOWAS and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to work towards the systematic involvement of women in initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism and further requested that these issues continue to be integrated into regular reporting by the Office.²⁷²

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, twenty-third and twenty-fourth paragraphs.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, fourteenth paragraph.

²⁷⁰ [S/PRST/2018/8](#), seventh paragraph.

²⁷¹ [S/PRST/2018/16](#), nineteenth paragraph.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, twelfth paragraph.

Americas

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

The Security Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia by resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#) of 10 July 2017 after the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The Verification Mission was mandated to, inter alia, verify the implementation of the process of political, economic and social reincorporation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) and of the personal and collective security guarantees provided under the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP of 24 November 2016.²⁷³

By resolution [2435 \(2018\)](#) of 13 September 2018, the Council extended the existing mandate of the Mission for a period of one year until 25 September 2019.²⁷⁴ The Council further expressed its willingness to work with the Government of Colombia to further extend the mandate of the Mission on the basis of agreement between the parties.²⁷⁵

²⁷³ For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016-2017*.

²⁷⁴ Resolution [2435 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 2. For further information, see part I, sect. 16 "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))".

Asia

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by the Security Council by resolution [1401 \(2002\)](#) of 28 March 2002 and was mandated to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001.²⁷⁶

During 2018, by resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#) of 8 March 2018, the Council extended the mandate of UNAMA, in accordance with previous practice, for one year until 17 March 2019.²⁷⁷

By the resolution, the Council welcomed the findings of the strategic review of UNAMA which was conducted in 2017 further to resolution [2344 \(2017\)](#).²⁷⁸ The Council called for the implementation of the recommendations of the review, including with a view to aligning the Mission's substantive functions in support of peace efforts with an emphasis on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding into the three pillars of work of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including in support of an intra-Afghan dialogue.²⁷⁹

The Council reiterated the priorities of UNAMA, as defined in previous resolutions, namely to provide outreach and good offices support to the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process; to promote more coherent support by the international community of development and governance priorities; to support regional cooperation; to monitor the situation of civilians, promote accountability and to assist in the respect for human rights; and to closely cooperate and coordinate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) non-combat Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, as well as the NATO Senior Civilian Representative.²⁸⁰ While also reiterating the Mission's electoral assistance mandate, the resolution specified that this would include the organization of future elections, including the parliamentary and district council elections as foreseen for 2018 and the presidential elections in 2019.²⁸¹

²⁷⁶ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, see previous *Repertoire, Supplements 2000-2017*.

²⁷⁷ Resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#), para. 4. See part I, sect. 17, "The situation in Afghanistan".

²⁷⁸ Resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#), para. 3. See [S/2017/696](#) and resolution [2344 \(2017\)](#), para. 7.

²⁷⁹ Resolution [2405 \(2018\)](#), para. 3.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 6(a) and (c)-(f).

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 6(b) and 14.

UNAMA was also requested to implement its remaining “priority tasks”, as defined previously, namely supporting the implementation of the Kabul Process, the efforts of the Afghan Government to improve governance and the rule of law, and the facilitation and delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as its task to support efforts to strengthen the protection of children.²⁸² Finally, the resolution encouraged the Government to identify further opportunities to support the participation of women in the peace process and requested the support of UNAMA in this regard.²⁸³

²⁸² Ibid., paras. 7(a)-(c) and 33.

²⁸³ Ibid., para. 39.

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) was authorized by the Security Council through an exchange of letters dated 7 and 15 May 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,²⁸⁴ at the initiative of the Governments of the region. With a view to strengthening the United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia, the Regional Centre was assigned a number of tasks, including liaising with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysis the situation on the ground; and maintaining contact with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Regional Centre was established with an open-ended mandate. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to its mandate.

²⁸⁴ [S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#). For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2007-2017*.

Middle East

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

The Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003 by resolution [1500 \(2003\)](#) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate under resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#) in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of 17 July 2003.²⁸⁵ Those responsibilities included among other issues coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development; and supporting efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions.²⁸⁶

During 2018, by resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#) of 14 June 2018, departing from the previous practice of twelve months, the Council extended the mandate of UNAMI for ten months until 31 May 2019.²⁸⁷

By the same resolution, the Council welcomed the results of the independent external assessment of UNAMI which was conducted in 2017 further to resolution [2367 \(2017\)](#)²⁸⁸ and revisited the Mission's priorities for the first time since 2007.²⁸⁹ Taking into account the views of the Government of Iraq,²⁹⁰ the Council decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and UNAMI would prioritize the provision of advice, support, and assistance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation.²⁹¹ In addition, it further decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would advise, support, and assist the Iraqi authorities on a variety of areas, in particular, the development of processes for holding elections and referenda, constitutional review and implementation, facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation, progress on security sector

²⁸⁵ [S/2003/715](#).

²⁸⁶ Resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#), paras. 8 (a)-(i). For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2000-2017*.

²⁸⁷ Resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para 1. In its statement after the vote on the resolution, the United States, as penholder, explained that the ten-month extension was done on a one-time basis so as to better align mandate renewals with the budget cycle, in keeping with the findings of the UNAMI independent external assessment ([S/PV.8285](#), p. 2). See part I, sect. 25, "The situation concerning Iraq".

²⁸⁸ Resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para 2.

²⁸⁹ For further information on the mandate priorities in 2007, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004-2007*, chap. V, part I.F.

²⁹⁰ See [S/2018/430](#).

²⁹¹ Resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para. 2 (a).

reform efforts on planning, funding and implementing reintegration programmes for former members of armed groups.²⁹² Finally, the Council also decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would promote, support, and facilitate, in coordination with the Government, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the implementation of programmes to improve services for the people, efforts at economic reform, capacity-building and setting conditions for sustainable development, and the contributions of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and would promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, in addition to support the work of the investigative team established in resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#).²⁹³ Moreover, the Council decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would approach gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue throughout the Mission's mandate, advising and assisting the Government in ensuring women's participation, involvement and representation at all levels; and would also assist the Government and the United Nations country team efforts to strengthen child protection, including the rehabilitation and reintegration of children.²⁹⁴

²⁹² Ibid., para. 2 (b).

²⁹³ Ibid., paras. 2(c) and (d).

²⁹⁴ Ibid., paras. 2(e) and (f). For information on the mandate of the investigative team established by resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#), see part VI, sect. II and part IX, sect. III.

Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

The establishment of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) was authorized by the Security Council by means of an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 8 and 13 February 2007.²⁹⁵ The Office was established with an open-ended mandate and the position of Special Coordinator created to replace the position of Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon created in the year 2000.²⁹⁶ During the period under review, there were no changes to the mandate of UNSCOL.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ [S/2007/85](#) and [S/2007/86](#).

²⁹⁶ [S/2000/718](#).

²⁹⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2004-2017*. See also part I., sect. 23, “The situation in the Middle East” and sect. 24, “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.