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## **Part X**

### **Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions**

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## Introductory note

### Article 29

*The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.*

### Rule 28

*The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.*

The powers of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs are set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and reflected in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part X of the present Supplement covers decisions of the Council relating to field-based subsidiary organs that the Council established for the performance of its functions under the Charter and that were active during 2021. These field-based subsidiary organs can be divided into two categories: peacekeeping operations (covered in section I); and special political missions (covered in section II).

Other subsidiary organs, such as committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, special advisers, envoys, representatives and coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, are covered in part IX. Peace operations led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII, which also covers the Council's cooperation with regional organizations.

Peacekeeping operations and special political missions covered in part X are presented by region and in the order in which they were established. Successor missions are listed immediately after their predecessors. The introduction to each main section includes overview tables identifying the mandates assigned to each mission (tables 1, 2, 4 and 5) and provides an analysis of the key trends and developments during the reporting period. The mandates of the missions are presented in those tables according to 21 categories of mandated tasks, which are based exclusively on the language of the decisions of the Council and do not necessarily reflect the specific structure or activities of the mission. The categories are provided only as a convenience for readers and do not reflect any practice or position of the Council. The introduction to section I includes an overview table of changes to the composition of peacekeeping operations during the reporting period (table 3).

Subsections provide a summary of major developments concerning the mandate and composition of each mission, reflecting the decisions of the Council adopted during the period under review. For information on the mandate and composition of missions in the past, see previous supplements to the *Repertoire*.

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## I. Peacekeeping operations

### Note

Section I is focused on the decisions adopted by the Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of peacekeeping operations, as well as changes to their mandates and composition.

### Overview of peacekeeping operations during 2021

During the period under review, the Council oversaw 12 peacekeeping operations.<sup>1</sup> Six of the operations were in Africa, three in the Middle East, two in Europe and one in Asia. The Council did not establish or terminate any operations in 2021.

#### *Extensions of mandates*

The Council extended the mandates of the following peacekeeping operations:

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
- United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

The mandates of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP),

the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) remained open-ended.

#### *Mandates of peacekeeping operations: differences in scope*

In 2021, the mandates of peacekeeping operations continued to vary considerably depending on their content and complexity. In that regard, the Council reauthorized the four largest missions, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS, to use all means necessary to implement their mandates, which covered a broad array of mandated tasks.<sup>2</sup> The mandates of all four missions continued to include tasks related to the protection of civilians, the protection and promotion of human rights, the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the protection of United Nations personnel and equipment. The Council retained the implementation of peace agreements and political transitions as priorities for MINUSCA, MINUSMA and UNMISS, while MINUSCA, MINUSMA and MONUSCO remained focused on support for stabilization and the extension of State authority.

The mandates of the remaining eight peacekeeping operations stayed narrower by comparison. UNIFIL and UNISFA, as interim security forces, remained focused on observing the redeployment of forces and maintaining security within their areas of responsibility; they were reauthorized to use force in fulfilling only specific tasks such as the protection of civilians, United Nations personnel and equipment, the protection of their freedom of movement and that of humanitarian workers, and the protection of the mission's area of responsibility.<sup>3</sup> UNFICYP continued to support the maintenance of the ceasefire and bicomunal contacts in Cyprus, while longstanding observer missions such as MINURSO, UNDOF, UNMOGIP and UNTSO concentrated on the

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<sup>2</sup> In connection with MINUSMA, see resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 20; in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 33; and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), paras. 27 and 29 (i) (a).

<sup>3</sup> In connection with UNIFIL, see resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 22; and, in connection with UNISFA, see resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 14.

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<sup>1</sup> For Council decisions and deliberations relating to the item entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations", see part I, sect. 22. For Council discussions concerning individual peacekeeping operations, see the respective country-specific studies in part I.

monitoring of ceasefires and the implementation of armistice and disengagement agreements.<sup>4</sup>

*Mandates of peacekeeping operations: modifications*

During the period under review, the Council modified the mandates of 6 of the 12 existing peacekeeping operations, with most of the changes affecting MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS. The most common changes made by the Council concerned provisions concerning the protection of civilians and early warning, the provision of support to political processes and the participation of women and other marginalized groups in those processes, and tasks related to addressing sexual and gender-based violence.

With respect to the protection of civilians, the Council decided that UNMISS and MONUSCO would adjust their postures and geographic focus in response to the changing security situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, respectively.<sup>5</sup> The Council decided that MINUSMA would implement a politically led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish a State presence, State authority and basic social services in central Mali and to promote understanding of and strengthen its Mission-wide early warning and response mechanisms.<sup>6</sup> UNMISS was tasked with implementing a Mission-wide early warning and response strategy that drew upon regular interaction with civilians in areas at high risk of conflict.<sup>7</sup> Also as part of a protection of civilians mandate, the Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA would include mitigating and avoiding the use of schools by parties to the conflict and to facilitate the continuation of education.<sup>8</sup>

Adding to their task of supporting the implementation of existing peace agreements, the Council decided that MINUSMA would support the realization of the political transition in Mali and MINUSCA would support a newly announced ceasefire

in the Central African Republic.<sup>9</sup> The political support role of UNMISS in South Sudan was expanded to include the provision of technical assistance for the implementation of the peace agreement and to coordinate the use of good offices with regional actors.<sup>10</sup> The Council provided additional detail in the electoral support mandates of MINUSCA, MINUSMA and UNMISS in preparation for elections in, respectively, the Central African Republic, Mali and South Sudan, envisaged for 2022 and 2023.<sup>11</sup>

Regarding political inclusivity, the Council requested UNISFA to integrate women into peace discussions, including by providing gender advisers.<sup>12</sup> The Council decided that the mandate of UNMISS would include assisting all parties in the full, effective and meaningful participation of women, youth, faith groups and civil society in the peace process, in transitional government bodies and institutions, and in all conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.<sup>13</sup> The Council requested MINUSMA to assist the Malian authorities in ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women in the political transition.<sup>14</sup> The Council clarified that UNIFIL assistance to the Lebanese authorities in ensuring full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women was to include the Lebanese security sector.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, the Council introduced new elements into the sexual and gender-based violence mandates of MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNIFIL and UNMISS. Specifically, the Council decided that MINUSCA and MONUSCO would include risks of conflict-related sexual violence in their data collection, threat analysis and early warning systems, and that UNMISS would respond to sexual and gender-based violence, in addition to deterring and preventing its

<sup>4</sup> In connection with UNDOF, see resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 15; and, in connection with MINURSO, see resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. See also, in connection with UNMOGIP, see resolutions [47 \(1948\)](#) and [91 \(1951\)](#); and, in connection with UNTSO, see resolution [48 \(1948\)](#).

<sup>5</sup> In connection with UNMISS, see resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (a) (iii); and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 29 (i) (a) and (e).

<sup>6</sup> See resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 30 (b) (i) and (c) (ii).

<sup>7</sup> See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (a) (ii).

<sup>8</sup> See resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 34 (a) (v).

<sup>9</sup> In connection with MINUSMA, see resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 30 (a) (i); and, in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 34 (b).

<sup>10</sup> See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (c) (i) and (iv).

<sup>11</sup> In connection with MINUSMA, see resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 30 (a) (vi); in connection with UNMISS, see [S/PRST/2021/20](#), third paragraph (in particular the reference to the letter dated 15 July 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, [S/2021/661](#)); and, in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 35 (b).

<sup>12</sup> See resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 21.

<sup>13</sup> See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (c) (ii).

<sup>14</sup> See resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 53.

<sup>15</sup> See resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 26.

occurrence.<sup>16</sup> The Council requested MINUSMA to support the provision of medical services, sexual and reproductive health care services, psychosocial services, mental health care services, legal services and socioeconomic services to survivors of sexual violence.<sup>17</sup> The Council mandated UNIFIL to support the implementation of the action plan on women and peace and security, including to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence, and requested UNIFIL to enhance its reporting to the Council on the issue.<sup>18</sup>

### Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations

As a means of enhancing effectiveness, the Council requested the Secretary-General to implement specific capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of operations and within the existing mandates and capacities of five peacekeeping operations.<sup>19</sup> Notwithstanding some differences between the missions, these capacities included, among others, the implementation of early warning and response strategies, confidence-building and mission mobility, protection against sexual and gender-based violence, the implementation of the women and peace and security and the youth and peace and security agendas, and taking child protection into account as a cross-cutting issue. In addition, as operational priorities, the Council specified improving peacekeeping intelligence and analysis, providing training, knowledge and equipment to counter explosive devices, implementing effective casualty and medical evacuation procedures, prioritizing mandated protection activities in decisions about the use of capacities and resources, implementing peacekeeping performance requirements and implementing the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.

The Council requested several missions, the Secretary-General, Member States and host Governments to take all appropriate measures to

enhance the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel in line with resolution 2518 (2020)<sup>20</sup> and implement resolution 2589 (2021) for establishing accountability for crimes committed against peacekeepers.<sup>21</sup> The Council requested the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries to implement the relevant provisions of resolution 2538 (2020) on removing barriers to and improving the participation of women in peacekeeping.<sup>22</sup> Further to the rollout of the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System as part of the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative to strengthen peacekeeping operations, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, utilizing data collected with the System and other strategic planning and performance measurement tools, to describe the impact of missions in order to facilitate, as necessary, a re-evaluation of missions' composition and mandates as realities on the ground may require.<sup>23</sup>

### Peacekeeping transitions

Recalling resolution 2594 (2021), the Council reiterated the importance of adequately resourcing United Nations peace operations during mission

<sup>16</sup> In connection with UNMISS, see resolution 2567 (2021), para. 3 (a) (iv); in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 34 (a) (vi); and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution 2612 (2021), para. 29 (i) (h).

<sup>17</sup> See resolution 2584 (2021), para. 55.

<sup>18</sup> See resolution 2591 (2021), para. 26.

<sup>19</sup> In connection with UNMISS, see resolution 2567 (2021), para. 18 (a)–(n); in connection with MINUSMA, see resolution 2584 (2021), para. 47; in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 42; in connection with UNISFA, see resolution 2609 (2021), para. 30; and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution 2612 (2021), para. 42.

<sup>20</sup> In connection with UNMISS, see resolution 2567 (2021), para. 18 (k); in connection with UNDOF, see resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 8; in connection with MINUSMA, see resolution 2584 (2021), para. 45; in connection with UNIFIL, see resolution 2591 (2021), para. 17; in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 41; in connection with UNISFA, see resolution 2609 (2021), paras. 8 and 9; and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution 2612 (2021), para. 41.

<sup>21</sup> In connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 41; in connection with UNISFA, see resolution 2609 (2021), para. 9; and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution 2612 (2021), para. 41.

<sup>22</sup> In connection with UNFICYP, see resolution 2561 (2021), para. 14 and 2587 (2021), para. 16; in connection with UNMISS, see resolution 2567 (2021), paras. 18 (h) and 23; in connection with MINUSMA, see resolution 2584 (2021), para. 47; in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 47; in connection with UNISFA, see resolution 2609 (2021), para. 31; in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution 2612 (2021), para. 46; in connection with UNDOF, see resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 13; and, in connection with UNIFIL, see resolution 2591 (2021), para. 27.

<sup>23</sup> In connection with UNMISS, see resolution 2567 (2021), para. 29; in connection with MINUSMA, see resolution 2584 (2021), para. 62 (ii); in connection with UNFICYP, see resolution 2587 (2021), para. 19; in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 57; and, in connection with UNISFA, see resolution 2609 (2021), para. 34.

transitions to support the long-term stability and continuity of peacebuilding activities.<sup>24</sup> In that regard, in connection with the future drawdown and exit of MONUSCO, the Council welcomed the transition plan developed on the basis of the joint strategy on the progressive and phased drawdown of MONUSCO<sup>25</sup> and underscored that the Mission's exit should be based on progress towards satisfying the benchmarks and indicators set out in the plan and taking into consideration the situation on the ground.<sup>26</sup> In a presidential statement adopted on 2 August marking the completion of the drawdown of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation of Darfur (UNAMID), the mandate of which was terminated on 31 December 2020, the Council expressed its intention to consider the lessons learned from UNAMID in its ongoing work to enhance the overall effectiveness of

United Nations peacekeeping, including its approach to peacekeeping transitions.<sup>27</sup>

Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the mandates of peacekeeping operations in 2021 and show the wide range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; and (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and reiterated by the Council during the reporting period. The tables include the tasks of peacekeeping operations with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions during previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the operations concerned.

<sup>24</sup> See resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), nineteenth preambular paragraph.

<sup>25</sup> [S/2020/1041](#), annex.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 48 and 53.

<sup>27</sup> See [S/PRST/2021/14](#), second paragraph. For more information on the mandate and termination of UNAMID, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. I.

**Table 1  
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2021: Africa**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>
Chapter VII		X	X	X	X	X
Authorization of the use of force		X	X	X	X	X
Ceasefire monitoring	X			X	X	X
Civil-military coordination		X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X	X	X	X
Electoral assistance	X			X	X	X
Human rights-related <sup>a</sup>		X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support	X	X	X	X	X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mission impact assessment		X			X	X
Political process		X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians		X	X	X	X	X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment		X	X	X	X	X
Public information		X		X	X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters		X	X	X	X	X
Security monitoring; patrolling; deterrence		X	X	X	X	X

## Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2021

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>
Security sector reform		X			X	X
Support to military		X			X	X
Support to police	X	X	X	X	X	X
Support to sanctions regimes		X		X	X	X
Support to State institutions		X		X	X	X

*Abbreviations:* MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; MINUSMA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

Table 2  
**Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2021: Asia, Europe and Middle East**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNMOGIP</i>	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNTSO</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>
Chapter VII			X			
Authorization of the use of force						X
Ceasefire monitoring	X	X		X	X	X
Civil-military coordination			X			
Demilitarization and arms management						X
Electoral assistance						
Human rights-related <sup>b</sup>		X	X			X
Humanitarian support		X	X			
International cooperation and coordination		X	X	X	X	X
Political process		X	X			
Protection of civilians						X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment						X
Public information						
Rule of law/judicial matters						
Security monitoring-patrolling-deterrence						X
Security sector reform						
Support to military						X
Support to police		X	X			

Mandate	UNMOGIP	UNFICYP	UNMIK	UNTSO	UNDOF	UNIFIL
Support to sanctions regimes						
Support to State institutions			X			X

*Abbreviations:* UNMOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNFICYP, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNMIK, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

*Authorized strength of peacekeeping operations*

As illustrated in table 3, during the period under review, the Council modified the composition of three

peacekeeping operations by increasing the number of authorized military personnel in MINUSCA and reducing it in MONUSCO and UNISFA.

Table 3  
**Changes in composition of peacekeeping operations, 2021**

Mission	Changes in composition	Decision
MONUSCO	The Council decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling from 14,000 to 13,500 military personnel, while maintaining 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units, and continued to agree to a temporary deployment of up to 360 personnel of formed police units	Resolution <a href="#">2612 (2021)</a>
UNISFA	The Council decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling from 3,550 to 3,250 military personnel until 15 May 2022 and to maintain the authorized police ceiling at 640 police personnel, including 148 individual police officers and three formed police units	Resolution <a href="#">2609 (2021)</a>
MINUSCA	The Council decided to increase the Mission's military component by 2,750 (from 11,650 to 14,400) personnel and police component by 940 (from 2,080 to 3,080) personnel	Resolution <a href="#">2566 (2021)</a>

*Abbreviations:* MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

## Africa

### United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

The Council established the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by resolution [690 \(1991\)](#) of 29 April 1991, in accordance with the settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). MINURSO was mandated to monitor the ceasefire, provide security for the

repatriation of refugees and support the organization of a free and fair referendum.<sup>28</sup>

In 2021, by resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#) of 29 October, the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO for one year, until 31 October 2022.<sup>29</sup> The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and 2 abstentions (Russian

<sup>28</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MINURSO, see previous supplements covering the period 1991 to 2020.

<sup>29</sup> See resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

Federation and Tunisia).<sup>30</sup> The Council did not modify the mandate or composition of MINURSO during the period under review.

### **United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

The Council established the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) by resolution [1925 \(2010\)](#) of 28 May 2010, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to succeed the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). MONUSCO was authorized to use all means necessary to carry out its protection mandate as set out in the resolution and was tasked with, *inter alia*, ensuring the effective protection of civilians and supporting the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with stabilization and peace consolidation.<sup>31</sup>

On 20 December, acting under Chapter VII, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), extending the mandate of MONUSCO for one year, until 20 December 2022.<sup>32</sup>

In the same resolution, the Council strongly urged Congolese political stakeholders to spare no efforts in implementing the critical governance, security and economic reforms contained in the Government's programme of action for the period

2021–2023 and encouraged MONUSCO to continue to support, through its good offices, peaceful, transparent, inclusive and credible political processes and the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for 2023 as well as future elections.<sup>33</sup>

In the resolution, the Council reiterated the strategic priorities of MONUSCO of protecting civilians and supporting the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms, and decided that the Mission's mandate should be implemented on the basis of a prioritization of tasks, with the protection of civilians to be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources.<sup>34</sup> The Council largely reiterated the priority tasks of MONUSCO, adding new language regarding the protection of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, security sector reform, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In addition, it elaborated on the Mission's exit strategy and transition plan, as detailed below.

In connection with the protection of civilians, the Council decided that MONUSCO would take all measures necessary to ensure effective, timely, dynamic and integrated protection of civilians under threat of physical violence within the provinces of its current deployment, with a specific focus on Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, including by means of good offices.<sup>35</sup> The Council also decided that targeted offensive operations would be carried out through a reconfigured and effective force Intervention Brigade that included combat units from additional troop-contributing countries functioning as quick reaction forces, including through a mobile, flexible and robust posture.<sup>36</sup> The Council further decided that, in working with the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Mission would leverage the capacities and expertise of the technical assistance team deployed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to strengthen and support the country's judicial system with a view to investigating and prosecuting all those allegedly responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in the country.<sup>37</sup>

Concerning sexual and gender-based violence, the Council called on MONUSCO to continue to work closely with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo at both the strategic and

<sup>30</sup> See [S/PV.8890](#). In explanation of its vote, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the resolution did not reflect the objective picture of what had happened on the issue of Western Sahara following the military escalation in November and would probably not be helpful in the efforts of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara to resume direct negotiations. In recent years, Council resolutions to extend the Mission's mandate had included wording that replaced the internationally agreed parameters for the settlement of the Western Sahara issue with general wording on the need to abide by "the so-called realistic" approaches or to make some compromises. Such signals had led to ambiguity, undermined trust in the Council's work and made it more difficult to resume a direct dialogue. For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 1, "The situation concerning Western Sahara".

<sup>31</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MONUSCO, see previous supplements covering the period 2010 to 2020. For more information on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part I, sect. 4.

<sup>32</sup> See resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 22.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 24 and 25.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 29 (i) (a).

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 29 (i) (e).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 29 (i) (f).

operational levels and requested the Mission to accelerate the coordinated implementation of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence and post-conflict situations.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to reiterating the Mission's mandate on security sector reform, the Council decided that MONUSCO would continue its support to the Government, through the Mine Action Service, in enhancing the capacities of the Congolese security forces by, among other things, offering advice, training and capacity development in managing weapons and ammunition, countering improvised explosive devices and disposing of explosive ordnance.<sup>39</sup>

The Council expanded the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mandate of MONUSCO to include good offices, advice and assistance, particularly in North and South Kivu and Ituri provinces, in close cooperation with the United Nations country team, for the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme of the Government.<sup>40</sup>

With regard to issues that were not among the Mission's priorities, the Council urged MONUSCO to work with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region to seek political solutions to stop the cross-border flows of armed combatants, arms and natural resources.<sup>41</sup> Regarding the effectiveness of the Mission, the Council set out 16 substantive and operational activities for the Secretary-General to implement in the planning and conduct of the Mission's operations within the limits of its mandate and area of operation and in line with existing United Nations guidelines and regulations.<sup>42</sup>

On the topic of the exit strategy, the Council welcomed the transition plan developed on the basis of the joint strategy on the progressive and phased drawdown of MONUSCO,<sup>43</sup> endorsed in resolution 2556 (2020), and requested the Mission to withdraw from Tanganyika Province by mid-2022 and to consolidate its footprint in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, the three provinces where active conflict persisted, while pursuing its good offices and institutional strengthening work at the national level, including by ensuring the continuation of an early

warning and rapid response system.<sup>44</sup> The Council encouraged the Secretary-General to discontinue, where appropriate, tasks in support of the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms that could be responsibly and sustainably assumed by other stakeholders, and to streamline MONUSCO accordingly.<sup>45</sup>

By resolution 2612 (2021), the Council reduced the Mission's authorized troop ceiling from 14,000 to 13,500 military personnel and maintained the ceiling of 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units.<sup>46</sup> In the same resolution, the Council reiterated its approval of the temporary deployment of up to 360 personnel of formed police units, provided that those personnel were deployed in replacement of military personnel, as proposed by the Secretary-General in 2019<sup>47</sup> and approved by the Council that same year,<sup>48</sup> and invited the Secretariat to consider further reductions in the military deployment and area of operations in the light of the positive evolution of the situation on the ground, in particular in the regions where the threat posed by armed groups was no longer significant, in line with the joint strategy.<sup>49</sup>

### United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

The Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by resolution 1990 (2011) of 27 June 2011, taking into account the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area, signed on 20 June 2011. The Council mandated UNISFA to, inter alia, monitor and verify the redeployment of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei Area, participate in relevant bodies as stipulated in the Agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council authorized UNISFA to take the actions necessary to, inter alia, protect United Nations and humanitarian personnel and property, protect

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., paras. 33 and 34.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., para. 29 (ii) (f).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., para. 29 (ii) (g).

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., para. 26.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., para. 42.

<sup>43</sup> S/2020/1041, annex. See also S/2021/807.

<sup>44</sup> See resolution 2612 (2021), para. 48.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., para. 51.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., para. 23.

<sup>47</sup> See S/2019/905.

<sup>48</sup> Resolution 2502 (2019), para. 23.

<sup>49</sup> See resolution 2612 (2021), para. 23.

civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and ensure security in the Abyei Area. By resolution [2024 \(2011\)](#) of 14 December 2011, the Council expanded the mandate of UNISFA to include assisting the Sudan and South Sudan in ensuring the observance of their agreement on border security and supporting the operational activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.<sup>50</sup>

In 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions [2575 \(2021\)](#) of 11 May, [2606 \(2021\)](#) of 15 November and [2609 \(2021\)](#) of 15 December, concerning UNISFA. By resolutions [2575 \(2021\)](#) and [2606 \(2021\)](#), the Council extended the Force's mandate for periods of six and one month, respectively.<sup>51</sup> By resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), it extended the mandate, with some modifications, for a further period of five months, until 15 May 2022.<sup>52</sup>

In resolution [2575 \(2021\)](#), the Council took note of the letter dated 1 April from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council,<sup>53</sup> which contained a report on joint consultations between the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa with the Governments of the Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as with other relevant stakeholders, to discuss an exit strategy for UNISFA and develop options for its responsible drawdown and exit as requested in resolution [2550 \(2020\)](#).<sup>54</sup> With regard to the way forward, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide to the Council, no later than 30 September, a strategic review of UNISFA in which he would assess recent political developments between and within the Sudan and South Sudan, make detailed recommendations for further reconfiguration of the mission and establish a viable exit strategy in which he should prioritize the safety and security of civilians living in Abyei, account for stability of the

region and include an option for an exit strategy not limited by the 2011 agreements.<sup>55</sup>

In resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), the Council took note of a letter dated 17 September from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council containing the findings of the strategic review.<sup>56</sup> The Council subsequently decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling of UNISFA from 3,550 to 3,250 military personnel until 15 May 2022 and to maintain the authorized police ceiling at 640 police personnel, including 148 individual police officers and three formed police units and expressed its intention to keep under review the recommendations contained in the letter.<sup>57</sup>

In addition to reiterating the existing tasks of UNISFA, the Council requested the Mission to collaborate with the United Nations country teams in the Sudan and South Sudan, in consultation with the host Governments and the local communities, to engage with local communities on peacebuilding initiatives, including with regard to conflict prevention and mitigation, and the rule of law. In that regard, the Council welcomed the development of an integrated rule of law support strategy in close coordination with the host Governments and local communities, and strongly encouraged all parties to cooperate with UNISFA on the establishment of the Abyei Police Service.<sup>58</sup> The Council expressed concern that women remained absent from the leadership of local peace committees and requested UNISFA to integrate women into peace discussions and to assist those efforts by, *inter alia*, providing for gender advisers in Abyei where their expertise was urgently needed.<sup>59</sup>

Regarding the Mission's effectiveness, the Council requested the Secretary-General to implement 16 substantive and operational activities in the planning and conduct of UNISFA operations within the

<sup>50</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNISFA, see previous supplements covering the period 2011 to 2020. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I, sect. 7.

<sup>51</sup> See resolutions [2575 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1 and 2, and [2606 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>52</sup> See resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>53</sup> [S/2021/322](#).

<sup>54</sup> In the letter, the Secretary-General noted that the consultations in question had been inconclusive and that, given the separate engagements with the parties and their different positions on the future of UNISFA, it had not been possible to formulate options that would have been minimally acceptable to the parties.

<sup>55</sup> See resolution [2575 \(2021\)](#), para. 7. See also resolution [2550 \(2020\)](#), para. 31.

<sup>56</sup> [S/2021/805](#), cited in resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), eleventh preambular paragraph. The strategic review contained a proposal to reconfigure UNISFA in three main areas: (a) gearing the operation towards fostering the conditions for the final stage of the negotiations on a political settlement; (b) establishing a new, lighter and more responsive posture consolidated around the areas of the security challenges; and (c) enhancing the focus on peacebuilding with a view to facilitating a rapprochement between the communities. The Secretary-General further recommended two options for the reconfiguration of the Mission's military component.

<sup>57</sup> See resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), paras. 4 and 5.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 19.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 21.

limits of the mandate and area of operation and in line with existing United Nations guidelines and regulations.<sup>60</sup>

## United Nations Mission in South Sudan

By resolution [1996 \(2011\)](#) of 8 July 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with a mandate to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term State-building and economic development; support the Government of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, and protect civilians; and support the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations country team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, establish the rule of law and strengthen the security and justice sectors. UNMISS was authorized to use all means necessary to carry out its protection of civilians mandate.<sup>61</sup>

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council adopted resolutions [2567 \(2021\)](#) of 12 March and [2577 \(2021\)](#) of 28 May and adopted a presidential statement concerning UNMISS on 27 October.<sup>62</sup> By resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year, until 15 March 2022.<sup>63</sup>

In the resolution, the Council took note of the findings of the independent strategic review of UNMISS,<sup>64</sup> which it had requested in resolution [2514](#)

(2020),<sup>65</sup> and decided that the Mission's mandate would be designed to advance a three-year strategic vision to prevent a return to civil war in South Sudan, build durable peace at the local and national levels, and support inclusive and accountable governance and free, fair and peaceful elections in accordance with the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, signed in 2018.<sup>66</sup>

In that context, the Council introduced several modifications to the tasks of UNMISS, mainly related to the protection of civilians and the Mission's support for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the peace process. Also in the area of protection of civilians, the Council added a new task for UNMISS to use technical assistance and capacity-building to support the Government in restoring and reforming the rule of law and justice sector in order to strengthen the protection of civilians, combat impunity and promote accountability, including by investigating and prosecuting gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence, and human rights violations and abuses.<sup>67</sup> The Council added that, to deter violence against civilians, the work of UNMISS should include the implementation of a Mission-wide early warning and response strategy drawing on regular integration with civilians, including with community liaison assistants.<sup>68</sup> The Council reiterated that it was the Mission's responsibility to maintain the public safety and security of and within protection of civilians sites and added that, where such sites were redesignated, UNMISS would maintain a flexible posture linked to threat analysis, contingency plans and the ability to scale up its presence and protection if the security situation deteriorated.<sup>69</sup> The Council decided that UNMISS would promptly and effectively engage any actor that was credibly found to be preparing attacks or engaged in attacks against civilians and in camps for internally displaced persons.<sup>70</sup> In addition to deterrence and prevention as provided for in resolution [2514 \(2020\)](#), the Council decided that UNMISS would respond to sexual and gender-based violence within its capacity and areas of deployment.<sup>71</sup>

Regarding the role of UNMISS in supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the peace process, the Council decided that the Mission

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 30.

<sup>61</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMISS, see previous supplements covering the period 2011 to 2020. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I., sect. 7.

<sup>62</sup> [S/PRST/2021/20](#).

<sup>63</sup> See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>64</sup> See [S/2020/1224](#). The independent strategic review of UNMISS resulted in the conclusion that the four pillars of the UNMISS mandate remained valid overall. Nonetheless, a number of adjustments were recommended to enhance the Mission's impact. Given developments in the country, it was noted that there was an increased need for UNMISS to focus its political engagement on providing support for the implementation of the peace process and extend its technical assistance to the creation or strengthening of the governance bodies outlined in the Revitalized Agreement and the creation of bodies and legislation that would support credible elections. In implementing the four pillars of its mandate, UNMISS would have to ensure that its activities were accompanied by political engagement. It was further recommended that the authorized military strength be decreased from 17,000 to 15,000.

<sup>65</sup> See resolution [2514 \(2020\)](#), para. 39.

<sup>66</sup> See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a) (vii).

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a) (ii).

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a) (iii).

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a) (x).

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a) (iv).

would use technical assistance to support mechanisms of the Revitalized Agreement and coordinate its good offices with relevant regional actors.<sup>72</sup> The Council decided that the mandate of UNMISS would include assisting all parties in the full, effective and meaningful participation of women, youth, faith groups and civil society in the peace process, transitional government bodies and institutions, and all conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.<sup>73</sup>

In resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), the Council decided that UNMISS, in addition to its role in the protection of civilians and the political process, should support the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with international law, including applicable international humanitarian law, and consistent with United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance.<sup>74</sup>

With respect to the Mission's effectiveness, the Council requested the Secretary-General to fully implement 14 substantive and operational capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of UNMISS operations.<sup>75</sup> The Council also requested the Secretary-General to conduct and provide to the Council, no later than 15 July, a needs assessment that included security, procedural and logistical requirements for creating an enabling environment for elections in South Sudan.<sup>76</sup>

In the presidential statement adopted on 27 October,<sup>77</sup> the Council took note of the conclusion of the needs assessment mission and requested the Secretary-General to establish an integrated electoral assistance team led by UNMISS, consistent with resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), to implement electoral assistance activities set forth in the assessment,<sup>78</sup> in support of the elections roadmap detailed in the Revitalized Agreement.<sup>79</sup>

In resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated its request to UNMISS to assist the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan and that Committee's Panel of Experts, within the Mission's mandate and capabilities.<sup>80</sup>

Regarding the Mission's configuration, in resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), the Council decided to maintain the overall force levels of UNMISS and expressed its readiness to consider adjustments to those levels and capacity-building tasks depending on security conditions on the ground and the implementation of priority measures related to the protection of civilians, security sector reform, ending obstructions to UNMISS, the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, the reconstitution of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States, and the initiation of a constitution-making process by the Government and all relevant actors, as outlined in paragraph 7 of the resolution.<sup>81</sup>

By an exchange of letters dated 4 and 10 February between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,<sup>82</sup> as a temporary request under emergency circumstances, the Council approved the final extension by two months of the temporary redeployment of two infantry companies and two military utility helicopters from UNMISS to MINUSCA, which continued to be counted against the authorized ceiling on military and civilian personnel of UNMISS.<sup>83</sup>

### **United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali**

The Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by resolution [2100 \(2013\)](#) of 25 April 2013, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (c) (i) and (iv).

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (c) (ii).

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (b) (i).

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 18 (a)–(n).

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 27.

<sup>77</sup> [S/PRST/2021/20](#).

<sup>78</sup> [S/2021/661](#), annex.

<sup>79</sup> See [S/PRST/2021/20](#), third paragraph. In [S/2021/661](#), the Secretary-General transmitted a summary of the key findings and recommendations of the needs assessment team and noted that the United Nations should provide assistance in two phases. In the first phase, in the immediate term, the United Nations would continue to support the peace process through awareness-raising, engagement, good offices, technical advice and assistance for the establishment of an electoral framework for credible elections whose results would be accepted. In the second phase, in the medium to long term (until end of

December 2023), technical assistance could be included regarding legal and procedural matters, operations, electoral security, information technology and database management, external relations, media training, and voter and civic education.

<sup>80</sup> See resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#), para. 21.

<sup>81</sup> See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), paras. 4 and 7.

<sup>82</sup> [S/2021/126](#) and [S/2021/127](#).

<sup>83</sup> The Council initially approved the temporary redeployment for a two-month period by an exchange of letters dated 22 and 23 December 2020 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council ([S/2020/1290](#) and [S/2020/1291](#)) to assist MINUSCA in reinforcing security in critical areas while maintaining the security of Bangui. See *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. I.

of the United Nations. The Council authorized MINUSMA to use all means necessary to stabilize population centres and support the re-establishment of State authority, support the implementation of a transitional road map, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property, assist the Malian authorities in promoting and protecting human rights, and support humanitarian assistance, national and international justice and cultural preservation.<sup>84</sup>

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2584 \(2021\)](#) of 29 June and [2590 \(2021\)](#) of 30 August concerning MINUSMA. By resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of MINUSMA by one year, until 30 June 2022.<sup>85</sup>

By resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council amended the primary strategic priority of MINUSMA by adding support for the political transition in Mali to the existing primary strategic priority of MINUSMA to support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, concluded in 2015, and reiterated that the Mission's second strategic priority was to facilitate the implementation by Malian actors of a comprehensive politically-led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish State authority, the presence of the State and basic social services in central Mali.<sup>86</sup>

Stressing that MINUSMA should implement its mandate on the basis of a prioritization of tasks, the Council made several adjustments to the Mission's priority and other tasks as defined in the resolution. Specifically, the Council expanded the Mission's existing priority task of supporting the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation to include support for the full realization of the political transition.<sup>87</sup> The Council requested MINUSMA to assist the authorities in ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women in the political transition.<sup>88</sup> The Council specified that the electoral assistance role of MINUSMA would from that point onwards include assisting the Malian authorities in the holding of presidential elections with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and the inclusion of youth, refugees and internally displaced persons,

noting that presidential elections were scheduled to take place on 27 February 2022.<sup>89</sup>

With regard to the priority task of supporting the stabilization and restoration of State authority in central Mali, the Council decided that MINUSMA would support Malian authorities in agreeing on and implementing a politically-led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish the State's presence, State authority and basic social services in central Mali, ensuring strengthened coordination between civilian and military components of the Mission as well as coordination with local and regional communities, groups and military and civilian authorities.<sup>90</sup> The Council also decided that the Mission would support the redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces to central Mali on the basis of clear, coherent and dynamic planning, strengthened information and intelligence-sharing.<sup>91</sup> In addition, MINUSMA was to increase efforts to improve coordination between its civil, military and police components.<sup>92</sup> Regarding the protection of civilians, MINUSMA was to strengthen and promote the understanding of the mission-wide early warning and response mechanisms, as part of its support for Malian authorities in anticipating, deterring and responding to threats to civilians, notably in northern and central Mali.<sup>93</sup>

As regards the Mission's other, non-priority tasks, the Council authorized MINUSMA to assist the Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices, as well as with weapons and ammunition management,<sup>94</sup> a task that the Mission was last authorized to undertake by resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#).<sup>95</sup> In resolutions [2584 \(2021\)](#) and [2590 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated its request to MINUSMA to assist and exchange information with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to the same resolution.<sup>96</sup> In resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council authorized the Mission to assist in raising awareness of the roles and mandates of the Committee and the Panel.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>84</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2012 to 2020. For more information on the situation in Mali, see part I, sect. 11.

<sup>85</sup> See resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 17.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 21.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 30 (a).

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 53.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 30 (a) (vi).

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 30 (b) (i) and (ii).

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 30 (b) (i) and (ii).

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 27.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 30 (c) (ii).

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 31 (c).

<sup>95</sup> See resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 39 (b).

<sup>96</sup> See resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 31 (b) and resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

<sup>97</sup> See resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 31 (b).

Concerning other security presences in Mali and the Sahel, in resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to ensure adequate coordination between MINUSMA and European partners, including Task Force Takuba, and to use the convening of regular meetings of the Instance de coordination au Mali as a platform to assist Mali in getting an encompassing view of the actions undertaken by the various security presences in the country.<sup>98</sup> With regard to cross-cutting issues, the Council reiterated its request to MINUSMA to support efforts to prevent sexual violence related to the conflict in the country including by supporting the provision of medical services, sexual and reproductive health-care services, psychological services, mental health-care services, legal services and socioeconomic services to all survivors of sexual violence.<sup>99</sup> The Council maintained all other Mission tasks without modification.

With regard to the effectiveness of MINUSMA, the Council outlined 15 substantive and operational capacities and existing obligations for the Secretary-General to implement in the planning and conduct of the Mission's operations.<sup>100</sup>

The Council decided to maintain the composition of MINUSMA during the reporting period.<sup>101</sup> However, in the light of the growing insecurity and the rise in physical violence against civilians in central Mali, the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit, no later than 15 July, a report on the progress of implementation of the force adaptation plan of 2019 and to make recommendations on the force levels and ceiling of MINUSMA uniformed personnel, and expressed its intent to discuss the Mission's force level on the basis of that proposal.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., para. 32.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., para. 55.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., para. 47.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., para. 18.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., para. 19. In [S/2021/657](#), the Secretary-General recommended an increase of 2,069 uniformed personnel, consisting of 1,730 military personnel, 300 formed police unit personnel and 39 individual police officers, with the aim of enhancing the Mission's ability to protect civilians in central Mali and create further space for the peace process in the north.

## United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

The Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) by resolution [2149 \(2014\)](#) of 10 April 2014, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. MINUSCA was authorized to use all means necessary to, inter alia, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property; support the implementation of the transition process; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; support justice and the rule of law; and support the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation strategies.<sup>103</sup>

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2566 \(2021\)](#) of 12 March, [2588 \(2021\)](#) of 29 July and [2605 \(2021\)](#) of 12 November concerning MINUSCA. By resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of MINUSCA for one year, until 15 November 2022.<sup>104</sup>

At the beginning of 2021, in resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), the Council expressed grave concern at the deterioration of the situation in the Central African Republic<sup>105</sup> and decided to increase the Mission's military component by 2,750 personnel (from 11,650 to 14,400) and the police component by 940 personnel (from 2,080 to 3,020),<sup>106</sup> as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 16 February.<sup>107</sup> The Council stressed that the reinforcements were aimed at enhancing the ability of MINUSCA to perform its priority tasks in an evolving context, in particular to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian access, and to enhance the Mission's capacity to prevent and reverse a further deterioration of the security situation while creating space for the political process to advance.<sup>108</sup> The Council noted that the reinforcements should be sequenced through a phased approach and requested the Secretary-General to review implementation, performance and necessity ahead of each phase as part of his reports to the Council and to include in the report to be

<sup>103</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2014 to 2020. For more information on the situation in the Central African Republic, see part I, sect. 5.

<sup>104</sup> See resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 29.

<sup>105</sup> See resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), second preambular paragraph.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., para. 1.

<sup>107</sup> [S/2021/146](#).

<sup>108</sup> See resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

issued on 11 October a proposal on the overall reconfiguration of the MINUSCA force.<sup>109</sup> The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and 1 abstention (Russian Federation).<sup>110</sup>

On 12 November, the Council adopted resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), by which it amended the mandate of MINUSCA. Like resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), this resolution was not adopted unanimously; it received 13 votes in favour (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and 2 abstentions (China and the Russian Federation).<sup>111</sup> In the resolution, the Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA was designed to advance a multiyear strategic vision to create the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to national reconciliation and durable peace through the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic of 6 February 2019 and the elimination of the threat posed by armed groups through a comprehensive approach and proactive and robust posture without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping.<sup>112</sup> The Council recalled that the Mission's mandate should be implemented on the basis of a prioritization

of tasks.<sup>113</sup> The priority tasks were largely reiterated, with few modifications: protecting civilians; providing good offices and supporting the peace process and the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation; facilitating the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and protecting United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods.<sup>114</sup>

In terms of modifications concerning the protection of civilians, the Council decided that the Mission's mandate would include supporting the authorities of the Central African Republic in preventing, mitigating and responding to the threat posed by explosive ordnance.<sup>115</sup> The Council expanded the Mission's mandate for the protection of women and children to include the provision of assistance to women and children affected by armed conflict, including by deploying protection advisers, child protection advisers, women protection advisers and civilian and uniformed gender advisers and focal points, as well as by holding consultations with women's organizations and providing support to women's participation in early warning mechanisms.<sup>116</sup> The Council mandated MINUSCA to take concrete measures to mitigate and avoid the use of schools by armed forces and deter the use of schools by parties to the conflict, and to facilitate the continuation of education in situations of armed conflict.<sup>117</sup> The Council reiterated its request to MINUSCA to take fully into account child protection as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the authorities in ensuring that the protection of children's rights was taken into account, including through quality education provided in a safe environment in conflict areas in order to end and prevent violations and abuses against children.<sup>118</sup> The Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA would include supporting the implementation of the joint communiqué of the Government of the Central African Republic and the United Nations on the prevention of and the fight against conflict-related sexual violence and to take into account the concerns in question throughout the activities of all Mission components. The Council also included in the Mission's mandate the task to ensure, in cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, that risks of conflict-related

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., para. 2.

<sup>110</sup> See [S/2021/258](#). Explaining the abstention, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed disappointment that the authors of the resolution had decided not to mention in the text the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance, as they should have done, in accordance with General Assembly resolution [46/182](#), and stressed that, in the selection of contingents to be part of the Mission's force, the Secretariat must coordinate closely with Bangui and listen to the views of the people of the Central African Republic. For more information on the Council discussions under the item entitled "The situation in the Central African Republic", see part I, sect. 5.

<sup>111</sup> See [S/PV.8902](#). The representative of the Russian Federation indicated that a number of fundamental points expressed by the Government of the Central African Republic had not been reflected in the resolution. She added that, although the adoption of the resolution was a token of trust in the Mission, the Russian Federation could not consider the work that MINUSCA had done satisfactory or competent and announced that her delegation would monitor how the Mission would take advantage of the support expressed by the Council. The representative of China regretted that the reasonable suggestions of the Central African Republic had not been afforded full consideration in the resolution.

<sup>112</sup> See resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 31.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., para. 32.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., para. 34.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (a) (iii).

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (a) (iv).

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (a) (v).

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., para. 46.

sexual violence were included in the Mission's data collection, threat analysis and early warning system.<sup>119</sup>

Concerning the Mission's good offices and support for the peace process, the Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA would include continuing the Mission's role in that regard, including in support of the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and the ceasefire, and to take active steps in support of the authorities in the creation of conditions conducive to the full implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation on the basis of the roadmap adopted by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in Luanda on 16 September.<sup>120</sup> The Council further specified that the Mission would need to ensure that its political and security strategies promoted a coherent process, particularly in support of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, which connected national peace efforts with the ongoing efforts to monitor the ceasefire, and to promote the participation of women and gender equality.<sup>121</sup> In addition, MINUSCA was tasked with providing technical expertise to the authorities of the Central African Republic in their engagement with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.<sup>122</sup>

In terms of the Mission's other tasks, the Council decided that the assistance of MINUSCA to the republican dialogue and the 2022 elections would include good offices, security support, operational support, logistical support and, as appropriate, technical support, and coordination with the United Nations Development Programme regarding international electoral assistance.<sup>123</sup> MINUSCA was tasked with supporting the authorities of the Central African Republic in safeguarding State institutions and addressing the cross-border illicit trade in natural resources.<sup>124</sup> The Council mandated MINUSCA to ensure appropriate oversight of the progressive redeployment of vetted members of the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic or of the Internal Security Forces engaged in joint operations with MINUSCA and the restoration and maintenance of public safety and the rule of law, and emphasized that those efforts were to be carried out in strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces and contingent on a determination by MINUSCA of the compliance by the

recipients with the Status of Forces Agreement, human rights law and international humanitarian law.<sup>125</sup>

The Council reiterated that MINUSCA was to support the authorities of the Central African Republic in implementing an inclusive and progressive programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, adding that such a programme was to be gender-sensitive, and authorized the Mission to support, in consultation and coordination with international partners, temporary and voluntary cantonment sites in support of community-based socioeconomic reintegration while paying specific attention to the needs of children associated with armed forces and groups and women combatants.<sup>126</sup> MINUSCA was tasked with coordinating the support provided by multilateral and bilateral partners, including the World Bank and the Peacebuilding Commission, with regard to disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.<sup>127</sup> Regarding support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity and the rule of law, and as part of the urgent temporary measures, on an exceptional basis, without creating a precedent and without prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping operations, the Mission was authorized to arrest and detain in order to maintain basic law and order and fight impunity, and to pay particular attention in that regard to those violating the ceasefire or the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.<sup>128</sup>

In resolution 2605 (2021), the Council reauthorized MINUSCA to assist the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic and the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic, and requested the Mission to provide support to the authorities of the Central African Republic in their efforts to achieve progress on the key benchmarks for the review of the arms embargo measures, established in the presidential statement of 9 April 2019.<sup>129</sup> The Council made the request in addition to an earlier request, reiterated in resolution 2588 (2021), that MINUSCA report on how the exemption of supplies of non-lethal equipment and the provision of assistance intended solely for support of or use in the country's security sector reform was contributing to that security sector reform.<sup>130</sup>

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (a) (vi).

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (b) (i).

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (b) (iii).

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (b) (vii).

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (b).

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (c) (i).

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (c) (iii).

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (e) (i).

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (e) (iv).

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (f) (iii).

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., para. 36 (a) and para. 49, and [S/PRST/2019/3](#), seventh paragraph. For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, see part IX, sect. I.

<sup>130</sup> See resolution 2588 (2021), para. 1 (b).

Regarding the effectiveness of MINUSCA, in resolution 2605 (2021), the Council requested the Secretary-General to fully implement 16 substantive and operational capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of the Mission's operations.<sup>131</sup>

By an exchange of letters dated 4 and 10 February between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,<sup>132</sup> as a temporary request under emergency circumstances brought about by the election-related violence in the Central African Republic since

<sup>131</sup> See resolution 2605 (2021), para. 42.

<sup>132</sup> S/2021/126 and S/2021/127.

mid-December 2020, the Council approved the final extension by two months of the temporary redeployment of two infantry companies and two military utility helicopters from UNMISS to MINUSCA, which continued to be counted against the authorized ceiling on military and civilian personnel of UNMISS.<sup>133</sup>

<sup>133</sup> The Council had initially approved the temporary redeployment for a two-month period by an exchange of letters dated 22 and 23 December 2020 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council (S/2020/1290 and S/2020/1291) to assist MINUSCA in reinforcing security in critical areas while maintaining the security of Bangui. See *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. I.

## Asia

### United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

The Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) by resolution 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948. The first team of military observers, who eventually formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP, was deployed in January 1949 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan established by resolution 39 (1948). Following the termination of the Commission, the Council, by resolution 91 (1951), decided that UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire

in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the renewed hostilities in 1971, the task of UNMOGIP has been to monitor developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. In 2021, the Council did not discuss UNMOGIP or make changes to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.<sup>134</sup>

<sup>134</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMOGIP, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1946–1951*, and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952 to 2020.

## Europe

### United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. In the interest of preserving international peace and security, UNFICYP was mandated to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.<sup>135</sup>

In 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions 2561 (2021) of 29 January and 2587 (2021) of 29 July concerning UNFICYP. The Council

extended the mandate of the mission twice for a period of six months each time, the second time until 31 January 2022.<sup>136</sup>

During the period under review, the Council did not modify the mandate or composition of UNFICYP. By resolution 2561 (2021), the Council reiterated its request that UNFICYP take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate, and requested the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the number of women in UNFICYP and ensure their full, equal and meaningful participation in all aspects of its operations, including senior leadership positions, and to implement other relevant provisions of resolution

<sup>135</sup> For further information on the history of the mandate of UNFICYP, see previous supplements covering the period 1964 to 2020. For more information on the situation in Cyprus, see part I, sect. 16.

<sup>136</sup> See resolutions 2561 (2021), para. 9, and 2587 (2021), para. 10.

2538 (2020). The request was again reiterated in resolution 2587 (2021).<sup>137</sup>

In resolution 2587 (2021), the Council regretted the lack of progress on an effective mechanism for direct military contacts between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides and the relevant involved parties, and urged engagement by the sides and parties, facilitated by UNFICYP, to develop a suitably acceptable proposal on the establishment of such a mechanism, and its timely implementation.<sup>138</sup>

### **United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo**

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the Council on

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<sup>137</sup> See resolutions 2561 (2021), para. 14, and 2587 (2021), para. 16.

<sup>138</sup> See resolution 2587 (2021), para. 6.

10 June 1999, by resolution 1244 (1999), under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council mandated UNMIK to carry out a range of tasks, including promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions, and organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.<sup>139</sup> In 2021, the Council did not adopt any decisions relating to UNMIK and made no change to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMIK, see previous supplements covering the period 1996 to 2020.

<sup>140</sup> For more information on Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999), see part I, sect. 17.B.

## **Middle East**

### **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Council on 29 May 1948, by resolution 50 (1948), to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the establishment of UNTSO, the Council has assigned it different tasks without formally changing its mandate, including the supervision of the General Armistice, the supervision of the armistice following the Suez war, the supervision of the armistice between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai, and the supervision of the truce between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, in collaboration with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), respectively.<sup>141</sup>

In 2021, the Council did not make changes to the composition or mandate of UNTSO, which remained open-ended. By resolutions 2581 (2021) of 29 June and 2613 (2021) of 21 December concerning the mandate

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<sup>141</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNTSO, see *Repertoire 1946–1951* and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952 to 2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19.

of UNDOF, the Council encouraged the Department of Peace Operations, UNDOF and UNTSO to continue relevant discussions on recommendations from the 2018 independent review of UNDOF to improve mission performance and implementation of the mandate of UNDOF.<sup>142</sup>

### **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force**

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Council on 31 May 1974, by resolution 350 (1974), following the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces, in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to supervise the implementation of the Agreement and the areas of separation and limitation.<sup>143</sup>

In 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions 2581 (2021) of 29 June and 2613 (2021) of 21 December concerning UNDOF. The Council extended the mandate of the mission twice for a period

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<sup>142</sup> See resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 12.

<sup>143</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNDOF, see previous supplements covering the period 1972 to 2020.

of six months each time, the second time until 30 June 2022.<sup>144</sup>

The Council did not make changes to the mandate or composition of UNDOF during the period under review. In resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), taking into account the impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the Council reiterated its request to UNDOF to take all appropriate steps to protect the safety, security and health of all UNDOF personnel, in line with resolution 2518 (2020), within existing capacities and resources.<sup>145</sup> The Council reiterated its request to the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries to seek to increase the number of women in UNDOF and ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of uniformed and civilian women at all levels and in all positions, including senior leadership positions, and to implement other relevant provisions of resolution 2538 (2020).<sup>146</sup> In resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), the Council reiterated its encouragement to the Department of Peace Operations, UNDOF and UNTSO to continue relevant discussions on the recommendations emanating from the 2018 independent review to improve mission performance and the implementation of the mandate of UNDOF.<sup>147</sup>

### United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Council on 19 March 1978, by resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. By resolution 1701 (2006), to address the continuing hostilities in Lebanon, the Council expanded the mandate of UNIFIL to include monitoring the cessation of hostilities; accompanying and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces; extending its assistance to help to ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; and assisting the Government of

Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry of arms or related materiel.<sup>148</sup>

In 2021, by resolution 2591 (2021) of 30 August, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNIFIL for one year, until 31 August 2022.<sup>149</sup> The resolution was adopted further to the letter dated 4 August from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council recommending the extension of the mandate of the mission.<sup>150</sup>

In resolution 2591 (2021), the Council reiterated the overall mandate of UNIFIL and made several additions. The Council expressed concern about the strong negative impact of the social, economic and humanitarian crises in Lebanon on the capacities of the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces, and requested UNIFIL, in line with resolution 1701 (2006), to take temporary and special measures, without prejudice to the mandate and its implementation, and the concept of operations and rules of engagement, to support and assist the Lebanese Armed Forces with the provision of relevant additional non-lethal material (fuel, food and medicine) and logistical support.<sup>151</sup> The support would be provided for a limited period of six months, within the existing resources and without implications to the increase of the budget level, as part of the joint activities undertaken by the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL and in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.<sup>152</sup> The Council added that the support should not be considered as a precedent, that it should be provided with full respect Lebanese sovereignty and at the request of the Lebanese authorities, and that it should be subject to appropriate and immediate oversight and scrutiny.<sup>153</sup>

The Council reiterated its request to UNIFIL to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Lebanese authorities in ensuring the full, equal, effective and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making in all efforts for the maintenance and

<sup>144</sup> See resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 15. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19.

<sup>145</sup> See resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 8.

<sup>146</sup> See resolution 2613 (2021), para. 13.

<sup>147</sup> See resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 12. See S/2018/1088, which provides an overview of the recommendations of the independent review of the Mission's mandate.

<sup>148</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIFIL, see previous supplements covering the period 1975 to 2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question and the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sects. 19 and 20.

<sup>149</sup> See resolution 2591 (2021), para. 1.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, sixth preambular paragraph. See also S/2021/707.

<sup>151</sup> See resolution 2591 (2021), thirtieth preambular paragraph and para. 11.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 11.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 11.

promotion of peace and security, including in the security sector.<sup>154</sup>

The Council welcomed the constructive role played by the tripartite mechanism in facilitating coordination and in de-escalating tensions, again encouraged UNIFIL to implement, in close coordination with the parties, measures to further reinforce the capacities of the tripartite mechanism and

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<sup>154</sup> Ibid., para. 26.

urged the parties to make a systematic, constructive and expanded use of the tripartite mechanism, including the subcommittee on the marking of the Blue Line and additional ad hoc subcommittees, as recommended in the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL dated 1 June 2020 (S/2020/473).<sup>155</sup> The Council maintained the composition of UNIFIL during the reporting period.

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid., para. 13 and penultimate preambular paragraph.

## II. Special political missions

### Note

Section II is focused on the decisions adopted by the Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of special political missions,<sup>156</sup> as well as the changes to their mandates.<sup>157</sup>

### Overview of special political missions during 2021

In 2021, the Council oversaw 12 special political missions. Five were based in Africa, three in the Middle East and two each in the Americas and Asia. Their nature varied from regional offices such as the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), missions with limited mandates to monitor and support the implementation of ceasefires and peace agreements such as the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), to larger assistance missions such as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), the United Nations Assistance

Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

### *Newly established special political missions, terminations and extensions of mandates*

The Council did not establish new or terminate existing special political missions during the period under review. The Council extended the mandates of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), UNAMA, UNAMI, UNITAMS, UNOCA, UNMHA, UNSMIL, UNSOM and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. The mandates of BINUH, UNAMA, UNSMIL and UNSOM, were extended for shorter periods of time compared with previous years without any modification or specific listing of their tasks. While the UNSOM mandate was shortened in duration, the Council did modify its content. The mandate of UNOWAS was renewed in 2020 for a period of three years, until 31 January 2023,<sup>158</sup> while the mandates of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon remained open-ended.

### *Mandates of special political missions: differences in scope*

In 2021, for most special political missions, the Council prioritized mandate tasks related to good offices and technical support for the implementation of peace agreements, political dialogue and national and local-level reconciliation, and political transitions involving elections and constitutional review processes. The Council underlined the importance of strengthening good governance and the capacity of national institutions to deliver basic services and implement reform agendas, including justice and

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<sup>156</sup> Special political missions described in the present part include regional offices and offices in support of political processes. Other types of special political missions, such as offices of special and personal envoys, advisers or representatives of the Secretary-General, sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels and other entities and mechanisms, are covered in parts VII and IX of the present Supplement.

<sup>157</sup> For information on the envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General whose mandates relate to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, other than those appointed as heads of peacekeeping operations or special political missions, see part IX, sect. VI.

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<sup>158</sup> See S/2019/1009 and S/2020/85. See also *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. II.

security sector reform, as well as of providing support for the promotion and protection of human rights, and of ensuring accountability. As part of those priorities, most missions were mandated to coordinate and support the mobilization of humanitarian and development assistance among a broad spectrum of United Nations, international, regional and subregional partners and stakeholders. Gender mainstreaming, including ensuring the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women in political decision-making, as well as the protection of children, were the most common cross-cutting element of mandates.

Regional offices, such as UNOCA and UNOWAS, continued to monitor and analyse emerging threats to peace and security, support the strengthening of local capacities for conflict prevention and management and early warning, promote inclusive political dialogue and reform processes and improve governance, provide electoral support and help to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues and challenges such as transnational organized crime, terrorism and violent extremism, illicit trafficking, transhumance and conflicts between farmers and herders, and the security implications of climate change. The mandates of BINUH and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia placed particular emphasis on, respectively, capacity-building of national justice and rule of law institutions and the political, economic and social reincorporation of former members of armed groups. UNMHA further retained its relatively narrow mandate to oversee and facilitate the implementation of ceasefire arrangements.

*Mandates of special political missions: modifications*

In 2021, the Council modified the mandates of seven missions, namely UNAMI, UNITAMS, UNOCA, UNOWAS, UNSMIL, UNSOM and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. Specifically, the Council expanded the roles of UNITAMS, UNSMIL and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia to support the implementation of peace and ceasefire agreements in Colombia, Libya and the Sudan. In that regard, after the signing of the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan, concluded between the Government of the Sudan and several Sudanese armed groups on 3 October 2020, the Council decided that UNITAMS would support the implementation of the Juba Agreement, including its ceasefire arrangements and monitoring mechanisms, and to provide expanded advisory and capacity-building support to the Joint Security-Keeping Force envisaged

thereunder.<sup>159</sup> UNSMIL was tasked with supporting the implementation of the Libyan ceasefire agreement of 23 October 2020 and its monitoring mechanisms, including by deploying ceasefire monitors.<sup>160</sup> At the request of the Government of Colombia, the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia was expanded to include the verification of compliance with and implementation of the sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace as provided for in the Colombian peace agreement.<sup>161</sup>

The Council strengthened the electoral support mandates of UNAMI and UNSOM in preparation for the presidential and parliamentary elections in, respectively, Iraq and Somalia. Specifically, UNSOM was tasked with supporting the conduct of elections in accordance with the framework agreed by the Somali parties on 27 May and to continue efforts towards inclusive and transparent one-person, one-vote elections at the levels of the federal member states and the districts in preparation for holding such elections at the federal level in 2025.<sup>162</sup> In preparation for the Iraqi national election scheduled for 10 October, the Council decided that UNAMI would provide a strengthened, robust and visible United Nations election monitoring team to for monitoring on election day and to continue to assist with the election in a manner that respected Iraqi sovereignty.<sup>163</sup> That task included launching a strategic messaging campaign to educate, inform and update Iraqi voters on election preparations and United Nations activities in that regard.<sup>164</sup>

*Mandates of special political missions: cross-cutting issues*

The Council placed significant emphasis on the inclusion and participation of women, youth and other marginalized groups in political and decision-making processes. For example, the Council decided that UNSOM should engage with the federal Government of Somalia and federal member states to ensure the participation in Somali-led politics of all stakeholders, including women, youth and all Somali clans.<sup>165</sup> UNAMI, as part of its priority task of providing advice, support and assistance for inclusive, political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation, was tasked with taking into account civil society input, with the full, equal meaningful

<sup>159</sup> See resolution 2579 (2021), para. 3 (ii) and (iii) (b).

<sup>160</sup> See resolution 2570 (2021), paras. 15 and 16.

<sup>161</sup> See resolution 2574 (2021), para. 1.

<sup>162</sup> See resolution 2592 (2021), para. 6 (c).

<sup>163</sup> See resolution 2576 (2021), para. 2 (a).

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2 (c).

<sup>165</sup> See resolution 2592 (2021), para. 6 (a).

participation of women.<sup>166</sup> As part of broader subregional efforts in Central Africa, UNOCA was given a mandate to develop, in consultation with Member States, regional partners, civil society networks and local communities, including women and young people, integrated strategies for supporting national efforts to sustain peace and prevent conflicts in the region, and to undertake early warning and analysis, including from a gender perspective.<sup>167</sup>

Several missions were given new tasks related to emerging peace and security issues such as the impact of climate change and the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, among other things. For example, UNAMI was requested to advise, support and assist the Government of Iraq on facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation, including on the adverse impact of climate change and to promote, support and facilitate the coordination and delivery of humanitarian and medical assistance, notably to respond to the pandemic.<sup>168</sup> Similarly, the Council added an additional element to the role played by UNSOM in promoting cooperation to maximize the use of development financing in Somalia to include issues related to climate change, drought and the safe, effective and equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.<sup>169</sup> UNOCA was given a mandate to support United Nations efforts, as well as regional and subregional efforts, to address the impact of persistent and emerging threats to peace and security such as those related to terrorist groups, the adverse implications of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes, natural disasters, illicit trafficking in natural resources and wildlife, and farmer-herder dynamics.<sup>170</sup> More broadly with regard to peacebuilding, the Council specified that UNITAMS and UNSOM were to work with international financial institutions in the mobilization and coordination of

development assistance,<sup>171</sup> while UNOCA was given a mandate to support subregional efforts to implement the Sustainable Development Goals.<sup>172</sup> The Council called on UNOWAS to work with all elements of the system at headquarters, including continued engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission and, in West Africa and the Sahel, the regional collaborative platform in West Africa and the Sahel.<sup>173</sup>

#### *Mandate reviews*

Regarding the future of special political missions, the Council requested the Secretary-General to review the mandates of four special political missions, namely BINUH, UNAMA, UNMHA and UNSOM, and to submit recommendations on ways to adjust the mandate to the situation on the ground, on benchmarks to track progress in mandate implementation and on ways to increase mission effectiveness, depending on the mission.<sup>174</sup>

Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the mandates of special political missions in 2021, showing the range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the period under review; (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and specifically reiterated by the Council during the period under review; and (c) tasks of missions with open-ended or multi-year mandates adopted in previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.

<sup>166</sup> See resolution 2576 (2021), para. 4 (a).

<sup>167</sup> See S/2021/719, annex, objective 1 (b) and (c), and S/2021/720.

<sup>168</sup> See resolution 2576 (2021), para. 4 (b) (iv) and (c) (i).

<sup>169</sup> See resolution 2592 (2021), para. 6 (m).

<sup>170</sup> See S/2021/719, annex, objective 3 (a), and S/2021/720.

<sup>171</sup> In connection with UNITAMS, see resolution 2579 (2021), para. 3 (iv) (a); in connection with UNSOM, see resolution 2592 (2021), para. 6 (n).

<sup>172</sup> See S/2021/719, annex, objective 4 (e), and S/2021/720.

<sup>173</sup> See S/PRST/2021/3, penultimate paragraph.

<sup>174</sup> In connection with UNMHA, see resolution 2586 (2021), para. 8; in connection with UNSOM, see resolution 2592 (2021), para. 18; in connection with UNAMA, see resolution 2596 (2021), para. 5; in connection with BINUH, see resolution 2600 (2021), paras. 2 and 3.

Table 4  
Mandates of special political missions, 2021: Africa

Mandate	UNOCA	UNSMIL	UNSOM	UNOWAS	UNITAMS
Chapter VII					
Ceasefire monitoring		X			X
Civil-military coordination					

**Part X. Subsidiary organs of the Security Council:  
peacekeeping operations and special political missions**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNOCA</i>	<i>UNSMIL</i>	<i>UNSOM</i>	<i>UNOWAS</i>	<i>UNITAMS</i>
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X		X
Electoral assistance	X	X	X	X	X
Human rights-related <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support		X		X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Maritime security	X		X	X	
Mission impact assessment					
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians					X
Public information				X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform			X	X	X
Support to military			X		X
Support to police			X		X
Support to sanctions regimes		X			X
Support to State institutions		X	X		X

*Abbreviations:* UNOCA, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNITAMS, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

**Table 5  
Mandates of special political missions, 2021: Americas, Asia and Middle East**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</i>	<i>BINUH</i>	<i>UNAMA</i>	<i>United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia</i>	<i>UNAMI Lebanon</i>	<i>Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon</i>	<i>UNMHA</i>
<b>Chapter VII</b>							
Ceasefire monitoring	X						X
Civilian-military coordination			X				
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X			X		X
Electoral assistance		X	X		X		
Human rights-related <sup>a</sup>		X	X		X		
Humanitarian support			X		X		
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

## Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2021

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</i>	<i>BINUH</i>	<i>UNAMA</i>	<i>United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia</i>	<i>UNAMI</i>	<i>Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon</i>	<i>UNMHA</i>
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Protection of civilians			X				
Public information					X		
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X	X		X		
Security monitoring – patrolling – deterrence							X
Security sector reform					X		
Support to police		X					
Support to sanctions regimes							
Support to State institutions			X		X		

*Abbreviations:* BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNAMI, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNMHA, United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

## Africa

### United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was established by an exchange of letters dated 11 December 2009 and 30 August 2010 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.<sup>175</sup> The functions of UNOCA included cooperating with the Economic Community of Central African States and other regional partners in the promotion of peace and stability in the broader subregion, to carry out good offices roles in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region, to promote an integrated subregional approach and facilitate coordination and information exchange among United Nations organizations and partners in the subregion, and to report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance. UNOCA was subsequently mandated to promote efforts to address emerging security and cross-border threats, to incorporate gender perspectives in the implementation of its mandate and to take into consideration in its activities climate and

ecological change and natural disasters on the stability of the Central African region.<sup>176</sup>

In 2021, by an exchange of letters dated 3 and 6 August between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, the Council extended the mandate of UNOCA for three years, until 31 August 2024.<sup>177</sup>

In extending the mandate, the Council adjusted the Office's objectives and mandate tasks. The Council took note of the draft mandate for UNOCA submitted by the Secretary-General, which contained the following amended objectives to be pursued by UNOCA in close collaboration with relevant subregional and regional partners and relevant United Nations entities: (a) monitor political and security developments in Central Africa and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General in order to prevent and resolve conflicts, to help sustain peace and to advise the Secretary-General and United Nations entities in the region on sustaining peace issues in Central Africa; (b) enhance subregional capacities for

<sup>175</sup> S/2009/697 and S/2010/457.

<sup>176</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNOCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2008 to 2020.

<sup>177</sup> S/2021/719 and S/2021/720. For more information on the situation in the Central African region, see part I, sect. 6.

conflict prevention and mediation in countries of the subregion, with due attention to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including human rights and gender dimensions; (c) support and enhance United Nations efforts in the subregion, as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, including from human rights and gender perspectives; and (d) enhance coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security.<sup>178</sup>

Under the first objective, the mandate would continue to include the task of performing good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General, and would be expanded with the tasks of preventing and resolving conflicts and undertaking regular early warning and analysis of, and reporting on, the situation in the countries of the subregion and regional trends, including from a gender perspective.<sup>179</sup> In addition, UNOCA was newly tasked with developing, in consultation with Member States, regional partners, civil society networks and local communities, including women and young people, integrated strategies for supporting national efforts to sustain peace and prevent conflicts in the region, and rally international and regional support for such strategies.<sup>180</sup>

Under the second objective, efforts by UNOCA to enhance the capacity of subregional actors, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States, for conflict prevention, mediation and peace consolidation, would henceforth include advancing human rights and inclusive peace and democratic processes.<sup>181</sup> Furthermore, the mandate would include building partnerships with civil society, including women's and youth groups, and supporting subregional civil society networks, in particular the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Conflict Prevention in Central Africa.<sup>182</sup> The mandate of UNOCA was modified specifically to include cooperation with the African Union and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in addition to cooperation with other regional and subregional organizations and mechanisms.<sup>183</sup>

Regarding the third objective of supporting United Nations efforts in the subregion and regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, UNOCA was tasked with rallying subregional support for the peace process in the Central African Republic,

in close cooperation with MINUSCA.<sup>184</sup> The mandate was further expanded to include promoting good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention, management and resolution initiatives in Central Africa.<sup>185</sup> With respect to the Office's role in promoting, supporting and advocating United Nations, regional and subregional efforts to address the impact of persistent and emerging threats to peace and security, the mandate was adjusted to include threats related to terrorist groups in the Lake Chad basin region and the Sahel region, the adverse implications of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes and natural disasters, illicit trafficking in natural resources and wildlife, and farmer-herder dynamics.<sup>186</sup> The mandate was also modified to include promoting and supporting, as appropriate, regional and subregional efforts to address the root causes of and achieve solutions to forced displacement.<sup>187</sup>

Finally, under the existing fourth objective of enhancing coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security, UNOCA was tasked with supporting United Nations country teams in helping to address structural conflict prevention efforts at the country level, including through contributions to common country assessments, United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks and relevant sustaining peace strategies.<sup>188</sup> The mandate was further adjusted to include the task of enhancing collaboration and coordination with UNOWAS in strengthening United Nations, regional and international efforts to address cross-cutting and cross-border challenges to peace and security, and establishing a clear division of labour between it and other United Nations entities in the subregion.<sup>189</sup> Finally, UNOCA was tasked with advocating for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and helping to leverage the role of the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States and other regional actors to that effect.<sup>190</sup>

## United Nations Support Mission in Libya

By resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#) of 16 September 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council

<sup>178</sup> See [S/2021/719](#), annex.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, objectives 1 (a) and (b).

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 1 (c).

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 2 (a).

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 2 (c).

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 2 (d).

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 3 (c). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see sect. I above.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 3 (d).

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 3 (a).

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 3 (b).

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 4 (c).

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 4 (a) and (d).

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, objective 4 (e).

established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), with a mandate to support Libyan national efforts to restore public security and order and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, extend State authority, promote and protect human rights and support transitional justice, initiate economic recovery, and coordinate international support.<sup>191</sup>

In 2021, the Council adopted resolutions 2570 (2021) and 2571 (2021) of 16 April, 2595 (2021) of 15 September and 2599 (2021) of 30 September concerning UNSMIL. In addition, the Council addressed the mandate of UNSMIL in an exchange of letters dated 29 December 2020 and 4 February 2021 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,<sup>192</sup> and in a statement by the President adopted on 15 July.<sup>193</sup> Departing from the prior practice of one-year extensions, the Council, by resolutions 2595 (2021) and 2599 (2021), extended the mandate for periods of 15 days and four months, respectively, the second time until 31 January 2022.<sup>194</sup>

During the period under review, the Council expanded the mandate to include the provision of support for the ceasefire agreement concluded on 23 October 2020. In the course of the exchange of letters, the members of the Council, as they examined the Secretary-General's recommendations for an amendment to the Mission's mandate concerning ceasefire support, requested that the Secretary-General establish and deploy swiftly an advance team to Libya, security conditions and COVID-19 pandemic requirements permitting, as proposed by the Secretary-General.<sup>195</sup> In the letter from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General of 4 February, the members of the Council conveyed that they would welcome reporting on the preparations undertaken by the advance team, as well as practical proposals, following coordination with the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, for amending the Mission's mandate, including with regard to the tasks and scale of the ceasefire monitoring mechanism, as soon as possible and no later than 45 days from the date of the letter. On 19 March, as requested by the Council, the Secretary-General submitted a progress report,<sup>196</sup> in which he outlined the developments regarding the Libyan-led

and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism that had transpired since his report of 19 January.<sup>197</sup> The report contained an update on the advance team's work, its mandate and terms of reference, and the consultations it had undertaken with Libyan and international stakeholders.

In resolution 2570 (2021), the Council took note of the progress report of the Secretary-General and approved his proposals concerning the composition and operational aspects of the ceasefire monitoring component as set out in his letter of 7 April.<sup>198</sup> The Council recalled resolution 2542 (2020) and its decision therein that UNSMIL was to help to achieve a ceasefire and provide appropriate support for its implementation.<sup>199</sup> The Council requested the Mission to provide support to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism, including through the facilitation of confidence-building measures and the scalable and incremental deployment of ceasefire monitors once conditions allowed.<sup>200</sup> Recalling resolution 2542 (2020), the Council underscored the Mission's role in supporting the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 24 December.<sup>201</sup>

The Council expressed its intention to review the progress made towards the deployment of UNSMIL ceasefire monitors ahead of the renewal of the Mission's mandate on 15 September; it requested that, as part of the independent strategic review of UNSMIL, previously requested in resolution 2542 (2020), the ceasefire monitoring component of the Mission be considered, and that the Secretary-General consult the Council about any increase in the initial maximum number of ceasefire monitors set out in his letter of 7 April.<sup>202</sup>

In the presidential statement adopted on 15 July, the Council welcomed efforts by UNSMIL to encourage the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum to

<sup>191</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSMIL, see previous supplements covering the period 2010 to 2020. For more information on the situation in Libya, see part I, sect. 10.

<sup>192</sup> S/2020/1309 and S/2021/110.

<sup>193</sup> S/PRST/2021/12.

<sup>194</sup> See resolutions 2595 (2021) and 2599 (2021), para. 1.

<sup>195</sup> S/2020/1309 and S/2021/110.

<sup>196</sup> S/2021/281.

<sup>197</sup> S/2021/62.

<sup>198</sup> S/2021/353.

<sup>199</sup> See resolution 2570 (2021), para. 15.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., para. 16.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., para. 6.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid., para. 20. See also S/2021/716, annex, in which the Independent Expert who conducted the independent strategic review recommended, inter alia, that the good offices of the Mission be intensified; that the Head of Mission be relocated to Tripoli from Geneva; that the Mission return to its previous configuration consisting of a Special Representative instead of a Special Envoy, to be supported by two Deputy Special Representatives; that an immediate surge capacity be put in place to reinforce the Mission; and that women and child protection advisers be deployed swiftly.

develop proposals for a free, fair and inclusive electoral process, and recalled the Mission's role in supporting the ceasefire.<sup>203</sup>

By resolutions 2595 (2021) and 2599 (2021), the Council unanimously extended the existing mandate of UNSMIL as set out in resolution 2542 (2020) and resolution 2570 (2021), paragraph 16, without reiterating the content and without further modification.<sup>204</sup> After the vote on resolution 2595 (2021), the representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States exchanged views regarding the ongoing discussions on the Mission's future mandate in the light of the findings of the independent strategic review and the elections scheduled for 24 December.<sup>205</sup> In their statements following the vote on resolution 2599 (2021), Council members expressed differing views on whether the recommendations emanating from the review should be implemented before or after the elections.<sup>206</sup>

As regards matters other than the Mission's support for the ceasefire, the Council, by resolution 2571 (2021), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of United Nations, reiterated the mandate of UNSMIL to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) and called on the Mission and the Government of Libya to support the Panel's investigatory work inside Libya.<sup>207</sup>

## United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

By resolution 2102 (2013) of 2 May 2013, the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) with the mandate, inter alia, to provide good offices functions to support the federal Government of Somalia in the peace and reconciliation process and to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and State-building; to assist in the coordination of international donor support, in particular on security sector assistance and maritime security; to help to build the capacity of the federal

Government to promote respect for human rights, women's empowerment, child protection and the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and the strengthening of justice institutions; and to monitor, help to investigate and report on abuses or violations of human rights.<sup>208</sup>

In 2021, the Council adopted resolutions 2568 (2021) of 12 March and 2592 (2021) of 30 August concerning UNSOM. By resolution 2592 (2021), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNSOM for a period of nine months, until 31 May 2022, a shorter extension than the 12 months provided for in resolution 2540 (2020).<sup>209</sup>

By resolution 2568 (2021), the Council extended its authorization for the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and called on the federal Government of Somalia, federal member states, AMISOM, UNSOM, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia and international partners to increase coordination and collaboration, including by establishing a joint fusion cell for the planning and delivery of integrated strategic operations led by the Government; to conduct joint analysis, joint integrated planning, operational coordination and joint performance assessments; and to extend the joint fusion cell into the AMISOM sectors.<sup>210</sup>

By resolution 2592 (2021), the Council renewed the existing mandate of UNSOM as set out in resolution 2158 (2014) with some modifications. With regard to the political process, the Council reiterated that it was the Mission's task to support the federal Government and federal member states in accelerating Somali-led inclusive politics, which ensured the participation of all stakeholders, including women, youth and all Somali clans.<sup>211</sup> The Mission's was to support inter- and intraclan reconciliation at the local, regional and national levels, including through the national reconciliation framework.<sup>212</sup> The Council expanded the Mission's electoral assistance tasks to include providing support for the conduct of elections in accordance with the implementation framework agreed by the federal Government and federal member states on 27 May to the technical electoral support

<sup>203</sup> See S/PRST/2021/12, eighth and tenth paragraphs.

<sup>204</sup> See resolutions 2595 (2021) and 2599 (2021), para. 1.

<sup>205</sup> See S/PV.8858.

<sup>206</sup> See S/PV.8870. For more information on the discussions after the vote on resolutions 2595 (2021) and 2599 (2021), see part I, sect. 10.

<sup>207</sup> See resolution 2571 (2021), para. 14. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and the Panel of Experts on Libya, see part IX, sect. I.

<sup>208</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSOM, see previous supplements covering the period 2013 to 2020. For more information on the situation in Somalia, see part I, sect. 2.

<sup>209</sup> See resolution 2592 (2021), para. 1.

<sup>210</sup> See resolution 2568 (2021), para. 4 (b). For more information on AMISOM, see part VIII, sect. III.

<sup>211</sup> See resolution 2592 (2021), para. 6 (a).

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., para. 6 (b).

team, the Federal Elections Implementation Team, the state electoral implementation teams and the Electoral Dispute Resolution Committee, all having been newly established, as well as to the federal Government, federal member states, the Somali Parliament and any other stakeholders with an agreed role in election delivery.<sup>213</sup> The Council decided that the Mission would continue to support efforts to make progress towards the objective of universal suffrage elections, provide good offices, technical and operational support to the constitutionally mandated electoral management bodies for the conduct of free, fair, inclusive and transparent one-person, one-vote elections at the federal member state and district levels, in preparation for holding such elections at the federal level in 2025.<sup>214</sup> In addition, the Council decided that UNSOM would provide technical advice and capacity-building assistance to support the federal Government and federal member states in their efforts to enable the full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making, in the context of elections and peacebuilding and reconciliation processes, as envisaged in the Somali Women's Charter.<sup>215</sup> The Council also decided that the Mission would continue its advocacy for increased investment in the women and peace and security agenda and to support the federal Government and federal member states in their efforts to enable the full, equal and meaningful participation of all Somalis, including, among other groups, all Somali clans in peace and reconciliation efforts, conflict resolution, peacebuilding and elections, and increasing participation and empowerment of civil society, minority communities and other marginalized groups at all decision-making levels.<sup>216</sup>

The Council decided that the support provided by UNSOM for security sector reform would include the integration of regional forces, the transition of the Somali Police Force to a federal police service and the development of a supporting legal framework and support for the military, police and civilian components of AMISOM in enabling Somalia to take full responsibility for its security in the future with the aim of Somalia taking the lead in 2021 and achieving full responsibility by the end of 2023.<sup>217</sup> By resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), the Council adjusted the Mission's role in promoting cooperation with relevant partners, with a view to making maximum use of development financing in Somalia, including in response to climate

change, flooding, drought, locusts and the COVID-19 pandemic, including the safe, effective and equitable distribution of vaccines.<sup>218</sup> The Council further mandated UNSOM to work closely with the United Nations country team, international financial institutions and all relevant stakeholders to ensure that international support to the federal Government and federal member states was conflict-sensitive and served to maximize policy and operational coherence on the basis of a shared understanding of risks and opportunities for peace and development.<sup>219</sup>

Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General, following consultations with the federal Government, to undertake a strategic review of UNSOM after the election process had concluded and after the anticipated reconfiguration of security support to Somalia, to include in his review recommendations for clearly defined, measurable and realistic benchmarks to track the Mission's timely execution and achievement of its mandate, to initiate the development of an integrated strategic framework and to report to the Council by the end of March 2022.<sup>220</sup>

### **United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel**

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) was established by an exchange of letters dated 14 and 28 January 2016 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, merging the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel with the United Nations Office for West Africa. The Council mandated UNOWAS to, inter alia, monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security; support the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements; and promote good governance, respect for the rule of law, and human rights and the mainstreaming of gender into conflict prevention and management initiatives. The mandate of UNOWAS was subsequently modified and

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<sup>213</sup> Ibid., para. 6 (c).

<sup>214</sup> Ibid.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid., para. 6 (d).

<sup>216</sup> Ibid., para. 6 (d) and (e).

<sup>217</sup> Ibid., para. 6 (f).

<sup>218</sup> Ibid., para. 6 (m).

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., para. 6 (n).

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., para. 18.

was most recently extended for a period of three years, from 1 February 2020 to 31 January 2023.<sup>221</sup>

In 2021, the Council adopted two presidential statements concerning UNOWAS, one on 3 February and one 17 August.<sup>222</sup>

In the presidential statement adopted on 3 February, the Council welcomed the assumption by UNOWAS of the good offices functions of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, following the conclusion of its mandate on 31 December 2020, and requested specific reporting on that function.<sup>223</sup> The Council recognized the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters on food security on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region, stressed the need for long-term strategies and encouraged UNOWAS to continue to integrate those elements into its activities.<sup>224</sup> The Council also encouraged cross-pillar efforts to foster greater coherence and coordination with the United Nations system as well as with partners in the region to implement the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and the United Nations Support Plan for the Sahel, and to help to enhance the regional implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063 of the African Union. In that connection, the Council called on UNOWAS to work with all elements of the United Nations system, at headquarters as well as in West Africa and the Sahel, in particular with the Regional Collaborative Platform, to strengthen integrated responses to the challenges facing the region.<sup>225</sup>

Subsequently, in the presidential statement adopted on 17 August, the Council commended the recent democratic transition in the Niger and the reconciliation efforts undertaken in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, encouraged the continued pursuit of those dialogues and commended the good offices role played by UNOWAS in supporting democratic practices and the leadership role played by ECOWAS in mediation in the region.<sup>226</sup> The Council also commended the efforts of the countries of the region to advance the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in political processes, welcomed the Secretary-General's reporting on this issue and encouraged

UNOWAS to continue its gender-sensitive reporting.<sup>227</sup> Welcoming the ongoing efforts by ECOWAS to evaluate the plans of action for the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, the Council called for enhanced political support and engagement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel in accompanying that process to ensure its effective and meaningful operationalization in the countries of the region.<sup>228</sup>

### United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan

By resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#) of 3 June 2020, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) for an initial period of 12 months, in the context of the drawdown and exit of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).<sup>229</sup> The Council decided that UNITAMS, as part of an integrated and unified United Nations structure in the Sudan, would have four strategic objectives, namely to assist the political transition in the Sudan, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace; to support peace processes and the implementation of future peace agreements; to assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law, in particular in Darfur and Blue Nile and South Kordofan (Two Areas); and to support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

In 2021, by resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#) of 3 June, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNITAMS for one year, until 3 June 2022, and introduced several adjustments.<sup>230</sup> Specifically, the Council amended the Mission's second strategic objective of supporting peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements to include the implementation of the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan concluded between the Government of the Sudan and several Sudanese armed groups on 3 October 2020.<sup>231</sup> The Council decided that

<sup>221</sup> For more information on the mandate of UNOWAS, see previous supplements covering the period 2016 to 2020. For more information on peace consolidation in West Africa, see part I, sect. 8.

<sup>222</sup> [S/PRST/2021/3](#) and [S/PRST/2021/16](#), respectively.

<sup>223</sup> See [S/PRST/2021/3](#), fifteenth paragraph.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, thirteenth paragraph.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, seventeenth paragraph.

<sup>226</sup> See [S/PRST/2021/16](#), tenth paragraph.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*, eleventh paragraph.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*, ninth paragraph.

<sup>229</sup> See resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the history of the establishment of UNITAMS, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I, sect. 7.

<sup>230</sup> See resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (ii).

UNITAMS would provide scalable support for the implementation of the Agreement and any future peace agreements, including support for ceasefire arrangements and monitoring mechanisms, for the provisions concerning power-sharing, landownership and usage, accountability and transitional justice, for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and for the safe and effective management and storage and security of weapons and ammunition stockpiles.<sup>232</sup> In addition, UNITAMS was tasked with providing good offices and support for ongoing and future peace negotiations between the Government and Sudanese armed groups.<sup>233</sup>

In resolution 2579 (2021), the Council added further elements to the strategic objectives of UNITAMS of assisting in the political transition in the Sudan; assisting in matters related to peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law; and supporting the mobilization of economic and development assistance and the coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance.<sup>234</sup> Concerning the Mission's assistance to the political transition, the Council decided that UNITAMS would use its good offices to assist in the Sudanese transition, including national efforts to meet the timelines set for it, and to provide technical assistance for the establishment and functioning of the Transitional Legislative Council.<sup>235</sup> Regarding the Mission's role in support of peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law, the Council tasked UNITAMS with providing expanded advisory and capacity-building support to the Sudanese Police Force and the Joint Security-Keeping Force envisaged in the Juba Peace Agreement, including through United Nations advisers, working in close cooperation with the United Nations country team.<sup>236</sup> UNITAMS was to support the Government of the Sudan in developing measurable benchmarks for the implementation of the national plan for the protection of civilians and, in doing so, was to emphasize transparency and inclusive procedures; in addition, the Mission was to support the Government in strengthening the promotion of human rights, in particular in conflict-affected areas.<sup>237</sup>

Under the Mission's strategic objective of supporting the mobilization and coordination of assistance, the Council tasked UNITAMS with

supporting coordination with international financial institutions and donors to optimize resources in support of the Government's national priorities.<sup>238</sup> The Mission's support for the coordination of humanitarian assistance was expanded to include support for the Government's facilitation efforts and the mobilization of humanitarian financing.<sup>239</sup> The Council also requested UNITAMS and its integrated United Nations country team partners to finalize the Sudan peacemaking, peacebuilding and stabilization programme and ensure that its implementation was sequenced and prioritized in line with the strategic objectives, and that it was reflective of available resources and personnel;<sup>240</sup> the Council also requested UNITAMS and its integrated United Nations country team partners to establish an integrated strategic framework within 60 days of the adoption of the resolution, 3 June.<sup>241</sup> In terms of regional support to the Sudan, the Council encouraged UNITAMS, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity in their efforts, including through a United Nations-African Union senior level coordination mechanism.<sup>242</sup>

Importantly, in line with its strategic objectives and support to the Government's national priorities, the Council decided that UNITAMS should prioritize six areas during its mandate period ending on 3 June 2022: (a) ceasefire monitoring in Darfur; (b) implementation of the Government's national plan for the protection of civilians; (c) ongoing and future peace negotiations between the Government and armed groups; (d) inclusive implementation of the power sharing provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement; (e) the constitution-drafting process; and (f) advisory and capacity-building support to the Sudanese Police Forces and the justice sector.<sup>243</sup> In addition, the Council took note of the benchmarks and indicators submitted by the Secretary-General to track the Mission's progress, requested UNITAMS, in consultation with the United Nations country team and the Government, to identify qualitative indicators to complement the existing indicators that were quantitative in nature.<sup>244</sup>

<sup>232</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (ii) (b).

<sup>233</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (ii) (a).

<sup>234</sup> Ibid., 3 (ii)–(iv).

<sup>235</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (i) (a) and (b).

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (iii) (b).

<sup>237</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (iii) (c) and (d). See also [S/2020/429](#) and [S/2021/984](#).

<sup>238</sup> See resolution 2579 (2021), para. 3 (iv) (a).

<sup>239</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (iv) (c).

<sup>240</sup> Ibid., para. 10.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid., para. 6.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid., para. 18.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid., para. 4 (i)–(vi).

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., para. 7. See also [S/2021/470](#), annex I, which contains the benchmarks and associated indicators designed to measure progress in the delivery of the nine strategic priorities across the four pillars of the Mission's mandate in line with resolution 2524 (2020).

## Americas

### United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

The Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia by resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#) of 10 July 2017 after the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The Verification Mission was mandated to, inter alia, verify the implementation of the process of political, economic and social reincorporation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) and of the personal and collective security guarantees provided under the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace of 24 November 2016 between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP.<sup>245</sup>

In 2021, by resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#) of 11 May and [2603 \(2021\)](#) of 29 October, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of the Verification Mission for periods of, respectively, five weeks and one year, the second time until 31 October 2022.<sup>246</sup> In both instances, the Council acknowledged a request of the Government of Colombia for the Mission's extension.<sup>247</sup>

By resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), following the request of the Government of Colombia,<sup>248</sup> to support the comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement, the Council expanded the Mission's mandate to include the verification of compliance with and implementation of the sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to individuals determined to have acknowledged, in detail and completely, the truth and their responsibility before the Judicial Panel for Acknowledgement of Truth, Responsibility and Determination of Facts and Conduct in line with the sentencing framework established under the Final Agreement.<sup>249</sup> The Council further decided that the tasks of the Verification Mission in

that regard would be those described in the letter dated 24 February from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council<sup>250</sup> and would include verifying the fulfilment by sentenced persons of the terms of their sentences as well as the establishment by Colombian State authorities of the conditions necessary for doing so.<sup>251</sup> The Council further stated that the Mission would adopt a strategic and inclusive approach to such verification, as described in the letter from the Secretary-General, and took note of the proposal contained therein that monitoring be focused on overall trends in compliance and select individual cases.<sup>252</sup>

### United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

By resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) of 25 June 2019, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). BINUH was mandated to advise the Government of Haiti in promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; preserving and advancing a peaceful and stable environment, including through supporting an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue; and promoting and protecting human rights. BINUH was further tasked with assisting the Government in planning and executing free, fair and transparent elections; reinforcing the capacity of the Haitian National Police; developing an inclusive approach to reduce community violence; addressing human rights abuses and violations and complying with international human rights obligations; improving penitentiary administration management and oversight of prison facilities; and strengthening the justice sector.<sup>253</sup>

In 2021, the Council adopted a presidential statement on 24 March,<sup>254</sup> and adopted resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#) of 15 October concerning BINUH. By that resolution, the Council unanimously extended the existing mandate of

<sup>245</sup> For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, see previous supplements covering the period 2016 to 2020. For more information on the item entitled "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)", see part I, sect. 13.

<sup>246</sup> See resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 4, and [2603 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>247</sup> See resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#), fifth preambular paragraph, and [2603 \(2021\)](#), eighth preambular paragraph.

<sup>248</sup> See [S/2021/147](#).

<sup>249</sup> See resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>250</sup> [S/2021/186](#), in which the Secretary-General made his recommendations regarding the expanded mandate of the Verification Mission made further to a request dated 30 January from the Council (see [S/2021/100](#)).

<sup>251</sup> See resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>253</sup> For more information on the mandate of BINUH, see previous supplements covering the period 2019 to 2020. For more information on the question concerning Haiti, see part I, sect. 12.

<sup>254</sup> [S/PRST/2021/7](#).

BINUH in accordance with resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) for a period of nine months, until 15 July 2022 without any modifications.<sup>255</sup> The Council departed from its previous practice of granting one-year extensions, which it had been following since the mission's establishment in 2019.

In resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment of the BINUH mandate, including whether and how the mandate could be adjusted to address the ongoing challenges faced by Haiti; increase the effectiveness of the mission and its efforts to support engagement between Haitian national authorities, civil society and

<sup>255</sup> Resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

other stakeholders; strengthen the rule of law; promote respect for human rights; and convey the findings within six months following the adoption of the resolution.<sup>256</sup>

In the presidential statement adopted on 24 March 2021 and in resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated its encouragement to continue close collaboration and coordination between BINUH, the United Nations country team, regional organizations and international financial institutions with a view to helping the Government to take responsibility for realizing the long-term stability, sustainable development and economic self-sufficiency of the country.<sup>257</sup>

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 2 and 3.

<sup>257</sup> [S/PRST/2021/7](#), twelfth paragraph and resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), para. 4.

## Asia

### United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by the Council by resolution [1401 \(2002\)](#) of 28 March 2002 with the core mandate to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001, as well as to promote national reconciliation and rapprochement through its good offices and manage all United Nations humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.<sup>258</sup>

In 2021, by resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#) of 17 September, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNAMA as defined in resolution [2543 \(2020\)](#) for a period of six months, until 17 March 2022, which was shorter than the previous mandate extension of one year.<sup>259</sup>

In resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), following the takeover of the country by the Taliban in August, the Council stressed the critical importance of a continued presence of UNAMA and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes across Afghanistan and called upon all Afghan and international parties to coordinate with the Mission in the implementation of its mandate and to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of

<sup>258</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2000 to 2020.

<sup>259</sup> Resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country.<sup>260</sup> The Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a written report by 31 January 2022 on strategic and operational recommendations for the Mission's mandate, in the light of the recent political, security and social developments.<sup>261</sup>

### United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia was authorized by the Council through an exchange of letters dated 7 and 15 May 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,<sup>262</sup> at the initiative of the Governments of the region. With a view to strengthening the United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia, the Centre was assigned a number of tasks, including liaising with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground; and maintaining contact with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Centre was established with an open-ended mandate. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to its mandate.<sup>263</sup>

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4. For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 14.

<sup>261</sup> Resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), para. 5.

<sup>262</sup> [S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#).

<sup>263</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, see previous supplements covering the period 2007 to 2020.

## Middle East

### United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

The Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003 by resolution [1500 \(2003\)](#) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate under resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#), in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of 17 July 2003.<sup>264</sup> Those responsibilities included coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development; and supporting efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions.<sup>265</sup>

In 2021, by resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#) of 27 May, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNAMI for one year, until 27 May 2022.<sup>266</sup>

The Council commended the efforts by the Government of Iraq to plan and execute free and fair Iraqi-led and owned elections that were inclusive, credible and participatory, and welcomed the request by the Government for further United Nations electoral advice, support and technical assistance in that regard.<sup>267</sup> Taking into account the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq dated 11 February,<sup>268</sup> the Council decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, as well as the Mission, would provide a strengthened, robust and visible United Nations team with additional staff in advance of the country's election planned for 10 October, monitor proceedings on election day and continue to assist with the election in a manner that respected Iraqi sovereignty.<sup>269</sup> The Council also decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would engage with, encourage, coordinate with and provide logistical and security support to international and regional third-party observers invited by the Government and would launch a United Nations strategic messaging campaign to educate, inform and

update Iraqi voters on election preparations as well as on United Nations activities in support of elections in advance of and on election day.<sup>270</sup> The Council further requested that the Secretary-General provide a detailed summary report on the electoral process in Iraq and on the Mission's assistance to that process within 30 days of the conclusion of the elections.<sup>271</sup>

The Council largely reiterated the remaining tasks of UNAMI with several additions. Specifically, the Council requested the Special Representative and UNAMI to take into consideration civil society input, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, when providing advice, support and assistance to the Government and the people of Iraq on advancing inclusive political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation.<sup>272</sup> Similarly, the Council requested that the Special Representative and UNAMI advise and assist the Government in ensuring the full, equal, and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making, including in the context of elections, and the promotion of women's economic empowerment, by supporting the implementation of the national action plan on women and peace and security.<sup>273</sup>

The Council also requested that the Special Representative and UNAMI further assist the Government with facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation on a variety of issues, including the adverse impacts of climate change,<sup>274</sup> and the coordination and delivery of medical assistance in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>275</sup> The Council asked the Special Representative and UNAMI to note the importance of treating children affected by armed conflict primarily as victims and support the implementation of the conclusions of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.<sup>276</sup> In addition, the Council requested the Special Representative and UNAMI to encourage both the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to implement fully their budget agreement concluded in 2021 and to negotiate agreements on other outstanding issues.<sup>277</sup> Finally, the Council expressed its intention to review

<sup>264</sup> [S/2003/715](#).

<sup>265</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMI, see previous supplements covering the period 2003 to 2020. For more information on the situation concerning Iraq, see part I, sect. 21.

<sup>266</sup> Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, fourth preambular paragraph.

<sup>268</sup> [S/2021/135](#), annex.

<sup>269</sup> Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 2 (a).

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2 (b) and (c).

<sup>271</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3. See also [S/2021/700](#).

<sup>272</sup> Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 4 (a).

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4 (e).

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4 (b) (iv).

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4 (c) (i).

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4 (f).

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4 (g).

the mandate and reporting cycle of UNAMI by 27 May 2022 or sooner if so requested by the Government of Iraq.<sup>278</sup>

### Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

The establishment of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon was authorized by the Council by means of an exchange of letters dated 8 and 13 February 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.<sup>279</sup> The Office was established with an open-ended mandate. The position of Special Coordinator was created to replace the position of Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon, which had been created in 2000.<sup>280</sup> The Special Coordinator was tasked with coordinating the work of the United Nations in the country and representing the Secretary-General on all political aspects of the Organization's work. The Special Coordinator was also responsible to ensure that the activities of the United Nations country team in Lebanon were well coordinated with the Government of Lebanon, donors and international financial institutions. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to the mandate of the Office.<sup>281</sup>

### United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

The Council established the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) by resolution 2452 (2019) of 16 January 2019 to support the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa as set out in the Stockholm Agreement. UNMHA succeeded the work of an

advance team which was established by resolution 2451 (2018) of 21 December 2018 and deployed to begin monitoring and to support and facilitate the immediate implementation of the Stockholm Agreement.<sup>282</sup> UNMHA was mandated to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces and mine action operations; to monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire and the mutual redeployment of forces; to work with the parties so that security was assured by local security forces; and to facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties in fully implementing the Hudaydah Agreement.<sup>283</sup>

In 2021, by resolution 2586 (2021) of 14 July, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNMHA for a period of one year, until 15 July 2022.<sup>284</sup>

In the resolution, the Council reiterated the existing mandate of the Mission without any modifications. The Council requested the Secretary-General to fully deploy UNMHA expeditiously, taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and called on the parties to the Hudaydah Agreement to support the United Nations.<sup>285</sup> In that connection, the Council demanded an end to the hindrances to the movement of UNMHA personnel in Hudaydah Governorate, particularly in conflict-affected districts, and expressed support for the efforts by UNMHA to reactivate the Redeployment Coordination Committee and its joint mechanisms to implement the Hudaydah Agreement and to meet the access needs of all parties and be equally responsive to their requests.<sup>286</sup> Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to present to the Council a further review of UNMHA at least one month before the mandate of UNMHA was due to expire.<sup>287</sup>

<sup>278</sup> Ibid., para. 6.

<sup>279</sup> S/2007/85 and S/2007/86.

<sup>280</sup> See S/2000/718.

<sup>281</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, see previous supplements covering the period 2004 to 2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, see part I, sect. 20.

<sup>282</sup> See resolution 2452 (2019), para. 1.

<sup>283</sup> For more information on the mandate of UNMHA, see previous supplements covering the period 2019 to 2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19.

<sup>284</sup> Resolution 2586 (2021), para. 1.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid., para. 5.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid., para. 8. See also S/2021/528, containing the review of UNMHA requested by the Council in resolution 2534 (2020), prior to the extension of the Mission's mandate by resolution 2586 (2021).