

## 10. The situation in Libya

During the period under review, the Security Council held 17 meetings under the item entitled “The situation in Libya” and adopted 6 resolutions, including two under Chapter VII of the Charter. All the meetings that were not devoted to the adoption of decisions of the Council took the form of briefings.<sup>367</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition to the meetings, in 2022, Council members held informal consultations of the whole and one informal interactive dialogue to discuss this item.<sup>368</sup> In 2022, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).<sup>369</sup>

In 2022, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL. These briefings focused on the ongoing political, security, humanitarian and socio-economic challenges facing Libya, including the constitutional review process in preparation for the postponed presidential and parliamentary elections. The briefings also covered the work of UNSMIL towards the implementation of the Libyan-led Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism as well as efforts to support the economic reform process and to improve the security and humanitarian situation across the country. Other briefers included the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya, who briefed the Council on the activities and developments relating to the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts; the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), who provided updates on the Court’s ongoing investigations regarding the situation in Libya; and three civil society briefers. Invitations under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure to speak during meetings were limited to Libya.

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<sup>367</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>368</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 37.

<sup>369</sup> See [S/2022/669](#) and [S/2022/670](#).

During her briefing to Council members on 24 January 2022, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs reported that growing polarization among political actors in disputes over key aspects of the electoral process had resulted in the postponement of the 24 December 2021 elections.<sup>370</sup> She noted that on 5 December 2021 the Secretary-General had appointed his Special Adviser on Libya, who was working closely with UNSMIL and who had undertaken wide-ranging consultations in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misratah and Sirte since her arrival in Libya on 12 December. Concerning the political situation in the country, the Under-Secretary-General underlined that the Special Adviser had reiterated to Libyan interlocutors that the focus of the political process should remain on holding the parliamentary and presidential elections in the shortest possible time frame. On the security track, she reported that various armed groups had been meeting, while on the economic track, she noted that further steps had been taken towards the reunification of the Central Bank of Libya. The Under-Secretary-General welcomed renewed efforts to advance national reconciliation based on the principles of transitional justice but noted that, while the ceasefire had continued to hold, political uncertainty in the run-up to the elections had negatively impacted the security situation. She reported that the second group of international monitors from the UNSMIL ceasefire monitoring component had deployed to Tripoli in December 2021. Regarding the human rights situation, the Under-Secretary-General informed that UNSMIL had documented incidents of election-related violence, attacks against journalists, activists and individuals expressing political views, and hate speech and violence against women and men working to protect and promote the rights of women. She also noted the continued occurrence of arbitrary detentions and the inhumane treatment of migrants and refugees in Libya, indicating nonetheless that the humanitarian situation had improved overall in 2021.

At the same meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL), a non-governmental organization. In connection with the elections, she warned that focusing on the dates for the elections instead of a clear process to facilitate them risked compromising due process for perceived political expediency. She reported that the systematic crackdown on civil society by all parties in Libya was particularly targeting women human rights

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<sup>370</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#).

defenders and women exercising their right to participate in political or public life. She called on the Council and Member States to support an electoral process rooted in a legitimate legislative and constitutional framework; demand accountability of all parties to the conflict, including third States; apply sanctions fairly, transparently and consistently; protect women and civil society; and adopt and implement the recommendations for the independent strategic review of UNSMIL.

On 31 January, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2619 \(2022\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL for three months, until 30 April. By the same resolution, the Council recalled that UNSMIL should be led by a Special Envoy and recognised the responsibility of the Secretary-General to appoint such envoy, as set out in resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#).<sup>371</sup> Despite the unanimous adoption, most Council members expressed disappointment at the Council's inability to reach an agreement on a substantive renewal of the mandate of UNSMIL.<sup>372</sup> Several Council members supported the three-month extension to allow the Council to respond to developments in the situation in Libya and to agree on the appointment of a Special Envoy.<sup>373</sup>

In her briefing to Council members on 16 March, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, reporting on the political situation in Libya, noted that the Libyan executive was facing a crisis that could lead to instability and parallel Governments in the country.<sup>374</sup> She reported increasingly threatening rhetoric, growing political tensions and divided loyalties among the armed groups in western Libya following the 1 March vote of confidence on the new Government. Despite concerns by the Secretary-General that that vote had fallen short of standards of transparency and procedure, the new Prime Minister had been sworn in by the House of Representatives on 3 March. The Under-Secretary General reported that the Special Adviser had continued her consultations with a broad cross-section of Libyan political and security actors and civil society and that the United Nations was focusing its efforts on building consensus among Libyan institutions on a constitutional basis for the elections to be

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<sup>371</sup> Resolution [2619\(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>372</sup> See [S/PV.8961](#).

<sup>373</sup> Russian Federation, China.

<sup>374</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#).

held as soon as possible. In that regard, she urged the members of the Council to call for responsible leadership by the Libyan institutions and to remain united in support of United Nations efforts to assist Libya.

At the same meeting, the Council heard a briefing from a member of civil society, legal academic/activist and candidate for the parliamentary elections. In her statement, she conveyed the concerns of the Libyan people regarding the ongoing impasse in the political process, the absence of a permanent constitution, the lack of executive and legislative legitimacy of the State authorities, and the situation of human rights in the country, particularly the rights of women. She called on the Council to support the Libyan electoral process through the international monitoring of the elections and to urge the Libyan leadership to honour the commitments of the Libyan State to respect women and ensure a gender perspective in all policies, legislation and national strategies.

On 29 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2629 \(2022\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL for three additional months, until 31 July.<sup>375</sup> In the resolution, the Council requested the Mission to implement the recommendations of the independent strategic review of UNSMIL and decided that the Mission should be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Tripoli, supported by two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, and called upon the Secretary-General to appoint that Special Representative promptly.<sup>376</sup> The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution every 30 days.<sup>377</sup> Many Council members expressed regret that the Council had not been able to secure consensus on a substantive one-year mandate renewal.<sup>378</sup> At the same time, most of them expressed the hope for agreement on a forthcoming substantive resolution on UNSMIL soon and called on the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative without delay. Several Council members

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<sup>375</sup> Resolution [2629 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 6.

<sup>378</sup> See [S/PV.9025](#), Ireland, Albania, Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Gabon, Kenya, Ghana, France, United States and United Kingdom,

welcomed the endorsement by the Council of the recommendations of the strategic review,<sup>379</sup> including through the reform of the Mission's leadership structure.<sup>380</sup>

On 26 May, during her briefing to the Council, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs informed Council members that the deadlock on the political, security and economic fronts in Libya had persisted, despite the best efforts of the United Nations to facilitate agreement among Libyan actors.<sup>381</sup> She added that the human rights situation had also deteriorated and expressed concern about the negative impact of the protracted political impasse on the security situation in the country. In that regard, she said that while the 2020 ceasefire continued to hold and the activities of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission had resumed, the situation remained fragile, with clashes among armed groups in Tripoli. On the economic front, the Under-Secretary-General recalled that the reluctance of the Government of National Unity to pay the Libyan National Army's salaries for the first quarter of 2022 had led to elements affiliated with the Libyan National army closing several oilfields, cutting the country's daily oil output in half.

During her briefing on 27 June, the Under-Secretary-General she informed the Council that during the final round of consultations of the House of Representatives and the High State Council, a broad consensus had been reached on most of the contentious issues regarding the constitutional basis for elections.<sup>382</sup> She was encouraged that the leaders of both Chambers had accepted the invitation of the Special Adviser to meet in Geneva in June to discuss and reach agreement on outstanding measures governing the transitional period leading to elections. Nevertheless, she noted that continued political divisions were contributing to a tense security environment in and around Tripoli. She also expressed alarm at the human rights situation, indicating that the civic space was consistently being eroded, with arbitrary restrictions imposed on civil society organizations and human rights activists being targeted and reports of torture in detention facilities and prisons. On the economic front, the Under-Secretary-General underscored

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<sup>379</sup> United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, Norway, France and United Kingdom.

<sup>380</sup> Ireland, Brazil, Mexico and France.

<sup>381</sup> See [S/PV.9047](#).

<sup>382</sup> See [S/PV.9078](#).

that the suspension of oil revenue transfers could negatively impact the ability of the Government of National Unity to pay salaries and meet other spending needs.

Following the briefing by the Under-Secretary-General, the Operations Manager of the Fezzan Libya Organization, a civil society organization, addressed the Council via videoconference from Sabha, Libya. Focusing her briefing on issues surrounding female participation in Libyan political life, she noted that the political participation of women continued to face significant challenges, with women in Libya being victim to systemic violence from the Government. While recent Governments in Libya had taken positive steps by appointing more women to higher positions, she underlined that achieving meaningful participation of women also required adopting pro-women legislation.

In her briefing on 25 July, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations indicated that the overall situation in Libya remained highly volatile, adding that the constitutional and political stalemate persisted, prolonging the tense security environment with an increased number of clashes in and around Tripoli.<sup>383</sup> She reported that progress had been made on the constitutional track with the agreement between the Speaker of the House of Representative and the President of the High State Council on some of the transitional measures that would lead to the holding of national elections and a road map. She also reported on the demonstrations held across Libya on 1 July, where protestors had expressed their frustration with the continuing political divisions and the deterioration of their living conditions. While the continued political divisions were prolonging the tense security environment in and around Tripoli, she reported that Libyan monitors, together with the international monitors of UNSMIL had conducted two joint workshops to operationalize the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism. Regarding the economic situation, she expressed concern about the politicization of the National Oil Corporation, stressing that the dire economic situation had had a negative impact on people's fundamental right to basic services and access to food, water, sanitation, healthcare and education.

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<sup>383</sup> See [S/PV.9098](#).

On 28 July, the Council adopted resolution [2647 \(2022\)](#), with three abstentions.<sup>384</sup> By the resolution, the Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL for an additional three months until 31 October 2022, and reiterated that the Mission should be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Tripoli, supported by two Deputy Special Representatives, and called upon the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative promptly.<sup>385</sup> Expressing regret that a number of the deliverables of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum had yet to be achieved, the Council also underlined that the objectives and governing principles set out therein were still relevant to the political process and urged the Libyan political institutions and key stakeholders to agree on a pathway to deliver elections as soon as possible through dialogue, compromise and constructive engagement, in a transparent and inclusive manner.<sup>386</sup> In the preambular paragraphs of the resolution, the Council expressed support for the ongoing facilitation of intra-Libyan consultations to create the conditions and circumstances for elections on a constitutional and legal basis while also encouraging further international support and regional cooperation between Libya, neighbouring countries and relevant United Nations Bodies in support of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the country and the region.<sup>387</sup> The Council also recalled that Libya's oil resources were for the benefit of all Libyans and needed to remain under the exclusive control of the National Oil Corporation and expressed grave concern at the humanitarian situation in the country.<sup>388</sup>

After the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom, the penholder of the resolution, highlighted that resolution [2647 \(2022\)](#) contained a number of important messages, including on the political and security processes, the integrity of the National Oil Corporation and human rights and of particular importance, the message to the Libyan parties on the need to agree on a pathway to deliver presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible.<sup>389</sup> She added, however, that she shared the frustration of her African colleagues who had abstained due to the

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<sup>384</sup> See [S/PV.9103](#). *For*: (Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States; *Abstaining* (Gabon, Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>385</sup> Resolution [2647 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*, second to fourth preambular paragraphs.

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*, sixth and ninth preambular paragraphs.

<sup>389</sup> See [S/PV.9103](#).

short three-month mandate and indicated that the approach by the Russian Federation of insisting on three-month rollovers in the absence of a Special Representative was short-sighted and undermined the ability of UNSMIL to support Libyan leaders to achieve the political and security objectives required to bring stability to the country. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the adopted resolution was the only possible compromise for all at that stage and stated that the tenure of the Special Adviser without an appropriate security mandate had been unjustifiably prolonged. He further insisted that the Secretary-General should promptly submit a worthy and authoritative candidate for the position of Special Representative and Head of UNSMIL, one that would suit the main Libyan actors and regional stakeholders, for subsequent approval by the members of the Council. He added that Russia's insistence on the issue of appointing a Special Representative was dictated solely by concern for maintaining the effectiveness of United Nations efforts to promote a settlement in Libya. The representative of Gabon explained that her delegation had abstained in the voting on the renewal of UNSMIL as a call for the interests and concerns of Libyans to be put above all other considerations. She pointed out that the Council remained insensitive despite the gradual deterioration of the security situation on the ground, adding that the short mandate renewals undermined the credibility of the Council. She further reiterated Gabon's support for the appointment of an African to the position of Special Representative. Similarly, the representative of Ghana emphasized that the Council had failed to show commitment to the Libyan people by not extending the mandate of UNSMIL for a one-year period to consolidate all the gains of the peace efforts and foster serious engagement between the Council and the Libyan people through UNSMIL. He asserted that the failure of the Council to find consensus on the Secretary-General's proposed nominee for the vacant position further complicated the Libyan peace process with the departure of the Special adviser of the Secretary-General on Libya. The representative of Kenya underscored that the resolution just adopted and its three-month mandate for UNSMIL constituted yet another disappointment to the people of Libya and expressed the belief that it was no longer tenable for UNSMIL to operate with such a brief and uncertain mandate. The representative of China expressed support for the appointment of an African candidate and noted that appointing the Special Representative as soon as possible would help to restore the full performance of



UNSMIL, strengthen the United Nations capacity for good offices and help to create conditions for UNSMIL to obtain a longer extension in the future. The representative of the United States welcomed that the resolution provided a more substantive mandate, including language in support of the political process and assurances that Libya's oil revenue was managed transparently for the benefit of the entire Libyan people. She noted the abstentions of the three African members of the Council in protest of Russia's insistence on a three-month mandate duration and shared their frustration. The representative of the United States further rejected Russia's "specious contention" that a three-month mandate would assist the Secretariat in securing the Council's full support for a nominee, adding that, to the contrary, a short duration only further complicated the efforts by the Secretariat to recruit the best candidate for the role and made it much harder for UNSMIL to implement long-term plans and develop sustainable solutions to Libya's challenges. Expressing the view that a candidate from the African continent would be well-suited for the position, the representative of Brazil noted that the compromise reached within the Council on the duration of the mandate of UNSMIL offered the Secretary-General and Council members a new opportunity to engage in the appointment of the Mission's leadership, with the expectation that a suitable candidate would be appointed as soon as possible and expressed hope that subsequent renewals of the mandate of UNSMIL would benefit from more predictable time frames.

During her briefing on 30 August, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs reported that the United Nations had continued to engage with Libyan actors at every level to facilitate a resolution to the political impasse.<sup>390</sup> She noted that the ongoing stalemate and continued delays in implementing the electoral process posed a growing threat to security in and around Tripoli, and potentially to all Libyans adding that fighting had broken out in Tripoli and its outskirts on 27 August between armed groups respectively supporting Mr. Abdulhamid Al Dabiba and Mr. Fathi Bashagha. The Under-Secretary-General expressed concern about the limited political progress made during the reporting period, and the lack of progress on forging a consensus on a constitutional framework for the elections.

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<sup>390</sup> See [S/PV.9120](#).

On 24 October, Council members heard the briefing of the newly appointed Special Representative and Head of UNSMIL, who reported that prior to his arrival in Libya he had spoken to a range of Member States' and regional organizations' representatives, stressing the importance of ensuring that the international community would support Libyan efforts in a coordinated manner, rally behind the United Nations lead and refrain from taking any action that could further deepen divisions.<sup>391</sup> Addressing the political situation in the country, the Special Representative indicated that the deadlock persisted, further delaying the prospects for the holding of inclusive, free and fair elections. He had given priority to consultations with Libyan institutional, political, security and civil-society actors from across the country. While significant differences remained among Libyans on how to resolve the crisis, the Special Representative noted the near unanimous condemnation across the spectrum of the presence of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces in Libya and the incessant foreign interference in the country's affairs. The Special Representative stated that while the ceasefire continued to hold, the security track needed to be reinvigorated, as it had been adversely impacted by the political impasse. He expressed concern regarding the human rights situation, reporting that violations against migrants and asylum-seekers continued with impunity and that arbitrary detentions were a common practice. Recalling that the situation in Libya called for a consensus State re-legitimation process, he stressed the paramount importance of the conduct of legislative and presidential elections and announced he would intensify his consultations in that regard.

On 28 October, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#),<sup>392</sup> by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL until 31 October 2023 and welcomed the appointment of Abdoulaye Bathily as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL.<sup>393</sup> By the same resolution, the Council reiterated its request for the Mission to implement the recommendations of the independent strategic review of UNSMIL.<sup>394</sup> Recalling the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum Roadmap, the Council urged the Libyan political institutions and key stakeholders to agree on a roadmap to deliver elections as soon as possible

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<sup>391</sup> See [S/PV.9162](#).

<sup>392</sup> See [S/PV.9173](#).

<sup>393</sup> Resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

across the country.<sup>395</sup> The Council also welcomed the support provided by the United Nations to the Libyan High National Elections Commission and, emphasising that there could be no military solution in Libya, called upon all parties to refrain from violence or other actions that could escalate tensions, exacerbate conflicts and undermine the political process or the 23 October 2020 ceasefire.<sup>396</sup> The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution every 60 days.<sup>397</sup>

After the vote, the representatives of Kenya, Brazil, Ghana and Gabon welcomed the substantive renewal of the mandate of UNSMIL for a 12-month period.<sup>398</sup> The representative of Gabon noted that, as an African State and one of the three African members of the Council, his delegation felt a sense of having contributed to an important milestone in the stabilization of a major African State. The representative of Kenya stated that the Libya peace process was complex at a national level and made more so by the involvement of competing external interests, and urged all international support to be channelled through the United Nations-led process.

During his briefing on 15 November, the Special Representative reported on the various meetings he had held with Libyan stakeholders as well as with representatives of the international community in efforts towards bringing the country back to peace and stability through a Libyan-Libyan solution to the crisis.<sup>399</sup> He informed that UNSMIL continued to provide technical assistance to the High National Elections Commission to maintain readiness for elections, and noted that there appeared to be broad agreement that restoring legitimacy of Libya's institutions across the board was of paramount importance, as was the need to coordinate bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives and to coalesce behind the efforts of the United Nations. He warned that further prolonging the postponement of elections would make the country even more vulnerable to political, economic and security instability and could put the country at risk of partition and urged the Council to send an unequivocal message to

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<sup>395</sup> Ibid., para. 4.

<sup>396</sup> Ibid., paras. 5 and 7.

<sup>397</sup> Ibid., para. 11.

<sup>398</sup> See [S/PV.9173](#).

<sup>399</sup> See [S/PV.9192](#).

obstructionists that their actions would not remain without consequences. On the security track, the Special Representative reported some progress, including the holding of a meeting of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission where the Commission had agreed to establish a subcommittee for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups. He further confirmed that the ceasefire continued to hold, despite ongoing escalatory rhetoric and a build-up of forces on both sides. He also expressed alarm about the human rights situation and reported that online violence against women had been on the rise. On the economic front, he noted that the lack of accountability, transparency and equity in the allocation of resources remained a key cause of tensions.

In his briefing to the Council on 16 December, the Special Representative reported about his engagement with Libyan stakeholders and international partners to advance the political process and revive the electoral track, including visits to Türkiye, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Tunisia.<sup>400</sup> The Special Representative called on the Council, its members and all those with convening power to support the efforts of UNSMIL to bring Libyan political leaders back to the negotiating table and prevent a further deterioration of the crisis. On the security and military track, while he reported that the ceasefire had continued to hold, he indicated that the proliferation of weapons under the control of State and non-State actors and the presence of foreign fighters, foreign forces and mercenaries continued to pose security challenges and undermine efforts to unify security institutions. Furthermore, UNSMIL continued to observe a systematic campaign by Libyan security actors attempting to undermine and silence civil society, humanitarian actors, human rights defenders and political activists, including women and young people. He expressed concern about new bureaucratic obstacles and movement restrictions impeding humanitarian access.

During the period under review, the Council also heard regular briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya.<sup>401</sup> During the briefings, the Chair highlighted the implementation and violations of the sanctions regime, namely, the arms embargo, asset freeze, travel ban and the timebound authorizations and

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<sup>400</sup> See [S/PV.9223](#).

<sup>401</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#); [S/PV.8996](#); [S/PV.9047](#); [S/PV.9120](#) and [S/PV.9223](#). For more information on the work of the Committee and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.1.

measures aimed at preventing the illicit exports of petroleum from Libya.<sup>402</sup> The Chair also reported on the implementation of the assets-freeze, including discussions regarding the preservation of the Libyan frozen assets for the benefit of the Libyan people, the exemption requests and notifications with respect to the illicit export of petroleum, the travel ban, assets freeze and arms embargo, and the consideration of delisting requests by the Committee. Moreover, on 13 July 2022, the Council adopted unanimously resolution [2644 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter. In that resolution, the Council decided to extend until 30 October 2023 the authorizations provided and measures imposed by resolution [2146 \(2014\)](#), [2441 \(2018\)](#) and [2509 \(2020\)](#).<sup>403</sup> The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established by resolution [1973 \(2011\)](#) until 15 November 2023 and requested that the Panel closely follow and report to the Committee any information relating to the illicit export from or illicit import to Libya of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products.<sup>404</sup> The Council also demanded full compliance by all Member States with the arms embargo and called on all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbated the conflict.<sup>405</sup>

In 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) continued to provide briefings to the Council. He reported twice on the progress and challenges relating to the Court's ongoing investigations regarding the situation in Libya. On 28 April, the Prosecutor briefed the Council on his office's twenty-third report to the Council, pointing out that it was the first time that the Office of the Prosecutor put forward benchmarks in terms of timelines for certain action, so that the Office could be held to account.<sup>406</sup> At the meeting on 9 November, the Prosecutor provided the briefing for the first time from Libya.<sup>407</sup> Describing the work performed by forensic experts at various locations, he underlined the need for the international community and the Court to do more to deliver justice to the people of Libya.

In their deliberations in 2022, Council members focused on the political, security and humanitarian situation in the country, addressing also the economic factors further destabilizing

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<sup>402</sup> For more information on the sanctions measures, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>403</sup> Resolution [2644 \(2022\)](#) para. 2.

<sup>404</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 3 and 12.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5.

<sup>406</sup> See [S/PV.9024](#).

<sup>407</sup> See [S/PV.9187](#).

the country. Many of them expressed disappointment and concern regarding the postponement of the presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as the deteriorating situation in the country.<sup>408</sup> Council members expressed support for the Libyan-led and owned political process,<sup>409</sup> and called on Libyan stakeholders to commit to holding free, fair and inclusive elections as soon as possible.<sup>410</sup> Several Council members expressed support for the efforts of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General and then the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to convene consultations between the House of Representatives and the High State Council to establish a constitutional basis for elections.<sup>411</sup> The representative of Gabon, speaking also on behalf of the representatives of Ghana and Kenya, recommended that the Secretary-General make use of the vast body of African expertise available in the context of the high-level United Nations leadership to achieve progress in the dialogue between the parties and strengthen coordination with States of the region.<sup>412</sup> Council members called for the full

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<sup>408</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), United Kingdom, Brazil, Albania, India, Mexico and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Russian Federation, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico, France, China, Norway and United States; [S/PV.9162](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Mexico, Albania, France, United States, Brazil, China, India, Ireland, United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9192](#), Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, United States, Brazil, France, Albania, India, China, Mexico, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Albania and India.

<sup>409</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India, Russian Federation, China, United States and Norway; [S/PV.9047](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India and Norway; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, China and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), United Kingdom, India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, Albania and Brazil; [S/PV.9120](#), Brazil, Russian Federation, India, Albania and China; [S/PV.9192](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Brazil, Albania, India, United Arab Emirates, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, Brazil, Ireland, United Arab Emirates and India.

<sup>410</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Ireland, Brazil, India, Mexico, France, United States and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), Brazil, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico, France, China, India, Norway, United States, Albania and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, Albania, United Arab Emirates, France, India, Norway and United States; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Norway, France, Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), United Kingdom, India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, France, Ireland, Norway, China, United Arab Emirates, Albania and Brazil; [S/PV.9120](#), Norway, Russian Federation, India, United States, Albania, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates, France, Mexico, Ireland and China; and [S/PV.9223](#), United Kingdom, China, Mexico, France, Ireland, Russian Federation, Norway, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United States and India.

<sup>411</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Brazil, Mexico, India, Norway, United States and Albania; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, Albania, China, United Arab Emirates, France, Norway and United States; [S/PV.9078](#), United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, United States, Brazil, France, Mexico, China, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United States, Norway and China; [S/PV.9192](#), China; and [S/PV.9223](#), China, Mexico, Brazil, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates and United States.

<sup>412</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#). See also [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana).

implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces from Libya,<sup>413</sup> compliance with the arms embargo,<sup>414</sup> the need for the unification of institutions in Libya,<sup>415</sup> national reconciliation,<sup>416</sup> full and meaningful political participation of women in the political process,<sup>417</sup> and for addressing Libya's concerns regarding the management of its frozen assets.<sup>418</sup> Some Council members addressed the attempts to disrupt oil

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<sup>413</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania, India, Mexico, France, United States and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), France, China, India, Norway, United States, Albania and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, Russian Federation, India, Norway and United States; [S/PV.9078](#), United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Norway, Brazil, France, Mexico, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), India, Mexico, France, China, United Arab Emirates), Russian Federation and Albania; [S/PV.9120](#), Norway, Russian Federation, India, Albania, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates, France, Mexico, Ireland and China; [S/PV.9162](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Kenya, Mexico, Albania, France, United States, Brazil, China, India, Ireland, United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9192](#), United Kingdom, United States, France, Albania, India, United Arab Emirates, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, Brazil, France, Russian Federation, Norway, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United States and India.

<sup>414</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India and Mexico; [S/PV.8996](#), France and United States; [S/PV.9047](#), United States; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and France; [S/PV.9098](#), United Kingdom, India, Mexico, France, Ireland, Norway and Albania; [S/PV.9120](#), Brazil, India, United States, France and Mexico; [S/PV.9162](#), Mexico, France, Brazil, India; [S/PV.9192](#), Brazil, France, India and Mexico; [S/PV.9192](#), Brazil, France, India and Mexico; and [S/PV.9223](#), Brazil, France, and India.

<sup>415</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), France, Russian Federation, China and United States; [S/PV.8996](#), United Kingdom, Russian Federation, United States and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates and France; [S/PV.9078](#), France; [S/PV.9098](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, France, Norway, Russian Federation and Albania; [S/PV.9120](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates and Mexico; [S/PV.9162](#), United Kingdom, Mexico, France, Brazil, United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9192](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), China, Brazil, France, Ireland, Russian Federation and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>416</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Kenya (also on behalf also of Gabon and Ghana) and China; [S/PV.8996](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9047](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates and India; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Brazil, China, Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), Mexico, United Arab Emirates and Russian Federation; [S/PV.9120](#), Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates and China; [S/PV.9162](#), Russian Federation, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, China, United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9192](#), Brazil, United Arab Emirates and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) China, Brazil, Russian Federation and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>417</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), France and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9047](#), Ireland, Albania and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Mexico and Ireland; [S/PV.9098](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); [S/PV.9162](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Albania, Brazil, Ireland, United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9192](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Mexico and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>418</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and China; [S/PV.8996](#), Brazil, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and China; [S/PV.9047](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana

production at the National Oil Corporation, calling for the Corporation not to be politicized and allowed to fulfil its duties without interference.<sup>419</sup> Council members expressed concern about the humanitarian and human rights situation in the country, in particular the condition and arbitrary detention of migrants and refugees,<sup>420</sup> and incidents of violence against journalists and civil society activists, including women's groups.<sup>421</sup> Some Council members further underscored the importance of ensuring that efforts undertaken for the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces included disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures in order to prevent instability in neighbouring countries and the Sahel region.<sup>422</sup> Several Council members expressed support for the action plan from the 5+5 Joint Military Commission for the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries.<sup>423</sup> The appointment of a Special Representative and Head of

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(also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China; [S/PV.9098](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China and Brazil; [S/PV.9120](#), Brazil, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates and China; [S/PV.9162](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and Brazil; [S/PV.9192](#), Brazil; and [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil and Russian Federation.

<sup>419</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#), United Kingdom, France, China, United States and Albania; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, China, France and Norway; [S/PV.9078](#), France, Mexico, China and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), United Kingdom, United States, China and Albania; [S/PV.9162](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and Brazil; [S/PV.9192](#), Russian Federation and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), United States.

<sup>420</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania, Mexico, France, United States and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), Ireland, Brazil, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico and Norway; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); Ireland, Brazil, France and Norway; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Mexico and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland and Albania; [S/PV.9120](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France, Mexico and Ireland; [S/PV.9162](#), Norway, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Albania, France, Ireland; [S/PV.9192](#), Norway, Mexico, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, France, Ireland and United States.

<sup>421</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Brazil; [S/PV.8996](#), Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United States and Albania; [S/PV.9047](#), Brazil, Albania, Norway, United States; [S/PV.9078](#), Norway and Ireland; [S/PV.9098](#), United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland, and Brazil; [S/PV.9162](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland; [S/PV.9192](#), Ireland, Albania and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), United Kingdom, Mexico, France, Ireland, Norway and Albania.

<sup>422</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India, Mexico, France, China and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya); [S/PV.9047](#), Ireland, France, India and Mexico; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, France and Mexico; [S/PV.9098](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United States and France; [S/PV.9120](#), Norway, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and France); [S/PV.9162](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France, Brazil, China; [S/PV.9192](#), Brazil, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, Mexico, France and India.

<sup>423</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Kenya (also on behalf also of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania, India, France, Russian Federation, China and United States; [S/PV.9047](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, France and Mexico; [S/PV.9162](#), Norway, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France, Brazil; and [S/PV.9223](#), Brazil, Norway and Albania.



UNSMIL was extensively discussed by Council members in regular briefings as well as in meetings for the adoption of decisions from January to August.

During his participation at Council meetings on Libya, the representative of Libya stressed that holding transparent and fair elections based on consensus laws and on a strong constitutional basis was the only genuine guarantee that could return legitimacy to the people, end the conflict and resolve the situation in the country.<sup>424</sup> The representative of Libya reiterated his request to the United Nations to support, seriously and more effectively, the electoral process and send its assessment teams, also reiterating the importance of Libyan ownership and leadership of any political process that would lead the country towards stability and impose State authority, while excluding all external dictates and intervention.<sup>425</sup> He further recalled the need to support the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to ensure the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement and put an end to any foreign presence on Libyan territories.<sup>426</sup> The representative of Libya emphasized that the people of Libya had become hostage to the disagreements of Council members and some regional powers, going as far as intervening directly in Libyan affairs, and recalled the lack of consensus on the mandate of UNSMIL or the appointment of a new Special Envoy of the Secretary-General.<sup>427</sup> The representative of Libya further called on the Security Council to play a positive and more effective role in supporting Libyan consensus, working to end all interventions in Libya, correcting past mistakes and support all efforts to launch a national reconciliation and transitional justice project.<sup>428</sup> The representative of Libya also called on the Council to support the strategic vision for national reconciliation efforts,<sup>429</sup> and to take additional constructive steps to support stability in Libya and end international division on the issue.<sup>430</sup>

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<sup>424</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#) and [S/PV.9162](#).

<sup>425</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#); [S/PV.8996](#); and [S/PV.9223](#).

<sup>426</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#) and [S/PV.9192](#).

<sup>427</sup> See [S/PV.9078](#).

<sup>428</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) [S/PV.9192](#) and [S/PV.9223](#).

<sup>429</sup> See [S/PV.9078](#) and [S/PV.9162](#).

<sup>430</sup> See [S/PV.9162](#).

In addition to the decisions outlined above, on 3 June, the Council adopted resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with one abstention.<sup>431</sup> By the resolution, the Council extended the authorizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, as set out in resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#) for a further 12 months.<sup>432</sup> After the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that the special inspection regime designated to implement the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya had failed to decrease the illicit trade in weapons and bring about a political settlement of the protracted conflict in Libya.<sup>433</sup> He further indicated that the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI had, over recent years, demonstrated low effectiveness in assisting the implementation of the arms embargo and said that the work of the EU Naval Force lacked transparency. He added that the Russian Federation would continue to closely monitor the work of Operation IRINI to ensure full compliance with the arms embargo and would also provide a legal assessment of the actions of the EU Naval Force.

Developments in Libya were also considered under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”.<sup>434</sup>

### Meetings: The situation in Libya

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8952</a> 24 January 2022	Letter dated 15 December 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1970 (2011)</a> concerning Libya addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2021/1058</a> ) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations		Libya	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Co-founder and Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya	13 Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees	

<sup>431</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *Against*: none; *Abstaining*: Russian Federation.

<sup>432</sup> Resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>433</sup> See [S/PV.9053](#).

<sup>434</sup> For further details, see part I, sect. 35.

Support Mission in Libya ( <a href="#">S/2022/31</a> )					
<a href="#">S/PV.8961</a> 31 January 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya ( <a href="#">S/2022/31</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/69</a> )			13 Council members <sup>b</sup>  Resolution <a href="#">2619(2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.8996</a> 16 March 2022			Libya	Under-Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Civil Society briefer	13 Council members, <sup>c</sup> all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9024</a> 28 April 2022			Libya	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9025</a> 29 April 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/356</a> )			14 Council members <sup>d</sup>  Resolution <a href="#">2629 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9047</a> 26 May 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya ( <a href="#">S/2022/409</a> )		Libya	Under-Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	13 Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9053</a> 3 June 2022		Draft resolution submitted by France ( <a href="#">S/2022/450</a> )			Russian Federation  Resolution <a href="#">2635 (2022)</a> 14-0-1 <sup>e</sup> (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9078</a> 27 June 2022			Libya	Under-Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, President and Operations Manager of Fezzan Libya Organization	13 Council members, <sup>f</sup> all invitees <sup>g</sup>

<a href="#">S/PV.9092</a> 13 July 2022	Letter dated 24 May 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1973 (2011)</a> addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/427</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/548</a> )		Resolution <a href="#">2644 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)		
<a href="#">S/PV.9098</a> 25 July 2022			Libya	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations	13 Council members, <sup>h</sup> all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9103</a> 28 July 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/580</a> )			10 Council members <sup>i</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2647 (2022)</a> 12-0-3 <sup>j</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9120</a> 30 August 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya ( <a href="#">S/2022/632</a> )		Libya	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	13 Council members, <sup>k</sup> all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9162</a> 24 October 2022			Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya	13 Council members, <sup>h</sup> all invitees <sup>l</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9173</a> 28 October 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/803</a> )			Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya	Resolution <a href="#">2656 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9187</a> 9 November 2022			Libya	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees <sup>m</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9192</a> 15 November 2022			Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya	13 Council members, <sup>f</sup> all invitees <sup>n</sup>	

<p><a href="#">S/PV.9223</a> 16 December 2022</p>	<p>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (<a href="#">S/2022/932</a>)</p>	<p>Libya</p>	<p>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</p>	<p>13 Council members,<sup>k</sup> all invitees<sup>n</sup></p>
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<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of India briefed also in his capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya.

<sup>b</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>c</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of India briefed also in his capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya.

<sup>d</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States.

<sup>e</sup> *For:* Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *Against:* none; *Abstaining:* Russian Federation.

<sup>f</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>g</sup> The President and Operation Manager of Fezzan Libya Organization participated by videoconference

<sup>h</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>i</sup> Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>j</sup> *For:* Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America; *Against:* none; *Abstaining:* Gabon, Ghana and Kenya.

<sup>k</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of India briefed also in her capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya.

<sup>l</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya participated by videoconference.

<sup>m</sup> The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court participated by videoconference.

<sup>n</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya participated by videoconference.