

### 3. The situation in the Great Lakes region

During the period under review, the Security Council held two meetings on the situation in the Great Lakes region, both in the form of briefings.<sup>86</sup> The Council did not adopt any decisions under this item in 2022. More information about the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is provided in the table below. In addition, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.<sup>87</sup>

In 2022, the Council heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region, the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region, as well as by a civil society representative. In addition, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission submitted written advice, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, in connection with the two briefings.<sup>88</sup> Further to the two reports of the Secretary-General,<sup>89</sup> during his briefings to the Council, the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region focused on the activities of his Office in supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region and the progress achieved on political and security fronts as well as the related challenges.

At the meeting held on 27 April, the Special Envoy noted that since his last briefing to the Council, the situation in the Great Lakes region had shown an encouraging trend in terms of dialogue, cooperation and integration and, in general, the continued will to tackle the root causes of the instability.<sup>90</sup> However, that positive trend had been disrupted by the security and humanitarian crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, compounded by the resumption of military activities by the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) in the last quarter of 2021, with attacks on several positions of the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo.<sup>91</sup> The Special Envoy further regretted that the Allied Democratic Forces and other local

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<sup>86</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>87</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 11. See also [S/2022/868](#).

<sup>88</sup> See [S/2022/353](#) and [S/2022/789](#). For more information about written advice submitted in accordance with rule 39, see part II, sect. VII, and part IV sect. VII.

<sup>89</sup> See [S/2022/276](#) and [S/2022/735](#).

<sup>90</sup> See [S/PV.9023](#).

<sup>91</sup> For more information about the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part I, sect. 4.

armed groups continued to commit atrocities against civilians. Despite that fragility, he remained convinced that it was still possible to consolidate the significant gains made in the region and to move progressively towards a lasting peace. To that end, the Special Envoy called for efforts to be made on at least three levels: (i) increased cooperation on security matters; (ii) direct, standing dialogue at the highest level between the leaders in the region to ease tensions and strengthen trust; and (iii) continued support by the international community for the region.

With respect to security cooperation, the Special Envoy noted, *inter alia*, the joint operations conducted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the memorandum of understanding between Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the establishment of the Contact and Coordination Group on non-military measures, as well as the efforts on devising a counterterrorism strategy at the level of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region. As regards the dialogue aimed at reducing tensions in the region, the Special Envoy welcomed the progress in normalizing the relations between Rwanda and Uganda and the relations between Burundi and Rwanda. Concerning the support of the international community, the Special Envoy called on the Council and the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes region to support regional dialogue efforts and welcomed the close cooperation between the Office of the Special Envoy and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The Special Envoy further informed the Council about his priority initiatives, which included, *inter alia*, continuing good-offices and diplomatic efforts aimed at improving relations among the countries of the region; supporting an effective deployment of the operational unit of the Contact and Coordination Group on non-military measures; providing technical and logistical support to the Nairobi peace process; promoting enhanced national and regional ownership of the Regional Initiative on Natural Resources; promoting the economic empowerment of women as a peacebuilding strategy; as well as supporting the efforts in combatting impunity and promoting human rights.

In his briefing to the Council, the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region noted that the region faced various security challenges, emanating mainly from the activities of negative forces and armed groups operating in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan. Mr.

Dinesh Mahtani, independent expert on the Great Lakes region, provided a briefing focused on the increasingly interconnected dynamics of insecurity in the region with other parts of the continent. He noted that the Governments of the Great Lakes and East Africa regions had agreed to possibly launch joint military operations against armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo but pointed that there were serious challenges to the implementation of any such proposed force, besides regional trust deficit. While the use of force should eventually constitute an important component in any exercise to neutralize armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, it was crucial that all interested parties first worked together to help implement the country's strategy on demobilization of armed groups and rebuild and consolidate trust among the Democratic Republic of the Congo's neighbours themselves.

During the discussion, Council members expressed concern about the security situation in parts of the Great Lakes region, particularly in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. They also noted the impact of the illicit exploitation of natural resources on the security and stability in the region. Several Council members raised the issue of a growing terrorist threat in the region and the connections between armed groups and terrorist organizations.<sup>92</sup> A number of Council members also expressed concern about the increase of human rights violations and abuses.<sup>93</sup> Among the positive developments, Council members noted the admission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the East African Community. Several Council members also welcomed the establishment of the operational cell of the Contact and Coordination Group on non-military measures,<sup>94</sup> as well as the commitment to dialogue that emanated from the meetings of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework.<sup>95</sup> In addition to Council members, the representatives of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda also took part in the discussion and expressed their views on the situation in the Great Lakes region, bilateral relations, regional security and economic cooperation and the challenges that were yet to be overcome.

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<sup>92</sup> France, Albania, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India and Russian Federation.

<sup>93</sup> Albania, Ireland, United States, Norway and United Kingdom.

<sup>94</sup> Albania, India and United States.

<sup>95</sup> Brazil, China, Ireland, India, Norway, Mexico and Russian Federation.

In his second briefing on 26 October, the Special Envoy informed that the Great Lakes region continued to experience instability due to the militancy of armed groups, whose activities fuelled the rekindling of mistrust and tensions among the countries of the region, in particular between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.<sup>96</sup> The illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources continued to fuel the vicious cycle of intercommunal clashes, the activities of armed groups and the use of such resources by cross-border criminal networks. The humanitarian situation continued to be of concern, with more than 4.9 million refugees and asylum-seekers having fled owing to the violence and climate-related issues. In response to and despite such challenges, the countries of the region remained engaged through various initiatives, including the East African Community peace process on the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, involving both military and non-military efforts. Regarding the deployment of the East African Community regional force, the Special Envoy recalled the vital importance of effective coordination with MONUSCO. On non-military initiatives, the Special Envoy reported, inter alia, that his Office had facilitated the first reconnaissance-and-contact mission of the operational cell of the Contact and Coordination Group to South Kivu province, whose goal was to engage with local actors to identify opportunities for contact with armed groups and facilitate their disarmament and voluntary repatriation without political preconditions. He highlighted his advocacy mission together with the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region in Paris and Brussels to increase support for better natural resource governance and announced the plan for future missions in the member States of the Conference, aware that national and regional ownership of the Regional Initiative on Natural Resources was a prerequisite for its effectiveness. The Office also continued to support efforts to promote greater participation of women in electoral processes and bodies and to conduct activities aimed at participation of youth in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The Special Envoy appealed to all the signatory countries to step up their efforts to fully implement the Framework Agreement and other regional agreements, solicited the support of Council members, and further appealed to the entire international community to lend more

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<sup>96</sup> See [S/PV.9165](#).

substantial multifaceted support to the regional initiatives and to the United Nations action plan for the Great Lakes region.

In their discussion, Council members deliberated on the security situation in the region, including the threat posed by the activities of the armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the question of illicit trade in natural resources as one of the root causes and contributing factors of conflict in the region. Echoing the Special Envoy, Council members called for the implementation of the Framework Agreement, as well as other regional agreements. Council members specifically welcomed the progress on the Luanda road map aimed at normalizing the political relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, as well as the increasing coordination with the Nairobi process between the countries of the Eastern African Community. Some Council members also commended the adoption of the Kinshasa declaration of June 2022 on the strengthening of judicial cooperation among the States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region.<sup>97</sup> On the deployment of the East African Community regional force, several Council members underscored the need for effective coordination of its activities with MONUSCO and the national forces.<sup>98</sup> Among them, some Council members encouraged the regional force to comply with obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law.<sup>99</sup> Council members also discussed the implementation of non-military measures in the region, notably the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme,<sup>100</sup> the operationalization of the Contact and Coordination Group,<sup>101</sup> as well as the need to combat hate speech, disinformation and misinformation.<sup>102</sup> Several Council members further called for inclusion of women in political and peace processes and their full, equal and meaningful participation at all levels.<sup>103</sup> In addition to Council members, the representatives of

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<sup>97</sup> France, India, Albania and Mexico.

<sup>98</sup> France, Russian Federation, United States, Norway, United Kingdom, Mexico and Ireland.

<sup>99</sup> France, United States, United Kingdom and Ireland.

<sup>100</sup> France, India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Norway, Brazil, United Kingdom, China and Mexico.

<sup>101</sup> France, India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China and Albania.

<sup>102</sup> Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates, Brazil and Albania.

<sup>103</sup> France, United Arab Emirates, Norway, Brazil, Albania and Ireland.

Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and South Africa also made statements and expressed their views on the situation in the Great Lakes region.

### Meetings: The situation in the Great Lakes region

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9023</a> 27 April 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region ( <a href="#">S/2022/276</a> )		Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region, Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region, independent expert on the Great Lakes region	13 Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees <sup>b</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9165</a> 26 October 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region ( <a href="#">S/2022/735</a> )		Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Africa	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region	13 Council members, <sup>c</sup> all invitees	

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>b</sup> The Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region and the independent expert on the Great Lakes region participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>c</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

#### **4. The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

During the period under review, the Council held eight meetings and adopted three resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter and one presidential statement in relation to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Three meetings were convened to adopt a decision of the Council and five took the form of briefings.<sup>104</sup> More details about the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, are provided in the table below. The Council also held one private meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).<sup>105</sup> In addition, in 2022, Council members held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>106</sup>

In 2022, further to the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General,<sup>107</sup> the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO, as well as briefings by representatives of civil society and subregional organizations.<sup>108</sup> The Council also heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region and the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations.<sup>109</sup> Consistent with prior practice, the Council also heard briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#).<sup>110</sup> In addition to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 2022, the representatives of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda also participated in the meetings held under this item.

In her quarterly briefings to the Council, the Special Representative focused on the deteriorating security situation in the east of the country, following the resurgence of the

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<sup>104</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>105</sup> The private meeting was held on 6 December 2022, under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”; see [S/PV.9209](#). See also [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 21.

<sup>106</sup> For more information, see [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 12.

<sup>107</sup> See [S/2022/252](#), [S/2022/503](#), [S/2022/709](#) and [S/2022/892](#).

<sup>108</sup> See [S/PV.9007](#), [S/PV.9081](#), [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>109</sup> See [S/PV.9051](#).

<sup>110</sup> See [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

previously dormant Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) and the continued attacks by other armed groups. She further provided updates on the regional initiatives aimed at defusing tensions and reported on the political developments, including the progress made on the preparation of elections scheduled for December 2023. Finally, the Special Representative continued to inform the Council about the phased drawdown of MONUSCO.

On the security situation, the Special Representative explained that in addition to the attacks perpetrated by the Allied Democratic Forces and the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo in North Kivu and Ituri, there had been an alarming increase in the activities by the M-23 in North Kivu, as well as violence against civilians in South Kivu carried out by the Mai-Mai groups.<sup>111</sup> In North Kivu, the situation was compounded by the disturbing use of improvised explosive devices by the Allied Democratic Forces. In June, the Special Representative stated that the escalation of the M-23 attacks and the resulting regional tensions had undermined the positive momentum between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and reported that the resurgence of that group had had broad repercussions for security, human rights and the humanitarian situation in the eastern part of the country, including the possibility that MONUSCO could find itself dealing with a threat that went beyond its current capacities.<sup>112</sup> In her September briefing, the Special Representative reported that MONUSCO remained fully mobilized to address the persistent insecurity created by the criminal activities of armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>113</sup> However, the resurgence of the M-23 had contributed to disinformation about and stigmatization of MONUSCO, which had led to violent new protests and serious incidents that had claimed the lives of dozens of protesters and four Mission employees. In that context, the Special Representative implored the Congolese authorities and members of civil society to continue to focus on easing the tensions to enable MONUSCO's full and unimpeded resumption of operations in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In her last quarterly briefing, the Special Representative stated that the country

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<sup>111</sup> See [S/PV.9007](#).

<sup>112</sup> See [S/PV.9081](#).

<sup>113</sup> See [S/PV.9142](#).



continued to show resilience despite the immense challenges, notably with regard to the security situation in the eastern part of the country, which had deteriorated dramatically.<sup>114</sup>

On the regional dimension, the Special Representative underscored that the stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was tied to the support of its nine neighbouring countries, welcomed the efforts of President Tshisekedi Tshilombo in increasing regional cooperation and saluted the decision of the East African Community to admit the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a full member.<sup>115</sup> Following the signing of a status of forces agreement in September between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the East African Community secretariat for its regional force to be deployed in the eastern part of the country for an initial period of six months, the Special Representative stressed the vital importance of effective coordination with MONUSCO in order to enable the Mission to fully carry out its protection of civilians mandate.<sup>116</sup> She further welcomed the adoption of the Luanda road map on 6 July, through the mediation of the president of Angola as the current Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, aimed at de-escalating tensions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. In response to increasing insecurity and tensions, regional initiatives had intensified, culminating in a mini-summit held on 23 November in Luanda to agree on measures to address the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including a timetable for the implementation of priority actions to achieve the cessation of hostilities, the immediate withdrawal of the M-23 from the occupied areas and the coordination of efforts under the Luanda and Nairobi processes.<sup>117</sup> The Special Representative welcomed the meeting among the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, the East African Community regional force and MONUSCO on 29 and 30 November in Goma and reported that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had formally requested MONUSCO's active involvement in the implementation of the Luanda mini-summit communiqué, which envisioned an operational role for MONUSCO. The Special Representative reiterated the Mission's readiness to leverage its capabilities in support of the regional peace

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<sup>114</sup> See [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>115</sup> See [S/PV.9007](#).

<sup>116</sup> See [S/PV.9142](#).

<sup>117</sup> See [S/PV.9215](#).

initiatives under way, in line with its mandate. At the same meeting, the Secretary General of the East African Community outlined the political and military tracks of the Nairobi process and requested the Council to support the East African Community in securing a permanent solution in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including through cooperation between MONUSCO, the Nairobi-led process and the East African Community regional force.<sup>118</sup>

With regard to political developments in 2022, the Special Representative reported that in June, the National Assembly and the Senate had enacted revisions to the electoral law, which were expected to increase the transparency of the electoral process and promote the participation of women as candidates.<sup>119</sup> However, the absence of the opposition from the parliamentary debate demonstrated that additional efforts were needed to create the conditions for an inclusive, transparent and peaceful electoral process. In September, the Special Representative reported on the significant progress made in the preparations for the general elections to be held by December 2023 and welcomed the efforts of the Government, the Parliament and the Independent National Electoral Commission to establish the legal framework and conditions for the proper conduct of the elections, while noting that major challenges remained, notably on reaching a broad consensus on the various aspects of the electoral process.<sup>120</sup> In her last quarterly briefing, welcoming the publication of the electoral calendar which set the presidential and legislative elections for 20 December 2023, the Special Representative reiterated the readiness of MONUSCO to promote a political environment conducive to a transparent, inclusive and peaceful electoral process.<sup>121</sup>

As regards the phased drawdown of MONUSCO, the Special Representative reported on the progress in the common efforts of the Mission, the United Nations country team and the Government, and added that the implementation of a progressive, responsible and sustainable transition also had advanced at field level.<sup>122</sup> In September, she expressed the Mission's readiness to work closely with the Government to re-evaluate the transition plan in order to step

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<sup>118</sup> See [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>119</sup> See [S/PV.9081](#).

<sup>120</sup> See [S/PV.9142](#).

<sup>121</sup> See [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>122</sup> See [S/PV.9007](#).

up the pace of MONUSCO's withdrawal.<sup>123</sup> Concerning the Mission's withdrawal from the remaining provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri, in her last briefing of the year, the Special Representative reiterated the United Nations readiness to work on the revision of the joint transition plan in order to define concrete actions for the effective implementation of priority benchmarks related to the creation of minimum security conditions for the responsible and sustainable withdrawal of MONUSCO.<sup>124</sup>

In addition to the briefings by the Special Representative and in light of the deteriorating situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, on 31 May, the Council heard briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region.<sup>125</sup> The Assistant Secretary-General reported that the already dire situation was worsening, owing to the recent resurgence of the M-23 and its hostile activity in North Kivu against the Congolese armed forces and MONUSCO. The Assistant Secretary-General stressed that it was imperative for the Council to lend its full weight to the ongoing regional efforts to defuse the situation and bring an end to the M-23 insurgency. She reiterated the Secretary-General's call to local armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to participate in the political process without preconditions, and to all foreign armed groups to disarm unconditionally and immediately return to their countries of origin. The Assistant Secretary-General also underscored the importance of involving women, including civil society representatives and those affiliated with armed groups, in the ongoing efforts in the search for inclusive and durable solutions. The Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region called on all armed groups to stop the violence, immediately lay down their arms and engage resolutely in the Nairobi political dialogue process facilitated by Kenya.<sup>126</sup> He reiterated the importance of non-military measures and encouraged the leaders of the region to continue their high-level dialogue on how to address the threat posed by the armed groups and prevent tensions from escalating between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours.

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<sup>123</sup> See [S/PV.9142](#).

<sup>124</sup> See [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>125</sup> See [S/PV.9051](#).

<sup>126</sup> For more information about the situation in the Great Lakes region, see part I, sect. 3.

Representatives of civil society also briefed the Council in 2022 with a focus on the deteriorating security situation and its impact on civilians, in particular women and children. In that regard, at the meeting held in June, the Director of the Fund for Congolese Women and the President of Female Solidarity for Integrated Peace and Development shared her views on the reasons for instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the wider region, and recommended strengthening of actions and consultation mechanisms in order to make the protection of the civilian population more effective, especially in the eastern part of the country, as the elections approached.<sup>127</sup> She called for, inter alia, the establishment of international justice for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the provision of greater medical and psychological assistance to survivors and continuing efforts to address the global food insecurity caused by the war in Ukraine and its ramifications in Africa, especially its impact on women and children. In her briefing in December, a civil society activist and member of the *Lutte pour le changement* offered her insights into the security situation, the impact of the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo on women and the crucial importance of women's political participation, as well as the role of MONUSCO.<sup>128</sup> She urged the Council to ensure that MONUSCO provided full protection to the civilians, especially women and girls; that all parties, including the Congolese armed forces, the East African Community regional force and MONUSCO, acted within a framework of strict respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; that women participated fully and equally in the electoral and peace processes; that MONUSCO's withdrawal was gradual, accountable and conditioned on respect for human rights and the protection of civilians; and further called on Council members to urge the Congolese authorities to begin reforming the security sector, particularly the army.

In 2022, the deliberations among Council members were focused primarily on the worsening security conditions in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the resulting violations of human rights, as well as the regional initiatives aimed at defusing tensions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours. Council members also discussed

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<sup>127</sup> See [S/PV.9081](#).

<sup>128</sup> See [S/PV.9215](#).

political developments, including the preparations for the 2023 elections, as well as the phased drawdown of MONUSCO as set out in the joint transition plan.

With regard to the security situation, Council members expressed concern over the further deterioration of conditions and growing violence, notably in the light of the resurgence of the M-23 and the activities of other armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this context, several Council members referred to a press statement issued by the Council on 24 May, condemning the attacks by armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and urging them to lay down their arms.<sup>129</sup> Council members repeatedly called for cessation of hostilities,<sup>130</sup> requested that all support for armed groups, including external, be stopped,<sup>131</sup> and demanded that the armed groups, particularly the M-23, withdraw from any occupied areas.<sup>132</sup> Council members also underscored the importance of non-military measures for the stabilization of the eastern parts of the country and in that respect called for the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.<sup>133</sup> Concerning the deployment of the East African Community regional force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Council members urged it to coordinate its activities closely with MONUSCO and to ensure full respect of international law and human rights.<sup>134</sup> In addition, several Council members continued raising the issue of the human rights situation, including violations and abuses involving conflict-related sexual violence against women and children.<sup>135</sup>

As regards regional dynamics, Council members expressed support for the efforts of regional and subregional stakeholders aimed at defusing tensions, in particular between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, and jointly tackling challenges in the broader Great Lakes region. In this regard, Council members underscored the importance of the Nairobi

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<sup>129</sup> See [S/PV.9051](#), United Arab Emirates, Albania and China.

<sup>130</sup> See [S/PV.9051](#), Russian Federation; [S/PV.9081](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland and Russian Federation; [S/PV.9142](#), India, United Arab Emirates and Russian Federation; [S/PV.9215](#), France, United Kingdom, China and Albania.

<sup>131</sup> See [S/PV.9215](#), United States, United Kingdom, Albania and India.

<sup>132</sup> See [S/PV.9215](#), France, United States, United Kingdom, China, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania and Mexico.

<sup>133</sup> See [S/PV.9007](#), [S/PV.9051](#), [S/PV.9081](#), [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>134</sup> See [S/PV.9081](#), [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>135</sup> See [S/PV.9007](#), [S/PV.9051](#), [S/PV.9081](#), [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

and Luanda processes,<sup>136</sup> the continued implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the role played by regional and sub-regional organizations, including the African Union, the East African Community, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community.<sup>137</sup>

On the political front, Council members welcomed the progress made towards the preparation of presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for December 2023.<sup>138</sup> In that regard, Council members underscored the importance of a free, fair, transparent and peaceful electoral process, with several speakers recalling the need for elections to be inclusive.<sup>139</sup> In addition, the representative of Ireland commended the efforts of MONUSCO and the Special Representative in engaging women and young people in electoral processes<sup>140</sup> and the representative of the United Arab Emirates stressed the importance of cooperation between the Mission and political stakeholders in creating an environment conducive to upcoming elections.<sup>141</sup>

Throughout the year, Council members also discussed the gradual withdrawal of MONUSCO and underlined the importance of a conditions-based, responsible and phased drawdown, guided by the situation on the ground and conducted in line with the joint transition plan.<sup>142</sup> The representative of Kenya, speaking also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana, expressed support for the call to MONUSCO by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to review the joint transition plan and ensure that the benchmarks encompassed strengthening key defence and security institutions, early-warning initiatives and preventive interventions that could mitigate any relapses into conflict.<sup>143</sup> Taking note of the request made by the Congolese authorities, the representative of Mexico asked for the review exercise to be carried out with

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<sup>136</sup> See [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>137</sup> See [S/PV.9007](#), [S/PV.9051](#), [S/PV.9081](#), [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>138</sup> See [S/PV.9007](#), [S/PV.9081](#), [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>139</sup> See [S/PV.9007](#), [S/PV.9081](#), [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>140</sup> See [S/PV.9081](#).

<sup>141</sup> See [S/PV.9081](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>142</sup> See [S/PV.9007](#), [S/PV.9081](#), [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>143</sup> See [S/PV.9142](#).

prudence, while the representative of India stated that the shortcomings reflected in the update on transition benchmarks needed to be addressed in coordination with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Following the renewal of the mandate of MONUSCO, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed hope that resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#) provided a solid basis for constructive dialogue between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Mission, including on the review of the joint transition plan.<sup>144</sup>

In its decisions in 2022, the Council took action on the issues outlined above. With regard to the political developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, on 3 June, the Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming the commitment by the regional Heads of State to implement a two-track approach aimed at finding lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the support provided by MONUSCO and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region to that process.<sup>145</sup> The Council also expressed concern over the increase of armed group activity in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and reiterated its condemnation of all armed groups operating in the country and of the recent attacks on the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo and MONUSCO.<sup>146</sup> The Council also expressed concern at the current humanitarian situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and remained deeply concerned by the high levels of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in parts of the country.<sup>147</sup> The Council encouraged further efforts to de-escalate tensions, to refrain from incendiary statements and incitement to violence and welcomed the engagement of existing regional mechanisms, including the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism, to bring light to alleged unauthorised cross-border military activity.<sup>148</sup>

On 20 December, by resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), adopted unanimously under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of the Mission and the Force Intervention Brigade

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<sup>144</sup> See [S/PV.9226](#). See also resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), paras. 38-39, 42-44.

<sup>145</sup> [S/PRST/2022/4](#), first paragraph.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, second paragraph.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, fifth and sixth paragraphs.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, seventh paragraph.

for one year until 20 December 2023.<sup>149</sup> In addition to reiterating the strategic priorities of MONUSCO concerning the protection of civilians and the support to the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms,<sup>150</sup> the Council also tasked MONUSCO with the support for the 2023 electoral process in the three provinces where the Mission was still deployed.<sup>151</sup> The Council also authorized MONUSCO to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate, in line with the basic principles of peacekeeping.<sup>152</sup>

Regarding the Mission's exit strategy, the Council took note of the call by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to review the transition plan and encouraged the United Nations and the Government, in liaison with civil society, to identify the concrete and realistic steps to be undertaken, as a matter of priority, to create the minimum security conditions to enable the responsible and sustainable exit of MONUSCO.<sup>153</sup> The Council further requested the Secretary-General to provide options for adapting MONUSCO's configuration of its civilian, police and military components and on the United Nations future configuration in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, once the joint review of the transition plan for MONUSCO was concluded and no later than July 2023.<sup>154</sup>

In 2022, Council members also deliberated on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) and took action on the Democratic Republic of the Congo sanctions regime. On 10 June, the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted its final report concluding that the security and humanitarian situation in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri had deteriorated despite a state of siege that had been in force for 11 months in those provinces and despite military operations by the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, the Uganda People's Defence Forces and MONUSCO.<sup>155</sup> On 30 June,

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<sup>149</sup> Resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 19.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 21.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 26 (a). For more information concerning the mandate of MONUSCO, see part X, sect. I. For further information on past mandates of MONUSCO, see previous supplements covering the period 2010-2021.

<sup>152</sup> Resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 21.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 38.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 44.

<sup>155</sup> See letter dated 10 June 2022 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2022/479](#)).



acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted, with 10 votes in favour and five abstentions,<sup>156</sup> resolution [2641 \(2022\)](#), renewing until 1 July 2023 the sanctions measures as set out in resolution [2293 \(2016\)](#) and extending until 1 August 2023 the mandate of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo as set forth in resolution [2360 \(2017\)](#).<sup>157</sup> By the same resolution, the Council decided that the financial and travel measures should also apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee for involvement in the production, manufacture or use in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of improvised explosive devices, or in the commission, planning, ordering, aiding, abetting or otherwise assistance of attacks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with improvised explosive devices.<sup>158</sup>

In the briefing of 30 September, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) gave an overview of the work of that body covering the period of the previous 12 months. He informed the Council about the planned visit of a delegation of Committee members to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, whose purpose was to gather first-hand accounts concerning the effective implementation of the sanctions measures imposed by resolution [2360 \(2017\)](#), as reaffirmed by resolution [2641 \(2022\)](#).<sup>159</sup> Further to the Chair's briefing, the Director of the Angaza Institute called on the Council to impose sanctions on Member States whose support for armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had been documented and urged that sanctions be imposed with a view to preventing the sale of wood, protected animals and other natural resources by armed rebel groups and governments. The representative of the United States noted that the M-23 remained designated under the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that Member States were required to freeze the assets of that armed group and ensure that no funds or economic resources were made available to it. In addition, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo called on the Council to strengthen sanctions against the mafia networks inside and outside the country that illegally exploited its natural resources and

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<sup>156</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya and Russian Federation (see [S/PV.9084](#)). For further detail on the discussion following the vote, see part VII, sect. III. B, case 6.

<sup>157</sup> Resolution [2641 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 8.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

<sup>159</sup> See [S/PV.9142](#).

called on the Council to fully lift the prior notification requirements concerning the shipments of arms or related materiel for the country's armed forces.

At the meeting held on 9 December, the Council heard another briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#), during which he provided an overview of his visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda from 7 to 18 November. In the briefing, the Chair reported that during the discussions in Kinshasa, he mainly emphasized that the arms embargo had applied only to armed groups since 2008 and that the notification requirement was binding only on supplier States.<sup>160</sup> Other topics of discussion during the visit included the security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the activities of armed groups, the alleged links between the Allied Democratic Forces sanctioned armed group and Da'esh, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and human rights violations, including conflict-related sexual violence.

On 20 December, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2667 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it lifted the notification requirements for arms embargo set out in paragraph 5 of resolution [1807 \(2008\)](#) and requested the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to provide a confidential report to the Council no later than 31 May 2023 detailing its efforts to ensure the safe and effective management, storage, marking, monitoring and security of the national stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as the efforts to fight arms trafficking and diversion.<sup>161</sup>

### **Meetings: The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9007</a> 29 March 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MONUSCO, civil society briefer <sup>d</sup>	13 Council members, <sup>b</sup> invitees <sup>c</sup>	

<sup>160</sup> See [S/PV.9215](#).

<sup>161</sup> Resolution [2667 \(2022\)](#), paras. 2 and 3.

	Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) ( <a href="#">S/2022/252</a> )			
<a href="#">S/PV.9051</a> 31 May 2022		Democratic Republic of the Congo, <sup>d</sup> Rwanda, Uganda	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region	13 Council members, <sup>e</sup> all invitees <sup>f</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9055</a> 3 June 2022				<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/4</a>
<a href="#">S/PV.9081</a> 29 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO ( <a href="#">S/2022/503</a> )	Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MONUSCO, President of Female Solidarity for Integrated Peace and Development	13 Council members, <sup>g</sup> all invitees <sup>h</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9084</a> 30 June 2022	Letter dated 10 June 2022 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo ( <a href="#">S/2022/479</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by France ( <a href="#">S/2022/523</a> )		Eight Council members <sup>i</sup> Resolution <a href="#">2641 (2022)</a> 10-0-5 <sup>j</sup> (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9142</a> 30 September 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO ( <a href="#">S/2022/709</a> )	Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MONUSCO, Director of the Angaza Institute	14 Council members, <sup>k</sup> all invitees <sup>l</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9215</a> 9 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO ( <a href="#">S/2022/892</a> )	Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MONUSCO, Secretary General of the	14 Council members, <sup>m</sup> all invitees <sup>n</sup>

			East African Community, activist and member of Lutte pour le changement		
<a href="#">S/PV.9226</a>	Report of the Secretary- General on MONUSCO ( <a href="#">S/2022/892</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by France ( <a href="#">S/2022/960</a> )		10 Council members <sup>o</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
20 December 2022		Draft resolution submitted by France ( <a href="#">S/2022/964</a> )			Resolution <a href="#">2667 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

<sup>a</sup> The civil society briefer was unable to deliver remarks at the meeting due to technical difficulties.

<sup>b</sup> The representative of Gabon made a statement also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya.

<sup>c</sup> The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Kinshasa.

<sup>d</sup> Democratic Republic of the Congo was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>e</sup> The representative of Kenya made a statement also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>f</sup> The Special Envoy participated in the meeting by videoconference from Nairobi.

<sup>g</sup> The representative of Ghana made a statement also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya.

<sup>h</sup> President of Female Solidarity for Integrated Peace and Development participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>i</sup> Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Russian Federation and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>j</sup> *For:* Albania, Brazil, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* none; *abstaining:* China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya and Russian Federation.

<sup>k</sup> The representative of Gabon made a statement in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#); the representative of Kenya made a statement also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>l</sup> Director of the Angaza Institute participated in the meeting by videoconference from Bukavu.

<sup>m</sup> The representative of Gabon made a statement in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#); the representative of Kenya made a statement also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>n</sup> Democratic Republic of the Congo was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs who participated in the meeting by videoconference. The Secretary General of the East African Community and the member of Lutte pour le changement also participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>o</sup> China, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

## 5. The situation in the Central African Republic

During the period under review, the Security Council held five meetings and adopted two resolutions, all under Chapter VII of the Charter, in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic. Three of these meetings took the form of briefings and the remaining two were held to adopt a decision of the Council.<sup>162</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers, and outcomes, is given in the table below. The Council held one private meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).<sup>163</sup> In addition to meetings, Council members held consultations of the whole in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic.<sup>164</sup>

During 2022, Council members heard three briefings on the reports by the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic, consistent with the four-month reporting schedule established by resolution [2387 \(2017\)](#).<sup>165</sup> Council members also heard briefings by the African Union Special Representative and Head of the African Union Office in the Central African Republic, the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and a civil society representative.

The briefings focused on the political, security, economic, human rights and humanitarian situation in the country. In that regard, the briefers continued to update the Council on the efforts aimed at the revitalization of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (“the Political Agreement”) signed by the authorities and 14 armed groups in Bangui on 6 February 2019, the implementation of the joint road map adopted under the auspices of the President of Angola on 16 September 2021 by the International Conference on the Great

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<sup>162</sup> For more information on format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>163</sup> The private meeting was held on 7 November 2022 under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”; see [S/PV.9185](#) and [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 21.F.

<sup>164</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 13.

<sup>165</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#), [S/PV.9074](#) and [S/PV.9156](#). For reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic, see [S/2022/119](#), [S/2022/491](#) and [S/2022/762](#).

Lakes Region, and the republican dialogue launched in March 2022 by the Government with the political parties and key forces. The briefers also apprised the Council on the preparations for the local elections, the status of the 15 October 2021 ceasefire, the activities of armed groups, including Coalition des patriotes pour le changement and their impact on security, elections and the provision of humanitarian assistance, the efforts to fight impunity for human rights violations, and the role of MINUSCA.

On 22 February, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, congratulating the new Prime Minister, said that he and his Government would have to overcome the challenges of the implementation of the Political Agreement, the organization of the republican dialogue and the restoration of state authority.<sup>166</sup> He briefed the Council on two visits by the representatives of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to the Central African Republic in January and February 2022 to advance the effective implementation of the road map and enable the establishment and development of the terms of reference of a follow-up working group to monitor the road map. He briefed the Council on the ways in which MINUSCA was contributing to advancing the political process through its good offices, the support of the Mission in preparing the local elections, and through establishing a climate of trust between the Government and the opposition leading to the return of the opposition to the organizing committee of the republican dialogue, which had resumed its work. He recalled that the security situation remained concerning and was marked by military offensives and continued reports of human rights violations. He commended the efforts of the Government to make operational the Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation, and the first public hearing of the Special Criminal Court as signs of progress in fighting impunity.

The African Union Special Representative, taking note of the political tensions surrounding the preparations for the republican dialogue, outlined some issues that remained to be addressed by its organizing committee, including the choice of topics, the presidium and the list of participants. He welcomed the initiatives and efforts of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in the context of the road map to mobilize the subregion in promoting dialogue in the country, including contacts with the leaders of the Coalition des patriotes pour le

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<sup>166</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#).

changement and the regrouping of its combatants. He informed that an offensive by the Forces armées centrafricaines forces, supported by bilateral forces, to decrease the potential trouble-making of armed groups was under way.

The Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region focused on the major political, security and humanitarian developments in the country. He commended the Government for establishing the organizing committee of the republican dialogue. He stressed that the implementation of the Political Agreement faced challenges owing to many interlinked factors, and the Government's institutional capacity to expeditiously implement the Agreement was hampered by both financial and non-financial challenges. He briefed on the obstacles to the holding of the local elections, including those related to voter registration and education. He expressed concerns regarding the humanitarian and security situation, highlighting continued displacement, poverty and unemployment, as well as abuses against civilians and attacks on defence and security forces.

On 22 June, the Special Representative updated the Council on the efforts aimed at the revitalization of the peace process as well as the repositioning of MINUSCA.<sup>167</sup> She briefed on her efforts to remobilize the region since she had taken office, culminating, under the leadership of the Central African Government and the auspices of Angola and Rwanda, in a strategic review meeting on the political process in Bangui on 4 June. She informed that the authorities had decided to establish a permanent platform for the strategic review to be convened on a quarterly basis and called for the Council's unanimous support in carrying out the plan for its monitoring. She suggested that the political commitments previously undertaken separately under the auspices of the Political Agreement guarantors and within the framework of the road map should be part of a single platform and bring together the representatives of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Angola and Rwanda, the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States and MINUSCA. She urged the Government to expedite the implementation of the recommendations of the republican dialogue, which was one of the components of the road map. Expressing concern about the persistent violations of the ceasefire

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<sup>167</sup> [S/PV.9074](#).

by all the parties, she informed that MINUSCA had readjusted its concept of operations to prioritize a preventive approach centred on the civilian populations.

The President of the Network for Women's Leadership in the Central African Republic expressed major concerns regarding the sociopolitical, security, humanitarian and human rights situation in her country highlighting, inter alia, the killings targeting the populations of the hinterlands and atrocities committed by the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement as well as members of the national army, its allies and the regime militias. She regretted that, despite the participation of the civil society in the republican dialogue, the nature of the dialogue was non-inclusive. She urged the Council to consider the Central African Republic as a country in an emergency situation for which emergency measures must be taken.

On 19 October, the Special Representative expressed concern regarding the security situation and highlighted the need to critically assess the progress in the implementation of MINUSCA's mandate in four areas: political and security dynamics, safeguarding the Mission's achievements, the decentralization of the political and peace process, and the extension of state authority.<sup>168</sup> She welcomed the implementation of the shared timetable of the Political Agreement and the joint road map and highlighted the developments that had already emerged in that regard, such as the opening of the President's dialogue with leaders of 11 armed groups. Concerning human rights violations, she informed about the establishment of a framework for constructive dialogue and accountability with regards to the follow-up of documented violations and the implementation of the recommendations made in the public reports of MINUSCA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Throughout 2022, discussions in the Council focused mainly on the topics outlined above. With regards to the political process, Council members took note of the holding of the executive and follow-up committee meeting of the Political Agreement on 14 February,<sup>169</sup> and the subsequent strategic review meeting held on 4 June by the Government of the Central African Republic, with the participation of regional actors, to monitor the implementation of the

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<sup>168</sup> See [S/PV.9156](#).

<sup>169</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#).



road map.<sup>170</sup> Council members stressed the need for the implementation of the road map and highlighted its critical importance in restoring peace and security in the country and returning to the commitments under the Political Agreement.<sup>171</sup> The representative of China expressed hope that the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region would enhance communication with the Government of the Central African Republic in the implementation of the road map and strive to form synergies based on the reality on the ground and its needs.<sup>172</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation underlined the importance for the authorities to commit to the principle of inclusivity when implementing the road map on actualizing the Political Agreement. Other Council members echoed similar sentiments, urging the process of the implementation of the road map to include women and other social groups.<sup>173</sup>

Concerning the republican dialogue initiated in March, Council members stressed the need for inclusivity, including ensuring the participation of women in the dialogue.<sup>174</sup> The representative of Mexico welcomed the regional mobilization to facilitate the republican dialogue and revitalize the Political Agreement, particularly through the road map, and expressed belief that the region could play an important role in opening channels of communication with the groups linked to Coalition des patriotes pour le changement to bring them back to the negotiating table.<sup>175</sup> The representative of France noted that some of the country's active forces had not been able to participate, emphasizing that only inclusive consultations and consensus surrounding the rules of the democratic process would enable the country to advance towards peace and reconciliation. Council members emphasized the need for the implementation of the

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<sup>170</sup> See [S/PV.9074](#), China, United Arab Emirates, India, and Norway.

<sup>171</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#), France, United Arab Emirates and Brazil; [S/PV.9074](#), France, Norway, Ireland, and Albania; and [S/PV.9156](#), France, Albania, , Chin), Mexico, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, India, Russian Federation, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>172</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#).

<sup>173</sup> See [S/PV.9156](#), France, Albania, Mexico, and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>174</sup> [S/PV.8971](#), United Arab Emirates, Gabon, and Norway; [S/PV.9074](#), France, Brazil, ,United Arab Emirates, India; [S/PV.9156](#), Brazil, United States, United Arab Emirates, Norway, United Kingdom, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya)..

<sup>175</sup> See [S/PV.9074](#).

recommendations resulting from the republican dialogue<sup>176</sup> and welcomed the establishment of the follow-up committee.<sup>177</sup>

Throughout the year, Council members repeatedly expressed concerns regarding the persistent human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law,<sup>178</sup> including those committed by the national security forces and the Wagner Group.<sup>179</sup> The representative of the United States recalled that the national defence forces and Wagner Group contractors, referred to as “other security personnel” in the report of the Secretary-General,<sup>180</sup> had perpetrated over 40 per cent of all violations documented during the reporting period, which was why the United States found it hard to consider lifting the arms embargo.<sup>181</sup> In a similar vein, concerned by the alarming reports regarding the conduct of the Central African forces and the brutal methods applied by the Wagner Group and instilled upon the Central African partners, the representative of France stressed that any changes to the embargo must be considered against that backdrop.<sup>182</sup> Council members condemned the massacres allegedly committed by the Wagner Group against civilians in January in Aigbando.<sup>183</sup> The representative of Ireland pointed out that state agents were also responsible for 45 per cent of violations and abuses documented between June and October, which was unacceptable.<sup>184</sup> The representatives of Albania and Norway expressed regret that the unilateral ceasefire had not produced the expected results in terms of ending hostilities, and the representative of the United States called upon the authorities to immediately stand up and enforce a ceasefire monitoring mechanism.<sup>185</sup> Council members further urged the Central African authorities to investigate the allegations of human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and bring those responsible for these acts to

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<sup>176</sup> Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and Norway.

<sup>177</sup> See [S/PV.9156](#), Brazil, India, and Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>178</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#), Albania, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), United Kingdom, and Ireland; [S/PV.9074](#), Brazil; and [S/PV.9156](#) France, Albania, Norway, Ireland, United Kingdom.

<sup>179</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#), Albania, Norway, and Ireland; and [S/PV.9074](#), France, Norway, United States, Ireland, United Kingdom, and Albania. [S/PV.9156](#), France, Albania, Ireland, United States, and Norway, United Kingdom.

<sup>180</sup> See [S/2022/119](#).

<sup>181</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#).

<sup>182</sup> See [S/PV.9074](#).

<sup>183</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#), France, Albania, and United States.

<sup>184</sup> See [S/PV.9156](#).

<sup>185</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#).

account, including through prosecution.<sup>186</sup> The representative of Gabon stressed the need for the implementation of a national special investigation commission to shed light on serious crimes and violations of human rights and humanitarian law.<sup>187</sup> The representative of the United States noted the initial steps taken by the special commission of inquiry, led by the Central African Republic's Minister of Justice, and the need to follow through on the investigations. Council members welcomed the start of public hearings of the Special Criminal Court.<sup>188</sup>

During the period under review, the Council adopted two resolutions under this item, one in relation to the mandate of MINUSCA and one concerning the sanctions measures on the Central African Republic. Neither of the two resolutions was adopted unanimously. With regard to the sanctions measures, by resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#) adopted on 29 July, the Council renewed until 31 July 2023 the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban,<sup>189</sup> and expanded the list of exemptions to the arms embargo.<sup>190</sup> The Council further removed the requirement of advance notification to the Committee of the intention to acquire arms and related material exempted from the arms embargo by the resolution.<sup>191</sup> The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 31 August 2023 requesting it to provide to the Council a final report no later than 30 May 2023.<sup>192</sup> By the resolution, the Council further welcomed the strategic review meeting held in Bangui on 4 June 2022 on the operationalization of the roadmap adopted by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on 16 September 2021 to revitalize the implementation of the Political Agreement.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#), Albania, Norway, United States, United Kingdom, and Ireland; and [S/PV.9074](#), Norway, Ireland, and United Kingdom.

<sup>187</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#).

<sup>188</sup> See [S/PV.8971](#), France, Mexico, Albania; and [S/PV.9074](#), Brazil, India, United States, Ireland, Mexico, and Albania; and [S/PV.9156](#) France, Ireland, Mexico, Brazil, and Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>189</sup> See resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1, 3 and 4. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>190</sup> See resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 (g) and (h).

<sup>191</sup> See resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 (a)-(h).

<sup>192</sup> See resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#), paras. 6 and 7. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

<sup>193</sup> See resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#), third preambular paragraph.

Resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#) was adopted with ten votes in favour and five abstentions.<sup>194</sup> Following the adoption, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic, Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad expressed satisfaction with the first significant step to be made with regard to the embargo on armed groups, but stressed that it remained to be seen how it could be applied to armed groups.<sup>195</sup> She thanked States that had voiced their support for lifting the embargo completely, China and the Russian Federation for their call to take into account the realities on the ground as well as the three African members of the Council, and regretted that the resolution did not respond to her country's legitimate request for a total lifting of the embargo.

Explaining their delegations' abstentions, the representatives of China, Gabon, Kenya and the Russian Federation recalled the requests by the Central African Republic authorities and regional organizations, to lift the embargo which the resolution failed to do. The representative of China said that the resolution still contained a number of restrictive measures that could pose unnecessary obstacles to the defence capacity-building of the Government and that the embargo measures had become increasingly incompatible with the developments in the country. The representative of Kenya, recalling provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, expressed hope that the Council would listen to the voices of Central Africans and the relevant regional organizations and take the remaining step of removing the notification requirement as soon as possible. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the resolution did not respond fully to the task of stabilizing the situation in the Central African Republic. The representative of Ghana expressed gratitude for the efforts of France as the penholder in trying to accommodate the input of delegations for a responsible release of the levers on the embargo in a way that did not have an adverse impact on the stability of the country and its neighbours and noted that the resolution represented the best possible outcome given the prevailing circumstances.

Among the Council members who voted in favour, the representative of France said that the resolution made it even easier for the Central African Republic's armed forces to acquire all

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<sup>194</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States; *against*: none; *abstained*: China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Russian Federation. See [S/PV.9105](#).

<sup>195</sup> See [S/PV.9105](#).

types of weapons and ammunition, sending a strong message to the authorities whose greater involvement was key to combating the proliferation of weapons in the country. The representative of Albania underscored that the resolution was the closest to a balanced approach. Recognizing the progress made by the authorities in meeting the benchmarks, he noted that the resolution's final formula kept the focus on the need to improve the ability of the country to safeguard its internal security and improve its compliance with the benchmarks. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the embargo remained an important tool for supporting the maintenance of peace and stability in the country. The representative of the United States noted that the region was awash with guns, and it was time to halt that unfettered flow. With effective implementation, which meant a notification requirement, the arms embargo could help silence the guns. The representative of Brazil said that the resolution kept in place important mechanisms, such as the system of benchmarks and the work of the Panel of Experts, to help guide the country towards stabilization and durable peace, and addressed, though only partially, the assessments and claims of the authorities and regional organizations.

Concerning the mandate of MINUSCA, on 15 November, the Council adopted resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), extending the mandate of MINUSCA for a period of one year until 15 November 2023.<sup>196</sup> The Council reiterated that MINUSCA's mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks.<sup>197</sup> In that regard, the Council reiterated, with certain modifications, MINUSCA's four priority tasks, namely, the protection of civilians; the provision of good offices and support to the peace process, including the implementation the Political Agreement and the ceasefire; the facilitation of the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and the protection of United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods.<sup>198</sup> By the resolution, the Council also took note of the republican dialogue held in March, and called for further steps from all actors to implement the recommendations contained therein to resolve any arising issues and conclude the electoral process through the organization of local elections.<sup>199</sup> The Council welcomed the strategic review meeting convened on 4 June,

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<sup>196</sup> See resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 29.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 33.

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 35 (a)-(d). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, seventeenth preambular paragraph.

noting the government's ongoing efforts and Prime Minister Moloua's leadership to coordinate the implementation of the Political Agreement through the road map.<sup>200</sup>

During the meeting at which the Council adopted resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), with three abstentions,<sup>201</sup> several Council members took the floor to explain their votes. Explaining her country's abstention, the representative of Gabon emphasized that the text of the resolution did not meet the aspirations of the Central African Republic.<sup>202</sup> She deplored the rejection during the negotiations of the proposals put forward by the three African members of the Council in support of a strong commitment to restoring State authority, which would undoubtedly help to build peace. She further regretted the lack of differentiated treatment of the armed groups and the Central African authorities, and the deletion of the well-defined deadline for the strategic review of MINUSCA. She emphasized that the resolution did not take into account the efforts made by the Central African armed forces in defending and securing their territory in difficult conditions. The representative of China emphasized that peacekeeping operations should define their priorities based on the needs of the host country. He regretted that the resolution did not reflect the fact that the Government continued to recover lost territory and did not take on board China's views on the security threat posed by armed groups, as well as the Mission's independent strategic review, which left China no other choice but to abstain in the voting. He hoped that the Mission's assistance in extending State authority in extending state authority would be prioritized. The representative of the Russian Federation underscored that his delegation could not accept a text that equated all parties and armed groups to one another, when it was well documented that the latter were responsible for the majority of the violations. He stressed that many points raised by the Russian Federation had not been included in the text, including the proposed wording on the need to effectively investigate the supply-chain used to deliver explosive devices and their components deployed to the country.

Among the Council members who voted in favour of the resolution, some expressed support for the inclusion of new language concerning MINUSCA's freedom of movement and

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<sup>200</sup> Ibid., twelfth preambular paragraph.

<sup>201</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstained*: China, Gabon, Russian Federation.

<sup>202</sup> See [S/PV.9190](#).

the authorization of night flights.<sup>203</sup> The representative of France deplored the abstentions and stressed the need for the Council’s unanimous support for MINUSCA. The representative of the United States regretted that the issue of the “Kremlin-backed Wagner Group” was left out of the resolution and emphasized that the forces sent by the Russian Federation to the Central African Republic had consistently obstructed MINUSCA’s ability to fulfil its mandate. The representative of the United Kingdom was disappointed by the loss of agreed responsibility-to-protect language, stressing that the Government remained primarily responsible for the protection of civilians. The representatives of Kenya and Ghana regretted that some of the proposals presented by the three African members of the Council, including promoting the extension of state authority, the deployment of security forces and the preservation of territorial integrity from “other tasks” to “priority tasks”, had been left out. Kenya also hoped for stronger language condemning the activities of armed groups and regretted that manifest geopolitical considerations had dictated the positions of certain delegations during the negotiation process.

### Meetings: The situation in the Central African Republic

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8971</a> 22 February 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic ( <a href="#">S/2022/119</a> )		Central African Republic	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, African Union Special Representative and Head of the African Union Office in the Central African Republic, Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> all invitees <sup>b</sup>	

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., France, United States and United Kingdom.

<a href="#">S/PV.9074</a> 22 June 2022	Letter dated 1 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/449</a> )	Central African Republic	Special Representative of the Secretary General, President of the Network for Women's Leadership in the Central African Republic	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> all invitees
	Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic ( <a href="#">S/2022/491</a> )			
<a href="#">S/PV.9105</a> 29 July 2022	Letter dated 14 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/489</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by France ( <a href="#">S/2022/579</a> )	Central African Republic	13 Council members <sup>c</sup> , invitee <sup>d</sup>
	Letter dated 29 June 2022 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2588 (2021) addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/527</a> )			Resolution <a href="#">2648 (2022)</a> 10-0-5 <sup>e</sup> (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9156</a> 19 October 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic ( <a href="#">S/2022/762</a> )	Central African Republic, Rwanda	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees <sup>d</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9190</a> 14 November 2022		Draft resolution submitted by France ( <a href="#">S/2022/845</a> )	Central African Republic	11 Council members <sup>f</sup> , invitee <sup>b</sup>
				Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a> 12-0-3 <sup>g</sup> (adopted under Chapter VII)

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>b</sup> Central African Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad. The African Union Special Representative and Head of the African Union Office in the Central African Republic participated in the meeting via videoconference from Bangui. The Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region participated in the meeting via videoconference from Kinshasa.

<sup>c</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>d</sup> Central African Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad.

<sup>e</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America; *against*: none; *abstained*: China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Russian Federation.

<sup>f</sup> Albania, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>g</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America; *against*: none; *abstained*: China, Gabon, Russian Federation.



## 6. Central African region

In 2022, the Security Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Central African region” and did not adopt any resolutions in connection with the situation in the Central African region. Both meetings took the form of briefings.<sup>204</sup> Under this item, the Council considered developments in Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congo, Gabon, and the Gulf of Guinea. More information on the meetings is given in the table below.<sup>205</sup> In 2022, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA).<sup>206</sup>

During the period under review, consistent with the six-month reporting period requested by the presidential statement of 10 August 2018,<sup>207</sup> the Council heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and the Head of UNOCA respectively further to the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Region.<sup>208</sup> The Assistant Secretary-General and the Special Representative apprised the Council on the activities of UNOCA, its continued cooperation with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), and its activities as the Secretariat for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. The briefers updated the Council on the political, human rights and security situation in the region. In that regard, the Assistant Secretary-General and the Special Representative briefed the Council on the preparation and conduct of electoral processes in several Central African countries and the subsequent political processes, the continued threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in the Lake Chad basin, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and the impact of climate change on

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<sup>204</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>205</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 24.

<sup>206</sup> See [S/2022/582](#).

<sup>207</sup> [S/PRST/2018/17](#), twentieth paragraph.

<sup>208</sup> See [S/2022/436](#) and [S/2022/896](#).

the security and prosperity of Central African countries. The Council also heard two briefings by the President of ECCAS and a briefing by the Vice-President of the Coalition des organisations de la société civile d’Afrique centrale pour la préservation de la paix, la prévention des conflits, la résolution et la transformation des crises (COPAC).

In her briefing to the Council on 8 June 2022, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations recalled that with several countries in the subregion such as the Republic of the Congo, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Gabon, preparing for crucial electoral processes, all stakeholders should create conditions conducive to credible, inclusive and peaceful elections and the Governments should widen the democratic space through the participation of women and young people in elections. She reported about the security challenges persisting in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where attacks were exacerbating political and humanitarian crises. The extremist violence in the Lake Chad basin continued to be a concern and in that connection, UNOCA and UNOWAS continued their high-level advocacy with the Member States to increase coherence in their responses to violent extremism and provide technical support. On climate security, she emphasized UNOCA’s close partnership with ECCAS in better preventing, mitigating and managing the security risks related to climate change. The Assistant-Secretary-General also highlighted the women and peace and security as a priority for the subregion and UNOCA, providing support for capacity-building, consultations and public initiatives by civil society focused on women’s participation in mediation, peacebuilding, political dialogue and elections in Angola, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe.<sup>209</sup> The President of ECCAS, underlining the Commission’s readiness to cooperate with the Council in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the Charter, reported about the positive developments in the region, including an improved security situation and strengthened confidence-building measures. Nonetheless, with the deteriorating security situation on the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and the postponement of the Chadian inclusive national dialogue, the President noted that the current political and security

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<sup>209</sup> See [S/PV.9058](#).

situation in the region continued to affect the collective security for which the Council was responsible. The Vice President of COPAC briefed the Council about the human rights situation and the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda in Central Africa.

In his briefing to the Council on 8 December 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa reported about the electoral progress in the region, highlighting the increased participation and representation of women in political institutions and processes, particularly in Angola and Sao Tome and Principe with a greater proportion of women in parliamentary assemblies and in Government. He emphasized that the States of Central Africa should further open up political and civic space and strengthen the inclusivity, diversity and credibility of political processes, ensuring the legitimacy of the institutions resulting from the elections. In that connection, he urged State authorities to ensure full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms and to avoid any disproportionate use of force in maintaining public order. On Central Africa's fight against climate change and its effects, the Special Representative noted the commitment of ECCAS and some of its member States during the twenty-seventh Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt and highlighted the role and capacity of subregional organizations to promote a common vision on key issues and the importance of regular consultations with the United Nations entities for greater efficiency of "delivering as one". He concluded his briefing by noting that the year 2023 would be marked by important political processes in several countries in Central Africa and calling for an increased support from the Security Council at the political level.<sup>210</sup> The President of ECCAS reported about the security and political situations in Central Africa, taking note of the elections held in the Republic of the Congo, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea. Briefing the Council about the recent activities of the Commission, he reiterated his full support of the Luanda and Nairobi processes set up by the African Union and the East African Community and noted that the Commission was exploring ways to support the regional force currently deployed in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and serving as an observer and a focal point for the two processes.

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<sup>210</sup> See [S/PV.9213](#).

In 2022, the Council's deliberations focused on major political and security challenges and on human rights, humanitarian and socioeconomic situations affecting the Central African region, including the adverse effects of climate change and food security exacerbated by the geopolitical conflicts and the lasting impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. On the political front, Council members welcomed the electoral processes in several countries in the Central African region, including Angola, the Congo, Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea and stressed the importance of delivering democratic elections and inclusive transitional processes and increasing the political participation and representation of women. Council members deliberated on the role of the United Nations and addressed its cooperation with subregional organizations, encouraging UNOCA and ECCAS to continue assisting the State authorities in inclusive political processes, electoral reforms and commitment to addressing climate-related security risks. Council members highlighted the key role played by the United Nations entities and subregional organizations in advancing the youth, peace and security agenda and promoting women's political participation in the Central African region. Several Council members also took note of the improved maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea and UNOCA's cooperation with UNOWAS in that regard.<sup>211</sup> Council members addressed the situation in specific countries and in particular (i) the ongoing violence in the Central African Republic, including the human rights abuses compounding the existing humanitarian situation and the operations of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the attacks against the humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel, as well as the progress in the republican dialogue;<sup>212</sup> (ii) the persisting political tensions in Cameroon, in particular the north-west and south-west regions and the human rights violations and abuses against civilians;<sup>213</sup> (iii) terrorism and violent extremism in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the emergence of tensions with Rwanda, reiterating the African Union's

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<sup>211</sup> [S/PV.9058](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, United Arab Emirates, Norway and China; [S/PV.9213](#), Russian Federation, Brazil, Norway, Ireland and India.

<sup>212</sup> [S/PV.9058](#), United Kingdom, Mexico, United States, India, Ireland, China and Albania; [S/PV.9213](#), United Kingdom, Mexico, United States and France. For further information on the Central African Republic, see part I, sect. 5.

<sup>213</sup> [S/PV.9058](#), United Kingdom, Mexico United States, France, Brazil, Russian Federation, Ireland, Norway and Albania; [S/PV.9213](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Brazil, Albania, Norway, United States, France and India.

call for the resolution of disputes through diplomatic means with the mediation of Angola;<sup>214</sup> and (iv) the progress of national dialogue and political transitions in Chad, including the signing of the Doha peace agreement and the appointment of an inclusive Government<sup>215</sup>. Council members deliberated on the cross-border threat posed by terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin and expressed support for action by the Multinational Joint Task Force to respond to those threats posed by the activities of terrorist groups such as Da'esh, Boko Haram and the Allied Democratic Forces. They also continued to discuss about the impact of the geopolitical conflict and the socioeconomic and humanitarian crises on women and promoting active participation of women in political processes and addressing sexual and gender-related violence. In 2021, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 3 and 6 August 2021 respectively, the Council extended the mandate of UNOCA for three years, until 31 August 2024.<sup>216</sup> In renewing UNOCA's mandate, the Council reiterated, with certain modifications, that UNOCA's mandate would focus on four core objectives, namely (1) the monitoring of political and security developments in Central Africa and carrying out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General in order to prevent and resolve conflicts, sustaining peace and advising the Secretary-General and United Nations entities in the area on sustaining peace issues in Central Africa; (2) enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation in countries of the subregion, with due attention to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including human rights and gender dimensions; (3) supporting and enhancing United Nations efforts in the subregion, as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, including from human rights and gender perspectives; and (4) enhancing coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security.<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> [S/PV.9058](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Norway and China; [S/PV.9213](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico, China and United States.

<sup>215</sup> [S/PV.9058](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), United States, France, Brazil and Albania; [S/PV.9213](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Brazil, France and India.

<sup>216</sup> [S/2021/719](#) and [S/2021/720](#).

<sup>217</sup> [S/2021/719](#), annex, Objectives 1-4. For more information on the mandate of UNOCA, see part X, sect. II.

**Meetings: Central African region**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9058</a> 8 June 2022	Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa ( <a href="#">S/2022/436</a> )			Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, President of the Commission of the Economic Community of Central African States, Vice-President of the Coalition des organisations de la société civile d'Afrique centrale pour la préservation de la paix, la prévention des conflits, la résolution et la transformation des crises	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9213</a> 8 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa ( <a href="#">S/2022/896</a> )			Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, President of the Commission of the Economic Community of Central African States	13 Council members <sup>b</sup> , all invitees <sup>c</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>b</sup> Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>c</sup> President of the Commission of the Economic Community of Central African States participated in the meeting via videoconference.

## 7. Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

During the period under review, the Security Council held 22 meetings and adopted six resolutions under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”. Sixteen of the meetings took the form of briefings and six were convened for the adoption of a resolution.<sup>218</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants and outcomes, is provided in the tables below. Besides meetings, Council members also held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.<sup>219</sup> In addition, the Council held two private (closed) meetings with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).<sup>220</sup>

Consistent with prior practice, the Council considered several topics under this item, namely, the situation in the Sudan and the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, the situation in the Abyei Area and the mandate of UNISFA, and the situation in South Sudan and the mandate of UNMISS.<sup>221</sup> The Council also discussed the work of the Committees and Panels of Experts concerning the Sudan and South Sudan and the implementation of resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), by which the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

In relation to the Sudan, the Council was briefed four times by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of UNITAMS further to the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the country and the activities of the Mission.<sup>222</sup> The Council also heard one briefing by a civil society representative.<sup>223</sup> The Special Representative focused his statements on the impact of the 25 October 2021 military takeover of the

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<sup>218</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>219</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap 26.

<sup>220</sup> The private meetings were held under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”. See [S/PV.8985](#) and [S/PV.9186](#).

<sup>221</sup> For more information on the mandates of UNISFA, UNMISS and UNITAMS, see part X.

<sup>222</sup> See [S/PV.9006](#), [S/PV.9041](#), [S/PV.9129](#) and [S/PV.9211](#).

<sup>223</sup> See [S/PV.9129](#).

Government on the political, economic, humanitarian and security situation in the Sudan. He also updated the Council on the work of the African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and United Nations in support of the Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led political dialogue to restore the political transition.

At the meeting held on 28 March 2022, the Special Representative noted that the Sudan remained without a functioning Government since the coup d'état.<sup>224</sup> Furthermore, protests against the coup d'état and the violent repression against them continued, and the economic, humanitarian and security situations in the country were deteriorating. In terms of economic developments, the Special Representative reported on the 45 per cent fall of the Sudanese pound against the United States dollar, a dramatic price increase for basic goods and services, the absence of foreign investment, and dwindling of exports. He added that the combined effects of the conflict, economic crisis and poor harvests would likely double the number of people facing acute hunger to approximately 18 million by the end of 2022. The Special Representative stated that, in the absence of a political solution to the crisis, the security situation had worsened across the country. In Darfur, crime and lawlessness were on the rise and inter-communal conflict had intensified. He welcomed steps taken by the Government of the Sudan and the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement to begin the training for and standing up of the joint security-keeping force. He further expressed support for the Government's request for international support to implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures. The Special Representative noted that, meanwhile, frequent protests against military rule continued in Khartoum and elsewhere, with protestors continuing to be killed, injured, arrested and subject to criminal charges. He added that it was of particular concern that women were targeted and subjected to violence and intimidation by members of the security forces, mentioning that as of 22 March 2022, 16 women had reportedly been raped during protests in Khartoum.

The Special Representative announced that the United Nations, African Union and IGAD had agreed to join efforts in supporting the Sudan through the next phase of the political process by facilitating an inclusive Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led political process with the full and meaningful participation of women. According to the Special Representative, in order to have a

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<sup>224</sup> See [S/PV.9006](#).



chance of succeeding, the political talks required favorable conditions which entailed an end to the violence and the establishment of the right to hold peaceful demonstrations, the release of political detainees, and a firm commitment to phase out the emergency status in the country.

On 13 September 2022, the Special Representative noted the announcement on 4 July 2022 by the President of the Sovereign Council, General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, of the military's intention to withdraw from politics, which generated momentum among civilian forces, resulting in several major initiatives aimed at reaching a common civilian vision.<sup>225</sup> One such initiative was a draft constitutional framework presented by the Sudanese Bar Association which gathered a broad spectrum of civilian stakeholders. The Special Representative emphasized that, while important differences about the institutional division of powers and particularly the role of the military remained, there was nevertheless a wide-ranging consensus on, among other things, the need for a civilian head of State, an independent prime minister and cabinet composed of experts and technocrats, and that transitional justice should be high on the list of priorities. With regard to the security situation, he noted the particularly worrying surge of violence in Darfur and Blue Nile, with UNITAMS documenting 40 incidents of inter-communal violence resulting in the death of more than 300 civilians from 24 May to 28 August 2022 and urged all communities to refrain from hate speech and the authorities to urgently address protection gaps. As a positive step in the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, the Special Representative referred to the graduation of the first batch of 2,000 fighters for the joint security-keeping force in Darfur, while also urging the authorities to begin their deployment. He informed Council members that humanitarian needs were at record levels owing to a combination of ongoing political instability, economic crises, a rise in inter-communal violence, poor harvests and floods. Some 11.7 million people were facing acute hunger and the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan was only 32 per cent funded.

At the meeting held on 7 December 2022, the Special Representative informed the Council that, on 5 December 2022, the military leadership and a broad range of civilian actors signed a political framework agreement to lay the ground for a final political accord and the

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<sup>225</sup> See [S/PV.9129](#).

formation of a new civilian Government, leading the country towards recovery and democratic elections over a two-year transitional phase.<sup>226</sup> The agreement followed negotiations, facilitated by the trilateral mechanism, based on the draft constitutional document prepared under the auspices of the Sudanese Bar Association. While the signing of the framework agreement was an important breakthrough, critical contentious issues such as security sector reform and the merger of forces, transitional justice, the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, the status of the dismantling committee and the situation in eastern Sudan still needed to be addressed. He underlined the importance of a sufficiently inclusive process in the lead up to a final political agreement in order to safeguard against the influence of those who did not see their interests advanced by a political settlement. He also cautioned that as the Sudan got closer to reaching a final political agreement, those who did not see their interests advanced by a political settlement could escalate attempts to undermine the process.

Reflecting on the challenges during the 13 months since the coup d'état, the Special Representative recalled that over 900 people had reportedly been killed and many more injured in violent conflict and that the resurgence of large-scale violence demonstrated the increasing fragility at the State level, exacerbated by the continued Government vacuum. In that regard, he noted that the situation in Blue Nile remained precarious despite the imposition of a state of emergency, while inter-communal violence in Lagawa locality, West Kordofan, in mid-October 2022 resulted in the killing of at least 19 and displacement of 65,000 people. Furthermore, there was intense fighting in Central Darfur between the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid Al-Nur and the Rapid Support Forces. Across the Sudan, 260,000 people had been displaced since the beginning of 2022 as a result of the conflict. Humanitarian partners estimated that about 15.8 million people, one third of the population, would need humanitarian assistance in 2023, which was an increase of 1.5 million compared to 2022. He concluded by noting that the framework agreement offered a path for realizing the aspirations of the Sudan's young people, women and men and that working together with the United Nations, Council members and the larger international community in support of those efforts could help them move forward on their chosen path.

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<sup>226</sup> See [S/PV.9211](#).

In his statement to the Council on 13 September 2022, the President of the Sudan Social Development Organization (SUDO) discussed the efforts of civil society under the Sudanese Bar Association initiative to reach an agreement on a civilian Government.<sup>227</sup> He underscored that a civilian Government could not be established without a unified army and State authority and that such a government was necessary to stabilize the economic situation, reform the civil service, begin constitutional reform, resolve the issue of transitional justice, and address insecurity in Darfur. The President of SUDO highlighted the lack of progress on ensuring the meaningful representation of women during the transition period and noted that, at the initiative of the Bar Association, civilian stakeholders agreed that 50 per cent of the cabinet and Sovereign Council and more than 40 per cent of the Transitional Legislative Council had to be represented by women.

In their discussions in 2022, most Council members expressed concern and disappointment with the negative impact of the 25 October 2021 military takeover on the political transition, as well as socioeconomic, humanitarian and security conditions in the Sudan. Council members welcomed and expressed support for the African Union-IGAD-United Nations trilateral mechanism and urged all stakeholders to negotiate in good faith with a view to restoring the political transition. Multiple Council members stressed that the transition process had to be inclusive and to consider the concerns of all stakeholders, particularly women, youth and other marginalized groups.<sup>228</sup> Council members welcomed the signing of the 5 December political framework agreement, describing it as a good step towards ending the political crisis in the country, with a number of speakers calling upon the parties to work towards a final agreement and the restoration of a civilian Government.<sup>229</sup> Some speakers further called on other political stakeholders that had not done so to sign the framework agreement.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> See [S/PV.9129](#).

<sup>228</sup> See [S/PV.9006](#), India, Ireland, Albania, Norway and Mexico; [S/PV.9041](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates, Albania, Brazil, Russian Federation, Norway, Mexico, Ireland and United States; [S/PV.9129](#), Ireland, Norway, Brazil, India, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and Albania; and [S/PV.9211](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Mexico and France.

<sup>229</sup> See [S/PV.9211](#), United Kingdom, Norway, United States, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, France and India.

<sup>230</sup> Russian Federation, China and Mexico.

Council members condemned the violence and human rights violations against protesters against the military takeover, including acts of sexual violence, and called on the military authorities to create the necessary conditions for political dialogue by lifting the state of emergency, allowing peaceful protests and freedom of expression, and releasing all political detainees.<sup>231</sup> With respect to insecurity and violence in Darfur, Blue Nile and Western Kordofan, some speakers urged the Government to ensure the full implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and the national plan for the protection of civilians.<sup>232</sup> Several delegations stressed the need for the international community to ensure continued support to the Government to ensure the full implementation of the peace agreement and the national plan.<sup>233</sup>

With respect to the economic and humanitarian situation, several delegations expressed concern with the decision of international financial institutions and donors to suspend aid to the Sudan following the military takeover, particularly noting the impact of such measures on the civilian population and objected to linking such support to progress in the political process.<sup>234</sup> In this regard, the representative of the Russian federation noted that the politicization of the provision of economic and financial assistance had already led to divisions in society, as well as a loss of civic trust in the transitional authorities, which in turn had led to general instability and new separatist trends in the country.<sup>235</sup> The representatives of Gabon and Kenya, speaking on behalf of the three African members of the Council, echoed the appeal of the Secretary-General for the creation of exceptional modalities to ensure continued international assistance for the Sudan and called on the international community to reconsider the temporary suspension of

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<sup>231</sup> See [S/PV.9006](#), United Kingdom, France, United States, Ireland, Albania and Mexico; [S/PV.9041](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, Norway, France, Mexico, Ireland and United States; [S/PV.9129](#), United Kingdom; and [S/PV.9211](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, Ghana (speaking also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United States and France.

<sup>232</sup> See [S/PV.9006](#), United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Ireland, Albania, Norway and Mexico; [S/PV.9041](#) Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Norway, France, Mexico and Ireland ; [S/PV.9129](#), Ireland, France; and [S/PV.9211](#), United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United States, Albania, Brazil and Mexico.

<sup>233</sup> See [S/PV.9041](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); [S/PV.9129](#), United Arab Emirates, China; and [S/PV.9211](#), United Arab Emirates.

<sup>234</sup> See [S/PV.9006](#), India, China and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9129](#), United Arab Emirates, India, and China; and [S/PV.9211](#), India.

<sup>235</sup> See [S/PV.9006](#).

aid.<sup>236</sup> Other Council members opined that an inclusive political settlement and the establishment of a civilian Government was the best way to improve socioeconomic and humanitarian conditions in the country.<sup>237</sup> In his remarks at Council meetings, the representative of the Sudan appealed to the international community for financial support for the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, particularly the provisions of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the resumption of development assistance to mitigate the impact of necessary economic reforms.<sup>238</sup>

By resolution [2636 \(2022\)](#) of 3 June 2022, the Council unanimously extended the existing mandate of UNITAMS as contained in resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#) for a period of one year, until 3 June 2023.<sup>239</sup> After the adoption, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that, as penholder, his delegation's preference would have been for the Council to adopt a substantive resolution that voiced support for the vital efforts of UNITAMS in facilitating a Sudanese-led process to restore a civilian-led transition toward democracy.<sup>240</sup> Furthermore, he added that a substantive resolution would also have enabled the priorities of the Mission to be updated to reflect the request of the Sudan for additional support on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, transition justice and civilian protection. A preference for a substantive resolution reflecting the realities on the ground was also expressed by the representatives of Albania, Ireland, Mexico and Norway. The representative of the Russian Federation urged all external players, including UNITAMS, to play a constructive role and recalled that the Mission was deployed at the invitation of the Government to support national efforts in strengthening peace, fulfilling the terms of the Juba Peace Agreement, dealing with issues relating to internally displaced persons and mobilizing assistance for economic development. The representative of China stated that the international community should maintain the patience necessary to create space for the resolution of differences among parties, avoid choosing sides, aggravating tensions and exerting excessive pressure. He recalled that UNITAMS was a political mission established

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<sup>236</sup> See [S/PV.9006](#), Ghana; [S/PV.9041](#), Kenya; and [S/PV.9211](#), Ghana.

<sup>237</sup> See [S/PV.9041](#), Albania, Norway and United States; and [S/PV.9129](#), United Kingdom.

<sup>238</sup> See [S/PV.9006](#); [p. S/PV.9041](#); [S/PV.9129](#); and [S/PV.9211](#).

<sup>239</sup> Resolution [2636 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>240</sup> See [S/PV.9054](#).

at the request of the Sudan under Chapter VI of the Charter, that it had to abide by the mandate of the Council and respect the Sudan's sovereignty, and called on it to strengthen its mandate on mobilizing international development assistance.

Council members also heard four briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) on the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts.<sup>241</sup> The Chair informed Council members that the Panel submitted its final report to the Committee in December 2021, after which the Committee reiterated some of the Panel's recommendations to the Permanent Representatives of the Sudan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt and Libya on 1 March 2022.<sup>242</sup> By resolution [2620 \(2022\)](#) of 15 February 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for a period of 13 months until 12 March 2023.<sup>243</sup> The Council took note of the Secretary-General's report of 31 July 2021, as requested in resolution [2562 \(2021\)](#), providing a review of the situation in Darfur and recommending benchmarks to assess the sanctions measures. The Council further expressed its intention to consider by 31 August 2022 adjusting the measures to respond to the situation in Darfur establishing clear, well-identified, and realistic key benchmarks.<sup>244</sup> In Council discussions during the reporting period, several Council members, as well as the representative of the Sudan, consistently stressed that the sanctions measures no longer corresponded to the situation in Darfur and impeded the implementation of Juba Peace Agreement and the Government's ability to maintain security and protect civilians.<sup>245</sup> The representative of China expressed regret that the Council was not able to define benchmarks by 31 August 2022 and noted that such benchmarks had to be clear, well-defined and realistic.<sup>246</sup>

In addition to the above, pursuant to resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), the Prosecutor of the International Court briefed the Council twice in 2022 in relation to Darfur.<sup>247</sup> On 17 January

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<sup>241</sup> See [S/PV.9005](#), [S/PV.9070](#), [S/PV.9128](#) and [S/PV.9210](#).

<sup>242</sup> See [S/PV.9005](#). See also [S/2022/48](#).

<sup>243</sup> Resolution [2620 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5. For the report of the Secretary-General, see [S/2021/696](#). The Council did not establish benchmarks to assess the measures in 2022.

<sup>245</sup> See [S/PV.8964](#), China and Russian Federation; [S/PV.9005](#), Sudan; [S/PV.9006](#), Russian Federation and China ; [S/PV.9041](#), China; [S/PV.9070](#), Russian Federation, China and Gabon; [S/PV.9129](#), China and Russian Federation; and [S/PV.9211](#), Russian Federation, China and Sudan.

<sup>246</sup> See [S/PV.9129](#). For further detail on the discussion, see part II, sect. VIII.

<sup>247</sup> See [S/PV.8948](#) and [S/PV.9113](#).

2022, the Prosecutor expressed concern with the suspension of investigative activities in the Sudan by his office following the military takeover and stressed the need for safe and secure access to the country and the archives.<sup>248</sup> On 23 August 2022, the Prosecutor briefed the Council by videoconference from Khartoum and reported on his first visit to Darfur and the interaction with Sudanese authorities and internally displaced persons.<sup>249</sup> In terms of procedural developments, he reported that the case against Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), the senior Janjaweed militia leader and sole suspect in the Court’s custody in relation to the situation in Darfur, had started in April 2022 on 31 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, he stated that the Government’s cooperation with his office had taken a step backwards in recent months and underlined the need for the issuance of multiple entry visa to help the establishment of an office in Khartoum, the collection of evidence and building relationships with the Sudanese authorities and the victims.

With respect to the Abyei Area and the situation between the Sudan and South Sudan, Council members were briefed twice by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa and once by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations.<sup>250</sup> At the meeting held on 21 April 2022, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations stated that, while the overall security situation in Abyei remained calm, the trust deficit between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities remained of great concern.<sup>251</sup> He noted several incidents of inter-communal violence since October 2021 in Noong/Annam, Kolom, Leu/Al Luo and the Amiet common market/Faydelzaraf areas that resulted in the killing of 29 people, including two women, and 30 injured from both communities. He underlined that it was first and foremost for the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to renew their engagement on the final status of Abyei and called upon them to use the next meeting of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee to move forward on the issue. He mentioned that significant progress was made in the development of the Abyei joint programme, through consultations

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<sup>248</sup> See [S/PV.8948](#).

<sup>249</sup> See [S/PV.9113](#).

<sup>250</sup> See [S/PV.9020](#) and [S/PV.9170](#).

<sup>251</sup> See [S/PV.9020](#).

between a team of representatives from the Department of Peace Operations, the Development Coordination Office and the United Nations country teams in the Sudan and South Sudan with women, youth, elders and other community members. The Under-Secretary-General informed the Council that the humanitarian situation had deteriorated largely owing to the inter-communal violence between the Twic Dinka and Ngok Dinka communities near Agok in February and March 2022. With respect to the other mandated area of UNISFA, he reported an absence of progress on re-operationalizing the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism team sites 11 and 12 and the headquarters of Sector 1 in Gok Machar after UNISFA was forced to relocate in 2021. Given the three direct attacks against their patrols in the past two months, the Under-Secretary-General concluded his remarks by strongly emphasizing the need to ensure the safety and security of UNISFA peacekeepers and called on the relevant authorities to investigate those incidents as a matter of priority.

In her statement at the same meeting, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa stated that, with the removal of the civilian Government in Khartoum, the momentum towards the resolution of outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan was suddenly stopped. Specifically, the meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism which was scheduled to take place in January 2022 was not held and no action was taken on the decisions reached at the previous meeting, including the withdrawal of Sudanese and South Sudanese forces from the safe demilitarized border zone and South Sudan's commitment to mediate between communities in Aweil towards the reactivation of the three locations of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. The Special Envoy nevertheless highlighted multiple engagements between the two countries in support of each other's peace processes. For example, in March 2022, General Al-Burhan visited Juba to address tensions between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and First Vice-President Riek Machar over the sharing of senior leadership positions in the future national army. South Sudanese officials, meanwhile, continued to shuttle between Juba and Khartoum to facilitate a solution between the military and civilian components of the transitional Government of the Sudan, as well as to exert efforts to convince Abdul Wahid Al-Nur and his faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army to join the peace process and to secure the resumption of negotiations between the Government and the



Al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North. General Al-Burhan and President Kiir also agreed to focus on cooperation along their common border, starting with the development of unitized oil fields, including in the Abyei Area.

At the meeting held on 27 October 2022, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa highlighted the renewed engagement of the Sudan and South Sudan to address the final status of Abyei and border issues.<sup>252</sup> She welcomed their agreement to enhance cooperation on issues related to Abyei and its final status, as well as their willingness to resume the meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee which had not met since 2017. Regarding the security situation, the Assistant Secretary-General noted a shift in the conflict dynamics over previous years, with a decrease in inter-communal violence between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities in 2022. However, since February 2022, a new conflict emerged between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities in southern Abyei with loss of lives and displacement on both sides. In coordination with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), UNISFA maintained close contact with the Government of South Sudan to support mediation efforts and, in particular, plans for a Government-facilitated peace conference in South Sudan. She expressed concern that, amid the tensions between the two communities, seven attacks on peacekeepers were recorded, including on 16 October 2022 when local community members threatened UNISFA personnel and demanded the removal of Twic Dinka employees and some international staff members from the Mission's headquarters. Finally, the Assistant Secretary-General reported that the reconfiguration of UNISFA into a multinational peacekeeping force was near completion, with 2,567 military personnel out of the authorized 3,250 personnel in place. She expressed the view that, with the Ngok Dinka-Twic Dinka conflict creating new protection needs in the south, the new force had to be better equipped to cover a wider area.

In her remarks, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa noted that, at the meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism on 24 May 2022, the two countries agreed to re-establish the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, activate river transport, immediately open border crossings, and recommit to withdrawing forces from the safe demilitarized border zone. Since May 2022, working with the Chairperson of the African Union

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<sup>252</sup> See [S/PV.9170](#).

High-Level Implementation Panel, the Special Envoy had held separate consultations with the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities to find a way out of the stalemate on the final status of Abyei. She added that, on 24 October 2022, the Sudan and South Sudan agreed to jointly expedite the provision of services to the citizens of Abyei and to activate joint mechanisms to provide humanitarian services. She concluded by stating that, notwithstanding the improved bilateral relations, a renewed commitment regarding the implementation of transitional arrangements, as well as the dispute resolution over Abyei's final status, could not be set apart from the fragile internal situations in both countries.

In their discussions on Abyei and the border during the reporting period, Council members welcomed the improvement in the relations between the Sudan and South Sudan and stressed the importance of using that as an impetus to make progress on the final status of the territory. Council members reiterated their calls for the implementation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011, particularly through the establishment of the joint institutions provided thereunder, and the regular holding of meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism. Most Council members expressed serious concern regarding persistent inter-communal violence in Abyei, including the conflict between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities. In that regard, a number of speakers highlighted the importance of UNISFA's role in supporting inter-communal peace initiatives and dialogue.<sup>253</sup> Regarding the operations of UNISFA, many delegations called on the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to ensure the Mission's freedom of movement including the ability of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism to fully implement its mandate and return to its sector headquarters in Gok Machar.<sup>254</sup> Finally, several Council members reiterated their calls on the Government of the Sudan to expedite the issuance of visas for the Mission's staff, including police personnel.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> See [S/PV.9020](#), United States, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, China, Mexico and Norway; and [S/PV.9170](#), United States, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation and Ireland.

<sup>254</sup> See [S/PV.9020](#), United States, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, United Arab Emirates, France, Ireland, China, Mexico, Albania and United Kingdom; and [S/PV.9170](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Albania, France, United Kingdom, Brazil, India, Mexico and Ireland.

<sup>255</sup> See [S/PV.9020](#), United States, India, Ireland and Albania and Norway; and [S/PV.9170](#), United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Albania, Norway, India, Mexico and Ireland.

By resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) of 12 May 2022 and [2660 \(2022\)](#) of 14 November 2022, both adopted unanimously, the Council twice extended the mandate of UNISFA to support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Mission's mandate in the Abyei Area.<sup>256</sup> While resolution [2630 \(2022\)](#) extended the mandate for 6 months, until 14 November 2022, resolution [2660 \(2022\)](#) did so for one year, until 15 November 2023. By virtue of both resolutions, the Council urged the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to provide full support for UNISFA in the implementation of its mandate and deployment of its personnel.<sup>257</sup> In resolution [2630 \(2022\)](#), the Council further reiterated that the Abyei Area should be demilitarized from any forces, as well as armed elements of the local communities, and urged the two Governments and the local communities to take all necessary steps in that regard.<sup>258</sup>

In connection with the situation in South Sudan, the Council was briefed four times by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of UNMISS further to the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the country.<sup>259</sup> The Council was also briefed by the Interim Chairperson of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC),<sup>260</sup> a representative of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,<sup>261</sup> and three civil society briefers.<sup>262</sup> In his briefings to the Council in 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General focused on the status of the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic in South Sudan as the two-year transitional period drew to a close. He also updated Council members on increasing levels of inter-communal violence and humanitarian needs in the country and the role of UNMISS in the protection of civilians and supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement.

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<sup>256</sup> Resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) and [2660 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>257</sup> Resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) and [2660 \(2022\)](#), para. 4.

<sup>258</sup> Resolution [2630 \(2022\)](#), para. 6.

<sup>259</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#), [S/PV.9067](#), [S/PV.9134](#) and [S/PV.9219](#). See also [S/2022/156](#), [S/2022/468](#), [S/2022/689](#) and [S/2022/918](#).

<sup>260</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#) and [S/PV.9219](#).

<sup>261</sup> See [S/PV.9067](#).

<sup>262</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#), [S/PV.9067](#) and [S/PV.9134](#).

In his first briefing of the year on 7 March 2022, the Special Representative stated that the ceasefire in South Sudan continued to largely hold, with civilian casualties significantly reduced over the past year.<sup>263</sup> On the progress in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, he noted the conclusion of executive appointments at the national and state levels and the reconstitution of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and Council of State and state parliaments. He was concerned, however, that as the remaining 12 months of the transitional period commenced, an accumulation of unfulfilled commitments remained with limited time to address them. Key pending benchmarks related to the necessary conducive political and civic space, as well as technical and logistical prerequisites and an agreed timetable for free and fair elections. He also recalled that the constitution-making bill was still pending and that the graduation of unified forces was yet to commence, with no agreement on the command structure.

The Special Representative stressed that the slow implementation of the Revitalized Agreement came with a cost and that peace dividends for South Sudanese remained elusive. Nowhere was this more clearly reflected than in the frustration of marginalized youth, many of whom had joined tribal militias or channeled their anger at humanitarians and peacekeepers. He noted that subnational violence, which was fueled by national and local political competition, continued to spread. The conflicts involved the non-signatory armed groups, clashes between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in opposition, as well as community disputes over land and resources, including those induced by climate change. He added that humanitarian needs were projected to continue growing with the third consecutive year of floods, exacerbated by insecurity and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, while the appetite of donors to furnish additional resources was trending in reverse. With regard to the efforts of UNMISS, the Special Representative stated that the Mission had established 125 temporary operating bases to prevent and respond to conflict hotspots and enhanced its capabilities by moving away from static security tasks and maximizing the mobility of the force, which contributed to a 42 per cent decline in the number of civilian casualties over the past year. He

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<sup>263</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#).

also stated that UNMISS stood ready to provide technical advice on constitutional and electoral matters which were ultimately sovereign choices for the South Sudanese to make.

In his remarks on 20 June 2022, the Special Representative noted that, after the opposition's withdrawal from the transitional security mechanisms amid a tense security situation at the end of March, on 3 April 2022, the parties reached a breakthrough agreement on a single joint command structure for the necessary unified forces.<sup>264</sup> It was now expected, according to the Special Representative, for the parties to agree on a roadmap recommitting themselves to the Revitalized Agreement, as jointly called for by the African Union, IGAD, the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the United Nations. He stated that more than 80 per cent of civilian casualties in 2022 had been attributed to inter-communal violence and community-based militias and particularly noted the spread of conflict in Eastern and Central Equatoria, Unity, Warrap and Jonglei states, as well as in the Abyei Area.

At the meeting held on 16 September 2022, the Special Representative informed Council members that on 4 August 2022 the signatory parties agreed on the roadmap for the remaining tasks which included revised benchmarks and timelines providing for an extension of the transition period for 24 months and the holding of elections in December 2024.<sup>265</sup> He added that, while the roadmap was a welcome development, the extension of the transitional period had met with mixed reactions by many South Sudanese who raised concerns about the inclusivity of the process and called for greater clarity around the Government's commitment to implement the agreement on time.

On 13 December 2022, the Special Representative stated that notable progress had been made in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement in the past several months with the adoption of essential bills by the national legislature, including the constitution-making bill, as well as the ratification of the roadmap of 4 August.<sup>266</sup> He noted that the graduation of the first phase of the necessary unified forces was largely complete and that the second phase required urgent financial, logistical and political support from the Government. While citing some progress in the preparation of the National Elections Act, he expressed concern that the deadlines

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<sup>264</sup> See [S/PV.9067](#).

<sup>265</sup> See [S/PV.9134](#).

<sup>266</sup> See [S/PV.9219](#).

relating to the Political Parties Act, the Political Parties Council, the reconstituted National Constitution Review Commission and the establishment of the Constitution Drafting Commission had been missed thereby causing a “domino effect” on subsequent key benchmarks in the roadmap. He reiterated the position of UNMISS that the first of the two phases recommended by the 2021 electoral needs assessment mission,<sup>267</sup> namely fulfilling the legal requirements and preparing the grounds and environment for the conduct of elections, had to be completed before material assistance for their actual conduct would be contemplated.

With regard to the security situation, he reported that the year-long fracturing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Army in opposition and the Kit-Gwang splinter group had taken on an ethnic dimension in the Nile River corridor of Upper Nile state, and condemned the resulting human rights violations and abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence. He stated that UNMISS was coordinating with humanitarian partners to accommodate fleeing civilians and engaging politically at the state and national levels to bring the needed attention to the conflict and encourage a resolution. Moreover, as tensions continued to simmer and intensify as the electoral date drew closer, the Special Representative underscored that UNMISS was prioritizing the protection of civilians in all aspects of its mandated tasks. He deemed that those efforts would go a long way to support an expansion of civic and political space and a culture of non-violent debate and dispute resolution. With 9.4 million people projected to need humanitarian and protection assistance in 2023, he urged partners to continue to respond generously to the humanitarian response plan. Finally, the Special Representative concluded his remarks by stating that the new roadmap was a “second mortgage” on the Revitalized Agreement and that, as moral guarantors and partners of that agreement, it was the collective task of the international community to ensure that the parties had the best possible international support to fulfil their commitments to the people of South Sudan.

In his statements to the Council, the Interim Chairperson of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission focused on the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement including the development and progress of the roadmap of 4 August 2022. On 7 March 2022, he observed that the most critical tasks for the conduct of free, fair and credible

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<sup>267</sup> See [S/2021/661](#).

elections and the fulfillment of the Revitalized Agreement were the unification of forces and their deployment, the enactment of a permanent constitution, the review of the political parties and electoral-related laws, and the constitution of the Political Parties Council and the National Election Commission.<sup>268</sup> Concerning the recurring challenges, he cited the lack of sufficient resources, the insufficient political will and commitment from some actors, trust deficits among the parties and capacity gaps, subnational violence and activities of holdout groups, the military defections from one signatory party to another, seasonal flooding and the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the challenges and the timelines provided under the Revitalized Agreement, he noted that the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission had tasked the Government of South Sudan to develop a clear roadmap and strategy on how to implement the outstanding critical tasks. On 13 December 2022, the Interim Chairperson provided an update on the implementation of the roadmap, particularly with respect to governance, permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, resource, economic and financial management, and the making of the permanent constitution.<sup>269</sup> In that context, he recommended to the Council to increase its engagement with the Government to adhere to the roadmap timelines and prioritize their implementation through the provision of predictable, timely and adequate funding for all tasks. He further recommended for the Council to encourage the Government to ensure that civic and political space were guaranteed and protected, to urgently address the root causes of inter-communal violence and insecurity particularly in Upper Nile and Jonglei states, and for the Council to remain seized of the peace process and consider undertaking regular visits to South Sudan as a show of solidarity.

In her remarks on 20 June 2022, the Acting Director in the Operations and Advocacy Division of Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs informed Council members that, against a backdrop of profound macroeconomic challenges in South Sudan, the drivers of conflict and climate shocks had resulted in a dire humanitarian situation.<sup>270</sup> She noted that 8.3 million people were likely to experience severe insecurity during the lean season, of which 2.9 million would likely face emergency levels of hunger and 87,000 would face catastrophic and

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<sup>268</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#).

<sup>269</sup> See [S/PV.9219](#).

<sup>270</sup> See [S/PV.9067](#).

famine-like levels of insecurity. Furthermore, South Sudan was facing a fourth year of above-average rainfall which had disrupted the agricultural season and constrained food production. The Acting Director noted that more than two million people remained internally displaced and that more than 2.3 million were refugees. While underlining the commitment of humanitarian partners to stay and deliver in South Sudan, she reported that four humanitarian workers were killed in 2022 up to that point. She concluded her briefing with three messages to the Council. First, she stressed that the international response needed humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts working together to address the root causes of the crisis. Secondly, the Government and all parties to the conflict needed to ensure the safety of aid workers and assets. Lastly, with only 26 per cent of the 2022 humanitarian response plan funded, unearmarked and early funding at scale was urgently required to address the growing humanitarian needs, including to prevent a dangerous deterioration in the food security situation.

In their briefings on South Sudan, civil society participants discussed the impact of the delays in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, particularly increased levels of inter-communal and local conflicts and sexual and gender-based violence. In her remarks on 7 March 2022, Ms. Riya Williams Yuyada, a women's human rights and peace activist working with the Crown The Woman, a feminist non-governmental organization in South Sudan, addressed the limited progress made in the implementation of the agreement and the increased violence at the local level driven by the exclusionary nature of political and peace efforts.<sup>271</sup> She noted that the denial of protection and justice to survivors of gender-based violence resulting from near total impunity continued to be raised to her organization. In that regard, she urged the Council to follow-up on its previous call on the Government to improve the judicial system and establish the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, as well as to swiftly implement the joint action plan for the armed forces on addressing conflict-related sexual violence. On 20 June 2022, Ms. Lorna Merekaje, a South Sudanese human rights defender, civil rights activist and peace advocate, expressed similar views to Ms. Yuyada regarding the implementation of the peace agreement and violence and human rights violations against civilians.<sup>272</sup> She stated that the people of South

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<sup>271</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#).

<sup>272</sup> See [S/PV.9067](#).



Sudan wanted to be given an opportunity to choose their leaders and participate in the design of a progressive agenda for the country, but that required strengthening the capacity of the institutions and personnel required to conduct a credible election, creating an environment conducive to the operation of free media and civic engagement without intimidation and reprisals, and strengthening the necessary legal framework. Furthermore, in order to enhance the contribution of civil society in South Sudan, she recommended the establishment of periodic forums in which civil society could engage with UNMISS in order to facilitate better in-country interaction and analysis and for the Council to authorize the Mission to facilitate or host periodic engagement with the Government and civil society. In her statement on 16 September 2022, the President of the South Sudan Women’s Empowerment Network called on the region and the international community to support a broad-based process to ensure inclusivity in South Sudan’s transition to peace, democracy and development, and in that regard, expressed support for the initiative of Fordham University to convene an inclusive political dialogue to help South Sudanese reach a broad consensus on a roadmap for a new transitional programme.<sup>273</sup>

During their discussions on South Sudan, Council members expressed concern with the delays in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement. They called upon the parties to fully implement the roadmap of 4 August in accordance with the timelines established therein and commended the facilitation efforts of IGAD and the African Union in that context. The representative of the United States expressed disappointment with the decision of the parties to extend the transitional period for another two years, despite failing to fully deliver on commitments made in the Revitalized Agreement in 2018.<sup>274</sup> Many speakers underscored the importance of an inclusive transition process with the engagement of civil society, women, youth, persons with disabilities and other marginalized groups and called on the Government to address the continued shrinking of the civic space and create the conditions necessary for the holding of future elections. Council members condemned the subnational and inter-communal violence over the past year, including acts of sexual and gender-based violence, with many of them recalling the primary responsibility of the Government of South Sudan to protect civilians

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<sup>273</sup> See [S/PV.9134](#).

<sup>274</sup> See [S/PV.9134](#) and [S/PV.9219](#).

and undertake inter-communal dialogue and reconciliation.<sup>275</sup> Many speakers also called on the Government to investigate and ensure accountability for such crimes.<sup>276</sup> Council members welcomed the graduation of the necessary unified forces stressing the importance of their urgent deployment to stabilize the security situation. Multiple delegations called for the review and lifting of the arms embargo imposed on South Sudan and noted that the embargo was hampering the deployment of the necessary unified forces, disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization and security sector reform efforts.<sup>277</sup>

Council members expressed serious concern with the humanitarian conditions in South Sudan, with many of them calling on the Government to ensure access and the safety and security of humanitarian workers. Several speakers called on the international community to strengthen humanitarian support for South Sudan.<sup>278</sup> Furthermore, some Council members made specific reference to the impact of climate change and floods on the situation in the country and underscored the need to define sustainable and long-term solutions to address the consequences of the phenomenon.<sup>279</sup> In his remarks, the representative of South Sudan noted that the new roadmap and extension of the transitional period were inevitable given that much remained to be implemented in the agreement, but stressed that it was crucial that the parties were able to agree on the way forward on their own and peacefully.<sup>280</sup> He also touched upon the need for continued international financial support and the lifting of the arms embargo for the implementation of the

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<sup>275</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#), United States, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania; [S/PV.9067](#), United States, Mexico, Russian Federation, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and France; [S/PV.9134](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, United Kingdom; and [S/PV.9219](#), United States, United Kingdom, Mexico, Albania, and Norway.

<sup>276</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#), United States, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, United Kingdom and Norway; [S/PV.9067](#), United States, Ireland, Norway, and France; [S/PV.9134](#), United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, United Kingdom and France; and [S/PV.9219](#), Mexico, Albania, Norway) and Ireland.

<sup>277</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); [S/PV.9067](#), Russian Federation and China; [S/PV.9134](#), China and Russian Federation; and [S/PV.9219](#), Russian Federation, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China.

<sup>278</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, India and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9067](#), India, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China; [S/PV.9134](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, Brazil; and [S/PV.9219](#), China and India.

<sup>279</sup> See [S/PV.8987](#), Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, Norway and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9067](#), Mexico, United Arab Emirates, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and Albania; [S/PV.9134](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway and Ireland; and [S/PV.9219](#), Mexico, Albania, United Arab Emirates and Ireland.

<sup>280</sup> See [S/PV.9134](#).

agreement, as well as for the international community to fulfil its humanitarian pledges particularly noting the severe impact of floods.<sup>281</sup>

By resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#) of 15 March 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year until 15 March 2023 with some modifications, particularly concerning the Mission’s support for constitution-drafting, the electoral process, combating and reporting on sexual and gender-based violence and providing risk assessments on the adverse effects of climate change.<sup>282</sup> With respect to the political process, the Council expressed its deep concern about the delays in implementing the Revitalized Agreement and called upon the Government and all relevant actors to take action to fulfill several priority measures, including, among others, providing security to re-designated protection of civilians sites, initiating a permanent constitution-making process, making progress on key milestones in the preparations for free and fair elections, and the completion of graduation of necessary unified forces.<sup>283</sup>

Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions by China and the Russian Federation. In her statement after the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation asserted that the Council and UNMISS did not have the appropriate resources to fulfil the functions of human rights capacity-building, combating sexual violence, defending the rights of women and fighting corruption, which were the internal matters of the country.<sup>284</sup> She added that, while the Mission could, at the request of the host country, provide technical and logistical assistance for the conduct of elections, its core function was to stabilize the security situation and assist the South Sudanese authorities in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement. The representative of China objected to the inclusion of human rights-related text in the draft resolution and the assignment of climate change-related mandates to peacekeeping operations without an in-depth analysis of its impact and a clear understanding of climate change as a driver of security risks. Furthermore, the representatives of China and Ghana criticized the use of the term “human rights defenders” in the draft text, which was not agreed

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<sup>281</sup> See [S/PV.9134](#) and [S/PV.9219](#).

<sup>282</sup> Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 3. For further detail on the mandate of UNMISS, see part X, sect. I.

<sup>283</sup> Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), paras. 6 and 9.

<sup>284</sup> See [S/PV.8994](#).

language and not clearly defined. While voting in favour of the resolution, the representative of India also expressed reservations regarding what he described as attempts to “securitize” climate change and added that the place for such discussions was within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. As penholder of the draft resolution, the representative of the United States thanked Council members for their efforts to strengthen the mandate of UNMISS and noted that the renewed mandate reinforced the Mission’s core tasks, strengthened its sexual- and gender-based violence prevention activities and authorized it to provide electoral assistance.

In addition to the regular briefings relating to South Sudan and UNMISS, on 13 December 2022, Council members heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), providing a summary of the work of the Committee in 2022, including its discussions on the final report of the Panel of Experts and the granting of five exemptions with respect to the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze.<sup>285</sup> By resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#) of 26 May 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze on South Sudan until 31 May 2023, as well as the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 1 July 2023.<sup>286</sup> The Council further requested the Secretary-General, in close consultations with UNMISS and the Panel of Experts, to conduct, no later than 15 April 2023, an assessment of progress achieved on the benchmarks established in resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#).<sup>287</sup>

Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#) was adopted with 10 votes in favour and five abstentions.<sup>288</sup> In explaining their decision to abstain in the vote, the representatives of China, Gabon, India, Kenya and the Russian Federation expressed regret that the resolution did not take into account the improved situation in South Sudan and the views of the Government, IGAD and the African Union on the need to lift the arms embargo and targeted sanctions, noting that the measures were

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<sup>285</sup> See [S/PV.9219](#). For further information on the sanctions measures relating to South Sudan, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>286</sup> Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1, 12 and 18. For further information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.1.

<sup>287</sup> Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), para. 5.

<sup>288</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States; *Against*: none; *Abstained*: China, Gabon, India, Kenya, Russian Federation.

not effective in supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and hindered the strengthening of the armed forces.<sup>289</sup> The representative of Kenya added that the resolution also fell short of the Council’s own commitment to progressively lift the measures. The representative of China recalled that his delegation put forward constructive amendments to the draft text, including on exempting training and non-lethal equipment, changing the application of exemption requests to reporting and adjusting the targeted sanctions which, had they been adopted, would have helped the country respond positively to the concerns of the African Union, enhance South Sudan’s security capacity and encourage the Government to take more substantive steps towards implementing the benchmarks.

For the purposes of facilitating the coverage of this item, information on meetings is set out below in three tables and under three headings, namely: (1) Sudan; (2) Sudan and South Sudan and Abyei; and (3) South Sudan.

**Table 1**  
**Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8948</a> 17 January 2022			Sudan	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8964</a> 15 February 2022	Letter dated 24 January 2022 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1591 (2005)</a> addressed to the President of the Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/48</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/111</a> )			Three Council members (China, Russian Federation, United States)	Resolution <a href="#">2620 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9005</a> 28 March 2022			Sudan		One Council member (Ghana) <sup>a</sup> , invitee	

<sup>289</sup> See [S/PV.9045](#).

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9006</a> 28 March 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan ( <a href="#">S/2022/172</a> )		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan	13 Council members <sup>b</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9041</a> 24 May 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan ( <a href="#">S/2022/400</a> )		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members <sup>c</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9054</a> 3 June 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/443</a> )			Nine Council members <sup>d</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2636 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9070</a> 21 June 2022			Sudan		Five Council members <sup>e</sup> , Sudan	
<a href="#">S/PV.9113</a> 23 August 2022			Sudan	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees <sup>f</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9128</a> 13 September 2022			Sudan		One Council member (Ghana) <sup>g</sup> , invitee	
<a href="#">S/PV.9129</a> 13 September 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integration Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan ( <a href="#">S/2022/667</a> )		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President of Sudan Social Development Organization	13 Council members <sup>h</sup> , all invitees <sup>i</sup>	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9210</a> 7 December 2022			Sudan		One Council member (Ghana) <sup>j</sup> , invitee	
<a href="#">S/PV.9211</a> 7 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integration Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan ( <a href="#">S/2022/898</a> )		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All Council members <sup>k</sup> , All invitees <sup>l</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> The representative of Ghana spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan.

<sup>b</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States,

<sup>c</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>d</sup> Albania, China, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>e</sup> China, Gabon, Ghana, Russian Federation and United States. The representative of Ghana spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan.

<sup>f</sup> The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>g</sup> The representative of Ghana spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan.

<sup>h</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>i</sup> The President of Sudan Social Development Organization participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>j</sup> The representative of Ghana spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan.

<sup>k</sup> The representative of Ghana also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Kenya.

<sup>l</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference from Khartoum.

**Table 2**  
**Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan and South Sudan and Abyei**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9020</a> 21 April 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei ( <a href="#">S/2022/316</a> )		Sudan, South Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees <sup>b</sup>	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9031</a> 12 May 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/387</a> )			One Council member (Russian Federation)	Resolution <a href="#">2630 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9170</a> 27 October 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei ( <a href="#">S/2022/760</a> )		Sudan, South Sudan	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General	13 Council members <sup>c</sup> , all invitees <sup>d</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9191</a> 14 November 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/839</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2660 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (Chapter VII)

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>b</sup> The Under-Secretary-General and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>c</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>d</sup> The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference.

**Table 3**  
**Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – South Sudan**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8987</a> 7 March 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan ( <a href="#">S/2022/156</a> )				Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, Ms. Riya Williams Yuyada (civil society briefer)	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees <sup>b</sup>



<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8894</a> 15 March 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan ( <a href="#">S/2022/156</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/219</a> )	South Sudan		Five Council members (China, Ghana, India, Russian Federation and United States), invitee	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a> 13-0-2 <sup>c</sup> (Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9045</a> 26 May 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/417</a> )	South Sudan		Six Council members (China, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya and Russian Federation), invitee	Resolution <a href="#">2633 (2022)</a> 10-0-5 <sup>d</sup> (Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9067</a> 20 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan ( <a href="#">S/2022/468</a> )		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Acting Director in the Operations and Advocacy Division of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudanese human rights defender, civil rights activist and peace advocate	13 Council members <sup>e</sup> , all invitees <sup>f</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9134</a> 16 September 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan ( <a href="#">S/2022/689</a> )		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President of the South Sudan Women's Empowerment Network	13 Council members <sup>g</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9219</a> 13 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan ( <a href="#">S/2022/918</a> )		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission	13 Council members <sup>h</sup> , all invitees <sup>i</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>b</sup> The Interim Chairperson of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the civil society briefer participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>c</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. *Against*: None. *Abstaining*: China and Russian Federation.

<sup>d</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. *Against*: None. *Abstaining*: China, Gabon, India, Kenya and Russian Federation.

<sup>e</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>f</sup> The South Sudanese human rights defender participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>g</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>h</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of Gabon spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan.

<sup>i</sup> The Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission participated in the meeting via videoconference.

## 8. Peace consolidation in West Africa

During the period under review, the Security Council held two meetings in connection with the item entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa”. The meetings took the form of briefings.<sup>290</sup> More information on the meetings, including invitees, speakers, and outcomes, is provided in table below. In addition to the meetings, the Council also held informal consultations of the whole.<sup>291</sup>

On 10 January 2022, Council members heard briefings by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), a lawyer and public policy analyst with Médecins du Monde, on behalf of the People’s Coalition for the Sahel, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS).<sup>292</sup> In her remarks, the Executive Director of UNODC noted that the Gulf of Guinea region continued to be a priority concern regarding maritime security as incidents in the region accounted for the majority of the global kidnappings of seafarers for ransom. She noted that it was clear that maritime insecurity, illicit flows and the linkages between transnational organized crime and terrorism all represented major obstacles to achieving peace, security and development in West Africa and the Sahel. The Executive Director also informed that the lack of opportunities and frustration were driving more youth to piracy and crime and leaving them more receptive to radicalization narratives, whereas desperate conditions rendered more people vulnerable to human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and more women and girls were at greater risk of exploitation and sexual violence. She said that alongside efforts to provide humanitarian and emergency assistance, and to prevent conflict and promote dialogue, there was the need to encourage political will and increased international support to strengthen comprehensive and cooperative crime responses, which needed to be built on international legal and institutional frameworks, regional partnerships, and national capabilities. Furthermore, she highlighted various ways through which UNODC had been supporting the countries of the region to advance such actions.

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<sup>290</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>291</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 31.

<sup>292</sup> See [S/PV.8944](#).

While noting that the entire security strategy had failed, the lawyer and public policy analyst with Médecins du Monde addressed the security and the humanitarian situation in the Sahel region. In that context, she proposed a new approach based on “four citizen pillars”. First, she noted that the Sahelian States and the international community needed to put civilians at the heart of their response to the crisis. Secondly, she expressed the view that the international community needed to ensure the implementation of a truly holistic approach addressing the root causes of the crisis. Thirdly, the humanitarian emergency needed to be addressed, and lastly, she stressed the need to fight impunity, as it fuelled the cycle of violence and encouraged recruitment by armed groups.

Presenting the report of the Secretary-General,<sup>293</sup> the Special Representative of the Secretary-General underscored that while there were reasons to celebrate the political progress among various Sahelian countries, the security environment in the region had become more concerning. He noted that one of the major consequences of those security developments was explained by the fact that the region was experiencing a multifaceted humanitarian crisis, characterized by rising food prices, increased poverty due to the COVID pandemic and crop losses due to drought. He made reference to the resurgence of coups d'état, particularly in West Africa, noting that it was frequently due to political practices that were completely out of step with the aspirations of the people. In that context, he commended ECOWAS for its active engagement in the crises in Mali and Guinea and noted the support of UNOWAS towards the efforts to enable a return to constitutional order. The Special Representative further noted the need for a long-term approach regarding climate change as well as more determination in the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda as well as the youth and peace and security agenda.

Following the briefings, many Council members expressed concern at the security situation in the region, which was characterized by the recurrence of terrorist attacks, including in Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger, and Nigeria. Council members also noted that the attacks were expanding to the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea/West Africa. In that context, Council members underlined the need for a holistic approach that addressed the root causes of instability,

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<sup>293</sup> See [S/2021/1091](https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire).

including relating to governance, development and human rights deficits, and the impact of climate on security.<sup>294</sup> Some speakers commended the role of regional security mechanisms such as the Joint Force of the Group of Five and the Multinational Joint Task Force and underlined the need for their further support, especially by ensuring predictable and sustainable funding for the Joint Force.<sup>295</sup> With regard to UNOWAS, Council members highlighted its role in supporting regional initiatives to address the issue of terrorism and maintaining peace. Many Council members welcomed the successful holding of presidential elections in Cabo Verde and the Gambia in October and December 2021, respectively. However, some Council members expressed concern at the challenges faced by the political transitions in Mali and Guinea,<sup>296</sup> and took note of the role played by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including through applying sanctions measures.<sup>297</sup>

On 7 July 2022, Council members heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Coordinator of the Association Alliance for Peace and Security.<sup>298</sup> Further to the report of the Secretary-General, the Special Representative highlighted the effects of climate change on existing conflicts, noting that extremist and criminal groups in many parts of the Sahel had exploited such weaknesses exacerbated by often inadequate State structures.<sup>299</sup> He said that the southward spread of extremist violence had grown from isolated incidents to a genuine threat in coastal countries and that the announced withdrawal of Mali from the Group of Five for the Sahel and the then military redeployments were jeopardizing the security arrangements in the subregion. Additionally, he underlined that there was no magic formula to effectively combat insecurity, and underscored that it was democratic and accountable governance, including the establishment of decentralized administrations that would deliver solutions to the daily lives of the population.

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<sup>294</sup> See [S/PV.8944](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Ireland, Albania, China, France, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates and United States.

<sup>295</sup> France, United Arab Emirates, India, and Norway.

<sup>296</sup> Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya, Albania, China, France, United Kingdom, United States and Russian Federation).

<sup>297</sup> Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), France and United States.

<sup>298</sup> See [S/PV.9086](#). See also [S/2022/521](#).

<sup>299</sup> See [S/PV.9086](#).

He further noted that ECOWAS had reached agreements to end the crisis with the transitional regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and the relaunching of dialogue with the transitional authorities in Guinea. Highlighting the accomplishments of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, the Special Representative noted that the Mixed Commission would forever remain a concrete model of effective United Nations support for peaceful conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

In her remarks, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission shared the perspective of the Commission on the situation in West Africa and the Sahel by drawing on its country-specific and regional engagements. In that regard, the Chair stated that the Peacebuilding Commission was concerned about the recent military takeovers in the region and the persistence of violent incidents perpetrated by non-State armed groups and terrorist groups. In that context, she elaborated on various recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission, notably, (i) the importance of investing in efforts to address the root causes that aggravated the conflicts, instability and violence in the region; (ii) the need for greater support for the objectives of the priority investment plan of the Group of Five for the Sahel; (iii) the need for sustained and coordinated support by the United Nations system for building and sustaining peace, including through the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel; as well as (iv) the need for the timely follow-up and support for the planned joint strategic assessment on the security and governance situation and response initiatives in the region by the African Union, United Nations, ECOWAS and the Group of Five for the Sahel.

Highlighting the deteriorating situation in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, the Coordinator of the Association Alliance for Peace and Security in her briefing underlined the importance for the international community to “do things differently”, namely, by putting the protection of the population at the heart of any response to the security crisis in the Sahel. She urged the Council to convince Sahelian leaders and Governments to better protect their citizens, by eradicating the reasons that drove young people to take up arms. To achieve that, she underlined the need to improve governance and access to basic social services, the need to fight against stigmatization and impunity, particularly that enjoyed by certain members of defence and security forces, which perpetuated the vicious circle of violence.

During the discussions, Council members continued to express concern at the security situation in the region, which had deteriorated since the meeting in January, reflected by ongoing intercommunal conflicts and increased incidents of terrorist threats and attacks, including their expansion to the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea/West Africa. While drawing attention to the challenges in the region, they underlined the importance of regional cooperation, with some Council members calling for adequate funding of regional initiatives.<sup>300</sup> Many Council members expressed concern at the humanitarian situation in the region exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, climate shocks and food insecurity.<sup>301</sup> Council members also expressed concern at the abuses and violations of human rights,<sup>302</sup> underlined the need to ensure accountability,<sup>303</sup> and called for improved compliance with international human rights standards.<sup>304</sup> Several Council members welcomed the democratic progress in the region, including following the successful parliamentary and local elections in Senegal and The Gambia.<sup>305</sup> Many speakers also noted the agreement with ECOWAS to implement 12-month and 24-month transition timelines, with Burkina Faso and Mali, respectively. In that regard, Council members welcomed the partial lifting of the sanctions measures on Mali by ECOWAS,<sup>306</sup> and further underlined the need to restore constitutional order by holding timely elections.<sup>307</sup> Additionally, several Council members underlined the need for the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in political processes, including elections and transitions and in consideration of leadership and decision-making posts.<sup>308</sup> Furthermore, some Council members welcomed the improvement in the regional maritime security since the meeting in January.<sup>309</sup>

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<sup>300</sup> Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Albania and China.

<sup>301</sup> Ireland, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, Albania, Russian Federation, and United Kingdom.

<sup>302</sup> Ireland, United States, Albania, and United Kingdom.

<sup>303</sup> Ireland and United Kingdom.

<sup>304</sup> United Kingdom.

<sup>305</sup> Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Albania, United Kingdom, Mexico, France, China,

<sup>306</sup> Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, Albania, Russian Federation, Mexico, China, and Brazil.

<sup>307</sup> Ireland, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United States, United Kingdom, and France.

<sup>308</sup> Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, Albania, United Kingdom, Mexico, and France.

<sup>309</sup> Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, China, and Brazil.

**Meetings: Peace consolidation in West Africa**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8944</a> 10 January 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel ( <a href="#">S/2021/1091</a> )			Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS); Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; lawyer and public policy analyst with <i>Médecins du Monde</i> , on behalf of the People's Coalition for the Sahel	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees <sup>b</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9086</a> 7 July 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel ( <a href="#">S/2022/521</a> )			Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, Coordinator of the Association Alliance for Peace and Security	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees	

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States.

<sup>b</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and lawyer and public policy analyst with *Médecins du Monde* participated in the meeting via videoconference.



## 9. Peace and security in Africa

During the period under review, the Security Council held eight meetings in connection with the item entitled “Peace and Security in Africa”. Three of the meetings took the form of briefings, two were held as debates and two convened for the purpose of the adoption of decisions.<sup>310</sup> The Council held one private meeting to discuss the situation in the north of Ethiopia in relation to which it issued a communique.<sup>311</sup> The Council adopted one resolution and a presidential statement. More information on the meetings, including invitees, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition to the meetings, the Council held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.<sup>312</sup>

In 2022, the meetings of the Council under this item focused on the activities and role of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, capacity-building for sustaining peace in Africa and on the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources.

Regarding the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Council held two briefings on 18 May and 16 November following the reports of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. Council members were provided briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, as well as two civil society representatives.<sup>313</sup> The briefings focused primarily on the political and security situation in the region, including the role of the Group of Five on the Sahel. In that regard, on 18 May, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa and the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel both took note of the “regrettable” decision by the Malian authorities to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel and its Joint Force.<sup>314</sup> The Assistant Secretary-General for Africa recalled that the security situation was deteriorating in the region and informed the Council that,

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<sup>310</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>311</sup> See [S/PV.9160](#).

<sup>312</sup> See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 35.

<sup>313</sup> See [S/PV.9035](#) and [S/PV.9194](#). For the reports of the Secretary-General, see [S/2022/382](#) and [S/2022/838](#).

<sup>314</sup> See [S/PV.9035](#).

in the light of the growing complexity of the crisis facing the Sahel, the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat were jointly conducting a strategic assessment with the objective of strengthening support to the Group of Five for the Sahel and other security and governance initiatives in the region and focusing on innovative ways to mobilize sustainable resourcing for regional initiatives. The Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel assured that the Group would participate in that assessment and hoped that its main components would enable it to better define a better security, governance and cooperation architecture in order to ensure the optimal use of resources. He said that given the way the Joint Force operated and the new context with the ongoing deterioration in the security situation, a review of the concept of its operations had been considered. On the political level, he underscored that the unconstitutional changes that had taken place in three of the five Group of Five countries (Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali), as well as the sanctions imposed on some of them, had not contributed to harmony within the subregion. The Coordinator and President of the Rights and Resources Initiative/Group focused her briefing on the links between climate change and the conflict in the Sahel countries, including the ways in which climate change exacerbated conflict and its impact on women and youth. She made several recommendations to address these effects, including strengthening cooperation with the Group of Five on climate change.

On 16 November, the Assistant Secretary-General regretted that in addition to its financial difficulties, the Joint Force was weakened by the withdrawal of Mali and the second coup d'état in Burkina Faso, further undermining regional cohesion.<sup>315</sup> The Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, underlining the consequences of Mali's withdrawal, reaffirmed the firm commitment of the Group and the Heads of State to continue its mission and working together and reported about the decisions undertaken on the new format of the Joint Force and its roadmap. He called for Council's attention to the situation in the region, noting the possibility of an even greater threat to international peace and security without a rapid and urgent response. As an independent expert on the Joint Force, Mr. Ramadan presented his analysis on the threats facing the region focusing in particular on the threat of terrorism , He stated that the

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<sup>315</sup> See [S/PV.9194](#).

results achieved by the Force seemed to be mixed, or inadequate, and outlined the limitations and weaknesses that it was facing of a political, financial, logistical and institutional nature, including the lack of a robust mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter by the Council.

Throughout the discussions that ensued following the briefings, Council members deliberated on the political, security, socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Sahel countries. In that regard, Council members called on members of the Group of Five for the Sahel, namely Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, to restore constitutional order.

Council members addressed security challenges in the region, including the expansion and spread of terrorism to the coastal region of the Gulf of Guinea.<sup>316</sup> Some members discussed the activities of the Wagner Group as another potential source of insecurity in the region.<sup>317</sup> Council members discussed the impact of the conclusion of Operation Barkhane in November 2022 on the security situation in the region.<sup>318</sup> They deliberated on the ways to combat insecurity in the Sahel, including through improving governance and addressing socioeconomic challenges as underdevelopment, poverty, inequality and corruption, as well as climate change.<sup>319</sup>

Council members often addressed the role of regional and subregional organizations, most notably the African Union and ECOWAS, in the peace and political processes in the countries of the Sahel.<sup>320</sup> Some took note of or welcomed the joint strategic assessment of security and development in the Sahel.<sup>321</sup> The representatives of Norway and Ghana, speaking also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya, underscored that the Panel should build on existing

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<sup>316</sup> See [S/PV.9035](#), France, China, India and Russian Federation; [S/PV.9194](#), France, Ireland, China, Brazil, Albania and India.

<sup>317</sup> See [S/PV.9194](#), France, United States, Ireland, United Kingdom, Albania, Norway.

<sup>318</sup> See [S/PV.9194](#), France, Mexico, Brazil and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya).

<sup>319</sup> See [S/PV.9035](#), Albania, India, United Kingdom, Ireland, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, and United States; and [S/PV.9194](#), United States, Ireland, Mexico, China, United Arab Emirates, Norway and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya).

<sup>320</sup> See [S/PV.9035](#), Albania, India, Mexico, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), and United States; and [S/PV.9194](#), Ireland, Russian Federation, Mexico, United Kingdom, and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>321</sup> See [S/PV.9035](#), Albania, Brazil, China, Mexico, Ireland, Norway, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), and United Arab Emirates; and [S/PV.9194](#), France, United States, Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom, China, Brazil, Albania, and Norway.

initiatives, including the efforts of the Group of Five, the Accra Initiative, the Multinational Joint Task Force, and the Nouakchott process.<sup>322</sup>

The activities of the Joint Force of the Group of Five in the context of the regional security architecture were frequently addressed by all Council members in 2022. Council members discussed the consequences of the decision by Mali to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel and its Joint Force.<sup>323</sup> Some emphasized the need for support from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to the Joint Force<sup>324</sup> and predictable support through United Nations-assessed contributions.<sup>325</sup>

Concerning the issue of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, at a meeting held on 31 May 2022,<sup>326</sup> the Council adopted resolution [2634 \(2022\)](#) in which it, *inter alia*, stressed the primary responsibility of the States of the Gulf of Guinea to counter the piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and address their underlying causes,<sup>327</sup> and called upon Member States in the region to criminalize the piracy and armed robbery under their domestic laws.<sup>328</sup> The Council requested the Secretary-General to report, within five months and on an exceptional basis in advance of the 10-year anniversary of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes, including any possible and potential linkages with terrorism in West and Central Africa and the Sahel, as well as the United Nations support and contributions and any recommendations for further supporting and enhancing national efforts and regional and international cooperation towards combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region.<sup>329</sup>

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<sup>322</sup> See [S/PV.9194](#). For discussions on the role of regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union and ECOWAS, in the pacific settlement of disputes, see part VIII, sect. II.B.

<sup>323</sup> See [S/PV.9035](#), France, Albania, Brazil, India, Mexico, Russian Federation, Ireland and United States; and [S/PV.9194](#), France, United States, Mexico, Brazil, Albania, India, Norway and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya).

<sup>324</sup> See [S/PV.9035](#), France, Albania, Brazil, China and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9194](#), Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya).

<sup>325</sup> See [S/PV.9035](#), France, India and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9194](#), France, India and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya). For more information on peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations, see part VIII, sect. III.

<sup>326</sup> See [S/PV.9050](#).

<sup>327</sup> Resolution [2634 \(2022\)](#), para 2.

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 16.

On 22 November, the Council held a briefing in which the Assistant Secretary-General presented a report of the Secretary-General further to the request included in resolution [2634 \(2022\)](#) on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes.<sup>330</sup> She reported on the steady decline in instances of piracy and armed robbery at sea.<sup>331</sup> She elaborated on the changing dynamics of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and their causes, including youth unemployment and inadequate access to public services, as well as regional and international initiatives aimed at addressing maritime challenges. She stressed the need to fully operationalize the maritime security architecture set out in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. She reported that there was no firm evidence to suggest any potential or possible linkages between terrorists and pirate groups, but suggested addressing the underlying social, economic and environmental challenges faced by communities in the region to contain both threats. Following the Assistant Secretary-General, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime made several recommendations to improve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, including by supporting Member States in developing their rule of law capacities and legal frameworks, remaining agile and adaptable in responding to shifting trends and emerging threats related to piracy in the region and addressing its root causes. In addition, the Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission briefed the Council on the achievements in terms of combatting piracy in the region, including in the context of Yaoundé architecture but also in terms of bilateral cooperation. She recalled other ongoing crimes in the region, impacting the well-being of coastal populations and the economic well-being of Governments, including illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, oil theft and pollution. Lastly, the Maritime Planning Officer of the African Union provided a briefing focusing on the nature of maritime crime in the region and regional and international efforts aimed at improving maritime security in the areas of information-sharing, joint training and exercises.

Further to the briefings, Council members discussed the different threats to the peace and security posed by piracy and other crimes at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. Speakers also addressed

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<sup>330</sup> See [S/2022/818](#).

<sup>331</sup> See [S/PV.9198](#).

the humanitarian, socioeconomic and environmental impact of these crimes,<sup>332</sup> and their underlying causes, including poverty, unemployment, corruption, climate change and food insecurity.<sup>333</sup> Participants addressed the role played by regional organizations, including ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, in the resolution and prevention of piracy and other maritime crimes.<sup>334</sup> Some took note of the recommendations provided by the Peacebuilding Commission.<sup>335</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation called for the establishment of a specialized entity under the auspices of the United Nations responsible for addressing the entire spectrum of issues related to combating maritime crime.<sup>336</sup>

Regarding the issue of capacity-building for sustaining peace in Africa, the Council held an open debate on 8 and 9 August 2022,<sup>337</sup> at the initiative of China which held the presidency for the month.<sup>338</sup> In his briefing to the Council, the African Union Commissioner elaborated on the security threats facing the region, most notably violent extremism, terrorism, climate change and the illicit exploitation of natural resources, as well as the means of combating these threats.<sup>339</sup> He stressed the need for demonstrable joint transformative leadership between the Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council and the need to strengthen democracies. The Special Adviser on Africa to the Secretary-General briefed the Council on the combination of internal and external factors that undermined the capacities of African countries to prevent and address violence. She recommended investing, inter alia, in institutional infrastructure to build the capacities needed to tackle the internal causes of violence and strengthening cooperation between peacekeeping missions and national and local authorities, which, from the institution-building and security perspectives, could create opportunities for increasing the State presence and enhancing the delivery of services, preventing gaps that could be leveraged by terrorist groups and non-State actors.<sup>340</sup> The Chair of the Peacebuilding

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<sup>332</sup> Ibid., Norway, Gabon, India, Albania, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, and European Union.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid., Gabon, United Kingdom, United States, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, China, Mexico and Ghana.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid., Norway, Gabon, India, United States, France, Albania, Brazil, China and European Union.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid., United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Ghana, and Germany.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid.

<sup>337</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#) and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For further detail on the discussion see part VIII, sect. II.

<sup>338</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 1 August 2022 ([S/2022/592](#)).

<sup>339</sup> Ibid., pp. 2-4. For more information on discussions concerning threats to regional and international peace and security, see part VII, sect. I.B.

<sup>340</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#).

Commission focused her briefing on the changing conflict dynamics and elaborated on the engagements of the Peacebuilding Commission in the field of capacity-building in Africa.<sup>341</sup>

In the ensuing discussion, speakers deliberated on the challenges to and identified ways for improving capacity-building for sustaining peace in Africa. Speakers addressed the roles of regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union,<sup>342</sup> as well as the United Nations, including the Security Council<sup>343</sup> and the Peacebuilding Commission<sup>344</sup> in the efforts aimed at sustaining peace on the African continent. The need to strengthen the cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations, including the Council, to in the context of capacity-building was frequently underlined by Member States.<sup>345</sup>

Participants also discussed the nexus between climate change and security,<sup>346</sup> as well as between sustainable development and peace and security.<sup>347</sup> Among some of the proposals put forward for strengthening capacity-building for sustaining peace, speakers made reference to increasing funding for peacebuilding;<sup>348</sup> strengthening institution-building and the rule of law,<sup>349</sup> and involving women, youth and/or civil society in peacebuilding efforts, including in decision-making, public policy implementation and security sector reform.<sup>350</sup> Some speakers commented

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<sup>341</sup> Ibid.

<sup>342</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#), Ireland, India, Mexico, Norway, United States, Russian Federation, Ghana, Albania, Senegal, South Africa, and Algeria; [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Republic of Korea, Germany, European Union, Malta, Portugal, Canada, Denmark, Thailand, Italy, Slovenia, Ethiopia, Australia, Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea, Argentina and Bangladesh.

<sup>343</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#), Switzerland; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Ethiopia.

<sup>344</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#), Kenya, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom, Brazil, Norway, France, Senegal, Egypt, Japan, and Algeria; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Republic of Korea, Poland, Portugal, Ecuador, Canada, Denmark, Thailand, Italy, Morocco, Rwanda, Australia, Equatorial Guinea and Bangladesh.

<sup>345</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#), Gabon, Brazil, Norway, Ghana, Egypt, South Africa and Algeria; [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Portugal, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), Italy, Netherlands, Slovenia and Equatorial Guinea. For more information on the discussions concerning the relationship between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, see part VIII, sect. II.

<sup>346</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#), Kenya, Ireland, Mexico, Ghana, Albania, France and Switzerland; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Poland, and Canada.

<sup>347</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#), China, Gabon, Mexico, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, and Switzerland; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Malta, Thailand, Italy, Morocco, Slovenia, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea, and Argentina.

<sup>348</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#), Kenya, Switzerland, Egypt and South Africa; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Germany, European Union, Portugal, Ecuador, Mozambique, Netherlands) and Morocco, Slovenia, Australia, Rwanda, and Tunisia.

<sup>349</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#).

<sup>350</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#), Ireland, Gabon, Mexico, United Kingdom, Brazil, Ghana, Albania, France, Switzerland, South Africa and Algeria; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Republic of Korea, European Union, Malta, Portugal, Canada,

on the impact of Council-imposed sanctions in relation to maintaining and sustaining peace in Africa.<sup>351</sup>

On 31 August 2022, the Council issued a presidential statement in relation to capacity-building for sustaining peace. In the statement, the Council recognized the need to step up capacity-building support to African countries and emphasized the importance of providing capacity support, at the request of and in close consultation with the country in question to improve the rule of law, strengthen national institutions, extend legitimate State authority, build governance, promote and protect human rights, enhance social cohesion and inclusiveness.<sup>352</sup> The Council further highlighted the importance of, inter alia, sharing best practices and providing financial support on promoting inclusive and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes; supporting socioeconomic development for sustaining peace in Africa; and capacity support and institutional training to address through a holistic approach the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>353</sup> The Council encouraged continued development and application of mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes through regional and subregional arrangements and welcomed the continuing important efforts and enhanced role of the African Union, sub-regional organizations and regional mechanisms in peace operations in accordance with Security Council resolutions.<sup>354</sup>

Concerning the issue of strengthening the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources, the Council held a high-level debate on 6 October 2022, at the initiative of Gabon which held the presidency for the month.<sup>355</sup> In her briefing to the Council, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime highlighted the importance of understanding the links between organized crime and terrorism in Africa through data collection, pointing out that illegal exploitation of minerals provided armed

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Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic Countries), Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Morocco, Slovenia, Slovakia, Tunisia and Bangladesh.

<sup>351</sup> See [S/PV.9106](#), China, Kenya, United States, Russian Federation, Equatorial Guinea and France. For the discussions on the role of sanctions and their unintended consequences, see part VII, sect. III and IX, respectively.

<sup>352</sup> See [S/PRST/2022/6](#), third and fourth paragraphs.

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid.*, sixth, thirteenth and sixteenth paragraphs.

<sup>354</sup> *Ibid.*, nineteenth and twentieth paragraphs. For more information, see part VIII, sect. II.

<sup>355</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 30 September 2022 ([S/2022/728](#)).



groups and terrorists with significant source of revenue.<sup>356</sup> She briefed about the Office's programmes to prevent and respond to crimes against the environment, illegal mining and trafficking, including its youth-driven peacebuilding projects. The African Union Commissioner reported about a number of initiatives deployed by the African Union, including the establishment of national counter-terrorism fusion centres, national financial intelligence units and law enforcement at the national level and underlined a need for enhanced cooperation in terms of capacity-building and the transfer of knowledge in favour of countries in post-conflict situations and strengthening the sanctions regimes against terrorist individuals, groups or organizations through a close collaboration with the Council. The civil society briefer elaborated on the complex nature of illicit trafficking by non-State and terrorist groups as well as the tools for combating the problem. In order to strengthen the fight against the financing of non-State armed groups through trafficking in natural resources, he suggested modernizing sanctions regimes, breaking up of the criminal networks within administrations and armed forces, and improving due diligence processes.

Further to the briefings, Council members discussed the nature of the threat emanating from the illicit trafficking in natural resources to finance terrorist activities. In that regard, speakers addressed the linkages between the exploitation of natural resources and conflict,<sup>357</sup> and the utilization of natural resources to finance terrorism, including through the acquisition of arms, ammunition, and mining concessions.<sup>358</sup> Some participants focused on the threats posed by the activities of specific groups, most notably ISIS (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida,<sup>359</sup> Al-Shabaab,<sup>360</sup> as well as the Wagner Group.<sup>361</sup> Regarding the proposals to mitigate the problem, speakers focused on the international and regional cooperation and support for African countries and on how the United Nations, including the Security Council,<sup>362</sup> as well as regional organizations, notably the

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<sup>356</sup> See [S/PV.9147](#).

<sup>357</sup> Ibid., Gabon, United States, India, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Brazil, and Central African Republic.

<sup>358</sup> Ibid., Gabon, Ghana, Russian Federation, Mexico, Norway, Kenya, Brazil and Central African Republic.

<sup>359</sup> Ibid., United States, India and Kenya.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid., United Arab Emirates, China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland, Kenya and Brazil.

<sup>361</sup> Ibid., United States, United Kingdom, France and Norway.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid., Gabon, United Kingdom, Kenya and Brazil.

African Union<sup>363</sup> and ECCAS,<sup>364</sup> could support the fight against the exploitation of natural resources. The role and effectiveness of Council-imposed sanctions as means of curbing the trafficking in natural resources was also addressed by several speakers.<sup>365</sup> Some speakers further suggested the need to address the shortcomings in governance, institutional frameworks and the rule of law.<sup>366</sup>

### Meetings: Peace and security in Africa

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9035</a> 18 May 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel ( <a href="#">S/2022/382</a> )			Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, Coordinator and President of the Rights and Resources Initiative/ Group	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9050</a> 31 May 2022		Draft resolution ( <a href="#">S/2022/62</a> ) submitted by 37 Member States <sup>b</sup>	29 Member States <sup>c</sup>		7 Council members <sup>d</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2634 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9106</a> ; <a href="#">S/PV.9106</a> ( <a href="#">Resumption 1</a> ) 8 and 9 August 2022	Capacity-building for sustaining peace  Letter dated 1 August 2022 from the Permanent Representative of		30 Member States <sup>e</sup>	African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Special Adviser on Africa to the United Nations Secretary-General and Chair of the Peacebuilding	All Council members, all invitees <sup>f</sup>	

<sup>363</sup> Ibid., Gabon, India, United Arab Emirates, China and United Kingdom.

<sup>364</sup> Ibid., India.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid., United States, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, Ireland, Norway, Brazil and Central African Republic.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid., India, China, United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland, France, Norway, Brazil, Central African Republic and Kenya.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9122</a> 31 August 2022	China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/592</a> )			Commission, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European to the United Nations	One Council member (China)	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/6</a>
<a href="#">S/PV.9147</a> 6 October 2022	Strengthening the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources  Letter dated 30 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/728</a> )		Central African Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Senegal	Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Regional Director for East Africa and Representative of the Institute for Security Studies to the African Union, Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members <sup>a</sup> , four rule 37 invitees <sup>b</sup> , all rule 39 invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9160</a> (closed) 21 October 2022			Ethiopia	Director, Operations and Advocacy Division of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, African Union High Representative for the Horn of Africa	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9194</a> 16 November 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel ( <a href="#">S/2022/838</a> )			Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, civil society representative	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9198</a> 22 November 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes ( <a href="#">S/2022/818</a> )		Germany, Nigeria	Chargé d'affaires of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, Maritime Planning Officer of the African Union Commission	All Council members, all invitees <sup>j</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>b</sup> Albania, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chad, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia and United States.

<sup>c</sup> Angola, Benin, Chad, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Gambia, Guinea, Japan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo and Tunisia.

<sup>d</sup> Brazil, China, Ghana, India, Norway, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>e</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malta, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia, Thailand and Ukraine.

<sup>f</sup> The African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and Special Adviser on Africa to the United Nations Secretary-General participated by videoconference.

<sup>g</sup> Gabon was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ghana was represented by its Minister for National Security. India was represented by its Minister of State for External Affairs. United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister of State.

<sup>h</sup> Central African Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea and Morocco.

<sup>i</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>j</sup> Germany (on behalf of: G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea).

## 10. The situation in Libya

During the period under review, the Security Council held 17 meetings under the item entitled “The situation in Libya” and adopted 6 resolutions, including two under Chapter VII of the Charter. All the meetings that were not devoted to the adoption of decisions of the Council took the form of briefings.<sup>367</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition to the meetings, in 2022, Council members held informal consultations of the whole and one informal interactive dialogue to discuss this item.<sup>368</sup> In 2022, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).<sup>369</sup>

In 2022, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL. These briefings focused on the ongoing political, security, humanitarian and socio-economic challenges facing Libya, including the constitutional review process in preparation for the postponed presidential and parliamentary elections. The briefings also covered the work of UNSMIL towards the implementation of the Libyan-led Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism as well as efforts to support the economic reform process and to improve the security and humanitarian situation across the country. Other briefers included the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya, who briefed the Council on the activities and developments relating to the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts; the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), who provided updates on the Court’s ongoing investigations regarding the situation in Libya; and three civil society briefers. Invitations under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure to speak during meetings were limited to Libya.

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<sup>367</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>368</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 37.

<sup>369</sup> See [S/2022/669](#) and [S/2022/670](#).

During her briefing to Council members on 24 January 2022, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs reported that growing polarization among political actors in disputes over key aspects of the electoral process had resulted in the postponement of the 24 December 2021 elections.<sup>370</sup> She noted that on 5 December 2021 the Secretary-General had appointed his Special Adviser on Libya, who was working closely with UNSMIL and who had undertaken wide-ranging consultations in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misratah and Sirte since her arrival in Libya on 12 December. Concerning the political situation in the country, the Under-Secretary-General underlined that the Special Adviser had reiterated to Libyan interlocutors that the focus of the political process should remain on holding the parliamentary and presidential elections in the shortest possible time frame. On the security track, she reported that various armed groups had been meeting, while on the economic track, she noted that further steps had been taken towards the reunification of the Central Bank of Libya. The Under-Secretary-General welcomed renewed efforts to advance national reconciliation based on the principles of transitional justice but noted that, while the ceasefire had continued to hold, political uncertainty in the run-up to the elections had negatively impacted the security situation. She reported that the second group of international monitors from the UNSMIL ceasefire monitoring component had deployed to Tripoli in December 2021. Regarding the human rights situation, the Under-Secretary-General informed that UNSMIL had documented incidents of election-related violence, attacks against journalists, activists and individuals expressing political views, and hate speech and violence against women and men working to protect and promote the rights of women. She also noted the continued occurrence of arbitrary detentions and the inhumane treatment of migrants and refugees in Libya, indicating nonetheless that the humanitarian situation had improved overall in 2021.

At the same meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL), a non-governmental organization. In connection with the elections, she warned that focusing on the dates for the elections instead of a clear process to facilitate them risked compromising due process for perceived political expediency. She reported that the systematic crackdown on civil society by all parties in Libya was particularly targeting women human rights

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<sup>370</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#).

defenders and women exercising their right to participate in political or public life. She called on the Council and Member States to support an electoral process rooted in a legitimate legislative and constitutional framework; demand accountability of all parties to the conflict, including third States; apply sanctions fairly, transparently and consistently; protect women and civil society; and adopt and implement the recommendations for the independent strategic review of UNSMIL.

On 31 January, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2619 \(2022\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL for three months, until 30 April. By the same resolution, the Council recalled that UNSMIL should be led by a Special Envoy and recognised the responsibility of the Secretary-General to appoint such envoy, as set out in resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#).<sup>371</sup> Despite the unanimous adoption, most Council members expressed disappointment at the Council's inability to reach an agreement on a substantive renewal of the mandate of UNSMIL.<sup>372</sup> Several Council members supported the three-month extension to allow the Council to respond to developments in the situation in Libya and to agree on the appointment of a Special Envoy.<sup>373</sup>

In her briefing to Council members on 16 March, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, reporting on the political situation in Libya, noted that the Libyan executive was facing a crisis that could lead to instability and parallel Governments in the country.<sup>374</sup> She reported increasingly threatening rhetoric, growing political tensions and divided loyalties among the armed groups in western Libya following the 1 March vote of confidence on the new Government. Despite concerns by the Secretary-General that that vote had fallen short of standards of transparency and procedure, the new Prime Minister had been sworn in by the House of Representatives on 3 March. The Under-Secretary General reported that the Special Adviser had continued her consultations with a broad cross-section of Libyan political and security actors and civil society and that the United Nations was focusing its efforts on building consensus among Libyan institutions on a constitutional basis for the elections to be

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<sup>371</sup> Resolution [2619\(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>372</sup> See [S/PV.8961](#).

<sup>373</sup> Russian Federation, China.

<sup>374</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#).

held as soon as possible. In that regard, she urged the members of the Council to call for responsible leadership by the Libyan institutions and to remain united in support of United Nations efforts to assist Libya.

At the same meeting, the Council heard a briefing from a member of civil society, legal academic/activist and candidate for the parliamentary elections. In her statement, she conveyed the concerns of the Libyan people regarding the ongoing impasse in the political process, the absence of a permanent constitution, the lack of executive and legislative legitimacy of the State authorities, and the situation of human rights in the country, particularly the rights of women. She called on the Council to support the Libyan electoral process through the international monitoring of the elections and to urge the Libyan leadership to honour the commitments of the Libyan State to respect women and ensure a gender perspective in all policies, legislation and national strategies.

On 29 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2629 \(2022\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL for three additional months, until 31 July.<sup>375</sup> In the resolution, the Council requested the Mission to implement the recommendations of the independent strategic review of UNSMIL and decided that the Mission should be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Tripoli, supported by two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, and called upon the Secretary-General to appoint that Special Representative promptly.<sup>376</sup> The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution every 30 days.<sup>377</sup> Many Council members expressed regret that the Council had not been able to secure consensus on a substantive one-year mandate renewal.<sup>378</sup> At the same time, most of them expressed the hope for agreement on a forthcoming substantive resolution on UNSMIL soon and called on the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative without delay. Several Council members

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<sup>375</sup> Resolution [2629 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 6.

<sup>378</sup> See [S/PV.9025](#), Ireland, Albania, Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Gabon, Kenya, Ghana, France, United States and United Kingdom,



welcomed the endorsement by the Council of the recommendations of the strategic review,<sup>379</sup> including through the reform of the Mission's leadership structure.<sup>380</sup>

On 26 May, during her briefing to the Council, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs informed Council members that the deadlock on the political, security and economic fronts in Libya had persisted, despite the best efforts of the United Nations to facilitate agreement among Libyan actors.<sup>381</sup> She added that the human rights situation had also deteriorated and expressed concern about the negative impact of the protracted political impasse on the security situation in the country. In that regard, she said that while the 2020 ceasefire continued to hold and the activities of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission had resumed, the situation remained fragile, with clashes among armed groups in Tripoli. On the economic front, the Under-Secretary-General recalled that the reluctance of the Government of National Unity to pay the Libyan National Army's salaries for the first quarter of 2022 had led to elements affiliated with the Libyan National army closing several oilfields, cutting the country's daily oil output in half.

During her briefing on 27 June, the Under-Secretary-General she informed the Council that during the final round of consultations of the House of Representatives and the High State Council, a broad consensus had been reached on most of the contentious issues regarding the constitutional basis for elections.<sup>382</sup> She was encouraged that the leaders of both Chambers had accepted the invitation of the Special Adviser to meet in Geneva in June to discuss and reach agreement on outstanding measures governing the transitional period leading to elections. Nevertheless, she noted that continued political divisions were contributing to a tense security environment in and around Tripoli. She also expressed alarm at the human rights situation, indicating that the civic space was consistently being eroded, with arbitrary restrictions imposed on civil society organizations and human rights activists being targeted and reports of torture in detention facilities and prisons. On the economic front, the Under-Secretary-General underscored

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<sup>379</sup> United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, Norway, France and United Kingdom.

<sup>380</sup> Ireland, Brazil, Mexico and France.

<sup>381</sup> See [S/PV.9047](#).

<sup>382</sup> See [S/PV.9078](#).

that the suspension of oil revenue transfers could negatively impact the ability of the Government of National Unity to pay salaries and meet other spending needs.

Following the briefing by the Under-Secretary-General, the Operations Manager of the Fezzan Libya Organization, a civil society organization, addressed the Council via videoconference from Sabha, Libya. Focusing her briefing on issues surrounding female participation in Libyan political life, she noted that the political participation of women continued to face significant challenges, with women in Libya being victim to systemic violence from the Government. While recent Governments in Libya had taken positive steps by appointing more women to higher positions, she underlined that achieving meaningful participation of women also required adopting pro-women legislation.

In her briefing on 25 July, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations indicated that the overall situation in Libya remained highly volatile, adding that the constitutional and political stalemate persisted, prolonging the tense security environment with an increased number of clashes in and around Tripoli.<sup>383</sup> She reported that progress had been made on the constitutional track with the agreement between the Speaker of the House of Representative and the President of the High State Council on some of the transitional measures that would lead to the holding of national elections and a road map. She also reported on the demonstrations held across Libya on 1 July, where protestors had expressed their frustration with the continuing political divisions and the deterioration of their living conditions. While the continued political divisions were prolonging the tense security environment in and around Tripoli, she reported that Libyan monitors, together with the international monitors of UNSMIL had conducted two joint workshops to operationalize the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism. Regarding the economic situation, she expressed concern about the politicization of the National Oil Corporation, stressing that the dire economic situation had had a negative impact on people's fundamental right to basic services and access to food, water, sanitation, healthcare and education.

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<sup>383</sup> See [S/PV.9098](#).

On 28 July, the Council adopted resolution [2647 \(2022\)](#), with three abstentions.<sup>384</sup> By the resolution, the Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL for an additional three months until 31 October 2022, and reiterated that the Mission should be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Tripoli, supported by two Deputy Special Representatives, and called upon the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative promptly.<sup>385</sup> Expressing regret that a number of the deliverables of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum had yet to be achieved, the Council also underlined that the objectives and governing principles set out therein were still relevant to the political process and urged the Libyan political institutions and key stakeholders to agree on a pathway to deliver elections as soon as possible through dialogue, compromise and constructive engagement, in a transparent and inclusive manner.<sup>386</sup> In the preambular paragraphs of the resolution, the Council expressed support for the ongoing facilitation of intra-Libyan consultations to create the conditions and circumstances for elections on a constitutional and legal basis while also encouraging further international support and regional cooperation between Libya, neighbouring countries and relevant United Nations Bodies in support of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the country and the region.<sup>387</sup> The Council also recalled that Libya's oil resources were for the benefit of all Libyans and needed to remain under the exclusive control of the National Oil Corporation and expressed grave concern at the humanitarian situation in the country.<sup>388</sup>

After the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom, the penholder of the resolution, highlighted that resolution [2647 \(2022\)](#) contained a number of important messages, including on the political and security processes, the integrity of the National Oil Corporation and human rights and of particular importance, the message to the Libyan parties on the need to agree on a pathway to deliver presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible.<sup>389</sup> She added, however, that she shared the frustration of her African colleagues who had abstained due to the

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<sup>384</sup> See [S/PV.9103](#). *For*: (Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States; *Abstaining* (Gabon, Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>385</sup> Resolution [2647 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*, second to fourth preambular paragraphs.

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*, sixth and ninth preambular paragraphs.

<sup>389</sup> See [S/PV.9103](#).

short three-month mandate and indicated that the approach by the Russian Federation of insisting on three-month rollovers in the absence of a Special Representative was short-sighted and undermined the ability of UNSMIL to support Libyan leaders to achieve the political and security objectives required to bring stability to the country. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the adopted resolution was the only possible compromise for all at that stage and stated that the tenure of the Special Adviser without an appropriate security mandate had been unjustifiably prolonged. He further insisted that the Secretary-General should promptly submit a worthy and authoritative candidate for the position of Special Representative and Head of UNSMIL, one that would suit the main Libyan actors and regional stakeholders, for subsequent approval by the members of the Council. He added that Russia's insistence on the issue of appointing a Special Representative was dictated solely by concern for maintaining the effectiveness of United Nations efforts to promote a settlement in Libya. The representative of Gabon explained that her delegation had abstained in the voting on the renewal of UNSMIL as a call for the interests and concerns of Libyans to be put above all other considerations. She pointed out that the Council remained insensitive despite the gradual deterioration of the security situation on the ground, adding that the short mandate renewals undermined the credibility of the Council. She further reiterated Gabon's support for the appointment of an African to the position of Special Representative. Similarly, the representative of Ghana emphasized that the Council had failed to show commitment to the Libyan people by not extending the mandate of UNSMIL for a one-year period to consolidate all the gains of the peace efforts and foster serious engagement between the Council and the Libyan people through UNSMIL. He asserted that the failure of the Council to find consensus on the Secretary-General's proposed nominee for the vacant position further complicated the Libyan peace process with the departure of the Special adviser of the Secretary-General on Libya. The representative of Kenya underscored that the resolution just adopted and its three-month mandate for UNSMIL constituted yet another disappointment to the people of Libya and expressed the belief that it was no longer tenable for UNSMIL to operate with such a brief and uncertain mandate. The representative of China expressed support for the appointment of an African candidate and noted that appointing the Special Representative as soon as possible would help to restore the full performance of

UNSMIL, strengthen the United Nations capacity for good offices and help to create conditions for UNSMIL to obtain a longer extension in the future. The representative of the United States welcomed that the resolution provided a more substantive mandate, including language in support of the political process and assurances that Libya's oil revenue was managed transparently for the benefit of the entire Libyan people. She noted the abstentions of the three African members of the Council in protest of Russia's insistence on a three-month mandate duration and shared their frustration. The representative of the United States further rejected Russia's "specious contention" that a three-month mandate would assist the Secretariat in securing the Council's full support for a nominee, adding that, to the contrary, a short duration only further complicated the efforts by the Secretariat to recruit the best candidate for the role and made it much harder for UNSMIL to implement long-term plans and develop sustainable solutions to Libya's challenges. Expressing the view that a candidate from the African continent would be well-suited for the position, the representative of Brazil noted that the compromise reached within the Council on the duration of the mandate of UNSMIL offered the Secretary-General and Council members a new opportunity to engage in the appointment of the Mission's leadership, with the expectation that a suitable candidate would be appointed as soon as possible and expressed hope that subsequent renewals of the mandate of UNSMIL would benefit from more predictable time frames.

During her briefing on 30 August, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs reported that the United Nations had continued to engage with Libyan actors at every level to facilitate a resolution to the political impasse.<sup>390</sup> She noted that the ongoing stalemate and continued delays in implementing the electoral process posed a growing threat to security in and around Tripoli, and potentially to all Libyans adding that fighting had broken out in Tripoli and its outskirts on 27 August between armed groups respectively supporting Mr. Abdulhamid Al Dabiba and Mr. Fathi Bashagha. The Under-Secretary-General expressed concern about the limited political progress made during the reporting period, and the lack of progress on forging a consensus on a constitutional framework for the elections.

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<sup>390</sup> See [S/PV.9120](#).

On 24 October, Council members heard the briefing of the newly appointed Special Representative and Head of UNSMIL, who reported that prior to his arrival in Libya he had spoken to a range of Member States' and regional organizations' representatives, stressing the importance of ensuring that the international community would support Libyan efforts in a coordinated manner, rally behind the United Nations lead and refrain from taking any action that could further deepen divisions.<sup>391</sup> Addressing the political situation in the country, the Special Representative indicated that the deadlock persisted, further delaying the prospects for the holding of inclusive, free and fair elections. He had given priority to consultations with Libyan institutional, political, security and civil-society actors from across the country. While significant differences remained among Libyans on how to resolve the crisis, the Special Representative noted the near unanimous condemnation across the spectrum of the presence of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces in Libya and the incessant foreign interference in the country's affairs. The Special Representative stated that while the ceasefire continued to hold, the security track needed to be reinvigorated, as it had been adversely impacted by the political impasse. He expressed concern regarding the human rights situation, reporting that violations against migrants and asylum-seekers continued with impunity and that arbitrary detentions were a common practice. Recalling that the situation in Libya called for a consensus State re-legitimation process, he stressed the paramount importance of the conduct of legislative and presidential elections and announced he would intensify his consultations in that regard.

On 28 October, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#),<sup>392</sup> by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL until 31 October 2023 and welcomed the appointment of Abdoulaye Bathily as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL.<sup>393</sup> By the same resolution, the Council reiterated its request for the Mission to implement the recommendations of the independent strategic review of UNSMIL.<sup>394</sup> Recalling the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum Roadmap, the Council urged the Libyan political institutions and key stakeholders to agree on a roadmap to deliver elections as soon as possible

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<sup>391</sup> See [S/PV.9162](#).

<sup>392</sup> See [S/PV.9173](#).

<sup>393</sup> Resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

across the country.<sup>395</sup> The Council also welcomed the support provided by the United Nations to the Libyan High National Elections Commission and, emphasising that there could be no military solution in Libya, called upon all parties to refrain from violence or other actions that could escalate tensions, exacerbate conflicts and undermine the political process or the 23 October 2020 ceasefire.<sup>396</sup> The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution every 60 days.<sup>397</sup>

After the vote, the representatives of Kenya, Brazil, Ghana and Gabon welcomed the substantive renewal of the mandate of UNSMIL for a 12-month period.<sup>398</sup> The representative of Gabon noted that, as an African State and one of the three African members of the Council, his delegation felt a sense of having contributed to an important milestone in the stabilization of a major African State. The representative of Kenya stated that the Libya peace process was complex at a national level and made more so by the involvement of competing external interests, and urged all international support to be channelled through the United Nations-led process.

During his briefing on 15 November, the Special Representative reported on the various meetings he had held with Libyan stakeholders as well as with representatives of the international community in efforts towards bringing the country back to peace and stability through a Libyan-Libyan solution to the crisis.<sup>399</sup> He informed that UNSMIL continued to provide technical assistance to the High National Elections Commission to maintain readiness for elections, and noted that there appeared to be broad agreement that restoring legitimacy of Libya's institutions across the board was of paramount importance, as was the need to coordinate bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives and to coalesce behind the efforts of the United Nations. He warned that further prolonging the postponement of elections would make the country even more vulnerable to political, economic and security instability and could put the country at risk of partition and urged the Council to send an unequivocal message to

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<sup>395</sup> Ibid., para. 4.

<sup>396</sup> Ibid., paras. 5 and 7.

<sup>397</sup> Ibid., para. 11.

<sup>398</sup> See [S/PV.9173](#).

<sup>399</sup> See [S/PV.9192](#).

obstructionists that their actions would not remain without consequences. On the security track, the Special Representative reported some progress, including the holding of a meeting of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission where the Commission had agreed to establish a subcommittee for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups. He further confirmed that the ceasefire continued to hold, despite ongoing escalatory rhetoric and a build-up of forces on both sides. He also expressed alarm about the human rights situation and reported that online violence against women had been on the rise. On the economic front, he noted that the lack of accountability, transparency and equity in the allocation of resources remained a key cause of tensions.

In his briefing to the Council on 16 December, the Special Representative reported about his engagement with Libyan stakeholders and international partners to advance the political process and revive the electoral track, including visits to Türkiye, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Tunisia.<sup>400</sup> The Special Representative called on the Council, its members and all those with convening power to support the efforts of UNSMIL to bring Libyan political leaders back to the negotiating table and prevent a further deterioration of the crisis. On the security and military track, while he reported that the ceasefire had continued to hold, he indicated that the proliferation of weapons under the control of State and non-State actors and the presence of foreign fighters, foreign forces and mercenaries continued to pose security challenges and undermine efforts to unify security institutions. Furthermore, UNSMIL continued to observe a systematic campaign by Libyan security actors attempting to undermine and silence civil society, humanitarian actors, human rights defenders and political activists, including women and young people. He expressed concern about new bureaucratic obstacles and movement restrictions impeding humanitarian access.

During the period under review, the Council also heard regular briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya.<sup>401</sup> During the briefings, the Chair highlighted the implementation and violations of the sanctions regime, namely, the arms embargo, asset freeze, travel ban and the timebound authorizations and

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<sup>400</sup> See [S/PV.9223](#).

<sup>401</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#); [S/PV.8996](#); [S/PV.9047](#); [S/PV.9120](#) and [S/PV.9223](#). For more information on the work of the Committee and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.1.



measures aimed at preventing the illicit exports of petroleum from Libya.<sup>402</sup> The Chair also reported on the implementation of the assets-freeze, including discussions regarding the preservation of the Libyan frozen assets for the benefit of the Libyan people, the exemption requests and notifications with respect to the illicit export of petroleum, the travel ban, assets freeze and arms embargo, and the consideration of delisting requests by the Committee. Moreover, on 13 July 2022, the Council adopted unanimously resolution [2644 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter. In that resolution, the Council decided to extend until 30 October 2023 the authorizations provided and measures imposed by resolution [2146 \(2014\)](#), [2441 \(2018\)](#) and [2509 \(2020\)](#).<sup>403</sup> The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established by resolution [1973 \(2011\)](#) until 15 November 2023 and requested that the Panel closely follow and report to the Committee any information relating to the illicit export from or illicit import to Libya of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products.<sup>404</sup> The Council also demanded full compliance by all Member States with the arms embargo and called on all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbated the conflict.<sup>405</sup>

In 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) continued to provide briefings to the Council. He reported twice on the progress and challenges relating to the Court's ongoing investigations regarding the situation in Libya. On 28 April, the Prosecutor briefed the Council on his office's twenty-third report to the Council, pointing out that it was the first time that the Office of the Prosecutor put forward benchmarks in terms of timelines for certain action, so that the Office could be held to account.<sup>406</sup> At the meeting on 9 November, the Prosecutor provided the briefing for the first time from Libya.<sup>407</sup> Describing the work performed by forensic experts at various locations, he underlined the need for the international community and the Court to do more to deliver justice to the people of Libya.

In their deliberations in 2022, Council members focused on the political, security and humanitarian situation in the country, addressing also the economic factors further destabilizing

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<sup>402</sup> For more information on the sanctions measures, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>403</sup> Resolution [2644 \(2022\)](#) para. 2.

<sup>404</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 3 and 12.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5.

<sup>406</sup> See [S/PV.9024](#).

<sup>407</sup> See [S/PV.9187](#).

the country. Many of them expressed disappointment and concern regarding the postponement of the presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as the deteriorating situation in the country.<sup>408</sup> Council members expressed support for the Libyan-led and owned political process,<sup>409</sup> and called on Libyan stakeholders to commit to holding free, fair and inclusive elections as soon as possible.<sup>410</sup> Several Council members expressed support for the efforts of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General and then the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to convene consultations between the House of Representatives and the High State Council to establish a constitutional basis for elections.<sup>411</sup> The representative of Gabon, speaking also on behalf of the representatives of Ghana and Kenya, recommended that the Secretary-General make use of the vast body of African expertise available in the context of the high-level United Nations leadership to achieve progress in the dialogue between the parties and strengthen coordination with States of the region.<sup>412</sup> Council members called for the full

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<sup>408</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), United Kingdom, Brazil, Albania, India, Mexico and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Russian Federation, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico, France, China, Norway and United States; [S/PV.9162](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Mexico, Albania, France, United States, Brazil, China, India, Ireland, United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9192](#), Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, United States, Brazil, France, Albania, India, China, Mexico, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Albania and India.

<sup>409</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India, Russian Federation, China, United States and Norway; [S/PV.9047](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India and Norway; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, China and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), United Kingdom, India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, Albania and Brazil; [S/PV.9120](#), Brazil, Russian Federation, India, Albania and China; [S/PV.9192](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Brazil, Albania, India, United Arab Emirates, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, Brazil, Ireland, United Arab Emirates and India.

<sup>410</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Ireland, Brazil, India, Mexico, France, United States and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), Brazil, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico, France, China, India, Norway, United States, Albania and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, Albania, United Arab Emirates, France, India, Norway and United States; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Norway, France, Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), United Kingdom, India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, France, Ireland, Norway, China, United Arab Emirates, Albania and Brazil; [S/PV.9120](#), Norway, Russian Federation, India, United States, Albania, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates, France, Mexico, Ireland and China; and [S/PV.9223](#), United Kingdom, China, Mexico, France, Ireland, Russian Federation, Norway, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United States and India.

<sup>411</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Brazil, Mexico, India, Norway, United States and Albania; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, Albania, China, United Arab Emirates, France, Norway and United States; [S/PV.9078](#), United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, United States, Brazil, France, Mexico, China, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), India, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United States, Norway and China; [S/PV.9192](#), China; and [S/PV.9223](#), China, Mexico, Brazil, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates and United States.

<sup>412</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#). See also [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana).

implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces from Libya,<sup>413</sup> compliance with the arms embargo,<sup>414</sup> the need for the unification of institutions in Libya,<sup>415</sup> national reconciliation,<sup>416</sup> full and meaningful political participation of women in the political process,<sup>417</sup> and for addressing Libya's concerns regarding the management of its frozen assets.<sup>418</sup> Some Council members addressed the attempts to disrupt oil

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<sup>413</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania, India, Mexico, France, United States and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), France, China, India, Norway, United States, Albania and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, Russian Federation, India, Norway and United States; [S/PV.9078](#), United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Norway, Brazil, France, Mexico, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), India, Mexico, France, China, United Arab Emirates), Russian Federation and Albania; [S/PV.9120](#), Norway, Russian Federation, India, Albania, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates, France, Mexico, Ireland and China; [S/PV.9162](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Kenya, Mexico, Albania, France, United States, Brazil, China, India, Ireland, United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9192](#), United Kingdom, United States, France, Albania, India, United Arab Emirates, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, Brazil, France, Russian Federation, Norway, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United States and India.

<sup>414</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India and Mexico; [S/PV.8996](#), France and United States; [S/PV.9047](#), United States; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and France; [S/PV.9098](#), United Kingdom, India, Mexico, France, Ireland, Norway and Albania; [S/PV.9120](#), Brazil, India, United States, France and Mexico; [S/PV.9162](#), Mexico, France, Brazil, India; [S/PV.9192](#), Brazil, France, India and Mexico; [S/PV.9192](#), Brazil, France, India and Mexico; and [S/PV.9223](#), Brazil, France, and India.

<sup>415</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), France, Russian Federation, China and United States; [S/PV.8996](#), United Kingdom, Russian Federation, United States and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates and France; [S/PV.9078](#), France; [S/PV.9098](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, France, Norway, Russian Federation and Albania; [S/PV.9120](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates and Mexico; [S/PV.9162](#), United Kingdom, Mexico, France, Brazil, United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9192](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), China, Brazil, France, Ireland, Russian Federation and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>416</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Kenya (also on behalf also of Gabon and Ghana) and China; [S/PV.8996](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9047](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates and India; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Brazil, China, Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), Mexico, United Arab Emirates and Russian Federation; [S/PV.9120](#), Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates and China; [S/PV.9162](#), Russian Federation, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, China, United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9192](#), Brazil, United Arab Emirates and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) China, Brazil, Russian Federation and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>417</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), France and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9047](#), Ireland, Albania and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Mexico and Ireland; [S/PV.9098](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); [S/PV.9162](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Albania, Brazil, Ireland, United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9192](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Mexico and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>418</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and China; [S/PV.8996](#), Brazil, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and China; [S/PV.9047](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana

production at the National Oil Corporation, calling for the Corporation not to be politicized and allowed to fulfil its duties without interference.<sup>419</sup> Council members expressed concern about the humanitarian and human rights situation in the country, in particular the condition and arbitrary detention of migrants and refugees,<sup>420</sup> and incidents of violence against journalists and civil society activists, including women's groups.<sup>421</sup> Some Council members further underscored the importance of ensuring that efforts undertaken for the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces included disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures in order to prevent instability in neighbouring countries and the Sahel region.<sup>422</sup> Several Council members expressed support for the action plan from the 5+5 Joint Military Commission for the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries.<sup>423</sup> The appointment of a Special Representative and Head of

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(also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China; [S/PV.9098](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China and Brazil; [S/PV.9120](#), Brazil, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates and China; [S/PV.9162](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and Brazil; [S/PV.9192](#), Brazil; and [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil and Russian Federation.

<sup>419</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#), United Kingdom, France, China, United States and Albania; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, China, France and Norway; [S/PV.9078](#), France, Mexico, China and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), United Kingdom, United States, China and Albania; [S/PV.9162](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and Brazil; [S/PV.9192](#), Russian Federation and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), United States.

<sup>420</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania, Mexico, France, United States and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), Ireland, Brazil, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico and Norway; [S/PV.9047](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); Ireland, Brazil, France and Norway; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Mexico and Albania; [S/PV.9098](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland and Albania; [S/PV.9120](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France, Mexico and Ireland; [S/PV.9162](#), Norway, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Albania, France, Ireland; [S/PV.9192](#), Norway, Mexico, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, France, Ireland and United States.

<sup>421</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Brazil; [S/PV.8996](#), Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United States and Albania; [S/PV.9047](#), Brazil, Albania, Norway, United States; [S/PV.9078](#), Norway and Ireland; [S/PV.9098](#), United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland, and Brazil; [S/PV.9162](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland; [S/PV.9192](#), Ireland, Albania and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), United Kingdom, Mexico, France, Ireland, Norway and Albania.

<sup>422</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), India, Mexico, France, China and Norway; [S/PV.8996](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya); [S/PV.9047](#), Ireland, France, India and Mexico; [S/PV.9078](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, France and Mexico; [S/PV.9098](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United States and France; [S/PV.9120](#), Norway, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and France); [S/PV.9162](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France, Brazil, China; [S/PV.9192](#), Brazil, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9223](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, Mexico, France and India.

<sup>423</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Kenya (also on behalf also of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania, India, France, Russian Federation, China and United States; [S/PV.9047](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Ireland, France and Mexico; [S/PV.9162](#), Norway, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), France, Brazil; and [S/PV.9223](#), Brazil, Norway and Albania.

UNSMIL was extensively discussed by Council members in regular briefings as well as in meetings for the adoption of decisions from January to August.

During his participation at Council meetings on Libya, the representative of Libya stressed that holding transparent and fair elections based on consensus laws and on a strong constitutional basis was the only genuine guarantee that could return legitimacy to the people, end the conflict and resolve the situation in the country.<sup>424</sup> The representative of Libya reiterated his request to the United Nations to support, seriously and more effectively, the electoral process and send its assessment teams, also reiterating the importance of Libyan ownership and leadership of any political process that would lead the country towards stability and impose State authority, while excluding all external dictates and intervention.<sup>425</sup> He further recalled the need to support the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to ensure the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement and put an end to any foreign presence on Libyan territories.<sup>426</sup> The representative of Libya emphasized that the people of Libya had become hostage to the disagreements of Council members and some regional powers, going as far as intervening directly in Libyan affairs, and recalled the lack of consensus on the mandate of UNSMIL or the appointment of a new Special Envoy of the Secretary-General.<sup>427</sup> The representative of Libya further called on the Security Council to play a positive and more effective role in supporting Libyan consensus, working to end all interventions in Libya, correcting past mistakes and support all efforts to launch a national reconciliation and transitional justice project.<sup>428</sup> The representative of Libya also called on the Council to support the strategic vision for national reconciliation efforts,<sup>429</sup> and to take additional constructive steps to support stability in Libya and end international division on the issue.<sup>430</sup>

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<sup>424</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#) and [S/PV.9162](#).

<sup>425</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#); [S/PV.8996](#); and [S/PV.9223](#).

<sup>426</sup> See [S/PV.8996](#) and [S/PV.9192](#).

<sup>427</sup> See [S/PV.9078](#).

<sup>428</sup> See [S/PV.8952](#) [S/PV.9192](#) and [S/PV.9223](#).

<sup>429</sup> See [S/PV.9078](#) and [S/PV.9162](#).

<sup>430</sup> See [S/PV.9162](#).

In addition to the decisions outlined above, on 3 June, the Council adopted resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with one abstention.<sup>431</sup> By the resolution, the Council extended the authorizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, as set out in resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#) for a further 12 months.<sup>432</sup> After the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that the special inspection regime designated to implement the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya had failed to decrease the illicit trade in weapons and bring about a political settlement of the protracted conflict in Libya.<sup>433</sup> He further indicated that the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI had, over recent years, demonstrated low effectiveness in assisting the implementation of the arms embargo and said that the work of the EU Naval Force lacked transparency. He added that the Russian Federation would continue to closely monitor the work of Operation IRINI to ensure full compliance with the arms embargo and would also provide a legal assessment of the actions of the EU Naval Force.

Developments in Libya were also considered under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”.<sup>434</sup>

### Meetings: The situation in Libya

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8952</a> 24 January 2022	Letter dated 15 December 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1970 (2011)</a> concerning Libya addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2021/1058</a> ) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations		Libya	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Co-founder and Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya	13 Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees	

<sup>431</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *Against*: none; *Abstaining*: Russian Federation.

<sup>432</sup> Resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>433</sup> See [S/PV.9053](#).

<sup>434</sup> For further details, see part I, sect. 35.

Support Mission in Libya ( <a href="#">S/2022/31</a> )					
<a href="#">S/PV.8961</a> 31 January 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya ( <a href="#">S/2022/31</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/69</a> )			13 Council members <sup>b</sup>  Resolution <a href="#">2619(2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.8996</a> 16 March 2022			Libya	Under-Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Civil Society briefer	13 Council members, <sup>c</sup> all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9024</a> 28 April 2022			Libya	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9025</a> 29 April 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/356</a> )			14 Council members <sup>d</sup>  Resolution <a href="#">2629 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9047</a> 26 May 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya ( <a href="#">S/2022/409</a> )		Libya	Under-Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	13 Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9053</a> 3 June 2022		Draft resolution submitted by France ( <a href="#">S/2022/450</a> )			Russian Federation  Resolution <a href="#">2635 (2022)</a> 14-0-1 <sup>e</sup> (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9078</a> 27 June 2022			Libya	Under-Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, President and Operations Manager of Fezzan Libya Organization	13 Council members, <sup>f</sup> all invitees <sup>g</sup>

<a href="#">S/PV.9092</a> 13 July 2022	Letter dated 24 May 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1973 (2011)</a> addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/427</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/548</a> )		Resolution <a href="#">2644 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)		
<a href="#">S/PV.9098</a> 25 July 2022			Libya	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations	13 Council members, <sup>h</sup> all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9103</a> 28 July 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/580</a> )			10 Council members <sup>i</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2647 (2022)</a> 12-0-3 <sup>j</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9120</a> 30 August 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya ( <a href="#">S/2022/632</a> )		Libya	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	13 Council members, <sup>k</sup> all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9162</a> 24 October 2022			Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya	13 Council members, <sup>h</sup> all invitees <sup>l</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9173</a> 28 October 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/803</a> )			Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya	Resolution <a href="#">2656 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9187</a> 9 November 2022			Libya	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees <sup>m</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9192</a> 15 November 2022			Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya	13 Council members, <sup>f</sup> all invitees <sup>n</sup>	



<p><a href="#">S/PV.9223</a> 16 December 2022</p>	<p>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (<a href="#">S/2022/932</a>)</p>	<p>Libya</p>	<p>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</p>	<p>13 Council members,<sup>k</sup> all invitees<sup>n</sup></p>
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<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of India briefed also in his capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya.

<sup>b</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>c</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of India briefed also in his capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya.

<sup>d</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States.

<sup>e</sup> *For:* Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *Against:* none; *Abstaining:* Russian Federation.

<sup>f</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>g</sup> The President and Operation Manager of Fezzan Libya Organization participated by videoconference

<sup>h</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>i</sup> Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>j</sup> *For:* Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America; *Against:* none; *Abstaining:* Gabon, Ghana and Kenya.

<sup>k</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of India briefed also in her capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya.

<sup>l</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya participated by videoconference.

<sup>m</sup> The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court participated by videoconference.

<sup>n</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya participated by videoconference.

## 11. The situation in Mali

During the period under review, the Security Council held seven meetings and adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter in relation to the situation in Mali. Five meetings took the form of briefings and two meetings were convened for the adoption of a resolution.<sup>435</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants and outcomes, is provided in the table below.<sup>436</sup> The Council also held one private meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).<sup>437</sup> Besides meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.

In 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of MINUSMA briefed the Council four times further to the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali.<sup>438</sup> The Council also heard briefings by three civil society representatives<sup>439</sup> and the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali.<sup>440</sup> Mali was represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in two out of the four briefings held under this item.<sup>441</sup>

In 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General updated Council members on the talks between the transitional Government of Mali and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to define a new transition timetable for the holding of elections and a return to civilian government, progress in the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, as well as the security and humanitarian situation in the country amid an increase in violence perpetrated by extremist groups. In his first briefing of the year on 11 January 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General noted that, at its extraordinary

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<sup>435</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>436</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 38.

<sup>437</sup> The private meeting was held on 7 June 2022 under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop-and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”. See [S/PV.9057](#).

<sup>438</sup> See [S/PV.8945](#), [S/PV.9012](#), [S/PV.9061](#) and [S/PV.9154](#). See also [S/2021/1117](#), [S/2022/278](#), [S/2022/446](#) and [S/2022/731](#).

<sup>439</sup> See [S/PV.8945](#), [S/PV.9012](#) and [S/PV.9061](#).

<sup>440</sup> See [S/PV.9200](#).

<sup>441</sup> See [S/PV.9061](#) and [S/PV.9154](#).

Summit of the Authority of Heads of State and Government held on 9 January 2022, ECOWAS rejected the new timeline proposed by the transitional Government of Mali to extend the political transition and hold elections by the end of 2025 and urged it to focus on a speedy return to constitutional order.<sup>442</sup> ECOWAS also decided to uphold the individual sanctions imposed on 12 December 2021 and added new measures including the closure of land and air borders between member States and Mali. The Special Representative noted that, against this political backdrop, the international mediation for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, led by Algeria and including MINUSMA and other international stakeholders, called for the early convening of a high-level decision-making meeting between the signatories to allow for overdue progress, most notably on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. MINUSMA also continued providing structured support for the Malian authorities on the drafting of a comprehensive politically-led strategy for central Mali, as requested by the Council.

The Special Representative observed that 2021 saw more extremist attacks than ever and that MINUSMA suffered the highest number of casualties since 2013, which underlined the dangerous environment in which it was operating. He stated that the conflict had a devastating impact on civilians and that the number of displaced persons increased from 216,000 in 2020 to more than 400,000 in 2021, and that more than 1.8 million people were expected to need food assistance in 2022 compared to 1.3 million in 2021. The Special Representative further reported on the work of MINUSMA to physically verify the status of schools, protect civilians and ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers.

During the meeting held on 7 April 2022, the Special Representative noted several deadly attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara in the Ménaka region and south of Gao and MINUSMA's deployment of its mobile task force units in response to the incidents.<sup>443</sup> He observed that the attacks occurred in the context of the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane and Takuba Taskforce from Mali and stressed the importance of maintaining the Mission's capabilities and troops and finding adequate response for its capability shortfalls. While noting that the Malian Defence and Security Forces had stepped up their counter-terrorism efforts in central Mali, the Special Representative emphasized that such operations had to be conducted in

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<sup>442</sup> See [S/PV.8945](#).

<sup>443</sup> See [S/PV.9012](#).

ways that minimized civilian harm and upheld human rights and international humanitarian principles and had to be complemented by practical and sustained steps to address the root causes of the conflict and violence including the finalization and implementation of the Government's politically-led strategy. With respect to the political transition, he noted that the ECOWAS extraordinary Summit of 25 March 2022 endorsed the proposal of its Mediator, former President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, to extend the transition period for 12 to 16 months as a basis of negotiation on the gradual lifting of sanctions against Mali.

On 13 June 2022, the Special Representative stated that the prolonged uncertainty surrounding the duration of the political transition made it more difficult to make progress in other areas, leaving little political space for a sustained commitment to the implementation of the Peace Agreement.<sup>444</sup> He noted that MINUSMA and Algeria continued to engage with the Government and other signatory parties particularly on the organization of the high-level decision-making meeting and finalizing the details of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process based on the Government's offer to integrate 26,000 combatants into State structures and a common understanding of the broad outlines of necessary institutional reforms. The Special Representative expressed concern regarding the deteriorating security situation in the tri-border area of Liptako-Gourma due to attacks by the Islamic State, with consequent effects on Ménaka and Gao. He noted that MINUSMA was enhancing its presence in Ménaka, prioritizing long-range patrols and establishing temporary operating bases in Gao and Mopti. With regard to the centre of Mali, he informed Council members that the Malian Defence and Security Forces campaign had undeniably led to the improvement of the situation in some areas and a weakening of the extremist groups. However, he expressed concern that some of the operations were marred by allegations of human rights violations.

In his statement on 18 October 2022, the Special Representative reported that significant progress was made in the preparation for elections in Mali following the agreement between Mali and ECOWAS in July 2022 on a new transition timetable which extended the transition until the end of March 2024.<sup>445</sup> Specifically with regard to the transition, the Special Representative noted that a draft constitution was presented to the transitional President of Mali,

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<sup>444</sup> See [S/PV.9061](#).

<sup>445</sup> See [S/PV.9154](#).

Colonel Assimi Goïta, on 11 October 2022 and was expected to be put to a referendum in March 2023. According to the Special Representative, the draft was based on the recommendations of the national dialogue on the reform process, provided for the establishment of a bicameral parliament and included provisions that would greatly facilitate the implementation of the Peace Agreement. He further noted progress in the establishment of the Independent Authority for Election Management and the operationalization of the mechanism for monitoring the transition timetable which involved the Malian parties, ECOWAS, the African Union and MINUSMA. Furthermore, in his view, the success of the electoral process depended on the availability of financial and logistical resources, the evolution of the security situation and its overall inclusiveness.

The Special Representative also noted some encouraging developments in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and welcomed the Government's adoption of its comprehensive strategy for the stabilization of central Mali on 24 August 2022 which was based on the four axes of peace, security and social cohesion; governance and justice; economic and humanitarian recovery; and communication and cooperation.

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Notwithstanding these positive developments, the Special Representative noted a sharp increase in the activities of extremist elements affiliated with the Islamic State and Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin in the Ménaka and Gao regions since March 2022. Regarding humanitarian developments, he informed Council members that the number of internally displaced persons had risen to over 422,000, while over 175,000 people were refugees in neighbouring countries. Furthermore, more than 1.8 million people faced severe food insecurity, 1.2 million children under the age of five were affected by malnutrition, and more than 600,000 children were affected by school closures due to insecurity. The Special Representative concluded his remarks by echoing the call of the Secretary-General for the urgent provision of missing capabilities for MINUSMA and stressed that its effectiveness depended on the

cooperation of the Malian authorities, including with regard to freedom of movement in conformity with the status of forces agreement.

In their briefings in 2022, the three civil society representatives offered their views on the connection between social inequality and the conflict in Mali, challenges to the participation of women in security sector reform and the impact of the political and security situation on the civilian population. At the meeting held on 11 January 2022, the Executive Director of the Youth Association for Active Citizenship and Democracy, a Mali-wide organization promoting social justice and democratic values, said that after ten years of failed stabilization strategies, and with the Sahelian crisis at its worst, it was time for a paradigm change.<sup>446</sup> She noted that social, economic, political and environmental inequalities were dangerously fuelling crises and instability and that the military response to the security situation was inadequate to overcome and contain threats. She called on the Council to put its trust in the Malian people and their civil society in order to improve governance, noting that MINUSMA had an important role to play in that regard. In her statement on 7 April 2022, the President of Women in Law and Development in Africa in Mali, a pan-African network for the promotion and protection of women's rights, expressed the view that the security context in Mali had compounded inequalities and widened the gap that had to be overcome for women and young people to gain access to resources and governance.<sup>447</sup> In the face of those challenges, she noted that civil society was planning to coordinate the efforts made by the Council and the Government and promote a legal framework and resources conducive to building a more inclusive, effective, transparent, sustainable and responsible security sector that would serve the people of Mali. In this regard, she outlined several recommendations on how to overcome the barriers to women's participation in the security sector and its reform and to strengthen the mandate of MINUSMA. She also called on the Council to add a reference to climate change to the Mission's mandate, as a key element that affected the security of the population, specifically women and children. On 13 June 2022, the Director of Mali Musso and writer, discussed the consequences of the political stalemate and deteriorating security situation in Mali, including grave violations and abuses against civilians,

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<sup>446</sup> See [S/PV.8945](#).

<sup>447</sup> See [S/PV.9012](#).

conflict-related and gender-based violence, the closure of schools and youth unemployment.<sup>448</sup> She underlined that the Council should ensure that its decisions were leading to action on the ground and reiterated the recommendation to bolster the mandate of MINUSMA under Chapter VII of the Charter to fight terrorism alongside the Malian armed forces.

By resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#) of 29 June 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of MINUSMA for a period of one year, until 30 June 2023.<sup>449</sup> While maintaining the overall strategic priorities of MINUSMA to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the political transition, and to facilitate the implementation by Malian actors of a strategy which addressed the root causes and drivers of conflict in central Mali, the Council also introduced some modifications including, among others, for the Mission to ensure that its support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces was provided in compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.<sup>450</sup> The Council further expressed its support for the proposal of the Secretary-General to conduct an internal review of MINUSMA and requested the review to be conveyed no later than 13 January 2023.<sup>451</sup> In addition to addressing the mandate of MINUSMA, the Council urged the Malian parties to work towards resuming the meetings of all implementing bodies of the Peace Agreement and called on the Government to make tangible progress to achieve the political transition, the swift return to constitutional order and the handover of power to democratically elected civilian authorities.<sup>452</sup> Further, the Council urged the Malian authorities to prevent, minimize and address civilian harm that might result from operations undertaken by the Malian Defence and Security Forces and called for a cessation of all restrictions on MINUSMA's freedom of movement by ground and air, disinformation campaigns and other destabilizing activities and a constructive dialogue between the authorities and the Mission.<sup>453</sup>

Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions cast by China and the Russian Federation.<sup>454</sup> In their statements after the vote, the representatives of

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<sup>448</sup> See [S/PV.9061](#).

<sup>449</sup> Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 15. For further information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

<sup>450</sup> Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), paras. 18 and 32.

<sup>451</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 58.

<sup>452</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 1 and 14.

<sup>453</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 2 and 6.

<sup>454</sup> See [S/PV.9082](#).

France, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed regret that the resolution did not receive unanimous support and highlighted the importance of the new provisions related to the Government's responsibility to ensure the Mission's freedom of movement, to protect civilians and conduct human rights monitoring and ensuring that the support given to the Malian Defence and Security Forces complied with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.<sup>455</sup>

The representatives of China, Gabon, Ghana and the Russian Federation disagreed with the addition of new language on human rights.<sup>456</sup> Specifically, the representative of the Russian Federation described the language as "intrusive" and expressed the view that it would not advance the Malian people's exercise of their sovereign right to protect their citizens and investigate incidents. The representative of China stated that the resolution lent too much prominence to human rights issues and stressed that, in fulfilling its human rights mandate, MINUSMA should communicate and cooperate closely with the Government and listen to its views carefully. The representative of Gabon opined that the resolution focused only on human rights, did not support Mali in restoring peace and stability, violated the country's sovereignty and failed to take into account the efforts made by its security forces to defend its territory. The representative of India criticized the ambiguous nature of terms such as "robust posture", emphasizing that MINUSMA was not mandated to conduct counter-terrorism operations. Furthermore, together with Brazil, the representative of India objected to the added language of climate change and the establishment of a link between climate change and security. In contrast to this view, the representatives of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya expressed regret that the resolution did not contain stronger language regarding the impact of climate change on the situation in Mali, in addition to strengthening the Mission's protection of civilians mandate.

On 23 November 2022, the Council heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali who reported on the work of the Committee during 2022.<sup>457</sup> In this regard, he highlighted the Committee's engagement with the representatives of Mali and regional States to discuss the challenges in the implementation of the sanctions measures authorized by the Council and its consideration of the final report of the

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<sup>455</sup> Ibid., France, United States and United Kingdom.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid., Russian Federation, China, Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>457</sup> See [S/PV.9200](#). For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), see part IX, sect I.B.1.



Panel of Experts of 3 August 2022 and its recommendations.<sup>458</sup> By resolution [2649 \(2022\)](#) of 30 August 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously renewed the travel ban and asset freeze on Mali as set out in resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) until 31 August 2023 and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 30 September 2023.<sup>459</sup> The Council further expressed its intention to review the mandate of the Panel and take appropriate action regarding its further extension no later than 31 August 2023.<sup>460</sup>

In their discussions during the periodic briefings in 2022, Council members expressed concern with the political, security and humanitarian situation in Mali. Regarding the political transition, they called for strengthened engagement between the Government of Mali and ECOWAS, welcomed the agreement on the new transition timetable and called for its full implementation for a swift restoration of constitutional order. Many Council members further expressed concern with the negative impact of the 2020 and 2021 coups d'état on the implementation of the Peace Agreement, but nonetheless welcomed the holding of the high-level decision-making meeting in August and the resumption of meetings of the Monitoring Committee in October 2022. While noting this progress, a number of speakers stressed the need for an inclusive approach to the transition and the peace process, with the full and equal participation of women.<sup>461</sup>

All Council members raised concern with the increase in terrorist attacks in Mali in 2022 and the impact on the civilian population. Several delegations noted their support for the strengthened counter-terrorism efforts of the Malian Defence and Security Forces since December 2021.<sup>462</sup> Multiple delegations, however, expressed concern with the reports of human rights violations committed during these operations and pointed to the responsibility of the

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<sup>458</sup> Ibid. See [S/2022/595](#).

<sup>459</sup> Resolution [2649 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 4. For more information on the sanctions measures relation to the situation in Mali, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>460</sup> Resolution [2649 \(2022\)](#), para. 4.

<sup>461</sup> See [S/PV.8945](#), United Kingdom, Mexico, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), United States, Albania, Brazil, Ireland and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9012](#), India, United Arab Emirates, United States, Albania and United Kingdom; [S/PV.9061](#), Brazil, United States, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, United Kingdom and Mali; and [S/PV.9154](#), Norway, Ireland, United States, United Arab Emirates, Ghana (on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) Albania, United Kingdom and Mali.

<sup>462</sup> See [S/PV.8945](#), Russian Federation and China; [S/PV.9012](#), Mexico, China, Russian Federation; [S/PV.9061](#), China, Brazil, Mexico and Russian Federation; and [S/PV.9154](#), China, Brazil and Russian Federation.

Government to protect civilians and ensure accountability for such acts.<sup>463</sup> Several Council members drew attention to the activities and human rights abuses by foreign mercenaries such as the Wagner group, including the attacks against civilians in Moura in March 2022 during joint operations with the Malian forces.<sup>464</sup> Given these reports, some speakers called on the Government to allow MINUSMA to fully implement its mandate to investigate and report on human rights violations and abuses.<sup>465</sup> More generally on the deteriorating regional security situation in the Sahel, Council members expressed disappointment with Mali's decision in May 2022 to withdraw from the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and stressed the importance of regional cooperation and coordination to address the terrorist threat.<sup>466</sup> Beyond military operations, speakers recognized the need of a holistic approach that addressed the root causes of the conflict and, in that regard, highlighted the importance of the Government's comprehensive politically-led strategy for the stabilization of the centre of the country.<sup>467</sup> In their statements, the representatives of China and the Russian Federation underscored the sovereign right of Mali to establish its own international security cooperation, with the Russian Federation pointing to a significant security vacuum following the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane and the Takuba Taskforce.<sup>468</sup>

Council members also exchanged views on the challenges MINUSMA faced in the implementation of its mandate, particularly noting an increase in attacks against its personnel and the Government's restrictions on air and ground movement, with many of them also calling on it to abide by its obligations under the status of forces agreement. Many speakers stressed the need for MINUSMA to be adequately resourced and equipped to implement its tasks and ensure the

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<sup>463</sup> See [S/PV.8945](#), United Kingdom, United States, Albania and Ireland; [S/PV.9012](#), France, Mexico, United States, Albania, Ireland and Brazil; [S/PV.9061](#), Brazil, United States, Mexico, Ireland, Norway and United Kingdom; and [S/PV.9154](#), France, Norway, Ireland, United States, Brazil, Albania and United Kingdom.

<sup>464</sup> See [S/PV.9012](#), France, Mexico, United States, Albania, Norway, Ireland, Brazil and United Kingdom; [S/PV.9061](#), United States, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom and Albania; and [S/PV.9154](#), France, Norway, Ireland, United States, Albania and United Kingdom.

<sup>465</sup> See [S/PV.9012](#), France, United States, Albania, Norway, Ireland and United Kingdom; [S/PV.9061](#), France, United States, Mexico, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom and Albania; and [S/PV.9154](#), United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and United Kingdom.

<sup>466</sup> See [S/PV.9061](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Mexico, Ireland and India.

<sup>467</sup> See [S/PV.8945](#), France, Russian Federation, United States, Albania, Brazil and China; [S/PV.9012](#), France, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Albania, China and Brazil; [S/PV.9061](#), United Arab Emirates and Norway; [S/PV.9154](#), China, United States, United Arab Emirates and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya).

<sup>468</sup> See [S/PV.9061](#) and [S/PV.9154](#).

safety and security of its personnel. Furthermore, looking ahead, several delegations called on the Secretariat to ensure that the internal review of the Mission, which was requested by the Council in resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#),<sup>469</sup> took into account the significant changes to the Mission's operational environment.<sup>470</sup> In their remarks to the Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and representative of Mali provided an overview of the Government's engagement with ECOWAS on the new timetable for the political transition, progress in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, enhancing the capacity of the security forces and counter-terrorism operations, and the restoration of State authority.<sup>471</sup> The Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Mali stated that MINUSMA needed to refocus its work on the foundation of its presence in Mali which was to support the restoration of State authority and improve its coordination with the Malian authorities.<sup>472</sup> He further listed the key principles which guided Mali's cooperation with the Council and other international partners, namely, respect for Mali's sovereignty; respect for its strategic choices and selection of partners; and the need to take the vital interests of the Malian people into account in all decisions.<sup>473</sup>

### Meetings: The situation in Mali

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8945</a> 11 January 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali ( <a href="#">S/2021/1117</a> )  Letter dated 4 January 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/8</a> )		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, Social activist and Executive Director of the Youth Association for Active Citizenship and Democracy	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees <sup>b</sup>	

<sup>469</sup> Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 58.

<sup>470</sup> See [S/PV.9154](#), Norway, Ireland, United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Russian Federation, Mexico and Albania.

<sup>471</sup> See [S/PV.8945](#); [S/PV.9012](#); [S/PV.9061](#); and [S/PV.9154](#).

<sup>472</sup> See [S/PV.9154](#).

<sup>473</sup> Ibid.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9012</a> 7 April 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali ( <a href="#">S/2022/278</a> )		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President of Women in Law and Development in Africa in Mali	13 Council members <sup>c</sup> , all invitees <sup>d</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9061</a> 13 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali ( <a href="#">S/2022/446</a> )  Letter dated 1 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/448</a> )		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Director of Mali Musso and writer	13 Council members <sup>e</sup> , all invitees <sup>f</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9082</a> 29 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali ( <a href="#">S/2022/446</a> )  Letter dated 1 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/448</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by France ( <a href="#">S/2022/517</a> )	Mali		11 Council members <sup>g</sup> , Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2640 (2022)</a> 13-0-2 <sup>h</sup> (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9119</a> 30 August 2022	Letter dated 3 August 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution <a href="#">2374 (2017)</a> addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/595</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by France and Mexico ( <a href="#">S/2022/650</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2649 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9154</a> 18 October 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali ( <a href="#">S/2022/731</a> )		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members <sup>i</sup> , all invitees <sup>j</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9200</a> 23 November 2022					One Council member (Mexico) <sup>k</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> The representative of Gabon also spoke on behalf of Ghana and Kenya.

<sup>b</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Social activist and Executive Director of the Youth Association for Active Citizenship and Democracy participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>c</sup> The representative of Ghana also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Kenya.

<sup>d</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the President of Women in Law and Development in Africa in Mali participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>e</sup> The representative of Ghana also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Kenya.

<sup>f</sup> The Director of Mali Musso participated in the meeting via videoconference. Mali was represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

<sup>g</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>h</sup> *In favour*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States; *Against*: None; *Abstaining*: China and Russian Federation.

<sup>i</sup> The representative of Ghana also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Kenya.

<sup>j</sup> Mali was represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

<sup>k</sup> The representative of Mexico spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali.

## Americas

### 12. The question concerning Haiti

During the period under review, the Security Council held seven meetings and adopted two resolutions under the item entitled “The question concerning Haiti”, including resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. Five meetings took the form of briefings, and two meetings were convened for the adoption of a resolution.<sup>474</sup> More information on the meetings, including participants and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.<sup>475</sup>

In 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) delivered a briefing to the Council three times further to the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Mission and twice in emergency meetings convened further to the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the country from September 2022.<sup>476</sup> The Council was also provided a briefing by the Deputy Secretary-General, the Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and two representatives of civil society.<sup>477</sup> The Council also heard a briefing by the representative of Gabon in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) which imposed targeted sanctions.<sup>478</sup> In addition to Haiti, which was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs on four occasions, the meetings under this item also featured statements from the representatives of Belize on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Canada on behalf Economic and Social Council Advisory Group on Haiti, the Foreign Minister and

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<sup>474</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>475</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 8.

<sup>476</sup> See [S/PV.8969](#), [S/PV.9066](#), [S/PV.9136](#), [S/PV.9153](#) and [S/PV.9233](#). See also [S/2022/117](#), [S/2022/481](#) and [S/2022/761](#).

<sup>477</sup> See [S/PV.9066](#), [S/PV.9136](#), [S/PV.9153](#) and [S/PV.9233](#).

<sup>478</sup> See [S/PV.9233](#).

representative of the Dominican Republic and the Permanent Observer of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie.<sup>479</sup>

In her statements to the Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti reported on the three intersecting crises in the country, namely, economic, security and political. She briefed on the developments following the decision of the Government of Haiti to reduce regressive subsidies on fuel, the dire security situation with alarming levels of gang violence, the blockade of the nation's main fuel terminal and its impact on the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation, including a new cholera outbreak. She also reported on efforts by the Government and stakeholders in Haiti to address the root causes of the crisis.

At the meeting held on 18 February, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated that the situation in Haiti remained fraught and highly polarized, despite some signs of progress.<sup>480</sup> She noted that the unveiling of the new Government of Haiti on 24 November 2021 appeared to have eased tensions somewhat and that momentum seemed to be building around an effort to form an inclusive, credible and effective provisional electoral council. The Special Representative stated that gang violence continued to plunge major urban centres into lawlessness and grief. She added that criminal armed groups had a strong hold on the economic and social lives of millions of children, women and men, particularly noting their indiscriminate use of abduction and murder, as well as sexual and gender-based violence. The Special Representative stressed that the Haitian National Police could not, on its own, curtail the alarming rise in gang-related insecurity. In that regard, she was of the view that the newfound momentum, epitomized by the imminent creation of a United Nations multi-donor basket fund for security assistance for Haiti, had to translate into increased Government funding for the police force, as well as additional international financial and technical support.

Beyond the security situation, the Special Representative highlighted the need for socioeconomic projects and reintegration activities in neighbourhoods most affected by gang violence, ending impunity, and ensuring that reform in the judiciary could be sustained over the long term. Furthermore, she noted that the lack of impact and effectiveness of development aid over many years required the formulation of a new approach, one premised on a deeper

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<sup>479</sup> See [S/PV.9066](#), [S/PV.9136](#), [S/PV.9153](#) and [S/PV.9233](#).

<sup>480</sup> [S/PV.8969](#).

coordination of international efforts and a real partnership with the Haitian authorities and actors. The Special Representative concluded by stating that it was imperative for all Haitian leaders to engage constructively to steer the country towards elections and for the international community to engage with them to create the security and political conditions necessary for national elections, as well as to ensure urgent structural reforms to tackle gang violence, address impunity and corruption, strengthen the justice system and transform the economy in a sustainable manner.

In her statement on 16 June, the Special Representative drew the attention of Council members to a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Haiti with gangs expanding their zones of influence.<sup>481</sup> She noted a rise of 36 per cent rise in kidnappings and 17 per cent in intentional homicides, compared to the last five months of 2021, incidents of sexual violence against women and girls, restrictions on the freedom of movement people and goods, the displacement of at least 17,000 people, and the absence of basic necessities such as food, water and medicine. With respect to efforts to end the ongoing political and institutional vacuum, the Special Representative noted the formation in late March of a civil society-led tripartite committee to enlarge consensus among various political platforms, including the Government, to forge a common path forward. In parallel, Prime Minister Ariel Henry was holding direct talks with the leadership of the “Montana group” which had proposed new modalities to relaunch formal negotiations.

In his statement, the Executive Director of *Volontariat pour le développement d’Haiti* provided an overview of what, based on his experience with civil society on the ground, were the most pressing challenges in Haiti and recommendations on how they could be addressed.<sup>482</sup> He underscored the need to broaden consensus on governance, urgent transnational action against those involved in the illegal arms trade and financial crimes, and international support for the Haitian National Police. Furthermore, he encouraged BINUH to work more closely with young people and civil society and opined that the Mission would be even more effective if it had adequate resources to strengthen its good offices mission and its work of advising and supporting the Haitian National Police.

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<sup>481</sup> [S/PV.9066](#).

<sup>482</sup> Ibid.



On 15 July, by resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of BINUH as set out in resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) for a period of one year until 15 July 2023.<sup>483</sup> The Council acknowledged the letter of the Secretary-General of 29 April 2022 providing recommendations for adjustments to the mandate and resources of BINUH and, on this basis, made several changes to the Mission.<sup>484</sup> Specifically, the Council increased the number of civilian and seconded personnel serving as police and corrections advisors in the police and corrections unit from 30 to 42 and provided that the human rights unit would include a dedicated capacity to address sexual and gender-based violence, including the identification of women's protection advisers.<sup>485</sup> In terms of tasks, the Council requested BINUH to work with UNODC and other relevant UN agencies to support Haitian authorities in combating illicit financial flows as well as trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel and in enhancing management and control of borders and ports.<sup>486</sup> With respect to the situation in Haiti, the Council demanded an immediate cessation of gang violence and criminal activities and expressed its readiness to take appropriate measures, as necessary, against those engaged in or supporting gang violence, criminal activities, or human rights abuses or who otherwise took action that undermined the peace, stability and security of Haiti and the region.<sup>487</sup> Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to develop possible options for enhanced security support for the efforts of the Haitian National Police to combat high levels of gang violence, and to submit a written report by 15 October 2022.<sup>488</sup>

At the meeting held on 26 September, the Special Representative noted that gang, economic and political crises in Haiti had begun to intersect in a new and frightening way. She reported that following the Government's announcement of its decision to reduce regressive subsidies on fuel, roadblocks were set up throughout the country which generated a countrywide

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<sup>483</sup> Resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For further information on the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, see part X, sect. II.

<sup>484</sup> *Ibid.*, fifth preambular paragraph. See [S/2022/369](#).

<sup>485</sup> Resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>486</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 8.

<sup>487</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5.

<sup>488</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 10. See letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting the report on possible options for enhanced security support for the Haitian National Police ([S/2022/747](#)).

lockdown that lasted for five days.<sup>489</sup> On 18 September, one of the largest alliances of criminal gangs in the capital blocked the nation's main fuel terminal in Varreux, cutting the capital off from its primary source of fuel, creating shortages across the country and closing down hospitals. She observed that the chronic situation at the fuel terminal threatened to highlight the very real limits of the Haitian National Police. The Special Representative noted that national stakeholders had begun to re-engage with a renewed sense of urgency with Government representatives, political groups and civil society organizations, launching new consultations on ways to forge a broader consensus on a path to elections. She added that insecurity also severely curtailed humanitarian access and that the various crises converged into a humanitarian catastrophe. She called upon the Council to take urgent action to support Haitians in their effort to build a better future.

The Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme noted that the humanitarian situation in Haiti had reached new levels of desperation. The Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme expected food security to further deteriorate in 2022 and surpass the record high of 4.5 million people estimated to face crisis levels of food insecurity or worse. She reported that insecurity made it very difficult and dangerous to implement humanitarian and development programmes. Gangs were blocking access to fuel supplies and key logistics hubs and protesters had ransacked and looted humanitarian warehouses throughout the country. In that regard, she looked forward to increased support from Member States to further facilitate humanitarian access and ensure the protection of humanitarian actors, personnel and assets. The Executive Director of UNODC noted that violence and organized crime, as well as the presence of and clashes between armed groups, were compromising stability, security and the rule of law in Haiti, hampering the efforts aimed at achieving peace and the prospects for lasting development. She underscored the need to prioritize supporting services that aimed to uphold and implement the law and criminal justice to assist the population and prevent any regional destabilization. In that regard, the Haitian Government directly tasked UNODC with supporting its border-management capacity-building endeavors. She also remarked that investments and efforts in the security sector should be

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<sup>489</sup> See [S/PV.9136](#).

accompanied by similar efforts throughout the entire criminal justice system and noted the activities planned by UNODC, with the support of BINUH and other organizations, on border management and tracking illicit financial flows.

In her briefing on 17 October, the Special Representative reported that in addition to the three intersecting crises – economic, security and political – Haiti was facing a humanitarian crisis as a growing number of cholera cases had been confirmed on the island.<sup>490</sup> Gangs continued to blockade the Varreux terminal and without the free movement of fuel, Haiti would be unable to get ahead of the crisis. Regarding the political situation, the Special Representative noted that resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#) had generated a sense of urgency and that society representatives were attempting to bring all stakeholders around a common proposal, with the support of the good offices of the United Nations. Against the backdrop of insecurity and a humanitarian crisis, on 7 October, the Council of Ministers authorized Prime Minister Henry to request the support of a specialized international armed force to help secure the free movement of water, fuel and medical supplies. The Special Representative reiterated the call of the Secretary-General for Haiti's partners to consider that request as a matter of urgency.

On 21 October, by resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously imposed sanctions measures concerning Haiti for an initial period of one year.<sup>491</sup> The measures consisted of a travel ban, asset freeze and targeted arms embargo against individuals and entities designated as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threatened the peace, security or stability of Haiti. By the resolution, the Council established a Committee mandated to monitor the implementation and designate individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures, and to consider requests for exemptions.<sup>492</sup> Furthermore, the Council requested the Secretary-General to create a Panel of Experts, for an initial period of 13 months, to support the work of the Committee.<sup>493</sup> The Council

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<sup>490</sup> See [S/PV.9153](#).

<sup>491</sup> Resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), paras. 3, 6 and 11.

<sup>492</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 19(a) and (c).

<sup>493</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 4 and 21.

also expressed its intent to consider authorizing the Ombudsperson to receive delisting requests.<sup>494</sup>

Explaining her delegation's vote in favour of the resolution, the representative of the United States, as co-penholder together with Mexico, expressed the view that the sanctions measures imposed by resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) accomplished the objectives of specifically targeting bad actors in Haiti and allowing humanitarian aid to reach civilians.<sup>495</sup> She added, however, that the measures were only the first step and noted the request from the Government of Haiti and the recommendation of the Secretary-General for the authorization by the Council of a non-United Nations international security assistance mission to help improve the security situation and enable the flow of humanitarian aid. According to the representative of Mexico, by imposing the sanctions measures, the Council gave a clear signal that the violence in Haiti could not remain unpunished.<sup>496</sup> He further stressed the importance of the embargo on the transfer of arms to non-State actors which were destabilizing the country. While noting that his country had always called for caution on the use or threat of use of sanctions in international relations, the representative of China recalled that his delegation was the first to propose the imposition of measures against the criminal gangs in Haiti considering the urgency of the situation. On the other hand, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that, despite his delegation's support for the resolution, it was not convinced that international restrictive measures would provide an adequate response to the range of problems plaguing Haiti and that a lasting solution should lie in an inclusive political process, socioeconomic development and the eradication of poverty and inequality. Several Council members stressed the importance of humanitarian exemptions in the new sanctions regime.<sup>497</sup> Speakers also welcomed the inclusion in the resolution of specific benchmarks to review the sanctions.<sup>498</sup> Some Council members highlighted the Council's recognition of the need for due process safeguards in the resolution, and welcomed

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<sup>494</sup> Ibid., nineteenth preambular paragraph. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Haiti, see part VII, sect. III. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), see part IX, sect. I. B.

<sup>495</sup> See [S/PV.9159](#).

<sup>496</sup> Ibid.

<sup>497</sup> Ibid., Norway, United Arab Emirates, Brazil and Ghana.

<sup>498</sup> Ibid., Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Brazil and Ghana.

its intention to authorize the Ombudsperson to receive delisting requests under the new sanctions regime.<sup>499</sup>

Opening the meeting held on 21 December, the Deputy Secretary-General stated that, at the end of 2022, Haiti was in a deepening crisis of unprecedented scale and complexity that was cause for serious alarm.<sup>500</sup> She noted that Port-au-Prince and the region beyond were suffering the worst human rights and humanitarian emergency in decades. Specifically, the Deputy Secretary-General informed Council members that 90 per cent of cholera cases in Haiti were in areas already suffering high rates of severe acute malnutrition. She further condemned the reports of widespread sexual violence by armed gangs. She called for international support and solidarity with Haiti and urged every country with the capacity to do so to urgently consider the Government's request for an international specialized armed force to help restore security and alleviate the humanitarian crisis in accordance with the letter of the Secretary-General dated 8 October 2022.<sup>501</sup>

Following the Deputy Secretary-General, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General noted that the siege of Haiti's main oil terminal came to an end in early November 2022 through a concerted effort by the Haitian National Police.<sup>502</sup> She noted that fuel began to flow in a number of neighborhoods in the Port-au-Prince area, allowing hospitals and businesses to open and creating the semblance of a possible return to normalcy. Hope was quickly dispelled, however, as a new level of gang activity was immediately felt across the capital, marked by spikes in kidnappings, killings and rapes. The increase in recorded rapes, according to the Special Representative, reflected a horrendous modus operandi of the gangs which used sexual violence to intimidate and subjugate whole communities. Further compounding the plight of the millions living amid the violence, she added, was the catastrophic economic situation, with some 20,000 people facing famine-like conditions, large levels of displacement, 34 per cent of schools remaining closed and 15,000 suspected cases of cholera.

The Special Representative noted that the adoption of the sanctions measures under resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) by the Council was widely welcomed by Haitians, while subsequent

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<sup>499</sup> Ibid., Norway, Ireland and Brazil.

<sup>500</sup> See [S/PV.9233](#).

<sup>501</sup> [S/2022/747](#).

<sup>502</sup> See [S/PV.9233](#).

bilateral sanctions appeared to have generated a renewed sense of urgency on ways to restore democratically elected institutions. She highlighted that, in October and November 2022, civil society groups launched a new round of inclusive consultations on a transitional roadmap with members of the “Montana group”, private sector associations, trade unions and religious organizations which resulted in the development of a national consensus document. The document outlined steps for moving Haiti to elections within an 18-month timeframe, with a transitional council and oversight mechanism. She expressed the view that the sanctions measures imposed by the Council would be most effective as part of a comprehensive approach that included both the ongoing political dialogue and enhanced operational security support to the Haitian National Police, as outlined in the letter of the Secretary-General.

In his first briefing to the Council as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti, the representative of Gabon stated that, in accordance with the resolution, the Committee imposed measures on individuals and entities it designated as being complicit in or having participated, directly or indirectly, in activities that threatened peace, security or stability in Haiti including a travel ban, assets freeze and a targeted arms embargo. The Chair informed the Council of his expectation that the Panel of Experts would appoint and assume its duties in January 2023 and would provide the Council with its interim report to the Council no later than 15 March 2023. He further echoed resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) in urging all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts.

Speaking last after the other briefers, the Editor of Haiti Liberté offered the view that previous military interventions in Haiti by the Council following the coup d'états in 1991 and 2004 cemented in place an unjust and illegal status quo and noted that Haitians were patently and almost universally opposed to any more United Nations interventions. He questioned the imposition of targeted sanctions by the Council against Jimmy Cherizier, known as “Barbecue”, whom he described as a spokesman for a federation of neighborhoods dedicated to keeping kidnapping, extortion, rape and other crimes out of their midst. An error of this magnitude, according to the editor, showed how easily misguided, counterproductive and blunt an instrument of the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter could be, especially when it was receiving inaccurate and skewed information. The editor underlined the belief of Haiti Liberté

that the situation in the country could not be resolved through foreign intervention, military force or even sanctions and that the only thing the United Nations might do was provide disinterested economic support to rebuild the ravaged economy and political institutions. He concluded by calling on the Council to respect the principles enshrined under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter.

In their statements at the meetings held throughout the year, Council members and other Member States focused on the further deterioration of the security situation in Haiti amid rising levels of gang activity and violence, including killings, kidnappings and sexual and gender-based violence as well as on the socioeconomic conditions and the political impasse and institutional vacuum in the country. They expressed grave concern regarding its impact of the civilian population, particularly women and children.<sup>503</sup>

In June, in anticipation of the renewal of the mandate of BINUH, Council members and other delegations took note of the assessment conducted by the Secretary-General and highlighted the need to strengthen different aspects of the Mission's work which they viewed as essential to address the situation on the ground, including good offices and mediation, capacity-building for the Haitian National Police to address gang violence, supporting efforts to curb arms trafficking and illicit financial flows, and human rights protection, monitoring and investigation.<sup>504</sup>

In September, following the outbreak of protests over the derogation of fuel price subsidies, including the blocking of Varreux oil terminal, Council members and other speakers expressed deep concern at the increase in violence and deterioration of the humanitarian situation, including the renewed outbreak of cholera in Haiti. They stressed the need for urgent action by the Council in support of national efforts to curb gang activity and ensure humanitarian access. As a means of addressing the gang problem, multiple speakers called for preventing the supply of arms and illicit financial flows to non-State actors and noted the Council's readiness to

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<sup>503</sup> [S/PV.8969](#), United States, Mexico, Ireland, Norway, France, Albania and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9066](#), Mexico, Gabon (also on behalf of Kenya and Ghana), Brazil, China, Ireland, Russian Federation, Albania and Dominican Republic; [S/PV.9136](#), China, United States, Mexico, Brazil and Russian Federation); [S/PV.9153](#), Ireland, Norway, United Arab Emirates and China; and [S/PV.9233](#), Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Norway, Gabon, France, India, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Canada.

<sup>504</sup> [S/PV.9066](#), Mexico, Gabon (also on behalf of Kenya and Ghana), Brazil, China, Ireland, Russian Federation, Albania and Dominican Republic.

take appropriate sanctions measures against those responsible for the instability in Haiti as expressed in resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#).<sup>505</sup> Some speakers further stressed that economic and humanitarian conditions and the rule of law could not be restored without first stabilizing the security situation.<sup>506</sup>

In December, further to the adoption of resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), several delegations noted their encouragement at the reopening of the oil terminal, but expressed regret that gang violence and insecurity remained widespread.<sup>507</sup> Multiple delegations called on the Council to effectively utilize the sanctions regime to take action against those responsible for the violence and instability in the country.<sup>508</sup> In this regard, some Council members called on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) to promptly begin its work and take action against those responsible for the violence and instability.<sup>509</sup> Generally, however, speakers concurred that sanctions alone were insufficient to address the multifaceted crisis in Haiti and therefore underlined the need for national actors, with the support of the international community, to take the steps necessary to end the political impasse and pave the way for institutional reforms and improving socioeconomic conditions.<sup>510</sup>

At the last two meetings of the year in October and December, Council members and other Member States exchanged views on the possible deployment of a multinational security force in support of the Haitian National Police further to the request of the Government of Haiti and the recommendations of the Secretary-General. Council members held differing views on the approach and benefits of such a deployment. At the meeting held on 17 October, the representative of the United States announced that her delegation was preparing a draft resolution together with Mexico which provided for the authorization of a non-United Nations security force, operating under Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>511</sup> The force would facilitate international support to the police and Coast Guard and rely on Member States contributions of

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<sup>505</sup> [S/PV.9136](#), China, Mexico, Brazil and Russian Federation; and [S/PV.9153](#), United States, Brazil, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and China.

<sup>506</sup> [S/PV.9136](#), United States, Albania and France.

<sup>507</sup> [S/PV.9233](#), United States, Ireland, Brazil, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, France and Haiti.

<sup>508</sup> *Ibid.*, Mexico, United States, Brazil, Kenya, Ghana, China, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Gabon, France, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Canada.

<sup>509</sup> *Ibid.*, Mexico, Brazil, China and France.

<sup>510</sup> *Ibid.*, Mexico, United States, Brazil, Ghana, France and Canada.

<sup>511</sup> [S/PV.9153](#).



personnel, equipment and other resources. Multiple Council members and other Member States over the last two meetings expressed support for the deployment of the force, particularly considering the Government's request for assistance in this regard,<sup>512</sup> while others called for more discussions on how best the Council could support the police.<sup>513</sup> Moreover, multiple speakers cautioned the Council against repeating the mistakes of previous international and United Nations interventions in Haiti, with some of them emphasizing the importance of any measures to this effect having the support of Haitians and regional actors.<sup>514</sup>

In their statements at the meetings held in 2022, the representatives of Haiti, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, focused on the efforts of the Haitian Government to stabilize the security and humanitarian situation and engagement with opposition groups to resolve the impasse and pave the way for future elections. The Foreign Minister stated that his country had experienced the limits of the United Nations presence in recent decades, yet also observed that following the withdrawal of the international forces, local structures could not achieve the same level of performance without receiving adequate training and means.<sup>515</sup> At the meeting on 26 September following the outbreak of violent protests, the Foreign Minister stressed that Haiti needed very strong support from the international community to support the Haitian National Police in combating armed gangs and welcomed the decision by some countries to consider imposing sanctions on those who participated in criminal activities and insecurity in Haiti.<sup>516</sup> After the Council's imposition of sanctions, on 21 December, the Foreign Minister observed that they had a clear impact and would help facilitate inter-Haitian dialogue and support for a national compromise that could lead to general elections in 2023.<sup>517</sup> He added, however, that without establishing an adequate security environment, it was deceptive to think that Haiti would emerge from the crisis for the long-term and stressed that the vast majority of Haitians were in favor of receiving assistance.

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<sup>512</sup> Ibid., United States, Mexico, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania and Dominican Republic; and [S/PV.9233](#), United States, Kenya, United Kingdom, France, Dominican Republic and Canada.

<sup>513</sup> [S/PV.9153](#), Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates and China and [S/PV.9233](#), Ireland, Kenya, Ghana, China, Norway and France.

<sup>514</sup> [S/PV.9153](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); and [S/PV.9233](#), Kenya, Ghana and India.

<sup>515</sup> [S/PV.9066](#).

<sup>516</sup> [S/PV.9136](#).

<sup>517</sup> Ibid.

## Meetings: The question concerning Haiti

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8969</a> 18 February 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti ( <a href="#">S/2022/117</a> )		Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of BINUH	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees <sup>b</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9066</a> 16 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti ( <a href="#">S/2022/481</a> )		Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of Volontariat pour le développement d'Haïti	13 Council members <sup>c</sup> , all invitees <sup>d</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9095</a> 15 July 2022		Draft resolution submitted by Mexico and the United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/560</a> )			Seven Council members <sup>e</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2645 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9136</a> 26 September 2022			Canada, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Deputy Executive Director of World Food Programme, Executive Director of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	13 Council members <sup>f</sup> , all invitees <sup>g</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9153</a> 17 October 2022	Letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/747</a> )  Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated		Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Permanent Observer for the International Organization of la Francophonie to the United Nations	13 Council members <sup>h</sup> , all invitees <sup>i</sup>	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Office in Haiti ( <a href="#">S/2022/761</a> )					
<a href="#">S/PV.9159</a> 21 October 2022	Letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/747</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by Mexico and the United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/765</a> )	Haiti		12 Council members <sup>i</sup> , Haiti	Resolution <a href="#">2653 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9233</a> 21 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti ( <a href="#">S/2022/761</a> )		Canada, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Editor of <i>Haiti Liberté</i>	Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members <sup>k</sup> , all invitees <sup>l</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> The representative of Kenya also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>b</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>c</sup> The representative of Gabon also spoke on behalf of Ghana and Kenya.

<sup>d</sup> Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>e</sup> Brazil, China, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation and United States.

<sup>f</sup> The representative of Kenya also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>g</sup> All participants invited under rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure participated in the meeting via videoconference. Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>h</sup> The representative of Kenya also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>i</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference. The representative of Belize spoke on behalf of the 14 member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>j</sup> Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates and United States.

<sup>k</sup> The representative of Gabon spoke twice, once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) and once in his national capacity.

<sup>l</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference. Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. Canada spoke on behalf of the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti.

### **13. Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))**

During the period under review, the Security Council held five meetings and adopted one resolution under the item entitled “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))”. Four of the meetings took the form of briefings and one was convened for the adoption of a resolution.<sup>518</sup> More information on the meetings, including participants and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.<sup>519</sup>

In 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and the Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia briefed the Council four times further to the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the Mission.<sup>520</sup> In addition, the Council was briefed by a former combatant of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército de Pueblo (FARC-EP), the President of the Truth Commission of Colombia, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and two representatives of civil society.<sup>521</sup> At the meetings, Colombia was represented by its President, Presidential Adviser for Stabilization and Consolidation, Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In his briefings, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General updated Council members on the progress made in the implementation of the Final Agreement and remaining challenges, the conduct of legislative and presidential elections and the priorities related to the peace process of the newly inaugurated administration of President Gustavo Petro. In his first briefing of the year on 20 January, the Special Representative stated that the fifth anniversary of the Final Agreement provided an opportunity to celebrate its achievements, acknowledge the

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<sup>518</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>519</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 40.

<sup>520</sup> See [S/PV.8951](#), [S/PV.9015](#), [S/PV.9094](#) and [S/PV.9151](#). See also [S/2021/1090](#), [S/2022/267](#), [S/2022/513](#) and [S/2022/715](#).

<sup>521</sup> See [S/PV.8951](#), [S/PV.9094](#) and [S/PV.9151](#).

persistent challenges and recommit to its comprehensive implementation.<sup>522</sup> According to him, the visit of the Secretary-General to Colombia in November 2021 served to reaffirm the commitment of the United Nations to the success of the peace process, for which the support of the Council had been instrumental. He noted that, in preparation for the congressional elections in March, the Colombian authorities were taking steps to ensure that the overall conditions for the process were peaceful and that all candidates were secure and protected. He added that an enhanced implementation of the security guarantees provisions of the Final Agreement was critical for the elections, especially in regions prioritized for implementation which continued to be hit by violence. Furthermore, while noting that political reintegration was at the core of the peace process, he called on the Colombian authorities to ensure that the political rights and protection of people who had laid down their arms was ensured, especially in the light of persistent insecurity and stigmatization.

More generally, on security, the Special Representative acknowledged the reduction in the number of killings of ex-combatants in 2021 but underscored the need to secure conflict-affected areas where illegal armed actors continued to take advantage of the limited presence of the State. Beyond security, the Special Representative opined that 2022 would also be a critical year for the transitional justice system, particularly highlighting the work of the Unit for the Search for Persons Deemed as Missing to find thousands of persons disappeared during the conflict, the Truth Commission's preparation of its final report and the issuing of its first sentences. The Special Representative concluded by noting that, with the peace agreement setting down ever deeper roots, the period ahead would be crucial for the parties and Colombian society.

Ms. Luz Marina Giraldo, a former combatant of FARC-EP, shared with Council members some of the views and concerns of the signatories to the Final Agreement and their families regarding the political process in Colombia. Noting the grievances and stigmatization of the families and children of killed former combatants, she stressed the need to ensure that they received differentiated, yet equal, treatment to ensure access to higher education, effective healthcare systems, the job market, the financial system and comprehensive social security

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<sup>522</sup> See [S/PV.8951](#).

systems and rights. She further underscored that the widows and orphaned children of former combatants were a special population who needed a robust plan with a differentiated and gender focus to prevent them from falling into poverty, being objectified or victims of stereotypes, gender violence or discrimination. She further stressed that the notion of family, which was mentioned 92 times in the Final Agreement, should not remain a dead letter and that, together with women, girls, boys and social leaders, it had to be a comprehensive part of the concept of security.

On 12 April, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported that the congressional elections held in March had been mostly free of violence.<sup>523</sup> He noted that the elections had seen an increase in the number of women elected to Congress and the opportunity to elect, for the first time, representatives of 16 new electoral districts established under the peace agreement in conflict-affected regions. Regarding the social and economic reintegration of former combatants, the Special Representative noted that the vast majority of the more than 13,000 who were accredited remained engaged with the peace process and that almost two thirds of former FARC-EP members were taking part in collective and individual income-generating activities. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the sustainability of the peace process remained contingent on halting the violence that still jeopardized the plans of former combatants to build a new life. He stated that, if implemented in a coordinated manner, the security guarantees provisions of the Final Agreement had the potential to boost key areas such as reintegration, political participation and transitional justice. The Special Representative also highlighted the importance of further progress in rural reform and combatting illegal drugs through crop-substitution programmes and the effective use of the institutions devised by the Government and the FARC-EP. Finally, he welcomed all the efforts made by the Government of President Iván Duque Marquez in the implementation of the Final Agreement and noted that this responsibility would soon pass to a new administration following the presidential elections in May 2022.

In his statement after the Special Representative, President Duque Marquez stated that the peace process launched in 2016 presented Colombia with both challenges and opportunities. He noted that his Government's policy of "Peace with Legality" was comprehensive in nature

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<sup>523</sup> See [S/PV.9015](#).

and aimed at ensuring progress in all areas, while maintaining a critical view in order to improve areas in which improvement was needed. In terms of successes, he cited the process of reintegration, restitution, reparation and political inclusion of victims, development programmes with a territorial focus and comprehensive rural reform, as well as truth, reconciliation, non-repetition and justice. The President underlined that the position of his Government was to establish institutional stability so that Colombia could fulfill the duty and secure the right to peace as enshrined in its Constitution.

In his briefing on 14 July, echoing the Secretary-General, the Special Representative expressed his encouragement with the mostly peaceful presidential elections in May and June 2022, which resulted in the election of President Gustavo Petro and Vice-President Francia Márquez.<sup>524</sup> He noted the significant contribution that the Final Agreement made to widening and deepening Colombian democracy and that the electoral outcomes increasingly reflected the diversity of the country's vibrant society. The Special Representative expressed hope that the Congress would make considerable progress in adopting the more than 30 pending peace-related norms, including on key matters such as comprehensive rural reform and guarantees for political participation. Despite the reasons for optimism stemming from the elections, the Special Representative noted that the Verification Mission had recorded the killing of 331 former combatants since the signing of the Final Agreement. He stated that indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities were among the most seriously affected by the violence and insecurity and expressed disappointment that the implementation of the ethnic provisions of the Final Agreement remained comparatively weak. As a milestone in the implementation of the Agreement, he welcomed the publication of the final report of the Truth Commission on 28 June which, in addition to shedding light on the causes and effects of the conflict, provided a wealth of recommendations for advancing peacebuilding and reconciliation as a national project. Furthermore, he noted that the Special Jurisdiction for Peace had held its first hearings of truth and acknowledgment of responsibility and was also moving towards the imposition of its first sanctions.

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<sup>524</sup> See [S/PV.9094](#).

Following the Special Representative, the President of the Truth Commission reported that, in the four years since its establishment, the Commission had heard more than 30,000 individual and collective testimonies from all sides in a conflict that affected more than 10 million people in various ways, including 450,000 killed between 1985 and 2018, 80 per cent of whom were unarmed civilians. The Commission had also heard multiple testimonies of the 50,000 kidnapped and of the many thousands of children brought into the war, primarily by the guerrillas. It had also visited the sites of more than 4,000 massacres where entire communities had been destroyed. The President of the Commission added that the work of the Commission included the search for answers as to the reason for the damage done to life, democracy and culture and to understand why the conflict persisted. In doing so, the Commission had established that it was necessary to change the security system and called for an end to the war against drug trafficking and armed prohibitionism. At the end of the meeting, the Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia provided an overview of the efforts of the outgoing administration with respect to the peace process. She stressed that the incoming administration had to continue along the same path, strengthening institutions and the economy, providing legal guarantees and effective and efficient policies for all Colombians, supporting victims, continuing with reincorporation and the voluntary substitution of illicit groups, comprehensive rural development, humanitarian demining and the implementation of cross-cutting perspectives of gender and ethnicity.

On 12 October, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated that Colombia was experiencing a moment of renewed expectations as a result of the “total peace” approach advanced by President Gustavo Petro, a policy anchored in the comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement.<sup>525</sup> In addition, he noted that the Government was seeking to deepen peace through the resumption of dialogue with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and rapprochement with other armed actors. The Special Representative added that the search for “total peace” was also an opportunity to continue building on the foundations of resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#), while ensuring the broad and effective participation of women. He also noted the concerns of community representatives about the threat posed by illegal armed actors and the

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<sup>525</sup> See [S/PV.9151](#).



frustration at unmet expectations regarding the slow delivery of basic services and development opportunities by the State. He therefore expressed confidence that some of the new measures taken by the Government, notably the development of an emergency plan for the protection of social leaders, human rights defenders and ex-combatants, would result in improvements in terms of security and quality of life.

In his remarks further to the Special Representative, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission noted that, at the request of the Government of Colombia, the Commission was mobilizing support for the peacebuilding efforts since the ratification of the Final Agreement in 2016 and described Colombia as a successful example of inclusive peacemaking. He commended President Petro and his Government for their commitment to peace and the full implementation of the Final Agreement, as well as to reducing inequality, governing with and for women, ensuring zero tolerance for corruption and holding regional dialogues, as critical steps towards building lasting peace. The Chair further commended the President for appointing a gender parity Cabinet and creating a Ministry of Equality to address issues related to gender, ethnic communities, youth and children, among others. He encouraged the full and effective use of mechanisms that drew on the inputs of civil society actors, victims and former combatants to build consensus towards the success of peace efforts. He welcomed the support that the Verification Mission and the United Nations country team provided to peacebuilding in Colombia, as well as the catalytic contribution of the Peacebuilding Fund through the multi-partner trust fund for sustaining peace and reiterated the Commission's commitment, within its mandate, to continue to accompany the country in its peacebuilding efforts.

At the same meeting, the legal representative of the Community General Council of San Juan spoke about what she termed as the process of “physical and cultural extinction” of the Black, indigenous and peasant communities throughout the Colombian Pacific as a result of the violation of their economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, and the armed conflict. She stated that these communities nevertheless had hope, particularly with the election of Vice-President Márquez – a Black woman born poor and a victim of the armed conflict – and expressed trust that the Government would guarantee human dignity and allow the ethnic peoples to decide how to live their lives, individually and collectively. She asked the international community to strengthen the direct presence of United Nations agencies and other

humanitarian organizations in the territories most affected by war and violence. In addition, she asked for more resources to be allocated to strengthen grassroots organizations and human right defenders, especially for initiatives that allowed communities to build economic self-sufficiency in balance with the environment and to combat climate change.

On 27 October, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2655 \(2022\)](#) extending the mandate of the Verification Mission for a period of one year until 31 October 2023, without any modification.<sup>526</sup> In the resolution, the Council acknowledged the request from the Foreign Minister of Colombia for the extension of the Mission and for the Council to consider tasking it to verify the implementation of Section 1 on comprehensive rural reform and Section 6.2 on the Ethnic Chapter of the Final Agreement.<sup>527</sup> In that regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide detailed recommendations on how these additional tasks would be carried out and to confirm any implications for the configuration of the Mission and expressed its intent to consider these recommendations swiftly.<sup>528</sup>

In terms of challenges, Council members maintained their serious concern regarding threats, attacks and killings of former FARC-EP members, community and social leaders, including women and members of indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. They called on the Government to increase security and State presence in conflict-affected areas, swiftly adopt the public policy on the dismantling of illegal armed groups, strengthen judicial institutions to ensure accountability for the crimes committed and implement the action plan of the Comprehensive Programme for Safeguards for Women Leaders and Human Rights Defenders. Moreover, while reiterating the need for further accelerated progress, Council members welcomed the advancements made by the Government in the socioeconomic reintegration of the over 13,000 demobilized former combatants, including through rural reform, crop replacement and development projects. With regard to inclusivity, multiple speakers highlighted the election of representatives from the 16 special districts and the highest number of women to Congress.<sup>529</sup>

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<sup>526</sup> Resolution [2655 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. See [S/PV.9169](#).

<sup>527</sup> Resolution [2655 \(2022\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph. See also [S/2022/787](#).

<sup>528</sup> Resolution [2655 \(2022\)](#), para. 2. See also the letter dated 9 December 2022 ([S/2022/940](#)) in which the Secretary-General presented his recommendations regarding the additional tasks of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia.

<sup>529</sup> See [S/PV.9015](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, United Arab Emirates, United States, Brazil, Mexico, Ireland, India and Norway.

Nevertheless, they also widely expressed concern with the slow implementation of the ethnic and gender provisions of the agreement, which they described as essential for lasting peace.<sup>530</sup>

**Meetings: Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)**

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8951</a> 20 January 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia ( <a href="#">S/2021/1090</a> )		Colombia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Former combatant of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo	All Council members, all invitees <sup>a</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9015</a> 12 April 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia ( <a href="#">S/2022/267</a> )		Colombia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members <sup>b</sup> , all invitees <sup>c</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9094</a> 14 July 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia ( <a href="#">S/2022/513</a> )		Colombia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President of the Truth Commission, Nasa indigenous woman, community leader and human rights defender	13 Council members <sup>d</sup> , all invitees <sup>e</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9151</a> 12 October 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia ( <a href="#">S/2022/715</a> )		Colombia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, Legal Representative of the Community General Council of San Juan	13 Council members <sup>f</sup> , all invitees <sup>g</sup>	

<sup>530</sup> See [S/PV.8951](#), Kenya and United States, [S/PV.9015](#), Albania, United States and Norway; [S/PV.9094](#), Norway, United States, Albania and Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); and [S/PV.9151](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Norway, United Kingdom, Ireland and Albania.

<a href="#">S/PV.9169</a>	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia ( <a href="#">S/2022/715</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by Mexico and the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/804</a> )	Five Council Resolution <a href="#">2655</a> members <sup>h</sup> ( <a href="#">2022</a> ) 15-0-0
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<sup>a</sup> Colombia was represented by its Presidential Adviser for Stabilization and Consolidation.

<sup>b</sup> The representative of Kenya also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Ghana. The United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for South and Central Asia, North Africa, the United Nations and the Commonwealth and the Prime Minister's Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict.

<sup>c</sup> Colombia was represented by its President.

<sup>d</sup> The representative of Kenya also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>e</sup> Colombia was represented by its Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Nasa indigenous woman and community leader and human rights defender participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>f</sup> The representative of Gabon also spoke on behalf of Ghana and Kenya. Gabon and Norway were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>g</sup> Colombia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The legal representative of the Community General Council of San Juan participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>h</sup> Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, United Kingdom and United States.

## Asia

### 14. The situation in Afghanistan

During the period under review, the Security Council held seven meetings under this item. Except for a meeting which was convened for the adoption of a decision, six meetings took the form of a briefing.<sup>531</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition, in 2022, Council members held informal consultations of the whole to discuss this item.<sup>532</sup>

During the year 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the Deputy Special Representatives provided quarterly briefings in meetings further to the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan.<sup>533</sup> The Council also heard remarks by the Secretary-General,<sup>534</sup> as well as briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.<sup>535</sup> The representative of India in his capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) provided briefings twice in 2022.<sup>536</sup> In addition, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) briefed Council members once in 2022.<sup>537</sup> In 2022, Council members also heard briefings by seven civil society representatives.<sup>538</sup> The representative of Afghanistan also delivered statements at six of the seven meetings held.<sup>539</sup>

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<sup>531</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>532</sup> See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 8.

<sup>533</sup> See [S/2022/64](#), [S/2022/485](#), [S/2022/692](#) and [S/2022/916](#).

<sup>534</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#).

<sup>535</sup> See [S/PV.9075](#), [S/PV.9118](#), and [S/PV.9227](#).

<sup>536</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#) and [S/PV.9227](#).

<sup>537</sup> See [S/PV.9137](#).

<sup>538</sup> The following representatives provided briefings to the Council: Afghan women human rights defender and Executive Director of the Afghan Women Skills Development Centre, on 26 January 2022 ([S/PV.8954](#)); Executive Director of the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies, on 2 March 2022 ([S/PV.8984](#)); a journalist as well as a consultant for VOICE Amplified, on 23 June 2022 ([S/PV.9075](#)); independent researcher and author, on 29 August 2022 ([S/PV.9118](#)); Former Deputy Speaker of the Afghan Parliament, on 27 September 2022 ([S/PV.9137](#)); and an Afghan women's rights activist, on 20 December 2022 ([S/PV.9227](#)).

<sup>539</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#), [S/PV.8984](#), [S/PV.9075](#), [S/PV.9118](#), [S/PV.9137](#), and [S/PV.9227](#).

At the outset of 2022, on 26 January, Council members held a high-level meeting.<sup>540</sup> In addition to the Special Representative, Council members heard remarks by the Secretary-General as well as briefings by the representative of India in his capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#), and by the Afghan women human rights defender and Executive Director of the Afghan Women Skills Development Centre.

During his remarks, the Secretary-General stated that half of all Afghans were facing extreme levels of hunger and the country was facing its worst drought in two decades, and the economy was also in dire straits.<sup>541</sup> He stated that human rights were also losing ground, with women and girls out of offices and classrooms, as well as reports of arbitrary arrests and abductions of women activists. In this context, the Secretary-General urged the Taliban to work closely with the global community and the Security Council to suppress the global terrorist threat in Afghanistan and build institutions that promote security, and to recognize and protect the fundamental human rights that every person shares. He also reiterated his appeal for or an increase in humanitarian operations, suspension of rules and conditions that constricted not only the economy of Afghanistan but also life-saving operations, and international funding to pay the salaries of public sector workers.

Following the Secretary-General, the Special Representative emphasized that it was past time for the Taliban to initiate a wider dialogue on a process for national reconciliation, while welcoming the recent statements by the de facto authorities' leaders that girls of all ages would be educated nationwide, on which she added that future incentives from some international donors would likely be determined by whether the de facto authorities deliver on their stated commitments. She reported that the United Nations had provided life-saving assistance to almost 18 million people by the end of 2021, but the humanitarian needs continued to be pressing and more funds were needed in assistance for 2022. In this context, she added that the adoption of the humanitarian exemption resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#) and the issuing of new general licenses by the United States in the previous year had provided some welcome assurances that facilitated humanitarian activities of the Mission. She also announced the launch of a comprehensive and system-wide strategy called the One-UN Transitional Engagement Framework for Afghanistan,

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<sup>540</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#). For more information on high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II.

<sup>541</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#).

aiming to prevent a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation and to generate economic stability. She noted, however, that donors were reluctant to show more flexibility until they had a better idea of what kind of government the de-facto Administration intended to create.

The representative of India, as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#), provided a briefing during which he reiterated that the main goal of the sanctions regime was to facilitate conditions to promote dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan Government intended to result in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. He reported that the Committee had once again extended the three-month travel ban exemption on 22 December 2021 for 14 listed Taliban members so that they could continue attending talks in the interest of promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan, and urged Member States to respect the annexes to resolutions including resolution [2611 \(2021\)](#), to consult in confidence with the Monitoring Team to facilitate the sharing of information, and to strengthen implementation of sanctions measures.

In her briefing, the Afghan women human rights defender and the Executive Director of the Afghan Women Skills Development Centre stated that the hasty exit of the international community from Afghanistan in August 2021 had undermined the achievements of the people of Afghanistan, especially women and girls, and had dashed their hopes for a democratic nation. While urging the Council, the international community and the United Nations to do everything in their power to provide life-saving assistance in order to avert further suffering, she also noted that it was in the collective interest of ordinary Afghans to ensure a robust international presence through UNAMA, monitoring developments in the country and ascertaining whether the Taliban were following through on their commitments, especially important at a time when civil society, the media and international non-governmental organizations were unable to do so.

On 2 March, Council members held a meeting and heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Executive Director of the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies.<sup>542</sup> In her briefing, the Special Representative stated that the worst fears of famine and widespread starvation had perhaps been avoided. She cautioned however that providing short-term relief was not the same as giving hope or preparing a strong foundation

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<sup>542</sup> See [PV.8984](#).

for Afghan self-reliance. Explaining that UNAMA could not truly assist the Afghan people without working with the de facto authorities, she also acknowledged that there remained an enduring distrust between the Taliban and much of the international community, and that the Taliban had made complaints including that the reports did not reflect the reality as they saw it. In this regard, she said that UNAMA had addressed issues through constructive engagement and cooperation with the de facto authorities, both on humanitarian delivery as well as on some of the sensitive issues.

The Executive Director of the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies focused on priorities for the new mandate of UNAMA, the humanitarian crisis and the political path forward for Afghanistan. Stressing that the Mission had to have the resources and capacity to extend its reach and support local organizations to carry out their human rights work, she urged the Council to ensure that UNAMA prioritized gender equality and the rights of women in terms of both their protection and their participation. Highlighting that the participation of women was essential in delivering humanitarian assistance, she emphasized that the humanitarian response had to be carried out in partnership with Afghan civil society which was ready to support if given the resources. Explaining that while the Taliban wanted an Islamic emirate, a form of Government where power is consolidated in a leader selected by a council, in the past 20 years Afghans had experienced life under a democracy, where citizens choose their leaders through elections, she proposed that the international community could play an important role in facilitating discussions between Afghans and the Taliban, as well as in monitoring progress towards that goal. To do so effectively, she cautioned that it had to unite and set clear benchmarks on fundamental issues such as women's rights, freedom of the press, inclusive governance and the equal representation of men, women, young people, civil society, victims and LGBTQI+ individuals from all ethnic and religious communities, which could then be supported and monitored through UNAMA.

On 17 March, the Council adopted (with one abstention) resolution [2626 \(2022\)](#), extending the mandate of UNAMA for one year.<sup>543</sup> The Council further decided that UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General were to continue to carry out their mandate in close consultation with all relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders including relevant

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<sup>543</sup> See resolution [2626 \(2022\)](#), para. 4.



authorities as needed, in support of the people of Afghanistan in a manner consistent with Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership.<sup>544</sup> Following the adoption of the resolution, nine Council members provided explanations of their vote.<sup>545</sup> While welcoming the adoption of the resolution and affirming that it provided a clear and unambiguous foundation upon which UNAMA could engage with all relevant Afghan stakeholders in support of a better future for Afghanistan and its people, the representative of Ireland expressed regret that the Council could not agree to include a reference to climate insecurity.<sup>546</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his country was compelled to abstain in the voting on the resolution because the reference to the importance of achieving the agreement of the host country on the presence of the United Nations was met with opposition during the discussions on the draft. He also regretted the ignorance of the new realities in the country and the promotion of irrelevant approaches as well as the omission of a more substantive cooperation between the special political mission and the Taliban authorities which he said could jeopardize the effectiveness of the Mission in achieving its mandate and, on the whole, could undermine international efforts to stabilize the situation.

On 23 June, Council members held a briefing. In addition to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Resident Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, an international correspondent and news presenter for BBC News, as well as a consultant for VOICE Amplified. In his briefing, the Deputy Special Representative focused on the recent deadly earthquake in Afghanistan with search-and-rescue operations ongoing, and other emergencies the population in Afghanistan faced.<sup>547</sup> He stated that the de facto authorities had increasingly restricted the exercise of basic human rights, including the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, limiting the rights and freedoms of Afghan women and girls, which included the ban on secondary schooling for girls and the decision to impose a face covering on women. He also reported on the economic crisis and the ongoing humanitarian emergency and underscored the need for continued engagement with the de facto authorities.

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<sup>544</sup> Ibid., para. 5. For more information on the mandate of UNAMA, see part X, sect. II.

<sup>545</sup> See [S/PV.8997](#). Norway, United Kingdom, United States, Ireland, Albania, Brazil, Russian Federation, China and the United Arab Emirates. The draft resolution [S/2022/237](#) was submitted by Norway.

<sup>546</sup> See [S/PV.8997](#).

<sup>547</sup> See [S/PV.9075](#).

Following the Deputy Special Representative, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs reported on his visits to Afghanistan. While highlighting the economic crisis, ongoing humanitarian emergency, and the need for continued engagement with the de facto authorities in Afghanistan, he stated that poverty was the most common reason people left their homes in the country, and that a lack of money was the main barrier to accessing basic services such as health care and electricity. He further highlighted that the humanitarian exception approved by the Council through its adoption of resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#) had been critical to ensuring that humanitarian partners continued to receive funds and do their work.

In her briefing, the international correspondent and news presenter for BBC News shared observations drawn from the years of reporting on Afghanistan. She underscored that the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan on 15 August 2021 had a transformative impact on the position of women and girls in Afghan society. Afghanistan had become the only country in the world where girls were prevented from receiving an education, and millions of Afghan girls across Afghanistan had been forced to contemplate a life without formal education. In that regard, she said that what was happening in Afghanistan was unique. She stated that it was the most sudden and significant change in the position of women to take place anywhere in the world in modern history.

Council members also heard a briefing by the consultant of VOICE Amplified. She noted that UNAMA had the potential to meaningfully serve the Afghan people going forward. In this context, she called on UNAMA to prioritize the participation of diverse Afghan women's organizations and politicians in exile, to resume regular public reporting immediately, and to ensure that its reports provide accurate and unvarnished information reflecting the realities on the ground. She also called on the Council to end all exemptions for the sanctioned Taliban leaders if there was no progress on women's rights in 60 days, and to call on UNAMA to prioritize facilitating an inclusive intra-Afghan dialogue as soon as the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General had been appointed.

On 29 August, the Council held a meeting at which it heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, and an independent researcher and author. The Under-Secretary-General reported that close to 19 million people were facing acute levels of food insecurity, and that more than half of the population needed humanitarian

assistance.<sup>548</sup> He added that the malnutrition crisis had been fueled by recurrent droughts, while some 25 million people were living in poverty. He also noted that large-scale development assistance had been halted for a year. In this context, he underscored that it was imperative for the international community, as reflected in the Council, continued to stay and deliver for the people of Afghanistan and that the de facto authorities of Afghanistan had to also do their part. He stressed that female humanitarian aid workers – national and international – had to be allowed to work unhindered and in safety and that girls had to be allowed to continue their education.

In his briefing, the Deputy Special Representative stated that the current regime in Afghanistan had not been recognized by any member of the international community. On the economic situation, he expressed that there was no question that the sanctions on the Taliban had affected the Afghan economy since the Taliban had taken control. He added that the de facto authorities were faced with a growing number of governance challenges, including the practice of governing by decree and through policy decisions which had further curtailed fundamental human rights and freedoms. He also noted that the previous three weeks had seen the highest number of civilian casualties in a one-month period since 15 August 2021, in a series of improvised explosive device attacks in Kabul, most of them claimed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP). Finally, he underscored the importance for the Taliban to understand that their neighbours, regional partners and the wider Islamic world wanted them to be part of the international community.

The independent researcher and author said that the rapid disintegration of Afghanistan following the departure of the international community in 2021 was no surprise adding that to know why that catastrophic failure occurred, it was necessary to understand what the main characteristics of what she termed the post-2001 Western intervention of Afghanistan had encompassed. In her briefing, she addressed a series of factors which she concluded indicated the extreme deception about what had been at the heart of the 20-year Western occupation of Afghanistan and what prompted the sudden withdrawal.

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<sup>548</sup> See [S/PV.9118](#).

On 27 September, the Council held a meeting further to the report of the Secretary-General.<sup>549</sup> In addition to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, the Council heard briefings by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the former Deputy Speaker of the Afghan Parliament. The Deputy Special Representative reported that the ongoing ban on secondary education for girls and growing restrictions on women's rights were signals that the Taliban were indifferent to more than 50 per cent of the population and of its willingness to risk international isolation.<sup>550</sup> He also noted that the economic situation in Afghanistan remained tenuous, while a part of the enduring economic downturn was due to liquidity problems that were related to Afghanistan's isolation from the international banking system. In this context, he emphasized that humanitarian assistance alone could not replace essential service delivery systems such as health and water, nor prevent an economic collapse, and pointed to a continued lack of political inclusiveness and transparency in decision-making. He said that in addition to the significant curtailment of the rights of women and girls, as well as potential violations of international human rights, UNAMA continued to record violations of the amnesty declaration that the Taliban laudably declared but had inconsistently enforced.

The Executive Director of UNODC explained that, with an alarming increase in methamphetamine production, the Taliban de facto authorities announced a complete ban on the cultivation and production of all narcotics, while granting a grace period that practically exempted the most recent major opium-poppy harvest which had ended in July 2022. Stating that severe droughts had destroyed food harvests at a time when the Afghan economy was collapsing, he noted that it remained unclear to what extent the ban could or would be enforced by the de facto authorities, considering the economic and political realities in Afghanistan and the presence of at least a dozen armed groups challenging the authorities' rule across 18 provinces. He also explained that UNODC was conducting its opium-cultivation surveys remotely, and publishing estimates of how much heroin had been produced from the most recent harvest.

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<sup>549</sup> See [S/2022/692](#).

<sup>550</sup> See [S/PV.9137](#).

In her briefing, the former Deputy Speaker of the Afghan Parliament noted that Afghanistan had yet again become a safe haven for international military extremist groups in the region. She also alerted that a wave of violence had taken on a new form, including through targeted extrajudicial and mass killings of different segments of the population, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. She emphasized that the only solution to the question of Afghanistan was a political dialogue and requested that the Council initiated and facilitated a stronger mechanism and collectively used all the leverage over the Taliban towards a meaningful and genuine commitment to dialogue and a peace process.

On 20 December, further to the report of the Secretary-General,<sup>551</sup> the Council held the last meeting of the year in relation to this item. In addition to the new Special Representative, who provided her first briefing since her appointment in September,<sup>552</sup> the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the representative of India in his capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) as well as an Afghan women's rights activist.<sup>553</sup> In her briefing, the Special Representative assessed that the Taliban remained essentially in control of the country, but unable to satisfactorily address the problem of terrorist groups operating inside Afghanistan. She expressed concern about the recent activity of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K), as well as the attacks on the embassies of the Russian Federation and Pakistan and a hotel hosting many Chinese nationals resulting in significant civilian casualties. Moreover, the media and civil society, which were already suffering from serious financial constraints, continued to be stifled through intimidation by the de facto security institutions and at times through repressive actions. She also reported that the social space of women was being restricted as much as their political space, and that the banning of secondary education would mean that no girls would be entering university in two years. On the economic front, the Special Representative reported some positive developments, including that corruption had significantly decreased compared to the days of the Republic. She indicated, nonetheless, that there had been worrying signs of an uptick in the previous six months. Lastly, she mentioned that UNAMA was undertaking

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<sup>551</sup> See [S/2022/916](#).

<sup>552</sup> See [S/2022/671](#) and [S/2022/672](#).

<sup>553</sup> See [S/PV.9227](#).

an internal review to assess the effectiveness in the implementation of its mandate which would yield recommendations for its future mandate. She concluded by expressing that engagement with the de facto authorities had to continue in some form.

Following the Special Representative, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs reported that 97 per cent of Afghans lived in poverty, and two thirds of the population needed humanitarian assistance to survive.<sup>554</sup> He explained that the humanitarian community in Afghanistan was fully mobilized to address the most urgent needs. In that regard, he discussed the challenges, including the routine interference and restrictions with the de facto authorities, the continued bank de-risking, the daunting financial challenge to fund humanitarian assistance, and the paucity of progress on restarting urgently needed development initiatives, without which the humanitarian situation was likely to further deteriorate, resulting in more people requiring emergency assistance.

In his briefing, the representative of India in his capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) reported that the number of UN-sanctioned individuals occupying Cabinet and senior positions in the Taliban Administration had risen from 41 to over 60, and conveyed concerns that the Taliban had reversed policies and gone back on commitments. He noted that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) remained a primary threat in Afghanistan and the neighboring countries. He concluded by reiterating the goal of the Committee's sanctions measures to promote a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan by deterring support to terrorist entities and by supporting peace and stability discussions. In that context, he emphasized the need for Member States to further support and assist the work of the Committee and the Monitoring Team, as outlined in paragraph 1 of resolution [2255 \(2015\)](#) and the annex to resolution [2611 \(2021\)](#).

In her briefing, the Afghan human rights' activist provided reflections in comparison to the briefing she had delivered to the Council in January. She reported that the situation had only worsened since then, as Afghanistan was the only country in the world where girls were banned from going to school, and that minorities had vanished and had been banished from

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<sup>555</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#), Norway, Ireland, Mexico, France, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Albania, Brazil, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afghanistan's public and social life. She added that international terrorist groups had also been wreaking havoc with impunity. She concluded her briefing requesting that the Council continued to provide life-saving aid to the Afghan people and emphasizing the need for support to reinvigorate the economy, as well as to make sure to keep the interests of the people of Afghanistan in mind when engaging with the Taliban.

Throughout 2022, many Council members and participants continued to call for formation of inclusive governance, and for inclusive dialogue with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women as well as ethnic and religious minorities.<sup>555</sup> Against the lack of progress, several Council members and participants reiterated their call for an inclusive intra-Afghan dialogue, and affirmed that a broad-based, inclusive and representative government in Afghanistan was necessary for both domestic and international engagement.<sup>556</sup> In this context, the representative of China stated that constructive engagement had to be strengthened to support Afghanistan in realizing autonomous and effective State governance. Participants at Council meetings also argued that continued engagement with the de facto authorities was necessary to advance peace in Afghanistan.<sup>557</sup>

Concerning the security in the country, Council members and participants called on the Taliban to put an end to reprisal killings and forced disappearances, and to respect freedom of expression, including for members of the media, and freedom of peaceful assembly.<sup>558</sup> The representative of Kenya also urged the Taliban to also engage with other regional countries to address and resolve any tensions and security incidents along border areas with a view to enhancing a collective security approach. In this connection, some speakers also highlighted the role of regional countries and Islamic countries including the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which they believed play a special role in relation to engagement with the Taliban.<sup>559</sup> In Council meetings throughout the period, speakers condemned the terrorist attacks in the country emphasizing the need to prevent terrorism from taking hold in Afghanistan and to

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<sup>555</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#), Norway, Ireland, Mexico, France, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Albania, Brazil, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

<sup>556</sup> See [S/PV.9075](#), India, Ghana, Mexico, United Kingdom, Brazil, Albania, Iran and Uzbekistan.

<sup>557</sup> See [S/PV.9227](#), Norway, China, United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Mexico, Russian Federation, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Pakistan.

<sup>558</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#), United States, Ghana and Afghanistan.

<sup>559</sup> See [S/PV.9118](#), Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates and Pakistan.

prevent attacks from being planned or financed from the country. Specifically, some Council members noted their concerns about the security situation including the intensification of terrorist attacks, including those by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant - Khorasan Province.<sup>560</sup> The discussions in the Council also focused on the need for the Taliban to intensify efforts aimed at combating terrorism and protecting the population, deemed their responsibility, as well as to meet its commitments to ensuring principled, unhindered humanitarian access across the country, upholding basic human rights, most pressingly for women and girls.<sup>561</sup>

The question of the gravity of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country was addressed by Council members throughout 2022 with a particular focus on the situation of women and girls. Council members highlighted the expectation for the Taliban to follow through their promise on the rights of women and girls, including to receive an education and access employment.<sup>562</sup> Many Council members also deplored the continued denial of access to education for girls by the Taliban, as well as the restrictions on women's participation in public life. Some participants condemned the announcement at the end of the year by the Taliban to ban women from public and private universities.<sup>563</sup>

Regarding the mandate of UNAMA, speakers reiterated their support for efforts and mandate of UNAMA on good offices, human rights monitoring reporting functions, its humanitarian coordination role, child and civilian protection activities and work to promote the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of public life.<sup>564</sup> Highlighting the importance of engagement, the representative of Norway stated that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and her team needed a strong mandate to promote political dialogue and engage with the Taliban, monitor and report on human rights and facilitate the provision of humanitarian and basic human needs. The representative of India underscored on his part that his country was working constructively with other members of the Council to

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<sup>560</sup> Ibid., Ghana, Kenya, Gabon, Russian Federation and France.

<sup>561</sup> Ibid., Norway, Gabon, United Kingdom, Albania, France, Kenya and Afghanistan.

<sup>562</sup> Ibid., Norway, Ghana, Ireland, China, United Kingdom), Mexico, Kenya, Gabon, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United States and France.

<sup>563</sup> See [S/PV.9227](#), United States, United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>564</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#), France, United Kingdom, United States, Albania, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Gabon and the United Arab Emirates.



ensure that UNAMA’s new mandate focused on the welfare, well-being and expectations of the Afghan people.

Regarding sanctions, Council members welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#) of 22 December 2021 to facilitate conditions for continuing the humanitarian assistance without violating the United Nations sanctions regime.<sup>565</sup> Speakers recalled that Afghan financial institutions had to have access to its assets which were subject to unilateral sanctions and the unfreezing of the assets was of importance, if Afghanistan was to have a chance at preventing a severe economic downturn and a dreadful rise in poverty and hunger.<sup>566</sup> In addition, a few speakers expressed regret that the Council could not reach a consensus on renewing exceptions to the travel ban for some of the individuals listed by the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#).<sup>567</sup> In this context, the representative of the Russian Federation called on the countries concerned to take a constructive stance by supporting the extension of the existing exemption. A number of participants also recalled the issue of the management and distribution of Afghan frozen assets to the benefit of the Afghan people.<sup>568</sup>

Developments in Afghanistan were also considered elsewhere under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”.<sup>569</sup>

### **Meetings: The situation in Afghanistan**

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8954</a> 26 January 2022			Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan and Uzbekistan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan,	Secretary-General, all Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees <sup>b</sup>	

<sup>565</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#), Norway, United States, Mexico, France, Russian Federation, China, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, Brazil, India. For further information on the sanctions measures concerning the Taliban, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>566</sup> See [S/PV.8954](#), Russian Federation, China, Brazil, Uzbekistan and Pakistan.

<sup>567</sup> See [S/PV.9118](#), Brazil and Pakistan.

<sup>568</sup> See [S/PV.9227](#), Gabon, China, Kenya, Ghana, Russian Federation, Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan.

<sup>569</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 30.

				Afghan women human rights defender and Executive Director of the Afghan Women Skills Development Centre		
<a href="#">S/PV.8984</a> 2 March 2022	Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security ( <a href="#">S/2022/64</a> )		Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8997</a> 17 March 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security ( <a href="#">S/2022/64</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by Norway ( <a href="#">S/2022/237</a> )			Nine Council members <sup>c</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2626 (2022)</a> 14-0-1 <sup>d</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9075</a> 23 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security ( <a href="#">S/2022/485</a> )		Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan and Uzbekistan	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, journalist, consultant for VOICE Amplified	All Council members, all invitees <sup>e</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9118</a> 29 August 2022			Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Independent researcher and author	All Council members, all invitees <sup>f</sup>	

<a href="#">S/PV.9137</a> 27 September 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for peace and security ( <a href="#">S/2022/692</a> )	Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Former Deputy Speaker of the Afghan Parliament	All Council members, all invitees <sup>g</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9227</a> 20 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for peace and security ( <a href="#">S/2022/916</a> )	Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Afghan women's rights activist	All Council members, <sup>h</sup> all invitees <sup>i</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The meeting was presided by the Prime Minister of Norway. The representative of India spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#).

<sup>b</sup> The Special Representative participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>c</sup> Norway, United Kingdom, United States, Ireland, Albania, Brazil, Russian Federation, China and the United Arab Emirates.

<sup>d</sup> *For:* Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States *Against:* None. *Abstaining:* Russian Federation.

<sup>e</sup> The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan, and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>f</sup> The Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Deputy Special Representative, and the independent researcher and author participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>g</sup> The Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>h</sup> The representative of India spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#).

<sup>i</sup> The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator participated in the meeting via videoconference.

## 15. The situation in Myanmar

During the period under review, the Council held one public meeting and two private meetings under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”. At the only public meeting in 2022, the Council also adopted a resolution, the first resolution adopted under this agenda item.<sup>570</sup> More information about the meetings including on participants, speakers and outcome, is provided in the table below. In addition, Council members held consultations in connection with this item.<sup>571</sup>

On 28 January and 27 May, the Council held private meetings during which it heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar and the Acting Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator. In addition, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cambodia provided briefings to the Council in his capacity as Special Envoy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Chair on Myanmar.<sup>572</sup>

On 21 December, the Council held a meeting at which it adopted resolution [2669 \(2022\)](#), with three abstentions.<sup>573</sup> By resolution [2669 \(2022\)](#), the Council demanded an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout Myanmar, and urged restraint and de-escalation of tensions and for all parties to respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, while also urging the Myanmar military to immediately release all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.<sup>574</sup> The Council further acknowledged the central role of ASEAN in helping to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Myanmar in the interests of the people of Myanmar and encouraged the international community to support the ASEAN-led mechanism and process in that regard, including efforts to implement

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<sup>570</sup> For further information on past proceedings and decisions adopted in connection with this item, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2004-2007 to Supplement 2021*.

<sup>571</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 32.

<sup>572</sup> For more information on participation in meetings of the Council, see part II.

<sup>573</sup> See [S/PV.9231](#). The draft resolution ([S/2022/980](#)) received 12 votes in favour (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America), none against and three abstentions (China, India, Russian Federation).

<sup>574</sup> See resolution [2669 \(2022\)](#), paras 1, 2 and 4.

the Five Point Consensus.<sup>575</sup> The Council also called for concrete and immediate actions to effectively and fully implement ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus agreed on 24 April 2021. It also requested the Secretary-General, or through his Special Envoy, to report orally by 15 March 2023 on the United Nations support on the implementation of the Five Point Consensus.<sup>576</sup> The Council further underscored the need to address the root causes of the crisis in Rakhine State and to create the necessary conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons.<sup>577</sup>

After the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom, the penholder of the resolution, affirmed that with the adoption of resolution [2669 \(2022\)](#), the Council had responded to the calls of ASEAN leaders for United Nations support for their efforts.<sup>578</sup> She also indicated that the briefing of the Secretary-General in March 2023, mandated under the resolution, would be an important opportunity to assess developments on the ground. The representative of France welcomed the adoption of the resolution and underlined that, faced with the continuous deterioration of the situation, it was essential that the Council expressed its concerns and its demands to the “junta”, in support of the Burmese people. The representative of Norway, while emphasizing the importance of the adoption of the resolution, expressed regret that the Council was not able to agree on a more substantial text that would send an even stronger signal to the actors in Myanmar to abstain from violence and engage constructively towards building a peaceful, reform-oriented and prosperous Myanmar. She indicated that Norway had advocated for stronger language, including on the protection of children and education in armed conflict, combating sexual and gender-based violence and ending impunity, as well as language on preventing the flow of arms and financial assets of the military. The representative of Norway further noted that resolution [2669 \(2022\)](#) should be followed by other, more substantial resolutions, including Chapter VII provisions, should the situation warrant it. The representative of Ireland recalled his country’s position that Council action in response to the violence suffered by the Myanmar people since the military coup in 2021 had been inadequate and emphasized that the Council could have and should have done more. He further explained that Ireland had

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<sup>575</sup> Ibid., para. 5.

<sup>576</sup> Ibid., para. 6.

<sup>577</sup> Ibid., para. 10.

<sup>578</sup> See [S/PV.9231](#).

voted in favour of the resolution in order to combat the cycle of violence and impunity that the Myanmar military relied upon. The representative of Ireland was of the view that the resolution should have gone further by recognizing and condemning the continued sale and transfer of weapons to Myanmar and the widespread sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations against children in Myanmar; and by recognizing the importance of accountability mechanisms such as the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and directly calling on the Myanmar military to halt their relentless assault on the people of Myanmar. The representative of Ireland also reiterated the need for the Council to maintain a dedicated focus on the situation in Myanmar, to do so in open meetings and to keep at the heart of its work the needs and interests of the Myanmar people. The representative of the United Arab Emirates welcomed the adoption of the resolution and noted that the text sent an important message about the need to address the challenges faced by the Rohingya, the crisis in Rakhine state and the dangers it posed to the situation in the region, at a time when international attention on the Rohingya crisis was waning. She considered, however, that the language contained in the resolution was insufficient and that the text failed to address the scope of the current challenges on the ground. The representative of the United States welcomed the adoption of the resolution but similarly stressed that the resolution did not go far enough, and that it had failed to: directly address the regime's severe violations of the freedom of religion and belief, call for the regime to face justice for the crimes it had reportedly committed, acknowledge General Assembly resolution [75/287](#) in support of an arms embargo, and pursue a mechanism to prevent the flow of financial resources to the regime. The representative of Ghana underscored that through resolution [2669 \(2022\)](#), the Council had responded to the call by ASEAN on the United Nations to support the organization's efforts in the implementation of the Five Point Consensus. The representative of Brazil expressed appreciation for the positive engagement of all Council members, which had allowed the Council to speak on the situation in Myanmar, and for the involvement of and consultations with ASEAN in the process. She further commended the United Kingdom, as penholder, for the inclusive and transparent manner in which it conducted the process to arrive at the text adopted. The representative of Albania underscored that the adoption of resolution [2669 \(2022\)](#) demonstrated the ability of the Council to respond to the growing calls for supporting Myanmar in finding a peaceful solution to the deep crisis in the country, noting that the Council

would have the opportunity to remain seized of the developments in Myanmar. The representative of Mexico explained that his country had voted in favour of the resolution because it conveyed an unequivocal message that reaffirmed the need for an immediate cessation of violence, respect for human rights and the need for an inclusive dialogue to resume the process towards democratic transition in the interest of the people of Myanmar. He pointed out, however, that Mexico would have preferred that the resolution had included references to the importance of preventing the flow of arms. The representative of Gabon indicated that his vote in favour of the resolution reflected a message of solidarity with the people of Myanmar and against violence on the civilian population as well as a call for a resolution of the Rohingya crisis. He indicated that Gabon would continue to support the quest for a solution based on dialogue, while encouraging the prioritization of the regional dynamic and the guiding role of ASEAN.

The representative of China, who abstained from the vote, expressed continued concerns about the resolution that had just been adopted. In terms of the format, the representative of China was of the view that a presidential statement would have been more appropriate under the circumstances. In terms of content, China considered that even after amendments, the tone of the text lacked balance. The representative of China warned that the Council should act with caution; and emphasized that blindly using the Council to exert pressure or threaten sanctions would only intensify confrontation and antagonism, complicate the situation and prolong the crisis. The representative of the Russian Federation explained that his country had abstained in the voting, as it was Russia's principled position that the situation in Myanmar did not pose a threat to international peace and security. He pointed out that the contents of the resolution were focused mostly on human rights aspects, which he said should be addressed by the Third Committee of the General Assembly rather than the Security Council. He further expressed dissatisfaction with the penholder, stating that the concerns regarding the text that other delegations had raised had been ignored, in particular the proposal to include a point about the counter-productiveness of unilateral restrictive measures that had a negative effect on the socioeconomic situation in the country. He also warned against the Council playing into the hands of those who would benefit from a destabilization of the situation on the ground, undermining the mediation efforts of ASEAN and creating divisions in the Council. He further indicated that the effect of the non-consensual resolution was going to be rather limited and thus the Russian Federation had decided

not to veto it, despite its clearly provocative nature. He also emphasized that the situation in Rakhine state was the only aspect of the situation in Myanmar that should be on the agenda of the Council. The representative of India, which also abstained from the vote, praised the delegation of the United Kingdom for having negotiated the text of resolution [2669 \(2022\)](#) in a transparent and consultative manner by taking into account the views of neighbouring countries, and in particular those of ASEAN. She noted, however, that under the current circumstances, India was of the view that a Council resolution might entrench the parties in their inflexible positions, rather than encourage them to pursue an inclusive political dialogue.

### Meetings: The situation in Myanmar

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8959</a> (closed) 28 January 2022			Cambodia <sup>a</sup>	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar, Acting Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9049</a> (closed) 27 May 2022			Cambodia <sup>a</sup>	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9231</a> 21 December 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/980</a> )			14 Council members <sup>b</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2669 (2022)</a> 12-0-3 <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cambodia briefed the Council in his capacity as Special Envoy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Chair on Myanmar.

<sup>b</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States.

<sup>c</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. *Against*: None. *Abstaining*: China, India, Russian Federation.



## **16. Letter dated 13 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2022/688](#))**

During the period under review, the Security Council held two meetings under this item. Both took the form of a briefing.<sup>579</sup> More information on the meeting, including on participants and speakers is provided in the table below. In addition, in 2022, Council members held informal consultations of the whole to discuss this item.<sup>580</sup>

During the year 2022, the Council heard two briefings from the Assistant Secretary General for Europe, Central Asia, and the Americas and the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations. The representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan also participated in both meetings and delivered statements.

During his briefing, on 15 September, the Assistant Secretary-General referred to the reports of the authorities in Armenia and Azerbaijan about heavy fighting on their international border.<sup>581</sup> He added that according to those reports, heavy artillery, drones and large-calibre weapons were used through 13 and 14 September and that a cease-fire was agreed starting on 14 September, at 8 p.m. local time. He informed that both countries had written to the Secretary General and the Council, citing violations of the ceasefire agreement brokered by the Russian Federation in 2020 and of their territorial integrity.<sup>582</sup> He stressed that ongoing mediation efforts in the region, particularly those of the Russian Federation and the European Union, could provide groundwork for enabling parties to engage in dialogue aimed at reaching a peaceful solution. He noted that the escalation underscored the urgent need for the parties to advance the process of delimitation and demarcation within the framework of their mutual recognition of their respective territorial integrity and sovereignty and was a reminder of the potential that the tensions could have in destabilizing the region. In the immediate term, he said that the parties had to abide by their obligations to fully implement the trilateral statement on the ceasefire of 9 November 2020 and urged them to return to the negotiating table and take steps towards the

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<sup>579</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>580</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 41.

<sup>581</sup> See [S/PV.9132](#).

<sup>582</sup> See [S/2020/996](#), and [S/2022/688](#).

signing of a lasting peace treaty. He also said that it was important for the Security Council to send a similar united message in order to enable the parties to focus on a diplomatic solution.

Following the briefing, discussions focused on the opportunities for negotiation between the parties.<sup>583</sup> Council members welcomed the ceasefire agreement on 14 September and called for a lasting peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Council members expressed concern regarding the clashes at the border and strongly condemned the attacks on civilians and the destruction of critical infrastructure in the region. They also welcomed international efforts in helping advance negotiations between the two countries. Most Council members called in particular for the preservation of and compliance with the trilateral statements brokered by the Russian Federation in 2020. Some Council members additionally expressed support for the mediation efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), especially the co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, as well as those of the European Union.<sup>584</sup> Several countries additionally highlighted and supported the progress made during the high-level meetings held on 31 August, in Brussels, mediated by the President of the European Council.<sup>585</sup>

The representative of the Russian Federation described his country's involvement with both parties to reduce tensions and to achieve a sustainable ceasefire and the return of Azerbaijani and Armenian soldiers to their previous positions. He also explained that the Collective Security Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), on 13 September, had met resulting in an agreement by the CSTO secretariat and the joint staff to send a mission to the Republic of Armenia in order to study the situation in various areas on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan and make appropriate recommendations and proposals to be reviewed by the CSTO Heads of State. While noting the difficult path to reconciliation between the two countries, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that his country was making every effort to normalize their relations based on the three trilateral statements made by the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. He underlined that the first of the agreements ended the hostilities and defined the parameters for the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping contingent along the Lachin corridor and the line of contact in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict

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<sup>583</sup> For further detail on the discussion, see part VI, sect. IV.

<sup>584</sup> See [S/PV.9132](#), Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Ghana, Albania, Norway and France.

<sup>585</sup> Ireland, Albania and United Kingdom.

area, the second one concerned the unblocking of all economic and transportation links in the region, and the third one was focused on establishing mechanisms for border demarcation and delimitation.

The representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan spoke last after Council members. With regard to the heavy fighting at the international border, the representative of Armenia stated that on 13 September, Azerbaijan initiated an attack on the eastern and south-eastern regions of Armenia. He highlighted the destruction of civilian settlements and infrastructure also emphasizing that civilian homes were impacted by the violence and noted that heavy fire reached densely populated towns. He called on the Council to uphold its responsibility in maintaining international peace and security and to condemn the attack against the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia, as well as demand the withdrawal of Azerbaijan's military forces. He also urged the Council to demand that Azerbaijan refrain from future acts of aggression and comply with international commitments and to engage in peaceful negotiations especially relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and for the release and repatriation of Armenian prisoners of war.

By contrast, the representative of Azerbaijan said that from 12 to 13 September, Armenia's armed forces committed a large-scale attack in the direction of the Azerbaijani districts of the state border resulting in the loss of servicemen, missing civilians and military infrastructure impacted. He maintained that Armenia continued attacks in border areas after the ceasefire agreement became effective on the morning of 13 September and stated that the military escalation was provoked by Armenia with the goal of destabilizing the normalization process. He explained that the countermeasures taken in response to Armenia's actions were limited and targeted at legitimate military objects. The representative of Azerbaijan called for the international community to persuade Armenia to reciprocate Azerbaijan's offer, cease its political and military provocations, abandon its aggressive rhetoric and actions and engage in good faith in direct negotiations to find peaceful diplomatic solutions to all issues pertaining to inter-State relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

On 20 December, the Council held a meeting further to the letters from Armenia and Azerbaijan.<sup>586</sup> At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary General

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<sup>586</sup> See [S/2022/979](#) and [S/2022/988](#).

for Europe, Central Asia, and the Americas who reported that regrettably, despite the promising diplomatic engagements over the previous months, the tensions both on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and around areas under the control of the Russian peacekeeping forces had not abated.<sup>587</sup> He explained that, in the latest sign of escalating tensions, protests had emerged near a Russian peacekeeping post on the Lachin road, a vital artery for the people living in the area. He said that it had been reported that the protests were against what was claimed to be the illegal exploitation of mineral resources and its environmental impact on the surrounding area. In the letters submitted by Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Secretary General and the Security Council, both alleged violations of the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020. He noted that the potential human toll of a resumption of the conflict could be considerable and cautioned that any renewed conflict would not only impact the people of Armenia and Azerbaijan but also likely those in the wider South Caucasus region and beyond. He emphasized that the parties must abide by their obligation to fully implement the trilateral statement on the ceasefire of 9 November 2020 and the subsequent agreed statements and commitments, as well as to redouble their diplomatic efforts to achieve a negotiated, lasting and peaceful settlement.

Following the briefing, the discussions focused on the opportunities for mediation as a pacific means to resolve the ongoing conflict.<sup>588</sup> Council members expressed their concern regarding the interference of the Lachin Corridor and heightened tensions between the neighboring countries and called for the immediate reopening of the Lachin corridor to allow for the natural flow of traffic and the delivery of goods, supplies, and services. Most Council members additionally encouraged Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve all disputes through diplomacy and dialogue and build upon the progress made.<sup>589</sup> Most Council Members also encouraged Armenia and Azerbaijan to fully abide by and implement the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020.<sup>590</sup> Some of them stressed further the importance of adhering to all previously reached agreements including the trilateral statements of 11 January 2021, 26 November 2021 and 31 October 2022,

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<sup>587</sup> See [S/PV.9288](#).

<sup>588</sup> For further detail on the discussion, see part VI, sect. IV.

<sup>589</sup> See [S/PV.9228](#), France, Albania, China, United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Brazil, Norway, Ghana, Ireland, Gabon and India.

<sup>590</sup> France, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, Mexico, Norway, Ghana and Ireland.

as they laid the groundwork for achieving peace and stability in the region.<sup>591</sup> Some Council members acknowledged and supported ongoing mediation efforts in the region whether that be the efforts of the Russian Federation, the European Union or other Member States.<sup>592</sup> Many Council members further encouraged the international community's role in helping facilitate dialogue and normalizing relations between the two countries.<sup>593</sup> In this regard, several Council members supported the delineation and delimitation of the border between the two countries.<sup>594</sup>

The representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan spoke last after Council members. While the representative of Armenia stated that the humanitarian crisis was created by Azerbaijan as a result of its imposition of an illegal blockade on the population of Nagorno-Karabakh in direct breach of its existing commitments, the representative of Azerbaijan accused Armenia of engaging in illegal military activities including the planting of mines in violation of the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020. Despite their disagreements, Azerbaijan underscored the commitment to achieve regional peace and stability and the establishment of good, neighborly relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The representative of Armenia called for the deployment of a fact-finding mission to Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin corridor to assess the humanitarian situation on the ground as well as ensure humanitarian access for United Nations agencies to Nagorno-Karabakh.

**Meetings: Letter dated 13 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2022/688](#))**

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9132</a> 23 September 2022			Armenia, Azerbaijan	Assistant Secretary General for Europe, Central Asia, and Americas, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations.	All Council Members, all invitees	

<sup>591</sup> Albania, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, Kenya and India.

<sup>592</sup> France, United Arab Emirates, United States, Russian Federation, Brazil, Norway, Ghana and India.

<sup>593</sup> United Arab Emirates, China, United States, Ghana, Norway, Ghana and Gabon.

<sup>594</sup> France, Russian Federation, Ghana and Gabon.

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<a href="#">S/PV.9228</a> 20 December 2022	Armenia. Azerbaijan	Assistant Secretary General for Europe, Central Asia, and Americas, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations.	All Council Members, all invitees
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## Europe

### 17. The situation in Cyprus

During the period under review, the Security Council held two meetings and adopted two resolutions concerning the situation in Cyprus.<sup>595</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes is given in the table below. Council members also held two private meetings with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to resolution [1353\(2001\)](#).<sup>596</sup> Council members also held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the situation in Cyprus.<sup>597</sup>

On 27 January, further to the reports of the Secretary-General,<sup>598</sup> the Council held a meeting at which it unanimously adopted resolution [2618 \(2022\)](#), extending the mandate of UNFICYP for a period of six months, until 31 July 2022.<sup>599</sup> Concerning the Mission's mandate and within its limits and area of operations, the Council requested the Secretary-General to implement a series of activities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of the Mission's operations relating, among other, to women and peace and security requirements under resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) and all resolutions addressing women and peace and security; peacekeeping performance requirements under resolutions [2378 \(2017\)](#) and [2436 \(2018\)](#) and youth, peace and security requirements under resolutions [2250 \(2015\)](#), [2419 \(2018\)](#) and [2535 \(2020\)](#).<sup>600</sup>

Recalling the status of Varosha as set out in its relevant decisions and expressing deep regret at the unilateral actions contrary to them, in the resolution, the Council called for the immediate reversal of this course of action and reiterated that no actions should be carried out in

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<sup>595</sup> For further information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>596</sup> The private meetings in connection with the item entitled "Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B - United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus" was held on 12 January and 13 July; see [S/PV.8947](#) and [S/PV.9094](#).

<sup>597</sup> For more information, see [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 1.

<sup>598</sup> See [S/2021/1109](#) and [S/2021/1110](#).

<sup>599</sup> Resolution [2618 \(2022\)](#), para. 10.

<sup>600</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 16. For further information on the mandate of UNFICYP, see part X, sect. I.

relation to Varosha that were not in accordance with its resolutions stressing the need to avoid any unilateral actions that could raise tensions on the island and undermine the prospects for a peaceful settlement.<sup>601</sup> The Council further expressed concern at the continued tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and called upon the leaders of the two Cypriot communities and all parties involved to refrain from any actions and rhetoric that could damage the settlement process.<sup>602</sup>

As in previous resolutions,<sup>603</sup> the Council called upon the two leaders to reinvigorate their efforts to provide the necessary support and overall guidance to free the Technical Committees from political obstructions in their work; ensure effective coordination and cooperation on criminal matters; intensify efforts to promote peace education across the island; improve the atmosphere for negotiation to secure settlement and increase their support to civil society engagement in peace efforts.<sup>604</sup> The Council also urged the sides to engage actively and with an increased sense of urgency with the Secretary-General and his team to this end, including by reaching an agreement regarding the proposal of the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations envoy.<sup>605</sup> The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report on his good offices as well as on the implementation of the resolution by 5 July 2022.<sup>606</sup> In this regard, the Council requested that the report on his good offices include the contents of the written updates of the leaders of the two communities to the good offices mission. The Council requested that the report on the implementation of the resolution would provide integrated, evidence-based and data-driven analysis, strategic assessments and frank advice to the Security Council, drawing on data collected and analysed through the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System, the Mission's implementation of the Integrated Peacekeeping Performance and Accountability Framework and other strategic planning and performance measurement tools to describe the Mission's impact and overall mission performance.

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<sup>601</sup> Resolution [2618 \(2022\)](#), para. 3. See also resolutions [550 \(1984\)](#), [789 \(1992\)](#) and [S/PRST/2021/13](#).

<sup>602</sup> Resolution [2618 \(2022\)](#), para. 4.

<sup>603</sup> See resolution [2587 \(2021\)](#), para. 4.

<sup>604</sup> Resolution [2618 \(2022\)](#), para. 5.

<sup>605</sup> *Ibid.*, para 2.

<sup>606</sup> Resolution [2618 \(2022\)](#), para. 19. For further background, see *Repertoire, Supplements 1963-2021*.



On 28 July, further to the reports of the Secretary-General,<sup>607</sup> the Council held an open meeting, at which it unanimously adopted resolution [2646 \(2022\)](#), extending again the mandate of UNFICYP for a period of 6 months, until 31 January 2023.<sup>608</sup> As with resolution [2618 \(2022\)](#), by resolution [2646 \(2022\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit by 3 January 2023 a report on his good offices and on the implementation of the resolution.<sup>609</sup>

### Meetings: The situation in Cyprus

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8956</a> 27 January 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus ( <a href="#">S/2021/1109</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/52</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2618 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus ( <a href="#">S/2021/1110</a> )					
<a href="#">S/PV.9102</a> 28 July 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus ( <a href="#">S/2022/533</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/578</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2646 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
	Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus ( <a href="#">S/2022/534</a> )					

<sup>607</sup> See [S/2022/534](#) and [S/2022/533](#).

<sup>608</sup> Resolution [2646 \(2022\)](#), para. 10.

<sup>609</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 20.

## **18. Items relating to the situation in the former Yugoslavia**

### **A. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

During 2022, the members of the Security Council held two meetings and adopted one resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter in connection with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The two meetings took the format of a debate.<sup>610</sup> More information about the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is provided in the table below.<sup>611</sup>

On 11 May 2022, the Council heard a briefing by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the outset of the meeting, prior to the briefing, the representatives of the Russian Federation and China asked to take the floor. The representative of the Russian Federation said that his delegation did not consider Mr. Christian Schmidt to be the legitimate High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina as the Council had not approved his appointment to that position. He added that the argument that his appointment had allegedly taken place in accordance with the decision of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council did not stand up to criticism and believed that the post of the High Representative remained vacant. In that connection, he said that the Russian Federation saw no basis for inviting Mr. Schmidt to meetings of the Council as High Representative and that his presence in the Chamber in that capacity undermined the authority of the Council and of the United Nations in general. He pointed out that at the same time the Council had a practice that allowed individuals to brief the Council in their personal capacity in order to determine whether their further participation was required and added that this was how his delegation viewed the presence of Mr. Schmidt at the meeting.<sup>612</sup> The representative of China stated that according to the Dayton Peace Agreement, the role of the Council in appointing a High Representative was indispensable and had been established practice. He added that in the light of the fact that the appointment of Mr.

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<sup>610</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>611</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 7.A.

<sup>612</sup> See [S/PV.9029](#).

Schmidt had not been endorsed by the Council, China believed that it was inappropriate for him to brief the Council in the capacity as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>613</sup>

In his briefing, the High Representative provided updates on developments in connection with his latest report.<sup>614</sup> At the outset, he noted that, as in the previous period, authorities of the Republika Srpska continued to embrace rhetoric and actions, including the adoption of legislation, that could undermine the constitutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>615</sup> In that regard, he added that what the Republika Srpska authorities were pursuing through the unilateral withdrawal from agreements on the transfer of competencies to the State would, if followed through, achieve a de facto secession of the entity by opting out of the constitutional framework and assuming the competencies of a State. He underlined that the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina existed by virtue of the Constitution and, as a constitutional part of the State, they had no right to secede. He added that announced moves by the Republika Srpska authorities undermined the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that as a representative of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, he was committed to preserving the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In that regard, he informed that with the support of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, he had used his executive authority as High Representative to issue decisions as a countermeasure to the illegal and destabilizing actions taken by the Republika Srpska authorities. The High Representative added that if constitutional order was to be amended or improved, that must be done by elected representatives working to find a legal solution. He also noted that while an agreement on electoral reforms had not been reached despite two years of negotiations, the elections could and would be held on schedule in October, just as general elections had been conducted on schedule in 2018, and added that the holding of regular, fair and free elections was a requirement under the General Framework Agreement for Peace. Additionally, he reported to have met with those responsible for Western Balkans policy in several capitals, especially those of the assembled members of the Steering Board, not only because of the urgency of the current situation, but also

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<sup>613</sup> For more information on the discussion concerning the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, see part II, sect. VII.

<sup>614</sup> See [S/2022/374](#).

<sup>615</sup> See [S/PV.9029](#).

because of the necessity of re-engaging the capitals in completing the tasks at hand. In that regard, he noted that the Russian Federation, as a member of the Peace Implementation Council, had suspended its participation. The High Representative further noted that the fulfilment of the 5 plus 2 agenda and the European Union recommendations would not only resolve certain grievances, but also contribute to lasting peace and stability.

During the discussion that ensued, Council members expressed concern with the continuing political stalemate and instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Speakers condemned particularly the deeply divisive ethnic rhetoric from political leaders and the increase in reported inter-ethnic tensions, fuelled by hate speech, genocide denial and glorification of war criminals. In that connection, several Council members noted that the recent initiatives by the Republika Srpska leadership to withdraw from State-level institutions in violation of the national Constitution and the Dayton Agreement were likely to undermine the security and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>616</sup> In addition, the representative of the United States noted that calls to obstruct elections or create a new territorial organization by Bosnian Croat leaders were also dangerous and could undermine peace and security in the region. In that context, a number of speakers expressed support for the presence of the European Union-led Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) in maintaining stability in the country.<sup>617</sup> More specifically, the representatives of the United Kingdom and Norway welcomed the increased presence of EUFOR Althea as a precautionary measure. The representative of the Russian Federation, on the other hand, noted with particular concern the increase of EUFOR Althea military contingent, which had been doubled in March. She was of the view that such behaviour raised serious questions about the added value of the continued presence of the European Union forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had gone from being a source of stability to an element of intimidation and political confrontation.

In view of the general elections scheduled for early October 2023, Council members expressed concern about the lack of progress in the electoral and constitutional reforms due to the political divergencies, as well as the fact that no government had been established in the

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<sup>616</sup> Brazil, United Kingdom, Gabon, Albania, France, Mexico and United States.

<sup>617</sup> United Kingdom, Gabon, France, China, Norway, Mexico and European Union.

Federation after the 2018 elections. In that context, several members expressed support for the work of the High Representative and called on all the relevant actors for dialogue, cooperation, and full respect for national institutions.<sup>618</sup> Some members expressed support for the use of the executive powers attributed to the Office of the High Representative, as decided by the Peace Implementation Council.<sup>619</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation, on the other hand, was of the view that attempts to invoke the Bonn Powers were unlawful and legally null and void, as there was no agreement on their use by the international community and also because those emergency tools had been granted personally to the High Representative, whose post remained vacant. In that regard, the Russian representative believed that a frank discussion was needed on practical ways to close the Office of the High Representative as soon as possible, as it had exhausted its positive functions. In that connection, some Council members said that it was important that any disagreement among members of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council be resolved through consensus and constructive engagement, in line with the Peace Agreement.<sup>620</sup> Furthermore, several Council members called upon all Bosnian authorities to fulfil the 5 plus 2 agenda, as a prerequisite for the closure of the Office of the High Representative.<sup>621</sup>

On 2 November, the Council held its second semi-annual debate on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the outset of the meeting, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>622</sup> By the resolution, the Council renewed the authorization of EUFOR Althea and the continued presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the country for a period of 12 months, starting from the date of the adoption of the resolution.<sup>623</sup>

In the ensuing debate, Council members discussed the most recent report of the High Representative.<sup>624</sup> Council members welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution [2658](#)

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<sup>618</sup> United Kingdom, Ireland, Albania, France, Kenya, United Arab Emirates, India, Norway, and United States.

<sup>619</sup> United Kingdom, Albania and Norway.

<sup>620</sup> Kenya and India.

<sup>621</sup> Brazil, Ireland, Albania, Kenya, India, Ghana, Norway, Mexico and United States.

<sup>622</sup> See [S/PV.9179](#).

<sup>623</sup> [Resolution 2658 \(2022\)](#), paras.1 and 2.

<sup>624</sup> See [S/2022/806](#).

(2022) as well as the renewal of EUFOR-Althea's mandate, and stressed the importance of the role of the European Union military operation in maintaining post-conflict stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that regard, the representative of the Russian Federation said that while they were pleased that the document voted upon was depoliticized and purely technical, they were concerned with the doubling of the size of the EUFOR-Althea's contingent, especially as the command of the operation had stated that there were no immediate threats to peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>625</sup> On the other hand, the representative of Ghana, who was the President of the Council for the month, stated that a substantive resolution would have better helped advance the peace agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and called for the Council's future efforts in that direction.

The majority of speakers welcomed the successful holding of general elections on 2 October. At the same time, a number of speakers acknowledged that the country still faced serious challenges, including the continuation of the ethnic-based and divisive rhetoric, and, in that context, called on all political representatives to ensure the swift formation of a new Government in order to put an end to the political stalemate and paralysis of State institutions.<sup>626</sup> The representative of the United States expressed deep concern about the allegations of fraud in the election, particularly in the Republika Srpska presidential race, and encouraged Bosnian institutions to fully address the shortcomings raised by election observers while urging all stakeholders and citizens to pursue any grievances through established channels. With regard to the outcome of the elections, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that an overwhelming majority of voters had opted for the ethnic-oriented and Dayton-based concept of statehood and its fundamental premise about the central role of the constituent peoples.

A number of speakers expressed support for the mandate of the High Representative in overseeing the implementation of the civilian aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace.<sup>627</sup> Some Council members expressed further support for the use the executive powers of

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<sup>625</sup> See [S/PV.9179](#).

<sup>626</sup> Ireland, Mexico, Norway, France, United States, Albania, Gabon, Brazil, United Kingdom, Ghana and European Union.

<sup>627</sup> Ireland, Norway, France, United States, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Ghana and European Union.

the High Representative, should the situation require it.<sup>628</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation, on the other hand, stated that the increased activity of the Office of the High Representative posed additional threats to the peace and stability in the country, which was in direct contradiction to the tasks originally assigned to it. The representative of China also expressed concern that the use of the Bonn Powers had become rather controversial and added that they were a special arrangement out of a specific era. In addition, the representative of India stated that the disagreement over the Office of the High Representative needed to be resolved through constructive engagement, in line with the Agreement for Peace. Finally, the President of the Council regretted the inability of the High Representative to participate in that meeting owing to the lack of consensus on the matter. In that connection, he stated that the collaborative exchanges between the Council and the Office of the High Representative, through his briefings, helped members to better appreciate the complex political situation that pertained to Bosnia and Herzegovina and expressed hope that in the future the Council would be able to resume its established format for the meeting. Several speakers encouraged the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue progress on the implementation of the 5 plus 2 agenda by which the Office of the High Representative could complete its mission and the international supervision of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be no longer needed.<sup>629</sup>

**Meetings: The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9029</a> 11 May 2022	Letter dated 3 May 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/374</a> )		Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia	High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees <sup>a</sup>	

<sup>628</sup> United States, Albania and United Kingdom.

<sup>629</sup> Ireland, Mexico, Norway, France, United Kingdom and Kenya.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9179</a> 2 November 2022	Letter dated 25 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/806</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by Ireland ( <a href="#">S/2022/809</a> )	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia	Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, <sup>b</sup> all invitees	Resolution <a href="#">2658 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

<sup>a</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina was represented by its Chair of the Presidency.

<sup>b</sup> Ireland was represented by its Minister of State for European Affairs.



## **B. Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)**

In 2022, the Security Council held two meetings in connection with this item. Both meetings took the form of a briefing.<sup>630</sup> More information on the meetings, including participants and speakers, is given in the table below.<sup>631</sup> No decisions were adopted in connection with this item during the period under review.

Council members heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),<sup>632</sup> further to the Secretary-General's reports pursuant to resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#).<sup>633</sup> In line with established practice, statements were also delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo during the meetings.

On 20 April, the Special Representative briefed the Council further to the elections in Serbia conducted on 3 April, while noting that developments in Ukraine inevitably had influenced and would continue to influence all issues of European security.<sup>634</sup> She explained that despite the urging by the international community to the Pristina and Belgrade authorities to agree on modalities to facilitate eligible voters' participation in Kosovo, a solution had not been identified to permit that. The Special Representative expressed regret about the polarizing effects of that decision since it had divided public opinion sharply along ethnic lines. This notwithstanding, she reported that the election process had gone smoothly and without incident.

The Special Representative drew attention to the incidents of serious concern in northern Kosovo, with attacks directly targeting Kosovo police patrols, and called the leaders of both Pristina and Belgrade to be very judicious in their actions and in their rhetoric at the political level and in the public arena, recalling that those leaders bore the main responsibility for reducing tensions. She noted that, even on extremely technical subjects, progress remained

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<sup>630</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>631</sup> See also [A/77/2](#), chap. 7.B.

<sup>632</sup> See [S/2021/963](#) and [S/2021/964](#).

<sup>633</sup> See [S/2022/313](#) and [S/2022/739](#).

<sup>634</sup> See [PV.9019](#).

tentative and slow and reemphasized the principle of the path towards agreements and solutions, however difficult, cautioning that unilateral actions by any side had the potential to damage the real interests of the people of both sides. She also observed that dramatic shocks to Kosovo's and other regional economies were building up well before the onset of events in Ukraine. In this context, she said that finding practical modes of economic cooperation among Belgrade, Pristina and all the neighbours of the region assumed greater urgency. Any region-wide initiatives that could help towards promoting that objective should be welcomed.

As she said, at the outset of her mandate, the Special Representative clarified two important points. First, she indicated that her responsibility was to provide objective information to the Secretary-General and the Security Council, and, in this regard, the contents of the Secretary-General's reports were not the subject of negotiation. Secondly, she referred to inaccurate perceptions regarding the mandate of UNMIK, namely that the Mission, in and of itself, represented either an obstacle or a vehicle for the outcome preferred by one or the other side or that the Mission harboured a particular agenda to forward or favour outside the bounds of its mandate. She affirmed that neither of those inaccurate perceptions contained any demonstrable truth and yet both had too frequently been allowed to gain currency in local public discourse. Accordingly, the Mission would continue its work in the areas where it was genuinely able to help to advance the common objectives held by the authorities, communities and institutions in Kosovo adding that UNMIK's legacy of institutional support, its trust among communities and political actors and its work with the full spectrum of multilateral and bilateral actors would be driving the agenda. She concluded by saying that the Security Council's support to the Mission remained essential as it was its attention to the state of relations between Pristina and Belgrade.

Following the briefing by the Special Representative and the statements by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and by the representative of Kosovo, Council members discussed the latest developments as reported by the Secretary-General. Council members noted the slow progress in a constructive Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and urged all actors to engage fully and constructively. Most representatives expressed support and appreciation for the work of UNMIK and underlined its important role in promoting peace and security, stability and respect for human rights. Some Council members, however, differed in their views on the role of the

Mission. The representative of Brazil underlined that substantial autonomy for Kosovo had been generally achieved, but the conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all communities in the region had not yet been accomplished and the main objective of UNMIK remained unfulfilled. The representative of China said that given the standstill in bilateral talks and the ongoing tensions on the ground, maintaining UNMIK's presence was crucial. The representative of the United Arab Emirates argued that the support for the important role played by the United Nations in Kosovo should continue, as it undertook many activities and projects that supported Government institutions as well as building trust between religious and ethnic communities and providing economic empowerment and support for the search for missing persons. A similar support to UNMIK was expressed by the representatives of Gabon, France and Ghana. This notwithstanding, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that conditions on the ground were unrecognizable from 1999, and a review of UNMIK's role and responsibilities was needed. The representative of Norway affirmed that while the Mission pursued important work in various areas, the delegation would support a close look at possible efficiency improvements. Finally, the representatives of Albania and the United States expressed the view that UNMIK had already fulfilled its mandate. The representative of the United States added further that it was time to reduce the frequency of briefings to an annual basis.

Following the statements by Council members, the representatives of the Russian Federation and Albania took the floor twice to make further statements. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo took the floor three times.

On 18 October, the briefing of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General focused on the Secretary-General's report on UNMIK and the latest developments on the ground.<sup>635</sup> She reported that there had been several escalations in political rhetoric between Pristina and Belgrade, as well as a few moments of acute tension on the ground. Amid all challenges, she also noted that there had been positive examples of leadership and cooperation. She also explained that her goal was for UNMIK to focus on those areas where the continued presence, in concert with the entire United Nations family — as well as other partners in Kosovo

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<sup>635</sup> See [S/PV.9155](#). See also [S/2022/739](#).

— contributed consistently, with positive effects. Among them, participating in and promoting effective communication across ethnic and political lines at all levels of society, redoubling the Mission’s commitment to support trust-building actors from across all parts of Kosovan society and helping to promote broad awareness about the interdependence and shared problems and interests of people across Kosovo and throughout the region.

Following the briefing by the Special Representative and the statements by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and by the representative of Kosovo, Council members discussed the latest developments as reported by the Secretary-General. In their statements, many Council members focused on the increased tensions in northern Kosovo and reiterated their concern at the slow progress in dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.

Several delegations welcomed the meetings held between the parties in Brussels in August and the agreement reached on free movement between Kosovo and Serbia.<sup>636</sup> The representative of Ireland added that the agreement was a positive step in the right direction and a proof that acceptable, pragmatic solutions were possible when leaders engaged openly and constructively in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. He also argued that the European Union-facilitated dialogue was the correct channel through which to resolve tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. Similarly, the representative of the United States underlined that the European Union-facilitated dialogue continued to be the principal mechanism for reconciling issues. The representatives of the United Kingdom and Kenya urged both parties to uphold their commitments made in the framework of the dialogue, while the representative of Ghana called to recommit to the full implementation of their respective obligations under previous and future agreements to be reached in the context of the European Union-facilitated dialogue.

Concerning the role of UNMIK, Council members expressed overall praise and support for its work on different fronts and specifically on confidence and trust-building efforts,<sup>637</sup> women and peace and security and youth and peace and security agendas,<sup>638</sup> as well as on the return of missing persons,<sup>639</sup> strengthening of the rule of law<sup>640</sup> and promotion of social

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<sup>636</sup> See [S/PV.9155](#), Ireland, Brazil, Ghana, India, China and France.

<sup>637</sup> Ireland, Kenya, Ghana, and Gabon.

<sup>638</sup> Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Ghana and Gabon.

<sup>639</sup> Ireland, India and Gabon.

<sup>640</sup> Norway, Kenya, Brazil, France and Gabon.

cooperation and cohesion in Kosovo.<sup>641</sup> As in April, at the meeting in October, Council members discussed the continuity of the Mission and the continued value of its mandate. While representatives of Albania, the United Kingdom and the United States advocated for a thorough review of UNMIK given the change of circumstances in Kosovo and its institutions, other Council members supported the continuity of the Mission and its mandate.<sup>642</sup> The representative of the United States expressed disappointment that the Council had not moved towards sunseting UNMIK, including by developing a plan to close the Mission. He again suggested that briefings were no longer needed on a six-month basis and should be reduced to annual meetings, stating also that the Council had far more pressing priorities to address, and its resources were limited. The representative of Albania was also of the view that it was time to reduce Security Council meetings to only one a year in recognition of the progress made, as well as encouragement for the parties to pursue dialogue with more determination. By contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed full support for UNMIK, as the most important guarantor of security in the province. While understanding the difficult circumstances in which it had to operate, the representative expressed the expectation that UNMIK made realistic rather than neutral rosy assessments of the situation in the province. The representative of China affirmed that the Special Representative and UNMIK should continue to work actively in accordance with resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#), effectively carrying out its mandates and playing a constructive role in maintaining regional stability, promoting national reconciliation and facilitating dialogue between the two sides. Following the statements by Council members, the representatives of both Serbia and Kosovo took the floor to make further statements.

**Meetings: Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)**

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<sup>641</sup> Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Ghana.

<sup>642</sup> Mexico, Russian Federation, Ghana and China.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9019</a> 20 April 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo ( <a href="#">S/2022/313</a> )		Serbia <sup>a</sup>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Ms. Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9155</a> 18 October 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo ( <a href="#">S/2022/739</a> )		Serbia <sup>a</sup>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo and Head of UNMIK, Ms. Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz	All Council members, all invitees	

<sup>a</sup> Serbia was represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs.

## 19. Items relating to Ukraine

### A. Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))

During the period under review, the Security Council held eight meetings under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))” and adopted one resolution.<sup>643</sup> Resolution [2623 \(2022\)](#) was the first resolution of the Council in 40 years deciding to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly.<sup>644</sup> In addition, the Council failed to adopt one draft resolution owing to the negative vote of a permanent member.<sup>645</sup> All the meetings that were not devoted to the adoption of decisions of the Council took the form of briefings.<sup>646</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. Council members also held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the situation in Ukraine.<sup>647</sup>

In 2022, the Council heard four briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs<sup>648</sup> and two briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.<sup>649</sup> The briefings focused on the ongoing political and security developments and the humanitarian situation in Ukraine. Other briefers were the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who briefed the Council on the challenges faced by the civilian population and humanitarian actors and on the growing number of displaced people and refugees;<sup>650</sup> the Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency, who provided updates on the military developments in the vicinity of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant;<sup>651</sup>

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<sup>643</sup> Resolution [2623 \(2022\)](#).

<sup>644</sup> For more information regarding the relations between the Council and the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.C. For more details on the discussion, see part V, sect. I.

<sup>645</sup> See [S/PV.8980](#). See also [S/2022/155](#).

<sup>646</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>647</sup> For more information, see [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 39.B.

<sup>648</sup> See [S/PV.8970](#), [S/PV.8974](#), [S/PV.8986](#), [S/PV.9011](#).

<sup>649</sup> See [S/PV.8983](#), [S/PV.9011](#).

<sup>650</sup> See [S/PV.8983](#).

<sup>651</sup> See [S/PV.8986](#).

the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, who reported on the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine and the global impact of the war;<sup>652</sup> and the Executive Director of the United Nations World Food Programme, who spoke about the decimating consequences of the war in Ukraine and the worsening food crisis around the world.<sup>653</sup> Whilst most invitations under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure were limited to Germany and Ukraine, on 25 February, 75 Members States were invited to participate in the meeting of the Council.<sup>654</sup> The Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations was invited once under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.<sup>655</sup>

On 21 February, the Council convened an emergency meeting during which it heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs further to the decree of the Russian Federation to recognize certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent regions. During her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General expressed concern about the possible implications of the latest developments for the existing negotiations frameworks and emphasized the importance to pursue dialogue. She also noted the decision to order a mass evacuation of civilians of Donetsk and Luhansk into the Russian Federation and expressed regret about the deployment of Russian troops into eastern Ukraine, reportedly on a peacekeeping mission. She further expressed concern about the escalating shelling across the contact line and the targeting of critical civilian infrastructure and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Underlining that the risk of major conflict was real and needed to be prevented at all costs, the Under-Secretary-General reiterated the full commitment of the United Nations to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.<sup>656</sup>

During the meeting, while only some participants condemned the Russian Federation's decision to recognize non-Government-controlled areas as independent entities,<sup>657</sup> others spoke of the political and security developments as an attack on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial

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<sup>652</sup> See [S/PV.9008](#).

<sup>653</sup> See [S/PV.9008](#).

<sup>654</sup> See [S/PV.8979](#).

<sup>655</sup> See [S/PV.9011](#).

<sup>656</sup> See [S/PV.8970](#).

<sup>657</sup> Albania, France, Kenya, Norway and Germany.



integrity,<sup>658</sup> and a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter,<sup>659</sup> and the Minsk agreements.<sup>660</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation recalled that the People's Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk declared their independence from Ukraine in 2014 and affirmed the high level of support for recognizing that independence, both in the Republics themselves and in Russian society. He also reminded that, at the time when the Minsk agreements were signed, the People's Republics had already declared their independence, and underlined that the Russian decision to recognize them on that day in no way changed the make-up of parties to the Minsk agreements, as Russia had not been a party to them. In his statement, the representative of Ukraine emphasized the responsibility of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security, in accordance with the Article 24 of the Charter,<sup>661</sup> and called on the members to make recommendations or decide what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.<sup>662</sup>

On 23 February, the Council held a meeting to hear a briefing from the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. At the outset of the meeting, the Secretary-General delivered opening remarks, followed by the briefing by the Under-Secretary-General. In his statement, the Secretary-General called on the President of the Russian Federation to stop his troops from attacking Ukraine.<sup>663</sup> The Under-Secretary-General informed the Council that the Ukrainian authorities had declared a nationwide state of emergency and announced other related defense and security measures, including the mobilization of reservists. In addition, she added that the Ukrainian authorities reported a new large-scale cyberattack targeting several State and financial institutions. In that regard, she encouraged the efforts of President Zelenskyy and President Putin to continue dialogue and diplomacy and assured that United Nations staff remain on the ground to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine.

Following the briefing, several participants condemned the decision by President Putin to send Russian troops into the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the announcement of a military

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<sup>658</sup> United States, Albania, France, United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland, Kenya, Ghana, Gabon, Norway and Ukraine.

<sup>659</sup> Albania, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Ghana, Norway and Ukraine.

<sup>660</sup> Albania, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Ghana, Norway and Ukraine.

<sup>661</sup> For further details on the discussion, see part V, sect. I.B.

<sup>662</sup> See [S/PV.8970](#).

<sup>663</sup> See [S/PV.8974](#).

operation.<sup>664</sup> Council members called on the Russian Federation to de-escalate and withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine,<sup>665</sup> urged to refrain from any action that may further increase tensions on the ground,<sup>666</sup> and emphasized the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes.<sup>667</sup> Council members were concerned about the high-intensity ceasefire violations and urged all parties to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure and to guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance, in accordance with their obligations under international law.<sup>668</sup> Some members continued to emphasize the responsibility of the Council to maintain international peace and security.<sup>669</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation announced that during the course of the meeting the President of the Russian Federation made an address informing of his decision to launch a special military operation in Donbas. He noted that the occupation of Ukraine was not part of his country's plans. Rather, the purpose of the special operation was to protect people who had been subjected to abuse and genocide by the Kyiv regime for eight years. He added that the decision had been made in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,<sup>670</sup> the approval of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation and pursuant to the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed with the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.<sup>671</sup> In her second statement at the meeting, further to the Russian Federation's statement informing about the launching of the special military operation, the representative of the United States announced that her delegation would be putting a draft resolution on the table the following day. Condemning the start of the military operation, the representatives of the United Kingdom and France both expressed support for the preparation of a Security Council resolution. The representative of Ukraine called on the representative of the Russian Federation to relinquish its responsibilities as President of the Security Council. Underscoring the responsibility of the Security Council, he called on the members to convene an

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<sup>664</sup> France, Norway, Germany, Albania and Ireland.

<sup>665</sup> Albania, United Kingdom, France, India, United Arab Emirates, Norway, Gabon and Germany.

<sup>666</sup> Ireland, India, China, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, and Ghana.

<sup>667</sup> India, United Arab Emirates, Norway, China, Brazil, Ghana and Gabon.

<sup>668</sup> United Arab Emirates, Norway, Ghana and Gabon.

<sup>669</sup> Ireland, Brazil, Mexico, Ukraine and United States.

<sup>670</sup> For more information on Article 51, see part VII, sec X.

<sup>671</sup> See [S/PV.8974](#).

emergency meeting to consider all necessary draft decisions and do everything possible to stop the war.

On 25 February, the Council held a meeting to vote on a draft resolution submitted by Albania and the United States and sponsored by 80 Member States.<sup>672</sup> Before the vote, the representatives of the United States and Albania explained the text of the draft resolution.<sup>673</sup> In addition, four other Council members made statements before the vote. The draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of one permanent member, namely, the Russian Federation. According to the draft resolution, the Council would have condemned the 23 February 2022 declaration by the Russian Federation of a “special military operation” in Ukraine and deplored in the strongest terms the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter as well as the Russian Federation’s 21 February 2022 decision related to the status of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine as a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>674</sup> In addition, according to the draft resolution, the Council would have decided that the Russian Federation should immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine, refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against any UN member state, immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and immediately and unconditionally reverse the decision related to the status of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.<sup>675</sup>

Following the vote, most Council members who voted in favour expressed regret about the decision of the Russian Federation to veto the draft resolution.<sup>676</sup> The representative of France welcomed the mobilization of all members of the Council who, by voting in favour of the draft resolution, had expressed their commitment to international law and their support for Ukraine. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that a large majority of the Security

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<sup>672</sup> See [S/2022/155](#).

<sup>673</sup> See [S/PV.8979](#).

<sup>674</sup> See [S/2022/155](#), sixth, preambular paragraph and paras. 2 and 5.

<sup>675</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 3, 4 and 6.

<sup>676</sup> See [S/PV.8979](#), Albania, Norway and Ireland.

Council had voted in favour of the draft resolution aimed at stopping the war, yet it had not been adopted only because of the single veto of the permanent member of the Council who was perpetrating that conflict. The representative of Norway stated that a veto cast by the aggressor undermined the purpose of the Council, adding that it was a violation of the very foundation of the Charter of the United Nations and that in the spirit of the Charter, as a party to a dispute, Russia should have abstained from voting on the draft resolution.<sup>677</sup> Some members condemned what they termed as an aggression by the Russian Federation,<sup>678</sup> while others called on the parties to immediately cease hostilities.<sup>679</sup> The representative of Gabon called on the parties to resume dialogue, while the representative of Ghana called on the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its forces from Ukraine and to recommit to dialogue and diplomacy.

In explaining his country's abstention, the representative of China noted that faced with the highly complex and sensitive situation, the Security Council should make the necessary response, while cautioning that actions should be truly conducive to defusing the crisis rather than adding fuel to the fire. He added that Russia's legitimate security aspirations should receive attention and be addressed properly, and Ukraine should become a bridge between the East and the West, not an outpost for confrontation between major powers. While affirming that Member States needed to honour the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the representative of India affirmed, in explaining his vote, that dialogue was the only answer to settling differences and disputes, however daunting it appeared at that moment. The representative of the United Arab Emirates expressed support for the draft resolution's emphasis on the need to adhere to the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations which she said must be the basis of the resumption of dialogue and the pathway forward.

Explaining his country's negative vote, the representative of the Russian Federation stated the draft resolution was anti-Russian and anti-Ukrainian and ran counter to the fundamental interests of the Ukrainian people. He concluded his statement by emphasizing that the Russian Federation was not waging a war against Ukraine or the Ukrainian people but was

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<sup>677</sup> For more details, see part II. sect. VIII.C

<sup>678</sup> See [S/PV.8979](#), United Kingdom, Mexico, Albania, Norway and Ireland.

<sup>679</sup> Gabon, Mexico, Brazil and United Arab Emirates.

carrying out a special operation against nationalists to protect the residents of Donbas and for the purposes of denazification and demilitarization. Speaking after Council members, the representative of Ukraine stressed that the Russian Federation had violated the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, rule 20 in relation to the President of the Security Council, by presiding over the Council during the consideration of a question with which it was directly connected.<sup>680</sup>

On 27 February, the Council held a meeting at which, despite the negative vote of the Russian Federation, it adopted resolution [2623\(2022\)](#), calling an emergency special session of the General Assembly taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 8979th meeting had prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>681</sup> Following the adoption, the representatives of Albania, Ireland and Mexico explained their vote of convening an emergency special session as a means for the General Assembly to condemn the aggression.

The representative of Albania underlined the historic significance of the resolution [2623\(2022\)](#) that had opened the big doors for the world to speak out and condemn an unprovoked and unjustified pure act of aggression. The representative of the United States noted that the Council had called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly for the first time in decades as an extraordinary action. Welcoming the results of the voting on the resolution, the representative of the United Kingdom urged all Members of the United Nations to use their voice to call for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine and end the war. Other members elaborated on the use of the veto by the Russian Federation by which the permanent member prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>682</sup> The representative of France asserted that his country would remain poised within the Council to ensure that it assumed its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. He added that together

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<sup>680</sup> For further details on the role of the presidency, see part II, sect. IV.

<sup>681</sup> See [S/PV.8980](#). For more information on the emergency special session and the relations between the Council and the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.C. For more details on the discussion, see part II sect. VIII.C and part V, sect. I.

<sup>682</sup> See [S/PV.8980](#), France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and Ghana.

with Mexico, France would submit a draft resolution to guarantee unhindered humanitarian access to meet the urgent needs of the people remaining in Ukraine. The representative of Mexico reiterated that the exercise of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council should not be a privilege and that, in every situation, it constituted as enormous and highly sensible responsibility. The representative of Ireland underlined that the Council had failed to exercise the responsibility to act in the face of conflict and called on the General Assembly members to step up where the Council had failed. In contrast, the representative of Brazil asserted that the Council had not yet exhausted its instruments and mechanisms to contribute to a negotiated and diplomatic solution towards peace and that the Security Council and the General Assembly must work together.

Expressing regret about the worsening of the situation in Ukraine, the representatives of India and the United Arab Emirates, whose delegations had abstained together with China, reiterated their call to cease hostilities and to return to the path of diplomacy and dialogue. In that regard, they also welcomed the latest announcement by both sides about the commencement of talks on the Ukraine-Belarus border. The representative of China expressed support for discussions on an equal footing between the European Union and Russia on security issues to establish a balanced, effective and sustainable European security mechanism. He added that the Security Council should play a constructive role in resolving the Ukraine issue and that the United Nations should help calm the situation and facilitate diplomatic solutions to avoid an escalation of tensions.

Elaborating on his vote, the permanent representative of the Russian Federation stated that he had voted against resolution [2623\(2022\)](#) because it placed on record that the Security Council was unable to uphold its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. He further underlined that the right of veto was granted to the permanent members of the Council as a tool for ensuring the balance of interest that ensured global stability and any attempt to circumvent or disregard the position of the Russian Federation undermined the bedrock of the Charter of the United Nations.

On 28 February, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs who reported on the latest civilian casualties, damage to critical civilian

infrastructure and growing humanitarian needs in the hardest hit areas of the conflict in Ukraine.<sup>683</sup> He underscored that the ongoing fighting had constrained the humanitarian movement of the United Nations and the work of humanitarian workers on the ground stressing the need for the parties to the conflict to provide assurances that humanitarian workers would be protected and rapid and unimpeded passage of impartial humanitarian relief would be ensured.

Following the Under-Secretary-General, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that, in addition to the grave situation inside Ukraine, hundreds of thousands were seeking refuge in the neighboring countries of Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia and the Russian Federation. Commending the Governments of the receiving countries, he encouraged them to maintain the access to all who were fleeing and underlined that there could be no discrimination against any person or any group. While noting that the challenges to admit, register, and ensure the protection of those fleeing so far had been met, he expressed concern about the likelihood of a further escalation in the number of arrivals. In that regard, he briefed the Council on the bilateral support to the receiving countries offered by the European Union and its member states and other Governments. He elaborated on the scaled-up efforts by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees with its United Nations partner agencies and national and international NGOs. He explained that the High Commissioner for Refugees was planning for up to 4 million refugees in the following days and weeks and that such a rapid increase would be a huge burden for receiving States and would no doubt stress reception systems and related resources. He added that like any country hosting refugees around the world, these countries could not be left alone to shoulder that responsibility and welcomed the support expressed by many European States at the European Union Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting to activate the Temporary Protection Directive for people fleeing Ukraine that would enable the provision of immediate temporary refuge in the European Union and facilitate the sharing of responsibility among European Member States for people fleeing Ukraine.

During the discussion, in their remarks on the humanitarian situation and protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, Council members welcomed the growing humanitarian efforts of the United Nations in Ukraine.<sup>684</sup> They called on both parties to immediately and

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<sup>683</sup> See [S/PV.8983](#).

<sup>684</sup> Albania, India, and China.

unconditionally cease hostilities,<sup>685</sup> respect international humanitarian law at all times,<sup>686</sup> exercise self-restraint<sup>687</sup> and refrain from attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure<sup>688</sup> and ensure safe and unimpeded access for humanitarian actors and their movements.<sup>689</sup> While representatives of Ireland and the United Kingdom spoke about Russia's indiscriminate attacks and use of explosives weapons in populated areas, the representatives of the United States, Albania and Ukraine stressed the need to document and address all violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. Against the backdrop of a humanitarian situation that was worsening with each passing hour, the representative of Mexico explained that together with France they would present a draft resolution aimed at achieving a general cessation of hostilities, the protection of civilians and guaranteed access to humanitarian aid. In response, the representative of the Russian Federation underlined that Russia's special operation did not impact civilian infrastructure and that civilians in the areas under the control of the Russian armed forces were not encountering acute humanitarian issues. With regard to the draft resolution, he said that his delegation needed to study the text closely before making any assessments and that, in any case, the Russian military would provide any necessary humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine in the territories that had been freed from what he referred to as "the radicals".

In connection with the refugee and displacement crisis, Council members commended the neighboring countries for receiving refugees,<sup>690</sup> and called for borders to be kept open.<sup>691</sup> While some members commented on the reported accounts of discrimination, experienced by the Africans and people of African descent as they were fleeing the war,<sup>692</sup> several representatives echoed the High Commissioner for Refugees urging the international community to provide support to all, without discrimination based on race or nationality.<sup>693</sup> Members also expressed differing views on the economic sanctions adopted against the Russian Federation and Belarus.

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<sup>685</sup> France, Ireland, India, Ghana, Gabon and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>686</sup> France, Mexico, United Arab Emirates and Brazil.

<sup>687</sup> United Arab Emirates and China.

<sup>688</sup> Ireland, Ghana, Gabon and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>689</sup> France, Mexico, Norway, Ghana, Gabon and Brazil.

<sup>690</sup> Kenya, United States, Ireland, Norway, Albania and Gabon.

<sup>691</sup> Mexico, Ireland and Norway.

<sup>692</sup> Kenya and Gabon.

<sup>693</sup> Norway, United States, Ghana and Gabon.



In that connection, the representative of France assured that the sanctions would be implemented with full regard for international humanitarian law and with no impact on the humanitarian response. The representative of Kenya cautioned that sanctions might lead to an escalation of the conflict rather than opening the path to peace. The representative of Brazil also warned that the severe economic sanctions being imposed may have ripple effects on the world's economy.

On 4 March, the Council heard a briefing from the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who focused on the latest developments in the area of the Zaporizhzhya and Chernobyl nuclear power plants and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Ukraine.<sup>694</sup> During her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General underscored that attacks on nuclear power facilities were contrary to international humanitarian law. Welcoming the statements and actions by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in connection with the establishment of an appropriate framework that would ensure the safe, secure and reliable operation of Ukraine's nuclear power plants, she emphasized the need for safe and urgent passage for the Agency's personnel. The Under-Secretary-General added that the United Nations was significantly increasing its humanitarian assistance in response to the escalating crisis and welcomed the agreements between Ukrainian and Russian negotiators on the establishment of humanitarian corridors to allow safe passage for civilians and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that the Russian forces had taken charge of the Chernobyl nuclear site. However, their advance towards the perimeter of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant had been met by opposition and groups of civilians who were blocking access to the facility. He further confirmed that, although a projectile impacted an adjacent building to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear plant facility, no security or safety systems had been compromised and the operations at both plants had continued normally. On the establishment of a framework to ensure the observance of the basic principles of safety and security, he underlined that the basic elements of the proposal had been already shared with the Ukrainian counterparts and the Russian authorities. He clarified that the mission of the

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<sup>694</sup> See [S/PV.8986](#)

International Atomic Energy Agency would be restricted and circumscribed to the safety and security of the nuclear installations in Ukraine.

During the discussion, Council members expressed concern about the situation at both the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhya nuclear sites. Council members continued to call on the Russian Federation to abide by its international obligations,<sup>695</sup> to halt the use of force near any power plant,<sup>696</sup> and to end violence and withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine.<sup>697</sup> The representative of Kenya urged the need to observe international conventions regulating the conduct of armed conflict and called on the leadership of Ukraine and the Russian Federation to reduce the targeting and threat to critical infrastructure. Referring to the Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations and to the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly in the context of the eleventh emergency special session,<sup>698</sup> the representative of Brazil urged all members of the Council to engage truly and actively to promote dialogue and rebuild trust.<sup>699</sup> The representatives of India, Ghana, China and the United Arab Emirates welcomed the second round of talks on the establishment of a safe humanitarian corridor. Participants at the meeting also expressed support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Ukraine and called for the urgent and unhindered access of its personnel to monitor the conditions and ensure nuclear safety. In his statement, the representative of the Russian Federation denounced that the statements about Russian troops attacking the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant was a part of an unprecedented campaign of lies and disinformation against his country and were untrue. In fact, according to the representative, an agreement to place the power plant under the protection of the Russian military had been reached with the management of the plant to ensure the security of the plant and prevent interruptions in power supply to the population of Ukraine and European consumers. He asserted that the current situation was similar in the area of the Chernobyl power plant and that the security of those facilities was being ensured jointly by the Russian armed forces and the Ukrainian operators of the nuclear installations. Stating that Russia had deliberately undertaken an armed attack against a nuclear power site, an action that had violated

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<sup>695</sup> United States, Ireland, Norway and Mexico.

<sup>696</sup> Albania, United States, France, Ireland and Ghana.

<sup>697</sup> United Kingdom, Albania, United States, Ireland and Norway.

<sup>698</sup> Resolution [ES-11/1](#).

<sup>699</sup> For more details on Chapter VI, see part VI.

all international agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the representative of Ukraine demanded that Russian forces withdrew from the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. He called on the international community to respond adequately to the actions of the Russian Federation by closing the skies over Ukraine, supporting Ukraine in terms of security and humanitarian assistance and expelling Russians from international institutions.

On 29 March, the Council heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator who informed the Council about the scaling up of the humanitarian system.<sup>700</sup> Highlighting the risk of human trafficking, as well as sexual violence, exploitation and abuse in Ukraine and the region, particularly for children fleeing the war, he announced the scaling up of protection services at the border and within the country in order to offer information on safe options and routes and access to helplines and safe shelters. In that connection, he reported that humanitarian partners were coordinating to provide swift and specialized services to survivors. He also stressed the need for detailed, realistic agreements on humanitarian ceasefire and pauses to ensure safe and unhindered passage of aid and indicated that, following the request from the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator had been engaging with both parties on possible arrangements for a humanitarian ceasefire.

Following the Under-Secretary-General, the Executive Director of the United Nations World Food Programme provided a briefing on the impact of the war on global food insecurity. He stressed the need not to neglect other regions such as the Sahel, North Africa, the rest of Africa and the Middle East to prevent a massive migration from all sides of Europe. He further explained the risk of a pricing problem due to the increase in fuel, food and shipping costs and an availability problem due to the lack of fertilizer-based products from Belarus and Russia, calling it a crisis on top of a crisis. In closing, he appealed to everyone involved to deconflict and provide the necessary access for the safe delivery of aid and to minimize the impact globally and in Ukraine.

Council members discussed the humanitarian impact of the conflict in Ukraine. While some members attributed the responsibility for the humanitarian crisis inside and outside Ukraine

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<sup>700</sup> See [S/PV.9008](#).

to the Russian Federation,<sup>701</sup> others commended the neighboring countries for receiving refugees.<sup>702</sup> Council members and other participants discussed the massive displacement and refugee crisis created by the conflict, the threats of human trafficking and gender-based violence as well as the challenges faced by civilians and humanitarian organizations. In this regard, most Council members called for the safe and unhindered access for humanitarian aid and safe passages for civilians in besieged cities. The representatives of Norway and the United Arab Emirates welcomed the Secretary-General's initiative to request the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to work directly with the parties on a possible agreement for a humanitarian ceasefire. Council members and other participants discussed the negotiations taking place between the parties in Istanbul at the time. While the representative of China underlined that the international community should encourage and support continued direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine until a positive outcome was achieved and peace was restored, the representative of the United Arab Emirates, also stressed the important role of women in conflict resolution and peace negotiations, including to ensure their sustainability and durability. Council members also discussed the impact of the economic sanctions adopted in response to the conflict in Ukraine. While some Council members denied an impact of the sanctions on the global food supply chains,<sup>703</sup> other Council members argued that sanctions exacerbated food shortages and price distortions having a detrimental impact on developing countries.<sup>704</sup>

On 5 April, the Council held a meeting during which it heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.<sup>705</sup> In his remarks, the Secretary-General said that Ukraine was one of the greatest challenges ever to the international order and the global peace architecture, founded on the Charter of the United Nations, because of its nature, intensity and consequences. He added that the world was dealing with the full-fledged invasion, on several fronts, of one State Member of the United Nations,

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<sup>701</sup> United States, United Kingdom and France.

<sup>702</sup> United States, Kenya, Norway and Gabon.

<sup>703</sup> France and United States.

<sup>704</sup> Kenya, Russian Federation, Brazil and China.

<sup>705</sup> See [S/PV.9011](#).

Ukraine, by another, the Russian Federation — a permanent member of the Security Council — in violation of the Charter and with several aims, including redrawing the internationally recognized borders between the two countries. He also focused on the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, including the massive devastation in urban centres and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, rapes and sexual violence as well as the displacement of more than 10 million people in just one month. In addition, he spoke about the massive increases in the prices of food, energy, and fertilizers, disrupting supply chains and increased cost of transportation, putting even more pressure on the developing world. Regretting the divisions that had prevented the Security Council from acting not only on Ukraine, but on other threats to peace and security around the world, he urged the Council to do everything in its power to end the war and to mitigate its impact, both on the suffering people of Ukraine and on vulnerable people and developing countries around the world.

In her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General focused on the ongoing military operations, noting that cities continued to be pounded, the number of civilians killed had more than doubled and hundreds of thousands of people remained trapped in encircled cities. She expressed grave concern about the persistent use of explosive weapons with a wide impact in or near populated areas and underlined those indiscriminate attacks were prohibited under international humanitarian law. She also expressed concern about the reports of cases of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances as well as about the emerging allegations of conflict-related sexual violence. Against that backdrop, she further reported that, according to the International Organization for Migration, suspected and verified cases of human trafficking were surfacing in the surrounding countries and expressed grave concern about the heightened risk for displaced persons and refugees. Away from the fighting, she reported that diplomatic efforts to end the war, including direct talks between Ukrainian and Russian representatives, had continued and commended, in that regard, the Government of Turkey. The Under-Secretary-General noted the reported withdrawal of Russian forces from around the Chernobyl nuclear site and reemphasized that all nuclear sites in Ukraine must be fully protected and secured. Noting the reported reduction of Russian troops and attacks around Kyiv and Chernihiv, she reiterated the call by the General Assembly for Russian forces to withdraw entirely from Ukrainian territory and cease all military operations. In closing, the Under-Secretary-General cautioned that the war had damaged

Europe's security architecture noting that the longer the war continued, the greater the risk that it would further weaken the global institutions and mechanisms dedicated to preserving peace and security.

In his statement, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator spoke about the humanitarian needs and what was being done to meet them. He also reported on his actions further to the Secretary-General's instruction to bring both sides together on humanitarian grounds to explore both specific and sustained ways to reduce humanitarian suffering, including, *inter alia*, the pursuit of a humanitarian ceasefire. In this regard, he spoke about his meetings with Russian authorities as well as about his upcoming meetings with Ukrainian authorities. While expressing gratitude for the generous contributions from donors, he stressed that funding to support the needs in Ukraine must not be diverted from other crises and concluded by calling on all Council members and Member States to support all efforts in the pursuit of peace and the alleviation of human suffering.

During the deliberations, Council members exchanged views on the reported violence and attacks against civilian and humanitarian infrastructure. Council members and other participants emphasized the responsibility of the Council to end the war and to maintain international peace and security,<sup>706</sup> urged the parties to the conflict to comply with international humanitarian law,<sup>707</sup> and condemned the atrocities and abuses committed on the territory of Ukraine.<sup>708</sup> Some Council members and participants expressed support for an investigation by the International Criminal Court,<sup>709</sup> and by the Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council.<sup>710</sup> In this connection, the representative of the United States announced that her country, in coordination with Ukraine and many other States Members of the United Nations, would seek Russia's suspension from the Human Rights Council.

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<sup>706</sup> Ireland, Brazil, Mexico and Norway. For more information on functions and powers of the Security Council, see part V, sect. I.

<sup>707</sup> [S/PV.9011](#), Albania, Gabon, Ireland, Brazil, China, France, United Arab Emirates and European Union.

<sup>708</sup> Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, India, France, Ghana and European Union.

<sup>709</sup> Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom and European Union.

<sup>710</sup> Mexico, France, Norway and European Union.

In addition to this item, during the period under review, the Council discussed developments of the situation in Ukraine under the following items: “ Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))”,<sup>711</sup> “ Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”,<sup>712</sup> and “Threats to international peace and security”.<sup>713</sup>

**Meetings: letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))**

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8970</a> 21 February 2022			Germany, Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8974</a> 23 February 2022			Germany, Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8979</a> 25 February 2022		Draft resolution submitted by 82 Member States <sup>a</sup> ( <a href="#">S/2022/155</a> )	75 Member States <sup>b</sup>		All Council members, Ukraine	Draft resolution <a href="#">S/2022/155</a> not adopted 11-1-3 <sup>c</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.8980</a> 27 February 2022		Draft resolution submitted by Albania and United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/160</a> )	Ukraine		14 Council members, <sup>d</sup> Ukraine	Resolution <a href="#">2623 (2022)</a> 11-1-3 <sup>e</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.8983</a> 28 February 2022			Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees <sup>f</sup>	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8986</a> 4 March 2022			Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency <sup>g</sup>	14 Council members, <sup>h</sup> all invitees	

<sup>711</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 19.B.

<sup>712</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 19.C.

<sup>713</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 34.

[S/PV.9008](#)

29 March 2022

Ukraine	Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Executive Director of the United Nations World Food Programme <sup>i</sup>	All Council members, <sup>j</sup> all invitees
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[S/PV.9011](#)

5 April 2022

Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees <sup>i</sup>
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<sup>a</sup> Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>b</sup> Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, the Niger, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Türkiye and Ukraine.

<sup>c</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: Russian Federation; *abstaining*: China, India, United Arab Emirates.

<sup>d</sup> The representative of Kenya did not make a statement.

<sup>e</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: Russian Federation; *abstaining*: China, India, United Arab Emirates

<sup>f</sup> The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>g</sup> The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>h</sup> The representative of Gabon did not make a statement.

<sup>i</sup> The Executive Director of the United Nations World Food Programme participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>j</sup> The United States was represented by its Deputy Secretary of State.

<sup>k</sup> Ukraine was represented by its President, who participated in the meeting by videoconference.



## **B. Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))**

During the period under review, the Security Council held two public meetings in connection with the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))”, which took the form of a briefing and adoption, respectively.<sup>714</sup> The Council failed to adopt a draft resolution in connection with this item having failed to obtain the required number of votes. More information on the meetings, including participants and speakers is given in the table below.<sup>715</sup>

On 17 February 2022, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Special Representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Chairperson-in-Office, the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and a Ukrainian civil society activist.

Drawing attention to the fragile security situation, the Under-Secretary-General cautioned that tensions in and around Ukraine were running higher than at any point since 2014.<sup>716</sup> She explained that the issues underpinning the crisis were complex and long-standing, tying together the eight-year conflict in eastern Ukraine with the larger issues relating to the European security architecture and she noted with regret that there had been little, if any, meaningful progress in the implementation of the Minsk agreements. She also said that both the talks in the Normandy Four format and the discussions led by the Trilateral Contact Group, remained deadlocked. Against that backdrop, she noted with concern the reports of ceasefire violations across the contact line and called on all sides to refrain from any unilateral measures that could go against the letter and spirit of the Minsk agreements or undermine their implementation. She added that it was incumbent on all Member States to fully respect the key principles of the United Nations Charter, to settle disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. She welcomed the efforts by France

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<sup>714</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>715</sup> For more information, see [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 39.C.

<sup>716</sup> See [S/PV.8968](#).

and Germany to host the recent Normandy Four discussions to break the current impasse and the recent diplomatic talks, including between Heads of State, and urged more tangible steps on the ground and an end to inflammatory rhetoric in order to defuse tensions. The Under-Secretary-General further reported that due to the COVID -19 related restrictions millions of people were unable to travel freely across the contact line and, as a consequence of increased isolation and abrupt loss of access to basic services and livelihoods, the needs of that already vulnerable population had been exacerbated. She further called for safe and unimpeded access by humanitarian actors and early and adequate funding to continue to meet the needs of vulnerable people in both Government-controlled and in non-Government-controlled areas. The Under-Secretary-General concluded by pointing out that, despite the persistent tensions, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had seen the previous year the lowest number of civilian casualties since the beginning of the conflict and underlined that the overall adherence to the ceasefire had been an important factor in that trend that had to continue. In concluding, she said that the world was looking to the collective security mechanisms in Europe, but also to the Security Council, to help ease tensions.

Following the Under-Secretary-General, the Special Representative of the OSCE in Europe Chairperson-in-Office said that it was impossible to address the Donbas issue without paying attention to the bigger context, which was the tense security situation around Ukraine and in the region, as well as intensive, high-level diplomacy. While noting that the bigger context had a strong interlinkage with the work of the Trilateral Contact Group, he noted that the positions of the participants to the discussions were too far from each other, affirming that it was not possible to resolve the conflict related to eastern Ukraine within the Contact Group. He observed that none of the elements of the Minsk agreements had been implemented or, at least, fully implemented while emphasizing that everyone involved in the discussion of the Contact Group needed to bear responsibility for carrying out what had been agreed. Highlighting that the security situation along the contact line in eastern Ukraine was one of the key focuses of the work of the Contact Group, he stressed that it was important to continue to stay calm along the contact line and avoid provocations. In this regard, the Special Representative further informed the Council about recent political, military and humanitarian developments on the ground emphasizing that all participants needed to remain committed to the goal of restoring Ukraine's

sovereignty over the totality of its territory. He added that the unprecedented international focus on Ukraine and the region should be used as an opportunity to unblock the work of the Contact Group which he noted had been meeting in video format in online meetings for almost two years. He expressed resolve to return to the face-to-face meetings bringing together Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE, as well as representatives of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The Chief Monitor of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine updated the Council on the impact of the eight-year conflict on the civilian population and the Monitoring Mission's increasingly challenging operational environment. He reported that the situation remained fraught with tension and expressed deep concern that the Mission had been deprived of its operational freedom and independence. In this context, he further explained that the Mission had been vilified in public rhetoric and its technical monitoring tools had been subjected to intense interference and it had suffered temporary blockades in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. He noted that since the last briefing to the Council, the security situation in eastern Ukraine had remained volatile with an increase in the level of armed conflict and kinetic activity, including destructive weapons, and a high number of ceasefire violations on both sides of the contact line resulting in civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. The Chief Monitor emphasized that in such challenging circumstances, it was imperative for the sides to strictly adhere to the ceasefire, reduce tensions and allow space for negotiations. Expressing hope that the recent resumption of the Normandy Four consultations and other confidence-building efforts under the auspices of the OSCE would provide much-needed political impetus for the conflict-resolution process to move forward, he called for the signatories of the Minsk agreements to adhere to all their commitments and urged the restoration of the Monitoring Mission's freedom of movement.

The Ukrainian civil activist affirmed that the authorities in Kyiv never had the intention of implementing the first package of the Minsk agreement and, to an even lesser degree, the subsequent Minsk package of measures agreement. She added that there was absolutely no explanation for the "Western hysteria" about Russia being about to invade and sustained that "the West" wanted a war with Russia, and that it wanted that war to take place on Ukraine's territory.

Following the briefing, Council Members discussed the security situation in and around Ukraine and its connection with the European security architecture. Reaffirming the support for the Minsk agreements, Council members expressed concerns at the military build-up by the Russian Federation at the border with Ukraine. Council members also expressed diverging views on the likelihood of a military invasion while affirming their support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.<sup>717</sup> In this regard, a majority of Council members called on both parties to de-escalate and engage instead in diplomacy and dialogue.<sup>718</sup> Most Council members affirmed that the Minsk agreements remained the framework for achieving a negotiated solution through the Normandy Format and the Trilateral Contact Group.<sup>719</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation recalled, however, that the Normandy Format, according to annex II to resolution [2202 \(2015\)](#), was a mechanism to oversee implementation and not a discussion forum on new decisions.

Council members also expressed concern at the resolution of the Russian State Duma calling on the President of the Russian Federation to recognize the self-declared People's Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk as independent States.<sup>720</sup> In response, the representative of the Russian Federation encouraged Council members to concentrate on the implementation of the Minsk agreements instead of speculating about the initiative — an appeal from the members of the State Duma.

Council members also exchanged views about the dire humanitarian situation after eight years of conflict. The representative of Norway stressed that civilians were increasingly losing access to essential life-saving services and humanitarian assistance and that any escalation of the conflict would lead to devastating humanitarian consequences. The delegations of Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, Ghana and Mexico further called for removing obstacles to the flow of humanitarian aid and freedom of movement of civilians in conflict areas. Some delegations also expressed concern at the obstacles to the freedom of movement of the Special Monitoring

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<sup>717</sup> See [S/PV.8968](#), United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, Kenya, Ghana, Albania and France. For more details on the discussion, see part III, sect. II.

<sup>718</sup> United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, India, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, France and Gabon.

<sup>719</sup> United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Brazil, Ireland, India, Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Ghana, France and Gabon.

<sup>720</sup> Norway, Ireland and France. For more information on the discussion, see part III, sect. II.

Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe impeding the implementation of its mandate.<sup>721</sup>

In addition to Council members, the representatives of Ukraine and Germany participated in the meeting and delivered statements. In his statement, the representative of Ukraine underscored that Russia's recognition of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic was tantamount to the withdrawal from the Minsk agreements. He called on the Russian Federation to take a constructive stance towards achieving progress within the framework of the existing negotiation formats and warned that Russia would bear full responsibility for undermining the Minsk agreements and the process of peaceful settlement of the armed conflict. With reference to the Charter of the United Nations, the representative of Germany underscored that the Russian State Duma resolution ran counter to the Minsk agreement and constituted a further breach of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. She deplored Russia's failure to provide any satisfactory explanation for the military build-up on the Ukrainian border and called on Russia to immediately withdraw its troops in a substantial and verifiable manner.

On 23 March, at a meeting convened under the same item, the Council voted on a draft resolution submitted by Belarus, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic.<sup>722</sup> The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes.<sup>723</sup> Among other aspects contained in the draft resolution, the Council would have demanded that civilians, including humanitarian personnel and persons in vulnerable situations, including women and children, were fully protected and that provisions of international humanitarian law in connection with objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure were fully respected by all parties.<sup>724</sup> It would have also called upon Member States to fund the flash appeal launched by the United Nations for the humanitarian response in Ukraine, as well as the regional refugee response plan for Ukraine.<sup>725</sup>

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<sup>721</sup> See [S/PV.8968](#), Ireland, Mexico, Ukraine and Germany.

<sup>722</sup> See [S/2022/231](#). See also [S/PV.9002](#).

<sup>723</sup> The result of the votes was as follows: *For*: China and Russian Federation), *Abstaining*: Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>724</sup> See [S/2022/231](#), paras. 1 and 3.

<sup>725</sup> *Ibid.*, para 6.

In addition, the Council would have called upon all parties concerned to allow safe and unhindered passage to destinations outside of Ukraine, including to foreign nationals without discrimination, and to facilitate safe and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in need in and around Ukraine.<sup>726</sup>

Before the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation took the floor to reject the assertion that the Council could not adopt a resolution on the Ukrainian humanitarian dossier. He affirmed that his delegation was submitting for a vote a draft resolution, based on the French-Mexican draft text, and was not politicized in any way, adding that it was analogous to other humanitarian draft resolutions adopted by the Council.<sup>727</sup> The representative of the United States also speaking before the vote, said that it was unconscionable that Russia would have the audacity to put forward a draft resolution asking the international community to solve a humanitarian crisis that Russia alone had created. She explained that the United States intended to abstain in the voting on the text because, to state the obvious, Russia did not care about the deteriorating humanitarian conditions.

After the vote, some delegations explained their abstentions by pointing out the lack of reference to immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities in the draft resolution.<sup>728</sup> The representative of France also explained that France and Mexico negotiated, in good faith, a draft resolution in the Security Council with the objective of obtaining an immediate cessation of hostilities and to provide a concrete response to the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Ukraine. He added that given the reality of Russian obstruction, together they decided to take that initiative to the General Assembly, where a transregional group had developed a draft resolution.<sup>729</sup> In this regard, the representative of the United Kingdom added that the General Assembly would soon vote on a draft resolution that made clear that the only way to end the humanitarian crisis was for Russia to end the war. The representative of Ghana explained the abstention affirming that his delegation did not believe that the draft resolution spoke to the position of the international community on the course of the humanitarian catastrophe, nor did it address the requirement for an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities. In

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<sup>726</sup> Ibid., para. 4.

<sup>727</sup> See [S/PV.9002](#).

<sup>728</sup> France, Ghana, Mexico, Ireland, Brazil and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>729</sup> For further information on the relations between the Council and the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.

explaining his delegation's vote, the representative of Mexico clarified that following the announcement that Mexico and France made on 14 March that they were going to take the initiative to the General Assembly, which had the item under consideration on its agenda pursuant to its resolution 377 (V), the Russian Federation decided, without prior warning, to submit an alternative draft text to be voted upon the following day. He argued that such conduct stood in contradiction with the willingness to engage in a dialogue with which Mexico and France led the process from the start.<sup>730</sup> The representative of Ireland explained that his country could not vote in favour of a draft resolution that purported to address the humanitarian situation, but which did not recognize the cause of the humanitarian crisis that was engulfing Ukraine. In this connection, the representative of Norway said that a party to a conflict could not expect to be perceived as neutral. In the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, she added that it should neither be the author of Council draft resolutions, nor should it take part in voting on the very same conflict to which it is a party. The representative of Gabon explained the abstention indicating that his delegation would do so every time it believed that humanitarian issues were being instrumentalized for hidden purposes, adding that humanitarian issues should be the permanent consensus of the social compact of humankind. The representative of the United Arab Emirates explained that while agreement was not possible, the Council could not abrogate its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The representative of the United States took the floor again after the vote to underline that it was not necessary to veto; thirteen members of the Security Council abstained, and that was all that was required to defeat the draft resolution.

The representative of China explained that his country's vote in favour was based on their call for the international community to attach high importance to the humanitarian issue in Ukraine and for the parties concerned to strengthen coordination on humanitarian issues so as to effectively protect the safety of civilians. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the vote that had taken place had exposed all those for whom politicizing the humanitarian file was more important than helping the United Nations to provide humanitarian aid to Ukrainians in need.

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<sup>730</sup> For further details on the discussion, see part II, sect. VII.

**Meetings: Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))**

<i>Meeting and Sub-date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8968</a> 17 February 2022			Germany, Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Special Representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group, Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Ukrainian civil society activist.	All Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees <sup>b</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9002</a> 23 March 2022	Draft resolution submitted by Belarus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Syrian Arab Republic ( <a href="#">S/2022/231</a> )		Belarus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Syrian Arab Republic		13 Council members, <sup>c</sup> all invitees	Draft resolution ( <a href="#">S/2022/231</a> ) not adopted 2-0-13 <sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The Russian Federation was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; the United States was represented by its Secretary of State and the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for Europe and North America.

<sup>b</sup> The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group, the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and the Ukrainian civil society activist participated in the meeting via videoconference from Kyiv.

<sup>c</sup> France, United Kingdom, Albania, Ghana, Mexico, Ireland, Norway, Brazil, China, Gabon, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United States and Mexico.

<sup>d</sup> *For*: China and Russian Federation; *against*: none; *abstaining*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.



### **C. Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine**

During the period under review, on 11 April 2022, the Security Council introduced a new item on its agenda entitled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”.<sup>731</sup> In connection with this item, the Council held 18 public meetings in 2022, most of which took the form of briefings. In addition, the Council issued one presidential statement,<sup>732</sup> and failed to adopt a draft resolution,<sup>733</sup> owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. Besides meetings, Council members also held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.<sup>734</sup>

At the first meeting under this item, on 11 April 2022, Council members discussed its scope.<sup>735</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation said that his delegation was not against adding the item to the agenda of the Security Council and had concluded that it covered all kinds of aspects of the situation in Ukraine and was, therefore, in essence universal in character. In this regard, he proposed to delete the two other items pertaining to Ukraine from the agenda of the Security Council, namely, the letters from Russia and Ukraine dating from 2014 ([S/2022/264](#) and [S/2014/136](#), respectively), which reflected common sense as well as the current situation. Bearing in mind the foregoing, he called on the presidency of the Council to take the necessary procedural steps to formalize adding the new agenda item and deleting the two older ones. By contrast, the representative of the United States clarified that the meeting had been proposed without prejudice to the agenda items in relation to the 2014 letters. She added that while the scope of the situation in Ukraine had grown far beyond the circumstances in 2014, it was important to recognize its history, and it was possible that Member States would wish to focus on Crimea during future meetings. Against this backdrop, she said that the earlier agenda items must remain in place. In response, the president of the Council noted that the process for removing

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<sup>731</sup> For more details, see part II, sect. II.A.

<sup>732</sup> See [S/PV.9028](#), [S/PRST/2022/3](#).

<sup>733</sup> See [S/PV.9143](#). See also [S/2022/720](#).

<sup>734</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 39.A.

<sup>735</sup> See [S/PV.9013](#).

items was normally governed by the Security Council's latest note by the President ([S/2017/507](#)) on its working methods and usually took three years. Given the split views heard, she proposed to discuss the issue separately and seek to agree a way forward in the following days.<sup>736</sup>

Briefings and deliberations under this agenda item focused on a broad range of topics, principally the political, security and humanitarian aspects of the conflict in Ukraine, including the political process to end the conflict; the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country; the reports of attacks on nuclear facilities; the implementation and extension of the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the impact of the war on global food insecurity. Briefings and discussions also covered the mass displacement of population and refugee crisis, the allegations of war crimes, human rights violations, and atrocity crimes. In addition to Council members, Ukraine participated in most of the meetings under this item under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. Also invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure were the following Member States: Belarus, Czechia, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and Türkiye.

In 2022, the Council heard three briefings by the Secretary-General,<sup>737</sup> eight briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs,<sup>738</sup> and two briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.<sup>739</sup> The Council also heard briefings by the Executive Director of UN-Women, the Director of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Office of Emergency Programmes, the United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Deputy Executive Director for Programmes at United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Special Adviser on

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<sup>736</sup> In 2022, all three agenda items remained on the list of matters of which the Council was seized. For more details, see part II, sect. II.

<sup>737</sup> See [S/PV.9027](#), [S/PV.9115](#) and [S/PV.9135](#).

<sup>738</sup> See [S/PV.9080](#), [S/PV.9104](#), [S/PV.9115](#), [S/PV.9126](#), [S/PV.9138](#), [S/PV.9161](#), [S/PV.9195](#) and [S/PV.9202](#).

<sup>739</sup> See [S/PV.9027](#) and [S/PV.9208](#).

the Prevention of Genocide, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ukraine. During the period under review, the Council also heard briefings from six civil society representatives during five of its meetings.<sup>740</sup>

At the first meeting held on 11 April, the Executive Director of UN-Women reported on her recent visit to Moldova and on the impact of the war on civilians, women, and children specifically. She also described the efforts of neighbouring countries and civil society partners in receiving Ukrainian refugees to ensure that the basic needs were met, and services provided. The Executive Director highlighted that women continued to serve and lead their communities and support internally displaced persons, and stressed that it was vital that they were consulted and engaged in all decisions related to the crisis and to peace.<sup>741</sup> At the same meeting, the Director of the Office of Emergency Programmes of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) said with reference to his recent mission to Ukraine that he had rarely seen so much damage caused in so little time adding that the attack on Kramatorsk train station had been particularly horrifying. The station had been a critical route for thousands of families fleeing Donetsk oblast, an area that had seen some of the war's worst violence and destruction. When the station was attacked, it was filled with families desperate to escape, which he denounced as a blatant disregard for civilian lives and international humanitarian law. He said that children, families and communities were under attack, adding that of the 3.2 million children estimated to have remained in their homes, nearly half could be at risk of not having enough food. Attacks on the water-system infrastructure and power outages had left an estimated 1.4 million people without access to water in Ukraine with another 4.6 million people with only limited access. He also reported that hundreds of schools and educational facilities had been attacked or used for military purposes and expressed concern about the widespread presence of explosive remnants of war, which exposed children to the risk of death and horrendous injury.

At her briefing on 19 April, the United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided an update on the situation of Ukrainian refugees in receiving countries and

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<sup>740</sup> See [S/PV.9013](#), [S/PV.9027](#), [S/PV.9056](#), [S/PV.9069](#) and [S/PV.9126](#).

<sup>741</sup> See [S/PV.9013](#).

displaced people within Ukraine. The Deputy High Commissioner further reported that in Ukraine the vast majority of people on the move were women and children and the risk of gender-based violence, trafficking and sexual exploitation and abuse was high.<sup>742</sup> At the same meeting, the Director General of the International Organization for Migration expressed concern about the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Ukraine and appealed to the parties to the conflict to honour all their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect civilians, their homes and civilian infrastructure. He highlighted specific risks for internally, displaced people, refugees and third-country nationals, including a negative psychological impact and mental health problems, and the concerning situation of women and children vulnerable to trafficking, violence, including sexual violence, exploitation and abuse.

At the meeting on 5 May, the Secretary-General addressed the Security Council on his recent visit to the Russian Federation and Ukraine, where he met with President Putin and President Zelenskyy on 26 April and 28 April, respectively. He explained that, as part of his visit, he also held discussions with President Erdoğan in Ankara and President Duda in Rzeszów, Poland stating that he said the same in Moscow, Kyiv and New York, namely that Russia's invasion of Ukraine was a violation of its territorial integrity and the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>743</sup> He emphasized the importance of humanitarian access and evacuations and the establishment of safe corridors, and discussed the global impact of the war on energy markets and financial systems, leading to the establishment of the Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy, and Finance to address these challenges. Following the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator focused on the increased threat of gender-based violence and allegations of sexual violence. He also highlighted the efforts of the United Nations and its partners in responding to humanitarian needs, including assisting displaced people, restoring basic services, and negotiating aid delivery and safe evacuations for civilians in active conflict areas. At the same meeting, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) briefed the Council on the allegations of violations of international human rights law and of international humanitarian law in the

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<sup>742</sup> See [S/PV.9018](#).

<sup>743</sup> See [S/PV.9027](#).

context of the Russian Federation's armed attack on Ukraine. The High Commissioner also briefed the Council on the arbitrary detention and possible forced disappearances of civilians and ill-treatment and summary execution of prisoners of war committed by both parties and urged the parties to the conflict to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law allegedly committed by their armed forces.

On 12 May, the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator provided an update on the joint efforts by the United Nations to negotiate humanitarian pauses to allow safe passage for civilians trapped in the fighting.<sup>744</sup> She stressed that, under international humanitarian law, the parties must respect all civilians and essential infrastructure and urged to remove any barriers to the movement of humanitarian staff to ensure the continued delivery of life-saving assistance across Ukraine. At the same meeting, the Deputy Executive Director for Programmes at UNICEF said that like all wars, the war in Ukraine was a child-protection and child-rights crisis. In this regard, he informed the Council about the verified cases of child death, injuries, displacement and grave child rights violations and attacks on schools and the critical infrastructure, including hospitals and water and sanitation systems.

At her briefing on 6 June, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict described the mounting allegations of conflict-related sexual violence, occurring against women, girls, men and boys.<sup>745</sup> In that regard, she acknowledged and commended the leadership of the Ukrainian authorities in their agreement of a framework of cooperation with the United Nations on the prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence. The framework would serve as the basis for a comprehensive and multifaceted preventive and service response and more effective coordination of all stakeholders, including the United Nations agencies in Ukraine and neighbouring countries. It aimed at strengthening the rule of law and accountability and at the capacity of the security and defence sector to prevent sexual violence. It also focused on ensuring that survivors of the sexual violence and their children had access to comprehensive services and that sexual violence was addressed in the

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<sup>744</sup> See [S/PV.9032](#).

<sup>745</sup> See [S/PV.9056](#).

framework of a ceasefire agreement and that such crimes were ultimately reflected in the specific provisions of any peace agreement. She further stressed equal and meaningful participation of women in all political processes, including negotiations for peace. Further in connection with other aspects of the framework, she emphasized on the action required to address conflict-related trafficking in person for the purposes of sexual exploitation and prostitution. She drew attention to the human trafficking dimensions of women and children fleeing the conflict, targeted for trafficking and exploitation, and protection challenges to address the pace and volume of displacement. Underlining that the framework of cooperation made women and girls in conflict settings an explicit priority, she called for the solidarity of the Council and the international donor community to support the Ukrainian authorities and relevant United Nations entities to implement the framework.

At the meeting held on 21 June, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide provided a briefing on the topic of incitement to violence, leading to atrocity crimes.<sup>746</sup> In this regard, she informed Council members about serious allegations, including indications of the possible commission of genocide and war crimes, in Ukraine. She reminded that the prevention of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes was a legal obligation for States under international law.

The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs did not address the Council until June and during her eight briefings she focused on the ongoing political, security and humanitarian challenges facing Ukraine and on the multi-dimensional threats beyond its borders. She also provided updates in connection with the attacks on civilians and critical civilian infrastructure and the mass displacement of the population.

During her briefing on 28 June, the Under-Secretary-General emphasized that the work of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine established by the Human Rights Council, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and other fact-finding efforts were essential to establishing accountability for the crimes and atrocities committed during the

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<sup>746</sup> See [S/PV.9069](#).

war and to prevent such violations in the future.<sup>747</sup> On 29 July, the Under-Secretary-General focused, among other topics, on the developments relating to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, noting that it was a sign of possible dialogue between the parties. She also underlined that despite the encouraging developments on grain and fertilizer, the lack of prospects for a shift towards a meaningful resumption of diplomatic efforts to end the war remained concerning and the escalatory rhetoric from any side was not consistent with the constructive spirit demonstrated at the signing of the agreement in Istanbul.<sup>748</sup>

At the meeting on 24 August, the Secretary-General provided an update on the progress of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, commending Ukraine, Russia and the Government of Türkiye for their constructive approach and efforts and calling on for a significant increase in support for developing countries to capitalize on the opportunities of the Initiative.<sup>749</sup> He also expressed concern about the ongoing fighting in Ukraine and the situation surrounding the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and highlighted allegations of violations of international humanitarian law and violations of abuses of human rights related to armed conflict. Following the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs said that the war was weakening the foundations of the international system and voiced concern at the reports of human rights violations and the arbitrary detention and forced disappearances of civilians, including local authorities, journalists, civil society activists.

On 7 September, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs focused during her briefing on the large-scale displacement of population, highlighting that Ukrainian women, who constituted half of those refugees, continued to face significantly increased security risks, including sexual and gender-based violence, trafficking, exploitation and abuse.<sup>750</sup> At the same meeting, the Under-Secretary-General expressed concern at the reports of attacks in the vicinity of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and urged all concerned to provide maximum cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Following the Under-Secretary-General, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights reported that armed

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<sup>747</sup> See [S/PV.9080](#).

<sup>748</sup> See [S/PV.9104](#).

<sup>749</sup> See [S/PV.9115](#).

<sup>750</sup> See [S/PV.9126](#).

attacks by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, along with human rights violations in territories occupied by Russian or controlled by affiliated armed force groups, had led to people fleeing to various regions, including territories under Russian control and to Russia itself. Her briefing highlighted credible allegations of forced transfers of unaccompanied children to Russian occupied areas and concerns about granting Russian citizenship to such children without parental consent, in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Civilians were subjected to so called filtration, a system of security checks and personal data collection, resulting in numerous human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and enforced disappearance. She urged the Russian Federation to provide unimpeded access to international monitors for all places of detention under their control and to allow representatives of human rights and humanitarian organizations to safely access conflict-affected individuals in the Russian Federation and occupied areas in Ukraine.

During a meeting on 22 September, the Secretary-General expressed concern at the reports of plans to organize so-called referendums in areas of Ukraine that were not under Government control at that time.<sup>751</sup> He underlined that any annexation of a State's territory by another State resulting from the threat or use of force was a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Following the Secretary-General, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court briefed the Council on the ongoing investigations in Ukraine. He underlined the fact that 43 State parties to the Rome Statute, one third of the Assembly, referred the matter to the Court signifying not only the nature of the crisis and the concern expressed but also an understanding that the law had an important role to play.

During her briefing on 27 September, the Under-Secretary-General reported on the so-called referendums conducted by de facto authorities in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya regions, underlining that given that those exercises had been held during active armed conflict they could not be called a genuine expression of the popular will and could not be regarded as legal under international law.<sup>752</sup> She also noted the alarming rhetoric regarding the

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<sup>751</sup> See [S/PV.9135](#).

<sup>752</sup> See [S/PV.9138](#).



use of nuclear weapons, which she deemed inconsistent with the joint statement of the leaders of the five-nuclear weapon States on preventing nuclear war and avoiding arms race.

On 21 October, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs informed the Council that the Russian Federation launched a series of attacks on cities and towns across the country and expressed grave concern about the destruction of critical energy infrastructure.<sup>753</sup> She also reported that, based on the report to the General Assembly submitted by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, there were grounds to conclude that war crimes and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law had been committed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022. She also expressed concern about the announcements of the Russian Federation to introduce martial law in the regions of Ukraine under its temporary military control and about the evacuation in Kherson amid intensified fighting on the ground. On the Black Sea Grain Initiative, she noted that the agreement had helped to lower and stabilize global food prices and to move grain from one of the world's breadbaskets to those in need and emphasized the critical nature of its extension for the maintenance of food security worldwide. Following the Under-Secretary-General, the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ukraine provided a briefing about the human toll of the war, the new dimensions of the humanitarian crisis and the challenge of access to non-Government controlled areas. With particular emphasis on the urgent need for humanitarian assistance and greater access to deliver aid, he underlined that, despite the challenges, humanitarian efforts had been made to provide assistance, but more support was needed to alleviate the suffering of the affected population.

On 16 November, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs said that Ukrainians had suffered some of the most intense bombardments of the war noting that Russian missiles and drones had rained down on Kyiv, Mykolayiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Kharkiv, Lviv, Poltava and elsewhere, destroying or damaging homes and severely disrupting critical services.<sup>754</sup> She added that the military dynamics on the ground continued to evolve with no end in sight to the war. She also said that allegations of atrocities

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<sup>753</sup> See [S/PV.9161](#).

<sup>754</sup> See [S/PV.9195](#).

and human rights violations in Ukraine during the war were extensive and highlighted grave concerns about the rights, safety and security of the youngest Ukrainians including reports of forced transfers of children, including of some under institutionalized care, to Russian-occupied territory or to the Russian Federation. She also expressed concern at the conditions of prisoners of war and affirmed that the extension of the Black Sea Grain Initiative remained critical in order to avoid a food crisis for millions of people. She also added that the risk of a nuclear incident in the context of the open hostilities in Ukraine remained an unacceptable danger, and echoed the serious concerns expressed by numerous Member States in that regard.

During her briefing on 23 November, the Under-Secretary-General reported on a new wave of missile and drone strikes in Ukraine.<sup>755</sup> She said that attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure were prohibited under international humanitarian law as well as attacks on military objectives that might be expected to cause harm to civilians that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. In this regard, she said that the United Nations strongly condemned those attacks and demanded that the Russian Federation immediately ceased those actions. She also expressed the remaining deep concern about the situation at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and said that the reported shelling at the plant over the weekend had been reckless and deplorable. Amid the dark news, she mentioned a positive development, namely that the parties had reported yet another prisoner exchange. At the last meeting under this item in 2022, held on 6 December, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator focused on the widespread death, destruction, displacement and suffering caused by the war, the ongoing humanitarian operations and the challenges that the humanitarian community continued to face amid winter temperatures. Gender-based violence targeting women and girls continued to be pervasive and underreported.<sup>756</sup> While there had been improvement in humanitarian access in eastern and southern oblasts, the biggest challenge remained the impediments to reaching areas in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya.

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<sup>755</sup> See [S/PV.9202](#).

<sup>756</sup> See [S/PV.9208](#).

In 2022, the deliberations in the Council under this item focused principally on the political, security and humanitarian developments in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine as well as on the possible accountability concerning the alleged war crimes and violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed in Ukraine.

Insofar as it concerns the political situation, Council members called for de-escalation and peaceful resolution of the conflict by returning to diplomacy and political dialogue. On May 6, the Council held a meeting to issue a presidential statement in which it expressed deep concern regarding the maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine, recalled that all Member States had undertaken, under the Charter of the United Nations, the obligation to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and expressed strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General in the search for a peaceful solution.<sup>757</sup> In addition, Council members addressed the so-called referendums conducted by the Russian Federation in eastern and southern Ukraine. In this connection, on 30 September, the Council voted on a draft resolution submitted by Albania and the United States.<sup>758</sup> The text of the draft resolution condemned the illegal referendums, called on all States not to recognize any alteration of the status of Ukraine's regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson or Zaporizhzhya and decided that Russia should immediately withdraw its troops from Ukraine. The draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.<sup>759</sup> Speaking prior to the vote as the penholder of the draft resolution together with Albania, the representative of the United States underlined that this was exactly what the Security Council was made to do: defend sovereignty, protect territorial integrity, and promote peace and security and urged all members to vote in favour.<sup>760</sup> The representative of the United Kingdom also spoke before the vote urging to condemn Russia's actions and vote in favour of the draft resolution as members of the Security Council, with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. In reference to

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<sup>757</sup> See [S/PRST/2022/3](#). For more information concerning the decisions of the Council relating to Chapter VI of the Charter in 2022, see part VI, sect. IV.

<sup>758</sup> See [S/2022/720](#).

<sup>759</sup> *For*: Albania, France, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: Russian Federation; *abstaining*: Brazil, China, Gabon, India. Further to the veto cast at the meeting, pursuant to GA resolution [76/262](#), the Security Council transmitted a special report to the Assembly ([A/77/551](#)). For further details, see part IV, sect. I. F.

<sup>760</sup> See [S/PV.9143](#).

the draft resolution, the representative of the Russian Federation argued instead that such openly hostile actions on the part of the West were a refusal to engage and cooperate within the Council. He noted that the Council had had the opportunity to adopt a truly balanced and useful document. He also stated that the authors of the draft resolution were prepared to devalue the efforts of the Council as the principal organ for the maintenance of peace and security and brazenly used the forum as a dress rehearsal before their main performance in the General Assembly. After the vote, some members expressed rejection at the veto by the Russian Federation,<sup>761</sup> while most members expressed support and commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In explaining their abstentions, the representatives of India, China, Brazil and Gabon expressed support for a diplomatic and negotiated solution to the conflict. The representative of China also recalled his country's position on the conflict, including that the legitimate security concerns of all parties should be taken seriously. He added that any action taken by the Security Council should be truly conducive to easing the situation and resolving the crisis, rather than intensifying conflict and exacerbating confrontation. He also expressed the view that facts had shown that political isolation, sanctions and pressure, stoking tensions and bloc confrontation would not bring about peace. The representative of Brazil further explained that the scope and language of the draft resolution did not favour an environment conducive to a solution to the conflict in Ukraine. Having voted in favor, the representative of Kenya acknowledged that the draft resolution, whether in the Council or in the General Assembly, would not solve the crisis adding that his country's affirmative vote was based on Kenya's principled defence of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, its protection of the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States. Council members also deliberated on the implications of the war vis-à-vis the Charter of the United Nations during other meetings. Some delegations underlined that the situation in Ukraine was a violation of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations<sup>762</sup> and stressed the role of the Security Council in conflict resolution<sup>763</sup> and its responsibility to maintain international peace and

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<sup>761</sup> Ibid., Norway, United Kingdom, Ireland, Ghana and France.

<sup>762</sup> See [S/PV.9104](#), Albania, United States, Norway, Mexico and Latvia; [S/PV.9115](#), Mexico; [S/PV.9135](#), Mexico and Ireland; [S/PV.9138](#), Mexico and Norway. For more information details on the discussions concerning Article 2(4) of the Charter, see part III, sect II.

<sup>763</sup> See [S/PV.9018](#), Ukraine; [S/PV.9135](#), Ghana; [S/PV.9138](#), United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9143](#), China.

security.<sup>764</sup> Several delegations also drew attention to the situation in Ukraine as a threat to international peace and security<sup>765</sup> and to the right of Ukraine to self-defense, under Article 51 of the Charter.<sup>766</sup> Several Council members also recognized the negotiation efforts of the United Nations and its partners with the parties to the conflict, particularly the Secretary-General's visits to Moscow and Kyiv, to create conditions for a solution to the ongoing security and humanitarian situation.<sup>767</sup>

Regarding the security and humanitarian situation, Council members discussed during the year the protection of civilians and critical infrastructure and human rights in the context of the war in Ukraine. Members underlined that attacks against civilians and critical infrastructure were in violation of international law,<sup>768</sup> and those responsible for the committed war atrocities must be held accountable.<sup>769</sup> On 16 November, after the latest launch of air and missile and bombardments against critical civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian cities, some delegations emphasized the responsibility of the Russian Federation in creating the current humanitarian and displacement crisis and called on Russia for a cessation of hostilities.<sup>770</sup> Focusing attention on the deepening humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine, speakers urged the parties to guarantee access to humanitarian aid for the people in need and to essential services which had been disrupted by the conflict.<sup>771</sup> Council members also focused on addressing and preventing

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<sup>764</sup> See [S/PV.9018](#), Kenya and Ukraine; [S/PV.9032](#), Kenya; [S/PV.9080](#), Ukraine and Poland; [S/PV.9104](#), United Arab Emirates and Ghana; [S/PV.9115](#), United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9135](#), Norway, Mexico, United States, Ireland, Brazil, Czechia and Poland; [S/PV.9143](#), United States, United Kingdom and Ukraine; [S/PV.9161](#), Ireland. For more information on the functions and powers of the Council, see part V.

<sup>765</sup> See [S/PV.9056](#), Ukraine; [S/PV.9104](#), Kenya; [S/PV.9115](#), Russian Federation; [S/PV.9126](#), Kenya; [S/PV.9135](#), Ukraine; [S/PV.9143](#), Norway. For information on threats to international peace and security considered by the Council in 2022, see part VII, sect. I.

<sup>766</sup> See [S/PV.9135](#), Norway, United States, Ghana and Ukraine; [S/PV.9138](#), France; [S/PV.9161](#), France; [S/PV.9080](#), United Kingdom; [S/PV.9195](#), United States, France, United Kingdom and Estonia. For more details on Article 51 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. X.A.

<sup>767</sup> See [S/PV.9027](#), Albania, Mexico, Ghana, China, Kenya, Brazil, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Gabon, Norway and India; [S/PV.9115](#), Albania, Norway, United Kingdom, Brazil, Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Ghana, Mexico and China; [S/PV.9135](#), Norway, Mexico, United States, China, Ireland.

<sup>768</sup> See [S/PV.9161](#), Mexico, France, Kenya, United States, Ireland, Ghana and Norway; [S/PV.9208](#), France, Brazil, Norway, Ghana and Albania.

<sup>769</sup> See [S/PV.9161](#), France, Ireland, Ghana and Norway; [S/PV.9069](#), United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Kenya, Ireland, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, Gabon and Ghana; [S/PV.9208](#), Mexico, Norway, Ireland and Albania.

<sup>770</sup> See [S/PV.9195](#), Albania, United Kingdom, Ireland, Ghana, Ukraine and European Union.

<sup>771</sup> *Ibid.*, Mexico, Ireland, Ghana, Norway, Gabon, Ukraine, Estonia and European Union.

national, racial or religious hatred as potential triggers for the commission of atrocity crimes in a debate on disinformation campaigns, propaganda and hate speech online and in the mainstream media.<sup>772</sup>

In their discussions concerning the alleged war crimes and violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed in Ukraine, in 2022, Council members stressed the importance of establishing facts and ensuring accountability. They expressed support for the investigation launched by national authorities and the International Criminal Court,<sup>773</sup> and for the establishment by the Human Rights Council of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry and by the Secretary-General of the Fact-Finding Mission to Olenivka.<sup>774</sup> On May 12, Council members pointed out severe conflict-related effects on education and expressed concern about the risks of human trafficking, sexual exploitation and abuse faced by unaccompanied children seeking refuge.<sup>775</sup> Many speakers condemned attacks against schools,<sup>776</sup> and called on the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict to record the situation in Ukraine in the upcoming report on children and armed conflict listing those responsible for violations against children.<sup>777</sup> On 6 June, during a discussion focused on conflict-related sexual violence and human trafficking, most Council members expressed support for the new framework of cooperation on preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence, signed by the United Nations and the Government of Ukraine.<sup>778</sup> In their remarks on forced displacement and deportations of Ukrainian civilians and “filtration” operations by the Russian and Russian-affiliated forces on 7 September, most members called to enable access for the United Nations agencies to the so-called filtration centres and to the places of forced deportation and relocation for an investigation to ensure accountability and to provide humanitarian assistance.<sup>779</sup>

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<sup>772</sup> See [S/PV.9069](#), United Kingdom, Norway, France, Kenya, Ireland, Mexico and Ghana.

<sup>773</sup> See [S/PV.9027](#), Mexico, France, Ireland, Norway and United States.

<sup>774</sup> See [S/PV.9069](#), United States, Mexico and United Arab Emirates. For more details on the discussion, please see part VI, sect. II.

<sup>775</sup> See [S/PV.9032](#), Mexico, Norway, Brazil and China.

<sup>776</sup> Ibid, France, Ghana, Kenya, Russian Federation, Poland and Slovakia.

<sup>777</sup> Ibid, Mexico, France, Albania, Ireland, United States and Ukraine.

<sup>778</sup> See [S/PV.9056](#), Mexico, United States, China, Norway, Gabon, Kenya, United Arab Emirates and Ireland.

<sup>779</sup> See [S/PV.9126](#), Albania, United States, United Kingdom, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Ireland, Gabon and France.

In addition to the deliberations in the Council on the political, security and humanitarian situation in Ukraine, in 2022, Council members also focused on the effect of the conflict beyond the borders of Ukraine in light of the mass displacement of population and the impact on global food supply. Against the backdrop of mass displacement in Ukraine, the influx of refugees in the neighboring countries and Ukrainians returning home, on 19 April, most delegations commended the neighboring countries and the efforts of the United Nations and its partners for their assistance to the affected people,<sup>780</sup> and expressed support for the Secretary-General's call for an urgent humanitarian pause to enable humanitarian corridors.<sup>781</sup> Some Council members stressed the need for the host countries to ensure protection for third-country nationals and avoid discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity.<sup>782</sup> Concerning the global food insecurity resulting from the conflict, most Council members highlighted the signing of the Black Sea Grain Agreement as an initiative encouraging the parties in support of its renewal and implementation and expressing hope for continuing dialogue and negotiations.<sup>783</sup> During a meeting on 19 April, members also exchanged views about the implications of unilateral sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation on food insecurity and on the energy crisis worldwide, bringing attention to the negative impact on the countries of the developing world.<sup>784</sup> Referring to the findings of the United Nations Global Crisis Response Group established by the Secretary-General to mobilize United Nations agencies, multilateral development banks and other international institutions to help countries faced with those challenges, the representative of India welcomed the recommendations of the Group for exempting purchases of food for humanitarian assistance by the World Food Programme from export restrictions, while the representative Kenya stated that States should resist export restrictions and make reserves

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<sup>780</sup> See [S/PV.9018](#), Mexico, Gabon, Norway, Ghana, Albania, Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine and Estonia.

<sup>781</sup> Ibid., Mexico, France, Norway, China, United States, Albania, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Sweden, Estonia and Slovakia.

<sup>782</sup> Ibid., Ireland, Mexico, France, Gabon, Norway, United States, Brazil and Ghana.

<sup>783</sup> See [S/PV.9104](#), Ireland and Gabon; [S/PV.9115](#), Norway, Brazil, Gabon, Kenya, Ghana, Mexico and China; [S/PV.9135](#), Norway, Mexico and Ghana; [S/PV.9138](#), China and Kenya; [S/PV.9161](#), Mexico, France, China, United States, United Kingdom, Norway; [S/PV.9195](#), United States, Albania, France, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Kenya, India, Ireland, Brazil, China, Norway and Ghana; [S/PV.9202](#), Norway, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Kenya, China and Ghana; [S/PV.9208](#), Mexico, Gabon, China, Norway and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>784</sup> See [S/PV.9018](#), Russian Federation, China, Brazil and Kenya.

available to countries with serious food insecurity.<sup>785</sup> On 29 July, the representative of Kenya underlined that the recommendations and solutions of the Group should receive sufficient financial and operational support and be a bridge to longer-term ambitious reforms and initiatives.<sup>786</sup>

In 2022, Council members also deliberated on the military and security situation in and around Ukrainian nuclear sites, particularly the Zaporizhzhya and Chernobyl nuclear power plants, and the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in preventing the risks of nuclear accidents.<sup>787</sup> On 24 August, the representatives of France and Ireland called on the Russian Federation to withdraw its forces from the Zaporizhzhya power plant and the representative of Gabon called on the parties to comply with nuclear security rules and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency.<sup>788</sup> On 23 November, several members expressed support for the establishment of a security zone in and around the Zaporizhzhya power plant recommended by the Agency,<sup>789</sup> while the representative of the United States underlined that Russia's attacks on infrastructure supporting the safety of Ukraine's nuclear power plants cast doubts on the seriousness with which it was engaging on the prospects of a protection zone around the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant.

Developments in Ukraine were also considered under the items "Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))", "Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))", and "Threats to international peace and security".<sup>790</sup>

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<sup>785</sup> See [S/PV.9018](#), India; [S/PV.9027](#), India; [S/PV.9080](#) India; [S.PV. 9032](#), Kenya.

<sup>786</sup> See [S/PV. 9104](#).

<sup>787</sup> See [S/PV. 9115](#), France, Ireland, Brazil and Gabon; [S/PV. 9126](#), China; [S/PV. 9135](#), Russian Federation; [S/PV.9195](#), France and Mexico and [S/PV. 9102](#), China, Russian Federation and Ghana.

<sup>788</sup> See [S/PV.9115](#), France, Ireland and Gabon.

<sup>789</sup> See [S/PV.9202](#), Albania, Norway, Mexico and Ghana.

<sup>790</sup> See part I, sects. 19.A, 19.B. and 34.



**Meetings: Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine**

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9013</a> 11 April 2022			Germany, Poland, Romania, Ukraine	Executive Director of UN-Women, Director of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Office of Emergency Programmes; President of La Strada-Ukraine <sup>a</sup>	All Council members, <sup>b</sup> all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9018</a> 19 April 2022			Estonia, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine	United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, Director General of the International Organization for Migration <sup>c</sup>	All Council members, <sup>d</sup> all invitees <sup>e</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9027</a> 5 May 2022			Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, <sup>f</sup> Slovakia, Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Advocacy Coordinator at Right to Protection <sup>g</sup>	Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees <sup>h</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9028</a> 6 May 2022						<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/3</a>
<a href="#">S/PV.9032</a> 12 May 2022			Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine	Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Deputy Executive Director for Programmes at UNICEF	All Council members, all invitees <sup>e</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9056</a> 6 June 2022			Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine	Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Co-founder and Director on Strategic Development of the Ukrainian Women's Fund, President of Sesame Workshop, President of the European Council <sup>i</sup>	All Council members, all invitees <sup>h</sup>	

<a href="#">S/PV.9069</a> 21 June 2022	Lithuania, Slovakia, Ukraine	Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Head of the Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security, <sup>i</sup> Chief Executive Officer of Jigsaw and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations	All Council members, all invitees <sup>k</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9080</a> 28 June 2022	Estonia, Poland, Ukraine <sup>l</sup>	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees <sup>s,m</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9104</a> 29 July 2022	Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union	All Council members, all invitees <sup>h</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9115</a> 24 August 2022	Ukraine <sup>k</sup>	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union	Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees <sup>l</sup>	Procedural vote (Rule 37) 13-1-1 <sup>n</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9126</a> 7 September 2022	Italy, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, Coordinator for international cooperation at the Center for Civil Liberties <sup>o</sup>	All Council members, all invitees <sup>h</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9135</a> 22 September 2022	Belarus, Czechia, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Türkiye, Ukraine	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy	Secretary-General, all Council members, <sup>p</sup> nine invitees <sup>k,q,r</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9138</a> 27 September 2022	Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees <sup>s</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9143</a> 30 September 2022	Draft resolution submitted by Albania and United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/720</a> )	Ukraine	All Council members, all invitees	Draft resolution <a href="#">S/2022/720</a> not adopted 10-1-4 <sup>t</sup>

<p><a href="#">S/PV.9161</a> 21 October 2022</p>	<p>Germany, Greece, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine</p>	<p>Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ukraine, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations</p>	<p>All Council members, all invitees<sup>u</sup></p>
<p><a href="#">S/PV.9195</a> 16 November</p>	<p>Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine</p>	<p>Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations</p>	<p>All Council members, invitees<sup>e</sup></p>
<p><a href="#">S/PV.9202</a> 23 November</p>	<p>Republic of Moldova, Romania, Ukraine<sup>v</sup></p>	<p>Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs</p>	<p>All Council members, invitees<sup>w</sup></p>
<p><a href="#">S/PV.9208</a> 6 December</p>	<p>Germany, Latvia, Poland, Ukraine</p>	<p>Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations</p>	<p>All Council members, invitees<sup>h</sup></p>

<sup>a</sup> The President of La Strada-Ukraine participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>b</sup> The United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for South and Central Asia, North Africa, UN and the Commonwealth, and the Prime Minister's Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict.

<sup>c</sup> The United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees and the Director General of the International Organization for Migration participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>d</sup> Ireland was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence.

<sup>e</sup> The representative of Estonia made a statement on behalf of the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The representative of Sweden spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries.

<sup>f</sup> Poland was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and National Heritage of Poland.

<sup>g</sup> The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Advocacy Coordinator at Right to Protection participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>h</sup> The representative of Latvia made a statement on behalf of the three Baltic states.

<sup>i</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the Co-founder and Director on Strategic Development of the Ukrainian Women's Fund participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>j</sup> The Head of the Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>k</sup> The representative of Lithuania made a statement on behalf of the three Baltic states.

<sup>l</sup> Ukraine was represented by its President.

<sup>m</sup> The President of Ukraine participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>n</sup> *For:* Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* Russian Federation; *abstaining:* China.

<sup>o</sup> The Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights and the Coordinator for international cooperation at the Center for Civil Liberties participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>p</sup> Albania was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Brazil, Gabon, Kenya and the Russian Federation were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs. China was represented by its State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs. France was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Ghana was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integrations. Ireland was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence. India was represented by its Minister for External Affairs. Mexico was represented by its Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Norway was represented by its Prime Minister. United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister of State for International Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. The United Kingdom was represented by its Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs. The United States was represented by its Secretary of State.

<sup>q</sup> The representative of Türkiye did not make a statement.

<sup>r</sup> Belarus, Czechia, Germany, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>s</sup> Ukraine was represented by its President, who participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>t</sup> *For:* Albania, France, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* Russian Federation; *abstaining:* Brazil, China, Gabon, India.

<sup>u</sup> The Under-Secretary-General participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>v</sup> Ukraine was represented by its President.

<sup>w</sup> The President of Ukraine participated in the meeting by videoconference.

## Middle East

### 20. The situation in the Middle East

During the period under review, the Security Council held 39 meetings in relation to the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. Consistent with prior practice, most meetings held under this item took the form of briefings.<sup>791</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the tables below. Under this item, Council members considered a variety of topics, principally, the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic; the conflict in Yemen; the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF); and the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In 2022, the Council also held three closed meetings with countries contributing troops and police to UNDOF and UNIFIL.<sup>792</sup> In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole to discuss this item.<sup>793</sup>

In 2022, the Council adopted a total of six resolutions in connection with this item. The Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), on 13 July 2022 for one year until 14 July 2023.<sup>794</sup> On 28 February 2022, the Council renewed the sanctions measures in relation to the situation in Yemen until 28 February 2023 and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for 13 months until 28 March 2023.<sup>795</sup> The Council also renewed twice the mandate of UNDOF for periods of six months each,<sup>796</sup> and extended the mandate of UNIFIL once for a period of 12 months until 31 August 2023.<sup>797</sup>

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<sup>791</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>792</sup> Held in connection with the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop-and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”. For UNDOF, see [S/PV.9060](#) and [S/PV.9212](#); for UNIFIL, see [S/PV.9111](#). See also [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 2B.

<sup>793</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 2.B..

<sup>794</sup> Resolution [2643 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>795</sup> Resolution [2624 \(2022\)](#), paras. 4 and 15.

<sup>796</sup> Resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and [2671 \(2022\)](#), para. 15.

<sup>797</sup> Resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

During the period under review, the meetings in relation to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to focus on three main aspects: the implementation of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process to end the conflict; the humanitarian situation in the country, including the issues of the protection of civilians, the worsening economic crisis and humanitarian access; and the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. Briefings concerning the political process and the humanitarian situation in Syria were often addressed jointly during the same meeting, whereas the proliferation and use of chemical weapons was addressed separately in dedicated meetings.<sup>798</sup>

Regarding the political process, Council members heard regular monthly briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria on the efforts to reach a political solution to the conflict. In this connection, in 2022, the briefings and discussions continued to focus on the progress of the Constitutional Committee in drafting a constitutional text and on the necessary elements for the implementation of resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#), such as a lasting nationwide ceasefire, the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons, the engagement with civil society representatives and women's groups, especially the Women's Advisory Board, for their meaningful participation in the political process, and step-by-step confidence-building. In March 2022, the Special Envoy noted that, there were significant differences between the parties, despite that the seventh session of the Small Body of the Syrian Constitutional Committee took place.<sup>799</sup> Furthermore, the Special Envoy continued to call for a nationwide ceasefire and a focus on supporting the political process.<sup>800</sup> In August, he also expressed concerns about troubling signs of a military escalation and mounting challenges in implementing resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#).<sup>801</sup> He also reported on the developments and status on the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons.<sup>802</sup> In this regard, he stated that his team continued to receive reports of arbitrary arrests throughout the country, while there was nothing new to report six months after the presidential amnesty decree, despite the continued engagement.<sup>803</sup> On 25 October, while

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<sup>798</sup> For more information on the format of meetings in relation to this item, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2018 and 2019*, part II, sect. I and *Supplements 2020 and 2021*, part II.

<sup>799</sup> See [S/PV.9003](#).

<sup>800</sup> See [S/PV.9083](#), [S/PV.9117](#) and [S/PV.9130](#).

<sup>801</sup> See [S/PV.9117](#).

<sup>802</sup> See [S/PV.9130](#).

<sup>803</sup> See [S/PV.9163](#).

pushing all stakeholders to engage in step-for-step confidence-building measures to help advance the implementation of resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#), the Special Envoy reported that he sought to work with the parties and the Co-Chairs of the Constitutional Committee to unblock obstacles to reconvene the Committee so that there would be the political will to engage in a spirit of compromise and at a faster pace, with better working methods and more substance.<sup>804</sup> At the end of 2022, the Special Envoy cautioned against an increase in mutual strikes and violence across northern Syria and reiterated the call by the Secretary-General for all parties to exercise maximum restraint and avoid escalation. Calling for all actors to engage in serious efforts to move towards a nationwide ceasefire, he expressed concern that the Syrian Constitutional committee had not met for six months and underlined the need for all parties to resume and make more substantive the meetings in Geneva.<sup>805</sup> Noting that 2022 saw no tangible progress in the political process, the Special Envoy appealed for all members to get behind the agenda as Syria needed sustained international attention starting with unity in the Council.<sup>806</sup>

In relation to the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, Council members also heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the Director for Operations and Advocacy at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The briefings focused on the findings of the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of relevant resolutions, including resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#) and [2642 \(2022\)](#) which authorized cross-border humanitarian operations.<sup>807</sup> The briefers provided regular updates on the humanitarian conditions in different parts of the country, particularly Idlib in northwestern Syria and the Rukban and Al-Hol refugee camps, and on the efforts of the cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance. During the year, the briefers also reported on the continued economic crisis affecting access to basic services such as water, sanitation, health and education, and the need for funding for early recovery and resilience programs. Furthermore, they also reported to the Council on the status of

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<sup>804</sup> See [S/PV.9163](#).

<sup>805</sup> See [S/PV.9204](#) and [S/PV.9230](#).

<sup>806</sup> See [S/PV.9230](#).

<sup>807</sup> Resolution [2165 \(2014\)](#).

the cross-border and crossline humanitarian deliveries in northwestern Syria and highlighted that cross-border assistance remained the central part of the humanitarian response.

Ahead of the expiration of the humanitarian aid delivery mechanism on 10 July,<sup>808</sup> at a meeting held on 20 June, the Secretary-General emphasized that the United Nations cross-border operation in Syria was one of the most heavily scrutinized and monitored aid operations in the world, and the importance of maintaining and expanding access to aid, including through cross-line and cross-border operations in order to save lives.<sup>809</sup>

With respect to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Council members were regularly briefed by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs on the progress in the implementation of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program. Except for the months of May and August, the Council heard monthly briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, following the practice followed in 2021.<sup>810</sup> In her briefings, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs reported on the activities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and informed the Council about the work undertaken by the Declaration Assessment Team, Fact-Finding Mission and Investigation and Identification Team. The OPCW Technical Secretariat had been unable to conduct a planned deployment of the Assessment Team to the Syrian Arab Republic, and it continued to assess that Syria's declaration was not accurate and complete.<sup>811</sup> In this regard, she reiterated the importance of resolving the remaining outstanding issues of the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic. On 29 April, the High Representative noted that while the Chemical Weapons Convention had achieved significant progress towards the elimination of chemical weapons over the past 25 years the Treaty had been challenged by the use of chemical weapons in Syria, despite Syria's accession to the Convention.<sup>812</sup> In this context, the High Representative noted that efforts to clarify the outstanding issues with Syria's initial declaration and subsequent declarations had not progressed, and that the Syrian Arab Republic

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<sup>808</sup> Resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#).

<sup>809</sup> See [S/PV.9068](#).

<sup>810</sup> For the practice in 2021, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2021*, part I, sect. 19.

<sup>811</sup> See [S/PV.8943](#), [S/PV.8982](#), [S/PV.8990](#), [S/PV.9026](#), [S/PV.9097](#), [S/PV.9141](#), [S/PV.9164](#), [S/PV.9184](#) and [S/PV.9207](#).

<sup>812</sup> [S/PV.9026](#).



continued to place conditions on the OPCW's efforts, violating its obligations under the Convention.<sup>813</sup> Reiterating the continued gaps and inconsistencies and the lack of sufficient technical information, the High Representative called on the Syrian Arab Republic to respond to the Technical Secretariat's request with urgency.<sup>814</sup>

In 2022, in addition to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), the Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and seven civil society representatives provided briefings to the Council members concerning the political and humanitarian situation in the country, specifically on the topics of detainees, abductees and missing persons, the participation of women in the political process, the growing humanitarian needs and the voices of the Syrian people including women, and on restoring the sovereignty in the Syrian Arab Republic.<sup>815</sup> On 27 January, the Under-Secretary-General of UNOCT reported on the attack by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) on Al-Sina'a prison in Hasakah city in north-east Syria and the ongoing fighting which had also affected the civilian population.<sup>816</sup> On 24 March, the Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, briefing the Council against the backdrop of the eleventh year anniversary of the Syrian crisis, announced and elaborated on the decision adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States of 9 March, forming the basis for the Arab position on the humanitarian crisis in the country.<sup>817</sup> He expressed the League's genuine concern about the consequences of the war in Ukraine on the Syrian crisis and the hope that the humanitarian aid mechanism would continue to function across borders to Syria and that it would be renewed in July free from any politicization of the issue.

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<sup>813</sup> [S/PV.9097](#) and [S/PV.9141](#).

<sup>814</sup> [S/PV.9164](#), [S/PV.9184](#) and [S/PV.9207](#).

<sup>815</sup> The following representatives provided briefings to the Council: Director of the Release Me project in northern Syria, on 26 January 2022 ([S/PV.8955](#)); Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council on 27 January 2022 ([S/PV.8957](#)); Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism on 27 January 2022 ([S/PV.8958](#)); Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States on 24 March 2022 ([S/PV.9003](#)); Director for the Middle East and North Africa of CARE International on 26 April 2022 ([S/PV.9022](#)); an OB/GYN, Syrian American Medical Society on 20 May 2022 ([S/PV.9038](#)); NGO Forum Coordinator of North West Syria NGO Forum, Türkiye/Gaziantep on 20 June 2022 ([S/PV.9068](#)); Syrian Emergency Task Force on 29 June 2022 ([S/PV.9083](#)); and the Director of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression on 14 September 2022 ([S/PV.9130](#)).

<sup>816</sup> See [S/PV.8958](#).

<sup>817</sup> See [S/PV.9003](#).

In 2022, in addition to the Syrian conflict, the Council continued to focus on three distinct areas in connection with the conflict in Yemen, namely, the nation-wide ceasefire and political process to find a solution to the conflict, the humanitarian situation in the country, and the sanctions measures in place against individuals and entities designated as engaging in or providing support for acts that threatened the peace, security and stability in Yemen.

Regarding the political process, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen.<sup>818</sup> The briefings focused on updating the Council on the ceasefire introduced and its extensions, as well as the status of the Hodeidah Agreement towards an inclusive political settlement and the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement, including the outcomes of consultations between the parties. In January 2022, the Special Envoy emphasized that the military escalation had accelerated as the parties had doubled-down on military options. He added that seven years down the road of war, the prevailing belief of all warring sides seemed to be that inflicting sufficient harm on the other would force them into submission. He clarified that there was no sustainable long-term solution to be found on the battlefield and stressed that the warring parties should talk, even if they were not ready to put down their arms.<sup>819</sup> During the subsequent briefing in February, the Special Envoy highlighted that the attacks on the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, indicated how the conflict in Yemen risked spiraling out of control unless serious efforts were urgently made by the Yemeni parties, the region and the international community to end the conflict.<sup>820</sup> He also reported on his continuous engagement with the parties on possible mutually agreeable compromises, and noted the establishment of a multitrack process that could produce durable solutions to the conflict, whilst seeking opportunities for de-escalation. In April, he announced that the parties had agreed to a United Nations initiative for a two-month, nationwide, renewable truce, which was the first nationwide truce in six years.<sup>821</sup> After the start of the truce, the Special Envoy discussed obstacles faced in its implementation and outlined a way forward including extending, consolidating and expanding the truce to reach a political settlement.<sup>822</sup> He also reported that there had been a significant

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<sup>818</sup> See [S/PV.8946](#), [S/PV.8966](#), [S/PV.8995](#), [S/PV.9017](#), [S/PV.9063](#), [S/PV.9110](#), [S/PV.9152](#) and [S/PV.9199](#).

<sup>819</sup> See [S/PV.8946](#).

<sup>820</sup> See [S/PV.8966](#).

<sup>821</sup> See [S/PV.9017](#).

<sup>822</sup> See [S/PV.9063](#).

decline in civilian casualties, with the first week of August seeing the lowest civilian casualty count since the beginning of the war.<sup>823</sup> While the truce in Yemen expired in October 2022, the Special Envoy welcomed the parties' restraint since the expiration of the truce on 2 October, with only sporadic exchanges of artillery and small arms fire in front-line areas in Taiz, Ma'rib, Al-Hudaydah and Dhale.<sup>824</sup> He also emphasized that the parties needed to demonstrate the leadership, compromise and flexibility required to urgently reach an agreement on the renewal and expansion of the truce. In November, he noted that despite incidents of concern and the expiration of the truce, there had not been a return to full-fledged war.<sup>825</sup> Nonetheless, the risk of military and economic escalation, undermining current mediation efforts, attacks on civilian infrastructure continued.

Regarding the humanitarian situation in Yemen, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, his Deputy and the Director and the Acting Director of the Operations and Advocacy of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, often in conjunction with the Special Envoy. The briefers focused on the devastating consequences of the conflict for civilians and civilian infrastructure, food insecurity, and the declining economy, all resulting in the deepening humanitarian crisis in the country. They also focused on the impact of the conflict in Ukraine given that one third of the wheat consumed in Yemen originated in the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Briefers also emphasized the need for safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, including the safety and security of humanitarian workers, and efforts to find a just, lasting end to the conflict. Regarding the FSO SAFER tanker, the representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported on the work of the United Nations in finding a pragmatic and workable solution to the grave danger posed by the tanker.<sup>826</sup>

In addition to the Special Envoy, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, his Deputy and the Director and the Acting Director of the Operations and Advocacy of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in 2022, the Council also heard briefings by two civil society representatives who spoke on various aspects of the peace

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<sup>823</sup> See [S/PV.9110](#).

<sup>824</sup> See [S/PV.9152](#).

<sup>825</sup> See [S/PV.9199](#).

<sup>826</sup> See [S/PV.8946](#) and [S/PV.9063](#).

talks and the humanitarian situation in the country and made concrete proposals to the Council with a view to ensuring the participation of women, young people and civil society and ameliorating the humanitarian crisis.<sup>827</sup>

In 2022, Council members also heard one briefing by the representative of Albania, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) in connection with the activities of the Committee and the Panel of Experts.<sup>828</sup>

In its decisions in 2022, the Council also addressed the issues outlined above concerning the conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen as well as the mandates of UNDOF and UNIFIL.

In connection with the Syrian Arab Republic and against the backdrop of the expiration of the authorization for the cross-border operations mechanism which had been last renewed on 9 July 2021 by resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#), the Council held a meeting to consider two competing draft resolutions submitted by Ireland and Norway, on the one hand, and by the Russian Federation, on the other.<sup>829</sup> At the meeting, held on 8 July 2022, the Council failed to adopt either one of the two drafts presented. The draft resolution submitted by Ireland and Norway, and voted on first, failed to be adopted due to the negative vote of a permanent member, the Russian Federation, while the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation was not adopted having failed to obtain the required number of votes.<sup>830</sup> By contrast, four days later, on 12 July, a new draft resolution submitted by Ireland and Norway was adopted as resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#) with the abstentions of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>831</sup> By this resolution, the Council extended the authorizations of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Security Council resolution [2165 \(2014\)](#), for a period of six months, until 10 January 2023, but restricted to the border crossing at Bab al-Hawa. The resolution also provided for an additional extension of six months, until 10

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<sup>827</sup> The Chief Executive Officer of the Sheba Youth Foundation for Development provided a briefing to the Council on 12 January 2022 ([S/PV.8946](#)). The Protection and Advocacy Officer from Peace Track Initiative provided a briefing to the Council on 14 June 2022 ([S/PV.9063](#)).

<sup>828</sup> See [S/PV.8966](#). For further information on the Committee and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect.I.B.1, and for further information on the sanctions in Yemen, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>829</sup> See [S/PV.9087](#). For the draft resolution, see [S/2022/538](#) and [S/2022/541](#).

<sup>830</sup> Further to the veto cast at the meeting, pursuant to GA resolution [76/262](#), the Security Council transmitted a special report to the Assembly ([A/76/905](#)). For further details, see part IV, sect. I. F.

<sup>831</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates; *abstaining*: France, United Kingdom, United States. See [S/PV.9089](#).

July 2023, subject to the requirement of a separate resolution confirming the extension. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide a special report on the humanitarian needs in Syria no later than 10 December 2022.<sup>832</sup> By the same resolution, the Council also encouraged the convening of a Security Council Informal Interactive Dialogue every two months with participation of donors, interested regional parties and representatives of the international humanitarian agencies operating in Syria in order to regularly review and follow-up on the implementation of this resolution, including progress in early-recovery projects.<sup>833</sup>

Prior to the adoption of the resolution, the representative of Ireland took the floor also speaking on behalf Norway, as co-penholders, noting that the resolution represented a delicate balance between the different positions of the members of the Council as the primary focus was for the Council to keep the cross-border mechanism open and operating.<sup>834</sup> Speaking on behalf of the 10 elected members, the representative of Kenya stated that while they supported a 12-month renewal, which would give humanitarian organizations more certainty in their operations, their fundamental interest was for the Council to meet the grave needs of the Syrian people and supported the resolution. After the adoption of the resolution, a majority of the Council members took the floor on the adoption of resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#) reauthorizing the Syria cross-border humanitarian mechanism. Abstaining from voting, the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States said that resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#) fell short of providing the operational certainty for the provision of humanitarian aid particularly during the winter and did not heed the call by the Secretary-General and the humanitarian community to renew the mechanism for 12 months. Nonetheless, they reiterated their commitment to working with partners to ensure the Council met the needs of the people at the time of the renewal. Having voted in favour of the resolution, the representative of the Russian Federation explained that the informal interactive dialogues offered opportunities to monitor progress in implementing the resolution to decide on the ultimate fate of the cross-border mechanism.<sup>835</sup> The representative of India reiterated his country's call for enhanced and effective humanitarian assistance without

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<sup>832</sup> Resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>833</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 6. In 2022, informal interactive dialogues were held pursuant to this resolution on 26 September, 21 November and 16 December, see [A/77/2](#).

<sup>834</sup> See [S/PV.9089](#).

<sup>835</sup> *Ibid.*

discrimination, politicization or preconditions and noted that cross-border operations could not exist in perpetuity.

With regard to the conflict in Yemen, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2643 \(2022\)](#) of 13 July 2022 concerning the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA). The Council extended the mandate of the Mission once, for a period of 12 months until 14 July 2023.<sup>836</sup> Despite having voted in favour of the resolution, the representative of Ireland stated that his country wished to put on record its view that Security Council resolutions should remain grounded in evidence-based reporting available to all Security Council members. He said that the language in the resolution that “expresses concern at accounts of the military use of the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa” was based on assessments that they did not all have access to, and therefore strayed from usual precedent and practice at the Security Council. He also said that it would also have been Ireland’s preference for the text to remain fully aligned with that of the original Hodeidah Agreement, on which the Mission’s capacity and focus remained.<sup>837</sup>

Regarding the sanctions measures imposed in connection with the conflict in Yemen, on 28 February 2022, the Council adopted resolution [2624 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with the abstentions of Brazil, Ireland, Mexico and Norway. By resolution [2624 \(2022\)](#), the Council renewed the sanctions measures in place until 28 February 2023, and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for 13 months, until 28 March 2023.<sup>838</sup> In their explanations of votes, the representatives of the United Arab Emirates, India, China and Albania welcomed the renewal of sanctions and condemned Ansar Allah for its attacks on the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.<sup>839</sup> Abstaining from voting, the representatives of Ireland, Mexico, Brazil and Norway, explained that despite condemning the actions of Ansar Allah leadership and welcoming the implementation of the arms embargo, impediments to humanitarian aid reaching people in need had to be avoided and expressed concern that designation may result in unintended negative humanitarian and political consequences. The representatives of Ireland,

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<sup>836</sup> Resolution [2643 \(2022\)](#), para. 1). For more information on the mandate of UNMHA, see part X, sect. II.

<sup>837</sup> See [S/PV.9091](#).

<sup>838</sup> Resolution [2624 \(2022\)](#), paras. 15 and 16. For more information on the sanctions measures, see part VII, sect. III and for more information on the Committee and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

<sup>839</sup> See [S/PV.8981](#).

Mexico, Brazil and Norway also stated that there was no internationally agreed definition of the terms “terrorism” or “terrorist group”, expressing concern about the fact that the use of those terms in a Council resolution dealing with sanctions on Yemen may have had unintended negative consequences for the Yemeni people living under Ansar Allah control. The representative of Kenya continued on to state that sanctions would be necessary to impede the capacity of Ansar Allah to carry out indiscriminate attacks and signal no political legitimacy may be achieved while carrying out such acts. The representative of Mexico also expressed concern about the implications of the designation for the United Nations-facilitated political process, as well as for the efforts to resolve the critical situation regarding *FSO SAFER* and did not consider it appropriate that the mechanism for the designation of terrorist groups should pass through resolutions relating to sanctions regimes. The representatives of Ghana and the Russian Federation stated that the sanctions regime should not result in exacerbating the critical humanitarian situation.

In 2022, the mandate of UNDOF was renewed twice by resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and resolution [2671 \(2022\)](#) for periods of six months each, until 31 December 2022 and 30 June 2023, respectively.<sup>840</sup> Both resolutions were adopted unanimously.

In connection with Lebanon, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), extending the mandate of UNIFIL for one year until 31 August 2023.<sup>841</sup>

For the purposes of facilitating the coverage of this item, information on meetings is set out below under four separate tables, namely: (a) Syrian Arab Republic, (b) Yemen, (c) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, and (d) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

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<sup>840</sup> Resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and [2671 \(2022\)](#), para.15. For more information on the mandate of UNDOF, see part X, sect. I.

<sup>841</sup> Resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNIFIL, see part X, sect. I.

**Table 1**  
**Meetings: The situation in the Middle East – Syrian Arab Republic**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8943</a> 5 January 2022	Letter dated 28 December 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council <a href="#">(S/2022/1103)</a>		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8955</a> 26 January 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Director of the Release Me project in northern Syria	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8957</a> 27 January 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council	14 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8958</a> 27 January 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Under-Secretary-General, United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8978</a> 25 February 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions <a href="#">2139 (2014)</a> , <a href="#">2165 (2014)</a> , <a href="#">2191 (2014)</a> , <a href="#">2258 (2015)</a> , <a href="#">2332 (2016)</a> , <a href="#">2393 (2017)</a> , <a href="#">2401 (2018)</a> , <a href="#">2449 (2018)</a> , <a href="#">2504 (2020)</a> , <a href="#">2533 (2020)</a> , and <a href="#">2585 (2021)</a> <a href="#">(S/2022/135)</a>		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	13 Council members <sup>b</sup> , all invitees	



<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8982</a> 28 February 2022	Letter dated 31 January 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/76</a> )		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members <sup>c</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8990</a> 10 March 2022	Letter dated 4 March 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/181</a> )		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members <sup>c</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9003</a> 24 March 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States	13 Council members <sup>b</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9022</a> 26 April 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions <a href="#">2139</a> ( <a href="#">2014</a> ), <a href="#">2165</a> ( <a href="#">2014</a> ), <a href="#">2191</a> ( <a href="#">2014</a> ), <a href="#">2258</a> ( <a href="#">2015</a> ), <a href="#">2332</a> ( <a href="#">2016</a> ), <a href="#">2393</a> ( <a href="#">2017</a> ), <a href="#">2401</a> ( <a href="#">2018</a> ), <a href="#">2449</a> ( <a href="#">2018</a> ), <a href="#">2504</a> ( <a href="#">2020</a> ), <a href="#">2533</a> ( <a href="#">2020</a> ), and <a href="#">2585</a> ( <a href="#">2021</a> ) ( <a href="#">S/2022/330</a> )		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, CARE International	13 Council members <sup>d</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9026</a> 29 April 2022	Letter dated 30 March 2022 from the Secretary-		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	12 Council members <sup>e</sup> , all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/281</a> )					
<a href="#">S/PV.9038</a> 20 May 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, OB/GYN, Syrian American Medical Society	12 Council members <sup>f</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9068</a> 20 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions <a href="#">2139 (2014)</a> , <a href="#">2165 (2014)</a> , <a href="#">2191 (2014)</a> , <a href="#">2258 (2015)</a> , <a href="#">2332 (2016)</a> , <a href="#">2393 (2017)</a> , <a href="#">2401 (2018)</a> , <a href="#">2449 (2018)</a> , <a href="#">2504 (2020)</a> , <a href="#">2533 (2020)</a> , and <a href="#">2585 (2021)</a> ( <a href="#">S/2022/492</a> )		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, NGO Forum Coordinator, North West Syria NGO Forum, Türkiye/Gaziantep	Secretary-General, Council members <sup>g</sup> , all invitees <sup>h</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9083</a> 29 June 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Syrian Emergency Task Force	13 Council members <sup>e</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9087</a> 8 July 2022		Draft resolution submitted by Ireland and Norway ( <a href="#">S/2022/538</a> ),  Draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation ( <a href="#">S/2022/541</a> )	Syrian Arab Republic		13 Council members <sup>i</sup> , invitee	Draft resolution ( <a href="#">S/2022/538</a> ) not adopted 13-1-1 <sup>j</sup>  Draft resolution ( <a href="#">S/2022/541</a> ) not adopted 2-3-10 <sup>k</sup>

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9089</a> 12 July 2022		Draft resolution submitted by Ireland and Norway <a href="#">(S/2022/546)</a>	Syrian Arab Republic		11 Council members <sup>f</sup> , invitee	Resolution <a href="#">2642 (2022)</a> 12-0-3 <sup>m</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9097</a> 20 July 2022	Letter dated 30 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council <a href="#">(S/2022/530)</a>		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members <sup>e</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9117</a> 29 August 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions <a href="#">2139 (2014)</a> , <a href="#">2165 (2014)</a> , <a href="#">2191 (2014)</a> , <a href="#">2258 (2015)</a> , <a href="#">2332 (2016)</a> , <a href="#">2393 (2017)</a> , <a href="#">2401 (2018)</a> , <a href="#">2449 (2018)</a> , <a href="#">2504 (2020)</a> , <a href="#">2533 (2020)</a> , <a href="#">2585 (2021)</a> , and <a href="#">2642 (2022)</a> <a href="#">(S/2022/635)</a>		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	13 Council members <sup>n</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9130</a> 14 September 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Director of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression	13 Council members <sup>e</sup> all invitees <sup>o</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9141</a> 29 September 2022	Letter dated 30 August 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members <sup>e</sup> , all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Council (S/2022/658)					
<a href="#">S/PV.9163</a> 25 October 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions <a href="#">2139</a> ( <a href="#">2014</a> ), <a href="#">2165</a> ( <a href="#">2014</a> ), <a href="#">2191</a> ( <a href="#">2014</a> ), <a href="#">2258</a> ( <a href="#">2015</a> ), <a href="#">2332</a> ( <a href="#">2016</a> ), <a href="#">2393</a> ( <a href="#">2017</a> ), <a href="#">2401</a> ( <a href="#">2018</a> ), <a href="#">2449</a> ( <a href="#">2018</a> ), <a href="#">2504</a> ( <a href="#">2020</a> ), <a href="#">2533</a> ( <a href="#">2020</a> ), <a href="#">2585</a> ( <a href="#">2021</a> ), and <a href="#">2642</a> ( <a href="#">2022</a> ) (S/2022/775)	Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye		Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Director for Operations and Advocacy at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9164</a> 25 October 2022	Letter dated 30 September 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/727)	Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye		High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9184</a> 7 November 2022	Letter dated 2 November 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/828)	Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye		High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members <sup>c</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9204</a> 29 November 2022		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye		Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	13 Council members <sup>b</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9207</a> 5 December 2022	Letter dated 30 November 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the	Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye		High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members <sup>c</sup> , all invitees	

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
	President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/897</a> )					
<a href="#">S/PV.9230</a> 21 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in the Syrian Arab Republic ( <a href="#">S/2022/933</a> )		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees	
	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions <a href="#">2139</a> ( <a href="#">2014</a> ), <a href="#">2165</a> ( <a href="#">2014</a> ), <a href="#">2191</a> ( <a href="#">2014</a> ), <a href="#">2258</a> ( <a href="#">2015</a> ), <a href="#">2332</a> ( <a href="#">2016</a> ), <a href="#">2393</a> ( <a href="#">2017</a> ), <a href="#">2401</a> ( <a href="#">2018</a> ), <a href="#">2449</a> ( <a href="#">2018</a> ), <a href="#">2504</a> ( <a href="#">2020</a> ), <a href="#">2533</a> ( <a href="#">2020</a> ), <a href="#">2585</a> ( <a href="#">2021</a> ), and <a href="#">2642</a> ( <a href="#">2022</a> ) ( <a href="#">S/2022/956</a> )					

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway (also on behalf of Ireland, its co-penholder on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>b</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>c</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>d</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway (also on behalf of Ireland as co-penholder), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>e</sup> Albania, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States

<sup>f</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway (also on behalf of Ireland, its co-penholder on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>g</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland (also on behalf of Norway, its co-penholder on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic), Mexico, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>h</sup> The Coordinator, North West Syria NGO Forum participated by videoconference.

<sup>i</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya (on behalf of the 10 elected members of the Security Council), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>j</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: Russian Federation; *abstaining*: China.

<sup>k</sup> *For*: China, Russian Federation; *against*: France, United Kingdom, United States; *abstaining*: Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates.

<sup>l</sup> Albania, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (on behalf of the 10 elected members of the Security Council), Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>m</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates; *against*: none; *abstaining*: France, United Kingdom, United States.

<sup>n</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>o</sup> The Director of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression participated by videoconference.

**Table 2**  
**Meetings: The situation in the Middle East – Yemen**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8946</a> 12 January 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Acting Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, co-Founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Sheba Youth Foundation for Development	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8966</a> 15 February 2022	Letter dated 25 January 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/50</a> )		Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8981</a> 28 February 2022	Letter dated 25 January 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/50</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/158</a> )			11 Council members <sup>a</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2624 (2022)</a> 11-0-4 <sup>b</sup> (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.8995</a> 15 March 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9017</a> 14 April 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9063</a> 14 June 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Acting Director, Operations and Advocacy Division of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection and Advocacy Officer from Peace Track Initiative	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9088</a> 11 July 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-general for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees <sup>c</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9091</a> 13 July 2022	Letter dated 13 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/484</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/549</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2643 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9110</a> 15 August 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Acting Director, Operations and Advocacy Division, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	All Council members, all invitees <sup>c</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9152</a> 13 October 2022			Saudi Arabia, Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees <sup>d</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9199</a> 22 November 2022			Saudi Arabia, Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Director for Operations and Advocacy, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway and United Arab Emirates

<sup>b</sup> For: Albania, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Norway.

<sup>c</sup> The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen participated by videoconference.

<sup>d</sup> The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator participated by videoconference.

**Table 3**  
**Meetings: The situation in the Middle East – United Nations Disengagement Observer Force**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9076</a> 27 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force ( <a href="#">S/2022/447</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation and the United States of America ( <a href="#">S/2022/512</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2639 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9234</a> 22 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force ( <a href="#">S/2022/887</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation and the United States of America ( <a href="#">S/2022/986</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2671 (2022)</a> 15-0-0

**Table 4**  
**Meetings: The situation in the Middle East – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9121</a> 31 August 2022	Letter dated 9 August 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/607</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by France ( <a href="#">S/2022/654</a> )			Four Council members <sup>a</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2650 (2022)</a> 15-0-0

<sup>a</sup> Brazil, India, United Arab Emirates and United States.



## **21. The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question**

During the period under review, the Security Council held 13 meetings in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”. No decisions were adopted by the Council during the period under review. In 2022, during the meetings under this item, the Council continued the practice of holding monthly briefings and quarterly open debates to consider this item.<sup>842</sup> In addition to the regular meetings under this item, the Council held an unscheduled meeting on 8 August 2022 further to the ceasefire agreed to between Israel and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad on 7 August.<sup>843</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole.<sup>844</sup> No videoconferences were held by the Council during the period under review. Under this item, the Council also considered developments in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and the overall situation in the Middle East region.<sup>845</sup>

During the period under review, Council members heard regular briefings by the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and once by the Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian territory.<sup>846</sup> In addition to the Special Coordinator, the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) delivered a briefing once.<sup>847</sup> Council members also heard briefings by five civil society representatives, namely the Palestine Director of EcoPeace Middle East,<sup>848</sup> the co-founder and

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<sup>842</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>843</sup> See [S/PV.9107](#).

<sup>844</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 2.A.

<sup>845</sup> See also part I, section 20.

<sup>846</sup> See [S/PV.9099](#).

<sup>847</sup> See [S/PV.9116](#).

<sup>848</sup> See [S/PV.8950](#).

Israel Director of EcoPeace Middle East,<sup>849</sup> the Executive Director of Musalaha,<sup>850</sup> the Spokesperson of the Parents Circle,<sup>851</sup> and the President of the U.S./Middle East Project.<sup>852</sup>

In his monthly briefings, in February, May, August and November, the Special Coordinator focused on developments in the occupied Palestinian territory, including the situation in Gaza, the situation in the West Bank, specifically the violence by the Israeli security forces, the attacks by Israeli settlers and other civilians against Palestinians and by Palestinians against Israeli civilians as well as the settlement expansion and the demolition, seizure or forced eviction of Palestinian-owned structures. The Special Coordinator also updated Council members on the engagement between Israeli and Palestinian officials as well as the fiscal and financial situation of the Palestinian Authority.<sup>853</sup> In addition, he raised concerns over the funding for UNRWA reiterating the Secretary-General's call to provide UNRWA with predictable, sustainable, and sufficient funding to provide essential assistance to Palestinian refugees in the region.<sup>854</sup> Beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Special Coordinator also addressed other topics in the region, including developments in the occupied Golan and Lebanon.<sup>855</sup>

At the meeting in May, the Special Coordinator also focused on the killing of the Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh.<sup>856</sup> In his remarks, he stressed the Secretary-General's condemnation of all attacks on journalists and called on the relevant authorities to carry out an independent and transparent investigation. In August, in addition to the regular meeting on 25 August, the Council held an emergency, previously unscheduled, meeting on 8 August 2022, during which it heard a briefing by the Special Coordinator on the escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip between 5 and 7 August 2022.<sup>857</sup> At that meeting, the Special Coordinator reported on the hundreds of air strikes carried out by the Israeli Defense Forces against targets in Gaza, including against a senior commander of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,

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<sup>849</sup> See [S/PV.8950](#).

<sup>850</sup> See [S/PV.9046](#).

<sup>851</sup> See [S/PV.9046](#).

<sup>852</sup> See [S/PV.9116](#).

<sup>853</sup> See [S/PV.8973](#) and [S/PV.9046](#).

<sup>854</sup> See [S/PV.8973](#).

<sup>855</sup> See [S/PV.8973](#), [S/PV/9046](#), and [S/PV.9116](#).

<sup>856</sup> See [S/PV/9046](#).

<sup>857</sup> See [S/PV.9107](#).

who was killed in the attack. He also reported on the launching by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other militant factions of thousands of rockets and mortars into Israel. He informed that the escalation of violence from 5 to 7 August, had resulted in 46 Palestinians killed and 360 injured, and hundreds of residential housing units damaged or destroyed, along with other civilian infrastructures as well as 70 Israelis injured, with damage to residential and other civilian structures. He welcomed the ceasefire but cautioned that it was fragile and that any resumption of hostilities would have devastating consequences for both sides. At the regular monthly meeting less than three weeks later, on 25 August, the Special Coordinator added that the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza had been partly mitigated by the ceasefire along with the economic relief delivered to the people of Gaza, reinstating a “fragile calm” in the region.<sup>858</sup> He reminded Council members that the humanitarian response across the occupied Palestinian territory continued to face chronic funding gaps and that maintenance of the status quo via short-term fixes was not a viable substitute for real political progress. Following the Special Coordinator, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA reported that more than 80 per cent of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza lived below the poverty line and alerted the Council about the decrease in funding allocated to UNRWA. He maintained that adequate funding was crucial for the agency to provide much-needed relief to Palestinian refugees and to protect their right to a dignified life. The President of the U.S/Middle East Project subsequently addressed the Council proposing to rethink and reappraise some assumptions and beliefs that might inadvertently contribute to the intractability of the conflict. He cautioned that in the absence of unprecedentedly far-reaching action to make good on partition as the political paradigm established 75 years before, Council members will be coming to debate the challenge of achieving equality under a reality of non-partition. At the 28 November meeting, the Special Coordinator affirmed that freezing the conflict or managing it permanently were not viable options. He cautioned that as the violence mounted, settlement expansion and restrictions continued to squeeze the economic and physical space for developing a viable Palestinian State. He said that political leadership was required to reset a trajectory towards a two-State solution, which still garnered support among Israelis and Palestinians.<sup>859</sup>

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<sup>858</sup> See [S/PV.9116](#).

<sup>859</sup> See [S/PV.9203](#).

During the monthly meetings that took place in February, May, August and November, in addition to reiterating the calls for dialogue and the support for a two-State solution, Council members expressed concern at the disproportionate use of force against civilians by the Israeli authorities.<sup>860</sup> In this regard, some Council members requested investigations into those incidents.<sup>861</sup> At the meeting in May, a number of Council members also condemned the killing of the Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh,<sup>862</sup> and expressed concern at the excessive and disproportionate use of force at her funeral by the Israeli police.<sup>863</sup> Some Council members made reference to the press statement issued by the Council on 16 May 2022, condemning the killing of the journalist.<sup>864</sup> In addition, most Council members called for an immediate, thorough, transparent and impartial investigation into the killing, expecting full accountability for those found responsible.<sup>865</sup> Some Council members also made reference to resolutions [2222 \(2015\)](#) and [1738 \(2006\)](#) relating to the protection of journalists, media professionals and associated personnel.<sup>866</sup> At the emergency meeting in August, most Council members welcomed the ceasefire reached between the parties, calling on them to fully respect the agreement and to exercise restraint, as well as emphasizing efforts to prevent further escalation.<sup>867</sup>

On a quarterly basis, the monthly briefings in March, June, September and December were used to report on the implementation of resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#). Consistent with prior practice, in 2022, the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#) were submitted in writing twice in the year, the twenty first report in June and the twenty second report in December.<sup>868</sup> During the briefings, the Special Coordinator continued to report on the limited progress on the implementation of the main provisions of the resolution, namely,

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<sup>860</sup> See [S/PV.8973](#), France, Ireland, Gabon and Russian Federation; [S/PV/9046](#), Russian Federation, Ireland, United Kingdom and Brazil, [S/PV.9116](#), Mexico, Ireland and China; and [S/PV.9203](#), China, Russian Federation and Ireland.

<sup>861</sup> See [S/PV.8973](#), France, Ireland and United Kingdom; [S/PV/9046](#), United Kingdom, Ireland and China; and [S/PV.9203](#), United Kingdom, China and Albania.

<sup>862</sup> [S/PV/9046](#), United States, Ireland, Norway and Mexico.

<sup>863</sup> *Ibid.*, Ireland, United Kingdom, France, Gabon, Mexico, Ghana and Brazil.

<sup>864</sup> *Ibid.*, China, Kenya and United Arab Emirates. See also [SC/14891](#).

<sup>865</sup> *Ibid.*, United States, China, Russian Federation, Ireland, Norway, Kenya, United Kingdom, Albania, France, United Arab Emirates, Gabon, Mexico and Brazil.

<sup>866</sup> *Ibid.*, Ireland, Mexico and Brazil.

<sup>867</sup> See [S/PV.9107](#).

<sup>868</sup> See [S/2022/504](#) and [S/2022/945](#).

those relating to: Israel's settlement activities; the violence against civilians, including acts of terror, incitement, provocation and inflammatory rhetoric; steps and efforts to advance the peace process; and actions by all States to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967. At these meetings, the Special Coordinator expressed continued concern about the deterioration of the security situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, the continued loss of life and injuries as well as the settler-related violence and the continued settlement advancement by Israel in the West Bank, including in and around East Jerusalem.<sup>869</sup> He reaffirmed that settlement expansion continued to fuel violence in the occupied Palestinian territory, further entrenching the occupation and undermining the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, independent statehood, as well as eroding the possibility of establishing a continuous and viable Palestinian state.<sup>870</sup>

In addition, at the meeting held in March, the Special Coordinator asserted that the possible excessive use of force by Israeli security forces, particularly the use of live ammunition, continued to raise serious concerns and resulted in the continued injury and killing of children.<sup>871</sup> In this regard, he urged Israeli authorities to conduct effective and transparent investigations into those killings and injuries and added that the absence of a meaningful peace process to end the Israeli occupation was fueling a dangerous deterioration that was destabilizing the situation across the occupied Palestinian territory. At the same meeting, most Council members urged Israel to uphold its responsibilities in accordance with international law and the relevant United Nations resolutions. In their remarks, a majority of Council members underlined the importance of implementing resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#) and expressed their support for the two-State solution, with the state of Palestine living side by side with Israel, in peace and security, based on the 1967 borders and with Jerusalem as the capital of both states.<sup>872</sup>

During the meeting that took place in June, the Special Coordinator maintained that the Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem remained deeply troubling as settlements constituted a flagrant violation of the United Nations resolutions

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<sup>869</sup> See [S/PV.9000](#), [S/PV.9077](#), [S/PV.9139](#) and [S/PV.9224](#).

<sup>870</sup> See [S/PV.9000](#), [S/PV.9139](#) and [S/PV.9224](#).

<sup>871</sup> See [S/PV.9000](#).

<sup>872</sup> *Ibid.*, Ireland, France, India, Mexico, Kenya, Ghana, Albania, China and the United Arab Emirates.

and international law.<sup>873</sup> Appalled by the killing of the journalist Shireen Abu Akleh and disturbed by the behaviour of some members of the Israeli security services in the context of her funeral, the Special Coordinator pointed to the Secretary-General's call for an independent and transparent investigation into her killing and the need to ensure that those responsible were held accountable. During the discussion that ensued, several Council members called for an effective investigation into the killing.<sup>874</sup> Most Council members criticized the continued violations and limited progress on the implementation of the resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#) while urging for further compliance. In that connection, some members also recalled that the Council had to do more to address the issue and that the Council had an obligation to ensure the implementation of the resolution.<sup>875</sup> At the same meeting, the full lifting of the blockade of Gaza was further urged, with explicit mention to resolution [1860 \(2009\)](#), so that humanitarian aid could be distributed.<sup>876</sup>

During the meeting held in September, the Special Coordinator reiterated that settlement expansion in the occupied Palestinian territory, as well as violence against civilians, had escalated, effectively violating paragraph 2 of resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#) calling for the immediate cessation of all Israeli settlement activity.<sup>877</sup> In that regard, he expressed concern at the advancement of construction plans for housing units in East Jerusalem and the emergence of new illegal outposts across the West Bank, as well as at the high rate of demolitions, evictions, and seizures of Palestinian-owned structures. He also expressed concern at the civilian deaths and injuries, including of children, caused by the latest escalation in Gaza, the deteriorating security situation in the occupied West Bank and the high levels of settler-related violence against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. This notwithstanding, the Special Coordinator commended the statements made by Prime Minister Yair Lapid and President Mahmoud Abbas during the high-level week of the General Assembly's seventy-seventh session in which they reaffirmed their commitment to a peaceful resolution. Regarding the lack of progress toward the implementation of resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#), he maintained that negotiations could no longer be put off indefinitely and meaningful initiatives were needed to turn the trajectory around under the

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<sup>873</sup> See [S/PV.9077](#).

<sup>874</sup> *Ibid.*, France, China, Ireland, Mexico and Albania.

<sup>875</sup> *Ibid.*, Ireland and Kenya.

<sup>876</sup> *Ibid.*, Gabon, Ireland and Kenya.

<sup>877</sup> See [S/PV.9139](#).

collective objective of ending the occupation and realizing the two-state solution. Following the Special Coordinator, speakers reiterated their support for a two-State solution, encouraging meaningful peace negotiations between the two parties and urging the Security Council to fulfill its responsibility by ensuring compliance. Some Council members underscored the importance of mitigating the impact of the conflict not only on civilian lives, but also on the economy.<sup>878</sup>

During the period under review, the Council fully resumed its practice of holding quarterly open debates in the Security Council Chamber.<sup>879</sup> All open debates held in 2022 involved the participation of large numbers of Member States, effectively restoring the practice existing prior to the COVID-19 outbreak.<sup>880</sup> In his briefings during the quarterly open debates, in January, April, July and October, the Special Coordinator updated the Council on the latest developments of the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, including the fiscal situation of the Palestinian Authority, the settlement expansion by Israeli security forces, demolitions and seizures of Palestinian-owned structures as well as the overall situation in Gaza. During these briefings, he also addressed developments in the region, including Lebanon and Syria. At the open debate that took place in January, the Special Coordinator cautioned that without a realistic prospect of an end to the occupation and the realization of a two-State solution based on United Nations resolutions, international law and previous agreements, it was only a matter of time before facing an irreversible, dangerous collapse and widespread instability.<sup>881</sup> In April, the Special Coordinator informed that, following the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, rising prices and market disruptions threatened food-security levels of vulnerable families in the occupied Palestinian territory.<sup>882</sup> In July, instead of the Special Coordinator, the Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process delivered a briefing. She reaffirmed that while the specific developments of the conflict fluctuated, the structural reality had not changed as her office continued to witness concerning levels of violence against civilians, which exacerbated

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<sup>878</sup> Ibid., Ireland, Russian Federation, Kenya, Brazil and United Kingdom.

<sup>879</sup> In light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the official record of the January open debate ([S/PV.8950](#) and [S/PV.8950 \(Resumption 1\)](#)) was supplemented by a compilation of annexes ([S/2022/39](#)) containing the statements submitted by interested non-members of the Council. For further details on the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II as well as *Repertoire, Supplements 2020-2021*, part II).

<sup>880</sup> For further information on the practice of open debates under this item, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2004-2007*.

<sup>881</sup> See [S/PV.8950](#).

<sup>882</sup> See [S/PV.9021](#). For further details on items relating to Ukraine, see part I, sect. 19.

mistrust and undermined a peaceful resolution of the conflict. She added that despite the worrisome backdrop, the visit by President Biden of the United States to the region had signaled renewed consensus for a two-State solution based on the 1967 lines and informed that, on 30 June, the Israeli Knesset had voted to dissolve itself and called for new parliamentary elections, scheduled for 1 November.<sup>883</sup> In October, the Special Coordinator informed that 2022 was on course to be the deadliest year for Palestinians in the West Bank since 2005.<sup>884</sup> He encouraged action from both parties toward peaceful resolution with the support of the international community and stressed the importance of empowering the Palestinian Authority to build toward a return to a political process. He also reported on the signing on 13 October of the Algiers declaration by 14 Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas. In the declaration, the factions agreed, *inter alia*, to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and to hold elections for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Palestinian National Council. Finally, in December, the Special Coordinator expressed deep concern over the high levels of violence as well as at the Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank.<sup>885</sup> While during the reporting period there were no advancements of housing units in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, he said that the total number of settlement housing units advanced in 2022 remained high. Expressing concern about the fragility of the political and security dynamics, he noted that the increase in violence and absence of political horizon had empowered extremists. Concerning Gaza, he emphasized the need for political solutions calling for a return of the legitimate Palestinian Government to the Strip, a full lifting of Israeli closures, in line with resolution [1860 \(2009\)](#), and an end to the militant build-up.

In addition to the briefings by the Special Coordinator, in January, the Palestine and Israel Directors of EcoPeace Middle East reported on the Green Blue deal for the Middle East as a practical and attainable path towards achieving climate security and water diplomacy as an integral part of the Middle East peace process, in order to advance the two-State solution within the 1967 borders.<sup>886</sup> The Israel Director of EcoPeace Middle East called further on the Council to

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<sup>883</sup> See [S/PV.9099](#).

<sup>884</sup> See [S/PV.9174](#).

<sup>885</sup> See [S/PV.9224](#).

<sup>886</sup> See [S/PV.8950](#).



recognize globally that climate change was a threat to peace, within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>887</sup>

At the quarterly open debates that took place in January, April, July, and October, Council members and invitees under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure expressed concern at the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Gaza, the advancement of the settlement activities in the West Bank as well as the security situation in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. Council members expressed concern about the continued tensions and violence between the two sides and called on both parties to protect civilians, including children. In their remarks, several members of the Council emphasized the need to an end to the settlement expansion, urging Israel to stop the building of new settlements and the demolition of Palestinian-owned structures.<sup>888</sup>

Most Council members also expressed support for the peace process, including through the Middle East quartet. In this regard, the mediation efforts of Egypt, Jordan and Qatar to de-escalate the situation in the region were recognized by a number of Council members in the discussions during open debates.<sup>889</sup> In April, the representative of the United Arab Emirates urged for more decisions to be taken to create a stable and sustainable situation that would allow for Palestinians and Israelis to sit together at the negotiating table and revive the Middle East peace process.<sup>890</sup> At that same meeting, the representative of China called on the international community to make greater efforts based on the relevant United Nations resolutions and international consensus, such as the principle of land for peace, to advance the Middle East peace process. In October, Algeria's mediation efforts were also acknowledged and most Council members welcomed the internal reconciliation agreement reached by the Palestinian political factions in Algiers, pointing to intra-Palestinian reconciliation as essential to finding a durable solution to the conflict.<sup>891</sup> At open debates, Council members reiterated the calls also made during monthly meetings urging the international community to provide more assistance for

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<sup>887</sup> For further information on the practice of the Council on Article 39 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. I.

<sup>888</sup> See [S/PV.8950](#), Norway, China and France; and [S/PV.9021](#), Russian Federation, Ireland, France, Mexico and China.

<sup>889</sup> See [S/PV.8950](#), United Arab Emirates and China; [S/PV.9021](#), Mexico, Gabon and Albania; [S/PV.9099](#), Russian Federation; and [S/PV.9174](#), Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Kenya.

<sup>890</sup> See [S/PV.9021](#).

<sup>891</sup> See [S/PV.9174](#), Ireland, Russian Federation, Albania, China, Norway, Kenya, Mexico, Brazil and Gabon.

Palestine, in particular through financial contributions to UNRWA. Regarding the tensions between the two sides during the holy month of Ramadan in April, most Council members raised concerns over the violent acts in and around the holy sites, notably the Al-Aqsa and Al-Ibrahimi Mosques and the Holy Esplanade and called on both parties to protect the historic and legal status quo.<sup>892</sup> This was reiterated again in October by some Council members.<sup>893</sup>

### Meetings: The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8950</a> and <a href="#">S/PV.8950</a> ( <a href="#">Resumption 1</a> ) 19 January 2022		Letter from the President of the Security Council dated 26 January 2022 ( <a href="#">S/2022/39</a> ) <sup>a</sup>	18 Member States <sup>b</sup>	Seven invitees <sup>c</sup>	All Council members <sup>d</sup> , all invitees <sup>e</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.8973</a> 23 February 2022			Israel	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9000</a> 22 March 2022				Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	All Council members, invitee	
<a href="#">S/PV.9021</a> and <a href="#">S/PV.9021</a> ( <a href="#">Resumption 1</a> ) 25 April 2022			26 Member States <sup>f</sup>	Five invitees <sup>g,h</sup>	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9046</a> 26 May 2022			Israel	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine to the United Nations, Executive Director of Musala,	All Council members, all invitees	

<sup>892</sup> See [S/PV.9021](#).

<sup>893</sup> See [S/PV.9174](#), Ireland, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Brazil and Gabon.

		Spokesperson of Parents Circle	
<a href="#">S/PV.9077</a> 27 June 2022		Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	All Council members, invitee
<a href="#">S/PV.9099</a> and <a href="#">S/PV.9099</a> (Resumption 1) 26 July 2022	24 Member States <sup>i</sup>	Seven invitees <sup>j</sup>	All Council members, all invitees <sup>k</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9107</a> 8 August 2022	Egypt, Israel, Jordan	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9116</a> 25 August 2022		Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Commissioner- General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, President of the U.S./Middle East Project	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9139</a> 28 September 2022		Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	All Council members, invitee
<a href="#">S/PV.9174</a> and <a href="#">S/PV.9174</a> (Resumption 1) 28 October 2022	28 Member States <sup>l</sup>	Five invitees <sup>m</sup>	All Council members, all invitees <sup>n</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9203</a> 28 November 2022		Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	All Council members, invitee
<a href="#">S/PV.9224</a> 19 December 2022		Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	All Council members, invitee

<sup>a</sup> The following delegations submitted written statements: Azerbaijan (on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), Costa Rica, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Qatar and Republic of Korea.

<sup>b</sup> Argentina, Bahrain, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye.

<sup>c</sup> Special Coordinator of the Middle East Peace Process, Palestine Director of EcoPeace Middle East, Co-Founder and Israel Director of EcoPeace Middle East, Observer State of Palestine, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

<sup>d</sup> Norway was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Ghana was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration.

<sup>e</sup> The Observer State of Palestine was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates; and the representative of Egypt spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States.

<sup>f</sup> Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Türkiye and Venezuela (Bolivian Republic of).

<sup>g</sup> Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine to the United Nations, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations and Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

<sup>h</sup> The Special Coordinator participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>i</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye and Venezuela (Bolivian Republic of).

<sup>j</sup> Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine to the United Nations, Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian territory, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the Observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations.

<sup>k</sup> The representative of Azerbaijan made a statement on behalf of the 120 States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM).

<sup>l</sup> Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Türkiye, Venezuela (Bolivian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

<sup>m</sup> Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine to the United Nations, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

<sup>n</sup> The representative of Pakistan spoke on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

## 22. The situation concerning Iraq

During the period under review, the Security Council held five meetings in relation to the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”. On 26 May 2022, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) until 31 May 2023, through the unanimous adoption of resolution [2631 \(2022\)](#).<sup>894</sup> All other meetings under this item during the period under review took the form of briefings.<sup>895</sup> More information on these meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held closed informal consultations to discuss this item.<sup>896</sup>

In 2022, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of UNAMI on the situation concerning Iraq. In addition, on 26 July, at the request of the representative of Iraq,<sup>897</sup> the Council held an emergency meeting to discuss the attack on 20 July on a tourist resort in the Dohuk governorate of Iraq’s Kurdistan region. In addition to the Special Representative, in 2022, the Council heard once a briefing by a civil society representative, a human rights defender and civil society activist and the co-Founder and Chairperson of the Iraqi Al-Amal Association.<sup>898</sup> In addition to Iraq, in 2022, the representative of Türkiye also participated in one of the meetings held under this item.

Further to the reports of the Secretary-General,<sup>899</sup> the Special Representative provided briefings in February, May and October focusing on the political developments in the country, including the parliamentary elections held in October 2021, its aftermath, and the participation of women in the political process. She also reported on the relations between Baghdad and Erbil and within the Kurdistan region and on the status of the implementation of economic reforms by the federal Government, the adoption of a federal budget and the fight against corruption. During her briefings, she informed about the security situation in Iraq, including the attacks committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) as well as the Iranian and Turkish

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<sup>894</sup> For more information on the mandate of UNAMI, part X, sect. II.

<sup>895</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

<sup>896</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 28.

<sup>897</sup> See [S/2022/574](#).

<sup>898</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#).

<sup>899</sup> See [S/2022/100](#), [S/2022/366](#), [S/2022/696](#). See also [S/2022/103](#), [S/2022/368](#), [S/2022/714](#).

shelling in the north. Additionally, during her briefings, the Special Representative described the environmental challenges facing Iraq, including water scarcity and desertification. She also reported throughout the period on the camps and prisons along the border of north-eastern Syrian Arab Republic, warning that children were at risk of exploitation and forced recruitment by terrorist groups. Lastly, she discussed progress on the repatriation and return of Kuwaiti property as well as third-country nationals and their remains.

Aside from the regular briefings by the Special Representative in February, May and October, on 26 July, the Council held an emergency meeting to discuss the attack on 20 July on a tourist resort in the Dohuk governorate of Iraq's Kurdistan region, following a request from the representative of Iraq.<sup>900</sup> At the meeting, the Special Representative provided an update on the shelling that took place in the Zakho district of the Dohuk governorate on 20 July, which had resulted in the loss of nine civilian lives and the injuring of 33 others.<sup>901</sup> She informed that, following the attack, Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi had established a committee, which had visited the site of the attack, collected evidence and engaged with witnesses and local authorities. Based on its assessment of the evidence collected, the Government of Iraq had attributed the tragic events to Turkish armed forces. In the meantime, the Turkish Foreign Ministry had issued a press statement condemning the attack and denying involvement, and the following day the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad had stated on social media that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) had been responsible for the attack. On 20 July, the PKK had issued a statement denying presence in the area, and in turn blaming Türkiye for the attack. Iraq's National Security Council had held an emergency session the same day, strongly condemning the attack and rejecting the use of Iraqi territory as a base to attack neighbouring countries and settle accounts. During a meeting of the Council of Representatives which had been convened on 23 July to discuss the incident, the parliamentary Security and Defence Committee had recommended the expulsion of PKK elements from Iraq, the withdrawal of all Turkish forces, the redeployment of federal forces along the border with Türkiye, the abolition of any security agreements with Türkiye and a review of the defence budget to enhance its military capabilities. The Special Representative clarified that Iraq was demanding that Türkiye withdraw its military

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<sup>900</sup> See [S/2022/574](#).

<sup>901</sup> See [S/PV.9100](#).

forces from all Iraqi lands and was calling for an investigation. She emphasized that it was of the greatest importance that all attacks on Iraqi territory ceased, as such aggression not only recklessly heightened national and regional tensions but also caused grave human tragedies.

Following the briefing, the representative of Iraq welcomed the press statement issued by the Security Council on 25 July condemning the attack and affirmed that on 20 July the Turkish army had committed an act of aggression against the territory and sovereignty of Iraq and the lives of its citizens in Dohuk governorate. He condemned in the strongest terms the aggression against innocent civilians, underscoring that the attack constituted an act of military aggression against the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Iraq and a threat to regional and international peace and security. The representative of Iraq demanded that Türkiye withdraw its military forces from Iraqi territories and recalled the matter was a recurring issue as documented in numerous letters from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council over the years. He further condemned the illegal presence of Turkish military forces on Iraqi territories, and, invoking Article 35 of the Charter, called on the Council to adopt a resolution compelling Türkiye to withdraw its occupying military forces from Iraqi territory under the Council's supervision.<sup>902</sup> The representative of Iraq further called on the Council to include an item on its agenda entitled "The situation concerning Iraq and Türkiye".<sup>903</sup> He further accused Türkiye of failing to uphold Article 51 and reaffirmed that there was no security agreement between Iraq and Türkiye that allowed for an incursion into Iraq by Turkish forces to chase the PKK. He also called on the Council to establish an international independent panel of inquiry to investigate the attack on Dohuk governorate and asserted that the people of Iraq hoped that the Council would play a decisive and effective role in finding solutions to prevent any future repercussions of the crisis.

The representative of Türkiye expressed his condolences to the people and Government of Iraq and informed the Council that immediately after the attack, Türkiye had been in touch with the Iraqi Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government making clear that Türkiye was ready to take all steps to unveil the truth. He added that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq were breached by terrorist organizations, not by Türkiye and stated that the Iraqi

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<sup>902</sup> For further information on the referral of disputes and situations pursuant to Article 35, see part VI, sect. I.

<sup>903</sup> For further information on the inclusion of new items on the agenda of the Council, see part II, sect. II.

Government could not exercise effective sovereignty over certain parts of its territory in the north, like in the case of Sinjar, where he claimed that the presence of the PKK was still being tolerated. He further emphasized that it was the obligation of the Iraqi authorities to stop the PKK from using the territory of Iraq and underscored that a State could not castigate its neighbour for using its right to self-defence. He said that, in the absence of the ability and willingness of Iraq to deal with the presence of terrorist organizations in its country, Türkiye was obliged to take the appropriate measures and would continue to exercise its inherent right to self-defence as outlined in article 51.<sup>904</sup>

During the period under review, deliberations in the Council focused on the evolving political situation in the country, the security situation inside Iraq and at its borders, as well as the remaining questions deriving from the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, namely, the compensations for the invasion and the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property.

In 2022, Council members expressed concern about the post-electoral political impasse,<sup>905</sup> and called on Iraqi leaders to form an inclusive Government that reflected the will and met the needs and aspirations of the Iraqi people.<sup>906</sup> Several Council Members welcomed the National Dialogue facilitated by the Iraqi Prime Minister to overcome the deadlock.<sup>907</sup> Some Council Members also endorsed the implementation of the Sinjar Agreement by the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan regional government.<sup>908</sup> Some Council members emphasized the importance of the full and meaningful participation and representation of women in the process of Government formation.<sup>909</sup> Several Council members additionally expressed concern about the

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<sup>904</sup> For further information on the discussion, see part VII, sect. X.

<sup>905</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#), Albania, Gabon (on behalf also of Ghana and Kenya), France and India; [S/PV.9034](#), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Mexico, Russian Federation, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and Norway, Brazil; and [S/PV.9145](#), India, United Kingdom, Ireland, Albania, Brazil, Mexico, Norway and France.

<sup>906</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#), United States, Albania, Gabon (on behalf also of Ghana and Kenya), Brazil, Norway, Ireland, France, United Kingdom, India, Mexico, United Arab Emirates and Russian Federation; and [S/PV.9034](#), United Arab Emirates, China, United Kingdom, Mexico, Russian Federation, Ireland, India, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Norway, Brazil, Albania and United States; and [S/PV.9145](#), United States, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, Norway, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>907</sup> [S/PV.9145](#), India, Ireland, Brazil, Mexico, Russian Federation and France.

<sup>908</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#), Mexico; [S/PV.9034](#), France; [S/PV.9145](#), United States and Mexico.

<sup>909</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#), Albania, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Norway, Ireland, France, United Kingdom, Mexico and United Arab Emirates; and [S/PV.9034](#), Mexico, Ireland, India, France, Gabon (also on behalf



incidence of political violence in the country,<sup>910</sup> in particular, with regards to the escalation of tensions and clashes in Sinjar.<sup>911</sup> Regarding the security situation in Iraq and the region, Council members expressed concern regarding the threat of terrorist groups and the continued attacks perpetrated by ISIL/Da'esh in Iraqi territory.<sup>912</sup> Several Council members also condemned Iran's ballistic missile attacks on Erbil on 13 March,<sup>913</sup> as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps attacks accounted for air strikes claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Kurdistan region on 28 September.<sup>914</sup> Council members condemned the attack on 20 July in Iraq's Dohuk governorate and expressed support for the investigation to ensure accountability.<sup>915</sup> Several Council members expressed concern that the attack could exacerbate the political and security crisis in the country,<sup>916</sup> and called for the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.<sup>917</sup>

Several Council members commended Iraq for fulfilling its obligations regarding the compensation for the unlawful invasion of Kuwait in 1990, through the United Nations Compensation Commission.<sup>918</sup> In addressing the issue of civilians stranded in detention facilities, some Council members emphasized the importance of treating children primarily as victims.<sup>919</sup> On the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, many Council members welcomed progress and cooperation between the two

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of Ghana and Kenya), Norway and Albania; and [S/PV.9145](#), Ireland, Albania, Mexico, Norway, France and Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>910</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#), Albania and United Kingdom.

<sup>911</sup> See [S/PV.9034](#), Mexico, Ireland, France and Norway.

<sup>912</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#), United States, Gabon (on behalf also of Ghana and Kenya), Norway, Ireland, France, United Kingdom, China, India, Mexico, United Arab Emirates and Russian Federation; and [S/PV.9034](#), United Arab Emirates, China, Mexico, Russian Federation, Ireland, India, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya and Albania; and [S/PV.9145](#), India, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>913</sup> See [S/PV.9034](#), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland and France.

<sup>914</sup> See [S/PV.9145](#), United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Albania, Brazil, Mexico, France, Gabon (on behalf also of Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>915</sup> See [S/PV.9100](#).

<sup>916</sup> United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Russian Federation and United Kingdom.

<sup>917</sup> United States, United Arab Emirates, Ireland), India, Norway, Ghana, France, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, China, Albania and Brazil.

<sup>918</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#), Gabon (on behalf also of Ghana and Kenya), Brazil, Ireland, France, United Arab Emirates and Russian Federation. For more information on the United Nations Compensation Commission, see part I, sect. 23.

<sup>919</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#), Norway and Ireland; and [S/PV.9145](#), Norway.

countries.<sup>920</sup> Most Council members discussed the impact of climate change on Iraq,<sup>921</sup> while some of them supported the work of the United Nations in assisting Iraq to address it.<sup>922</sup> The representative of Brazil questioned specifically the conceptual and scientific evidence linking sandstorms with climate change, as opposed to the former being merely localized climatological events.<sup>923</sup>

During his interventions in Council meetings in 2022, among other matters, the representative of Iraq reiterated his call for the territories of Iraq not to be used as an arena for settling scores or for advancing political interests on the pretext of combating terrorism and called on the Council to give serious consideration to the respect for the principles of the Charter, in particular for the sovereignty of Member States, good-neighbourly relations and the promotion of cooperation.<sup>924</sup>

In 2022, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2631 \(2022\)](#) extending the mandate of UNAMI until 31 May 2023.<sup>925</sup> In the resolution, the Council commended the Government of Iraq and the Independent High Electoral Commission for executing a technically well-managed and generally peaceful election on 10 October 2021 and called for the swift and peaceful formation of a new government to deliver on national priorities for the Iraqi people, including through economic reform, regional cooperation, stabilization, development and the promotion and protection of human rights<sup>926</sup> By the resolution the Council also recognized the threat of explosive ordinance and its impact on civilians, including children,<sup>927</sup> and condemned in the strongest terms the 7 November 2021 assassination attempt against Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi.<sup>928</sup> By the resolution the Council noted the importance of the Government of Iraq to

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<sup>920</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#), Gabon (on behalf also of Ghana and Kenya), Ireland, France, United Kingdom, China, India and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9034](#), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Mexico, India, France and Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya); and [S/PV.9145](#) India, United Kingdom, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, China, France and Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>921</sup> See [S/PV.9034](#), China, United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Norway, Brazil, Albania and United States; [S/PV.9145](#) United States, United Kingdom, Albania, Norway, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya).

<sup>922</sup> See [S/PV.9034](#), China, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Albania and United States.

<sup>923</sup> See [S/PV.9034](#).

<sup>924</sup> See [S/PV.8975](#), [S/PV.9034](#), and [S/PV.9145](#).

<sup>925</sup> Resolution [2631 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNAMI, see part X, sect. II.

<sup>926</sup> Resolution [2631 \(2022\)](#), sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs.

<sup>927</sup> *Ibid.*, third preambular paragraph.

<sup>928</sup> *Ibid.*, fourth preambular paragraph.

urgently deliver meaningful reform, recognized the Government of Iraq's efforts to that effect, and called for State institutions to redouble efforts to pursue accountability for those responsible for crimes involving the killing, serious injury, abduction or disappearance of demonstrators and journalists, and to safeguard and respect the right of freedom of expression.<sup>929</sup> In connection with climate change, the Council recognized that the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters, among other factors, could contribute to desertification and drought, adversely impact the humanitarian situation, and aggravate any existing instability and acknowledged the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement.<sup>930</sup> The Council further reiterated the tasks of UNAMI with several additions and modified the reporting requirement for the Secretary-General to the Council on the progress made towards the fulfilment of all UNAMI's responsibilities from every three months to every four months.<sup>931</sup> Following the vote, the representative of India, expressed appreciation for the work of UNAMI and its close cooperation with the Government of Iraq.<sup>932</sup> He also emphasized, however, the need to ensure that the focus of UNAMI not be distracted by additional responsibilities that either duplicated or could otherwise be efficiently executed by the competent agencies in Iraq. He also reiterated that issues of climate change had to be addressed holistically through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in accordance with its provisions and principles and the Paris Agreement, and that no artificial link should be drawn between climate change and security-related issues without any firm scientific basis.

In addition, developments in 2022 relating to the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh /Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant established pursuant to resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#) were dealt with under the item entitled "Threats to international peace and security"<sup>933</sup> and relating to the United Nations Compensation Commission under the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait".<sup>934</sup>

### **Meetings: The situation concerning Iraq**

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<sup>929</sup> Ibid, eighth preambular paragraph.

<sup>930</sup> Ibid, eleventh preambular paragraph.

<sup>931</sup> Ibid, para. 5.

<sup>932</sup> See [S/PV.9043](#).

<sup>933</sup> For further information, see part I, sect. 34 and part IX, sect. III.

<sup>934</sup> For further information, see part I, sect. 22.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8780</a> 27 May 2021	Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution <a href="#">2107 (2013)</a> ( <a href="#">S/2021/395</a> )  Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution <a href="#">2522 (2020)</a> ( <a href="#">S/2021/426</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the United States ( <a href="#">S/2021/503</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2576 (2021)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.8842</a> 25 August 2021	Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution <a href="#">2107 (2013)</a> ( <a href="#">S/2021/689</a> )  Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution <a href="#">2576 (2021)</a> ( <a href="#">S/2021/700</a> )		Iraq	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8910</a> 23 November 2021	Thirty-second report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution <a href="#">2107 (2013)</a> ( <a href="#">S/2021/930</a> )  Report of the Secretary-General on electoral process in Iraq ( <a href="#">S/2021/932</a> )  Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution <a href="#">2576 (2021)</a> ( <a href="#">S/2021/946</a> )		Iraq	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNAMI; Coordinator of the Iraqi Women's Network <sup>b</sup>	All Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees	

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>b</sup> Iraq was represented by its Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>c</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. Special Representative participated in the meeting via videoconference.

### 23. The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

During the period under review, the Security Council held one meeting in relation to the item entitled “The situation between Iraq and Kuwait” at which it adopted one resolution.<sup>935</sup> This was the first meeting held by the Council under the item since February 2019.<sup>936</sup> More information on the meeting, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.<sup>937</sup>

On 22 February 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution [2621 \(2022\)](#), deciding that the United Nations Compensation Commission had fulfilled its mandate under resolutions [687 \(1991\)](#) and [692 \(1991\)](#) and reaffirming that Iraq had fulfilled its international obligations to compensate all claimants awarded compensation by the Commission for direct loss, damage – including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources – or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as set out in paragraphs 16 and 18 of resolution [687 \(1991\)](#) and resolution [692 \(1991\)](#).<sup>938</sup> By the same resolution, the Council decided to terminate the mandate of the Commission and to conclude its consideration of compensation by the Commission for liability as set out in paragraphs 16 and 18 of resolution [687 \(1991\)](#) and [692 \(1991\)](#).<sup>939</sup>

At the meeting, following the vote, the President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission noted that the Commission was the first successful example of a system giving individuals recourse to seek compensation from an aggressor State and recalled that on 9 February, the Governing Council had adopted decision 277, its final decision, which had marked the fulfilment of the mandate of the Commission and had declared that the Government of Iraq had fulfilled its international obligations to compensate for losses and damages suffered as a direct result of its unlawful invasion of Kuwait.<sup>940</sup> He further indicated that the Commission had

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<sup>935</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>936</sup> For more information on prior meetings on the item, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2019*, part I. sect. 23.

<sup>937</sup> See also [A/77/2](#), part II, sect. 5.

<sup>938</sup> Resolution [2621 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

<sup>939</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 7 and 8.

<sup>940</sup> See [S/PV.8972](#).

completed its work and would be winding down all activities in 2022. He added that a final administrative Governing Council session would be held following the closure of the accounts for the return of any remaining funds in the Compensation Fund to Iraq and the issuance of all audit reports. Following the final session, the Commission would be dissolved, and a reporting letter would be sent to the Security Council.<sup>941</sup> He underscored that the Commission demonstrated what multiple States with different interests could achieve through positive cooperation at the United Nations, and that post-war reconstruction and reconciliation, by Member States acting through the United Nations, were possible.

The representative of the United Kingdom, who was the drafter of the resolution, indicated that the Commission represented an important success for the international rules-based order and indicated that its work was a historic achievement for multilateralism in terms of post-conflict reconciliation and solutions to large-scale and complex problems related to conflict. She added that the successful completion of the mandate of the Commission was not only a reminder of the consequences of breaching international law, but also an example of what could be achieved through positive cooperation at the United Nations.<sup>942</sup> The representative of the United States noted that the Commission was a successful mechanism for post-conflict management, made possible by the Council's collective commitment to multilateralism and the maintenance of international peace and security and underlined that while the completion of the work of the Commission was a success, it was also a reminder that the impact of war extended for decades. He also underscored that the Council, consistent with its role under the Charter, must continue to undertake actions to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict and advance international peace and security. The representative of France noted that the closure of the Commission was a major achievement in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation and marked the beginning of a new chapter in Iraq-Kuwait relations. The representative of the United Arab Emirates stated that the conclusion of the work of the Commission represented a historic moment for the agenda item on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. The representative of India said that the episode served as a good model of how Member States could come together to achieve post-conflict reconciliation through positive cooperation. The representative of Ireland emphasized that the fulfilment of the

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<sup>941</sup> See [S/2022/104](#).

<sup>942</sup> See [S/PV.8972](#).

mandate of the Commission marked an unprecedented achievement in the history of international claims resolution and the first case of individuals having recourse to seek compensation from an aggressor State. She added that the joint efforts, commitment and perseverance of the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait, acting through the United Nations, were a reminder of the enduring value of dialogue and multilateralism. The representative of Norway referred to the conclusion of the mandate of the Commission as a historic and significant achievement. The representative of China similarly said that the completion of the work of the Commission was very significant and expressed hope that Iraq and Kuwait would deepen cooperation and jointly promote regional stability, peace and prosperity. The representative of Albania noted that the Commission remained a model for post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, demonstrating the value and importance of international law and respect for Member States. He added that the occasion should serve as a reminder of the catastrophic costs of war and a lesson of the importance of showing resolve in efforts to prevent conflicts, discourage illegal acts of aggression and end wars. The representative of Ghana expressed satisfaction that the Commission had lived up to and successfully completed its mandate, and expressed her conviction that meaningful post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation could be achieved by Member States through constructive cooperation in a multilateral setting. The representative of Kenya indicated that the day marked a momentous occasion for the United Nations and for multilateralism. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the dissolution of the Commission was a historic event and expressed his belief that the resources that would be available to Iraq would make a tangible contribution to improving the socioeconomic situation in the country, which, he said, had endured the humanitarian consequences of sanctions pressure since the outbreak of the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1990.

Many Council members asserted that Iraq had fulfilled its obligations in relation to the Chapter VII measures concerning its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990,<sup>943</sup> and commended Iraq for its the commitment to make its payments often in challenging circumstances.<sup>944</sup> Some Council members also expressed appreciation to the Government of

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<sup>943</sup> United Kingdom, United States, France, Mexico, India, Gabon, Norway, China, Albania and Kenya.

<sup>944</sup> United Kingdom, United States), France, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, India, Ireland, Norway, China, Ghana, Brazil, Kenya and Russian Federation.

Kuwait for its commitment to the mechanism of the Commission.<sup>945</sup> Several Council members called for further progress on the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and the issue of missing Kuwaiti property, including items from the national archives.<sup>946</sup>

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq stressed that the cooperation of his Government with the Commission and the Security Council was a successful model of multilateral action that reinforced confidence in international mechanisms and measures to resolve crises confronting the world. He added that the fulfilment of Iraq's international obligations to the international community and Kuwait was a major development that would strengthen Iraq's relations with the region and the world, as well as its historical ties with Kuwait. He clarified that following Iraq's fulfilment of its obligations, the international community and the United Nations now had a legal and moral obligation towards Iraq which included ceasing the application of Chapter VII measures to Iraq; preserving Iraq's rights, assets and international legal privileges; and shielding Iraq from any future claims, in line with the United Nations-led international efforts and in accordance with the Charter and the norms of international law ensuring justice and fairness. The representative of Kuwait welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution [2621 \(2022\)](#) and underscored that the fulfilment of the tasks and responsibilities by mechanisms and subsidiary organs established by the Council and the readiness to follow up on their implementation to achieve desired outcomes to the resolutions enhanced the credibility and effectiveness of the Council. He further praised the Security Council on the historic achievement regarding its work on the issue of compensation and congratulated Iraq on fully meeting its obligations related to the issue of compensation and on ceasing to be subject to one of its most important obligations under Chapter VII. The representative of Kuwait also renewed his country's commitment to work and cooperate with the Iraqi Government to finalize the outstanding issues and obligations relating to missing Kuwaitis, third-country nationals and the return of property, including the national archives, as stipulated in resolution [2107 \(2013\)](#).

### **Meetings: The situation between Iraq and Kuwait**

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<sup>945</sup> United States, France, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Ireland, Norway, China, Albania, Ghana, Brazil and Kenya.

<sup>946</sup> United Arab Emirates, India, Gabon and Ireland.



<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8972</a> 22 February 2022	Letter dated 10 February 2022 from the President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/104</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by the Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/136</a> )	Iraq, Kuwait	President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission	All Council members, all invitees <sup>a</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2621 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (under Chapter VII)

<sup>a</sup> Iraq was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## Thematic issues

### 24. United Nations peacekeeping operations

During the period under review, the Security Council held four meetings, adopted one resolution and issued one presidential statement under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations. Two of the meetings took the form of briefings, one took the form of an open debate and one was convened for the adoption of a decision.<sup>947</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants and outcomes, is provided in the table below.<sup>948</sup>

In 2022, the Council continued to hold the annual briefings on the Action for Peacekeeping and Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiatives further to resolution [2378 \(2017\)](#) and on the work of United Nations police components. The Council also held a high-level open debate on the importance of strategic communications for efficient peacekeeping, during which it issued a presidential statement, and adopted resolution [2668 \(2022\)](#) addressing mental health and psychosocial support for United Nations peace operations personnel. During these meetings, the Council was briefed twice by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and once by the Secretary-General, the Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the Police Commissioners of MONUSCO and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Director of Research at the International Peace Institute and a representative of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.<sup>949</sup>

On 12 July 2022, at the initiative of Brazil which held the presidency of the Council for the month,<sup>950</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate on the role of strategic communications in efficient peacekeeping.<sup>951</sup> Opening the meeting, the Secretary-General stated that strategic communications were critical across the mandates of peacekeeping operations, including to protect civilians and prevent violence, secure ceasefires and safeguard political settlements, investigate and report on human rights abuses and violations, advance the women and peace and

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<sup>947</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>948</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 4.

<sup>949</sup> See [S/PV.9090](#) and [S/PV.9090 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9123](#) and [S/PV.9189](#).

<sup>950</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 5 July 2022 ([S/2022/539](#)).

<sup>951</sup> See [S/PV.9090](#) and [S/PV.9090 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information on high-level meetings, see part II.

security agenda and promote the role of women as peacekeepers, peacemakers and peace leaders, and ensure the safety and security of the personnel and the communities they served.<sup>952</sup> The Secretary-General noted that disinformation was not just misleading, but dangerous and potentially deadly, fuelling open violence against United Nations personnel and their partners. The best way and most cost-effective instrument for countering that threat, according to the Secretary-General, were credible, accurate and human-centred strategic communications which, not only defused harmful lies, but also provided for tailored two-way communication that built trust and political and public support. Such communication could strengthen the understanding among local populations of United Nations missions and mandates, and in return strengthen the understanding of peacekeepers of the concerns, grievances, expectations and hopes of those populations.

The Secretary-General observed that, in order to be effective, strategic communications had to be grounded in evidence, based on verified data, open to dialogue, rooted in storytelling and delivered by credible messengers. As a means of improving strategic communications in peacekeeping, he noted that the United Nations was working on adopting a whole-of-mission communication approach, holding mission leaders accountable to own and lead these efforts, providing guidance and training to missions, working with technology and media companies and Member States, monitoring and evaluating the efficacy of information campaigns, and deploying communications to strengthen accountability and to end misconduct by personnel and partners, including combating sexual exploitation and abuse. The Secretary-General concluded by emphasizing that the United Nations had to take a deliberate stand as a trusted information actor in conflict environments by providing engaging and factual content, facilitating inclusive dialogue, demanding the removal of harmful speech, calling leaders to account and promoting peace and unity.

Following the Secretary-General, the Force Commander of MONUSCO shared his perspective on the utility of strategic communications in countering the overall poor perception among the population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo regarding the relevance of the Mission in improving the security situation. In this regard, the Force Commander noted that one

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<sup>952</sup> See [S/PV.9090](#).

part of the Mission's strategy was to communicate in person with stakeholders, from the village chief to the media and up to the national and regional armed forces leadership, all of whom played a critical role in countering the criticism, to explain the aim and the limits of the mandate and to acknowledge the validity of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. In terms of challenges, he highlighted the need for more female translators, better pre-deployment training for units and qualified public information and information operation staff officers, as well as a specialized military psychological operational unit. Furthermore, he stressed the need for synergy between the military campaign plan and the strategic communications plan and that strategic communication was a command duty and a Mission leadership endeavour.

In her remarks, the Director of Research of the International Peace Institute discussed the role of strategic communications in enhancing the protection of civilians, how to ensure that communication was, not only gender sensitive, but also gender transformative, and the importance of active listening to place the experiences of communities in peacekeeping at the forefront. With respect to the protection of civilians, she stated that strategic communications were not limited to managing expectations by communicating the limitations of the mission's protection work, but also included messaging on how populations could better access the protection interventions that were available. Strategic communications could also be used to counter hate speech and misinformation or disinformation that was used to incite violence, inflame identity-based cleavages or mobilize individuals into armed groups. The Director of Research explained that gender-transformative communications used narratives and storytelling that promoted gender equality and combatted harmful stereotypes and behaviours by, for example, highlighting stories and images that expanded traditional understandings of gender roles, addressing harmful gender practices and using information to increase women's access to power and resources. Finally, she emphasized that strategic communications had to move beyond a unidirectional flow of relaying information to a dynamic dialogue between missions and communities. In this regard, she suggested the use of, in addition to data and analytics, storytelling as a means of persuading people and inspiring them to act for the sake of peace.

In their discussion, members and participating non-members of the Council highlighted the importance of strategic communications for the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in increasingly complex and hostile operating environments characterized by a significant increase

in the dissemination of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech through digital technologies. They pointed out the link between effective strategic communications and the implementation of protection of civilians mandates and ensuring the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel. In terms of practical steps, speakers recommended implementing communications strategies across all missions and all of their respective components, ensuring the ownership of such strategies by mission leadership, improving communication capabilities through the deployment of specialized personnel, training and the use of technology, and ensuring a “two-way” communication between peacekeepers, communities, host governments and other stakeholders on the ground. Many speakers also emphasized the utility of strategic communications in advancing the women and peace and security agenda.

In the presidential statement issued during the meeting, the Council underscored the importance of strategic communications to the implementation of the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations and the safety and security of peacekeepers.<sup>953</sup> The Council recognized that strategic communications and the provision of accurate content helped strengthen the understanding of peacekeeping mandates, managed expectations and garnered trust and support among relevant stakeholders, notably host governments and local communities, and contributed to countering disinformation and misinformation.<sup>954</sup> Moreover, the Council stressed the need to improve the culture of strategic communications across all mission components and called on operations in the implementation of protection of civilians mandates to enhance community engagement and awareness about the protection needs and capacities of local communities.<sup>955</sup> Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide, no later than 15 April 2023, a strategic review of strategic communications across all peacekeeping operations and to ensure that his regular reports on individual operations included, as applicable, information on the actions and impact of such communications for mandated activities.<sup>956</sup>

On 6 September 2022, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations briefed the Council further to resolution [2378 \(2017\)](#) on the progress and challenges concerning the

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<sup>953</sup> [S/PRST/2022/5](#), fifth paragraph.

<sup>954</sup> Ibid.

<sup>955</sup> Ibid., sixth and seventh paragraphs.

<sup>956</sup> Ibid., sixteenth and seventeenth paragraphs.

implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping and Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiatives.<sup>957</sup> Noting the increasingly complex geopolitical environment, the Under-Secretary-General stressed the need to do everything to preserve the space needed for United Nations peacekeeping operations which continued to visibly manifest a multilateral system in action on the ground. He then provided an overview of the implementation of some of the priorities of the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative. Specifically, in line with the second on strategic and operational integration, the Under-Secretary-General reported that 11 out of 12 missions developed either integrated mission plans or results frameworks for the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS), most of which took into account gender considerations and the women and peace and security agenda. Noting that missions could only fulfil their mandates if they had the appropriate capacities at the right time, he called for the support of Council members to fill the critical capacity gaps, especially utility and armed helicopters. With regard to the fourth priority on safety and security, the Under-Secretary-General expressed regret over the doubling of peacekeeper deaths in 2021 compared to 2020 and noted that the trend continued in 2022, particularly with the use of explosive ordnance and improved explosive devices.

On the sixth priority, the Under-Secretary-General stated that missions were working to fully integrate strategic communications into planning and decision-making and were proactively communicating on the tangible impact of peacekeeping in a compelling, human-centred way, particularly through the use of social media and United Nations-operated radio networks. Regarding the participation of women in peacekeeping, he noted that, except for military contingents, most targets set in the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy had been met and surpassed. The Under-Secretary-General stated that work on creating more gender-responsive working and living environments continued and that gender analysis was being used to inform decision-making. Nevertheless, he emphasized constraints related to inadequate resources and personnel, including a shortage of gender advisers. While stating that notable progress had been made in addressing the priorities outlined in the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative, the Under-Secretary-General called for stronger and more united support from the Council for advancing the political efforts of peacekeeping operations and support for missions when they

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<sup>957</sup> See [S/PV.9123](#).

faced undue restrictions and obstacles from the parties to the conflict, including violations of status-of-forces agreements.

In their exchanges following the briefing, Council members widely recognized the improvements made in the performance of peacekeeping operations since the launch of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, but also outlined a number of challenges. Most Council members stressed that effective mandate implementation required tailored, realistic and properly-resourced mandates that formed part of an overall strategy to achieve a political solution to the conflict. Several Council members expressed concern with the increasingly broad nature of mandates and stressed that their focus should remain on supporting political processes.<sup>958</sup> Several speakers further raised the need to engage with and improve relations with host governments.<sup>959</sup> Some Council members urged host governments to avoid imposing restrictions on missions and abide by their obligations under the status-of-forces agreements.<sup>960</sup> A number of Council members pointed to the increasing tensions between some missions and local communities and called for the greater use of strategic communications to rebuild and maintain trust.<sup>961</sup> In terms of other priorities for improving peacekeeping performance, speakers highlighted the importance of partnerships with regional organizations and regional missions on the ground, additional resources and capacities to ensure the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel, the use of data and technology, the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda and creating conditions conducive to the participation of women in missions.

On 14 November 2022, the Council held the annual briefing with select police commissions of United Nations peacekeeping operations.<sup>962</sup> In his introductory remarks, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations provided an overview and examples of the work of the Secretariat and United Nations police personnel in support of political transitions, increasing linkages between long-term strategic planning and operational decision-making, aligning pre-deployment training with in-mission training, performance assessment, the development of police-related impact indicators within the CPAS framework, strategic

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<sup>958</sup> Ibid., Ghana, China and Russian Federation.

<sup>959</sup> Ibid., China, Gabon, Russian Federation, Kenya, India and France.

<sup>960</sup> Ibid., Ghana, United Kingdom, United States and France.

<sup>961</sup> Ibid., Norway, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Albania and Brazil.

<sup>962</sup> See [S/PV.9189](#).

communication and improving cooperation with host countries during transitions.<sup>963</sup> Moreover, the Under-Secretary-General stated that gender-responsive policing efforts ensured that the different security needs of women, men, girls and boys were considered, including through a robust network of gender advisers and police gender focal points. He added that United Nations police had already achieved its gender parity targets for 2025, with women comprising almost one in five police officers and five out of nine police components being headed by women.

In their remarks, the Police Commissioners of UNMISS and MONUSCO described the work of their police components on the protection of civilians and improving performance. The Police Commissioner of UMMISS noted that, as part of its mandate, the police component participated in whole-of-mission efforts to foster protection through dialogue and engagement, participated in integrated civilian-military-police patrols and deployment to temporary operating bases near conflict hotspots, and contributed to the creation of a protective environment through its support to rule of law institutions. As a means of improving performance, he highlighted the need to create a more enabling environment for the participation of women, additional capacity for joint and integrated planning, proactive and resourceful police officers with good education and pre-deployment training, and additional formed police units. The Police Commissioner of MONUSCO noted the efforts to improve the performance of the Mission's police component, particularly through communication with police-contributing countries on the quality of formed police units and necessary specialized teams, training and the use of monitoring and measurement systems such as CPAS, and the implementation of an annual workplan as a monitoring and assessment mechanism. He also referred to the deployment of police teams to measure and help improve the performance of the Congolese National Police in combating urban and organized crime.

Following the Police Commissioners, Ms. Emma Birikorang, a representative of the Kofi Anna International Peacekeeping Training Centre, spoke about the influence of decisions, norms, ideas and policies implemented at the multilateral level of United Nations peacekeeping on the decision-making of peacekeeping stakeholders at the national level. Specifically, she expressed the view that peacekeeping had a democratizing effect on the security sector in host communities

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<sup>963</sup> Ibid.



and troop-contributing countries and strengthened the legitimacy and effectiveness of domestic security relations. She further noted that there were mutually reinforcing benefits that police in peacekeeping brought to the women and peace and security agenda in the peacekeeping theatre and at the domestic level. While noting the critical contribution of police components to the Action for Peacekeeping priorities, she highlighted the need for improvements in innovation, adaptability, operational readiness, strategic and operational integration and accountability for peacekeepers in mission in which fragile States were often beneficiaries. However, Ms. Birikorang added that, even beyond fragile host countries, police-contributing countries had maximized their participation in peacekeeping in order to benefit their own societies and strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of domestic security relations.

In their statements following the briefers, Council members recognized the important the work of police components, particularly in conflict prevention and early warning, the protection of civilians, peacekeeping transitions, capacity-building, the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda and strategic communications. Council members underscored that ensuring effective and accountable police components was a key requirement under the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative.<sup>964</sup> While noting some improvements, Council members stressed the need to ensure that police officers were provided with specialized and tailored training relevant to their operational environment and to have the right mindset and necessary equipment, including technology, to successfully perform their duties. Council members further acknowledged the important role of women police officers, particularly in community engagement, and called for additional progress on increasing their participation in police components and improving their working conditions. As a key element to increasing the effectiveness of police, speakers called for stronger partnerships between police components and local communities, host countries, United Nations country teams, civil society, regional organizations, among other stakeholders. Furthermore, some members underscored the need for greater coordination between the Council, Secretariat, police-contributing countries and host States, particularly with respect to planning, mandate design and exit strategies.<sup>965</sup>

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<sup>964</sup> Ibid., Kenya, Ireland, United States, Mexico, United Kingdom and Ghana.

<sup>965</sup> Ibid., China, India and Russian Federation.

On 21 December 2022, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2668 \(2022\)](#) by which it recognized the need to raise awareness of the importance of mental health and psychosocial support to United Nations peace operations personnel.<sup>966</sup> The Council encouraged troop- and police-contributing countries, including Member States and the Secretariat, to provide mental health services to support personnel during pre-deployment training, to continue fostering a culture of well-being and care during deployment, and to continue to provide peace operations personnel at the post-deployment stage with adequate mental health and psychosocial support services.<sup>967</sup> Furthermore, the Council requested the Secretary-General to include information on the implementation of aspects of the 2018 United Nations Mental Health and Well-Being Strategy, as appropriate, in his comprehensive reports to the Council under resolution [2378 \(2017\)](#).<sup>968</sup>

Following the vote, while expressing support for the resolution, the representatives of India and the Russian Federation questioned whether the Council was the appropriate forum to address the issue of mental health and psychosocial support for peacekeeping personnel.<sup>969</sup> Specifically, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the General Assembly was the specialized platform which brought together all interested parties, including troop contributors and Secretariat experts, for a comprehensive review of all aspects of peacekeeping operations and added that the Council lacked the necessary competence, data and analysis to consider peacekeeping personnel and mental health issues.<sup>970</sup> Furthermore, the representative of the Russian Federation was of the view that mixing the notions of “peacekeeping operations” and “special political missions” under the single term “peace operations” introduced uncertainty regarding the responsibility for the appropriate selection of personnel, their mental health support, funding and the overall scope of the efforts needed, given that the latter missions fell under the responsibility of the Secretariat. Similarly, the representative of India stressed that any serious deliberation of the issue should be

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<sup>966</sup> Resolution [2668 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>967</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 2-4.

<sup>968</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5.

<sup>969</sup> See [S/PV.9229](#).

<sup>970</sup> *Ibid.* For further information on the relations between the Security Council and the General Assembly, including its subsidiary organs, see part IV.

premised on data and studies conducted in consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries and that the Special Committee was giving due consideration to the mental health of peacekeeping personnel as a result of which there had been consistent improvement in recent years in the operating environment, living conditions, casualty evacuation and medical facilities, among other areas. As penholder of the resolution, the representative of Mexico expressed the position that the Council should give due importance not only to the physical well-being of uniformed and civilian personnel, but also to their mental health before, during and after their deployment.

### Meetings: United Nations peacekeeping operations

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8837</a> 18 August 2021	Protecting the protectors	Draft resolution submitted by 80 Member States ( <a href="#">S/2021/730</a> ) <sup>a</sup>	65 Member States <sup>b</sup>			Resolution <a href="#">2589 (2021)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.8838</a> 18 August 2021	Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping  Letter dated 26 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2021/681</a> )	Letter dated 20 August 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2021/732</a> )			Secretary-General, all Council members <sup>c</sup>	<a href="#">S/PRST/2021/17</a>
<a href="#">S/PV.8851</a> 8 September 2021	United Nations transitions  Letter dated 24 August 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2021/756</a> )	Letter dated 10 September 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2021/783</a> )		Former President of Liberia, President of the Community Development Association of the Sudan	Secretary-General, all Council members, <sup>d</sup> all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8852</a> 9 September 2021	United Nations transitions	Draft resolution submitted by 97 Member States ( <a href="#">S/2021/771</a> ) <sup>e</sup>	82 Member States <sup>f</sup>			Resolution <a href="#">2594(2021)</a> 15-0-0
	Letter dated 24 August 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2021/756</a> )					
<a href="#">S/PV.8901</a> 10 November 2021	Police Commissioners			Under Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Police Commissioner of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, Police Commissioner of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	12 Council members, <sup>g</sup> all invitees <sup>h</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Lithuania, Malta, Morocco, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand and Uruguay.

<sup>b</sup> Brazil was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ghana was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. India was represented by its Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs. The United Arab Emirates was represented by its Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs.

<sup>c</sup> Indonesia spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Safety and Security of United Nations Peacekeepers. Denmark spoke on behalf of the Nordic Countries.

<sup>d</sup> The Police Commissioners of UNMISS and MONUSCO participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>e</sup> Albania, Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>f</sup> Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and Türkiye.

## 25. International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

During 2022, the Security Council held four meetings related to the work of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.<sup>971</sup> Of the four meetings, two took the form of a debate, and two were held in the form of adoptions.<sup>972</sup> The Council adopted one resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter in connection with the item. More information on the meetings, including participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

On 31 March 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement by which it requested the Mechanism to submit, by 14 April 2022, a report on its work progress since June 2020, including detailed schedules for the ongoing proceedings, as well as factors related to projected completion dates for the remaining cases.<sup>973</sup> By the presidential statement, the Council also requested the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals to carry out a thorough examination of the Mechanism's report, as well as the report on the evaluation of the methods and work of the Mechanism by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, which was due by 31 March 2022.<sup>974</sup> The Council asked the Informal Working Group to present in its review, its views and any findings or recommendations for the Council's consideration by 13 May 2022.<sup>975</sup> Furthermore, the Council noted with concern that despite reaching an earlier agreement, the Mechanism continued to face problems in the relocation of acquitted persons and convicted persons who had completed their sentences and emphasized the importance of the successful relocation of such persons, stressing its ongoing determination to combat impunity for those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law and the necessity that all persons indicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including the remaining fugitives, were brought to justice.<sup>976</sup>

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<sup>971</sup> For further information on the International Residual Mechanism for International Tribunals, see previous Supplements covering the period 2018-2021 and for the issues considered under this item, see also previous Supplements covering the period 1996-2007.

<sup>972</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

<sup>973</sup> [S/PRST/2022/2](#), fifth paragraph.

<sup>974</sup> *Ibid.*, sixth paragraph.

<sup>975</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>976</sup> *Ibid.*, ninth and tenth paragraphs.

On 14 June Council members held a meeting in which they heard the semi-annual briefings by the President of the Mechanism and by its Prosecutor.<sup>977</sup> At the meeting, the President and the Prosecutor presented their latest reports on the work of the Mechanism, submitted pursuant to paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution [1966 \(2010\)](#). Addressing the Council for the last time before he stepped down as President of the Mechanism, Judge Carmel Agius expressed his satisfaction with the significant progress accomplished during the reporting period, affirming that there were only three main cases left, which represented a markedly reduced judicial workload as compared to early 2019, and that appeal cases proceedings were on track for completion by the projected time frames. Additionally, the President highlighted the advances in the tracking of fugitives of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which had also had a decisive impact on the Mechanism's operations and outlook. He said that, as a result of the efforts of the Prosecutor, only four fugitives were left, all of whom were expected to be tried in Rwanda. The President also highlighted progress regarding the enforcement of sentences as well as regarding the monitoring of cases referred to national jurisdictions, which had been reduced from seven to two cases. In parallel to the results, the President also mentioned some setbacks experienced during the reporting period. In that connection, he announced that the binding agreement signed between the United Nations and the Niger to relocate the acquitted and released persons to the Niger's territory had not been honoured. He also mentioned the failure of Serbia to fulfil the international obligations under resolution [1966 \(2010\)](#), which was illustrated by the contempt case against Petar Jojić and Vjerica Radeta. In closing, the President stated that, like its predecessor tribunals, the Mechanism was part of a broader system, reflecting a shared vision of justice and a determination that the crucial work of those tribunals would be seen through to the very end. He added that after almost a decade of operations, the Mechanism was far closer to realizing the Council's vision of a small and temporary institution. He emphasized, nonetheless, that many of the Mechanism's activities, including a number of judicial functions, would extend into the foreseeable future and for long after the main cases had concluded, unless the Council decided otherwise. In that connection, he said that it would be for the Council to determine the scope of the Mechanism's mandate and to decide if and when certain duties should

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<sup>977</sup> See [S/PV.9062](#).

more appropriately be discharged by others. In his statement, the Prosecutor informed the Council that in the previous two years his Office had accounted for half of the fugitives who had remained at large following the closure of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, with only four fugitives remaining. In that regard, he reported that after several challenging years, progress was being made with the Republic of South Africa and that an operational task team had recently been established to assist his Office in bringing Fulgence Kayishema's flight from justice to an end. He added that their goal was to account for all four outstanding fugitives by the time the Council next reviewed the work of the Mechanism. In addition, the Prosecutor provided updates on his Office's continuing efforts to complete the *Kabuga* case, as well as the *Fatuma et al.* and the *Stanišić and Simatović* cases. With regard to the Council's mandate for his Office to respond to requests for assistance from domestic investigators and prosecutors around the world, the Prosecutor affirmed that assisting national jurisdictions prosecuting international crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda continued to be a priority. He added that as his Office moved closer to completing their last cases and accounting for the final fugitives, it was important to remind that thousands of cases still needed to be completed in national courts and that his Office's assistance was essential to completing that work. Furthermore, national prosecutors still faced other critical challenges, with regional judicial cooperation being the most significant issue remaining in the former Yugoslavia. In that connection, the Prosecutor urged the countries concerned to significantly increase their cooperation in the search for missing persons, which was a humanitarian imperative. With respect to Rwanda, the Prosecutor said that the challenge was fundamentally about priorities and resources and, sometimes, a lack of political will. More broadly, in relation to both Rwanda and the countries of the former Yugoslavia, he said that genocide denial and the glorification of war criminals persisted and that there could be no tolerance for such behaviour, which insulted the victims and sowed the seeds for future conflict. In closing, the Prosecutor outlined the main findings of the ongoing review process and of the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services and reported on the steps that had been taken to deliver on the mandate of his Office during the review period, including securing convictions in the trials in *Stanišić and Simatović* and *Nzabonimpa et al.*, as well as the *Mladić* appeal.

Following the briefings, the Council discussed the progress achieved by the Mechanism during the reporting period. At the outset, the representative of Gabon, as Chair of the Informal Working Group stated that, as requested in the statement by the President of the Council of 31 March 2022,<sup>978</sup> the status update given by the President and the Prosecutor attempted to show that the Council had been right to trust and invest in the Mechanism to bring justice to victims of international crimes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.<sup>979</sup> He added that the progress made by the Mechanism during the biennium had been considerable, despite the many challenges it had faced from the health crisis caused by the coronavirus disease pandemic, a statement that was echoed by several Council members.<sup>980</sup> By contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation was of the view that the Mechanism had not made any progress in the planned completion of its activities and that there had been no real downsizing over the previous five years. He said that the results of the following biennial review which was under way would determine the parameters of the further functioning of the Mechanism and that that process would help the leadership of the Mechanism undertake the necessary efforts to draw down its work as soon as possible. Other Council members acknowledged the progress achieved by the Mechanism in judicial matters and its working methods during the reporting period, while encouraging the Mechanism to take the necessary measures to keep the projected timelines on track and to implement the remaining recommendations in keeping with its mandate.<sup>981</sup> In that regard, several members acknowledged the progress in the *Kabuga* case and looked forward to the completion of its trial<sup>982</sup> as well as to the judgements in the *Stanišić and Simatović* and *Fatuma et al* cases.<sup>983</sup> Most Council members also underscored the importance of judicial cooperation of national jurisdictions and between States concerned, as well as of full cooperation with the Mechanism in order to enable it to complete its mandate. In that connection, several members expressed concern with the non-compliance by Serbia with the Mechanism's arrest

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<sup>978</sup> See [S/PRST/2022/2](#), fifth paragraph.

<sup>979</sup> See [S/PV.9062](#).

<sup>980</sup> Gabon, India, France, Ghana, United Kingdom, United States, Mexico, Kenya and Ireland.

<sup>981</sup> India, France, United Kingdom, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, China and Albania.

<sup>982</sup> Gabon, France, United Kingdom, United States, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, China, Kenya, Norway, Ireland and Albania.

<sup>983</sup> United Kingdom, United States, Mexico, Norway and Albania.



warrant for the *Jojić and Radeta* case,<sup>984</sup> and others urged States to help in the arrest and surrender of the four remaining fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.<sup>985</sup> Furthermore, many Council members expressed concern about the relocation issue of the acquitted or released persons and called upon the States concerned and the Mechanism to urgently find an appropriate solution to the current situation.<sup>986</sup> Speakers, members and non-members, also condemned the denial of atrocity crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as the glorification of their perpetrators.<sup>987</sup>

On 22 June, the Council adopted, with one abstention,<sup>988</sup> resolution [2637 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it appointed the Prosecutor of the Mechanism with effect from 1 July 2022 until 30 June 2024.<sup>989</sup> In the resolution, the Council continued to urge all States to intensify their cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the Mechanism, in particular to achieve the arrest and surrender of all remaining fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as soon as possible.<sup>990</sup> The Council noted with concern that despite having reached an earlier agreement, the Mechanism continued to face problems in the relocation of acquitted persons and convicted persons who had completed serving their sentence, and emphasised the importance of finding expeditious and durable solutions to those problems, including as part of a reconciliation process.<sup>991</sup> In that regard, the Council noted that decisions on the relocation of persons who had been acquitted or completed their sentences should take into account inter alia the readiness of the state of origin to accept its nationals, the consent or any objections raised by the individuals to be relocated and the availability of other relocation states.<sup>992</sup> The Council welcomed the report submitted by the Mechanism to the Council and the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the evaluation of the methods and work of the Mechanism.<sup>993</sup> In that regard, the Council requested

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<sup>984</sup> United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Ireland and Albania.

<sup>985</sup> France, Ghana, United States, Mexico, Kenya, Norway and Ireland.

<sup>986</sup> India, Ghana, United Kingdom, United States, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, Norway and Ireland.

<sup>987</sup> Gabon, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States, Ireland, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

<sup>988</sup> See [S/PV.9072](#).

<sup>989</sup> Resolution [2637 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>990</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

<sup>991</sup> *Ibid.*, para 4.

<sup>992</sup> *Ibid.*, para 5.

<sup>993</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 8. See also [S/2022/319](#) and [S/2022/148](#).

the Mechanism to implement the recommendations made by the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals and to continue to take steps to further enhance its efficiency and effective and transparent management, including the production of clear and focused projections of completion timelines at the earliest stage possible and disciplined adherence thereto.<sup>994</sup> The Council reiterated its request to the Mechanism to include in its six-monthly reports to the Council information on progress achieved in implementing resolution [2637 \(2022\)](#).<sup>995</sup> With a view to strengthening independent oversight of the Mechanism, the Council recalled that, as set out in its presidential statement of 31 March 2022, future reviews carried out pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution [1966 \(2010\)](#) should include evaluation reports sought from the Office of Internal Oversight Services with respect to the methods and work of the Mechanism.<sup>996</sup>

On 12 December, Council members heard the second of the semi-annual briefings by the President of the Mechanism and its Prosecutor, in which they presented the latest progress report on the work of the Mechanism.<sup>997</sup> During the meeting, the President of the Mechanism reported that after disposing of the contempt case in *Prosecutor v. Fatuma et al.* on 29 June, in line with the original projection, only two main cases remained in the Mechanism's pending judicial caseload.<sup>998</sup> In that regard, she reported that the trial against Mr. Félicien Kabuga had commenced at the Hague on 29 September and was proceeding apace, and that the projection for the completion of its trial phase remained by September 2024. She also reported that the appeals procedure in the *Stanišić and Simatović* case continued to be on track and expressed confidence that the appeal judgment would be delivered by June. In addition, she reported that the Mechanism had made important strides with respect to its other continuous judicial activities such as the protection of victims and witnesses, assistance to national jurisdictions and the monitoring of cases referred to national courts, as well as the enforcement of sentences. She added that those matters regularly called for decisions by Mechanism judges or the President and required sustained effort and resources to see the full cycle of justice through to the end.

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<sup>994</sup> Resolution [2637 \(2022\)](#), para. 10.

<sup>995</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 12.

<sup>996</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 16.

<sup>997</sup> See [S/2022/583](#).

<sup>998</sup> See [S/PV.9217](#).

Regarding the eight relocated persons who had been acquitted or completed their sentences, the President affirmed that the best way to resolve the situation would be for the existing agreement between the United Nations and Niger to be observed and that the collective inability to find a durable solution reflected negatively not only on the Organization but on the credibility of international justice as a whole. She further stated that State assistance in identifying and implementing an acceptable solution to that crisis would help the Mechanism to move ahead with its transition plans. In connection with the request by the Council that the Mechanism provide options regarding the transfer of its remaining activities in due course, the President stated that developing a strategy for the future had become one of the priorities of her presidency and that she had presented the Informal Working Group with a road map for developing a Mechanism-wide scenario-based workforce plan. She affirmed that with the road map as a first point of reference, the Mechanism would provide updates on the development of a comprehensive strategy to guide its continued transition to a truly residual court. The President underscored that any delay on addressing current challenges such as the enforcement of sentences would have an impact on the transition plans. In that connection, she urgently appealed to States to share the burden of enforcing the sentences of people convicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or the Mechanism and added that unless additional States came forward, the Mechanism would struggle to continue to fulfil its duties in that important area. Finally, the President stated that despite the Council's continued emphasis on ensuring that the Mechanism remained guided by the premise of operating as a small, temporary and efficient structure, the scope of its responsibilities and the volume of its activities extended far beyond what had been envisaged when the ad hoc tribunals had been established. In that sense, she said that its mandated residual functions, including judicial functions, remained essential and that even after the completion of its pending caseload, the Mechanism would be left with a number of long-term responsibilities, including the enforcement of sentences, the protection of witnesses and assistance to national jurisdictions. In closing, the President also underscored the need to redouble efforts to counter genocide denial, revisionism and the glorification of war criminals. Following the President of the Mechanism, the Prosecutor reported on the progress of the two core crime cases remaining — the *Kabuga* trial and the *Stanišić and Simatović* appeal. He also highlighted his Office's work

under its mandate to investigate and prosecute contempt-of-court crimes. With regard to the search for the remaining fugitives, he reported that only four remained at large and, in that connection, thanked the President of South Africa for establishing a dedicated national investigative team to work directly with the Prosecutor's tracking team in the search for Fulgence Kayishema. He added that important results had been achieved and that their investigation in South Africa was progressing quickly. Furthermore, the Prosecutor highlighted that there were still other over a thousand fugitives wanted by Rwandan prosecutors for crimes committed during the genocide and said that while tracking the fugitives, his Office had discovered some fugitives who were enjoying impunity in third countries. In that context, he stated that his Office would work with those countries' national authorities who were responsible for extraditing or prosecuting those individuals and that Rwanda would continue to need assistance from the international community to account for the many other fugitives suspected of genocide. Recalling that the Council had mandated his Office to respond to requests for assistance from domestic investigators and prosecutors around the world, the Prosecutor affirmed that meeting that mandate continued to be his priority. He reminded that while his Office moved closer to completing the last cases and accounting for the final fugitives, thousands of cases remained to be completed in national courts and that his Office's assistance remained essential for investigating and prosecuting the thousands of perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity and genocide who had yet to be investigated and prosecuted in the former Yugoslavia. In that regard, he anticipated that requests for assistance would increase in number as well as in complexity and significance. Concerning regional cooperation in the Balkans, the Prosecutor stated that despite important signs of positive progress, local prosecutors reported that they did not receive the cooperation they needed from Croatia in cases involving Croatian suspects. In that context, he said that his Office would continue to engage with Croatian authorities to find mutually acceptable solutions. The Prosecutor also referred to issues related to the continuation of the denial of war crimes and the glorification of convicted war criminals in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

Council members acknowledged the progress achieved by the Mechanism towards the completion of its work during the reporting period and welcomed the initiative of the President

to devise a drawdown strategy for the Mechanism. The representative of the Russian Federation thanked the President of the Mechanism for her intention to transform the Mechanism from a judicial body into a genuine residual structure. In that context, he said that the Russian Federation had taken note of the plans to close the pretrial detention facility in Arusha and the Sarajevo office as of 1 April 2023, a decision they considered a step in the right direction. He added that, given the residual nature of the Mechanism, its leadership should regularly review its functions, departments and offices to check for redundancies and diminishing relevance, and that the relevant practical recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services were much needed. The Russian representative was of the view that the Mechanism should follow the best practices of other similar structures, in particular the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Council members continued to call on all States to cooperate fully with the Mechanism in tracking all the remaining fugitives to enable the judicial process to be completed. The representative of Gabon, as Chair of the of the Informal Working Group, stated that the credibility and effectiveness of the Mechanism would continue to depend largely on the assistance that States provided, especially their support to the Prosecutor to facilitate the arrest of the fugitives at large, and the purpose and effectiveness of the Mechanism would be called into question if the fugitives were not arrested and then tried according to the required legal procedures. Still with regard to cooperation, several Council members regretted that the situation of the eight acquitted or released individuals remained unresolved.<sup>999</sup> In that context, some members called on Niger and the states concerned to abide by the terms of the relocation agreement.<sup>1000</sup> In that connection, the representative of Ghana recalled the implementation of resolution [2529 \(2020\)](#) which emphasized the importance of expeditiously and durably relocating those persons. He stressed that the international justice community had to pay attention to and resolve that situation and called on the Council to critically discuss the matter with an outcome that would assist the Mechanism in line with paragraph 5 of resolution [2637 \(2022\)](#). Also emphasizing the importance of cooperation between the Mechanism and Member States concerned, a number of Council members urged Serbia to promptly execute the

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<sup>999</sup> United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Norway and India.

<sup>1000</sup> Ireland, Norway and India.

outstanding arrest warrants of Petar Jojić and Vjerica Radeta,<sup>1001</sup> while others expressed regret about the need to continue to confront the denial of crimes and glorification of war criminals.<sup>1002</sup>

During the period under review, the Council also took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to renew the mandate of the President of the Mechanism for a new term of office, as well as to reappoint 25 nominated judges, all with effect from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2024.<sup>1003</sup>

### Meetings: International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9010</a> 31 March 2022						<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/2</a>
<a href="#">S/PV.9062</a> 14 June 2022			Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Rwanda and Serbia	President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Prosecutor of the Mechanism	All Council members, all invitees <sup>a</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9072</a> 22 June 2022		Draft resolution submitted by Gabon <a href="#">(S/2022/501)</a>				Resolution <a href="#">2637 (2022)</a> (adopted under Chapter VII) 14-0-1 <sup>b</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9217</a> 12 December 2022	Note by the Secretary-General on the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals <a href="#">(S/2022/583)</a>		Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Rwanda and Serbia	President of the Mechanism, Prosecutor of the Mechanism	All Council members, all invitees	

<sup>a</sup> Serbia was represented by its Minister of Justice.

<sup>b</sup> For: Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: Russian Federation.

<sup>1001</sup> United States, Ireland, Norway, Albania, United Kingdom.

<sup>1002</sup> United States, Ireland, Albania, France, Mexico and United Kingdom.

<sup>1003</sup> See [S/2022/486](#) and [S/2022/487](#). See also [S/2022/511](#). For more information on actions of the Council concerning the judges of the Mechanism, see part IV, sect. I.D, and part IX, sect. IV.

## 26. Children and armed conflict

During the period under review, the Security Council held one open debate in connection with the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”.<sup>1004</sup> More information on the meeting, including on participants and speakers, is provided in table 1 below.<sup>1005</sup>

The open debate was held on 19 July at the initiative of Brazil, which held the Presidency for the month,<sup>1006</sup> and further to the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict.<sup>1007</sup> The open debate was chaired by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil and featured briefings from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Founder and Executive Director of the non-governmental organization Similar Ground.<sup>1008</sup>

In her remarks, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict noted that the abuses that children were subjected to the previous year were as grievous as they were many. In 2021, she reported that 23,982 verified cases of grave violations were committed against over 19,165 children in the 21 conflict country situations and one regional monitoring arrangement covered by her mandate. She added that during 2021, 8,000 children were either killed or maimed, making these the most prevalent of all grave violations. The recruitment and use of children for, in and by parties to armed conflict, with more than 6,300 verified as recruited and used, was the second most prevalent violation, followed by the denial of humanitarian access to children, with more than 3,900 incidents. The Special Representative expressed concern over the increase of abduction, rape and other forms of sexual violence as well as the steady increase in violations against girls, especially through killing and maiming and sexual violence and abduction. She also noted a general rise in attacks on schools and hospitals and a verified increase in the military use of schools. She added that the Secretary-General had

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<sup>1004</sup> [S/PV.9096](#) and [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1005</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 14.

<sup>1006</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 5 July 2022 ([S/2022/540](#)).

<sup>1007</sup> See [S/2022/493](#).

<sup>1008</sup> See [S/PV.9096](#) and [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For further information on high-level meetings, see part II.

included the situations of Ethiopia, Mozambique and Ukraine on the agenda on children and armed conflict due to the severity of the armed violence, conflict and war in those places and would commence monitoring to report on those situations by 2023. On the positive developments, she highlighted the implementation of 17 joint action plans with parties to conflict, and 40 new commitments and agreed measures put in place as well as the release from armed groups and forces of over 12,200 children from armed groups and forces during 2021 in the wake of the advocacy of the United Nations. In addition, progress had been made in analysis, policy development and partnerships as well as on prevention mechanisms as provided for in resolution [2427 \(2018\)](#), including the launching of a guidance note on the violation of abduction, the publishing of studies on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on grave violations against children in armed conflict, as well as a report consolidating the results of the four regional consultations. In conclusion, the Special Representative highlighted three of the recommendations outlined in the report of the Secretary-General. First, the need for United Nations operations on the ground to be adequately mandated, staffed and funded to continue carrying out their mandate in relation to the protection of children. Secondly, safeguarding humanitarian spaces and ensuring safe, timely and unimpeded humanitarian access to all children. Third, ensuring sustainable financial support and technical assistance for timely, gender-, age- and disability-sensitive, survivor-centered and inclusive reintegration programs for children, critical for breaking cycles of violence and allowing child survivors a second chance at a constructive life. In concluding, she stressed that the best way to protect children and prevent violations against them in situations of armed conflict was to promote and champion peace.

While lamenting the continued proliferation of conflicts and grave violations against children, as well as the addition of three new situations to the report of the Secretary-General, the Executive Director of UNICEF underscored the progress made, in particular, the removal of eight situations from the report, and the release of over 10,000 children from armed forces and groups, bringing the total release number to more than 186,000 since 2000. She expressed continued commitment on the part of the United Nations to protecting children in accordance with the humanitarian principles, while underlining that Member States had enormous power to drive progress to protect children. She called on Member States not only to insist on compliance



with international humanitarian law but to go beyond that and use their power to issue military orders with zero-tolerance policies on grave violations against children, to endorse and implement the Safe Schools Declaration, to use their influence to push States and non-State armed groups to prevent and end grave violations against children, to protect children surviving grave violations from stigma and revictimization, and to support the United Nations efforts through the allocation of resources and their commitment to supporting the agenda.

During his briefing, Mr. Patrik Kumi, the Founder and Executive Director of the non-governmental organization Similar Ground shared with the Council his personal experience first growing up forced to become a child soldier, escaping then to Uganda to become a refugee, joining the War Child programme, known as VoiceMore, a youth-advocacy programme to run a project for orphans and separated children and finally setting set up (together with friends) his own community-based organization, Similar Ground, to help hundreds of children to recover from stress and trauma. Based on his own experience, he proposed four recommendations to the Council relating to reintegration of children, longer-term funding for projects and local organizations and community groups, greater participation in decision-making for children and youth, and greater accountability for violations of humanitarian law, including but not limited to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Geneva Conventions and relevant Security Council resolutions in relation to the protection of children.

In their statements, Council members and other delegations expressed concern at the growing number of children subjected to all the six grave violations committed against children in conflict, as defined in relevant Security Council resolutions. Speakers also stressed that children associated with armed or terrorist groups should not be treated as criminals but, rather, as victims.<sup>1009</sup> In that connection, the representative of Kenya expressed his belief that human-rights-sensitive and effective counter-terrorism was a key tool in the protection of children and called for a more robust and consistent counter-terrorism regime to protect children. Moreover, many speakers welcomed the inclusion of Ukraine, Mozambique and Ethiopia as situations of concern in the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict for the year

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<sup>1009</sup> [S/PV.9096, Brazil, Norway, Ghana, China, Canada](#) (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict) and Switzerland; [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Slovenia, Italy, Andorra and Chile.

to come, given the severity of the armed violence in the countries.<sup>1010</sup>

On the way forward, many speakers also underscored that impunity for grave violations against children was unacceptable and called for full accountability through national and international justice mechanisms.<sup>1011</sup> Some speakers underlined that all parties to armed conflict must comply with international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international refugee law and to act to prevent and end grave violations against children.<sup>1012</sup> In that connection, speakers encouraged all Member States to commit to the Safe Schools Declaration, the Paris Principles and the Vancouver Principles and to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.<sup>1013</sup>

Speakers held that the agenda on children and armed conflict should be mainstreamed into all efforts and discussions concerning conflict, including conflict prevention, mediation, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, and child-protection provisions and capacities should be incorporated adequately into all relevant mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations and political missions.<sup>1014</sup> Meanwhile, to facilitate response to threats against children, speakers urged full support for the allocation of targeted and rapid resources, among other things, in order to provide safe accommodation and enhanced protection of displaced refugees and stateless children victims of the six grave violations committed against children in conflict as well as to enable the safe and meaningful participation of victims and survivors in legal proceedings to end impunity.<sup>1015</sup> A majority of speakers noted that the fight against grave

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<sup>1010</sup> [S/PV.9096](#), United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Albania, Canada and Ukraine; [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Italy, Germany, European Union, Belgium, Poland, Slovakia, Australia and Bulgaria.

<sup>1011</sup> [S/PV.9096](#), Brazil, Norway, France, India, Gabon, Mexico, United Kingdom, Albania, United States, Canada, Malta, Liechtenstein and Uruguay; [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Slovenia, Estonia, Denmark, Italy, European Union, Slovakia, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Palestine and Morocco.

<sup>1012</sup> [S/PV.9096](#), Canada (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict), Malta); [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Denmark, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Republic of Korea and Georgia.

<sup>1013</sup>. [S/PV.9096](#), France, India, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Gabon, Mexico, Ireland, China, Canada (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict), Malta, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Uruguay and Ecuador; [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Slovenia, Denmark, Italy, Germany, Botswana, Slovakia, New Zealand, Spain, Andorra, Malaysia, Georgia, Portugal, Chile and Bulgaria.

<sup>1014</sup> [S/PV.9096](#), Brazil, Ghana, United States, India, Kenya, Ireland, Albania and Switzerland; [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Poland, Thailand, Malaysia, Bulgaria and Türkiye.

<sup>1015</sup> [S/PV.9096](#), Ghana, Canada (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict), Liechtenstein and Switzerland; [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Thailand, Türkiye, South Africa and Bangladesh.

violations should not end with the release of children but should also include their reintegration into society.

Affirming the important role of the listing mechanism of the annual report of the Secretary-General on child protection, speakers held that clear, objective, impartial, transparent and measurable criteria was critical.<sup>1016</sup> Noting with concern that the Secretary-General's report included situations that were not situations of armed conflict or threats to the maintenance of international peace and security, the representative of India cautioned that attempts to selectively expand the mandate would only politicize its agenda.<sup>1017</sup> The representative of Canada expressed concern about the decision to list the Syrian Government in annex I.B to the report of the Secretary-General and considered that the decision had set a troubling precedent as he opined that such decision should have been taken only based on a significant decrease in serious violations and respect for specific time-bound commitments.

In 2022, the Council addressed the children and armed conflict agenda in several of its country- and region-specific decisions and in decisions relating to thematic items. Selected provisions of decisions in which the Council explicitly referenced actions or measures concerning the agenda during 2022 are listed in table 2. In 2022, the Council, inter alia: (a) condemned and demanded the cessation of violations and abuses against children, including attacks on schools and the deprivation of access to education, and called for accountability and compliance with international instruments; (b) called for the implementation of action plans and programmes on children and armed conflict, with new emphasis on preventing and responding to sexual violence against children; (c) underscored the importance of taking into account child protection concerns in the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration processes and security sector reform; (d) requested monitoring, analysis and reporting on violations and abuses against children; (e) mandated United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions with child protection tasks; (f) imposed or called for the imposition of measures against

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<sup>1016</sup> [S/PV.9096](#), Ireland, China, Canada (also on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict), Malta, Liechtenstein and Switzerland; [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Slovenia and Belgium.

<sup>1017</sup> See [S/PV.9096](#).

perpetrators of violations against children, and building on resolution [2601 \(2021\)](#),<sup>1018</sup> (g) called for the protection, respect and promotion of the right to education in armed conflict.

**Table 1**  
**Meetings: Children and armed conflict**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8889</a> (29 October 2021)		Draft resolution submitted by 99 Member States <sup>a</sup> ( <a href="#">S/2021/893</a> )	88 Member States <sup>b</sup>		Three Council members (Norway, Niger, India)	Resolution <a href="#">2601 (2021)</a> 15-0-0

<sup>a</sup>Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen.

<sup>b</sup>Brazil (President of the Council) was represented by its Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>c</sup>The representative of Botswana spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect. The representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict. The representative of Denmark spoke on behalf of the Nordic Countries. Hungary was represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

**Table 2**  
**Selection of provisions relevant to children and armed conflict, by theme and agenda item**

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	<b>Condemnation of, and demands for cessation of, violations and abuses against children and calls for accountability and compliance with international instruments</b>		
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	26, 27, 56
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	9, 10
	The situation in Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2640 (2022)</a>	5, 12, 47
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2628 (2022)</a>	14, 14 (a),(b),(d)
		Resolution <a href="#">2657 (2022)</a>	10, 10 (a)(i), (a)(iv)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	17
	The situation concerning Haiti	Resolution <a href="#">2653 (2022)</a>	1
<b>Thematic</b>	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/7</a>	fifth

<sup>1018</sup> For further information, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2021*, part I, sect. 24.

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
<b>Action plans and programmes on children and armed conflict</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	27
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	8, 10, 24 (i)(e)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2640 (2022)</a>	48, 49
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2628 (2022)</a>	14 (e)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2657 (2022)</a>	10 (b), 13 (b)
	Peace and security in Africa	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/6</a>	nineteenth
<b>Child protection in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	Peace and security in Africa	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/6</a>	sixth
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	11, 36 (e)(i)
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/4</a> Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	fourth 11,24(ii)(g), 24(ii)(h), 24(ii)(k)
<b>Thematic</b>	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/7</a>	13
<b>Monitoring, analysis and reporting on violations and abuses against children</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	36(b)(ii)
	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution <a href="#">2626 (2022)</a>	5 (g)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2640 (2022)</a>	26 (d)(ii)
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2662 (2022)</a>	48
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a> Resolution <a href="#">2633 (2022)</a>	3(d)(ii) 21
<b>Child protection mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	35(a)(iv), 36(b)(ii), 36(e)(i), 43, 48
	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution <a href="#">2626 (2022)</a>	5 (a), (f), (j)
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	24(i)(e), (ii)(g), (h), (k), 28,
	The situation in Iraq	Resolution <a href="#">2631 (2022)</a>	2(c)(ii), (f)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2640 (2022)</a>	26 (c)(iii), (d)(ii), 41
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	3(a)(i)

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	3(a)(i), (a)(v)
<b>Measures against the perpetrators of violations and abuses against children</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation concerning Haiti	Resolution <a href="#">2653 (2022)</a>	16 (a), (e)
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution <a href="#">2624 (2022)</a>	12
<b>Calls for the protection, respect and promotion of the right to education in armed conflict</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	56
	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution <a href="#">2626 (2022)</a>	5 (f)

<sup>a</sup> For additional information on mandates and decisions relevant to peacekeeping and political missions, see part X.

## 27. Protection of civilians in armed conflict

During the 2022, the Security Council held three meetings in connection with the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Two out of the three meetings took the form of open debates, and one was held in the format of a briefing.<sup>1019</sup> No decisions were adopted under this item during the period under review. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in table 1 below.<sup>1020</sup>

On 25 January 2022, at the initiative of Norway, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,<sup>1021</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “War in cities: protection of civilians in urban settings”.<sup>1022</sup> At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Chairperson and co-founder of the Mwatana Organization for Human Rights in Yemen. In his remarks, the Secretary-General briefed on the devastating harm suffered by civilians and civilian infrastructure when hostilities took place in urban settings, especially when explosive weapons were used in populated areas.<sup>1023</sup> In that regard, he mentioned some examples of conflict zones in which the urban civilian population had been heavily impacted, including in Palestine, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Syria and Iraq. The Secretary-General then outlined some prevention and mitigation measures against the impact of urban war and urged States to follow good practices in order to reduce the humanitarian impact of using explosive weapons in populated areas. Furthermore, he welcomed efforts towards a political declaration to address the harm arising from the use of those weapons and urged all Member States to commit themselves to avoiding the use of wide-area explosive weapons in populated areas. Finally, the Secretary-General urged all Member States to use their influence over their partners and allies to

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<sup>1019</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1020</sup> See also [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 15.

<sup>1021</sup> A concept note was circulated by letter dated 10 January 2022 ([S/2022/23](#)).

<sup>1022</sup> See [S/PV.8953](#) and [S/PV.8953 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2022/54](#). While briefers and Council members participated in-person at the meeting, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II.

<sup>1023</sup> See [S/PV.8953](#).

ensure respect for international humanitarian law and the adoption of good practices and underlined the Council's vital role in that regard.

The President of the ICRC pointed to the negative impacts of the urbanization of conflict and attacks on interconnected infrastructure on populations in urban areas, with no major improvements despite repeated calls for action. He voiced the concern of the ICRC about the extensive use of heavy explosive weapons in urban and other populated areas, which was a particular cause of civilian harm in armed conflicts at the time. In that regard, he announced the issuing of a new ICRC report on heavy explosive weapons in populated areas in over a decade of analysis. According to the President of the ICRC, the report provided practices and recommendations to political authorities and armed forces on a range of mitigating measures which could serve as a tool to inform ongoing negotiations on a political declaration on explosive weapons in populated areas. The ICRC continued to urge Member States to act more decisively to improve their own action and leverage their special relationship with allies and partners to enhance respect for international humanitarian law, as there was an urgent need to adopt and implement measures to protect essential services, particularly as the world confronted the double vulnerability of conflict and the pandemic. In that regard, the President of the ICRC urged States to fully and swiftly implement resolution [2573 \(2021\)](#), and stressed the need for Council members to ensure that sanctions allowed the work of humanitarian actors to prevent the implosion of basic social service systems.

The Chairwoman of the Mwatana Organization for Human Rights, speaking from Sana, reported that civilians continued to suffer in the conflict in Yemen and that all warring parties had committed violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. In that regard, she provided a summary of figures documented by her organization, including on air and ground attacks and mine explosions as well as on civilians killed or wounded since the outbreak of the conflict in 2014. She added that in a large number of those attacks, either no military target had been identified, or the documented civilian harm was beyond any apparent military benefit, concluding that those attacks had happened because the parties to the conflict had confidently relied on impunity. She further noted that it was not sufficient to name and shame the warring parties and their behaviour, and that the Council should refer the Yemen's situation to the International Criminal Court.



During the debate that ensued, Member States shared their perspectives on the impact of armed conflict in urban areas. Participants reflected on the major complexities of the prevailing wars at the time, characterized by the embedment of non-State actors and armed groups within the infrastructure of urban areas not in compliance with international humanitarian law. The Prime Minister of Norway stated that warfare in urban areas, particularly in protracted conflicts, caused civilian deaths and human suffering beyond what was acceptable and stressed that civilians must be protected, whether the individual military attack was considered legal or not. He added that it was not just a question of complying with international humanitarian law and made a number of proposals for actions that should be taken for the effective protection of civilians and civilian objects in urban settings. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Gabon stated that recent partial data revealed that urban warfare killed an average of eight times more civilians than conflicts in rural areas. He added that the complexity of urban theatres was a major challenge for military and humanitarian operations, owing to the density of the population and the overlap of civilians and combatants. Member States addressed the need for parties to conflict to avoid the use of explosive weapons with wide-area impact in densely populated areas and to strengthen compliance with international humanitarian law and all relevant instruments. A number of speakers highlighted the concerns reflected in the latest report of the Secretary-General concerning the devastating impact of armed conflicts on civilian populations.<sup>1024</sup> In that regard, several speakers recalled the unanimous adoption of or urged compliance with resolution [2573 \(2021\)](#) concerning the protection of civilians and essential civilian infrastructure.<sup>1025</sup> In addition, several Member States proposed concrete actions, including the use of sanctions to coerce or deter perpetrators;<sup>1026</sup> strengthening the participation and leadership of women in humanitarian and reconstruction processes and initiatives;<sup>1027</sup> and documenting civilian harm as

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<sup>1024</sup> See [S/PV.8953](#), Ireland, Mexico, Albania, India, Liechtenstein, Switzerland (on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict), Austria, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Poland; and [S/PV.8953 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Ecuador, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Holy See and Georgia. See also [S/2022/54](#), Azerbaijan, Republic of Korea, Rwanda and San Marino. For the Secretary-General report, see [S/2021/423](#).

<sup>1025</sup> See [S/PV.8953](#), United States, Mexico, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Austria, Malta, Italy, Germany and Poland; and [S/PV.8953 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Japan, Ecuador, Sweden, Holy See, Belgium. See also [S/2022/54](#), Republic of Korea and San Marino.

<sup>1026</sup> See [S/PV.8953](#), United Arab Emirates and France. See also [S/2022/54](#), Myanmar.

<sup>1027</sup> See [S/PV.8953](#), Norway, United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, Germany; and [S/PV.8953 \(Resumption 1\)](#) Indonesia.

a means to assess whether the predicted casualties of military operations corresponded to the damage actually caused to civilians.<sup>1028</sup> Some Member States also underscored the need for mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations to better integrate protection of civilians in mission planning and reflect the realities on the ground.<sup>1029</sup> The representative of Canada pointed out that action to condemn a State or armed group which flouted the law happened less frequently due to the Council often being obstructed by the veto.<sup>1030</sup> He noted that since 2011, the Council had been blocked 16 times from taking urgently needed action on Syria, including to address some of the most pressing humanitarian aspects of the civil war. Moreover, he stated that it was incumbent upon all Member States to challenge the Council when its will was blocked by the veto and pressure it to achieve its mandate or find alternative avenues of collective address within the Charter.

On 25 May, the Council held its annual open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict to discuss the latest report of the Secretary-General.<sup>1031</sup> At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Director of Coordination in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Director-General of the ICRC, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the International Rescue Committee and the Country Director of Women for Women International in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Director of Coordination in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs highlighted some of the key concerns set out by the Secretary-General in his annual report, including the fact that when explosive weapons had been used in populated areas such as in Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen and Gaza, about 90 per cent of casualties had been civilians, compared with 10 per cent in other areas.<sup>1032</sup> Other concerns he voiced included attacks against schools and health-care facilities, damage to the natural environment and essential infrastructure. He noted that conflict-driven hunger had also worsened, leading to acute food insecurity of millions in 24 States, including in Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen. Moreover, humanitarian operations had also faced continued complex access challenges that had deprived

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<sup>1028</sup> See [S/PV.8953](#), Brazil.

<sup>1029</sup> Ibid., Ireland, France and Slovenia; and [S/PV.8953 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Guatemala and Philippines.

<sup>1030</sup> See [S/PV.8953 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>1031</sup> See [S/PV.9042](#) and [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2022/381](#).

<sup>1032</sup> See [S/PV.9042](#).

people of the assistance they needed to survive in Somalia, the Central African Republic and Myanmar. In that connection, he stated that sanctions and broadly conceived counter-terrorism measures had impeded principled humanitarian activities and that misinformation and disinformation had eroded trust, putting humanitarians at risk of harm and ultimately jeopardizing humanitarian operations. Turning to the conflict in Ukraine, he said that it had effectively ended Ukraine's food exports and that the humanitarian impacts were being felt far beyond its borders, with price increases for staple foods threatening people in countries across Africa and the Middle East, exacerbating suffering in other conflict situations and planting the seeds for further political instability and unrest worldwide. The Director of Coordination in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs concluded by mentioning a few practical steps that States and non-State armed groups should take to fully comply with international humanitarian law, as repeatedly stated by the Secretary-General. They included tracking reports of civilian harm to gauge the impact of military operations and shift course, if necessary; increasing the understanding of the effects of conflict on the natural environment and integrating legal protection for the environment into military training, doctrine and policy and legal frameworks; engaging in political dialogue, training and joint operational planning with security allies, including non-State armed groups and withholding arms transfers where there was a clear risk that the arms would be used to commit serious international humanitarian law violations; ensuring that humanitarian operations were shielded from the political dynamics of conflict and supporting humanitarian engagement with all parties to conflict; facilitating humanitarian activities and excluding them from the scope of counter-terrorism and sanctions measures; investigating alleged war crimes, prosecuting perpetrators, ensuring reparations for victims and strengthening other States' capacity to investigate and prosecute; and finally, developing policy frameworks and building upon good policies and practices.

The Director-General of the ICRC stated that while certain progress had been made on the normative and policy fronts on the issue of the protection of civilians, the reality on the ground continued to tell a very different story, with deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, frequent indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, politicization of humanitarian action, while political solutions to end conflict remained elusive. He added that States were falling short of their primary responsibility of respecting and ensuring respect for international

humanitarian law. To that end, he urged States to take decisive action in three areas of concern, namely, making the protection of civilians a strategic priority in the planning and conduct of all military and security operations in populated areas; working to avoid and prevent the spread of misinformation and disinformation in armed conflicts and mitigate their impact on affected people; and refraining from making operational humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC responsible for sharing data from international humanitarian law monitoring. In that regard, the Director-General stated that there was a need to bridge the wide gap between the ever-growing protection and assistance needs of conflict-affected people and the ability of humanitarian organizations to deliver an adequate response. That meant removing obstacles such as restrictive measures that criminalized aid and denied access, politicized funding, or imposed requirements compromising the humanitarian principles. He concluded by stating that the responsibility for removing those obstacles and for ensuring protection lied first and foremost with States, including the members of the Council.

The President of the International Rescue Committee said that the system for protecting civilians was not succeeding and that no failure was greater than the denial of access for innocent civilians to the legal right to receive life-saving aid. In that context, he stated that every year the delivery of aid became harder in conflict zones, not because the natural geography was more difficult but because the human-made obstacles were more significant. He said that while the Council was not responsible for the tactics of those laying siege to communities or targeting civilians or aid workers, it was responsible for the failure to hold those actors to account and curb their illegal excesses, which needed to change. He added that the denial of humanitarian access should be a permanent agenda item for the Council and that the Council should set a standard for defending United Nations officials who called out violations of international law and that those officials should be backed by independent assessments of access violations that left no room for political pressure. He stressed the importance of early-warning mechanisms and suggested that resolution [2417 \(2018\)](#) on conflict-induced hunger could be an effective indicator of food insecurity and famine and a tool to fight, if it were not undermined by weak and inconsistent implementation, data and reporting. Lastly, he said that where the Council had direct power over access to aid, such as in the upcoming vote to renew cross-border access to Syria, that vote should be based on facts and law alone to ensure that humanitarian aid reached those in need by

the most direct and effective routes. When the Council was divided, the General Assembly could continue to play a critical role in establishing independent mechanisms to gather evidence on international humanitarian law violations.

The Director at Women for Women International in the Democratic Republic of the Congo focused her briefing on the challenges faced by the women and other marginalized populations affected by conflict in the eastern part of the country and on how gender-transformative approaches and local women's organizations like hers must be part of the strategy from the start to ensure better humanitarian access and protection of all civilians. In that regard, she said that there must be closer coordination among the humanitarian country teams, Government authorities, peacekeeping missions and civil society across the planning and implementation phases of humanitarian response.

Following the briefings, delegations discussed the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in various conflict zones around the world and the unprecedented challenges to global efforts for the protection of civilians. In that connection, a number of delegations underscored the need for full and effective implementation of relevant Council resolutions concerning the protection of civilians.<sup>1033</sup> The representative of Brazil held the view that it was clear that the problem was not the absence of norms, but the lack of implementation and respect for them.<sup>1034</sup>

Among the most pressing protection challenges discussed during the meeting, speakers pointed to the use of heavy explosives in densely populated areas and the widespread availability of weapons; conflict-related sexual violence and increased vulnerabilities faced by women, children, refugees, internally displaced persons and persons with disabilities; the shrinking of the humanitarian space due to deliberate attacks on humanitarian and medical personnel, schools and medical facilities; as well as the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation. Several delegations also raised concerns about the unintended consequences of sanctions and counter-

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<sup>1033</sup> See [S/PV.9042](#), Gabon, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Albania, China, Mexico, and Switzerland (on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict); and [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#) Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal New Zealand, Austria, Yemen, South Africa, Japan, Morocco, Poland, Italy, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives, Argentina, Republic of Korea and Belgium. For more information on the discussion concerning the obligation of Member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council in the context of the protection of civilians in armed conflict, see part V, sec. II.

<sup>1034</sup> See [S/PV.9042](#).

terrorism measures on humanitarian assistance.<sup>1035</sup> In that regard, some delegations underscored the need that safeguards or humanitarian carveouts, such as the one established by resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#) concerning Afghanistan, be considered in order to exclude the application of sanctions to humanitarian activities.<sup>1036</sup> The representative of France stressed the need to sanction violations of international humanitarian law with regard to the protection of civilians by making better use of the tool of sanctions against those responsible for those violations.<sup>1037</sup> A number of speakers also touched upon the fact that the world faced unprecedented levels of food insecurity due to the widespread and protracted armed conflicts. In that regard, several delegations held the view that the adverse effects of the conflict in Ukraine on food and energy prices had exacerbated an already critical humanitarian situation in conflict zones.<sup>1038</sup>

Furthermore, Member States drew attention to the instrumental role played by peacekeepers in the protection of civilians as well as the increasing challenges faced by United Nations missions around the world in executing their protection mandates. In that connection, many delegations advocated for more adequate training and resources so that peacekeepers could effectively implement their protection mandates.<sup>1039</sup> In addition, a number of speakers stressed the importance of preventing the outbreak of armed conflicts as the most effective way to protect civilians.<sup>1040</sup> While most delegations called for compliance with international humanitarian law and accountability, some participants also underscored the necessity of embedding civilian protections into national legislations.<sup>1041</sup> The representative of New Zealand said that improved

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<sup>1035</sup> Ibid., Brazil, Ireland, France, Norway, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, and Switzerland (on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict); and [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#), European Union and Iran (Islamic Republic of).

<sup>1036</sup> See [S/PV.9042](#), Brazil, Kenya, United Arab Emirates and Switzerland (on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict); and [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Belgium.

<sup>1037</sup> See [S/PV.9042](#).

<sup>1038</sup> Ibid., United States, Albania, Mexico and Türkiye; and [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Ecuador, European Union, Portugal, Liechtenstein, Slovakia, Greece and Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic Countries).

<sup>1039</sup> See [S/PV.9042](#), India, Norway, China, United Arab Emirates, Egypt; and [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#), New Zealand, Estonia, Australia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Argentina, Indonesia, Guatemala, Malaysia and Chile.

<sup>1040</sup> See [S/PV.9042](#) (United Kingdom, Brazil, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Egypt); and [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Slovenia, Viet Nam, Qatar, Maldives, Uruguay, Croatia (on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect) and Chile.

<sup>1041</sup> See [S/PV.9042](#), United Kingdom, France and Mexico; and [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Canada, South Africa, Italy and Croatia (on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect)).

integration with the United Nations peacebuilding architecture would better protect civilians at all stages of conflict.<sup>1042</sup>

On 15 September, at the request of Brazil and Ireland, as co-focal points on food security and armed conflict, the Council held a briefing further to a white note sent to the Council by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on 24 August 2022, in accordance with resolution [2417 \(2018\)](#).<sup>1043</sup> Pursuant to the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report swiftly to the Council when the risk of conflict-induced famine and widespread food insecurity in armed conflict contexts occurred. Accordingly, the white note detailed the situation in four regions: northern Ethiopia, north-east Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen. At the meeting, the Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Chief Economist of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP).

Recalling the request of the Council in resolution [2417 \(2018\)](#), the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs reported on the recent assessments that had identified the four regions in which such risk was clear.<sup>1044</sup> In that regard, the Under-Secretary-General reported that, according to the Integrated Phase Classification system, which monitored food security worldwide, hundreds of thousands of people in those regions were facing catastrophic levels of hunger – the equivalent of phase 5, which was the system’s ultimate, most devastating phase. Elaborating on the main drivers of hunger due to the direct and indirect impact of conflict and violence, he noted that a similar pattern recurred in each context characterized by forced displacement, disruption of access to markets, agricultural production and income generation caused by explosive remnants of war, destruction of essential civilian infrastructure and equipment as well as the deliberate suspension of access to commercial supplies and essential services, in addition to the eventual use of hunger as a tactic of war. Humanitarian organizations faced impediments and attacks, which prevented them from reaching people in need and made their suffering worse. Further to providing a snapshot of the situation in each of those regions in

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<sup>1042</sup> See [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>1043</sup> See [S/PV.9133](#). See also resolution [2417 \(2018\)](#), paras. 1 and 12.

<sup>1044</sup> See [S/PV.9133](#).

crisis, the Under-Secretary-General recommended four specific steps to be taken by Member States with regard to each area, namely, to pursue peaceful and negotiated resolutions to conflicts and other situations of violence; to remind and encourage States and armed groups to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law; to support an integrated response to address the underlying drivers of acute food insecurity; and to sustain humanitarian financing for those crises. Before concluding, the Under-Secretary-General also pointed to the impact of climate change and how it was felt variously by those who did little to create it. Drawing the attention to the risk of famine in Somalia specifically, he called on the climate community and Member States to ensure that money pledged for climate financing reached its destination.

In his briefing, the Chief Economist of FAO underscored that conflict had immediate and lasting effects on every dimension of agrifood systems and severely hampered humanitarian access to civilians. Prior to describing the situations in the four contexts addressed by the white note, he said that although not included in detail in the note, it was important to describe the dire situation in Somalia as well as to draw the Council's attention to Afghanistan, where the humanitarian situation remained highly fragile. In closing, he said that preventing conflict was the most effective means of preventing famine and that immediate action was essential to minimize potential calamities.

In his briefing, the Executive Director of the WFP stated that the world was facing a global emergency of unprecedented magnitude, with the threat of mass starvation and famine growing constantly. He echoed the assessments of the situations in Ethiopia, north-east Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen elaborated by previous briefers and urged the Council to show the leadership the world needed that helped facilitate political solutions to end those wars.

In the ensuing debate, Council members emphasized that armed conflict and violence remained primary drivers of the risk of conflict-induced famine and wide-spread food insecurity in parts of South Sudan, Yemen, north-eastern Nigeria and in northern Ethiopia, as highlighted in the white note as well as in Somalia and Afghanistan. A number of participants highlighted the Council's preventive role in averting conflict, as foreseen in resolution [2417 \(2018\)](#) and called



for its full implementation.<sup>1045</sup> In that connection, the representatives of Mexico and the United States underscored the importance of the white note as a useful early-warning tool.<sup>1046</sup> Many delegations held the view that the conflict in Ukraine had exacerbated the already precarious situation in those regions.<sup>1047</sup> In contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the causes of food crises in any country needed specific analysis without hasty generalizations. He added that the Secretary-General had recently warned of the risk of mass famine in five countries, four of which had been on the agenda of the Security Council for years. In that context, the Russian representative regretted that the subject of food security was being manipulated for geopolitical ends and that “Western countries continue[d] to blame Russia for every problem,” including the food crisis, even as they acknowledged that it had preceded the special military operation in Ukraine.

Throughout 2022, the Council continued the practice of hearing briefings by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict under country- and region-specific items.<sup>1048</sup> The Council also included protection-related provisions in most of its decisions in relation to both country- and region-specific items as well as thematic ones during the year. The Council focused on multiple aspects of the protection of civilians’ agenda and used a variety of language formulas to address the protection of civilians in its decisions. Selected provisions of those decisions are listed in table 2. In particular, the Council (a) strongly condemned all forms of violence and abuses committed against civilians, in particular against women and children, and demanded the cessation of attacks against humanitarian and medical personnel, civilian infrastructure, including attacks against schools, hospitals and humanitarian facilities;<sup>1049</sup> (b) demanded that all parties to armed conflict ensure rapid, safe and unhindered access for delivery of humanitarian

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<sup>1045</sup> Brazil, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Norway, Albania, United States and France.

<sup>1046</sup> Mexico and the United States.

<sup>1047</sup> Brazil, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Norway, India, Albania, United States, France and Italy.

<sup>1048</sup> In 2022, the Council heard briefings by the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 35 times at public meetings and 20 times in either private meetings or informal consultations, for a total of 55 briefings. For more information on briefings on those items prior to 2022, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2021*, part I, sect. 25.

<sup>1049</sup> For more information on the decisions of the Council concerning children and armed conflict and specifically the protection of schools and education facilities, see sect. 26 above. For more information on the decisions of the Council concerning conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence, see sect. 29 below.

assistance to populations in need, and ensure safety of humanitarian and medical personnel; (c) called upon all relevant parties to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law and called for accountability measures against perpetrators of such crimes; (d) emphasised the primary responsibility of States to comply with their relevant obligations and called for their action to protect civilians; (e) requested additional monitoring and response mechanisms to threats and attacks against civilians as well as reporting arrangements in order to improve the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and (f) adopted or expressed its intention to adopt targeted measures, including sanctions, against individuals or entities who violated international humanitarian and human rights law. In that regard, the Council also decided on humanitarian exemptions and urged Member States to minimize and mitigate the unintended adverse humanitarian consequences of targeted measures, as decided later in the year by resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#).<sup>1050</sup> In addition, the Council's practice of strengthening the mandates of United Nations peace operations with a view to protecting civilians continued to evolve. During the reporting period, the Council continued to request several missions to take the protection of civilians under threat of physical violence as specific priorities and benchmarks of their mandates, with particular attention, but not limited to, women, children, refugees and internally displaced persons, including by creating a secure environment for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as strengthening local community engagement and empowerment and early warning mechanisms, in addition to the use of strategic communications in order to counter disinformation and misinformation.<sup>1051</sup>

**Table 1**  
**Meetings: Protection of civilians in armed conflict**

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<sup>1050</sup> See resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the discussion related to preventing humanitarian consequences of sanctions, see part I, sect. 24. For more information on the economic problems arising from the implementation of sanctions by the Council, see part VII, sect. IX.

<sup>1051</sup> For further details on the mandates of peacekeeping and special political missions, see part X.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8953</a> <a href="#">S/PV.8953</a> <a href="#">(Resumption 1)</a> and <a href="#">S/2022/54</a> 25 January 2022	War in cities: protection of civilians in urban settings  Letter dated 10 January 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/23</a> )		33 Member States <sup>a</sup>	President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Chairperson and co-founder of the Mwatana Organization for Human Rights, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations	Secretary-General, all Council members <sup>b</sup> , all invitees <sup>c</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9042</a> <a href="#">S/PV.9042</a> <a href="#">(Resumption 1)</a> 25 May 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict ( <a href="#">S/2022/381</a> )		50 Council members <sup>d</sup>	Seven invitees <sup>e</sup>	All Council members, all invitees <sup>f</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9133</a> 15 September 2022			Italy	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Chief Economist of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Executive Director of the World Food Programme	All Council members, all invitees	

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine and Yemen.

<sup>b</sup> The meeting was presided over by the Prime Minister of Norway. Ghana was represented by its Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gabon was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Member of the President's Cabinet.

<sup>c</sup> The Chairperson and co-founder of the Mwatana Organization for Human Rights participated in the meeting with audio only, from Sana, Sweden spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries, Switzerland spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine.

<sup>d</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Yemen.

<sup>e</sup> Director of Coordination in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Director-General of the ICRC, President and Chief Executive Officer of the International Rescue Committee, Country Director of Women for Women International in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine to the United Nations and Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations, Germany was represented by its State Secretary at the Federal Foreign Office, Switzerland spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Croatia spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect, Denmark spoke on behalf of the Nordic Countries, The Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Montenegro as well as Georgia, Monaco, San Marino, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

**Table 2**  
**Selection of provisions relevant to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, by theme and item, 2022**

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
<b>Condemns and demands the cessation of attacks and acts of violence against civilians and civilian infrastructure, humanitarian and medical personnel</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	3, 25, 56
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	7, 9, 10
	The question concerning Haiti	Resolution <a href="#">2653 (2022)</a>	1
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2628 (2022)</a>	16, 17, 18
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	11
<b>Thematic</b>	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/7</a>	fifth, sixth
<b>Demands parties to allow immediate humanitarian access and ensure the safety of humanitarian and medical personnel and facilities</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	54, 55
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	31
	The situation in Myanmar	Resolution <a href="#">2669 (2022)</a>	9
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2657 (2022)</a>	11, 11 (a), 11(a) (iii)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	10, 12
<b>Calls for compliance with and accountability under applicable international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law as well as relevant Council resolutions by all parties</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	14, 22
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	5
	The situation Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2640 (2022)</a>	31, 46, 47
	The situation in Myanmar	Resolution <a href="#">2669 (2022)</a>	4, 10
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2657 (2022)</a>	9

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	9
<b>Thematic</b>	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/7</a>	thirteenth
<b>Affirms the primary responsibility of States and parties to conflict to protect civilians and calls for action to protect civilians</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	10, 24
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/4</a>	fifth, sixth
		Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	5, 6
	The situation Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2640 (2022)</a>	2, 12, 25, 45
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2628 (2022)</a>	6, 9, 14 (c), 19
		Resolution <a href="#">2657 (2022)</a>	13 (a), (b)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	5, 13, 17, 20 (g)
		Resolution <a href="#">2630 (2022)</a>	4
<b>Requests for specific monitoring and analysis of and reporting on protection of civilians</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	36 (b) (i), 43
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	30, 43
	The situation Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2640 (2022)</a>	57 (i), (iv)
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution <a href="#">2642 (2022)</a>	2, 5
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2628 (2022)</a>	11, 53 (f)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	20 (a)
		Resolution <a href="#">2633 (2022)</a>	23
<b>Imposes targeted measures against perpetrators of violations against civilians in armed conflict</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2648 (2022)</a>	5
		Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	4
	The question concerning Haiti	Resolution <a href="#">2645 (2022)</a>	5
		Resolution <a href="#">2653 (2022)</a>	13, 16 (e), (g)
	The situation Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2649 (2022)</a>	2
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2657 (2022)</a>	11 (d)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	18
		Resolution <a href="#">2633 (2022)</a>	13
<b>Stresses the need to minimize adverse humanitarian consequences of sanctions measures and humanitarian exemptions</b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	Peace and security in Africa	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/6</a>	eighth

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	The question concerning Haiti	Resolution <a href="#">2653 (2022)</a>	10, 17
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution <a href="#">2624 (2022)</a>	6, 16
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2662 (2022)</a>	28
<b>Thematic</b>	General issues relating to sanctions	Resolution <a href="#">2664 (2022)</a>	1, 7
	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/7</a>	seventh, seventeenth
<b>Includes mission-specific protection mandates and benchmarks<sup>a</sup></b>			
<b>Country and region-specific</b>	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	35 (a) (i)-(iv), (c), 36 (b) (i), (iii), (f) (i), (iv), (vii), 41
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	21, 24, 24 (i), (i) (a), (e), (f), 25, 26 (b), (c)
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution <a href="#">2631 (2022)</a>	2 (c) (i),(ii)
	The situation Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2640 (2022)</a>	26 (b) (i), (iii), 26 (c) (i)-(ii), 26 (d) (i)-(ii), 26 (e)
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2657 (2022)</a>	7 (a)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	3 (a) (i)-(iii), (v), (vii), (viii), (x), 3 (b), 3 (c) (v), 3 (d) (i), 3 (d) (iv), 20 (j), 25
<b>Thematic</b>	United Nations peacekeeping operations	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/5</a>	seventh, fifteenth

<sup>a</sup> For additional information on mandates and decisions relevant to peacekeeping and political missions, see part X.

## 28. General issues relating to sanctions

During the period under review, the Security Council held two meetings in connection with the item entitled “General issues relating to sanctions”. The last time that the Council held a meeting under this item was in 2017.<sup>1052</sup> One of the meetings took the form of a debate while the other was convened to adopt a resolution. More information on the meeting, including on participants, speakers and outcome, is provided in the table below.<sup>1053</sup>

On 7 February 2022, at the initiative of the Russian Federation, which held the presidency of the Council for the month, the Council held a debate focusing on preventing the humanitarian and unintended consequences of sanctions.<sup>1054</sup> The Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.<sup>1055</sup> The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs pointed out that sanctions remained a vital tool for the Council to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. To be effective, she added, sanctions should be part of a comprehensive political strategy. She clarified that sanctions were no longer the blunt instrument they once were and that since the 1990s, they had undergone considerable changes to minimize their possible adverse consequences on civilian populations and third States. Despite the changes, she noted that some concerns remained about unintended consequences and adverse effects of Council sanctions. She explained that de-risking policies and over-compliance were probably two of the most important problems facing humanitarian actors. In that regard, she said that more could be done to reduce the possible adverse consequences of sanctions. She welcomed the adoption of resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#), which carved out a humanitarian exemption to the sanctions regime on Afghanistan, adding that similar standing exemptions in other sanctions regimes could go a long way to respond to the critical

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<sup>1052</sup> The last meeting was held on 3 August 2017 (See [S/PV. 8018](#)). For more information, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016-2017*, part I, sect. 32. As no meeting was held in the following three years and in accordance with the procedure set out in document [S/2017/507](#), the item was deleted from the list of agenda items seized by the Council (see [S/2021/10](#) and [S/2021/10/Add.10](#)). For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1053</sup> See also [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 16.

<sup>1054</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 2 February 2022 ([S/2022/86](#)).

<sup>1055</sup> See [S/PV. 8962](#).

needs of civilian populations and that Member States could further minimize the burden on humanitarian actors by keeping their domestic legislation as close as possible to Security Council language. She emphasized that the continued monitoring by sanctions committees of the possible humanitarian impact of sanctions was vital and that it was essential to increase cooperation with humanitarian actors and the private sector. She also highlighted the role of the Office of the Ombudsperson for individuals and entities seeking to be removed from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list adding that providing fair and clear procedures to all other designated entities and individuals would render the sanctions tool even more effective.

Noting the evolution of sanctions and the progress in the design of sanctions to limit unintended consequences, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator summarized some concerns over the use of sanctions in countries already affected by humanitarian crises. As he explained, humanitarian access and principles could be put under pressure by the demands of sanctions, making it harder for humanitarian agencies to engage and transact with listed individuals or entities that held significant control over the lives of entire populations. In addition, banks and other commercial operators, aiming to avoid any risk of penalty or prosecution, could effectively deny services to humanitarian customers, severing commercial relationships or making routine transactions excessively slow and bureaucratic, even when they were well within the permitted rules. Furthermore, commercial operators that traded food, fuel and other necessities could also decide to err on the side of caution or over-comply leading to shortages and price rises. Finally, he mentioned that when ministries and departments were run by listed individuals, sanctions aimed at political movements and figures could limit the provision of social services and economic stability. In that regard, he noted that mitigating the humanitarian impact of sanctions required to continue to review both the way in which sanctions were designed and how they were implemented and how they impacted. In that connection, he suggested some priorities. He urged the Council and Member States to ensure that sanctions applicable in armed conflict would not impede the assistance and protection activities of impartial humanitarian organizations for persons who were not fighting, irrespective of their allegiance or designation. He also said that the Council and



other jurisdictions should build comprehensive humanitarian carveouts into the original legislation rather than through case-by-case authorization procedures, which could be cumbersome and inefficient. In closing, he said that it was a collective responsibility to ensure that sanctions were used to improve compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and equally, to ensure that they would not have unintended consequences for civilians already caught up in humanitarian crises.

Following the briefings, Council members discussed the role of sanctions imposed by the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>1056</sup> Council members also focused on the humanitarian impact of sanctions and specifically on their unintended consequences, including overcompliance. In this regard, Council members made observations and proposals with a view to mitigating the detrimental impact of sanctions. In addition to Council members, the representatives of Iraq, Mali, Sudan, South Sudan and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela participated in the meeting and expressed concern at the impact of sanctions in their respective countries and regions. The representative of Iraq said that sanctions should be targeted, smart and able to achieve their goals without exposing an entire society to shortages and need, because that could lead to violent extremism, the militarization of society or an increase in organized crime.<sup>1057</sup>

On 9 December 2022, the Council held a meeting at which it adopted resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>1058</sup> The resolution, which was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention,<sup>1059</sup> created a humanitarian carveout to all asset freeze measures imposed by the Council or any of its sanctions committees.<sup>1060</sup> By the resolution, the Council requested the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to brief or to arrange a briefing for each relevant Committee 11 months from the date of the adoption of the resolution and every 12 months thereafter on the delivery of humanitarian assistance and other activities

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<sup>1056</sup> For more details on the discussion, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>1057</sup> See [S/PV. 8962](#).

<sup>1058</sup> The resolution was submitted by Ireland and the United States and co-sponsored by 52 member states. For the list of sponsors, see [S/2022/925](#).

<sup>1059</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*; none; *abstaining*: India.

<sup>1060</sup> Resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

supporting basic human needs.<sup>1061</sup> By means of the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to issue a written report on unintended adverse humanitarian consequences of Security Council sanctions measures within nine months of the adoption, which would include recommendations on ways to minimize and mitigate such unintended adverse consequences.<sup>1062</sup>

Speaking before the adoption, as one of the penholders of the draft resolution, the representative of the United States explained that the humanitarian community had asked for a clear, standard carveout of humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs for all United Nations sanctions regimes and that was exactly what Council members were voting on that day.<sup>1063</sup> Following the adoption of resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#), Council members welcomed the adoption of the resolution, underscoring its role in providing clarity for humanitarian actors and diminishing the unintended adverse consequences of sanctions. The representative of Ireland, as co-penholder of the resolution with the United States, underscored that the resolution, while significant, was not a panacea, and that it would take some time for its effects to be implemented by States and executed by all relevant stakeholders. Explaining his country's abstention during the vote, the representative of India said that his delegation's concerns emanated from proven instances of terrorist groups taking full advantage of such humanitarian carveouts and making a mockery of sanctions regimes. He also mentioned several cases of terrorist groups reincarnating themselves as humanitarian organizations and civil-society groups precisely to evade such sanctions. He stressed that humanitarian exemptions must not facilitate the mainstreaming of terror entities in the political space and that due diligence and extreme caution in the implementation of resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#) was an absolute must. He regretted that the proposal of his delegation for a proactive role for the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring team coupled with robust reporting standards and mechanism was not fully addressed in the final text and expressed hope that the shortcoming would be corrected in the future when reviewing the implementation of the resolution. The representative of the United Arab Emirates noted that although most aid providers were covered by the resolution, some genuine humanitarian organizations might be left out. He also added that while the resolution constituted a milestone in

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<sup>1061</sup> Ibid., para. 5.

<sup>1062</sup> Ibid., para. 7. For more information on sanctions regimes, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>1063</sup> See [S/PV. 9214](#).

the Council's support for people in need of humanitarian assistance, his delegation saw some potential for overcompliance and believed that it was important to regularly review how the resolution was being implemented on the ground and adjusted as needed. The representative of the Russian Federation said that her delegation was pleased that the many calls of his delegation were finally heeded by those who, for many years now and under various pretexts, kept postponing the resolution of this issue. She added that the resolution did not resolve many of the issues that existed when it came to Security Council sanctions, but if it could help humanitarians in certain countries to be more effective in providing assistance to the most vulnerable people, that already in itself was a worthwhile result. Similarly, the representative of China expressed appreciation towards the co-penholders for having responded to the appeals and demands of all parties and introduced the resolution on humanitarian exemptions. He also expressed hope that States Members of the United Nations and international humanitarian agencies would actively implement the humanitarian exemptions provided for in the resolution and prevent an expanded interpretation or excessive implementation of sanctions.

#### **Meetings: General issues relating to sanctions**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8962</a> 7 February 2022	Preventing their humanitarian and unintended consequences  Letter dated 2 February 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/86</a> )		Iraq, Mali, South Sudan, the Sudan, Venezuela(the Bolivarian Republic of)	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees <sup>a</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9214</a> 9 December 2022		Draft resolution submitted by Ireland and United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/925</a> )	46 Member States <sup>b</sup>		10 Council members <sup>c</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2664 (2022)</a> 14-0-1 <sup>d</sup>

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
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(adopted under  
Chapter VII)

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## 29. Women and peace and security

In 2022, the Security Council held five high-level meetings under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, all of which took the form of open debates.<sup>1064</sup> More information on the meeting, including on participants and speakers is given in table 1 below.<sup>1065</sup> The Council did not adopt any decision in relation to this item during the year.

In 2022, Council members heard briefings by the Executive Director of UN Women three times.<sup>1066</sup> The Council also heard a briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights<sup>1067</sup> and the Managing Director of International Monetary Fund,<sup>1068</sup> and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.<sup>1069</sup> In addition, Council members were briefed by the representatives of regional and sub-regional organizations, namely, the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission,<sup>1070</sup> the Secretary-General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union Ambassador for Gender and Diversity and the Assistant Secretary-General and Head of Social Affairs Sector at the League of Arab States.<sup>1071</sup> Council members also heard briefings by civil society representatives in four out of the five meetings held under this item.

On 18 January 2022, at the initiative of Norway which held the Presidency for the month,<sup>1072</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under this item with the sub- item entitled “Protecting participation: addressing violence targeting women in peace and security processes”.<sup>1073</sup> The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway presided over the meeting, during

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<sup>1064</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1065</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 17.

<sup>1066</sup> See [S/PV.8989](#), [S/PV.9064](#) and [S/PV.9158](#).

<sup>1067</sup> See [S/PV.8949](#).

<sup>1068</sup> See [S/PV.8989](#).

<sup>1069</sup> See [S/PV.9016](#).

<sup>1070</sup> See [S/PV.9064](#) and [S/PV.9158](#).

<sup>1071</sup> See [S/PV.9064](#).

<sup>1072</sup> A concept note was circulated by letter dated 10 January 2022 ([S/2022/22](#)).

<sup>1073</sup> See [S/PV.8949](#) and [S/PV.8949 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information on format of meetings and participation, see part II.

which the Council heard briefings by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Executive Director of the Women and Children Legal Research Foundation and the Executive Director of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. The Council also invited 34 Member States to deliver statements in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.<sup>1074</sup>

In her briefing to the Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that women's safe and meaningful participation was necessary to address not only the root causes of conflict but also its full impact, including gender-based violence and the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. She stated that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights had documented patterns of attacks against women working on gender equality, sexual and reproductive health and rights, corruption, labour rights and environmental and land issues and added that reprisals by State and non-State actors against people who cooperated with the United Nations remained high, including in countries on the Council's agenda, significantly undermining global efforts to prevent conflict and sustain peace because they deter women from participation and leadership. Calling for more actions to provide safe spaces for women human rights defenders to interact with the Council and its subsidiary bodies without fear of retribution, the High Commissioner requested the Council to harmonize approaches to ensure the safe involvement of women in peace processes, as well as their participation in the Council's work. She suggested that peace operation mandates could explicitly include provisions for the protection of all civil-society actors and United Nations interlocutors from threats and reprisals, particularly women peacebuilders. The Executive Director of the Women and Children Legal Research Foundation focused on the situation in Afghanistan focused on the situation in Afghanistan, highlighting the important role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). She urged Council members, as they considered renewing its mandate, to ensure that UNAMA continued to monitor the human rights situation, protect and promote human rights and support for education as part of the humanitarian efforts and to ensure that education also fell under the new UNAMA mandate. She said that the Council must call for an inclusive, negotiated peace process that enjoyed the full, equal and meaningful participation of

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<sup>1074</sup> In accordance with the understanding reached among Council members, 10 delegates participated by submitting written statements ([S/2022/38](#)).

diverse women from across the country at all stages of planning, negotiation and implementation. The Executive Director of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security underlined the pattern of reprisals and intimidation against female civil society representatives who had briefed the Council, which had increased exponentially in recent years. She called on all Members States, the leadership of the United Nations and the Council members to stop such attack, end impunity and ensure that all perpetrators were held accountable and urged the Council to call on the Secretary-General to ensure the leadership of the United Nations to publicly champion the role of women human rights defenders.<sup>1075</sup> Further to the briefings, participants at the open debate expressed concerns about intimidations, violence and reprisals against female representatives of civil society and women human rights defenders and highlighted the importance of making tangible progress in the participation of women in peace processes, including in negotiations and peacekeeping. Calling for more effective protection mechanisms, several delegates also called for the allocation of rapid funding resources and policies to respond to threats against women peacebuilders.<sup>1076</sup> The Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania and the representative of the United Arab Emirates underscored their shared commitments on Women and peace and security to make the issue a top priority during their respective Council presidencies.<sup>1077</sup>

On 8 March 2022, at the initiative of United Arab Emirates which held the Presidency for the month,<sup>1078</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under this item with a sub-item entitled “Women’s economic inclusion and participation as a key to building peace”.<sup>1079</sup> The Minister for Climate Change and Environment of the United Arab Emirates presided over the meeting, during which the Council heard briefings by the Executive Director of UN Women, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and a civil society briefer representing the Network

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<sup>1075</sup> See [S/PV.8949](#).

<sup>1076</sup> *Ibid.*, Ghana, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Gabon, Norway, Canada and European Union; [S/PV.8949 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Portugal, Australia, Jordan and Egypt.

<sup>1077</sup> See [S/PV.8949](#).

<sup>1078</sup> A concept note was circulated by letter dated 1 March 2022 ([S/2022/175](#)).

<sup>1079</sup> See [S/PV.8989](#) and [S/PV.8989 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information on the format of meetings, agenda, and participation, see part II.

of Women Economic Agents in the Ségou region of Mali. The Council invited 43 Member States to deliver statements in-person in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Welcoming the open debate's focus on the role of the private sector and private-public partnerships as an underexplored area for innovation, the Executive Director of UN Women called on the Council to be more vocal about women's economic inclusion and pointed out that some resolutions that covered women and peace and security tended to be gender-blind on economic security and development issues. In this connection, she called on the Council to use such resolutions to prioritize women-led businesses and support for the care economy in all reconstruction and recovery initiatives.<sup>1080</sup> The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) commended the Council's decision to focus on the role of women in peace and security on International Women's Day and noted the significant impact of gender equality in significantly increasing economic growth, enhancing financial stability and reducing income inequality and highlighted the importance of a country-tailored approach in empowering women and girls as powerful agents of change that help society transition from fragility to stability. Other briefers highlighted the importance of economic development and inclusion, with an explicit focus on the role of gender equality, as a precondition for lasting peace and societal transition for a better future for all. Further to the briefings, participants at the open debate addressed the disproportionate impact of the coronavirus pandemic on social and economic participation of women and noted that providing access to entrepreneurship, finance and job opportunities to women not only created a societal wealth but also generated long-term sustainable peace. Some Council members and Member States also highlighted the important role played by public-private partnership in advancing skills development and business environment, thereby strengthening women's full, equal and meaningful participation in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.<sup>1081</sup>

On 13 April 2022, at the initiative of the United Kingdom which held the Presidency for the month,<sup>1082</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under this item with the following two

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<sup>1080</sup> See [S/PV.8989](#).

<sup>1081</sup> See, for example, [S/PV.8989](#), United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Mexico and Brazil; [S/PV.8989 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Ecuador, Liechtenstein, Peru, South Africa, Costa Rica, Lebanon and Bangladesh.

<sup>1082</sup> A concept note was circulated by letter dated 5 April 2022 ([S/2022/293](#)).



sub-items entitled “Accountability as prevention”, and “Ending cycles of sexual violence in conflict”.<sup>1083</sup> The Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence of the United Kingdom presided over the meeting, during which the Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Goodwill Ambassador, a co-founder of Huquqya and an Ethiopian female civil society briefer. The Council also invited 54 Member States to deliver statements in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Presenting the annual report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence,<sup>1084</sup> the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict emphasized the importance of accountability, including prosecution as a form of prevention that could help convert the culture of impunity for such crimes. She also remarked that all Council members could lead the way in reflecting that prohibition of sexual violence in their military manuals, international humanitarian law dissemination and training, codes of conduct and military disciplinary measures at all levels of the chain of command.<sup>1085</sup> The Nobel Peace Prize laureate and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Goodwill Ambassador, Ms. Nadia Murad noted that accountability could be a crucial component of prevention by including meaningful justice and the services and support for survivors, calling on everyone in the Chamber to make it a reality by choosing to act.<sup>1086</sup> Other briefers spoke about the situation of sexual violence and entrenched discrimination against women and girls in Syria and Ethiopia. They urged the Council and Member States to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court and champion the work of the recently established International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia and demanded all parties to ensure full and safe humanitarian access to Tigray. Further to the briefings, most participants at the open debate noted the deeply traumatizing nature of conflict-related sexual violence and underscored that justice and accountability should be at the core of the international response and survivors kept at the centre

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<sup>1083</sup> See [S/PV.9016](#) and [S/PV.9016 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information on the format of meetings, agenda, and participation, see part II.

<sup>1084</sup> See [S/2022/272](#).

<sup>1085</sup> See [S/PV.9016](#).

<sup>1086</sup> *Ibid.*

of its approach. They also called on the international community to fight impunity for sexual violence against women.<sup>1087</sup>

On 15 June 2022, at the initiative of Albania which held the Presidency for the month,<sup>1088</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under this item with a sub-item entitled “Keeping the promises: the role of regional organizations in implementing the women and peace and security agenda in the face of political turmoil and seizures of power by force”.<sup>1089</sup> The Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania presided over the meeting, during which the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Executive Director of UN Women, the Secretary-General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the European Union Ambassador for Gender and Diversity and the Assistant Secretary-General and Head of Social Affairs Sector at the League of Arab States. The Council also invited 36 Member States to deliver statements in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

In his statement, the Secretary-General pointed out that while the Council had met several times every year on the issue with consensus among Member States on the importance of the Women and peace and security agenda, the situation on the ground was regressing because of the political deadlocks and entrenched conflicts based on enduring power imbalances and patriarchy. He emphasized the role of neighboring countries and regional organizations, including the European Union, the African Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in implementing the commitments of the Women and Peace and Security agenda, noting the centrality of women and girls on security policies in his proposed New Agenda for Peace, included in the report “Our Common Agenda”. The Executive Director

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<sup>1087</sup> See [S/PV.9016](#), for example, United Kingdom, India, Brazil, Albania, Ireland, France, Mexico, Ghana, Gabon, Colombia, Jordan, Malta and Canada (also on behalf of 64 States members of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security); [S/PV.9016 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Australia, Netherlands, Slovenia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Argentina, South Africa, Luxembourg, Estonia, Morocco, Switzerland, European Union, Turkey, Croatia, Poland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Belgium, Italy, Liechtenstein, Germany, Denmark (also on behalf of the Nordic countries, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), Czech Republic, Malaysia, Spain, Slovakia, Georgia, Holy See, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Austria, Nepal, Chile, Sweden, Republic of Korea and Algeria.

<sup>1088</sup> A concept note was circulated by letter dated 4 June 2022 ([S/2022/457](#)).

<sup>1089</sup> See [S/PV.9064](#) and [S/PV.9064 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information on the format of meetings, agenda, and participation, see part II.

of UN Women, applauding the efforts of 12 regional organizations that had adopted action plans on women, peace and security, observed that when regional organizations made such commitments, national actions often followed. She also underscored the key role of regional organizations in the development of networks of women mediators, such as the registry of women experts in peace and mediation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Women Leaders Network and FemWise-Africa and the Arab Women Mediators Network. She further called on the regional organizations to ensure the presence of women when convening negotiations and encourage legislative and administrative reforms among their member States. The representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African Union, the European Union and the League of Arab State focused on their respective commitments and contributions to advancing the women and peace and security agenda and expanding their cooperation with the Council.<sup>1090</sup> Further to the briefings, Council members and other Member States stressed the critical role of regional partners in supporting safe and enabling environments for women peacebuilders, civil society activists and human rights defenders and emphasized that gender perspectives should be mainstreamed in regional peacebuilding efforts by promoting the inclusion of women in key political processes and decision-making and governance.<sup>1091</sup>

On 20 October 2022, at the initiative of Gabon which held the Presidency for the month,<sup>1092</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under this item with a sub-item entitled “Strengthening women’s resilience and leadership as a pathway to peace in regions plagued by armed groups”.<sup>1093</sup> In accordance with the letter dated 4 October 2022, the Permanent Representative of Gabon stated that the presidency would collect some of the highlights, best practices and any new concrete commitments to advancing the women and peace and security

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<sup>1090</sup> See [S/PV.9064](#).

<sup>1091</sup> See, for example, [S/PV.9064](#), Albania, Ghana, Gabon, Kenya, Mexico, Finland and Canada (also on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security); [S/PV.9064 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Türkiye, Malta, Bulgaria, South Africa, Germany, Namibia, Austria, Ecuador, Poland, Guatemala and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

<sup>1092</sup> A concept note was circulated by letter dated 4 October 2022 ([S/2022/743](#)).

<sup>1093</sup> See [S/PV.9158](#) and [S/PV.9158 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information on the format of meetings, agenda, and participation, see part II.

agenda in a Chair's summary. The Council heard briefings from the Deputy Secretary-General, the Executive Director of UN Women, Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Editor-in-Chief of Zan Times. The Head of the Delegation of the European Union, the NATO Secretary-General's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security and Head of Policy and Humanitarian Diplomacy Division, International Committee of the Red Cross participated in the meeting in accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. The Council also invited 56 Member States to deliver statements in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

The Deputy Secretary-General, emphasizing the slow progress of women's participation in peace processes and the consistent underfunding for women peacebuilders, reaffirmed five transformative actions for the decade identified by the Secretary-General on women's rights. She urged everyone's action to implement them without delay and pay special attention to protecting women human rights defenders. Noting that the women and peace and security agenda was not just an answer to historic wrongs and marginalization but an opportunity to do things differently, she highlighted the need for full gender parity, including through special quotas to accelerating the inclusion of women across election monitoring, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and justice systems.<sup>1094</sup> The Executive Director of UN Women, presenting the annual report of the Secretary-General,<sup>1095</sup> focused her briefing on women human rights defenders and the need to strengthen reporting and coordination within the United Nations, build partnerships with Member States, regional organizations and civil society and provide material and political support. She called on the Member States to demand that women be properly represented in peace processes and urged to make the smart decision on funding and prioritize resources. The Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission called on the Council to strengthen its collaboration with the AU Peace and Security Council to align priorities and actions on the ground in support of women's full participation in peace processes. She emphasized the importance of predictable and flexible funding for women's organizations and the deliberate measures to increase women's

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<sup>1094</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1095</sup> See [S/2022/740](#).

participation in peace processes and the impact of climate change, the coronavirus pandemic and conflicts in combining peacebuilding efforts with women's economic survival as mutually reinforcing strategies. In her briefing, the Editor-in-Chief of Zan Times, a woman-led newsroom covering human rights violations in Afghanistan, warned Council members of the disturbing reports of war crimes that continued to emerge in Afghanistan and that they had overwhelming evidence that the Taliban were terrorising women, girls, and marginalized groups. She urged the Council to call on the Taliban to respect the human rights of all Afghans, including women, girls, LGBT people and all ethnic and religious groups, and stop the targeting and abuse of protesters, human rights defenders, journalists and their families. She added that the Council should ensure the full, equal, and meaningful participation of Afghan women civil society in any decision-making regarding the future of Afghanistan, including its own decisions. Further to the briefings, participants at the open debate deliberated on women's leadership in achieving progress in peace and security by strengthening the global response to conflict-related sexual violence and making meaningful progress in women's participation in peace processes. Several Council Members and Member States urged the Secretary-General and the Council to take concrete actions to fight in solidarity against destabilization, terrorism and armed groups and the protection of women and girls from attacks on their right to education.<sup>1096</sup>

During the period under review, the Informal Experts Group on Women and Peace and Security continued to convene in accordance with resolution [2242 \(2015\)](#),<sup>1097</sup> including to address country-specific situations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, the Middle East including the Palestinian question and Myanmar.<sup>1098</sup>

In 2022, Council members submitted communications to the President of the Security Council in connection with the Women and Peace and Security agenda. By a letter dated 3 February, the permanent representatives of Ireland, Kenya and Mexico transmitted a handover and summary report of a "Presidency Trio for Women, Peace and Security".<sup>1099</sup> In a letter dated

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<sup>1096</sup> See, for example, [S/PV.9158](#), Gabon, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Ireland, China, Mexico, France, Norway and Finland; [S/PV.9158 \(Resumption 1\)](#), South Africa, Greece, Slovakia, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Mali, Morocco, Kuwait and International Committee of the Red Cross.

<sup>1097</sup> See resolution [2242 \(2015\)](#), para. 5(a).

<sup>1098</sup> See [S/2022/171](#), [S/2022/258](#), [S/2022/557](#), [S/2022/593](#), [S/2022/815](#), [S/2022/816](#) and [S/2022/1005](#).

<sup>1099</sup> See [S/2022/91](#).

12 October 2022, the permanent representative of Norway transmitted, ahead of the open debate held on 20 October 2022, a summary report entitled “Protecting women human rights defenders in conflict” resulting from the civil society consultations on the issue of reprisals against women human rights defenders in conflict-affected countries, including as a result of cooperation with the United Nations. <sup>1100</sup> In addition, in a letter dated 27 December 2022, the permanent representative of Norway, on behalf of the 15 signatories (former, then current and incoming Security Council members, namely, Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Malta, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom), transmitted the statement of shared commitments on women and peace and security, which were launched in December 2021, building on the trio initiative of September 2021 by Ireland, Kenya and Mexico. <sup>1101</sup>

The Council referred to women and peace and security related issues under multiple items on its agenda in 2022. As summarised in table 2 below, the Council addressed in its decisions various measures concerning the specific implementation of the women and peace and security agenda and, in particular, in relation to the following categories: (i) the representation and participation of women in public affairs and decision-making, as well as in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution; (ii) the participation of women in peacekeeping operations, including through the appointment of women’s protection and gender advisers; (iii) the development and inclusion of gender mainstreaming, gender expertise and gender-sensitive responses by Member States and UN entities, including socioeconomic empowerment, participation of women in security sector reforms and counter-terrorism efforts; and (iv) combatting sexual violence including through the monitoring, analysing and reporting on conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence as well as its accountability mechanisms including prosecutions of the perpetrators of sexual violence and the use of targeted sanctions.

**Table 1**  
**Meetings: Women and peace and security**

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<sup>1100</sup> See [S/2022/756](#).

<sup>1101</sup> See [S/2022/1009](#).

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8949</a> <a href="#">S/PV.8949</a> <a href="#">(Resumption 1)</a> 18 January 2022	Protecting participation: addressing violence targeting women in peace and security processes  Letter dated 10 January 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General ( <a href="#">S/2022/22</a> )		34 Member States <sup>a</sup>	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Executive Director of the Women and Children Legal Research Foundation, Executive Director of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, <sup>b</sup> all invitees <sup>c</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.8989</a> <a href="#">S/PV.8989</a> <a href="#">(Resumption 1)</a> 8 March 2022	Women's economic inclusion and participation as a key to building peace  Letter dated 1 March 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/175</a> )		43 Member States <sup>d</sup>	Executive Director of UN-Women, Managing Director of International Monetary Fund, Civil Society briefer, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, <sup>e</sup> all invitees <sup>f</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9016</a> <a href="#">S/PV.9016</a> <a href="#">(Resumption 1)</a> 13 April 2022	Accountability as prevention  Ending cycles of sexual violence in conflict  Letter dated 5 April 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/293</a> )		54 Member States <sup>g</sup>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Goodwill Ambassador, Co-Founder of Huquqyat, Civil Society briefer, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Head of the NATO Liaison Office to the United Nations, Holy See	All Council members, <sup>h</sup> all invitees <sup>i</sup>	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9064</a> <a href="#">S/PV.9064</a> (Resumption 1) 15 June 2022	Keeping the promises: the role of regional organizations in implementing the women and peace and security agenda in the face of political turmoil and seizures of power by force  Letter dated 4 June 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Albania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/457</a> )		36 Member States <sup>j</sup>	Executive Director of UN-Women, Secretary-General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, European Union Ambassador for Gender and Diversity, Assistant Secretary-General, Head of Social Affairs Sector at the League of Arab States	Secretary-General, all Council members <sup>k</sup> all invitees <sup>l</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9158</a> <a href="#">S/PV.9158</a> (Resumption 1) 20 October 2022	Strengthening women's resilience and leadership as a pathway to peace in regions plagued by armed groups  Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security ( <a href="#">S/2022/740</a> )  Letter dated 4 October 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/743</a> )		57 Member States <sup>m</sup>	Executive Director of UN-Women, Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Editor-in-Chief, <i>Zan Times</i> , Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, NATO Secretary-General's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, Head of Policy and Humanitarian Diplomacy Division, International Committee of the Red Cross, Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine to the United Nations	Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members, <sup>n</sup> all invitees <sup>o</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Fiji, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey.

<sup>b</sup> Albania was represented by the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs; Ghana was represented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. Norway was represented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. the United Arab Emirates was represented by the Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs. The United States was represented by the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.

<sup>c</sup> Belgium spoke on behalf of Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of women, peace and security. Denmark spoke on behalf of the Nordic Countries.



<sup>d</sup> Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, the Maldives, Malta, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Viet Nam.

<sup>e</sup> India was represented by its Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs. Ireland was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence. Mexico was represented by its Vice-Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights. United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister for Climate Change and Environment. United States of America was represented by its Permanent Representative and Member of President Biden's Cabinet.

<sup>f</sup> Maldives was represented by its Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Barbados spoke on behalf of: Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of women, peace and security. Sweden spoke on behalf of: Nordic-Baltic countries.

<sup>g</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen.

<sup>h</sup> United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for South and Central Asia, North Africa, UN and the Commonwealth, and the Prime Minister's Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict. United States was represented by its Permanent Representative of the United States and Member of President Biden's Cabinet.

<sup>i</sup> Colombia was represented by its Vice President and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Canada spoke on behalf of: Group of Friends of women, peace and security. Denmark spoke on behalf of: Nordic Countries. Sweden spoke on behalf of the LGBTI Core Group. The Civil Society briefer participated by videoconference.

<sup>j</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Italy, Indonesia, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, Namibia, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

<sup>k</sup> Albania was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Norway was represented by its State Secretary. Ghana was represented by its Deputy Minister for Finance. United Arab Emirates was represented by its Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs. United States was represented by its Permanent Representative and Member of President Biden's Cabinet.

<sup>l</sup> Finland was represented by its Minister for Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade and spoke on behalf of the Nordic Countries. Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of women, peace and security. Luxembourg spoke on behalf of the Benelux countries. Germany spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of the African Women Leaders Network.

<sup>m</sup> Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Niger, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Yemen.

<sup>n</sup> Albania was represented by its Deputy Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs. United Arab Emirates was represented by its Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs. United States was represented by its Permanent Representative of the United States of America and Member of President Biden's Cabinet.

<sup>o</sup> Central African was represented by its Republic Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad. Democratic Republic of the Congo was represented by its Minister of Gender, Family and Infants. Finland was represented by its State Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and also spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries. Canada spoke on behalf of: Group of Friends of women, peace and security. Türkiye spoke on behalf of

Australia, Indonesia, Mexico and Republic of Korea. Germany spoke on behalf of: Group of Friends of the African Women Leaders Network. Croatia spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect.

**Table 2**  
**Selection of provisions relevant to women and peace and security, by theme and agenda item**

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
<b>Representation and participation of women in political processes at all levels, including decision-making</b>			
<b>Country- and region-specific</b>	Peace and security in Africa	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/6</a>	Fifth
	The situation in Afghanistan	<a href="#">Resolution 2626 (2022)</a>	5(c), 5(f)
	The situation in the Central African Republic	<a href="#">Resolution 2659 (2022)</a>	9, 49
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	<a href="#">Resolution 2666 (2022)</a>	2, 29
	The question concerning Haiti	<a href="#">Resolution 2653 (2022)</a>	6
		<a href="#">Resolution 2645 (2022)</a>	3, 18
	The situation concerning Iraq	<a href="#">Resolution 2631 (2022)</a>	2(e)
	The situation in Libya	<a href="#">Resolution 2647 (2022)</a>	4
		<a href="#">Resolution 2656 (2022)</a>	6
	The situation in Mali	<a href="#">Resolution 2640 (2022)</a>	3, 14, 26(a)(vi), 48
	The situation in Somalia	<a href="#">Resolution 2628 (2022)</a>	3
		<a href="#">Resolution 2657 (2022)</a>	8(c)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	<a href="#">Resolution 2625 (2022)</a>	3(e)(v), 7, 8, 21, 24
The situation in the Middle East	<a href="#">Resolution 2650 (2022)</a>	27	
<b>Thematic</b>	United Nations peacekeeping operations	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/5</a>	Eighth
<b>Participation of women in peacebuilding and in conflict prevention and resolution</b>			
<b>Country- and region-specific</b>	Peace and security in Africa	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/6</a>	Fifth
	The situation in Cyprus	<a href="#">Resolution 2618 (2022)</a>	5(e), 6, 7, 13
		<a href="#">Resolution 2646 (2022)</a>	5(e), 6
	The situation in the Central African Republic	<a href="#">Resolution 2648 (2022)</a>	4
		<a href="#">Resolution 2659 (2022)</a>	2, 7, 11, 35(b)(iii), 35(b)(iv), 35(b)(v), 35(b)(vi), 49
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	<a href="#">Resolution 2666 (2022)</a>	16
	The situation concerning Iraq	<a href="#">Resolution 2631 (2022)</a>	2(a)
		<a href="#">Resolution 2576 (2022)</a>	4(a)
	The situation in Mali	<a href="#">Resolution 2640 (2022)</a>	9, 26(a)(v), 48
	The situation in Somalia	<a href="#">Resolution 2628 (2022)</a>	3, 22
	<a href="#">Resolution 2657 (2022)</a>	8(c)	
	<a href="#">Resolution 2625 (2022)</a>	3(e)(ii), 6, 14, 24	

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2630 (2022) Resolution 2633 (2022)	6 9
	The situation in Libya	Resolution 2647 (2022) Resolution 2643 (2022) Resolution 2650 (2022) Resolution 2656 (2022)	4 10 3,14 27
	The question concerning Haiti	Resolution 2645 (2022)	3
	The situation concerning Western Sahara	Resolution 2654 (2022)	14
	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2626 (2022)	5(f)
<b>Thematic</b>	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/1</a>	Fifteenth
	United Nations peacekeeping operations	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/5</a>	Seventh
<b>Socio-economic environment for the meaningful participation and empowerment of women / funding of national programmes</b>			
<b>Country- and region-specific</b>	Peace and security in Africa	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/6</a>	Ninth, fourteenth
	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2618 (2022) Resolution 2646 (2022)	5(e) 5(e)
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2631 (2022)	2(e)
	The situation concerning The Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2666 (2022)	7, 29
<b>Conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence</b>			
<b>Country- and region-specific</b>	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2626 (2022)	5(e)
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2659 (2022)	26, 27, 35(a)(iv), 35(a)(vi), 35(b)(iv), 35(b)(v), 35(b)(vi), 36(b)(ii), 36(f)(vii), 44, 49
	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2618 (2022) Resolution 2646 (2022)	16(e) 17 17(e) 18
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/4</a> Resolution 2666 (2022)	Sixth 7, 9, 24(i)(e), 29, 30, 37
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2631 (2022)	2(e)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2640 (2022)	7, 14, 26(e)(iii), 26(d)(ii), 45, 49, 50, 51
		Resolution 2649 (2022)	9
	The question concerning Haiti	Resolution 2645 (2022) Resolution 2653 (2022)	2, 8, 10 1, 16(a), 16(f), 25(b)
	The situation in Libya	Resolution 2647 (2022)	9
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2624 (2022)	12

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
		Resolution 2639(2022)	14
		Resolution 2650 (2022)	26
		Resolution 2671 (2022)	14
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2628 (2022)	14, 15, 15(a), 15(d), 15(e), 34
		Resolution 2657 (2022)	8(f), 9, 13(a), 13(b), 13(c)
		Resolution 2662 (2022)	48
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2625 (2022)	3(a)(iv), 3(a)(vii), 3(a)(viii), 3(d)(ii), 11, 15, 17, 20(h), 20(o), 26
		Resolution 2633 (2022)	13, 21
	The situation concerning Western Sahara	Resolution 2654 (2022)	16
<b>Thematic</b>	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/1</a>	Fifteenth
	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Resolution 2651 (2022) <a href="#">S/PRST/2022/7</a>	3, 4 Fifth
	United Nations peacekeeping operations	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/5</a>	Seventh, ninth
<b>Role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism</b>			
<b>Thematic</b>	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/7</a>	Eighth
<b>Gender mainstreaming, gender expertise and gender-sensitive responses</b>			
	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2626 (2022)	5(f)
	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2618 (2022)	5(e), 6, 16(a), 18
		Resolution 2646 (2022)	5(e), 6, 17(a), 19
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2659 (2022)	11, 35(a)(iv), 36(e)(i), 36(e)(ii), 43, 49
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2666 (2022)	11, 24(ii)(g), 24(ii)(h), 29, 43
<b>Country- and region-specific</b>		<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/4</a>	Fourth
	The situation concerning Haiti	Resolution 2653 (2022)	24
	The situation the Middle East	Resolution 2639 (2022)	13
		Resolution 2650 (2022)	27
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2657 (2022)	23(b)
		Resolution 2662 (2022)	23, 44
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2631 (2022)	2(e)
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2625 (2022)	3(a)(v), 3(a)(vi), 3(b)(i), 20(a), 20(k), 24, 25,	
	Resolution 2633 (2022)	19	

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2640 (2022)	26(c)(iii), 47
<b>Thematic</b>	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Resolution 2668 (2022)	4
	International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	Resolution 2637 (2022)	10
	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	S/PRST/2022/7	Thirteenth
<b>Women's Protection and Women's Protection Advisers</b>			
<b>Country- and region-specific</b>	Peace and Security in Africa	S/PRST/2022/6	Nineteenth
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2525 (2022)	3(a)(i)
		Resolution 2625 (2022)	3(a)(i), 3(a)(v)
	The situation in Haiti	Resolution 2645 (2022)	2
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2640 (2022)	12, 26(c)(iii), 48
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2628 (2022)	15(a)
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2666 (2022)	29
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2631 (2022)	3
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2659 (2022)	11, 35(a)(iv), 49
<b>Participation of women in peacekeeping operations</b>			
<b>Country- and region-specific</b>	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2022/6	Nineteenth
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2659 (2022)	4
		Resolution 2640 (2022)	44
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2639 (2022)	13, 21
		Resolution 2650 (2022)	28
		Resolution 2671 (2022)	13
	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2618 (2022)	16(a), 18
		Resolution 2646 (2022)	17(a), 19
	The situation concerning Western Sahara	Resolution 2654 (2022)	12
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2659 (2022)	35(b)(iii), 43, 49
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2666 (2022)	29
	Reports of the Secretary General on Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2625 (2022)	20(k), 25
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2628 (2022)	35	
<b>Thematic</b>	United Nations peacekeeping operations	S/PRST/2022/5	Eighth
<b>Participation of women in the security sector and in security sector reform (SSR)</b>			

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
<b>Country- and region-specific</b>	The situation in Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2640 (2022)</a>	48
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2628 (2022)</a>	24(i), 35
		Resolution <a href="#">2657 (2022)</a>	8(c)
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution <a href="#">2650 (2022)</a>	27
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	12, 35(b)(iii), 36(d)(iv), 36(e)(i)
		Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>	13, 24(iii)(l), 29
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2659 (2022)</a>	12, 36(d)(iv)

### **30. Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts**

During the period under review, the Council held four meetings under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”. Three of the meetings held in 2022 took the form of briefings and the remaining meeting was convened for the adoption of a decision.<sup>1102</sup> Indeed, the Council adopted one resolution, under Chapter VII of the Charter, and one presidential statement.<sup>1103</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.<sup>1104</sup>

In 2022, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and by the Acting Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. In addition, Council members were briefed by two civil society representatives, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies and a survivor of the Mumbai terror attacks of 26 November 2008. Briefings during the reporting period focused on the expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) affiliates and those of Al-Qaida throughout the African continent, the increase in terrorist attacks based on xenophobia, racism and intolerance, the humanitarian and security situation of thousands of individuals suspected of having links with Da’esh held in detention facilities, and the activities of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate in support of the counterterrorism efforts of Member States. Briefers and Council members also discussed how developments in Afghanistan continued to affect counter-terrorism efforts in the region,<sup>1105</sup> and the importance of countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes.

On 9 February, Council members heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism on the fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by Da’esh to international peace and security.<sup>1106</sup> The Under-Secretary-General reported that Al-Qaida and Da’esh and their various affiliates remained serious threats and indicated that

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<sup>1102</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1103</sup> Resolution [2665 \(2022\)](#) and [S/PRST/2022/7](#).

<sup>1104</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 22.

<sup>1105</sup> For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 14.

<sup>1106</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#). For the report of the Secretary-General, see [S/2022/63](#).

terrorist attacks based on xenophobia, racism and intolerance were increasing. He urged the Council and all Member States to use every available tool at their disposal to sustain important gains against the threat posed by Da'esh to prevent its regional expansion and curtail its capabilities to launch attacks and recruit new members. He emphasized the need to focus on restoring human dignity, trust and social cohesion, starting by addressing the desperate situation in displacement camps and detention facilities across Syria and Iraq, where thousands of people, especially children, remained stranded at a growing risk of further radicalization and recruitment. He added that it was essential to ensure humanitarian access to those locations to alleviate suffering and reduce security concerns. He further reported that in Iraq and in the Syrian Arab Republic, Da'esh continued to operate as an entrenched rural insurgency, while its regional affiliates beyond those two countries continued to expand at an unsettling scale and pace. That, he specified, was particularly pronounced in Central, East and West Africa. In connection with the security landscape in Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover, the Under-Secretary-General reiterated the repeated calls by the Secretary-General for collective work to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorist activities. He also reported that in Europe, online terrorist radicalization and recruitment remained a foremost concern over the reporting period. In concluding, he urged the Council to sustain its consensus in counter-terrorism cooperation.

In his briefing to Council members during the same meeting, the Acting Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate asserted that the global terrorist landscape continued to present a range of complex challenges for Member States.<sup>1107</sup> He added that the threat of Da'esh persisted, with a resurgence of violence in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, and supporters notably emerging and expanding their operations in the battlefields of West, East, Southern and Central Africa while also seeking to exploit recent developments in Afghanistan. He further noted that Da'esh and other terrorist groups had sought to exploit fault lines arising from social restrictions, political tensions and economic downturns exacerbated by the pandemic. Against that backdrop, he reported that the Directorate continued to coordinate closely with the Office of Counter-Terrorism and other key partners to ensure that the

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<sup>1107</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#).



recommendations of the Counter-Terrorism Committee served as the basis for relevant capacity-building activities. He informed that the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate had recently issued its updated global survey of implementation by Member States of resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) and other resolutions, as well as its updated global survey on the implementation of resolution [1624 \(2005\)](#), and a number of other reports and studies on the challenges faced by Member States. He said that the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate had continued to work closely with the Office of Counter-Terrorism on a series of activities aimed at enhancing the capacities of Member States on, inter alia, countering terrorist travel; the creation of fusion cells; countering the trafficking of small arms and light weapons; the protection of vulnerable targets; countering the financing of terrorism; and prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration.

On 19 August, Council members heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism on the fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by Da'esh to international peace and security.<sup>1108</sup> The Under-Secretary General reported that Da'esh had continued to pose a threat to international peace and security which had been rising since the onset of the coronavirus disease pandemic, with Da'esh and its affiliates continuing to exploit pandemic-related restrictions and misuse digital spaces to intensify their efforts to recruit sympathizers and attract resources. He added that Da'esh had significantly increased the use of unmanned aerial systems and had managed to do so partially by resorting to a largely decentralized internal structure centred around a so-called general directorate of provinces and associated offices. He indicated that those offices operated not only in Iraq and Syria but also outside the core conflict zone, with the most active ones being reported in Afghanistan, Somalia and the Lake Chad basin and underscored the importance of understanding better and continuously monitoring that structure in order to counter and prevent the threat posed by Da'esh. He also noted that the threat posed by Da'esh and its affiliates remained higher in societies affected by conflict, such as the border between Iraq and Syria and Afghanistan, and reported that in Africa, Da'esh had expanded in Central, South and West Africa. He also expressed concern about the potential impact of climate-related challenges and global food insecurity in West Africa and the Sahel. Regarding Europe, he noted that Da'esh had called on

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<sup>1108</sup> See [S/PV.9108](#). For the report of the Secretary-General, see [S/2022/576](#).

sympathizers to carry out attacks by exploiting the easing of pandemic-related restrictions and the conflict in Ukraine. He noted that despite the persistent threat, joint efforts by Member States had continued to yield positive results and underscored that the diversity of resources used by Da'esh to finance terrorist activities and exert control over affiliated groups and fighters underlined the importance of sustained efforts to counter the financing of terrorism. He expressed deep concern about the limited progress achieved in repatriating foreign terrorist fighters and their family members from camps in the north-east of Syria. In closing, he concluded that the persistent threat posed by Da'esh, as well as the magnitude of the challenges it presented, underlined the importance of non-military measures to counter terrorism and address its consequences. He emphasized the importance of addressing the vulnerabilities, societal grievances and inequality which were exploited by the group. In this regard, he also emphasized the importance of promoting and protecting human rights and the rule of law.

During his briefing to the Council at the same meeting, the Acting Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate asserted that the threat posed by Da'esh and its affiliates remained both global and evolving.<sup>1109</sup> He added that despite its recent leadership losses, Da'esh continued to take advantage of conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism to recruit as well as to organize and execute complex attacks. He noted that the situation in Africa, particularly in West and Central Africa and in Mozambique had become more concerning. The Acting Executive Director informed that over the current year, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate had been able to resume its on-site assessment visits on behalf of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. He also stated that the Directorate had issued several analytical and research products such as a report on key trends and developments in relation to Da'esh in Africa, a study on the interrelationship between counter-terrorism frameworks and international humanitarian law, and a joint report with the International Peace Institute on the relationship between masculinities and violent extremism conducive to terrorism. He also informed the Council about the forthcoming special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the use of emerging technologies for counter-terrorism purposes, to be held from 28 to 30 October in New Delhi and Mumbai, India.

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<sup>1109</sup> See [S/PV.9108](#).

At the same meeting, a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, a think tank on human security in Africa, provided his reflection and analysis on why the threat posed by Da'esh to Africa was growing day by day and why the continent could be the future of the caliphate. He noted with concern that at least 20 countries in Africa had directly experienced Da'esh activity with more than 20 others being used for logistics and to mobilize funds and other resources. He emphasized that there were regional hubs which had become corridors for instability in Africa. He informed that the Lake Chad basin continued to serve as the group's biggest area of operations, that the Sahel had become ungovernable, and that Somalia remained the hotspot for the Horn of Africa. He enumerated the factors that he considered had made Da'esh successful in Africa. In this regard, he mentioned, inter alia, the presence of natural resources in connection with what he termed the battle over Africa's natural resources, the lingering grievances about global injustices and the lack of political will to deal with the Palestinian problem as a main source of radicalization for young people in Africa, the ability of Da'esh to work with other terror and criminal groups on the continent, the inconsistency in State responses to terrorism, the ailing war on terrorism in Africa, and the divorce between the fight against transnational organized crime and counter-terrorism in Africa. He stated that the Council could mobilize support for counterterrorism in Africa, be closer and more involved, and find a way to ensure that the resolutions that it adopted were communicated to those concerned on the ground, particularly at the community level. He also called on the Council to work closely with the African Union and regional economic communities in the fight against terrorism in Africa.

On 15 December, at the initiative of India which held the presidency for the month,<sup>1110</sup> the Council held a high-level meeting under the sub-item entitled "Global counter-terrorism approach – principles and the way forward". At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, the Acting Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate as well as a civil society representative.

The Under-Secretary-General of Office of Counter-Terrorism asserted that despite continuing leadership losses by Al-Qaida and Da'esh, terrorism in general had become more prevalent and more geographically widespread.<sup>1111</sup> He emphasized the urgency of the situation in

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<sup>1110</sup> A concept note was circulated by letter dated 5 December 2022 ([S/2022/906](#)).

<sup>1111</sup> See [S/PV.9221](#).

West Africa and the Sahel, where terrorist groups were striving to expand their areas of operation, and added that the activities of such groups had also contributed to the deteriorating security situation in Central and Southern Africa. Turning to the situation in Afghanistan, he indicated that the sustained presence of terrorist groups in the country continued to pose serious threats to the region and beyond, as some groups had ambitions to conduct external operations. He also reported that the de facto authorities had failed to sever long-standing ties with terrorist groups sheltering in the country, despite the Council's demands to do so. The Under-Secretary-General expressed concern about the manner in which terrorist groups misused and abused developments in technological innovation, including online videogames, to advance their agendas. In that regard, he welcomed the adoption of the Delhi declaration on countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes at the special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee held in India, in October. The Under-Secretary-General was also concerned about the increase in terrorist attacks based on xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief. He also enumerated four principles for guiding collective action in countering terrorism going forward, namely, prevention, community-based and conflict- and gender-sensitive whole-of-society approaches, human rights at the centre of effective counter-terrorism responses, and the leverage of regional-based approaches.

During his briefing to the Council at the same meeting, the Acting Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate stated that the threat of terrorism had become diffuse and diverse in nature, with battlefields emerging in the Sahel, in West, East, Southern and Central Africa and in parts of Asia.<sup>1112</sup> He noted that Da'esh was also persisting to regroup in its traditional geographic centre and indicated that threats from terrorism on the basis of xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance had been increasing. He further underlined that terrorists continued to exploit online platforms, to recruit and radicalize, raise funds, plan and coordinate operations and disseminate propaganda. He reported in that connection, that the Counter-Terrorism Committee had held a special meeting in India on 28 and 29 October, with the support of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, on the topic of countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes. At the meeting, the Committee had

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<sup>1112</sup> Ibid.

adopted the Delhi declaration to reaffirm its commitment to working with Member States in achieving the full implementation of all relevant Council resolutions to address the threats posed by terrorism. He indicated the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate would support the Counter-terrorism Committee in developing a set of non-binding guiding principles consistent with international human rights law and humanitarian law, with a view to assisting Member States in countering the threat posed by the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes. At the meeting, the Council also heard a briefing by a civil society representative, a staff nurse at the Cama and Albless Hospital in Mumbai who survived the terrorist attack on the hospital on 26 November 2008. She briefed the Council on her experience as a victim and survivor of terrorism, asserting that the victims and survivors of such attacks live the rest of their lives in trauma, and urging the international community, through the Council, to bring to justice the sponsors of the Mumbai attacks and give closure to the families of the victims.

At the end of the meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement by which it reaffirmed that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constituted one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and condemned in the strongest terms terrorism and all terrorist acts, including those on the basis of xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief, further reaffirming that terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization, or group.<sup>1113</sup> The Council also stressed the need to promote and protect rights of victims of terrorism, including women and children, and reaffirmed that Member States must ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, emphasizing also that effective counterterrorism measures and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law were complementary and mutually reinforcing and an essential part of a successful counterterrorism effort.<sup>1114</sup> The Council further underscored the importance of a whole of government and whole of society approaches in increasing awareness about the threats of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism and effectively tackling them, and urged Member States to continue efforts to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership of women and inclusion of youth in all counter-terrorism and violent extremism conducive to

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<sup>1113</sup> See [S/PRST/2022/7](#), first and second paragraphs.

<sup>1114</sup> *Ibid.*, fifth and seventh paragraphs.

terrorism approaches and strategies.<sup>1115</sup> The Council also reiterated its call to Member States to, inter alia, take actions to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, and prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups through effective border controls and other measures.<sup>1116</sup> The Council also urged Member States, when designating and applying measures to counter the financing of terrorism, to take into account the potential effect of those measures on exclusively humanitarian activities, including medical activities carried out by impartial humanitarian actors in a manner consistent with international humanitarian law.<sup>1117</sup> The Council also expressed deep concern that the threat of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, had increased and become more diffuse, in various regions of the world, aided by the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes, while recognizing that innovations in technology could also offer significant opportunities for countering terrorism and in that regard, welcomed the adoption of the Delhi Declaration on Countering the Use of New and Emerging Technologies for Terrorist Purposes.<sup>1118</sup>

On 16 December, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2665 \(2022\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter, deciding that all States shall continue to take the measures required by paragraph 1 of resolution [2255 \(2015\)](#) with respect to individuals and entities designated prior to the date of adoption of resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) as the Taliban, as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan as designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) in the 1988 Sanctions List.<sup>1119</sup> The Council also decided to extend for a period of 12 months, until December 2023, the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#).<sup>1120</sup>

In 2022, the discussions at the Council focused on many of the topics covered by the briefers and the decisions adopted during the meetings featured above. Council members

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<sup>1115</sup> Ibid., eighth paragraph.

<sup>1116</sup> Ibid, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth paragraphs.

<sup>1117</sup> Ibid., seventeenth paragraph.

<sup>1118</sup> Ibid., twenty-third paragraph.

<sup>1119</sup> Resolution [2665 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>1120</sup> Ibid., para. 2. For further information on the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#), see part IX, sect. I.B.1.

expressed concern about the continued activity of Da'esh, and its expansion in other regions, particularly throughout Africa.<sup>1121</sup> Several Council members also expressed concern regarding the situation of foreign nationals including many women and children stranded in displaced persons camps and detention facilities,<sup>1122</sup> and emphasized the importance of repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration of women and children<sup>1123</sup> and prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters.<sup>1124</sup> Furthermore, Council members discussed the importance of tackling terrorism financing,<sup>1125</sup> and the misuse of new technologies by terrorists.<sup>1126</sup> Some Council members continued to emphasize the need for the international community to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorism.<sup>1127</sup> Council members also discussed the importance of holistic approaches to countering terrorism, including addressing its root causes,<sup>1128</sup> and the need for full, equal and meaningful participation of women in counter-terrorism efforts.<sup>1129</sup>

Developments concerning Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts were also considered under the item entitled “Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”.<sup>1130</sup>

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<sup>1121</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#), United States, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Albania, China, Norway, France, Gabon, Ireland, Ghana, India, Brazil, Kenya and Russian Federation; [S/PV.9108](#), United States, Norway, France, Ghana, Gabon, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Kenya, Russian Federation, Ireland, Albania, India, Mexico and China; and [S/PV.9221](#), Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Norway, France, China and Gabon.

<sup>1122</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#), United States and Albania; [S/PV.9108](#), United States, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, Albania and China and [S/PV.9221](#), United States.

<sup>1123</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#), United States, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Ireland and Brazil; [S/PV.9108](#), United States, Brazil, United Arab Emirates and China; and [S/PV.9221](#), United States.

<sup>1124</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#), United States, Norway and Ireland; [S/PV.9108](#), United States; and [S/PV.9221](#), United States.

<sup>1125</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#), United States, France, Gabon, Ireland, Ghana, India and Kenya; [S/PV.9108](#), France, Ghana, Gabon, Kenya, Albania, India and China; and [S/PV.9221](#), India, United Arab Emirates, United States, United Kingdom, Ghana and France.

<sup>1126</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, France and India; [S/PV.9108](#), Ghana, United Arab Emirates, Albania, India and China; and [S/PV.9221](#), India, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, United States, United Kingdom, Kenya, Norway, France, Albania, China and Brazil.

<sup>1127</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#), United States, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, China, France, India and Russian Federation; [S/PV.9108](#), United States, Norway, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Albania, India, Mexico and China; and [S/PV.9221](#), Ireland, United Kingdom and France.

<sup>1128</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#), Albania, Norway, Mexico, Ireland, Ghana and Brazil; [S/PV.9108](#), Norway, France, Ghana, Gabon, Brazil, Ireland, Albania, China and Mexico; and [S/PV.9221](#), Ireland, United Arab Emirates, United States, United Kingdom, Kenya, Norway, France, Albania, China, Mexico, Brazil and Gabon.

<sup>1129</sup> See [S/PV.8963](#), United States, United Arab Emirates, Norway and Ireland; [S/PV.9108](#), Ireland; and [S/PV.9221](#), Ireland, United Arab Emirates, United States, United Kingdom, Norway and Brazil.

<sup>1130</sup> See part I, sect. 31.

**Meetings: Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8963</a> 9 February 2022	Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat ( <a href="#">S/2022/63</a> )			Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, Acting Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	All Council Members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9108</a> 9 August 2022	Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat ( <a href="#">S/2022/576</a> )			Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, Acting Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies	All Council Members, all invitees <sup>a</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9221</a> 15 December 2022	Global counter-terrorism approach – principles and the way forward  Letter dated 5 December 2022 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/906</a> )			Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, Acting Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Nursing Officer at the Cama and Albles Hospital in Mumbai	All Council Members, <sup>b</sup> all invitees	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/7</a>
<a href="#">S/PV.9222</a> 16 December 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/955</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2665 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (Adopted under Chapter VII)

<sup>a</sup> The senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>b</sup> Ghana was represented by its Permanent Secretary. Kenya was represented by its Principal Secretary of Foreign Affairs. India was represented by its External Affairs Minister. Ireland was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence. United Arab Emirates was represented by its Cabinet Member and Minister of Culture and Youth. United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State. United States of America was represented by its Under Secretary for Political Affairs.



## 31. Briefings

As with previous supplements, briefings by different speakers not explicitly connected to a specific item on the agenda of the Security Council are featured in this section. In 2022, the Council held five such meetings, four of which were public.<sup>1131</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is provided in the tables below.<sup>1132</sup>

In 2022, the Council held one meeting under the item “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”. On 14 March, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, in his capacity as Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), provided a briefing to the Council focusing on the developments in Ukraine.<sup>1133</sup> In this regard, he said that he addressed the Council with a sense of urgency and moral imperative to make every possible effort to stop the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, noting that close cooperation between the OSCE and the United Nations was even more needed when the basic principles of the Charter and international law were being flagrantly violated in the very heart of Europe.<sup>1134</sup> The Chairperson-in-Office stated that the international community had rightly condemned Russia’s invasion and called on Moscow to withdraw its forces from Ukraine, adding that it was hard to ignore 141 countries assembled in the General Assembly asking the President of the Russian Federation to stop the war. He further noted that any sustainable, political solution had to fully respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. Turning to the broader implications of the developments in Ukraine, the Chairperson-in-Office affirmed that Russia’s aggression threatened the very existence of the OSCE and that its non-compliance with the OSCE principles and commitments was forcing the Organization to put on hold or delay some of the issues that were important for its daily operation. Furthermore, the changing situation on the ground would probably determine the scope and character of the future engagement of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. The Chairperson-in-Office also stated

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<sup>1131</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1132</sup> For more information, see [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 18, 19, 20 and 23.

<sup>1133</sup> For more information about discussions relating to Ukraine, see also part I, sects. 19.A, B and C and 36.

<sup>1134</sup> See [S/PV.8992](#).

that the OSCE would continue to call on all sides to military conflicts to abide by humanitarian law and refrain from activities directed against the civilian population and civilian infrastructure. Concluding, he asserted that it was true that the OSCE might evolve as a result of the current experience and that the celebrations of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act could turn out to be dedicated to finding a solution to the deep crisis of multilateralism. At the same meeting, the Council also heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs in which she reflected on the complementarity and cooperation between the United Nations and the OSCE in line with Chapter VIII of the Charter, citing the examples of joint work in Central Asia, the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh and Moldova. Regarding the war in Ukraine, the Under-Secretary-General noted that it was the most severe test that the OSCE and related regional frameworks had faced since their creation and added that the Russian invasion had shaken the foundations of the European security architecture. She held the view that any questioning of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders would be inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant Council and General Assembly resolutions.

During the discussion, Council members took note of the commitment of the Polish chairmanship of the OSCE to finding peaceful solutions to protracted conflicts in the OSCE area, and recalled the importance of the principles of the prohibition of the use or threat of the use of force,<sup>1135</sup> the peaceful settlement of disputes and the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.<sup>1136</sup> In response to some of the comments expressed by Council members, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office took the floor for a second time.<sup>1137</sup>

In accordance with previously established practice, the Council heard one briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice at a private (closed) meeting held on 26 October.<sup>1138</sup>

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<sup>1135</sup> For more information on the prohibition of the threat or the use of force, see part III.

<sup>1136</sup> For more information on the peaceful settlement of disputes, see part and VI.

<sup>1137</sup> For more information about invitees under rule 39 and their interventions, see part II.

<sup>1138</sup> See [S/PV.9166](#). For further information on the relations with the International Court of Justice, see part IV.

In addition, on 2 November, the Council heard the yearly briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.<sup>1139</sup> At the meeting, the High Commissioner reflected on the impact of growing conflicts, the climate emergency, pandemics, energy and food crises on more than 103 million refugees and displaced people. With regard to Ukraine, he noted that the Russian invasion had driven the fastest and largest displacement witnessed in decades with some 14 million people forced from their homes since 24 February. In addition to Ukraine, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had responded to 37 emergencies around the world in the past 12 months, including in Ethiopia, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan and the Syrian Arab Republic. Further, the High Commissioner highlighted the intersection between climate change and displacement, which in many situations included a clear connection with conflict as well. In that regard, he cited the examples of Somalia and the Sahel. The High Commissioner concluded by drawing the attention of the Council to four areas: (i) the need for more resources for humanitarian aid; (ii) strengthening peacebuilding by reinforcing the capacity of the police, the judiciary, local government and overall rule of law in fragile countries; (iii) safeguarding humanitarian action including by ensuring that international humanitarian law was upheld and by contributing to preserving the civilian character of refugee settings; and (iv) the need for the international community, starting with Council members, to overcome its divisions and disagreements, at least on humanitarian issues.

Following the briefing, Council members underscored the importance of addressing the root causes of forced displacement, in particular armed conflicts, with many speakers raising the issue of climate change as a contributing factor in this regard.<sup>1140</sup> In response to some of the questions raised by Council members, the High Commissioner took the floor for a second time.<sup>1141</sup>

In 2022, the Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”. On 23 November, the Council heard a joint briefing by the Chairs of the three committees related to counterterrorism and non-proliferation, namely,

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<sup>1139</sup> See [S/PV.9178](#). The previous briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Council was held on 7 December 2021, see [S/PV.8919](#). See also *Repertoire, Supplement 2021*, part I, sect. 29.

<sup>1140</sup> See [S/PV.9178](#), Kenya, France, Brazil, Ireland, Gabon, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom and Ghana.

<sup>1141</sup> For more information about invitees under rule 39 and their interventions, see part II.

the Committee established pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#), the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#). At the meeting, the Chairs provided an overview of the work of the three committees, noting that the three subsidiary bodies had continued to cooperate and coordinate their work to ensure an effective and efficient approach to counter terrorism and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by non-State actors.<sup>1142</sup> The representative of Norway, speaking on behalf of the three committees, and the representative of India, in her capacity as Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, further reported that the Counter-Terrorism Committee had convened a special meeting on 28 and 29 October in Mumbai and New Delhi on countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes, at which it adopted the Delhi declaration.<sup>1143</sup> In addition, Council members underscored the value of field visits, including joint ones,<sup>1144</sup> as well as the sharing of information among the committees.<sup>1145</sup> Council members also raised the issue of the evolving nature of the threat of terrorism in several parts of Africa, Asia and the Middle East,<sup>1146</sup> and discussed the conclusion of the comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#).<sup>1147</sup>

In line with the established practice, on 12 December, the Council heard the end-of-year briefing by the outgoing Chairs of the various subsidiary bodies who were concluding their terms at the end of 2022.<sup>1148</sup> At the briefing, they presented the key activities undertaken during their

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<sup>1142</sup> See [S/PV.9201](#).

<sup>1143</sup> For more information about the Committees, see part IX, sect. I.

<sup>1144</sup> See [S/PV.9201](#), Norway, India, Mexico, United States, China, Russian Federation, Brazil and Ireland.

<sup>1145</sup> *Ibid.*, Mexico, United States, China, Gabon and Ireland.

<sup>1146</sup> *Ibid.*, Norway, India, Russian Federation (p. 10), France, Ireland and Ghana.

<sup>1147</sup> *Ibid.*, Mexico, China, United Arab Emirates, Norway, Brazil, United Kingdom and Ireland. For more information about the comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), see part I, sect. 34.A.

<sup>1148</sup> See [S/PV.9218](#). The Chairs of the following subsidiary organs provided briefings: Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab, Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) concerning counter-terrorism, Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#), Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya, Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, and Committee established pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.

tenure and offered their recommendations for the incoming elected members of the Council. Several Chairs reflected on the need for effective implementation of sanctions regimes and underscored the importance of the humanitarian carveout to minimize the unintended consequences of sanctions measures.<sup>1149</sup> The representative of Ireland, speaking in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab, outlined the innovative elements Ireland had introduced, including the broadening of the scope of Committee discussions by inviting new briefers and holding joint meetings with other sanctions committees. In her capacity as Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, the representative of Norway stated, *inter alia*, that it had been important to her as Chair to consistently strive for conclusions that were fit for purpose, practical and instruments for real action. She further stated that the Working Group had received and reviewed regular global horizontal notes to stay alert of recent developments and urged the Council to continue to mainstream child protection throughout its work. The representative of India, speaking in her capacity as Chair of several committees, noted that it was important that the five permanent members of the Council respected the consensus of the 10 elected members and took their preferences seriously for chairing a particular subsidiary body. Further, the representative of India held the view that the function or dysfunction of a subsidiary body depended on the cooperation of its members, pointed to the need to bring predictability to the scheduling of Committee meetings and to enhance the transparency of their functioning, and added that the credibility of a Committee also depended on how objective and fair its decisions were perceived to be.<sup>1150</sup> The representative of Kenya, speaking on behalf of the Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, noted that the Working Group was a good platform that could be utilized for horizon-scanning briefings on emerging global issues that impinged on peace and security in Africa. He added that the Working Group should consider utilizing field visits, including with other committees, to enrich its deliberations. Speaking in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the representative of Mexico stated that the Committee had undertaken a review of the lessons learned over the past five years and had

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<sup>1149</sup> See [S/PV.9218](#), Ireland, Norway and Mexico.

<sup>1150</sup> For more information about the Committees, see part IX, sect. I.

formulated proposals for its future mandate. In his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, the representative of Mexico noted that greater support was needed from the Committee and the Secretariat in order to ensure that the countries of the region had the technical tools to fully implement sanctions. He further reported on the better coordination of activities with the Government authorities, including through the provision of access to the final reports of the Group of Experts prior to their publication.

**Table 1**  
**Meetings: briefings by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8992</a> 14 March 2022			Ukraine	Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	

**Table 2**  
**Meetings: briefings by the President of the International Court of Justice**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9166</a> 26 October 2022 (closed)				President of the International Court of Justice	Council members, invitee	

**Table 3**  
**Meetings: briefings by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9178</a> 2 November 2022				United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	All Council members, invitee	

**Table 4**  
**Meetings: briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9201</a> 23 November 2022					Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions <a href="#">1267 (1999)</a> , <a href="#">1989 (2011)</a> and <a href="#">2253 (2015)</a> concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1373 (2001)</a> , and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1540 (2004)</a> , <sup>a</sup> all Council members	
<a href="#">S/PV.9218</a> 12 December 2022					Chairs of eight Committees and two Working Groups <sup>b</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> Before his briefing as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, the representative of Norway delivered a joint statement on behalf of that Committee and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#).

<sup>b</sup> Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab; Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict; Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) concerning counter-terrorism, the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya; Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali; and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.

## **32. Items relating to non-proliferation**

### **A. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**

During the period under review, the Security Council held three meetings in connection with the item entitled “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”. One meeting took the form of a briefing and two meetings were convened for the adoption of resolutions.<sup>1151</sup> In 2022, the Council unanimously adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>1152</sup> More information on the meetings, including invitees, speakers and outcomes is given in the table below.<sup>1153</sup>

On 14 March 2022, Council members held a meeting in connection with this item focused on the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#). At the meeting, Council members heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on its activities during the year of 2021.<sup>1154</sup> In his briefing, the Chair underscored that resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) remained a vital component of the global non-proliferation architecture aimed at preventing non-State actors, including terrorists, from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. He said that States had made significant progress in the full implementation of the resolution regardless of the remaining gaps in its full and effective implementation. Outlining the activities of the Committee, he stated that 185 Member States had submitted their first reports containing information on measures taken to comply with their obligations under resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), and 136 Member States had informed the Committee of their national points of contact for the implementation of the resolution. In addition, noting that 35 Member States had submitted voluntary national implementation action plans to the Committee since 2007, he informed that the Committee had supported Botswana and Mongolia in their individual process of developing their own plans. The Chair explained that the Committee would continue to support States that wished to conduct peer reviews, through which Member States could identify effective national practices and share with the Committee and other partners. Emphasizing the

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<sup>1151</sup> For more information on format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1152</sup> Resolutions [2622 \(2022\)](#) and [2663 \(2022\)](#).

<sup>1153</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 25.

<sup>1154</sup> See [S/PV.8993](#).



important role of the Committee in facilitating assistance to Member States, the Chair noted that the Committee had received four new assistance requests during 2021 and assured that the Committee would include new programmes and updated information regarding available assistance on its website. As one of the main priorities of the Committee, he informed the Council that the Committee continued to conduct the comprehensive review of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) as provided for in resolution [1977 \(2011\)](#), further to the extension of the Committee's mandate by resolution [2622 \(2022\)](#). He also explained that the review of the status of the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) by Member States was a central theme of the comprehensive review.

Following the briefing, Council members reaffirmed that resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) remained an essential component of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture in preventing non-State actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction and the central role played by the Committee and its Group of Experts in that regard. Noting the importance of approving the Committee's mandate, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the mandate should be based on the unifying principles of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and aimed at maintaining the fundamental principles of the Committee's work, without endowing it with intrusive or attributive powers. Some Council members expressed concern over the evolving risks of proliferation posed by non-state actors, including the risks posed by their attempted use of crude toxin weapons such as ricin,<sup>1155</sup> and their exploitation of modern and new technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, synthetic biology and artificial intelligence.<sup>1156</sup> Several Council members expressed support for enhanced cooperation and coordination of the Committee with international organizations and other United Nations committees, such as those dealing with terrorism in delivering its mandate.<sup>1157</sup> Regarding the on-going comprehensive review of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), Council members underlined the importance of inclusiveness

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<sup>1155</sup> Ibid., United Kingdom.

<sup>1156</sup> Ibid., China and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>1157</sup> Ibid., France, India and Gabon.

of the process and encouraged broad consultations with, inter alia, Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations, civil society and the private sector.<sup>1158</sup>

On 25 February and 30 November, the Council convened two meetings at which it adopted resolution [2622 \(2022\)](#) and resolution [2663 \(2022\)](#), respectively. Both resolutions were adopted unanimously, and both were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.

By resolution [2622 \(2022\)](#), the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) until 30 November 2022 with the continued assistance of its Group of Experts, as specified in paragraph 5 of resolution [1977 \(2011\)](#).<sup>1159</sup> It also decided that the Committee pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), while continuing its work pursuant to its mandate, would continue to conduct and complete the comprehensive review on the status of implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and submit to the Council a report on the conclusion of the review.<sup>1160</sup> Explaining the vote further to the adoption of resolution [2622 \(2022\)](#), the representative of the Russian Federation expressed concern that the Council had once again limited itself to a strictly technical rollover of the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) in the interest of ensuring that the comprehensive review of the resolution's implementation could be concluded swiftly. He underlined the importance of undertaking the review appropriately and allowing substantive contributions to be made by key participants. He also underscored that failing to do so, the added value of the review process would be largely wasted.<sup>1161</sup> The representative of China expressed the hope that the Committee would elaborate plans to advance its work in an orderly manner, including the comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) adding that the legitimate concerns of all parties should be accorded equal attention and properly addressed in that process. Noting the comments made with respect to the process of a technical renewal of the mandate, the representative of Mexico clarified that consultations were conducted in good faith and

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<sup>1158</sup> Ibid., France, Ghana, Ireland, Norway, Brazil, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, United States and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>1159</sup> Resolution [2622 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For further details on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), see part IX, sect. I.B.2.

<sup>1160</sup> Resolution [2622 \(2022\)](#), para. 2. For details on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), see part IX, sect. I. B.

<sup>1161</sup> See [S/PV.8977](#).

transparently and in response to all concerns expressed adding that the great majority of members expressed their preference for a technical renewal as the most viable way of undertaking the broad review mandated by resolution [1977 \(2011\)](#). Following Mexico, the representative of the United States stated that the technical extension would allow the Committee and the Group of Experts to continue their important work. He also said that during the upcoming comprehensive review and mandate renewal, his delegation would prioritize the full implementation of States' obligations under resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) by striving to improve the functionality and credibility of the Committee, empowering its Group of Experts and enhancing its support to assistance- and outreach-related activities. Expressing a strong support for the adoption of resolution [2622 \(2022\)](#), the representative of the United Kingdom applauded Mexico's efforts as Chair to secure an extension of the mandate.

By resolution [2663 \(2022\)](#), the Council endorsed the 2022 comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and took note of its results as contained in its final report.<sup>1162</sup> By the same resolution, the Council extended the mandate of the Committee for a period of 10 years until 30 November 2032,<sup>1163</sup> and reiterated the mandate of the Committee in promoting the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), emphasizing in particular those aspects relating to outreach and technical assistance to Member States.<sup>1164</sup> Following the adoption, 11 Council members delivered statements. Some Council members emphasized the importance of the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and welcomed its inclusion in the resolution, encouraging the Committee to give due consideration to the matter in all its activities.<sup>1165</sup> Council members also welcomed the strengthening of the Committee's cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations and other Committees.<sup>1166</sup> Certain Council members underlined the central role of the Group of Experts in monitoring and supporting the

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<sup>1162</sup> Resolution [2663 \(2022\)](#), twenty-second preambular paragraph. See also [S/2022/899](#).

<sup>1163</sup> Resolution [2663 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>1164</sup> For details on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), see part IX, sect. I. B.

<sup>1165</sup> [S/PV. 9205](#), Ireland, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Norway, Mexico and Ghana. See also Resolution [2663 \(2022\)](#), nineteenth preambular paragraph.

<sup>1166</sup> [S/PV. 9205](#), Ireland, Albania, India and Ghana. See also Resolution [2663 \(2022\)](#), fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and twenty-first preambular paragraphs and paras. 21, 23, 25 and 26.

work of the Committee,<sup>1167</sup> and noted the call for the Committee to review its internal guidelines on matters regarding its group of experts.<sup>1168</sup> The representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States expressed disappointment that the new mandate did not go further in strengthening the Committee’s support to Member States in implementing the resolution, including on the issue of proliferation financing,<sup>1169</sup> and did not give the Committee and its Group of Experts the tools that they would need to work efficiently and effectively.<sup>1170</sup> The representative of China pointed out that the unfair and unreasonable aspects of the international non-proliferation regime remained striking, while the right of the majority of developing countries to the peaceful use of science and technology continued to be subject to many restrictions.

In 2022, the Council also heard an additional briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) under a separate item of the agenda, entitled “Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”.<sup>1171</sup>

### Meetings: Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8977</a> 25 February 2022	Draft resolution submitted by Mexico ( <a href="#">S/2022/147</a> )			Five Council members (China, Mexico, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States)		Resolution <a href="#">2622 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.8993</a> 14 March 2022					All Council members <sup>a</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV. 9205</a> 30 November 2022		Draft resolution submitted by Mexico ( <a href="#">S/2022/881</a> )			11 Council members <sup>b</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2663 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

<sup>a</sup> The representative of Mexico spoke in his capacity as the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#).

<sup>b</sup> Albania, China, Ghana, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>1167</sup> [S/PV. 9205](#), Ireland, United Kingdom, Norway and United States.

<sup>1168</sup> *Ibid.*, Norway and United States (p. 6). See also resolution [2663 \(2022\)](#), para. 5.

<sup>1169</sup> [S/PV. 9205](#), United Kingdom.

<sup>1170</sup> *Ibid.*, United States.

<sup>1171</sup> See [S/PV.9221](#). For more details, see part I, sect. 31.

## **B. Non-proliferation**

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Non-proliferation”. Both meetings took the form of briefings.<sup>1172</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole.<sup>1173</sup>

Under the item, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, and the representative of Ireland as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Islamic Republic of Iran participated in both meetings under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure and delivered statements.

On 30 June, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).<sup>1174</sup> During the briefing, the Under-Secretary-General noted that diplomatic engagements in and around the Joint Commission to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action resumed in November 2021. She added notwithstanding that the participants and the United States had yet to return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) despite their determination to resolve political and technical differences.<sup>1175</sup> She reiterated her appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions as outlined in the Plan, and to extend the waivers regarding the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran, while calling on the Islamic Republic of Iran to reverse the steps it had taken that were not consistent with its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. She further added that the bilateral and regional initiatives to improve relationships with the Islamic Republic of Iran remained key and should be encouraged and built upon. In addition to the issues with regard to the implementation of the “JCPOA commitments”, she expressed that it was also important for the Islamic Republic of Iran to address the concerns raised by participants

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<sup>1172</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1173</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 30.

<sup>1174</sup> See [S/2022/490](#).

<sup>1175</sup> See [S/PV.9085](#).

in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Emphasizing that the Plan was at a critical juncture, she expressed the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States would continue to build on the momentum of the previous few days of talks, facilitated by the European Union, to resolve the remaining issues. Following the Under-Secretary-General, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations reported that, after more than one year of intense multilateral negotiations, very tough political choices had to be made by all participants in the Plan and the United States to reach the delicate balance in the text. With the deal almost finalized and the space for further significant changes exhausted, he stated that it was therefore important to show the necessary political will and pragmatism to restore the Plan on the basis of the text on the table. While acknowledging the strong sense of urgency, he emphasized the importance to avoid escalatory steps and preserve sufficient space for diplomatic efforts to succeed. Furthermore, he urged all Members of the Organization to refrain from actions and statements that would increase regional and international tensions and thereby escalate a military build-up in the region and beyond. The representative of Ireland, as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), thanked all Council members for unanimously approving the thirteenth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of the Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).<sup>1176</sup> Elaborating on some aspects of the report, she informed that the Council held one meeting in the 2231 format on 23 June 2022. At that meeting, representatives discussed the findings and recommendations on the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General prior to its public release. They also discussed the ongoing diplomatic efforts to restore the Plan, the ballistic missile and space vehicle launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and issues related to implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). She also highlighted the importance of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in conducting verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as requested under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), as well as providing confidence for the international community that the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran was for exclusively peaceful purposes. In that regard, she added that the reports of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency played a key role.

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<sup>1176</sup> See [S/2022/510](#).

Many Council members reiterated their ambition and call for a mutual return to the full implementation of the Plan and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).<sup>1177</sup> In that context, several speakers expressed concerns about the impediments to the verification and monitoring activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the removal of surveillance cameras and monitoring equipment.<sup>1178</sup> Some Council members called for the reconsideration of unilateral coercive measures imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for the United States to lift all relevant unilateral sanctions on the Republic to fully benefit from the economic dividends of the Plan.<sup>1179</sup>

On 19 December, the Council held the second briefing for the year further to the relevant reports of the Secretary-General.<sup>1180</sup> In her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General reported on the status of the negotiations noting that the space for diplomacy appeared to be shrinking rapidly since her last briefing.<sup>1181</sup> She encouraged all parties and the United States to resume their efforts to resolve the outstanding issues, lest the gains achieved by the Plan after years of painstaking efforts be completely lost. The Under-Secretary-General also expressed regret at the reporting of the International Atomic Energy Agency about the intention of the Islamic Republic of Iran to instal new centrifuges at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant and to produce more uranium enriched up to 60 per cent at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, which was estimated to be more than 18 times the allowable amount under the Plan. During the briefing, the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations stressed that the restoration of the Plan remained the only way for the Islamic Republic of Iran to reap the full benefits of the Plan and reach its full economic potential, since the restoration of the Plan would result in a comprehensive lifting of sanctions that would encourage greater cooperation by the entire international community with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Noting that the process to conclude a deal and bring the Plan back on track had been seriously challenged by the various developments over the previous months, he reiterated that diplomacy and restoring the Plan’s full implementation was still the best option to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from developing

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<sup>1177</sup> See [S/PV.9085](#), United States, Mexico, France, Norway, Ghana, Kenya, United Arab Emirates, and Ireland.

<sup>1178</sup> United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Albania, and Germany.

<sup>1179</sup> Mexico, Gabon, China, Ghana, Ireland, and Russian Federation.

<sup>1180</sup> See [S/PV.9225](#). For the reports, see [S/2022/912](#), [S/2022/919](#), and [S/2022/937](#).

<sup>1181</sup> See [S/PV.9225](#).

a nuclear weapon, which was also instrumental to the security of the whole region. The representative of Ireland, as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), emphasized the importance of the full restoration of the Plan as soon as possible, and for all parties to the agreement to uphold it in both letter and spirit, avoid actions that undermined the implementation of commitments, and ensure its full and effective operation.

During the deliberations, some Council members reiterated the need to resume negotiations with all parties with a view to returning to the full implementation of the resolution.<sup>1182</sup> Other Council members expressed their continued concern about the nuclear enrichment by the Islamic Republic of Iran.<sup>1183</sup> Several Council members called for an interim agreement to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide assurances of the exclusively peaceful nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme.<sup>1184</sup>

Concerning the implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), several speakers raised concerns about the findings in the Secretary-General's report ([S/2022/912](#)) concerning the transfer and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation, and encouraged an inspection of those vehicles recovered in Ukraine.<sup>1185</sup> In that regard, the representative of Brazil stated that he would await an independent assessment of such allegations. The representative of the Russian Federation reiterated that any results of the "pseudo-investigation" were null and void from a legal standpoint, while references to any alleged practice in the conduct of inspections were irrelevant. The representative of China expressed his hope that the parties concerned, including the Secretariat, would accurately interpret Council resolutions and documents, prudently handle issues such as the Islamic Republic of Iran's space launch and so-called transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles systems, and avoid influencing negotiations on resuming compliance.

Developments relating to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) were also considered by the Council under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security".<sup>1186</sup>

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<sup>1182</sup> Gabon, Ghana, China, and Kenya.

<sup>1183</sup> Ireland, Mexico, France, Albania, Norway and United Kingdom.

<sup>1184</sup> Gabon, United Arab Emirates, and India.

<sup>1185</sup> Ireland, France, Norway, United Kingdom and Germany.

<sup>1186</sup> See [S/PV.9167](#). For more information, see part I, sect. 35.



## Meetings: Non-proliferation

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9085</a> 30 June 2022	Letter dated 10 June 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution <a href="#">2231 (2015)</a> addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/482</a> )		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Germany	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees	
	Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution <a href="#">2231 (2015)</a> ( <a href="#">S/2022/490</a> )					
	Letter dated 24 June 2021 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution <a href="#">2231 (2015)</a> addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/510</a> )					
<a href="#">S/PV.9225</a> 19 December 2022	Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution <a href="#">2231 (2015)</a> ( <a href="#">S/2022/912</a> )		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Germany	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees	
	Letter dated 6 December 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution <a href="#">2231 (2015)</a> addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/919</a> )					
	Letter dated 12 December 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution <a href="#">2231 (2015)</a> addressed to the					

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for- against- abstaining)</i>
	President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/937</a> )					

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<sup>a</sup> The representative of Ireland gave a briefing in her capacity as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

### **C. Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

During the period under review, the Security Council held six meetings under this item. Four meetings took the form of a briefing and two were convened to adopt a decision.<sup>1187</sup> The Council adopted a resolution, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#).<sup>1188</sup> In addition, one draft resolution failed to be adopted due to the negative vote of two permanent members. More information on the meetings, including speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.<sup>1189</sup>

During the review period, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific of the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations. Their briefings focused on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's launches of unprecedented numbers of ballistic missiles during the year and the risk of a significant escalation of tension in the region and beyond.<sup>1190</sup> In their briefings, they reaffirmed the Secretary-General's commitment to working with all the parties for sustainable peace and a complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, reiterating that the unity of the Council was essential to ease tensions and overcome the diplomatic impasse. Noting the negative action-reaction cycle of missile launches and military exercises, the briefers stressed the importance of strengthening communication channels, including inter-Korean and military-to-military ones, in de-escalating tensions and lowering the risk of miscalculation.<sup>1191</sup> On the grave humanitarian situation in the country, the briefers expressed the readiness of the United Nations to assist people in need and reiterated the Secretary-General's call for the unimpeded entry of international staff and humanitarian supplies. In addition to Council members, Japan and the

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<sup>1187</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1188</sup> For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

<sup>1189</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 33.

<sup>1190</sup> See, for example, [S/PV. 9004](#), [S/PV. 9146](#) and [S/PV. 9183](#).

<sup>1191</sup> See [S/PV. 9183](#) and [S/PV. 9197](#).

Republic of Korea participated in all meetings of the Council under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At those meetings, Council members held differing views regarding the approach to the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Many Council members considered that the continued nuclear weapons' development and testing undermined the non-proliferation regime and raised tensions in the region and beyond, posing a threat to international peace and stability.<sup>1192</sup> Some speakers criticized the continued silence of the Council.<sup>1193</sup> Considering the absence of a consensus on the adoption of a draft resolution on the situation, the representative of the United States expressed the intention to propose a draft presidential statement to hold the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accountable for its dangerous rhetoric and destabilizing actions. Several Council members called on all parties to demonstrate restraint and reaffirm in practice their readiness to renew dialogue.<sup>1194</sup> While also expressing concern over the rising tensions and intensifying confrontation on the Korean peninsula, the representatives of China and Russian Federation expressed opposition to any military activity threatening the security of the peninsula.<sup>1195</sup> They further argued that the joint draft resolution proposed by China and the Russian Federation would help ease the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, create an atmosphere for dialogue and promote the realization of a political statement.

At the meetings, Council members also discussed the role of sanctions in addressing the peace and security issues on the Korean peninsula. Some Council members affirmed the effectiveness of sanctions in slowing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's weapons-of-mass-destruction and ballistic-missile advancements,<sup>1196</sup> and underlined the importance of sanctions compliance by all Member States and the full implementation of relevant Security

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<sup>1192</sup> See for example, [S/PV. 9197](#), United States, Albania, Ireland, Gabon, India, Kenya, Brazil and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>1193</sup> *Ibid.*, Albania, France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, Mexico and Republic of Korea.

<sup>1194</sup> *Ibid.*, Albania, France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, Gabon, Mexico, Kenya and the United Arab Emirates.

<sup>1195</sup> *Ibid.*, China and Russian Federation.

<sup>1196</sup> See, for example, [S/PV. 9030](#), United States; [S/PV. 9183](#), Norway and United Arab Emirates.

Council resolutions.<sup>1197</sup> Some Council members expressed concern regarding the evasion of sanctions by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea allowing continued funding to its illegal weapons of mass destruction programs, including through cyberactivity,<sup>1198</sup> and some opined that all reasonable measures should be taken to prevent evasion and the current sanctions regime should be updated to cover the new areas and stricter sanctions should be imposed.<sup>1199</sup> Stressing that sanctions were only a means to an end, at a meeting held on 11 May, the representative of China stated that sanctions should not be equated to, or used to replace, diplomatic efforts, and considered that furthering sanctions by means of a resolution, as proposed by the United States, was an inappropriate way to address the situation.<sup>1200</sup> At the same meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed the conviction that seeking a mutually acceptable political and diplomatic solution was the only way to peacefully resolve the issues concerning the Korean peninsula and regretted that the Council had only tightened the sanctions while ignoring the positive signals from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the past few years. He believed that the further strengthening of sanctions exceeded the scope of the measures needed to cut off channels for funding nuclear missile programmes and exposed the people of North Korea to unacceptable socioeconomic and humanitarian turmoil. At a meeting held on 5 October, the representative of Brazil called on the Council to seriously explore alternative avenues to reducing tensions on the peninsula and breaking the deadlock. He was of the view that while multilateral sanctions were part of a comprehensive response, they alone could not address the peace and security issue of the peninsula.<sup>1201</sup>

In their deliberations, Council members also addressed the grave humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Some Council members believed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea itself had worsened the situation of its own people through diverting resources from humanitarian needs to illegal military and ballistic missile programmes, and called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to prioritize the needs of

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<sup>1197</sup> See, for example, [S/PV. 9030](#), Ireland and United Arab Emirates and [S/PV. 9146](#), United States, Albania, Ireland and Norway.

<sup>1198</sup> See, for example, [S/PV. 9030](#), Ireland, United Kingdom, France, Norway; [S/PV. 9183](#), Mexico.

<sup>1199</sup> See, for example, [S/PV. 9030](#), France; [S/PV. 9183](#), France and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>1200</sup> See [S/PV. 9030](#).

<sup>1201</sup> See [S/PV. 9146](#). For more information on the imposition of sanctions by the Council, see part VII, sect. III.

its people over costly military ventures, and to allow the entry of relief organizations and the flow of humanitarian aid into the country.<sup>1202</sup> In response to the concern that sanctions exacerbated the humanitarian situation, the representative of Norway, who chaired the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) in 2022, stated at various meetings that sanctions were not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilians and pointed out that members of the Council continued to show that they had taken the humanitarian situation in the country seriously, as requests for humanitarian sanctions were swiftly processed in the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#).<sup>1203</sup>

In addition, in 2022, the Council convened twice to adopt decisions in connection with this item. On 25 March, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2627 \(2022\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter, extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) for a period of 12 months, until 30 April 2023.<sup>1204</sup> Several Council members made statements after the adoption of the resolution, noting with concern the leaks of the 2021 interim and final reports of the Panel of Experts and the potential damages to the credibility of the work of the Committee, and stressed the need for the Panel to improve its working methods.<sup>1205</sup> The representative of Mexico regretted that the Council members could not reach agreement on explicit instructions to the Panel of Experts to investigate and report in a timely manner on incidents relating to the launch of ballistic missiles in addition to its interim and final reports. Despite having voted in favour, the representative of China expressed regret and discontent that the concerns of his delegation, supported by a large number of Council members, were not taken on board by the penholder of the resolution.

On 26 May, the Council convened to vote on a draft resolution submitted by the United States.<sup>1206</sup> As the penholder of the draft resolution, the representative of the United States made a statement before the vote affirming that the launch of six intercontinental ballistic missiles since the beginning of 2022, including those launched on 25 May, constituted a threat to the peace and

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<sup>1202</sup> See, for example, [S/PV. 9183](#), United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV. 9197](#), Ireland, Kenya and United Arab Emirates; and [S/PV. 9146](#), Albania, United Kingdom.

<sup>1203</sup> See, for example, [S/PV. 9183](#), Norway and [S/PV. 9197](#), Norway. See also [S/2022/2](#).

<sup>1204</sup> See resolution [2627 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>1205</sup> See [S/PV. 9004](#), United States, China and Russian Federation.

<sup>1206</sup> See [S/2022/431](#).

security of the entire international community.<sup>1207</sup> She noted that there had not been a response by the Council to any of the six intercontinental ballistic missiles launched despite the commitment made in resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#). She also explained that some Council members had argued that a presidential statement was the appropriate response to the launches. She recalled that her delegation had proposed press elements and a press statement following many of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's launches in the year but had been told that any such statement could lead to escalation or destabilize the Korean peninsula. She argued that the exact opposite had happened, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had taken the Council's silence as a green light to act with impunity and escalate tensions on the peninsula. She added that with the adoption of the draft resolution, Council members could send a message to all proliferators that they would not stand for any actions on their part that sought to undermine international peace and security. She also stated that if adopted, the resolution would restrict the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ability to advance its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic-missile programmes, streamline sanctions implementation and further facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. The draft resolution was not adopted due to the negative vote of two permanent members.<sup>1208</sup>

Following the vote, 13 Council members made statements. The representative of China stated that with regard to the peninsula issue, the Council should play a positive and constructive role, and its actions should help de-escalate the situation and prevent it from deteriorating and even spiralling out of control, adding that reliance on sanctions would not help to resolve the issue.<sup>1209</sup> He said that sanctions would not only fail to resolve the problem but would lead to further negative consequences and an escalation of the confrontation. He noted that his delegation had repeatedly expressed the hope that the United States would consider issuing a presidential statement instead, as the best way to garner consensus among Council members and

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<sup>1207</sup> See [S/PV. 9048](#).

<sup>1208</sup> The results of the vote were as follows: *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States; *Against*: China and Russian Federation. Further to the veto cast at the meeting, pursuant to GA resolution [76/262](#), the Security Council transmitted a special report to the Assembly on the use of the veto at the 9048th meeting of the Security Council, held on 26 May 2022 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea" ([A/76/853](#)). For further details, see part IV, sect. I. F.

<sup>1209</sup> [S/PV. 9048](#).

avoid confrontation. Explaining his country's vote, the representative of the Russian Federation said that the penholder had ignored the frequent clarifications made and that his delegation's appeals for it to be issued as a presidential statement instead had gone unheeded. According to the representative of the Russian Federation, strengthening the sanctions pressure on Pyongyang was not only futile but extremely dangerous considering the humanitarian consequences of such measures. He added that the quest for mutually acceptable political and diplomatic solutions was the only possible way to reach a peaceful solution to the Korean peninsula question and establish robust security mechanisms in North-East Asia. Other speakers pointed out that the continued launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of ballistic missiles, including that of intercontinental range, had been a clear violation of Security Council resolutions and of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and regretted that the draft resolution had not been adopted due to the veto by two permanent members.<sup>1210</sup> Some speakers expressed concern that the veto would send a wrong signal of impunity and embolden the authority of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.<sup>1211</sup> In that connection, several Council members called for the swift issuance of a special report by the Council to the General Assembly explaining the veto in accordance with the General Assembly resolution [76/262](#).<sup>1212</sup>

#### **Meetings: Non-proliferation / Democratic Republic of Korea**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9004</a> 25 March 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/263</a> )	Japan, Republic of Korea	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	Resolution <a href="#">2627 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9030</a> 11 May 2022			Japan, Republic of Korea	Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific	All Council members, all invitees	

<sup>1210</sup> Ibid., Kenya, Mexico, Albania, Ireland, Ghana, Norway, Brazil, United Kingdom, Gabon, France, United States, Japan and Republic of Korea.

<sup>1211</sup> Ibid., Brazil, United Kingdom, France, United States and Republic of Korea.

<sup>1212</sup> For more information on the special reports issued further to General Assembly resolution [76/262](#), see part IV, sect. I. F.



<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9048</a> 26 May 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/431</a> )	Japan, Republic of Korea		13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees	Draft resolution <a href="#">S/2022/431</a> 13-0-2 <sup>b</sup> (not adopted)
<a href="#">S/PV.9146</a> 5 October 2022			Japan, Republic of Korea	Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9183</a> 4 November 2022			Japan, Republic of Korea	Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9197</a> 21 November 2022			Japan, Republic of Korea	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	

<sup>a</sup> Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States.

<sup>b</sup> In favour: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Against: China, Russian Federation.

### 33. Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace” which took the form of a briefing and an open debate.<sup>1213</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers is given in the table below. In 2022, no decision was adopted in connection with this item.<sup>1214</sup>

On 27 July, the Council held its annual briefing to discuss the report of the Peacebuilding Commission. At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the permanent representative of Egypt in his capacity of Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission for 2021 and by the chargé d'affaires of Bangladesh, in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission for 2022.<sup>1215</sup>

During his briefing, the Permanent Representative of Egypt focused on the annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its fifteenth session, under his country’s chairmanship.<sup>1216</sup> The representative of Egypt informed that throughout 2021, the Commission had led efforts towards the operationalization of the review outcome as contained in the 2020 twin resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council,<sup>1217</sup> including by exploring avenues to strengthen the Commission’s advisory, bridging and convening roles, with a focus on enhancing the impact of peacebuilding in the field.<sup>1218</sup> He reported that in 2021, the Commission had engaged in support of 13 country- and region-specific settings, including holding meetings for the first time on the Gulf of Guinea and the transition in Chad, for a total of 23 different countries and regions, the highest number since its inception. In terms of thematic engagements, the Commission considered new themes, including interlinkages between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform. Regarding its advisory and bridging roles, he informed that the Commission had further expanded and strengthened its relations with the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, through the designation of informal coordinators for the

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<sup>1213</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1214</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 27.

<sup>1215</sup> See [S/PV.9101](#).

<sup>1216</sup> See [S/2022/89](#).

<sup>1217</sup> Resolution [2558 \(2020\)](#) and General Assembly resolution [75/201](#).

<sup>1218</sup> See [S/PV.9101](#).

Commission's relations with those organs and better alignment of their programmes of work. He noted that the Commission had provided advice nine times to the Security Council during 2021, including for the first time on the Great Lakes region. The chargé d'affaires a.i. of Bangladesh, in his capacity of Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission for 2022, briefed the Council on the Commission's programme of work for 2022 and its implementation status for the year. He noted that the Commission planned to engage with at least 12 different countries and five different regions during the year, in addition to its ongoing thematic priorities. He also informed the Council that the Chair of the Liberia configuration had conducted a field visit to the country and meetings had been held at the request of Colombia, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Burkina Faso, while regional meetings had been held on the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin and the Pacific Islands. He emphasized that the programme of work for the year prioritized national ownership and inclusivity and a coherent United Nations approach to peacebuilding. He also indicated that the Commission continued its efforts to enhance its advisory and bridging role with the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council and reported that for the first time, the Commission had shared its programme of work with the General Assembly and the Security Council, through formal communications from the Chair.<sup>1219</sup> He also highlighted that the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and the President of the Council had requested the Secretary-General to liaise with the Commission in advance of relevant reporting to the Council, and underlined that the Commission had sent advisories to the Council on Burkina Faso, Central Africa, the Great Lakes, Women and peace and security, and the impact of the coronavirus disease pandemic on peacebuilding and had briefed the Council on the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel.

Council members welcomed the briefings by the former and current Chairs and discussed the advisory role of the Commission to the Security Council, including approaches to enhance the relationship between both organs.<sup>1220</sup> In that regard, the representative of Kenya, which served as informal coordinator between the two bodies, emphasized the critical need to ensure that the Commission remained well-positioned to provide timely, relevant and actionable advice

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<sup>1219</sup> See [S/2022/202](#) and [S/2022/250](#).

<sup>1220</sup> For more on the relationship between the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, see part IX, sect. VII.

to the Council, whether thematic, country-specific or region specific.<sup>1221</sup> Recognizing that the alignment of the programmes of work of the Council and the Commission remained a challenge, the representative of Kenya also stressed the need for early focus and planning around the already calendarized Council meetings, particularly in regard to peace operation transitions and mandate renewals. He further called for the establishment of a follow-up mechanism to ensure that the Council integrated and followed up on the Commission's advice in its work. Similarly, the representative of Mexico suggested that the Commission's recommendations to the Council should reach the latter in time for them to be duly considered. The representative of Brazil called for more meaningful collaboration between the two bodies, including through consultations on issues relating to peacebuilding and sustaining peace ahead of the formation, review, drawdown and transition of peace operations; the regular submission of written advice by the Commission on issues on the agenda of both bodies; the submission of advice on how peacebuilding planning could concretely address the needs of children affected by conflict, a further alignment of the work programmes of the two bodies, greater interaction between the Commission and Council penholders; and enhancing the Council's working methods regarding interaction with the Commission. The representative of China encouraged the Council to invite the Chair of the Commission to brief more frequently in order to strengthen communication and the representative of Gabon welcomed the efforts made by the Commission to establish more coordinated action with the Council.

The representative of the United Arab Emirates encouraged Council members to further engage with the Commission, including by continuing to invite it to brief and provide written advisories to the Council on relevant matters and suggested that Council members could coordinate with the Commission before and during their assumption of the Council presidency. She also called for drawing on the perspectives and recommendations of the Commission in the design and implementation of mandates of peace operations and their transitional arrangements; and proposed that the Council include the Commission in the initial stages of exit strategies in order to foster peace in local contexts. The representative of Ghana welcomed the practice by the Commission of submitting letters or notes of advice ahead of Council meetings, and underscored

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<sup>1221</sup> See [S/PV.9101](#).

that if further established, that practice would undergird the relations between the two bodies in a manner that would allow for the Commission to contribute to addressing the underlying causes of the conflicts on the agenda of the Council. The representative of Norway noted that the Council had to request, deliberate and draw upon the targeted advice of the Commission more often, especially in the formation of mandates, renewals and transitions. The representative of the United Kingdom recognized the potential of the Commission and indicated that by continuing to deepen its follow-up on the countries with which it engaged and by rallying collective responses to peacebuilding challenges, the Commission would continue to grow in value.

The representative of India was of the view that the advisory role of the Commission should be exercised judiciously and only when warranted. The representative of the Russian Federation believed that there was room for improvement in the quality of the recommendations of the Commission to the Council and emphasized that the value of the Commission was that it could pass the peacebuilding priorities of host countries along to the Council, which could be a useful addition to the reports of the Secretary-General. She added that the value and pertinence of the Commission's recommendations played a fundamental role in it being taken into account in the work of the Council and noted that in order to improve the quality of the cooperation between the two organs in some cases, there was no need to wait for a planned Council meeting for the head of a country-specific configuration to issue a formal statement. If the matter was urgent, then a letter could be written to the Council to that effect. Highlighting the advisory role of the Commission, the representative of Ireland called on the Council to turn that advice into action and to ensure that the Commission and the Member States it represented were empowered to fulfil their important role.

Emphasizing the importance of the work of the Commission on thematic and cross-cutting subjects, particularly in promoting the women and peace and security and the youth, peace and security agendas, the representative of France noted that such work had to be placed in specific geographical contexts. She suggested for the Commission to support preparations for the withdrawal of peacekeeping operations and to produce complementary, targeted and operational recommendations to the Council, while respecting the mandates of the two bodies in particular before the renewal of peacekeeping operation mandates and in anticipation of dialogue with Council penholders.

On 3 November, at the initiative of Ghana which held the Presidency for the month,<sup>1222</sup> the Council convened a high-level open debate under the sub-item, “Integrating effective resilience-building in peace operations for sustainable peace”.<sup>1223</sup> Council members heard introductory remarks by the Secretary General, and briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union, the Chair of The Elders and the Executive Director of Security Council Report.<sup>1224</sup>

During his briefing, the Secretary-General indicated that the local and global contexts in which United Nations peace operations were deployed were becoming increasingly challenging. He affirmed that geopolitical tensions were growing, and that insecurity was becoming widespread. He emphasized that the drivers of conflict were fueling political tensions, economic despair and social unrest, and warned that the peacebuilding gains on the African continent and elsewhere were reversing. He stressed the need to ensure a sharper focus on prevention and building resilience and for peace operations to be empowered and equipped to play a greater role in sustaining peace at all stages of conflict and in all its dimensions. The Secretary-General encouraged engagement with local communities and noted that peace operations could help promote more responsive and inclusive governments and institutions. He advocated for the participation and leadership of women and youth in conflict prevention and resolution efforts. Regarding resilience-building and sustaining peace, he recommended a holistic and integrated approach involving strengthening partnerships among the United Nations and regional organizations, including the African Union, and with international and regional financial institutions. He also suggested better integrating the work of United Nations country teams with the mandates of peace operations and in transition contexts. Lastly, he noted that funding by the international community had to be scaled up in support of the Peacebuilding Fund.

The Assistant Secretary General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations addressed the need to adapt United Nations peace operations to fast-changing conflict dynamics and called for holistic and integrated approaches

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<sup>1222</sup> A concept note was circulated by letter dated 24 October 2022 ([S/2022/799](#)).

<sup>1223</sup> See [S/PV.9181](#) and [S/PV.9181\(Resumption1\)](#).

<sup>1224</sup> See [S/PV.9181](#).

and for inclusive strategies that considered the entire spectrum of peace in order to ensure the success of such operations. She further underlined the importance of mobilizing and engaging international, regional, and national actors working cooperatively and collaboratively on conflict prevention and resolution. She also emphasized that peace operations needed clear, realistic and topical mandates while noting that security-oriented responses alone were insufficient. She emphasized the need for inclusive strategies in peacebuilding efforts including acknowledging the contributions and concerns of women and youth; and encouraged meaningful engagement with communities at the local level. She also stressed the importance of complementarity and collaboration between peace and security efforts and the protection of human rights and development and humanitarian work. In relation to sustaining peace, she emphasized the UN country teams' role in supporting countries especially during United Nations transitions.

In his briefing, the Commissioner of the African Union for Political Affairs, Peace and Security stressed that the Security Council could ensure that peace operations in Africa facilitated a pathway to address the underlying causes of conflict by adopting a whole-of-organization approach in implementing mandates. He also underscored the need to align programmes for complementing critical political transitions with exit strategies for peace support operations in order to build relevant institutional and normative capacities towards resilience. He noted that the African Union was working closely with the United Nations Development Programme to support political transitions and asked for the Council's support for the African Union-United Nations Regional Governance Facility for Managing Inclusive Transitions in Africa. He further called for a common purpose between the African Union and the United Nations in addressing existing and emerging threats to regional and international peace, with increased collaboration and coordination.

In her briefing, the Chair of The Elders emphasized that security, sustainable development, and human rights should lay the foundation for resilient peace operations. She stated that peace operations should address the root causes of conflict and insecurity and not just the immediate symptoms, and called on the Council to play a more proactive role and promote a whole-of-United Nations approach in support of just and sustainable peace, while ensuring that peace operations drew on and complemented the work of staff at the country level. She also expressed the support of The Elders for enabling regional organizations to take a leading role in

conflict prevention and resolution and emphasized that the Council should cooperate closely with those organizations and step in when those organizations were unable to take effective action. She also stressed the importance of ensuring the fair and meaningful participation of women and girls in peace processes, including by increasing the representation of women in the defense and security structures and in peacebuilding and mediations. She further underlined that the climate crisis was a threat multiplier and driver of conflict and recommended integrating an environmental analysis into the work of the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission.

The Director of Security Council Report noted the Council's acknowledgement of previously unaddressed structural factors of conflict and non-traditional threats, including for example, in discussions on the effects of gang violence in Haiti, and the recent establishment of the Haiti sanctions' regime. She also recalled the Council's support for transitional justice initiatives in mandating peace operations in the Central African Republic and Colombia. She suggested that the Council could consider additional steps to protect its investments in peace through peace operations by, inter alia, signaling the Council's strong interest in sustaining peace, in tandem with the work of the Peacebuilding Commission; and following-up with countries after mission closure from time to time, including through visits of the Council. She concluded that while no peace operation was expected to address every last issue, the full, intricate context in which those operations intervene had to be considered.

Following the briefings, some Council members and other participants conveyed their support for the Secretary General's Action for Peacekeeping and/or Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiatives.<sup>1225</sup> Numerous speakers underscored that military interventions by peace operations were insufficient to achieve sustainable peace, emphasizing the need for a holistic approach including non-military measures to identify and address the root causes and drivers of conflicts. In this regard, some participants asserted that the humanitarian-development-peace nexus had to be strengthened in order to address the root causes of conflict.<sup>1226</sup> A number of Council members and other participants pointed at the need to integrate resilience-building into

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<sup>1225</sup> See [S/PV.9181](#), United States, Kenya, Albania, Italy, Austria, Sweden; [S/PV.9181\(Resumption1\)](#), Netherlands, Rwanda and Portugal.

<sup>1226</sup> See [S/PV.9181](#), Ghana, Republic of Korea; [S/PV.9181\(Resumption1\)](#), European Union, Poland and Morocco.



peace operations, especially during transition planning.<sup>1227</sup> Numerous speakers defended initiatives centered on inclusion and the meaningful participation of women and youth. Some Council members and other participants also highlighted the importance of addressing the underlying factors exacerbating the threat of terrorism in conflict situations.<sup>1228</sup> Several Council members and other participants similarly acknowledged the existence of climate related-security risks and emphasized the need to address them.<sup>1229</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation said that political solutions had to be based on a common understanding of the causes of conflict without which it would not be possible to agree on realistic mandates, gain the confidence of host States or ensure regional support. Some Council members noted that the Council should concentrate on the core mandate of peace operations and work more closely with national governments and authorities in determining strategies and priorities for maintaining peace and creating space for finding solutions to conflicts.<sup>1230</sup>

In strengthening the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, most speakers expressed support for greater coordination and collaboration between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission as well as with other UN bodies, regional organizations and country teams in the context of transitions and in informing Council decision-making concerning mandate renewals. In that regard, Council members and participants acknowledged the fundamental role of the Peacebuilding Commission as a bridge within and outside of the UN system, particularly in helping mobilize attention and commitment to international peacebuilding efforts. In this connection, many speakers emphasized the importance of sustainable and predictable funding for peacebuilding efforts, including through contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund. Some participants also welcomed the emerging practice of the Peacebuilding Commission to provide written advice and recommendations to inform Council discussions, including on peace operations and resilience building.<sup>1231</sup>

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<sup>1227</sup> See [S/PV.9181](#), Ghana, Gabon, Ireland, Mexico, Albania, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, Slovenia; [S/PV.9181\(Resumption1\)](#), Bangladesh and Lebanon.

<sup>1228</sup> See [S/PV.9181](#), Ghana, Ireland, India, Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Republic of Korea, Malta,; [S/PV.9181\(Resumption1\)](#), Tunisia, Algeria, Bangladesh, Portugal, Nigeria and Germany.

<sup>1229</sup> See [S/PV.9181](#), Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Albania, France, United Arab Emirates, Slovenia, Austria, Malta, Sweden; [S/PV.9181\(Resumption1\)](#), European Union, Chile, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Poland, Lebanon, Portugal, Nigeria, Germany, Chile, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Poland, Lebanon, Portugal, Nigeria and Germany.

<sup>1230</sup> See [S/PV.9181](#), India, China, Russian Federation.

<sup>1231</sup> See [S/PV.9181](#), Kenya, Norway, Switzerland; [S/PV.9181\(Resumption1\)](#), Japan and Germany.

**Meeting: Peacebuilding and sustaining peace**

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9101</a> 27 July 2022		Annual Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its fifteenth session ( <a href="#">S/2022/89</a> )		Permanent Representative of Egypt, in his capacity as former Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission; Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Bangladesh, in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9181</a> and <a href="#">S/PV.9181 (Resumption 1)</a> 3 Nov 2022	Integrating effective resilience-building in peace operations for sustainable peace  Letter dated 24 October 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/799</a> )		32 Member States <sup>a</sup>	Assistant Secretary General for Africa; Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union; Chair of the Elders; Executive Director of Security Council Report; Chargé d'affaires a.i., Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	The Secretary-General, all Council members <sup>b</sup> , all invitees <sup>c</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia and Ukraine.

<sup>b</sup> The meeting was presided over by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of Ghana. The United States was represented by its Permanent Representative and Member of President Biden's Cabinet. Gabon was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ireland was represented by its Minister of State for European Affairs. India was represented by its Foreign Secretary.

<sup>c</sup> The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union participated in the meeting via videoconference.

### 34. Threats to international peace and security

In 2022, the Security Council held 22 meetings under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, 21 of which were public, and one was private. Among the public meetings, 17 took the form of a briefing, two were convened to adopt a decision, and the remaining two were held in the debate format.<sup>1232</sup> The Council adopted one decision under this item, and one draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. More information about the meetings, including participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition, Council members held informal consultations of the whole to discuss different topics under this item.<sup>1233</sup>

During the period under review, various topics were considered under this item. Most of the meetings under this item in 2022 focused on the conflict in Ukraine and its implications on the humanitarian situation in the country as a result of the war, the alleged use and manufacturing of biological weapons in Ukraine (in connection to which a draft resolution failed to be adopted), the safety of nuclear facilities in the context of the armed conflict, and the Black Sea Grain Initiative.<sup>1234</sup> Furthermore, two other meetings were devoted to the gas leaks detected in the Nord Stream submarine pipelines in the Baltic Sea and the investigation conducted into the forced landing of Ryanair flight FR-4978 by Belarus on 23 May 2021, and two additional meetings focused on climate and security in Africa, and counter-terrorism in Africa. Finally, consistent with prior practice, the Council also held three meetings and adopted one resolution under this item in connection with the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) established pursuant to resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#).<sup>1235</sup>

In 2022, a total of 15 meetings convened under this item were devoted to the conflict in Ukraine, including the tensions prior to the outbreak of war. On 31 January, the Council held a

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<sup>1232</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1233</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 29.

<sup>1234</sup> For more information about the items relating to Ukraine, see part I, sect. 19.

<sup>1235</sup> For further details on the establishment of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016-2017*.

meeting at the request of the United States to discuss the threat to international peace and security posed by the build-up of Russian forces on the border of Ukraine.<sup>1236</sup> Upon request from the Russian Federation, the provisional agenda was put to the vote and adopted with 10 votes in favour, two votes against and three abstentions.<sup>1237</sup> During the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs who expressed great concern over the tensions that continued escalating in a dangerous military build-up in the heart of Europe.<sup>1238</sup> It was reported that more than 100,000 troops and heavy weaponry from the Russian Federation were positioned along the border with Ukraine, with unspecified numbers also reportedly deployed to Belarus ahead of large-scale joint military exercises in February on the borders with Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic States. The Under-Secretary-General added that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members were reportedly planning additional deployments in Eastern European member States, and NATO had advised that 8,500 troops were currently on high alert. She conveyed the Secretary-General's strong belief that there should not be any military intervention in that context and that diplomacy should prevail, adding that any such intervention by one country in another would be against international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The Under-Secretary-General repeated the full commitment of the United Nations to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, in accordance with relevant General Assembly resolutions and stressed the Secretary-General's appeal to all concerned to take immediate steps to de-escalate tensions and continue on the diplomatic path.

In the discussion, most speakers expressed concern about the situation on the borders of Ukraine and urged respect for the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity as well as the prohibition on the threat or use of force. Council members called for de-escalation and peaceful resolution of the situation by focusing on preventive diplomacy and political dialogue. The representative of the United States held the view that Russia's aggression threatened not only

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<sup>1236</sup> See [S/PV.8960](#).

<sup>1237</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: China, Russian Federation; *abstentions*: Gabon, India, Kenya. For more information about the procedural vote on the provisional agenda, see part II.

<sup>1238</sup> See [S/PV.8960](#).

Ukraine but also Europe and the international order that the Council was charged with upholding. If the Russian Federation further invaded Ukraine, the consequences would be horrific and the situation in eastern Ukraine would have paled in comparison to the humanitarian impact of the full-scale land invasion that the Russian Federation was currently planning in Ukraine. The representative of the United States expressed the belief that there was a diplomatic path out of the crisis and noted that if the situation was truly about the security concerns of the Russian Federation, the United States was offering it an opportunity to address those concerns at the negotiating table. The representative of China opposed the holding of the public meeting, noting that it was not conducive to creating a favourable environment for dialogue or defusing tensions. The representative of the Russian Federation rejected the allegations of the planned military invasion of Ukraine and noted that the Russian troops had been deployed within the territory of the Russian Federation. Among the security concerns of the Russian Federation, he stated that Ukraine was not to join NATO and no foreign troops were to be deployed on its territory. The representative of the Russian Federation agreed with the calls for a settlement of the crisis around Ukraine, noting that it was an internal matter. The representative of Ukraine stated that the situation at the border of Ukraine where the Russian Federation continued its military build-up constituted a grave threat to international peace and security. He reiterated the absence of any aggressive intention from the Government of Ukraine and noted that the Council needed to take into account the information it heard at the meeting to make an informed decision, when appropriate, on acting swiftly and decisively in employing preventive diplomacy under Chapter VI of the Charter.

Following the outbreak of war, in her two additional briefings in March, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs reported on the growing number of casualties and the attacks on civilian infrastructure, including through the use of cluster munition, and noted that such acts were prohibited under international law and called for investigations and accountability.<sup>1239</sup> She further urged to intensify efforts for cessation of hostilities to allow for safe passage of civilians and humanitarian aid and welcomed diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the war. At the second briefing in March, the Council also heard updates

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<sup>1239</sup> See [S/PV.8991](#) and [S/PV.8998](#).

from the Assistant High Commissioner for Operations of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who reported that the number of refugees from Ukraine in neighbouring countries had risen to more than 3.1 million, in what had become the fastest-growing refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War.<sup>1240</sup> More than 90 per cent of the refugees fleeing Ukraine were women and children, while at least two million people were believed to have been displaced internally. Despite all efforts, UNHCR was unable to respond to the sheer scale of the rapidly growing needs of the Ukrainian people and systematically deliver much-needed life-saving assistance. The Assistant High Commissioner called for the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, the upholding of the international humanitarian law and the enabling of safe passage for civilians. At the same meeting, the Director-General of the World Health Organization urged the Council to work for an immediate ceasefire and a political solution and all donors to support the response to the humanitarian and health needs in Ukraine and neighbouring countries. Although Ukraine was rightly the focus of the world's attention, the Director-General urged Council members not to lose sight of the many other crises in which people were suffering.

In their discussions during the above meetings in March, Council members focused on the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, the attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, as well as the order of the International Court of Justice of 16 March in which it requested, inter alia, the suspension of military operations by the Russian Federation in Ukraine.<sup>1241</sup>

In addition, in 2022, the Council heard six briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and her Deputies concerning allegations of a biological weapons programme in Ukraine as well as the reports of supplies of lethal weapons to Ukraine. In four of those briefings, the High Representative and her Deputies, respectively, reiterated that the United Nations was not aware of biological weapons programmes in Ukraine.<sup>1242</sup> Additionally, the representatives of the Office for Disarmament Affairs recalled on those occasions that the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention contained several measures to which concerned States parties

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<sup>1240</sup> See [S/PV.8998](#).

<sup>1241</sup> See [S/PV.8998](#).

<sup>1242</sup> See [S/PV.8991](#), [S/PV.8999](#), [S/PV.9033](#) and [S/PV.9171](#).

could have recourse in order to address situations in which States parties had concerns or suspicions about the activities of their peers, such as the possibility of convening a formal consultative meeting to consider such matters or lodging a complaint with the Council to initiate an investigation. In the briefings, the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to note that the Biological Weapons Convention needed to be operationalized and institutionalized and to recall that the upcoming Ninth Review Conference in November and December presented an opportunity for its states parties to strengthen the Convention. In October, the Deputy to the High Representative reported that the Office for Disarmament Affairs was aware that the Russian Federation, following its earlier request for the convening of a formal consultative meeting under article V of the Biological Weapons Convention, had filed an official complaint, in line with the provisions of article VI of the Convention, regarding the allegations of biological weapons programmes in Ukraine.<sup>1243</sup> The Deputy to the High Representative noted that the provisions of article VI had not been invoked since entry into force of the Convention which did not provide any guidance on the type of investigation that the Council might initiate. Were the Council to initiate an investigation, the Office for Disarmament Affairs stood ready to support it.

At the meeting held on 2 November,<sup>1244</sup> a draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes.<sup>1245</sup> The draft resolution would have established a commission consisting of all Council members to investigate the claims against the United States and Ukraine contained in the complaint of the Russian Federation regarding the compliance with obligations under the Convention in the context of the activities of biological laboratories in the territory of Ukraine.<sup>1246</sup> In explaining their votes, Council members exchanged views on the conditions for an investigation by the Council as laid out in Article VI of the Biological Weapons Convention.<sup>1247</sup>

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<sup>1243</sup> See [S/PV.9171](#).

<sup>1244</sup> See [S/PV.9180](#).

<sup>1245</sup> See [S/2022/821](#). The vote on the draft resolution was as follows: *For*: China, Russian Federation; *against*: France, United Kingdom, United States; *abstaining*: Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates.

<sup>1246</sup> See [S/2022/796](#). For further details, see part IX, sect. VIII.

<sup>1247</sup> For more information on the discussion and about investigative and fact-finding functions acknowledged by the Council, see part VI, sect. II.

Finally, in her September and December briefings, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs focused on the reported supplies of lethal weapons to Ukraine and their consequences and noted that since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, a number of States had transferred weapons systems and ammunition to Ukraine for its defence forces, which was a matter of public record.<sup>1248</sup> The High Representative noted that any large-scale influx of weapons into any armed conflict situation raised many concerns, including the possible diversion of these weapons and, in that context, referred to the available mechanisms for enhancing transparency of arms transfers and measures to mitigate risks of weapons and ammunition diversion.

During the discussions concerning the allegations of biological weapons programme, Council members underscored the importance of the Biological Weapons Convention as a key mechanism for dealing with that topic. The representative of the Russian Federation continued to raise concern about the possible use of such programmes by Ukraine with the support of the United States,<sup>1249</sup> while the representatives of Ukraine and the United States rejected those allegations and denied any involvement in such activities.<sup>1250</sup> On the reported transfer of weapons systems and ammunition to Ukraine, speakers also addressed other topics such as arms control and the importance of the Arms Trade Treaty,<sup>1251</sup> with some Council members also raising the issue of weapons from the Islamic Republic of Iran being used by the Russian Federation in contravention of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).<sup>1252</sup> In the context of the war in Ukraine, several speakers also addressed the issue of the right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter.<sup>1253</sup>

During the year, the Council also heard two briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator in March and October, once jointly with the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and once with the

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<sup>1248</sup> See [S/PV.9127](#) and [S/PV.9216](#).

<sup>1249</sup> See [S/PV.8991](#), [S/PV.8999](#), [S/PV.9033](#), [S/PV.9171](#) and [S/PV.9180](#).

<sup>1250</sup> See [S/PV.8991](#), [S/PV.8999](#), [S/PV.9033](#), [S/PV.9171](#) and [S/PV.9180](#).

<sup>1251</sup> See [S/PV.9216](#), Russian Federation, China, United Arab Emirates, United States, Mexico, Brazil and Ukraine.

<sup>1252</sup> *Ibid.*, Norway, United Kingdom, Albania, United States and Ireland.

<sup>1253</sup> *Ibid.*, Norway, United Kingdom, Ghana, Albania, United States, Mexico, Brazil, Ireland and Ukraine. For more information about discussions relating to Article 51 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. X.



Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In March, the Emergency Relief Coordinator noted that as the unthinkable had become the reality, the United Nations and its humanitarian partners had started a scalable and agile, adaptable and resilient humanitarian operation fit for the changing situation.<sup>1254</sup> He outlined the three priorities which he had conveyed to the Ukrainian and Russian authorities, namely for the parties to take constant care to spare civilians and civilian homes and infrastructure in their military operations and allow safe passage for civilians to leave areas of active hostilities on a voluntary basis, in the direction they chose; to enable safe passage for humanitarian supplies into areas of active hostilities; and to put in place a system of constant communication with parties to the conflict and assurances to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid. In her briefing, the Executive Director of UNICEF focused on the impact of the conflict on children and called upon Council members to remind all parties of their legal and moral obligation to protect children and spare them from attacks, and to refrain from targeting civilian infrastructure. She further appealed to all parties to avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, asked the Council to send a strong message to all parties of their obligation to ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel and equipment, and to ensure that sanctions and other restrictive measures did not impede humanitarian action. UNICEF also renewed its call for an immediate suspension of ongoing military actions in Ukraine. Following the briefings, Council members discussed the humanitarian impact of the war, the question of ensuring safe humanitarian corridors, the protection of civilians and the need for the cessation of hostilities.<sup>1255</sup>

In his briefing in October, in the aftermath of reports of the Sevastopol attacks and damage to the Russian military vessels and infrastructure, the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator focused on the implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in light of the decision of the Russian Federation to suspend its participation in the Initiative.<sup>1256</sup> On the alleged connection between those attacks and the Initiative, the Emergency Relief Coordinator underscored that military vessels, aircraft or assets belonging to any party were prohibited from approaching closer than 10 nautical miles to the cargo ships and that the corridor

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<sup>1254</sup> See [S/PV.8988](#).

<sup>1255</sup> See [S/PV.8988](#).

<sup>1256</sup> See [S/PV.9176](#).

provided neither cover nor protection for offensive or defensive military action. Turning to the alleged misuse of cargo vessels in the Initiative for military purposes, the Emergency Relief Coordinator affirmed that none had been in the corridor on the night of 29 October, when the reported attacks had taken place. Expressing readiness to consider an inquiry into any evidence, the Emergency Relief Coordinator stated that all sides had decided, within the Joint Coordination Centre, that the Initiative would be entirely civilian in nature and that the safety of shipping was protected by the commitments of Ukraine and the Russian Federation not to attack ships and related port facilities.

Following the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD noted that the impact of two initiatives – the Black Sea Grain Initiative and a memorandum of understanding on promoting the unimpeded export of Russian food products and fertilizers to world markets – had been made clear in a short period of time, with massive global welfare effects. She referred to the chilling effect of the sanctions on the private sector and noted that transaction costs on insurance premiums, financial payments, shipping costs and transport costs for Russian food and fertilizer exports were very high, leading to continued high global food and fertilizer prices. Adding that there was still a lot of work that remained to be done even with clear exemptions to the sanctions, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD urged all parties to make every effort to resume and extend the Black Sea Grain Initiative and implement both agreements to their fullest extent.

At the meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that his country had suspended its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative following the air and sea strikes against its fleet and infrastructure. He added that the implementation of the Initiative was not possible and that the decisions of the Joint Coordination Centre without the participation of the Russian Federation were not binding. In the discussion that ensued, Council members exchanged views on the decision of the Russian Federation to suspend the agreement and urged the continued implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, noting its importance for global food security.

In light of the reported attacks on nuclear facilities in Ukraine, the Council heard one briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs in August and

three briefings by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in August, September and October, the last of which took place during a private meeting.<sup>1257</sup> In her August briefing, the Under-Secretary-General stated that despite numerous calls and appeals, instead of de-escalation, reports of alarming incidents involving the Zaporizhzhya nuclear plant continued almost on a daily basis.<sup>1258</sup> She urged the parties to provide the IAEA mission with immediate, secure and unfettered access to the site and noted that any potential nuclear incident would have catastrophic consequences not only for the immediate vicinity, but for the region and beyond. The Under-Secretary-General further underscored that it was imperative to receive the express commitment of the parties to stop any military activities around the plant to enable its continued safe and secure operations.

In his open briefings in August and September, the Director General of the IAEA reported on the situation at the nuclear facilities in Ukraine, focusing on the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and called for any military actions that could jeopardize nuclear safety to be stopped immediately.<sup>1259</sup> Since 24 February, the IAEA had activated its Incident and Emergency Centre, established regular contact with the Ukrainian authorities and closely monitored the situation at the facilities, as well as activities involving radioactive sources and nuclear material in Ukraine.<sup>1260</sup> Following the shelling of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant on 5 August, the Director General asked both sides to cooperate with the IAEA and allow a mission to the site to proceed as soon as possible so that the Agency could corroborate facts and develop and provide an independent assessment of the nuclear safety and security risks. In September, the Director General reported on the mission conducted by the IAEA to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, including on the proposed establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone.<sup>1261</sup> The Director General further reported that the IAEA inspectors had remained at the site to be able to directly and immediately evaluate the situation on the ground as it developed. At the same meeting, the Secretary-General delivered remarks and welcomed the IAEA mission and requested the Russian and Ukrainian forces to commit not to engage in any military activity

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<sup>1257</sup> See [S/PV.9172](#).

<sup>1258</sup> See [S/PV.9114](#).

<sup>1259</sup> See [S/PV.9109](#) and [S/PV.9124](#).

<sup>1260</sup> See [S/PV.9109](#).

<sup>1261</sup> See [S/PV.9124](#).

towards or from the Zaporizhzhya plant site. He also called for an agreement on a demilitarized perimeter, which would include a commitment by Russian forces to withdraw all military personnel and equipment from that perimeter and a commitment by Ukrainian forces not to move into it. The Secretary-General regretted that the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had failed to reach consensus on the outcome document which had sought to address the issue of the safety and security of nuclear power plants in armed conflict zones, including in Ukraine.

In their discussions concerning the reported attacks involving the nuclear facilities in Ukraine, Council members expressed concern about the risks of nuclear incidents and called for the de-militarization of the areas around all nuclear sites in Ukraine.<sup>1262</sup> Council members also discussed the need for a cessation of hostilities, the importance of avoiding any actions that could lead to nuclear disasters and pursuing dialogue to end the conflict. They expressed support for the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security and welcomed the IAEA mission to Ukraine conducted in September and the continued presence of its inspectors on the ground. Several Council members urged the Russian Federation to withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine and to return full control of nuclear facilities to the Ukrainian authorities.<sup>1263</sup>

In 2022, the Council also held a meeting under this item focused on the gas leaks detected in the Nord Stream submarine pipelines in the Baltic Sea. On 30 September, the Council heard briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the official spokesperson for Gazprom and the Director of the Centre for Energy and Climate of the French Institute of International Relations.<sup>1264</sup>

The Assistant Secretary-General emphasized that the United Nations was not in a position to verify or confirm any of the reported details related to the incident and noted that while the causes of the incident were being investigated, it was equally urgent to address the

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<sup>1262</sup> See [S/PV.9109](#), [S/PV.9114](#) and [S/PV.9124](#).

<sup>1263</sup> See [S/PV.9109](#), United States, Norway, Albania, France, Ireland and United Kingdom; [S/PV.9114](#), Norway, United States, Ireland, Ghana, United Kingdom, France and Albania and [S/PV.9124](#), United States, United Kingdom, Albania, Ireland, Norway and France.

<sup>1264</sup> See [S/PV.9144](#).

consequences of those leaks. The damage to the Nord Stream pipelines raised concerns regarding the uncertainty in the global energy markets, the potential environmental impact and the vulnerability of critical energy infrastructure. The Assistant Secretary-General concluded that the incident was not to be allowed to further increase tensions or deepen divisions in an already tense regional context. The other two briefers noted, *inter alia*, that the ruptures in the Nord Stream pipelines were unprecedented, with an impact on energy supplies to Europe.

Following the briefers, the representative of the Russian Federation argued that the damage to the Nord Stream pipelines was an act of sabotage that did not benefit European States nor the Russian Federation, and instead noted that it benefitted the United States. He further stated that the Russian Federation endorsed a comprehensive investigation to shed light on the true circumstances of the incident, adding that any international investigation could claim to be objective only if the Russian Federation was included in it. The representative of the United States categorically denied any involvement in the incident. At the meeting, most Council members also noted that the available information indicated that the damage to the pipelines was the result of an act of sabotage,<sup>1265</sup> and several underscored the importance of an independent and impartial investigation to be conducted about the incident,<sup>1266</sup> with some expressing support for the ongoing investigation led by Denmark, Germany and Sweden.<sup>1267</sup> During the meeting, some Council members also addressed the broader context of the war in Ukraine,<sup>1268</sup> with several among them also calling for an end to the conflict.

In 2022, the Council held a meeting under this item focused on the findings of an investigation conducted into the forced landing of Ryanair flight FR-4978 by Belarus on 23 May 2021.<sup>1269</sup> On 31 October, the Council heard a briefing by the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), in which he reported on the findings of an investigation conducted by his organization into the forced landing of Ryanair flight FR-4978 by Belarus on 23 May 2021, which had been diverted to land in Minsk while travelling from Athens

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<sup>1265</sup> Ibid., Norway, Mexico, Ireland, United Kingdom, United States, China, United Arab Emirates, Albania and France.

<sup>1266</sup> Ibid., Mexico, Gabon, China, United Arab Emirates, India and Ghana.

<sup>1267</sup> Ibid., Norway, Ireland, United Kingdom, United States, Albania and France.

<sup>1268</sup> Ibid., Mexico, Gabon, United States, United Arab Emirates, Albania, Kenya and India.

<sup>1269</sup> See for further detail on the incident, [S/2021/608](#) and [S/2022/802](#).

to Vilnius.<sup>1270</sup> The investigation had led to the conclusion that Belarus senior officials had orchestrated the deliberate diversion of the flight under the false pretext of a bomb threat. The ICAO Council had decided that the actions of the Government of Belarus amounted to an infraction of the Chicago Convention, to be reported to the ICAO Assembly, which had acknowledged that there was an infraction of the Chicago Convention by Belarus and adopted resolution A41-1, condemning the actions of the Government of Belarus in committing an act of unlawful interference that had deliberately endangered the safety and security of Ryanair Flight FR-4978 and the lives of those on board.

Following the briefing, Council members and other participants of the meeting took note of the report of the ICAO fact-finding mission, with many expressing concern over the implication of the Belarusian authorities in the incident, which they viewed as a violation of the relevant international aviation norms.<sup>1271</sup> In that regard, most speakers also addressed the detention of a Belarusian journalist, arrested following the forced landing of the Ryanair flight in Minsk.<sup>1272</sup> Some speakers also raised the issue of complicity of Belarus in the war in Ukraine.<sup>1273</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation held the view that the ICAO report carried little credibility and expressed doubts about the impartiality of ICAO because no objective and transparent investigation into the incident involving the Ryanair flight had been conducted. The representative of China recalled his country's objection to the ICAO report and noted that different parties had different views on it and had concerns about the source and authenticity of some key information contained therein. The representative of Belarus stated that his country would never accept the conclusions of the report, which it viewed as based on incomplete information. Some Council members also questioned whether the Council was the adequate body to discuss the matter.<sup>1274</sup>

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<sup>1270</sup> See [S/PV.9175](#). For further detail on the discussion, see part VI, sect. II.

<sup>1271</sup> See [S/PV.9175](#), Albania, United Kingdom, United States, France, Ireland, Norway, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, Ghana, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia (also on behalf of Czechia and Estonia), Greece and Germany.

<sup>1272</sup> *Ibid.*, Albania, United Kingdom, United States, France, Ireland, Mexico, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia (also on behalf of Czechia and Estonia) and Germany.

<sup>1273</sup> *Ibid.*, Albania, United Kingdom, France, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Latvia (also on behalf of Czechia and Estonia) and Germany.

<sup>1274</sup> *Ibid.*, Russian Federation, Brazil, Mexico and China.

In 2022, consistent with prior practice, the Council held two briefings under this item focused on the work of UNITAD and a held a third meeting to adopt a resolution extending its mandate. On 8 June and 5 September, further to the two biannual reports on the activities of the Investigative Team,<sup>1275</sup> the Council heard briefings by the Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD during which he reported on the progress made in the investigative activities of the Team, including on witness interviews, digitization of documentary evidence and drafting of case files.<sup>1276</sup> Investigations had progressed into the Bayt Al-Mal regarding the provision of financial support to Da'esh, as well as into the development and use of chemical and biological weapons, the case concerning the Christian community in Ninawa plains, as well as the cases involving the destruction of cultural heritage sites in Iraq. The Special Adviser also provided updates on cases involving the crimes committed against the Yazidi community and those committed against the personnel of Tikrit Air Academy, as well as the case of the Badush prison. He added that UNITAD had expanded and further operationalized arrangements with the Iraqi judiciary and increased its support to ongoing domestic proceedings in several Member States, in consultation with the Government of Iraq.<sup>1277</sup> In that context, in addition to the landmark conviction for the crime of genocide of a Da'esh member in Frankfurt in 2021, the Special Adviser noted that the Team had also supported the prosecution authorities in Sweden and France in cases involving crimes connected to Da'esh.<sup>1278</sup> In his December briefing, the Special Adviser noted that the sharing of evidence with the Iraqi judiciary for criminal proceedings could take place only once the respective legal requirements and standards were met in terms of substantive and procedural law. He emphasized that promoting accountability for international crimes committed by Da'esh in Iraq meant delivering tailored assistance in accordance with the needs of the respective investigative court or judge.

Following the briefings, at both meetings, Council members expressed their support for the work of UNITAD and welcomed the cooperation between the Investigative Team and the Iraqi authorities. Specifically, several Council members noted the importance of a gender-

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<sup>1275</sup> See [S/2022/434](#) and [S/2022/836](#).

<sup>1276</sup> See [S/PV.9059](#) and [S/PV.9206](#).

<sup>1277</sup> See [S/PV.9059](#) and [S/PV.9206](#).

<sup>1278</sup> See [S/PV.9059](#) and [S/PV.9206](#).

responsive approach to UNITAD's investigation of Da'esh crimes.<sup>1279</sup> Some Council members reiterated the need to ensure full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its jurisdiction over crimes committed in its territory,<sup>1280</sup> with several members also pointing to the importance of handing over the collected evidence to the Iraqi authorities.<sup>1281</sup> In that regard, some Council members underscored the need for progress on developing the relevant domestic legislation to enable the prosecution of those crimes in Iraq, including as regards the aspects related to the capital punishment.<sup>1282</sup>

On 15 September, further to the request of the Government of Iraq,<sup>1283</sup> the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2651 \(2022\)](#), extending the mandate of the Special Adviser and the Investigative Team for a period of one year, until 17 September 2023.<sup>1284</sup> By the resolution, the Council underscored the importance of sharing evidence collected by the Investigative Team with the relevant Iraqi authorities, in a timely manner, for eventual use in fair and independent criminal proceedings, consistent with applicable international law and the Investigative Team's Terms of Reference.<sup>1285</sup> It also requested the Special Adviser to continue to submit and present reports to the Council on the Team's activities every 180 days.<sup>1286</sup>

In 2022, under this item, the Council also held two meetings focused on Africa, specifically on climate and security in Africa and on counter-terrorism in Africa.

On 12 October, at the initiative of Gabon, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled "Climate and security in Africa".<sup>1287</sup> At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, the

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<sup>1279</sup> See [S/PV.9059](#), United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Gabon, Kenya, Norway, Ireland and France; and [S/PV.9206](#), France, Norway, Ireland and Kenya.

<sup>1280</sup> See [S/PV.9059](#), Gabon, China and Brazil and [S/PV.9206](#), Brazil.

<sup>1281</sup> See [S/PV.9059](#), Russian Federation, Ghana, China, Brazil and India; and [S/PV.9206](#), United Arab Emirates, China, Ghana, Russian Federation, Brazil, Kenya and India.

<sup>1282</sup> See [S/PV.9059](#), Mexico, Norway, Ireland and France; and [S/PV.9206](#), Albania, France, Norway, Mexico, United States and Ireland.

<sup>1283</sup> See [S/2022/687](#).

<sup>1284</sup> Resolution [2651 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>1285</sup> *Ibid.*, seventh preambular paragraph.

<sup>1286</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3. For further details, see part IX, sect. III.

<sup>1287</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 3 October 2022 ([S/2022/737](#)).



former Chair of the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change and the Regional Director for Africa at the International Committee of the Red Cross.<sup>1288</sup>

The Assistant Secretary-General stated that the climate emergency was a danger to peace and added that climate change exacerbated existing risks and created new ones. To support the African continent in addressing the impact of climate change on peace and security, the Assistant Secretary-General noted that action was needed on multiple fronts. For that reason, she added that multidimensional partnerships connecting the work of the United Nations, regional organizations, Member States, international financial institutions, civil society, the private sector and international and local researchers were vital.

The former Chair of the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change outlined the links between climate change and peace and security in Africa, examined the resources available to Africa in addressing the threat of climate change to peace and security in Africa, and explored the ways to maximize the international community's support for Africa to minimize the effects of climate change on peace and security.

The Regional Director for Africa at the International Committee of the Red Cross noted that the convergence of climate risk, environmental degradation and armed conflict threatened people's lives and health and worsened food, economic and water insecurity. He added that climate change multiplied existing vulnerabilities and inequalities in conflict zones, and that the impact of such overlap could shape human mobility and access to resources on a regional scale, citing the examples of several countries in the Sahel, as well as Mali, the Niger and Somalia.

Following the briefings, Council members and other speakers discussed the impact of climate change on peace and security in Africa and the steps that the Council and the broader international community could take to address that question. Speakers exchanged views on the extent to which climate change was a contributing factor or threat multiplier in various conflict situations and deliberated on the role of the Council in addressing it.<sup>1289</sup>

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<sup>1288</sup> See [S/PV.9150](#).

<sup>1289</sup> For more information on Council members' discussions on whether the issue of climate change was within the purview of the Council's mandate, see part V, sect. I.

On 10 November, under the presidency of Ghana, the Council held a high-level debate under the sub-item entitled “Counter-terrorism in Africa: an imperative for peace, security and development”.<sup>1290</sup> During the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Deputy Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Managing Director for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response of the European External Action Service and by the Chief Executive Officer of the International Crisis Group.<sup>1291</sup>

In her briefing, the Deputy Secretary-General noted that terrorists and violent extremists had exploited instability and conflict to increase their activities and intensify attacks across Africa, with women and girls bearing the brunt of insecurity and inequality. Countering international terrorism required effective multilateral responses which needed to address terrorism together with concurrent and converging threats, including the worsening climate emergency, armed conflict, poverty and inequality, lawless cyberspace and uneven recovery from the coronavirus disease pandemic.

Following the Deputy Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission stated that in Africa, terrorism and the increasingly frequent use of violence as a means of gaining and maintaining power were fragmenting societies and causing dozens of deaths and significant physical and psychological damage. He added that Somalia, Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso, the Lake Chad basin, Mozambique and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo were all theatres and preferred areas for the proliferation of deadly terrorist activities, noting that the defeat of terrorism in Africa was necessary to cut its chances of metastasizing elsewhere.

The Managing Director for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response of the European External Action Service highlighted further that West Africa required immediate attention to stem the risks of spillover from advancing terrorist actors.

The Chief Executive Officer of the International Crisis Group affirmed that conflicts involving non-State armed groups would be a source of instability in Africa for some time to

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<sup>1290</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 1 November 2022 ([S/2022/822](#)).

<sup>1291</sup> See [S/PV.9188](#).

come; robust, African-led missions were well positioned to counter those threats, but required proper and reliable resources; and stabilizations missions alone could not stem the threat of non-State armed groups as they required broader responses, including projects to provide basic services and better governance. The International Crisis Group held the view that conflicts that destabilized several African regions were not only about counter-terrorism, but were often rooted in concrete grievances with State authorities and elites whose level of public legitimacy was dismal, and that the use of force was to always be part of a wider political strategy.

In their discussion, Council members focused on the role of regional and sub-regional organizations and initiatives, such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, in countering terrorism in different regions of Africa, including in the Sahel, West Africa and the Horn of Africa. They also discussed the threat posed by various terrorist groups, focusing on Al-Qaida and Da'esh and their local offshoots. Other topics addressed during the discussion included the prevention efforts in tackling the underlying causes of terrorism and drivers of instability, the impact of climate change, as well as the extent to which the United Nations peace operations could tackle the challenges of terrorism in Africa.

### **Meetings: Threats to international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8960</a> 31 January 2022			Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees <sup>a</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.8988</a> 7 March 2022			Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.8991</a> 11 March 2022			Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, High	14 Council members, <sup>b</sup> all invitees	

			Representative for Disarmament Affairs	
<a href="#">S/PV.8998</a> 17 March 2022	Poland, Ukraine		Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Assistant High Commissioner for Operations of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Director-General of the World Health Organization	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.8999</a> 18 March 2022			High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	All Council members, invitee
<a href="#">S/PV.9033</a> 13 May 2022			Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	All Council members, invitee
<a href="#">S/PV.9059</a> 8 June 2022	Iraq		Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution <a href="#">2379 (2017)</a> (UNITAD)	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9109</a> 11 August 2022	Ukraine		Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency	All Council members <sup>c</sup> , all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9114</a> 23 August 2022	Ukraine		Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9124</a> 6 September 2022	Germany, Ukraine		Secretary-General, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency	All Council members, all invitees <sup>d</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9127</a> 8 September 2022	Ukraine		High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Director of the Center for Geostrategic Studies	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9131</a> 15 September 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/693</a> )		Resolution <a href="#">2651 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9144</a> 30 September 2022			Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development in the Department for Economic and Social	All Council members, all invitees <sup>e</sup>

			Affairs, Spokesperson for Gazprom, Director of the Centre for Energy and Climate of the French Institute of International Relations	
<a href="#">S/PV.9150</a>	Climate and security in Africa	10 Member States <sup>f</sup>	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, Former Chair of the African group of Negotiators on Climate Change, Regional Director for Africa at the International Committee of the Red Cross	All Council members, <sup>g</sup> all invitees <sup>h</sup>
	Letter dated 3 October 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/737</a> )			
<a href="#">S/PV.9171</a>		Ukraine	Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9172</a>		Ukraine	Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency	Council members, invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9175</a>		Belarus, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland	President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization	All Council members, all invitees <sup>i</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9176</a>		Germany, Romania, Türkiye, Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9180</a>		Draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation ( <a href="#">S/2022/821</a> )		14 Council members <sup>j</sup> Draft resolution <a href="#">S/2022/821</a> not adopted 2-3-10 <sup>k</sup>
<a href="#">S/PV.9188</a>	Counter-terrorism in Africa: an imperative for		Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Managing	Deputy Secretary-General, all

	peace, security and development		Director for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response of the European External Action Service, President and Chief Executive Officer of the International Crisis Group	Council members, <sup>l</sup> all invitees <sup>m</sup>
	Letter dated 1 November 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/822</a> )			
<a href="#">S/PV.9206</a> 5 December 2022	Letter dated 7 November 2022 from the Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/836</a> )	Iraq	Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD	All Council members, all invitees
<a href="#">S/PV.9216</a> 9 December 2022		Ukraine	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, civil society representative	All Council members, all invitees

<sup>a</sup> The representative of Lithuania also spoke on behalf of Estonia and Latvia.

<sup>b</sup> The representative of the United Arab Emirates (President of the Council) did not make a statement in her national capacity.

<sup>c</sup> The United States was represented by its Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.

<sup>d</sup> The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>e</sup> The spokesperson for Gazprom and Director of the Centre for Energy and Climate of the French Institute of International Relations participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>f</sup> Colombia, Egypt, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Poland, South Africa and Ukraine.

<sup>g</sup> Gabon (President of the Council) and Norway were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>h</sup> The representative of Germany spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security.

<sup>i</sup> The representative of Latvia also spoke on behalf of Czechia and Estonia.

<sup>j</sup> The representative of Gabon did not make a statement.

<sup>k</sup> *For*: China, Russian Federation; *against*: France, United Kingdom, United States; *abstaining*: Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates.

<sup>l</sup> Ghana (President of the Council) was represented by its President; Gabon was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; the United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister of State; the United States was represented by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.

<sup>m</sup> All rule 39 invitees participated in the meeting by videoconference.

### **35. Maintenance of international peace and security**

During the period under review, the Security Council held eight meetings in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”. Four of the meetings took the form of briefings, three took the form of open debates and one was convened to adopt a decision of the Council.<sup>1292</sup> The Council adopted one resolution, under Chapter VII of the Charter. More information on the meetings, including on the participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.<sup>1293</sup>

In 2022, as in previous periods, a broad range of new and existing sub-items were discussed in connection with this item.<sup>1294</sup> The thematic sub-items addressed during the period under review were the following: (a) implementation of resolutions [2532 \(2020\)](#) and [2565 \(2021\)](#); (b) conflict and food security; (c) technology and security; (d) strengthening accountability and justice for serious violations of international law; (e) promoting common security through dialogue and cooperation; and (f) a new orientation for reformed multilateralism. The meetings addressing the above sub-items are featured below in chronological order. The Council also adopted a decision in relation to the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2491 \(2019\)](#) relating to the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya.

On 11 April, the Council held a briefing under the sub-item entitled “Implementation of resolutions [2532 \(2020\)](#) and [2565 \(2021\)](#)”.<sup>1295</sup> At the meeting, Council members heard briefings by the Global Lead Coordinator for the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Vaccine Country Readiness and Delivery, the Senior Adviser to the Office of the Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Health and Nutrition Coordinator at CARE South Sudan.

The Global Lead Coordinator for COVID-19 Vaccine Country Readiness and Delivery asserted that the pandemic was still far from over and highlighted the urgency of raising COVID-

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<sup>1292</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1293</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 34.

<sup>1294</sup> For more information on new sub-items, see part II, sect. III.A.

<sup>1295</sup> See [S/PV.9014](#).

19 vaccination rates in countries that did not have that opportunity in 2021. Noting that more than 11.1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines had been administered globally, he pointed out, however, that the vaccination rate in low-income countries was only 11 per cent. He added that with strong political leadership, country coordination and planning, and the implementation of mass vaccination campaigns, countries could quickly pick up their vaccination rates and coverage. To address the significant vaccine equity gap that continued to pose a threat to global health security, he called for continued strong support and actions to implement resolutions [2532 \(2020\)](#) and [2565 \(2021\)](#), with a particular focus on ensuring that countries continued to prioritize COVID-19 vaccinations. Secondly, he expressed appreciation for the \$4.8 billion in pledges made at the COVAX Advance Market Commitment Summit and stated that commitments had to be turned into tangible support for lower income countries with COVID-19 vaccination needs and a priority on a delivery system. Thirdly, he stressed the need to advocate for and help guarantee full, safe and unhindered access, and to ensure the safety of health and humanitarian personnel administering vaccines in humanitarian settings. Fourthly, he asked Member States to ensure strong national vaccination planning that addressed the needs of all populations living within the national territory, regardless of nationality, migration or refugee status. Finally, he emphasized the need to engage in the important conversations on the global health emergency architecture and to advocate for strong governance and investment in the basics of primary health care as a key element of future pandemic preparedness.

The Senior Adviser to the Office of the Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross stated that the successes in the development and production of vaccines meant that many countries were starting to regain a sense of normalcy. She noted, however, that to end the pandemic, vaccination needed to occur everywhere and that was not the case in conflict-affected areas. To achieve vaccination in conflict settings, she requested the international community to first ensure that international humanitarian law was respected, in particular the protection of hospitals and other medical facilities, as well as medical personnel from attacks. She also stressed the importance of integrating COVID-19 vaccinations into a broader health strategy and, in tandem, strengthening the health system to address renewed outbreaks of other highly contagious and lethal diseases. She advocated for the involvement of the community in



vaccination activities and to adequately resource community engagement. She further emphasized that equitable access to COVID-19 vaccination was a humanitarian imperative.

The Health and Nutrition Coordinator at CARE South Sudan described the work of his organization in providing humanitarian assistance to various parts of the country in multiple sectors, including health care, nutrition, gender and protection, food security and livelihoods. He urged Council members to call on the United Nations system, the international donor community and host Governments to take a number of actions, namely: to ensure safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all people in need and that COVID-19 vaccine costing models and budgets covered all aspects of delivery and reflected the real-world costs of rolling out the vaccines to the last mile; to ensure that non-governmental organizations (NGOs), women-led organizations and front-line health-care workers had meaningful roles in the COVID-19 vaccine roll-out; to invest in community-driven, bottom-up approaches including the meaningful and consistent participation of local NGOs, community groups and women's groups; and to make concrete investments to ensure an equitable COVID-19 vaccine roll-out that left no one behind.

During the discussion, Council members expressed concern regarding the global vaccine equity gap, while stressing the need for a concerted effort by the international community to work on ensuring equitable access to COVID-19 vaccinations, especially in conflict-affected areas. In that context, they underscored the need to strengthen the capacity of national health systems and of safeguarding humanitarian access for vaccine distribution and called for continued support and actions to implement resolutions [2532 \(2020\)](#) and [2565 \(2021\)](#). Referring to the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) Facility, many Council members underlined the need to strengthen and support the mechanism to ensure equitable access to vaccines. In that connection, some Council members expressed support for initiatives to waive intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines.<sup>1296</sup> Several Council members further discussed the vital role of the African Union in the distribution of vaccines to vulnerable countries.<sup>1297</sup>

On 19 May, at the initiative of the United States which held the presidency for the month,<sup>1298</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled "Conflict and

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<sup>1296</sup> Ibid., China, Mexico, Gabon and India.

<sup>1297</sup> Ibid., United Kingdom, Ghana, Gabon and Kenya. For further details on the discussion regarding the cooperation with regional organizations, see part VIII, sect. I.

<sup>1298</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 12 May 2022 ([S/2022/391](#)).

food security”.<sup>1299</sup> Council members heard opening remarks by the Secretary-General and briefings by the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Gro Intelligence.

In his opening remarks, the Secretary-General noted that 60 per cent of the world’s undernourished people lived in areas affected by conflict. He emphasized that armed conflict created hunger, adding that the impact of conflicts was magnified by the climate crisis and economic insecurity, which had been compounded by the pandemic. Consequently, he said, decades of progress in combating hunger were being undone. He stated that 49 million people in 43 countries were at emergency levels of hunger, known as Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) 4, which was just one step away from famine, with women and girls being the worst affected. Addressing the situation in Ukraine, he stated that the war there was adding a frightening new dimension to that picture of global hunger. He suggested four actions that countries could take to break the deadly dynamic of conflict and hunger. First, to invest in political solutions to end conflicts, prevent new ones and build sustainable peace. Secondly, referring to international humanitarian law as reflected in resolution [2417 \(2018\)](#), he emphasized that the Council had a critical role to play in demanding adherence to international humanitarian law and pursuing accountability when the law was breached. Thirdly, he called for greater coordination and leadership to address the interconnected risks of food insecurity, energy and financing. Fourthly, he urged donors to fund humanitarian appeals in full and to demonstrate the same generosity that had been shown to Ukraine to all other countries in need, while also underscoring that feeding the hungry was an investment in global peace and security.

Citing the crises in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Ukraine, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme underscored that the world was facing an unprecedented storm, a perfect storm caused by conflict, climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. He brought attention to the increasing number of people who were at the verge of starvation struggling to find food daily and living from hand to mouth every day. He also identified food prices as the number-one problem in 2022 and predicted that in 2023, it would be replaced by issues of food

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<sup>1299</sup> See [S/PV.9036](#) and [S/PV.9036 \(Resumption1\)](#).

availability. He urged the international community to help stabilize the food markets to prevent a further deterioration of the situation, by, inter alia, opening ports and increasing production around the world.

The Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reported that there had been a spike in the global level of acute hunger over the past five years. He warned about the risk of famine in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and Afghanistan and asserted that conflict remained the single-greatest driver of hunger. He further described the steps that FAO had taken to strengthen agrifood systems, save lives and protect the agricultural livelihoods of the world's most vulnerable. He urged Member States to urgently transform their agrifood systems to be more efficient, inclusive, resilient and sustainable. Stating that technology, good policies, and management were solutions to alleviate the food crisis, he urged Member States to invest more in innovation and new technologies, especially water management, irrigation systems and high-quality agricultural inputs, including fertilizer, and in more transparent market information systems.

The Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Gro Intelligence provided insights from her organization's data on the state of the global food systems. She noted that the Russia-Ukraine conflict did not start the food security crisis, but simply added fuel to a fire that was long burning. She listed five major challenges occurring simultaneously that had already started to unravel decades of global economic progress, namely, lack of fertilizer, climate disruptions, record low inventories in cooking oils, record low inventories of grains and logistical bottlenecks. She underscored the need for substantial, immediate, and aggressive coordinated global actions to prevent further human suffering and economic damage.

Following the briefings, speakers discussed the challenges of conflict-driven global food insecurity, including ways to mitigate those impacts on the most vulnerable groups such as women and children, especially in developing countries. Recalling resolution [2417 \(2018\)](#), which had established the link between armed conflict and violence and conflict-induced food insecurity and the threat of famine, participants urged the Council to ensure its implementation. Many speakers noted the grave consequences of conflict on food security, while citing the impact of the war in Ukraine, climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic among other factors contributing to the worsening global food crises. Notably, speakers brought attention to the

alarming food security situations in countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, highlighting the risk of famine posed by the blockade of Ukrainian ports, which had prevented shipments of grains from Ukraine. Participants also raised concerns about the rising food prices and the increasing number of people in need of assistance, particularly in developing countries.

On 23 May, the Council held a briefing under the sub-item entitled “Technology and security”.<sup>1300</sup> Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Director of Advox, the Digital Rights Project of Global Voices, and an Adjunct Professor at the McGill University Center for International Peace and Security Studies and non-resident Fellow at the International Peace Institute.

The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs highlighted various benefits of digital technologies for the maintenance of international peace and security. She indicated that technological developments had improved the ability to detect crises, to better preposition humanitarian stocks and to design data-driven peacebuilding programming. She affirmed that the use of digital technologies could improve the safety and security of peacekeeping and civilian staff on the ground and noted that the launch of the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of United Nations Peacekeeping represented an essential step towards that goal as well as for a more effective mandate implementation, thereby increasing early-warning capacities. She added that digital tools allowed to visualize information and convey data-rich analysis to support the Council’s decision-making. The Under-Secretary-General indicated, however, that advances in technology had also created significant new risks that could affect conflict dynamics for the worse and expressed concern about the increasing number of State- and non-State-sponsored incidents of malicious use of digital technologies for political or military ends, in particular those targeting essential infrastructure. She also stated that digital technologies had raised major human rights concerns, from artificial intelligence systems that may be discriminatory to the widespread availability of surveillance technologies that could be deployed to target communities or individuals, as well as the increasing use of Internet shutdowns. She highlighted several actions that had been undertaken to mitigate those risks, driven by the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, launched by the

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<sup>1300</sup> See [S/PV.9039](#).

Secretary-General. She urged Member States to fully embrace the opportunities offered by digital technologies to advance peace and to mitigate the risks that such technologies posed and promote their responsible use by all actors.

The Director of Advox, the Digital Rights Project of Global Voices, first cautioned against interpreting her remarks on digital technology in relation to peace and security as an invitation for the militarization and securitization of the Internet, and urged the Council to instead commit to preserving the Internet as a global public good. Recalling the Council's mandate to preserve peace and security, she urged for a multilateral, transnational and generational approach to addressing the challenges of human rights in the digital age. To achieve such an approach, she elaborated on three key principles that in her view would create opportunities for action to safeguard peace and security. First, she noted that digital rights were human rights, and any effort to address those challenges had to begin with the protection of the human from the excesses of the power of the State and private corporations. Secondly, she stated that the power of the Internet could and had to be harnessed for the greater good as a global public good, without allowing the interests of security or profit to drown out the interests of peace. Finally, she suggested that whatever actions the Council chose to take had to look beyond the moment to protect the aspirations of future generations.

The Adjunct Professor at the McGill University Center for International Peace and Security Studies and non-resident Fellow at the International Peace Institute shared his perspective on three interlinked topics concerning technology and security. First, he addressed how digital technologies were reshaping the conflicts on which the Security Council was engaged. In that context, he urged the Council to demand social media companies to apply their content moderation resources equally across their global reach. Secondly, he commented on how those technologies and their use by parties to conflict and the United Nations itself had impacted the Organization's efforts to prevent and resolve violence. Thirdly, he elaborated on how the United Nations peace and security toolkit, especially its peace operations, could adapt to the impacts of digital technologies on conflict, mitigate the negative impacts of those technologies on their own operations and use digital technologies to work more effectively and responsibly in those evolving contexts.

Following the briefers, Council members outlined the benefits of digital technology in conflict management while also raising concerns about the risks posed by technology in exacerbating conflicts. Many Council members underscored the threat posed by digital technology when used for malicious purposes by both State and non-State actors, including through misinformation and the suppression of human rights. In that context, some Council members expressed concern about the increasing use of Internet shutdowns to prevent freedom of expression and political participation, while noting that such practice was a violation of human rights.<sup>1301</sup> Several Council members also specifically emphasized the need to combat misinformation and disinformation campaigns on social media platforms, including in the context of peace operations and humanitarian activities.<sup>1302</sup>

On 2 June, at the initiative of Albania which held the presidency for the month,<sup>1303</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “Strengthening accountability and justice for serious violations of international law”.<sup>1304</sup> Council members heard briefings by the President of the International Court of Justice, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and a professor of Public International Law at the University of Oxford.

The President of the International Court of Justice highlighted the special role played by the Court in strengthening the accountability of States in the context of armed conflict and widespread abuses of human rights. She recalled that the Court’s judgments and orders on the indication of provisional measures were legally binding on the parties to a case. She explained also that before addressing the merits of any contentious case brought before it, the Court had to satisfy itself that it had the jurisdiction to do so. She reminded Member States that the Court could promote accountability only to the extent that Member States accorded it the jurisdiction to do so. The President of the Court said that the adoption of a convention on crimes against humanity would be one way to promote accountability for violations of some of the most fundamental obligations found in international law, while pledging that the Court would be ready to decide any disputes over which it would have jurisdiction based on such a convention.

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<sup>1301</sup> Ibid., United States, Albania, France and Norway.

<sup>1302</sup> Ibid., United States, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Norway and United Kingdom.

<sup>1303</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 24 May 2022 ([S/2022/418/Rev.1](#)).

<sup>1304</sup> See [S/PV.9052](#) and [S/PV.9052\(Resumption1\)](#).

Focusing her briefing on three key initiatives by her organization, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, first underlined that the Human Rights Council had stepped up its response to serious human rights violations that may also amount to international crimes, including by creating mechanisms with mandates to establish the facts and circumstances of violations; collecting, consolidating, preserving and analysing information and evidence; identifying those responsible; and making recommendations towards establishing future accountability. Secondly, she informed that together with the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and the wider United Nations system, her Office had been working to enhance the Organization's support for national transitional justice mechanisms, including truth commissions and reparations programmes. Thirdly, she stated that her Office had been strengthening its focus on gender sensitivity in all phases of justice and accountability processes. Addressing the issue of accountability, she asserted that the adoption of a convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity would fill a significant gap and would facilitate international cooperation in that area. She also emphasized that the support of the Council towards efforts promoting independent and impartial investigations, justice and accountability was essential. Lastly, she underlined that placing victims at the centre of accountability strategies would contribute to the sustainability of accountability and justice efforts.

Mr. Dapo Akande, Professor of Public International Law at the University of Oxford stated that to strengthen accountability and bring about justice for international crimes progress was needed on two levels. First, he underlined the importance to develop some of the rules that underpinned the prevention, investigation and punishment of such crimes. In that context, he stated that although crimes against humanity were clearly prohibited under customary international law, there was no corresponding treaty that established obligations of prevention and punishment regarding that category of international crime and urged States to begin negotiations to adopt such a treaty. Secondly, he emphasized the need to strengthen the institutional mechanisms for delivering accountability for international crimes. He suggested that the Council had a special role to play in strengthening accountability, given its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. He stressed that, beyond issuing referrals to the International Criminal Court, the Council could, inter alia, promote cooperation by States and consider imposing targeted sanctions on individuals wanted by the Court. In the

case of situations that had not been referred to the International Criminal Court, he emphasized the need to ensure that credible investigations of international crimes were conducted in a way that provided future opportunities for prosecution at either the international or the domestic levels, including through the creation of United Nations investigative support mechanisms.

During the discussion, Council Members and other participants reaffirmed the need to strengthen and further develop accountability mechanisms for the most serious violations of international law at the national, regional and international levels, including by urging states to take collective measures in the maintenance of international peace and security and by enhancing efforts by the Council to ensure accountability and justice for serious violations of international law in conflict situations under its consideration. Several speakers welcomed and highlighted the importance of the adoption of General Assembly resolution [76/262](#), which had provided for the convening of the General Assembly following the exercise of the right of veto in the Security Council.<sup>1305</sup> In that context, the representatives of Mexico and France made reference to their declaration providing for the suspension of the veto in situations of mass atrocities. Some speakers also underlined the important role of the International Court of Justice in issuing advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.<sup>1306</sup>

On 22 August, at the initiative of China which held the presidency for the month,<sup>1307</sup> the Council held a briefing under the sub-item entitled “Promote common security through dialogue and cooperation”.<sup>1308</sup> Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the President of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

During his briefing, the Secretary-General informed of his trip to Ukraine, Türkiye and Moldova, where he had witnessed the Black Sea Grain Initiative in action. Together with the agreement to facilitate the unimpeded access to global markets for food and fertilizers

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<sup>1305</sup> See [S/PV.9052](#), Ireland, Kenya and Malaysia; [S/PV.9052\(Resumption1\)](#), Switzerland, Denmark, Latvia, Bulgaria, European Union, Estonia and Türkiye. For further details on the discussion, see part II, sect. IX.

<sup>1306</sup> See [S/PV.9052](#), India, Mexico and Luxembourg; [S/PV.9052 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Philippines. For discussions concerning the relationship between the Council and the International Court of Justice, see part IV, sect. III.

<sup>1307</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 12 August 2022 ([S/2022/617](#)).

<sup>1308</sup> See [S/PV.9112](#).



originating from the Russian Federation, the initiative was a concrete example of how dialogue and cooperation could deliver hope, even in the midst of conflict. He added that the same commitment to dialogue and results had to be applied to the critical situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. He also stressed the need to reforge a global consensus around the cooperation required to ensure collective security, including the work of the United Nations. He also renewed his call on all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to demonstrate flexibility and a willingness to compromise across all negotiations during the Tenth Review Conference.

The President of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stated that, since its entry into force in 1970, the Treaty had proven to be a bulwark of international peace and security and a key facilitator of the benefits of nuclear energy and nuclear applications. He indicated that despite the challenges facing the Treaty due to the geopolitical turmoil that had begun on February 2022, State parties had come together resolved to strengthen the global regime that spanned its three pillars, namely, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He said that for the States parties to be able to make progress and strengthen the implementation of all three pillars, they needed to reach agreement on several key areas, namely: action on nuclear disarmament, confidence building and de-escalation; risk reduction and strengthening security assurances; and strengthening the non-proliferation regime against emerging challenges.

Following the briefers, Council members presented ideas on how the multilateral system should evolve to meet present and future challenges to international peace and security through dialogue and cooperation. In that regard, Council members discussed the tools at the Council's disposal to exercise its mandate. In the context of the final week of the Review Conference, most Council members emphasized the importance of nuclear non-proliferation. Several Council members also stressed the importance of comprehensive approaches that addressed the root causes of conflict.<sup>1309</sup> Collaboration with regional organizations in prevention of conflicts was also highlighted by some Council Members.<sup>1310</sup>

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<sup>1309</sup> Ibid., Brazil and Ireland.

<sup>1310</sup> Ibid., United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Gabon, Kenya and Norway. For further details on the discussion regarding the pacific settlement of disputes and cooperation with regional organizations, see part VI, sect. IV and part VIII, sect. I.

On 26 October, the Council held a briefing with the participation of the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel further to a request to brief the Council on Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations in connection with the work performed by the Secretary-General and the Secretariat with respect to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).<sup>1311</sup> The Under-Secretary-General explained that Article 100 of the Charter set out obligations for the Secretary-General and the staff of the Secretariat in the conduct of their work and corresponding obligations on the part of Member States vis-à-vis the Secretariat. In this regard, he added that paragraph 2 of Article 100 set out two corresponding obligations on the part of Member States, namely: to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. With respect to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), he recalled that the President of the Council issued a note dated 16 January 2016 under the symbol [S/2016/44](#) that set forth practical arrangements and procedures for the Security Council for carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). He further clarified that the same note requested the Secretary-General to appoint the Security Council Affairs Division as a point of contact and support the work of the Security Council and of its facilitator and, as envisaged by annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the resolution. He further informed that since the first report pursuant to the resolution had reported on the implementation of the restrictive measures in annex B in force during the reporting period concerned, including on information voluntarily brought to its attention by Member States in writing and through meetings at United Nations Headquarters or in capitals He noted that the Secretary-General had not received any request, pursuant to paragraph 6 (g) of the note or otherwise, that supplemented or modified the nature and scope of the work done by the Security Council Affairs Division in the preparation of the Secretary-General's six-monthly reports to the Council. Therefore, absent further guidance by the Security Council, the Secretary-General would continue to prepare those reports in the manner in which they had been prepared to date.

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<sup>1311</sup> See [S/PV.9167](#).

Following the briefing, Council members discussed the interpretation and application of Article 100 of the Charter.<sup>1312</sup> The discussion centred specifically on the mandate of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General in relation to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) concerning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear issue, in the context of the reported transfer from Iran to the Russian Federation of unmanned aerial vehicles being used in the conflict in Ukraine. Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ukraine also participated in the meeting and delivered statements. Against the backdrop of this meeting, the representatives of France, Germany, United Kingdom and United States, by letters dated 21 October,<sup>1313</sup> expressed concern with respect to the transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran to Russia in violation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). They requested for an investigation of this issue by the United Nations Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In response, by a letter also dated 21 October,<sup>1314</sup> the representative of the Russian Federation expressed concerns regarding the attempts of certain Member States to give instructions to the United Nations Secretariat in violation of Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations. In his view, the United Nations Secretariat had no authority to conduct an “investigation” with regard to claims of an alleged breach of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and requested the Secretariat to abstain from any engagement in any form in any “investigation” relating to the matter.

On 14 December, at the initiative of India which held the presidency for the month,<sup>1315</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “New orientation for reformed multilateralism” at which Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly.<sup>1316</sup>

The Secretary-General informed that his report “Our Common Agenda” had initiated a process aimed at reinvigorating multilateralism to deal with current interconnected threats.<sup>1317</sup> He emphasized that, notwithstanding the important progress achieved since the inception of the

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<sup>1312</sup> For further details on the discussion, see part II, sect. VI and part VI, sect. IV.

<sup>1313</sup> [S/2022/781](#) and [S/2022/782](#).

<sup>1314</sup> [S/2022/783](#).

<sup>1315</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 25 November 2022 ([S/2022/880](#)).

<sup>1316</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#). For discussions concerning the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.

<sup>1317</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#). For the Secretary-Generals’ report, see [A/75/982](#).

United Nations in maintaining collective security, the international community was still grappling with many of the same challenges, notably: inter-State wars, limits to peacekeeping ability, terrorism, a divided collective security system and evolving conflicts including the climate crisis and the negative implications of digital technologies. The Secretary-General informed that his New Agenda for Peace would address the full range of new and old security challenges, local, national, regional and international and would examine ways to update existing tools for mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and counter-terrorism. He added that the New Agenda for Peace would articulate a vision for the United Nations work in peace and security; set out a comprehensive approach to prevention, linking peace, sustainable development, climate action and food security; consider how the United Nations adapted its peace and security instruments to an era of cyberthreats, information warfare and other forms of conflict; and look to Member States for new frameworks to reinforce multilateral solutions and manage intense geopolitical competition. Pointing out that many Member States were aware that the Council should be reformed to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities, the Secretary-General expressed hope that regional groups and Member States would work together to achieve greater consensus on the way forward and on the terms of the reform and noted that the Secretariat was ready to provide the necessary support. He also noted the calls of Member States for the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly and the strengthening of the Economic and Social Council in the framework of a reformed multilateralism. To that end, he stated that regarding any decision by Member States to streamline the practices of the General Assembly, the Secretariat was also ready to provide support.

The President of the General Assembly underlined that the international rules, norms, instruments and institutions that had guided inter-State relations for over 75 years were facing deep and existential questions of relevance at a time when the world needed them most. Stating that global challenges such as coronavirus disease pandemic, the climate crisis, protracted debt, and food and energy emergencies were far too great for any one nation to handle alone, he expressed hope that the international community would find a multilateral solution, designed in line with the Charter of the United Nations and international law to address those issues. He added that just as the actions taken in the United Nations had profound effects across the globe, so did inaction in the Assembly or the Council. He recalled that the 193 Member States of the

General Assembly had placed their trust in the 15 Security Council members and emphasized that each Council member was expected to act for the good of all and to uphold the Charter. While Council members had done so on countless occasions, he maintained that there had also been examples of failed collective action, citing specifically the lack of consensus in adopting any resolutions concerning the war in Ukraine to mitigate the exact type of crisis the United Nations was created to prevent. In that regard, he underlined that the so-called veto initiative had opened an important door for a new form of collaboration and accountability between the two bodies. He added that Member States were participating in 15 negotiating processes on a range of issues, including the ongoing intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, and noted that despite having been a mandated duty of the Assembly for many years, the outcome was still less than what had been expected. He finally urged the Council to prioritize dialogue and diplomacy and to trade political differences for genuine political will.

During the discussion, speakers focused on the need to strengthen the multilateral system as well as on the reform of the Security Council, to effectively address evolving threats to international peace and security. In that connection, many participants expressed support for Council reform while highlighting the important role of the intergovernmental negotiations at the General Assembly on the reform of the Security Council. Participants also exchanged views on the Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and on the impact of the use of the veto on the ability of the Council to discharge its functions.<sup>1318</sup> Numerous participants addressed the question of limiting the use of the veto and enhancing accountability and transparency regarding its use.<sup>1319</sup> In that context, some Member States welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution [76/262](#).<sup>1320</sup> While many speakers welcomed the Secretary-General's report on "Our Common Agenda", including his proposal for the New Agenda for Peace, the representatives of Brazil and Kenya expressed the view that the New Agenda for Peace had to include Security Council reform if it was to truly offer a new chapter for multilateralism. Some Council members also stressed the importance of

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<sup>1318</sup> For further details on the discussion, see part V, sect. I.

<sup>1319</sup> For further details on the discussion, see part II, sect. IX.

<sup>1320</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#), Ireland, Japan and Poland; [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Switzerland, Singapore, Estonia, Bulgaria, Malta, Liechtenstein, Lebanon and Romania.

strengthening partnerships between the Council and regional organizations and of leveraging the key role of regional organizations in preventing conflict and addressing crises.<sup>1321</sup>

In 2022, the Council adopted one resolution in connection with this item. On 29 September, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), welcoming the Secretary-General's report of 30 August 2022, including its observations on the plight of migrants and refugees in Libya and condemning all acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya.<sup>1322</sup> Acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed the authorizations regarding acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Libya's territorial sea as set out in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), for a further period of twelve months. The Council further renewed the reporting requests set out in paragraph 17 of its resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#) and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council eleven months after the adoption of the resolution on its implementation, in particular with regard to the implementation of paragraphs 7 to 10 of its resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#).<sup>1323</sup>

### Meetings: Maintenance of international peace and security

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9014</a> 11 April 2022	Implementation of resolutions <a href="#">2532 (2020)</a> and <a href="#">2565 (2021)</a>			Global Lead Coordinator for COVID-19 Vaccine Country-Readiness and Delivery; Senior Advisor to the Office of the Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross; Health and Nutrition Coordinator, CARE South Sudan	All Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees <sup>b</sup>	

<sup>1321</sup> [S/PV.9220](#), China and Albania; and [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Philippines, Egypt, South Africa, European Union, Indonesia, Spain, Thailand, Chile, Viet Nam, Kazakhstan and Portugal. For further details on the discussion regarding the cooperation with regional organizations, see part VIII, sect. I.

<sup>1322</sup> Resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), third preambular paragraph and para. 1. For the Secretary-General's report, see [S/2022/655](#).

<sup>1323</sup> Resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), paras. 2 and 3.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9036</a> and <a href="#">S/PV.9036</a> <a href="#">(Resumption1)</a> 19 May 2022	Conflict and food security Letter dated 12 May 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/391</a> )		56 Member States <sup>e</sup>	Executive Director, World Food Programme; Director General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Gro Intelligence; Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; Observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations	Secretary-General, all Council members <sup>d</sup> , all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9039</a> 23 May 2022	Technology and security			Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Director of Advox, the Digital Rights Project of Global Voices; Adjunct Professor at the McGill University Center for International Peace and Security Studies and Non-resident Fellow at the International Peace Institute	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9052</a> and <a href="#">S/PV.9052(Resumption1)</a> 2 June 2022	Strengthening accountability and justice for serious violations of international law Letter dated 24 May 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Albania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/418/Rev.1</a> )		48 Member States <sup>e</sup>	President of the International Court of Justice; United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; Professor of Public International Law, University of Oxford; Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine to the United Nations	All Council members <sup>f</sup> , all invitees <sup>g</sup>	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9112</a> 22 August 2022	Promote common security through dialogue and cooperation  Letter dated 12 August 2022 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/617</a> )			President of the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	Secretary-General, all Council members, invitee	
<a href="#">S/PV.9140</a> 29 September 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution <a href="#">2598 (2021)</a> ( <a href="#">S/2022/655</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by 29 Member States <sup>1</sup> ( <a href="#">S/2022/718</a> )	25 Member States <sup>1</sup>			Resolution <a href="#">2652 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 Chapter VII
<a href="#">S/PV.9167</a> 26 October 2022			Islamic Republic of Iran, Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel	All Council members, all invitees	
<a href="#">S/PV.9220</a> and <a href="#">S/PV.9220(Resumption)</a> 14 December 2022	New orientation for reformed multilateralism  Letter dated 25 November 2022 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/880</a> )		48 Member States <sup>k</sup>	President of the General Assembly, Head of Delegation of the European Union	Secretary-General, all Council members, <sup>1</sup> invitees	

<sup>a</sup> The United Kingdom (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister of State for South and Central Asia, North Africa, UN and the Commonwealth, and the Prime Minister's Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict; The United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister of State for Advanced Technology; the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative and Member of President Biden's Cabinet.

<sup>b</sup> All rule 39 invitees participated via video teleconference.

<sup>c</sup> Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic (also on behalf of: Group of Friends of Action on Conflict and Hunger), Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji (also on behalf of: Pacific Islands Forum), Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania (also on behalf of the Baltic Countries), Luxembourg, Malta, Maldives, Mauritius, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.



<sup>d</sup> The United States (President of the Council) was represented by its Secretary of State. Ghana was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. Kenya was represented by its Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Gabon was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. Albania was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Norway was represented by its Minister of International Development. The United Arab Emirates was represented by its Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs. India was represented by its Minister of State for External Affairs. Ireland was represented by its Minister of State for Overseas Development Aid and Diaspora.

<sup>e</sup> Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria (also on behalf of Group of Friends of the Rule of Law), Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark (also on behalf of: Nordic Countries), Ecuador, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, the Marshall Islands (also on behalf of: Group of Friends of Accountability following the aggression against Ukraine), Morocco, Myanmar, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). The representative of Pakistan spoke twice.

<sup>f</sup> Albania (President of the Council) was represented by its Prime Minister. India was represented by its Minister of State for External Affairs. Ireland was represented by its Attorney-General. The United States of America was represented by its Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. The United Arab Emirates was represented by its Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs. The representatives of India and China spoke twice.

<sup>g</sup> The President of the International Court of Justice and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights participated in the meeting via video teleconference.

<sup>i</sup> Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

<sup>j</sup> Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden

<sup>k</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine and Viet Nam.

<sup>l</sup> India (President of the Council) was represented by its External Affairs Minister. The United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister of Culture and Youth and Cabinet Member. The United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet. Ghana was represented by its Permanent Secretary.

<sup>m</sup> Armenia, Japan, Pakistan and Poland were represented by their respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs. Azerbaijan was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Kuwait was represented by its Assistant Foreign Minister for International Organizations. The representative of Saint Lucia spoke on behalf of the Group of like-minded countries. Viet Nam spoke on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

### **36. Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security**

During the period under review, the Security Council held four meetings and issued one presidential statement under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”. Two of the meetings took the form of briefings and two took the form of debates.<sup>1324</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants and outcomes, is provided in the table below.

In 2022, the Council continued to hold its annual meetings on cooperation with the African Union and European Union, while also meeting to discuss relations with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the League of Arab States. The Council further adopted a presidential statement addressing its cooperation with the League. The four meetings featured briefings by the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General of the CSTO, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission.<sup>1325</sup> At the meeting on cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Council was also briefed by a civil society representative on peace and security challenges in the Arab region.<sup>1326</sup>

Addressing the Council in the context of a debate on 16 February on cooperation between the United Nations and the CSTO, the Secretary-General stated that the two organizations were continuously strengthening their ties and deepening their responses to regional challenges in Central Asia since the signing of the Joint Declaration on Cooperation between their Secretariats in 2010.<sup>1327</sup> The Secretary-General reflected on the three priorities for strengthening their relations across the peace and security spectrums which had been identified at the tenth anniversary of the Joint Declaration in 2020. First, on conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics, he stated that the good working relations between the CSTO and the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) enabled

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<sup>1324</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>1325</sup> See [S/PV.8967](#), [S/PV.9001](#), [S/PV.9065](#) and [S/PV.9149](#).

<sup>1326</sup> See [S/PV.9001](#).

<sup>1327</sup> See [S/PV.8967](#).

constructive early warning exchanges and regular contacts during security-related events in the region. Second, with regard to peacekeeping, the Secretary-General expressed the view that further cooperation would help to advance the Action for Peacekeeping and Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiatives and noted that he looked forward to receiving more pledges from the CSTO to the United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. Third, the Secretary-General opined that close coordination with the CSTO was critical in helping to defuse evolving threats from terrorism and illicit drugs and arms flows stemming from the situation in Afghanistan, preventing spill-over, promoting stability and saving lives. He concluded by recalling that one of the main goals of his “Our Common Agenda” report was to build, by encouraging partners, a more inclusive and effective multilateralism that operated like a network and noted his intention to continue holding annual meetings with all leaders of regional organizations.

The Secretary-General of the CSTO observed that, at the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Collective Security and the twentieth anniversary of its establishment, the CSTO had become an effective international organization that protected its member States from existing threats on a collective basis. He underlined that the United Nations was the main international partner of the CSTO and expressed interest in further developing relations in all areas based on the Joint Declaration, including counter-terrorism and peacekeeping. The Secretary-General noted that the CSTO had developed practices to deprive international terrorist organizations of their “breeding grounds” to cut off channels of recruitment and financing and the spread of terrorist ideology and propaganda. He further noted that, under the auspices of the United Nations, the aim was to develop universal rules, norms and principles for proper conduct in the information sphere. He expressed the readiness of the CSTO to share its experience in conducting rapid response prevention operations to combat international terrorism and extremism and encouraged international and regional organizations and individual States to participate in them. He recalled that the United Nations and the CSTO established a working group on peacekeeping in December 2021 and that the CSTO received beneficial assistance in conducting certification procedures for various programmes and methodology for the training of its peacekeepers. Moreover, he added that the CSTO was reviewing the possibility of having its peacekeepers join United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Secretary-General concluded by

reaffirming the commitment of the CSTO to developing friendly and mutually acceptable relations with third countries and international organizations to maintain peace and stability based on the principles of international law, the rejection of confrontation and an embrace of lasting solutions through political and diplomatic means, in line with the provisions and aims of the Charter of the United Nations.

In the subsequent discussion, Council members and participating Member States exchanged views on the challenges facing the Central Asian region, ways of strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and the CSTO and the principles that should underly such cooperation.<sup>1328</sup> They further reflected on the deployment of the CSTO peacekeeping forces following the civil unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022 and the security threats emanating from the conflict in Afghanistan. Many speakers opined that the United Nations and the CSTO could further develop their joint work on conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, counter-terrorism, and countering the trafficking in persons, arms and narcotics. In terms of concrete proposals, several speakers called for increased engagement, consultation and information-sharing between the two organizations.<sup>1329</sup> The representative of Ghana opined that regular consultations could help bridge conceptual differences in the understanding of the security challenges of the Eurasian region and improve harmonized responses. He added that the wealth of experience of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy should be enhanced in its engagement with the CSTO, particularly through the UNRCCA. The representative of Kenya recommended for the two organizations to undertake joint horizon-scanning and analysis to inform strategic actions that drew support from Member States in the region. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed the shared desire of CSTO member States to resolve emerging problems through political and diplomatic means under international law.

In his remarks at the briefing on cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States held on 23 March, the Secretary-General stated that strengthening cooperation with regional organizations was a *sine qua non* for strengthening multilateralism globally.<sup>1330</sup> He stated that the League was critical across the spectrum of the work of the United Nations and that

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<sup>1328</sup> For more information on the discussion in this meeting on the principles of cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, see part VIII, sect. I.B.

<sup>1329</sup> See [S/PV.8967](#), Ghana, Kenya, Mexico and United Arab Emirates.

<sup>1330</sup> See [S/PV.9001](#).

the two organizations remained united in their pursuit of multilateral answers to the cascading challenges that the Arab world and the world beyond were facing. Those efforts, according to the Secretary-General, had an added urgency in the face of the profound global ramifications of the war in Ukraine which were hitting the poorest the hardest and planting the seeds of political instability and unrest across the globe. The Secretary-General highlighted the joint engagement of the United Nations and the League of Arab States to address the situations in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and between Israel and Palestine. He noted that ever-closer cooperation was vital to achieving all the goals in relation to those situations and that the United Nations looked forward to strengthening those ties, including through its Liaison Office to the League. He further noted that the two organizations were expanding their cooperation on youth, peace and security, women and peace and security, as well as disarmament, mediation and peacebuilding.

In his briefing, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States stated that the international order was perhaps at its most critical juncture since the end of the Cold War and that the escalation of conflict between global powers was bringing several security, political and economic risks. He expressed hope that that situation would not have a negative impact on the Council's attention to other issues and crises worldwide, particularly in the Arab region. In that regard, he noted that the region continued to suffer from the significant shock of 2011 and that internal conflicts continued in the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya and Yemen. Further, while noting that developments in the international arena led many in the Arab region to consider the suffering of the Palestinian people differently, he reminded the Council that it had endorsed the principle of land for peace and the two-State solution as a basis for resolving the historic conflict. In that regard, he called on all international powers to shoulder their responsibilities, as set forth in the Charter, to address all issues and crises alike in full respect for international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter. The Secretary-General also referred to what he described as Iranian intervention in the internal affairs of Arab States, stressing the need for an agreement to establish a zone free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and for good and neighbourly relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran based on respect for sovereignty and non-interference. Regarding overall cooperation with the United Nations and the Council, the Secretary-General welcomed the convening of the ministerial-level meeting with the

Arab Summit Troika on the margins of the 76<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly high-level segment in September 2021 in accordance with the presidential statement issued on 29 January 2021.<sup>1331</sup> He also called for the implementation of other provisions of the presidential statement such as conducting joint field visits and working to increase the participation of women and young people in international peace and security efforts. He concluded by reiterating the commitment of the League to the strategic partnership with the Council in order to achieve their common goals.

Noting that she spoke on behalf of Arab youth who represented 60 per cent of the population in the Arab region, Ms. Alaqil presented several recommendations to the Council.<sup>1332</sup> Specifically, she stressed the need to ensure the participation of youth at all levels of the United Nations, including all three pillars of the Organization's work, and in the formulation and implementation of national and regional policies. Furthermore, she noted that youth participation could never be complete without the participation of women in all efforts. Finally, she pointed to the need to address the main Arab challenges which were before the Council so that financial and human resources could be directed towards the development and implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In that regard, she emphasized that the roles of the Council and the League of Arab States were pivotal.

Following the briefers, Council members and the representative of Yemen, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, exchanged views on how to strengthen the cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States with a view to addressing the conflicts in the Arab region, as well as cross-cutting issues such as counter-terrorism, climate and security, women and peace and security, youth, peace and security and children and armed conflict.<sup>1333</sup> Speakers called for institutionalizing the relationship through regular consultations and information exchange. Multiple delegations also underlined the importance of further strengthening the trilateral cooperation between the United Nations, the League and the African Union.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Council issued a presidential statement by which it reiterated its intention to consider further steps to promote closer cooperation and strategic

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<sup>1331</sup> See [S/PRST/2021/2](#).

<sup>1332</sup> See [S/PV.9001](#).

<sup>1333</sup> For more information on the discussions within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, see part VIII, sect. I.B.

coordination between the United Nations and the League of Arab States in the fields of conflict early warning and prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, sustaining peace, promoting respect for international law and the Charter, addressing root causes of conflicts and enhancing safety and security at sea, preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, and building resilience to resist incitement.<sup>1334</sup> The Council also recognized the importance of cooperation in sustainable development, comprehensive risk assessments and risk management strategies, including poverty eradication, food security and water management, disaster risk reduction, and desertification and drought management in the Arab region.<sup>1335</sup> The Council reaffirmed the important and positive contribution of youth to the efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and stressed the importance of creating policies for them that would positively contribute to peacebuilding efforts in the Arab region.<sup>1336</sup> The Council expressed its intention to consider holding further joint consultation meetings with the Council of the League and requested the Secretary-General to provide a brief report on the implementation of the presidential statement and on further ways of strengthening institutional relations and cooperation between the two organizations.<sup>1337</sup>

At the annual briefing on cooperation with the European Union which was held on 16 June, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy noted that the multilateral system was under pressure as never before, especially as there was a strong demand for an approach to global problems based on multilateralism, the supply of which was insufficient given the scale of cooperation needed to manage the global commons.<sup>1338</sup> He stated that the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was an attack on the foundations of the United Nations and the Council by one of its permanent members and urged all Council members to help end it, restore the sovereignty of Ukraine and ensure that the global fallout was contained, especially the increasing food crisis affecting millions of people around the world. He added that the European Union fully supported the efforts of the United Nations so that Ukraine

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<sup>1334</sup> [S/PRST/2022/1](#), seventh paragraph.

<sup>1335</sup> *Ibid.*, eighth paragraph.

<sup>1336</sup> *Ibid.*, sixth paragraph.

<sup>1337</sup> *Ibid.*, ninth and twenty-first paragraphs.

<sup>1338</sup> See [S/PV.9065](#).

could resume its deliveries of grain to the world and in dealing with the global consequences of the war.

Beyond the war in Ukraine, the High Representative noted that the United Nations and the European Union worked closely together at headquarters and field level in a number of areas, starting with crisis management operations such as the European Union military operation in the Mediterranean (Operation IRINI) in support of the implementation of the Council's arms embargo on Libya; the European Union Naval Forces Operation Atalanta to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia; and the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea). Further, he noted that the European Union made large contributions to the work of the United Nations on mediation, peacebuilding and transitions and underlined the strategic nature of cooperation on peace and security between the European Union and the African Union. Lastly, the High Representative commented on the efforts of the European Union, together with the United Nations, to address the crises in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sahel, Afghanistan and with respect to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In the subsequent discussion, Council members widely recognized the contribution of the European Union to international peace and security and multilateralism, including in cooperation with the United Nations. They particularly noted and called for strengthening cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management and humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, development, human rights, climate and security, and the implementation of the women and peace and security and children and armed conflict agendas. Most Council members expressed grave concern regarding the war in Ukraine and its geopolitical and humanitarian impact in Europe and beyond. Council members recognized the role of the European Union in efforts to alleviate the consequences of the conflict, particularly to ensure global food security.<sup>1339</sup> The representative of the United States stated that the European Union had clearly demonstrated its support for the values enshrined in the Charter, with its actions to uphold the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity after the war of the Russian Federation on Ukraine. The representative of Norway underlined the need for a strong European Union working together with the United Nations and the Council to contribute to advancing the causes

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<sup>1339</sup> Ibid., United States, Ghana, Ireland, India, United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom.



of peace and prosperity. The representatives of China and Ghana further encouraged the European Union to play a mediation role to end the conflict.

The representative of the Russian Federation took a different view regarding the role of the European Union in relation to the war in Ukraine, maintaining that the organization was circumventing the Council by imposing illegitimate unilateral sanctions. He added that a collective western policy on sanctions had helped to provoke the food and energy crisis. The representative of Brazil urged the European Union to consider in advance the possible consequences of unilateral sanctions. Several Council members, in contrast, asserted that the sanctions imposed by the European Union did not impact the provision of humanitarian aid or the ability of the Russian Federation to export agricultural products, and that the negative impact on global food security was the result of the actions of the Russian Federation.<sup>1340</sup> The representative of France stated that the sanctions measures had only one objective which was to bring the Russian Federation back into compliance with the Charter.

More generally, the representative of China stated that the European Union should take the lead in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter, complying with international law and the universally recognized fundamental norms of international relations, earnestly respecting the sovereignty and political independence of all countries, and committing to the principle of non-interference. He further added that the European Union was expected to play an active and constructive role in international affairs by rejecting any revival of the idea of confrontation between camps or blocs and by encouraging all countries to strengthen unity and achieve shared progress under the banner of multilateralism. With respect to peacekeeping, the representative of Brazil stated that European Union missions should always be aligned with the mandates established by the Council and act in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Charter.

At the debate held on 11 October, the Secretary-General presented his annual report on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union including the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union.<sup>1341</sup> He noted that, at the twentieth anniversary of the creation of the African Union, the cooperation between the two organizations

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<sup>1340</sup> Ibid., France, Ireland and United Kingdom.

<sup>1341</sup> See [S/PV. 9149](#). See also [S/2022/643](#).

had never been stronger, although challenges remained. In this regard, the Secretary-General opined that the use of force was too often seen as the only method of resolving disputes and further noted the rise of unconstitutional changes of government, the efforts of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) to extend its reach in the Sahel, protracted conflicts in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, the Sudan and Libya, as well as violence against women and the use of misinformation and hate speech as weapons of war. In order to address those challenges, the Secretary-General stressed the need for States to develop the capacity to detect and pre-empt conflicts at the earliest signs, address the governance deficit, and for the Council to ensure predictable funding for African Union operations which it authorized. Second, the Secretary-General stated that climate change was a matter of survival for countries in Africa and urged leaders, especially those of the Group of 20 (G-20), which were responsible for 80 per cent of greenhouse-gas emissions, to finally take the urgent action needed. Third, he called for a Sustainable Development Goals stimulus, led by the G-20, to massively boost development assistance. He further stressed the need for international financial institutions and multilateral banks to remove the barriers that prevented developing countries from accessing the financing they needed and for an effective global debt relief mechanism. Finally, the Secretary-General called on all leaders – in the Council, on the African continent and beyond – to spare no effort in supporting the African Union in achieving its goals for an integrated, peaceful and prosperous continent.

In his statement, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission stated that the main issue that the African Union and United Nations faced in their cooperation no longer had to do with normative mechanisms but the need to consider the profound transformations that had occurred throughout African development and, secondly, the conservatism that governed the doctrine in force at the United Nations since the Second World War. Given that Africa was home to 1.4 billion people, 70 per cent of United Nations peacekeeping missions were in Africa and that African issues were at the forefront of debates at the Organization, the Chairperson questioned why it was the only true continent excluded from the benefits of permanent membership in the Council. In that regard, he called for a specific timeframe to discuss and decide on Africa's role in that forum for world peace. He further emphasized the need to ensure the primacy of establishing and safeguarding peace in the mandates of African missions, to

secure funds and financial structures for preventing and combating pandemics, to ensure that investment on climate issues was no longer the small portion of financing allotted to Africa, and that the unlimited universe of science and new technologies was generously opened to Africa. According to the Chairperson, if the Council chose that path, it would find the entire continent mobilized around it. If not, its credibility could suffer irreversibly. He concluded by commending the achievements in the cooperation between the two organizations and called for deepening partnerships between their specialized agencies, special envoys and, especially, the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council.

In their statements, members and participating non-members of the Council underscored the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter and discussed the progress and challenges in relations between the Organization and the African Union since the signing of the Joint Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in 2017. In that regard, several speakers underlined the importance of the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and the use of comparative advantages in their cooperation.<sup>1342</sup> In particular, speakers noted their joint efforts to prevent and address conflict, especially through mediation, in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, the Sahel, the Sudan, as well as the important role of the African Union in the resolution of the conflict in Ethiopia. Participants further highlighted the cooperation on conflict prevention, early warning, mediation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, countering maritime piracy and security sector reform and called for strengthening joint action on peacebuilding and addressing the root causes of conflict, climate and security, countering misinformation and countering the proliferation of small arms, among other areas.<sup>1343</sup>

**Meetings: Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations**

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
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<sup>1342</sup> See [S/PV. 9149](#), Gabon, India, Egypt and South Africa.

<sup>1343</sup> For more information on the discussion within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, see part VIII, sect. I.B.

<a href="#">S/PV.8967</a> 16 February 2022	Collective Security Treaty Organization	Five Member States <sup>a</sup>	Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization	Secretary- General, all Council members <sup>b</sup> , all invitees <sup>c</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9001</a> 23 March 2022	League of Arab States  Letter dated 17 March 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/240</a> )	Yemen	Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, civil society briefer	Secretary- General, all Council members <sup>d</sup> , all invitees <sup>e</sup>	<a href="#">S/PRST/2022/1</a>
<a href="#">S/PV.9065</a> 16 June 2022	European Union		High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy	All Council members <sup>f</sup> , invitee <sup>g</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9149</a> 11 October 2022	African Union  Report of the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union ( <a href="#">S/2022/643</a> )  Letter dated 3 October 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/736</a> )	Seven Member States <sup>h</sup>	Chairperson of the African Union Commission	Secretary- General, all Council members <sup>i</sup> , all invitees <sup>j</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

<sup>b</sup> The Russian Federation was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>c</sup> The Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization participated in the meeting by videoconference from Moscow.

<sup>d</sup> The United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. India was represented by its Foreign Secretary.

<sup>e</sup> The representative of Yemen spoke on behalf of the Arab Group.

<sup>f</sup> Albania was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs.

<sup>g</sup> The High Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference.

<sup>h</sup> Egypt, Germany, Japan, Morocco, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa.

<sup>i</sup> Gabon was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet. The United Arab Emirates was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs.

<sup>j</sup> The Chairperson of the African Union Commission participated in the meeting by videoconference.