

7. Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

During the period under review, the Security Council held 15 meetings, adopted seven resolutions, and issued two statements by the President under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”. Eleven of the meetings took the form of briefings and four were convened for the adoption of a decision.¹⁹⁷ More information about the meetings is provided in table 1 below. Council members also held nine open videoconferences in connection with this item, more details of which are given in table 2 below.¹⁹⁸ In addition to the meetings and open videoconferences, in 2021, Council members held informal consultations of the whole and closed videoconferences and an informal interactive dialogue in connection with this item.¹⁹⁹ In 2021, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).²⁰⁰

Consistent with prior practice, the Council considered several distinct topics under this item, namely the situation in the Sudan, the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) and the drawdown and liquidation of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, the situation in the Abyei Area and the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA); and the situation in South Sudan and the mandate of UNMISS.²⁰¹ The Council also discussed the work of the Committees and Panels of Experts concerning the Sudan and South Sudan and the implementation of resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), by which the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.²⁰²

¹⁹⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

¹⁹⁸ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II.

¹⁹⁹ See [A/76/2](#), chap. 26. See also [S/2021/1014](#), [S/2021/1084](#) and [S/2022/174](#). In 2021, informal consultations of the Council and informal interactive dialogues were also held in the form of closed videoconferences. An informal interactive dialogue related to this item was held on 14 April 2021. For more details on the procedures developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II of this Supplement as well as *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II.

²⁰⁰ See [S/2021/49](#) and [S/2021/50](#).

²⁰¹ For more information on the mandates of UNISFA, UNMISS and UNITAMS, see part X.

²⁰² For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan and their respective Panels of Experts, see part IX, sect. I. B.

In relation to the Sudan, the Council was briefed four times by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of UNITAMS and twice by civil society representatives.²⁰³ The Council also heard two briefings from the Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support on the drawdown and liquidation of UNAMID.²⁰⁴

In his briefings in 2021, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of UNITAMS reported on the progress and challenges in the political transition, including the military takeover on 25 October 2021, the security situation in Darfur and the activities of UNITAMS. At the open videoconference held on 9 March 2021, he noted that the transition had moved forward in February 2021 with the expansion of the Sovereign Council to include three armed group signatories to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement and the formation of a new cabinet with a broad coalition built on power-sharing among civilians, the military and armed movements.²⁰⁵ The new Government agreed on five national priorities, namely addressing socioeconomic conditions; implementing the peace agreement and resuming negotiations with the non-signatory armed groups; security sector reform and the protection of civilians; international relations; and advancing the democratic transition. At the same time, however, important milestones foreseen in the 2019 Constitutional Document and the Juba Peace Agreement had yet to be reached, notably, the formation of the Transitional Legislative Council, with at least 40 per cent representation of women. The Special Representative also noted progress on the economic reform agenda with the Government's decision to float the Sudanese pound which would unlock financial assistance, paving the way for debt relief and fostering private sector engagement. At the same videoconference, the Managing Partner of Insight Strategic Partners, a think tank in Khartoum, briefed the Council on the possible implications of the work of UNITAMS on civil society in the Sudan and the importance of the latter's buy-in during the transition period. She noted that the success of UNITAMS could not be directly tied to the Government's ability to implement the transition and that civil society could bolster support to the protection of civilians in Darfur and help ensure the sustainability of crucial state-building exercises. She affirmed that the inclusion of civil society had to be done in such a way

²⁰³ See [S/2021/246](#), [S/2021/495](#), [S/PV.8857](#) and [S/PV.8925](#).

²⁰⁴ See [S/2021/246](#) and [S/PV.8825](#).

²⁰⁵ See [S/2021/246](#).

that increased, not limited, civic space and not to undermine the fragile and inchoate social contract between the civilian Government and the public.

At the open videoconference held on 20 May 2021, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General noted the adoption of legislation establishing the Peace Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Transitional Justice Commission and urged the Sudanese authorities to proceed rapidly in operationalizing those entities.²⁰⁶ He welcomed the organization of the Paris Conference by the Government of France on 17 May 2021, at which Member States announced bilateral debt forgiveness, helping the Sudan to clear its arrears with the international financial institutions. Regarding the peace talks with non-signatory armed groups, on 28 March 2021, the Chairperson of the Sovereign Council of the Sudan, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and the Chairperson of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, Abdelaziz Al-Hilu faction, had signed a declaration of principles that would form the basis of peace talks in Juba which, as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General subsequently reported at a meeting held on 14 September 2021, had taken place in June 2021 without agreement on a framework for the process.²⁰⁷ At the 14 September 2021 meeting, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General also expressed concern about the impact of the conflict in Ethiopia on the Sudan, including the flow of refugees, and urged all stakeholders to avoid further unnecessary escalation in the context of the tensions over the Fashaqah border area and the stalemate over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Following the Special Representative, the Regional Director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, a regional network of civil society organizations, stated that, as was the case before the revolution in the Sudan, women were disproportionately affected by violence, the deterioration of services and the slow pace of reform. She highlighted the need to ensure women's full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership throughout the transitional Government bodies and in the ongoing peace processes and called for accountability for all violations of human rights, including gender-based violence, that occurred before, during and after the revolution.

²⁰⁶ See [S/2021/495](#).

²⁰⁷ See [S/PV.8857](#).

On 3 June 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), extending the mandate of UNITAMS for one year until 3 June 2022 with several modifications and outlined priorities for the Mission during the new mandate period.²⁰⁸ In the resolution, the Council also welcomed the steps taken to implement the Constitutional Document and called upon the Government of the Sudan to accelerate establishing the independent commissions and the swift formation of the Transitional Legislative Council.²⁰⁹ The Council welcomed the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement and urged the signatories, with the support of UNITAMS, to ensure swift, full and inclusive implementation.²¹⁰

At the meeting held on 10 December 2021, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported that the political transition was undergoing its greatest crisis with the military takeover of 25 October 2021 and the arrests of Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, senior officials and political activists.²¹¹ The takeover triggered widespread protests and condemnation, resulting in the death of at least 44 people and hundreds injured as a result of the excessive use of force by security forces. Against this backdrop, the Special Representative noted that he had welcomed the 21 November 2021 political agreement between the Prime Minister and the Chairperson of the Sovereign Council which could help avoid further bloodshed and provide a positive step towards comprehensive dialogue and a return to constitutional order. He underlined the importance of reaching an inclusive political agreement on the way forward and the formation of a technocratic cabinet, as provided in the 21 November agreement. The Special Representative stated that, in the aftermath of these events, the Sudan's military and political leaders would have to take confidence-building measures to rebuild trust with their own domestic public, particularly the young generation, and to regain financial, economic and political support from the international community. In terms of the security situation, at the same meeting, the Special Representative expressed deep concern at the resurgence of intercommunal conflicts and armed banditry in Darfur, Blue Nile and the Kordofans, with reports of a significant rise in the killing of civilians, destruction of property and displacements, and sexual violence against women and

²⁰⁸ See resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1 and 4(i)-(vi).

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, third preambular paragraph.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, fifth preambular paragraph.

²¹¹ See [S/PV.8925](#).

girls. He added that the formation and deployment of the joint security-keeping force provided under the Juba Peace Agreement and the operationalization of the Government's National Plan for the Protection of Civilians had to be undertaken without delay. Regarding the implementation of the UNITAMS mandate, the Special Representative stated that, in addition to redoubling its good offices, the Mission also continued its work on human rights and support for the protection of civilians and the permanent ceasefire mechanisms.

Regarding the drawdown and liquidation of UNAMID, at the videoconference held on 9 March 2021, the Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support noted that, following the termination of its mandate on 31 December 2020, UNAMID was on track to complete the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian personnel other than those required for its liquidation by 30 June 2021, as provided in resolution [2559 \(2020\)](#).²¹² He noted that the Secretariat was preparing a detailed concept of operations and costing requirements for the deployment of two police units as guard units which, in accordance with the decision of the Council, would be responsible for the protection of UNAMID personnel, facilities and assets. On 27 July 2021, the Under-Secretary-General confirmed that the Secretariat had achieved the initial milestone set by the Council for the withdrawal of all UNAMID personnel and staff by 30 June 2021.²¹³ The remaining liquidation process, would consist of two phases, from 1 July to 30 September 2021 for the withdrawal, sale and destruction of the Mission's equipment and, from 1 October onward, the donation and associated distribution of remaining fixed and movable assets to Government institutions and related non-governmental organizations. In the presidential statement issued on 2 August 2021, marking the completion of the drawdown, the Council recognized the progress made since the Mission's deployment and expressed deep appreciation for its important contribution over a period of more than 13 years.²¹⁴

In their discussions on the Sudan, Council members welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the Constitutional Document and the Juba Peace Agreement and encouraged further steps in that regard, particularly the establishment of the Transitional Legislative Council

²¹² See [S/2021/246](#).

²¹³ See [S/PV.8825](#).

²¹⁴ See [S/PRST/2021/14](#), first and fourth paragraphs.

with at least 40 per cent women representatives, and other transitional institutions. Multiple Council members also called on non-signatory armed groups to join the peace process.²¹⁵ Council members noted their concern with the increase in intercommunal violence in Darfur, with most of them calling on the Government to swiftly implement the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians.²¹⁶ A number of speakers also stressed the need for international debt relief and financial support,²¹⁷ and the review of the sanctions measures imposed by the Council to alleviate the difficult socioeconomic conditions in the Sudan.²¹⁸ Council members expressed concern regarding the tensions between the Sudan and Ethiopia over the Fashaqah border area and called on both parties to work towards a peaceful solution.²¹⁹ At the meeting held on 10 December 2021, several Council members noted that the military takeover of 25 October 2021 had the potential of jeopardizing the progress made in Sudan's political transition.²²⁰ The representative of the United Kingdom, among others, expressed concern at the deterioration of the human rights situation with the killing of at least 43 protesters, underscored the need for freedoms of expression and assembly to be protected and welcomed the commitment of the Sudanese authorities to investigate their deaths. Some Council members expressed the view that the 21 November 2021 political agreement was a step towards resolving the crisis and resuming the political transition.²²¹ The representative of Tunisia encouraged all transitional partners to swiftly implement the political agreement in a climate of peace and national reconciliation.

²¹⁵ See [S/2021/246](#), France, India, United Kingdom, and Viet Nam; [S/2021/495](#), China, Estonia, India, Ireland, Kenya, and United States; [S/PV.8857](#), France, China, Tunisia, and Russian Federation; and [S/PV.8925](#), Tunisia, Mexico, Ireland, Viet Nam, and France.

²¹⁶ See [S/2021/246](#), Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom, and United States; [S/2021/495](#), Estonia, Kenya, Mexico, United Kingdom, and Viet Nam; [S/PV.8857](#), United Kingdom, France, United States, Estonia, Mexico, Viet Nam, and Ireland; and [S/PV.8925](#), United Kingdom, Estonia, Norway, Mexico, Ireland Viet Nam, and France.

²¹⁷ See [S/2021/246](#), India, Viet Nam, and Sudan; [S/2021/495](#), China, India, Ireland, Kenya, Viet Nam, and Sudan; [S/PV.8857](#), China, Tunisia, India, Viet Nam, Ireland, and Sudan; and [S/PV.8925](#), Russian Federation, China, and Sudan.

²¹⁸ See [S/2021/246](#), Russian Federation; [S/PV.8857](#), China and Viet Nam; and [S/PV.8925](#), Viet Nam, Russian Federation, and China.

²¹⁹ See [S/2021/246](#), Estonia, France, Mexico, United Kingdom, and United States; [S/2021/495](#), Ireland and Mexico; and [S/PV.8925](#) and Ireland.

²²⁰ See [S/PV.8925](#), United Kingdom, Estonia, Ireland, and France.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Mexico, Russian Federation, and China.

Council members also heard four briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) on the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts.²²² The Chair informed Council members that the Panel submitted its final report to the Committee in December 2020, after which the Committee addressed some of the Panel's recommendations to the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations on 25 February 2021 and held consultations with the Sudan and regional States on 23 February 2021.²²³ By resolution [2562 \(2021\)](#) of 11 February 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts for a period of 13 months until 12 March 2022.²²⁴ The Council requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the Government, signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement, UNITAMS, and the Panel of Experts, to conduct a review of the situation in Darfur, including threats to stability, implementation of the agreement and the National Plan for Civilian Protection, measures to tackle the proliferation of weapons, including progress on the weapons collection program, and compliance with the measures, as recalled in the resolution.²²⁵ The Council further requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council, by 31 July 2021, a report containing recommendations for clear and well identified benchmarks that could serve in guiding it to review the measures on Darfur and expressed its intention to establish clear and well identified key benchmarks no later than 15 September 2021, with readiness to consider adjusting the measures to respond to the situation in Darfur.²²⁶

In addition to the above, pursuant to resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court briefed Council members once in 2021 in relation to Darfur, departing from the practice of two briefings per year since the adoption of the resolution.²²⁷ On 11 June 2021, in her final briefing as the Prosecutor, Ms. Fatou Bensouda, updated the Council on her first historic visit to Darfur, 15 years since the Council referred the Darfur situation to her office.²²⁸ The Prosecutor reported that the Court and the Government of the Sudan had turned a

²²² See [S/2021/308](#), [S/PV.8795](#), [S/PV.8856](#) and [S/PV.8924](#).

²²³ See [S/2021/308](#).

²²⁴ See resolution [2562 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

²²⁶ *Ibid.* For the report of the Secretary-General see [S/2021/696](#). The Council did not establish benchmarks to assess the measures in 2021.

²²⁷ For more information, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2004-2007 to 2020*.

²²⁸ See [S/PV.8791](#).

new page in their relationship and that, following the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding on 14 February 2021, her team of investigators had undertaken investigative activities in the Sudan and were preparing to go to Darfur. She informed Council members that the confirmation of charges hearing for Ali Muhammad Ali Abd Al-Rahman were held on 24 and 26 May 2021 and that, with almost all other suspects in the custody of the Government, there was no legal impediment for their surrender to the Court.

With respect to the Abyei Area and relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, Council members were briefed twice each by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, and once by the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel.²²⁹ While the Under-Secretary-General focused on the situation in Abyei and UNISFA's mandate, the Special Envoy and the Chairperson of the High-level Implementation Panel briefed Council members on the relations between the Sudan and South Sudan and the progress on the implementation of the 2012 cooperation agreements.

At the open videoconference held on 26 April 2021, the Under-Secretary-General stated that the continued rapprochement between the Sudan and South Sudan had not translated into significant improvements in the Abyei Area, where the situation remained tense, as did relations between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities, and was also negatively impacted by the inability of the parties to convene the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee.²³⁰ There had been modest progress towards the seven benchmarks on the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism set out in resolution [2550 \(2020\)](#), with the approval of all requested aerial and ground monitoring missions by the two Governments and their deployment of national monitors, with the exception of team site 22 in Abu Qussa/Wunkur.²³¹ Furthermore, four out of the 10 border crossing corridors were open and functioning. Regarding UNISFA, the Under-Secretary-General highlighted interruptions to the deployment of authorized formed police units due to non-issuance of Sudanese visas.

²²⁹ See [S/2021/408](#) and [S/PV.8887](#).

²³⁰ See [S/2021/408](#).

²³¹ See resolution [2550 \(2020\)](#), para. 3.

On 27 October 2021, the Under-Secretary-General presented the findings and recommendations of the strategic review of UNISFA for a possible drawdown and exit strategy as requested by the Council in resolutions [2550 \(2020\)](#) and [2575 \(2021\)](#).²³² He noted that the review team was guided by the improved relationship between the two Governments but had identified a significant trust deficit that remained between the communities in Abyei and an important space for United Nations peacebuilding, humanitarian, recovery and development assistance. The review proposed two viable options regarding the future of the Mission's military component, namely keeping the force numbers close to what they were or a lightly reduced troop ceiling. The Under-Secretary-General stressed that negotiations towards a political settlement concerning Abyei remained crucial building blocks towards an exit strategy for UNISFA. Furthermore, as part of defining a strategic vision for the Mission, it was important that a set of benchmarks be established in close coordination with the two Governments containing specific requirements for the inclusion of women and building upon the joint mechanisms that the parties had already established towards the settlement of the Abyei issue. The Under-Secretary-General further stated that the planning of the Secretariat towards a full replacement of the Ethiopian military contingent with a multinational one would continue at full speed.

On 26 April 2021, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa noted the progress made by the Sudan and South Sudan on the implementation of the 2012 cooperation agreements, particularly with the definition of a roadmap for their review and follow-up and the decision to reopen border crossing points.²³³ Noticeable differences remained, however, over the establishment of the joint mechanisms provided under the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Administrative and Security Arrangements for Abyei and the resolution of the territory's final status. In terms of support for each other's peace processes, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General highlighted the role of South Sudan in the signing of the declaration of principles between the Chairperson of the Sovereign Council of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North Al-Hilu faction in Juba on 28 March 2021.

²³² See [S/PV.8887](#). See letter dated 17 September 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2021/805](#)), providing the findings and recommendations of the strategic review of UNISFA requested by resolution [2575 \(2021\)](#). See also resolutions [2550 \(2020\)](#), para. 32 and [2575 \(2021\)](#), para. 7.

²³³ See [S/2021/408](#).

Nonetheless, on 27 October 2021, he reported that the South Sudanese mediation committee had not succeeded in bringing the Al-Hilu faction back to the negotiating table following the suspension of the talks on 15 June 2021.²³⁴ Furthermore, Abdul Wahid Al-Nur of the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement/Army continued to reject peace talks with the Government of the Sudan.

In his briefing on 27 October 2021, the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel provided Council members with an overview of the Panel's engagement with the Sudan and South Sudan based on the 2012 proposal for the resolution of the Abyei issue, including the proposed referendum on the status of the territory.²³⁵ The Chairperson noted that the main obstacles in that regard were the lack of agreement on how the referendum would be conducted and who would be eligible to vote, as well as matters pertaining to revenue sharing and economic development. He expressed hope that consensus between the two Governments could be reached and that such consensus would be consonant with the views of the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities so that the agreement made would guarantee the stability of Abyei. In the meantime, he underscored the importance of the role of UNISFA in maintaining stability.

In 2021, Council members welcomed the improvement in relations between the Sudan and South Sudan and highlighted the importance of further progress on the implementation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement, the resolution of the status of Abyei, and the dialogue between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities. Council members discussed the various operational impediments to the mandate of UNISFA including the delays in the deployment of authorized police personnel due to the non-issuance of Sudanese visas, the lack of agreement with the parties on the appointment of a civilian deputy Head of Mission, and the safety and security of the Mission's personnel. In their statements on 27 October 2021, Council members widely welcomed the findings and recommendations of the strategic review of UNISFA. Some Council members emphasized specific aspects of the process. While the representative of Ireland noted the need for careful planning and sequencing to ensure a smooth rotation towards a multinational force, the representative of the Russian Federation observed that it was important to consider the

²³⁴ See [S/PV.8887](#).

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

Secretariat's proposals on the configuration of the Mission, including its national composition, in a manner that took into account the views of Khartoum and Juba. Similarly, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed the hope that the interests of the people of Abyei remained at the forefront of decision-making on the future configuration of UNISFA.

By resolutions [2575 \(2021\)](#) of 11 May 2021 and [2609 \(2021\)](#) of 15 December 2021, both adopted unanimously, the Council twice - for periods of six months - extended the mandate of UNISFA to support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Mission's mandate in the Abyei Area, the latter time until 15 May 2022.²³⁶ In between the adoption of the two mentioned resolutions, on 15 November 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2606 \(2021\)](#) extending the mandate of UNISFA for one month pending discussions among Council members on the findings and recommendations of the strategic review of the Mission.²³⁷ By resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), noting the recommendations of the strategic review, the Council reduced the authorized troop ceiling of UNISFA from 3,550 to 3,250, while maintaining the police ceiling at 640 police personnel, including 148 individual police officers and three formed police units.²³⁸ The Council expressed grave concerns over developments in Gok Machar, including threats to the safety and security of peacekeepers which resulted in the death of a peacekeeper on 14 September 2021 and urged the Government of South Sudan to intensify its outreach to the local community to facilitate the redeployment of UNISFA personnel to their previous locations.²³⁹ The Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan were further called upon to provide support to UNISFA in the implementation of its mandate and deployment of its personnel.²⁴⁰

In connection with the situation in South Sudan, Council members were briefed four times by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of UNMISS and twice by representatives of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Council members also heard three briefings from members of

²³⁶ See resolutions [2575 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1 and 2 and [2609 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

²³⁷ See resolution [2606 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

²³⁸ See resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), paras. 4 and 5.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, seventh preambular paragraph.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

civil society.²⁴¹ In his briefing on 3 March 2021, the outgoing Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. David Shearer, stated that, at the first anniversary of the formation of South Sudan's Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, there had been some positive steps in the implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan with the formation of the South Sudan presidency and the Council of Ministers and the delegation of power to state governors.²⁴² In subsequent meetings in 2021, his successor, Mr. Nicholas Haysom, highlighted additional progress such as the inauguration of the reconstituted Parliament on 30 August 2021 and the historic appointment of women as Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and Deputy Speaker of the Council of States, the reconstitution and appointment of members to nine state assemblies, the adoption of a bill on the constitution-making process, as well as on transitional justice and addressing conflict-related sexual violence.²⁴³

According to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, however, these steps were not sufficient if the momentum to realize peace was to be sustained. In this regard, in his briefing to the Council on 15 December 2021, he noted that the parties had failed to reach an agreement on command ratios for the future unified security forces, which in turn resulted in the fracturing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition.²⁴⁴ Moreover, the Government bore a special responsibility to facilitate the establishment of the forces, including through the provision of resources. Furthermore, while noting the announcement by President Salva Kiir Mayardit that elections would take place in 2023, the Special Representative urged the Government to promote the fundamental human rights of all South Sudanese, including the freedom of expression, to create a platform for democratic dialogue in a free and fair electoral process. He also called for further progress in the operationalization of Parliament, particularly the establishment of standing committees necessary to consider critical bills during the transition period.

²⁴¹ See [S/2021/219](#), [S/PV.8801](#), [S/PV.8859](#), and [S/PV.8931](#)

²⁴² See [S/2021/219](#).

²⁴³ See [S/PV.8859](#) and [S/PV.8931](#).

²⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8931](#).

In addition to the political process, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General also focused his briefings on the progress in the implementation of the mandate of UNMISS. Following its extension in March 2021, at the meeting held on 21 June 2021, he noted that UNMISS would advance a three-year strategic vision focus on making irreversible gains on implementing the agreed transitional benchmarks, making optimal use of uniformed personnel to enhance general security and political engagement at the grassroots level, and promoting greater coherence among international partners such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union, the European Union, the “Troika” (Norway, United Kingdom and United States), neighbouring States, and the diplomatic community in general.²⁴⁵ On 15 December 2021, he stated that, partly because of UNMISS, the number of civilian casualties attributed to localized violence in 2021 was roughly halved compared to the same period in 2020.²⁴⁶ UNMISS continued to adapt its strategy to respond to conflict hotspots in an integrated manner, including through the flexible deployment of temporary operating bases, while also overseeing and supporting planning for the eventual redesignation of the remaining protection of civilians site in Malakal to a camp for internally displaced persons. He underlined that, with the broader Horn of Africa region facing complex political, security and humanitarian challenges, it was essential more than ever to ensure that South Sudan remained stable.

Concerning the humanitarian situation in South Sudan, the representatives of OCHA updated the Council on the most recent trends, particularly rising levels of food insecurity, further displacement, and flooding. On 15 September 2021, the Director for Operations and Advocacy informed Council members that the people of South Sudan faced the highest levels of food insecurity since independence in 2011, with over 60 per cent of the population being severely food insecure and 8.3 million in need of humanitarian assistance, including 1.4 million children.²⁴⁷ Further, some 108,000 people faced catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity at the height of the lean season, with conflict as the major driver fueling displacement and leading to the loss of lives, assets and livelihoods and disproportionately impacting women and girls. The challenging situation was further compounded by new emerging needs because of the sub-

²⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8801](#).

²⁴⁶ See [S/PV.8931](#).

²⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8859](#).

national violence such as in Central and Western Equatoria. Meanwhile, there was limited change in the behaviour of non-State armed groups and certain youth groups that continued to hamper humanitarian access. In her briefing on 15 December 2021, the Director of the Coordination Division noted that around 300,000 people were displaced between March and October 2021, bringing the number of internally displaced to two million.²⁴⁸ The effects of climate change were also being felt, with catastrophic flooding for the third consecutive year, impacting some 835,000 people in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states. Conflict, as well as violence directed at aid workers and their assets, operational interference, bureaucratic impediments, and physical access challenges continued to impact the humanitarian response. The Director stressed the need for adequate and early funding for the humanitarian response plan, particularly to avert catastrophic food insecurity levels, for the Government and non-State actors to abide by their obligation to facilitate safe and unhindered humanitarian access, and for all actors with influence to ensure the protection of civilians across the country.

Civil society briefers focused, in their statements, on the human rights and political situations in South Sudan. In her briefing at the open videoconference held on 3 March 2021, the Founder and National Director of the Centre for Inclusive Governance, a local non-governmental organization that worked on human rights, justice, peacebuilding, and women's rights in South Sudan, underlined that the country's leaders had to be held accountable for implementing key aspects of the Revitalized Agreement in the remainder of the transitional period.²⁴⁹ As key pending tasks, she highlighted the need to reconstitute state and national legislatures, establish transitional mechanisms, constitutional reform, security sector reform, disarmament and demobilization, and the upholding of human rights. She called on the Council to pressure the parties to take concrete steps to ensure that the 35 per cent quota for the representation of women at all levels of governance was met and on UNMISS to join civil society in advocating for the respect of fundamental rights and to support human rights defenders and civil society organizations facing intimidation in carrying out their essential work.

²⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8931](#).

²⁴⁹ See [S/2021/219](#).

On 21 June 2021, the Executive Director and co-founder of the Organization for Responsive Governance, a civil society organization based in South Sudan, stated that ineffective political leadership and a neglect of principles that guided the country's struggle for independence resulted in a meltdown in all sectors, including politics and governance, security, and the economy.²⁵⁰ She stressed the need for the unity Government to effectively discharge its mandate, governance based on the principles of the struggle, and for the Council to support these efforts, working jointly with IGAD, the African Union and other actors to raise the cost of the willful sabotage of peace implementation. On 15 September 2021, Ms. Merekaje Lorna Nanjia, a South Sudanese civil society activist, stated that the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement had been minimal, inconsistent, intermittent, and slow.²⁵¹ Human rights violations occurred in different forms, while the provision of services, addressing youth unemployment and the exclusion of women from national processes did not seem to be national priorities. She recommended for the Council to mandate UNMISS to support the implementation of key legislative reforms and an inclusive and participatory constitution-making process, facilitate the conduct of free, fair and peaceful elections, provide capacity-building and facilitation in the rule of law, justice, governance and accountability sectors, and to facilitate periodic engagement between the Government and civil society or citizens groups to build confidence and support the implementation of the agreement.

During their discussions on South Sudan, Council members welcomed the establishment of the Transitional Legislative Assembly and Council of States, state-level appointments, and the Government's approval for the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan. Nevertheless, they also noted the significant delays in security sector reform, the full operationalization of the Assembly and the constitution-making process, establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, women's participation in the agreement and initial preparations and planning for elections. Some speakers underscored the need for the international community's political, financial, and

²⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8801](#).

²⁵¹ See [S/PV.8859](#).

technical assistance to the Revitalized Agreement.²⁵² Council members discussed the ongoing review of the sanctions measures concerning South Sudan against the benchmarks, with some emphasizing the negative impact of the measures on the implementation of the security provisions of the Revitalized Agreement.²⁵³ Other speakers rejected the notion that the delays in security sector reform, notably the graduation of the Necessary Unified Forces, were linked to the arms embargo,²⁵⁴ with some of them inviting the Transitional Government to utilize the exemption procedures provided under resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#).²⁵⁵

In the context of rising food insecurity and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the country, speakers called on the international community to increase humanitarian assistance for South Sudan.²⁵⁶ Council members widely expressed concern regarding subnational violence in South Sudan and its impact on civilians, including violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and conflict-related sexual violence. Noting the increasing restrictions on civil space, some speakers called on the Government to ensure respect for human rights and the freedom of expression.²⁵⁷ Council members further called on South Sudan to abide by the status of forces agreement signed with the United Nations²⁵⁸ and on all parties to facilitate the safe and unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance.²⁵⁹

By resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#) of 12 March 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year until 15 March 2022,²⁶⁰ introducing some modifications to the Mission's tasks while maintaining its composition. UNMISS was

²⁵² See [S/2021/219](#), Kenya, (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and South Sudan; [S/PV.8801](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia); and [S/PV.8859](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia).

²⁵³ See [S/PV.8859](#), Russian Federation and Viet Nam and [S/PV.8931](#), Russian Federation, Viet Nam and China.

²⁵⁴ See [S/PV.8801](#), United States and [S/PV.8931](#), United States, Mexico, Estonia, United Kingdom and France.

²⁵⁵ See [S/PV.8801](#), United States and [S/PV.8931](#), United States, Estonia and United Kingdom.

²⁵⁶ See [S/2021/219](#), China, India, United Kingdom, and Viet Nam; [S/PV.8801](#), India, Viet Nam, Kenya and China; [S/PV.8859](#), India, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Viet Nam, and China; and [S/PV.8931](#), United States, India, Viet Nam, and China.

²⁵⁷ See [S/PV.8859](#), France, Estonia and Ireland and [S/PV.8931](#), United States, Estonia, United Kingdom, and France.

²⁵⁸ See [S/2021/219](#), Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom, and United States; [S/PV.8801](#), United States and Ireland; [S/PV.8859](#), India; and [S/PV.8931](#), United States and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

²⁵⁹ See [S/2021/219](#), France and Mexico; [S/PV.8801](#), France; [S/PV.8859](#), United States, Mexico, Kenya, Viet Nam, and Norway; and [S/PV.8931](#), Mexico, Estonia, United Kingdom, and Viet Nam.

²⁶⁰ See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNMISS, see part X, sect. I.

further requested to advance a three-year strategic vision to prevent a return to civil war, build a durable peace, support inclusive and accountable governance and free, fair, and peaceful elections in accordance with the Revitalized Agreement.²⁶¹ In a presidential statement of the Council issued on 27 October 2021, the Council took note of the conclusions of an elections needs assessment mission conducted further to resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#) and requested the Secretary-General to establish an integrated electoral assistance team led by UNMISS to implement the electoral assistance activities as defined in the Revitalized Agreement.²⁶² The presidential statement recognized that conducting free and fair elections, reflecting the will of all South Sudanese and with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, youth, people with disabilities, displaced persons, refugees, and members of all political groups, would be critical for a transition towards a stable, inclusive, democratic and self-reliant State.²⁶³ The Council further underscored that elections would need to be preceded by an inclusive and transparent constitution-drafting process.²⁶⁴

In addition to the regular briefings relating to South Sudan and UNMISS, on 15 December 2021, Council members heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), providing a summary of the work of the Committee in 2021, including its discussions on the final report of the Panel of Experts of 14 April 2021 and the visit of the Chair to South Sudan from 16 to 20 November 2021.²⁶⁵ By resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#) of 28 May 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze on South Sudan until 31 May 2022, as well as the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 1 July 2022.²⁶⁶ The Council expressed its readiness to review arms embargo, through inter alia, the suspension, or progressive lifting of these measures, in the light of progress of key benchmarks outlined in the resolution.²⁶⁷

²⁶¹ See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

²⁶² See [S/PRST/2021/20](#), third paragraph. See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 27.

²⁶³ See [S/PRST/2021/20](#), fourth paragraph.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ See [S/PV.8931](#). See also letter dated 14 April 2021 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2021/365](#)).

²⁶⁶ See resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1, 11 and 17.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., paras. 2(a)-(e). See also report of the Secretary-General dated 31 March 2021 providing benchmarks to assess the arms embargo on South Sudan ([S/2021/321](#)).

Resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions cast by India and Kenya. In the statement submitted further to the vote, the delegation of India stated that the resolution had imposed certain benchmarks for the lifting or easing of the arms embargo which did not consider positive developments in South Sudan and some of which were administrative in nature and disregarded the genuine challenges that the country was facing.²⁶⁸ Recalling the calls by IGAD and the African Union for the lifting of all sanctions, the delegation of Kenya affirmed that the arms embargo and targeted sanctions had not been effective tools in support of the South Sudan peace process but rather, in certain cases, counterproductive. While the resolution was an improvement on the preceding one, the delegation of Kenya posited that more flexibility could have been extended to make the eventual lifting of the sanctions realistic and certain. Voting in favour of the resolution, the delegations of China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Viet Nam underscored the importance of reviewing the sanctions measures with a view to their future adjustment and eventual lifting.²⁶⁹

Table 1
Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan– the Sudan

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8784 3 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (S/2021/470)	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2021/521)			Two Council members (Russian Federation, United States)	Resolution 2579 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8791 9 June 2021			Sudan	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees ^a	

²⁶⁸ See [S/2021/518](#).

²⁶⁹ Ibid., China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Viet Nam.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8795 14 June 2021			Sudan		One Council member (Estonia) ^b , Sudan	
S/PV.8825 27 July 2021			Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support	12 Council members ^c , all invitees	
S/PV.8829 2 August 2021						S/PRST/2021/14
S/PV.8856 14 September 2021			Sudan		One Council member (Estonia) ^d , Sudan	
S/PV.8857 14 September 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (S/2021/766)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Mission in Sudan, Regional Director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa	12 Council members ^e , all invitees ^f	
S/PV.8924 10 December 2021			Sudan		One Council member (Estonia) ^g , Sudan	
S/PV.8925 10 December 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (S/2021/1008)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan	12 Council members ^h , all invitees	

^a The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court participated in the meeting via videoconference.

^{bdg} The representative of Estonia spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#).

^c China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^e China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States and Viet Nam.

^f The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and the Regional Director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa participated in the meeting via videoconference.

^h China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

Table 2
Videoconferences: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
11 February 2021	S/2021/136	Letter dated 11 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2562 (2021) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII) S/2021/131 (record of written procedure)
9 March 2021	S/2021/246	Letter dated 11 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
25 March 2021	S/2021/308	Letter dated 29 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
20 May 2021	S/2021/495	Letter dated 21 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

Table 3
Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan and South Sudan and Abyei

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8887 27 October 2021	Letter dated 17 September 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/805) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2021/881)		South Sudan, Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel	12 Council members ^a , all invitees	S/PRST/2021/20

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8904 15 November 2021		Draft resolution submitted by the United States (S/2021/948)				Resolution 2606 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8932 15 December 2021		Draft resolution submitted by the United States (S/2021/1034)	South Sudan		Russian Federation, South Sudan	Resolution 2609 (2021) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII)

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

Table 4
Videoconferences: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan and South Sudan and Abyei

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
26 April 2021	S/2021/408	Letter dated 28 April 2021 from the President of the Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
11 May 2021	S/2021/458	Letter dated 11 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2575 (2021) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII) S/2021/450 (record of written procedure)

Table 5
Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – South Sudan

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8801 21 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2021/566)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Executive Director and co-founder of the Organization for Responsive Governance	12 Council members ^a , all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8859 15 September 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2021/784)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of UNMISS, Director for Operations and Advocacy in the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ms. Lorna Nanjia, civil society activist	12 Council members ^c , all invitees ^d	
S/PV.8931 15 December 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2021/1015)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of UNMISS, Director of the Coordination Division, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	Twelve Council members ^e , all invitees ^f	

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^b The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and the Executive Director and co-founder of the Organization for Responsive Governance participated in the meeting via videoconference.

^c China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^d The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Ms. Nanjia participated in the meeting via videoconference.

^e China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam. The representative of Viet Nam spoke twice, once in his national capacity and once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2016\)](#).

^f The Director of the Coordination Division, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, participated in the meeting via videoconference.

Table 6
Videokonferences: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – South Sudan

<i>Videokonference date</i>	<i>Videokonference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
3 March 2021	S/2021/219	Letter dated 5 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
12 March 2021	S/2021/259	Letter dated 12 March 2021 from the President of the Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2567 (2021) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII) S/2021/254 (record of written procedure)
28 May 2021	S/2021/518	Letter dated 28 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2577 (2021) 13-0-2 ^a (Chapter VII) S/2021/515

^a *For*: China, Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam; *abstaining*: India and Kenya.