



Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council

20th Supplement

2016-2017

Department of Political Affairs - Security Council Affairs Division
Security Council Practices and Charter Research Branch

Part X

Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

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Introductory note

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

The powers of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs are set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and reflected in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part X covers decisions of the Council relating to field-based subsidiary organs that the Council established for the performance of its functions under the Charter and that were active during 2016 and 2017. These field-based subsidiary organs, referred to herein as peace operations, can be divided into two categories: (a) peacekeeping operations (covered in section I); and (b) special political missions and peacebuilding offices (covered in section II).

Other subsidiary organs, such as committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, special advisors, envoys, representatives and coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, are covered in part IX. Peace operations led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII, which deals with the Council's cooperation with regional organizations.

Peace operations covered in part X are presented by region and in the order in which they were established. Successor operations are listed immediately after their predecessors. The introduction to each section includes an overview table identifying the mandates assigned to each operation since its establishment and provides an analysis of the key trends and developments during the reporting period. The mandates of operations, as presented in tables 1, 2, 4 and 5, are

classified into 21 categories which are based exclusively on the language of the decisions of the Council and do not necessarily reflect the specific structure or activities of the mission. The categories are provided only as a convenience for readers and do not reflect any practice or position of the Security Council.

Based on the provisions of Council decisions, the subsections provide a summary of major developments concerning the mandates and composition of each peace operation during the period under review. For information on the mandate and composition of missions in the past, previous Supplements should be consulted.

I. Peacekeeping operations

Note

Section I focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of peacekeeping operations, as well as changes to their mandates and composition.

Overview of peacekeeping operations during 2016 and 2017

During the two-year period under review, the Council oversaw 17 peacekeeping operations,¹ terminated the mandates of two and established one new operation during 2017. Nine of these missions were in Africa, two in the Americas, one in Asia, two in Europe and three in the Middle East.

Newly established peacekeeping operations and mandate terminations and extensions

By resolutions [2284 \(2016\)](#) of 28 April 2016 and [2333 \(2016\)](#) of 23 December 2016, the Council renewed for final periods the mandates of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 30 June 2017 and 30 March 2018, respectively. By resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#) of 13 April 2017, the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for a final six-month period until 15 October 2017 and established the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

¹ For decisions and deliberations relating to the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, see part I, section 27. For discussions concerning individual peacekeeping operations, see the respective country-specific studies in part I.

(MINUJUSTH) as a follow-on peacekeeping operation to support the Government of Haiti in improving the rule of law and building peace and justice capacity. In addition, the Council extended the mandates of the following peacekeeping missions:

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO),
- African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),
- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO),
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA),
- United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS),
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA),
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA),
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

The mandates of the three remaining operations, namely the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), remained open-ended with no decision required to extend their mandates.

Mandates of peacekeeping operations, including the authorization of the use of force

In 2016 and 2017, the Council continued to recognize the need to regularly review all peacekeeping operations to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness, taking into account developments on the ground,² and requested the Secretary-General to conduct strategic reviews or assessments of the following eight peacekeeping operations: UNMIL, UNOCI, UNAMID, MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSCA, MINUSTAH and UNFICYP.³

Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the mandates of peacekeeping operations in 2016 and 2017, showing the wide range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include tasks: (i) mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; and (ii) mandated in previous periods and reiterated by the Council during the period under review. The tables also include the tasks of peacekeeping operations with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions from previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.

During the period under review, the Council reauthorized the use of force by UNOCI, MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSMA, and MINUSCA.⁴ Four other missions, namely UNAMID,

² See, for example, resolutions [2295 \(2016\)](#), para. 12; [2351 \(2017\)](#), sixth preambular paragraph; [2363 \(2017\)](#), para. 39; [2369 \(2017\)](#), fifteenth preambular paragraph; and [2373 \(2017\)](#), twentieth preambular paragraph.

³ In connection with UNMIL, resolution [2308 \(2016\)](#), para. 3; in connection with UNOCI, resolution [2260 \(2016\)](#), para. 2; in connection with UNAMID, resolution [2296 \(2016\)](#), para. 33; in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), para. 51; in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2327 \(2016\)](#), para. 32; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2281 \(2016\)](#), para. 4; in connection with MINUSTAH, resolution [2313 \(2016\)](#), para. 3; and in connection with UNFICYP, resolution [2369 \(2017\)](#), para. 12.

⁴ In connection with UNOCI, resolution [2284 \(2016\)](#), para. 16; in connection with MONUSCO, resolutions [2277 \(2016\)](#), para. 34 and [2348 \(2017\)](#), para. 33; in connection with UNMISS, resolutions [2304 \(2016\)](#), para. 4, [2326 \(2016\)](#), para. 2., [2327 \(2016\)](#), para. 7, and [2392 \(2017\)](#), para. 1; in connection with MINUSMA, resolutions [2295](#)

UNISFA, MINUJUSTH, and UNIFIL, were authorized or reauthorized to undertake all necessary action in fulfilling certain elements of their mandates such as protecting civilians, ensuring the freedom of movement and protection of United Nations personnel and equipment and of humanitarian workers, ensuring that the area of operations was not used for any hostile activities and supporting and developing national police capacities.⁵

The Council continued to task the majority of peacekeeping operations with the protection of civilians, United Nations personnel and property and humanitarian workers; the facilitation of humanitarian assistance; the provision of good offices and support for political and reconciliation processes; the monitoring and reporting on human rights violations and abuses; and demilitarization and arms management. As in previous periods, the mandates of the four peacekeeping operations established prior to the 1970s, namely MINURSO, UNMOGIP, UNTSO and UNDOF, remained relatively narrowly focused on tasks related to the monitoring of ceasefires.

In modifying or expanding mandates, the Council requested three missions with the broadest range of tasks, namely MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA, to prioritize the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel and property, support for political and reconciliation processes, support for state institutions (through stabilization and the extension of state authority), the promotion and protection of human rights and humanitarian assistance.⁶ The

(2016), para. 17 and [2364 \(2017\)](#), para. 18; and in connection with MINUSCA, resolutions [2281 \(2016\)](#), para. 2, [2301 \(2016\)](#), para. 32 and [2387 \(2017\)](#), para. 41.

⁵ In connection with UNAMID, resolutions [2296 \(2016\)](#), paras. 5 and 18, and [2363 \(2017\)](#), para. 14; in connection with UNISFA, resolutions [2287 \(2016\)](#), para. 9, [2318 \(2016\)](#), para. 9, [2352 \(2017\)](#), para. 11 and [2386 \(2017\)](#), para. 11; in connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#), para. 12; and in connection with UNIFIL, resolution [2373 \(2017\)](#), para. 14.

⁶ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), para. 34; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2295 \(2016\)](#), para. 19; and in connection with MINUSCA, resolutions [2301 \(2016\)](#), para. 33 and [2387 \(2017\)](#), para. 42.

Council further requested MINUSMA and MINUSCA to implement a phased approach for this purpose.⁷ With respect to UNAMID, the Council requested the Mission to implement its mandate based on a “two-pronged approach” combining peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks in different geographical areas.⁸

Peacekeeping operations deployed in complex and volatile security environments were requested to take “robust” measures in defence of their mandates, particularly as they related to the protection of civilians and United Nations and humanitarian personnel. In this regard, MONUSCO was requested to ensure “effective and dynamic” protection of civilians by, inter alia, preventing armed groups from inflicting violence on the populations; while MINUSMA and MINUSCA were respectively mandated to take “robust and active steps” and to take a “proactive and robust posture” to protect civilians.⁹ Further, the Council decided that UNMISS would include a Regional Protection Force with the authorization to use “all necessary means”— including undertaking “robust action”— in the implementation of its mandate and to engage any actor found to be preparing or engaging in attacks against United Nations protection of civilians sites, or other United Nations premises, United Nations personnel, and humanitarian actors.¹⁰

Emphasizing the importance of a comprehensive approach to the protection of civilians, the Council requested UNAMID, MINUSMA and MINUSCA to enhance early warning to anticipate, deter and counter threats, through the implementation of mission-wide strategies and

⁷ In connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2364 \(2017\)](#), para. 48(i); and in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2301 \(2016\)](#), para. 31.

⁸ Resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#), para. 2.

⁹ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), para. 34(i)(a); in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2295 \(2016\)](#), paras. 19(c)(ii); and in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2387 \(2017\)](#), para. 39.

¹⁰ Resolution [2304 \(2016\)](#), paras. 8 and 10(c).

strengthened civil-military cooperation for this purpose.¹¹ UNMISS was also specifically tasked with deterring and preventing sexual and gender-based violence.¹²

The Council continued to underscore the primary importance of peacekeeping operations' support for inclusive political and reconciliation processes by, for example, mandating MINUSCA to enhance its support for inclusive political dialogue and to assist efforts of the national and local authorities for an increased participation of political parties, civil society, and women in the peace process.¹³ Further, UNMIL, MONUSCO and MINUSMA were requested to support electoral and constitutional referendum processes in furtherance of peace agreements and political transition processes.¹⁴

Addressing impunity and support for transitional justice mechanisms remained prominent mandated tasks for several missions, with MINUSMA being requested to support the establishment of an international commission of inquiry and the operationalization of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission; and MINUSCA being tasked to conduct a mapping of human rights violations and abuses in the Central African Republic since 2003 to inform efforts to fight impunity, as well as to provide the authorities with technical assistance to identify, investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes involving violations of international humanitarian law

¹¹ In connection with UNAMID, resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#), paras. 15(a)(i) to (iii); in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2295 \(2016\)](#), paras. 19(c)(ii) and 22; and in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2301 \(2016\)](#), paras. 33(a)(i) and (iii).

¹² Resolution [2327 \(2016\)](#), para. 7(a)(v).

¹³ Resolution [2387 \(2017\)](#), para. 42(b)(i) and (ii).

¹⁴ In connection with UNMIL, resolution [2333 \(2016\)](#), para. 12; in connection with MONUSCO, resolutions [2277 \(2016\)](#), paras. 35(ii) (c) and [2348 \(2017\)](#), paras. 34(ii) (a), (c) and (d); and in connection with MINUSMA resolution [2364 \(2017\)](#), paras. 8 and 20(a)(iv) and (b).

and abuses of human rights.¹⁵ The Council also requested UNMISS to monitor, investigate and report on incidents of hate speech and incitement to violence in cooperation with the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.¹⁶

In terms of cross-cutting issues, the Council tasked several missions, namely UNMIL, MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUJUSTH, to take gender issues fully into account throughout the implementation of their mandates and to encourage the participation of women in national political and transition processes.¹⁷ MONUSCO and MINUSCA were also newly mandated to ensure that the environmental impact of their operations was fully taken into account in the implementation of their mandates.¹⁸

¹⁵ In connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2295 \(2016\)](#), paras. 19(a)(iii); and in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2301 \(2016\)](#), paras. 33(b)(i) and 34(d)(iv).

¹⁶ Resolution [2327 \(2016\)](#), para. 7(b)(iii).

¹⁷ In connection with UNMIL, resolution [2333 \(2016\)](#), para. 8; in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), para. 37; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2295 \(2016\)](#), para. 26; and in connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#), para. 15.

¹⁸ See, in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), para. 48; and in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2387 \(2017\)](#), para. 48.

Table 1
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2016-2017: Africa

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>UNMIL</i>	<i>UNOCI</i>	<i>UNAMID</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>
Chapter VII		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Authorization of the use of force			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ceasefire monitoring	X						X	X	
Civil-military coordination				X	X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Electoral assistance	X	X			X		X	X	X
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support	X		X	X			X	X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mission impact assessment					X			X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of humanitarian/UN personnel and facilities/Free movement of personnel and equipment		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Public information		X	X		X			X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters		X		X	X	X		X	X
Security monitoring – patrolling – deterrence		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform		X	X		X		X	X	X
Support to military			X		X			X	X
Support to police	X	X		X	X	X	X		X
Support to sanctions regimes		X		X	X		X	X	X
Support to State institutions		X	X	X	X		X	X	X

Abbreviations: MINURSO – United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia; UNOCI – United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire; UNAMID – African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; MONUSCO – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic

of the Congo; UNISFA – United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS – United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan; MINUSMA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSCA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

Table 2
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2016-2017: Americas, Asia, Europe and Middle East

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINUSTAH</i>	<i>MINUJUSTH</i>	<i>UNMOGIP</i>	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNTSO</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>
Chapter VII	X	X			X			
Authorization of the use of force		X						X
Civil-military coordination					X			
Ceasefire monitoring			X	X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management	X							X
Electoral assistance	X							
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict	X	X			X			
Humanitarian support	X			X	X			X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X		X	X			X
Political process	X	X		X	X			
Protection of civilians	X	X						X
Protection of humanitarian/UN personnel and facilities/Free movement of personnel and equipment	X							X
Public information	X							
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X						
Security monitoring-patrolling-deterrence								X
Security sector reform	X							
Support to military								X
Support to police	X	X		X	X			
Support to sanctions regimes								
Support to State institutions	X	X			X			X

Abbreviations: MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti; MINUJUSTH – United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti.; UNMOGIP – United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNTSO – United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNDOF - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

Authorized strength of peacekeeping operations

As illustrated in table 3, during the review period, the Council modified the composition of 11 peacekeeping operations. The military and/or police components of UNMIL, UNOCI, UNAMID, MONUSCO, UNISFA, and MINUSTAH were decreased. The Council also increased the military and/or police components of UNMISS, MINUSMA, MINUSCA and UNFICYP and authorized the initial deployment of police personnel in MINUJUSTH.

Table 3
Changes in composition of peacekeeping operations, 2016-2017

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Changes in composition</i>	<i>Decision</i>
UNMIL	The military component was reduced from 1,240 to 434, comprising one company and appropriate enablers, including aviation assets	2333 (2016)
	The police component was reduced from 606 to 310, including two formed police units and individual police officers	
UNOCI	The military component was reduced from 5,437 to 4,000	2260 (2016)
	The military component was further reduced to 2,000 by 31 August 2016 followed by final reductions and completed withdrawal from February 2017 to 30 April 2017	
UNAMID	The police component was reduced from 500 to 250 individual police officers by December 2016 followed by the progressive repatriation of the remainder by 30 April 2017 and repatriation of three out of six formed police units in March and April 2016 followed by the repatriation of the remainder by March and April 2017	2284 (2016)
	The military component was reduced from 15,845 to 11,395 by 29 December 2017 and to 8,735 from 31 January 2018 and by 30 June 2018	
UNAMID	The police component was reduced from 1,583 personnel and 13 formed police units of up to 140 personnel to 2,888 personnel including individual police officers and members of formed police units by 29 December 2017 and to 2,500 personnel including police officers and members of formed police units from 31 January 2018 and by 30 June 2018	2363 (2017)
	The military component was reduced from 19,815 to 16,215 troops and 760 to 660 military observers and staff officers	2348 (2017)
UNISFA	The military component was reduced from 5,326 to 4,791	2352 (2017)
UNMISS	The military component was increased from 13,000 to 17,000, including 4,000 for the Regional Protection Force	2304 (2016)
	The police component was increased from 2,001 to 2,101, including individual police officers, formed police units and 78 corrections officers	2327 (2016)
MINUSMA	The military component was increased from 11,240 to 13,289	2295 (2016)
	The police component was increased from 1,440 to 1,920	
MINUSCA	The corrections officers were increased from 40 to 108 as part of police component	2264 (2016)
		2387 (2017)

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Changes in composition</i>	<i>Decision</i>
	The military component was increased from 10,750 to 11,650 personnel	
MINUSTAH	The military component of 2,370 was ordered to withdraw by 15 October 2017 The police component was reduced from 2,601 to seven formed police units (or 980 personnel) and 295 individual police officers by 15 October 2017	2350 (2017)
MINUJUSTH	A component consisting of up to seven formed police units (or 980 personnel) and 295 individual police officers was authorized	2350 (2017)
UNFICYP	The military component was increased from 860 to 888	2263 (2016)

Abbreviations: UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia; UNOCI - United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire; UNAMID - African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; MONUSCO – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA – United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS – United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan; MINUSMA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSCA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti; MINUJUSTH – United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti; UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

Africa

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by the Security Council on 29 April 1991 by resolution [690 \(1991\)](#) with the mandate to monitor the ceasefire, provide security for the repatriation of refugees, reduce the threat of unexploded ordnances and mines, and support the organization of a free and fair referendum, in accordance with the settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente Polisario).¹⁹

During 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2285 \(2016\)](#) of 29 April 2016 and [2351 \(2017\)](#) of 28 April 2017 in relation to MINURSO. Consistent with prior practice, the Council, extended the mandate of MINURSO twice for periods of one year, the last being until 30 April 2018,²⁰ without any change to the Mission’s mandate. By non-unanimously adopted resolution [2285 \(2016\)](#), the Council expressed regret regarding the inability of MINURSO to fully carry out its mandate, as the majority of the Mission’s civilian component, including political personnel, could not perform their duties within the Mission’s area of operations.²¹ The Council further emphasized the urgent need for MINURSO to return to full functionality and called on the parties to fully respect the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire and to cooperate with the Mission’s operations and to ensure unhindered movement and immediate access for the UN personnel in carrying out their mandate.²²

¹⁹ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

²⁰ Resolutions [2285 \(2016\)](#), para. 1 and [2351 \(2017\)](#), para. 1. See for further background information, part I, sect. 1 on “The situation concerning Western Sahara”.

²¹ Resolution [2285 \(2016\)](#), twenty-third preambular paragraph.

²² *Ibid.*, paras. 2, 4 and 5.

United Nations Mission in Liberia

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter, by resolution [1509 \(2003\)](#) of 19 September 2003 to, inter alia, support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment, and assist in security sector reform.²³

During 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2284 \(2016\)](#) of 28 April 2016, [2308 \(2016\)](#) of 14 September 2016 and [2333 \(2016\)](#) of 23 December 2016 in relation to UNMIL.

By resolution [2308 \(2016\)](#), acting under Chapter VII, the Council recalled its previous request to the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment mission to Liberia,²⁴ and affirmed its readiness to consider, based on a review of Liberia's capacity to ensure stability and security on the ground, the withdrawal of UNMIL and transition to a future United Nations presence in order to continue to assist the Government to consolidate peace.²⁵ The Council extended the existing mandate of UNMIL, as defined in resolution [2239 \(2015\)](#), for a three month period — in contrast to the previous practice of one year extensions — until 31 December 2016.²⁶

By resolution [2333 \(2016\)](#), the Council took note of the 15 November 2016 report of the Secretary-General and the recommendations contained therein,²⁷ and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,²⁸ extended the mandate of UNMIL for a final period of 15 months, until 30 March

²³ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

²⁴ Resolution [2239 \(2015\)](#), para. 18.

²⁵ Resolution [2308 \(2016\)](#), para. 3.

²⁶ Ibid. para. 1. See for further background information, part I, sect. 2 on “The situation in Liberia”.

²⁷ [S/2016/968](#).

²⁸ France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom abstained in the vote, arguing, inter alia, that the situation in Liberia no longer constituted a threat to international peace and security and that the envisaged tasks of UNMIL

2018, and reduced the military force from 1,240 to 434 personnel and the police from 606 to 310 personnel.²⁹

The mandate of UNMIL during the period under review continued to focus on protecting the civilian population, advising the Government on the reform of the Liberia National Police, supporting the Government in the promotion and protection of human rights and in combatting sexual and gender-based violence, promoting sustainable peace, protecting United Nations personnel and equipment, providing good offices support, and enhancing inter-mission cooperation with UNOCI to support the stabilization of Liberia's border with Côte d'Ivoire.³⁰

In anticipation of the termination of the Mission's mandate, the Council also made several additions to the tasks of UNMIL. By resolution [2333 \(2016\)](#), the Council requested the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia and Head of UNMIL to use his good offices mandate to assist the Government in addressing the root causes of the conflict, as well as with the reconciliation process, constitutional and institutional reforms — especially in the rule of law and security sectors —, combatting sexual and gender-based violence, and building trust between Liberian citizens and state institutions and processes.³¹ The Council also authorized UNMIL to assist the Government with logistical support and voter registration for the October 2017 presidential and legislative elections.³²

did not require the adoption of the resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter. See [S/PV.7851](#), pp. 3 (Russian Federation), 4 (France) and 4-5 (United Kingdom).

²⁹ Resolution [2333 \(2016\)](#), seventeenth preambular paragraph, and paras. 10 and 16. For more information about the previous force structure for UNMIL see resolution [2239 \(2015\)](#), para. 15.

³⁰ Resolutions [2284 \(2016\)](#), para. 34 and [2333 \(2016\)](#), paras. 4, 11(a) to (e).

³¹ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

³² *Ibid.*, para. 12.

Furthermore, the Council requested UNMIL to work closely with the United Nations Country Team to prepare for the drawdown and closure of the Mission and the transfer of tasks; and requested the Secretary-General to develop a peacebuilding plan to direct the role of the United Nations system and other relevant actors in supporting Liberia's transition.³³ Finally, UNMIL was requested to take into account a gender perspective in implementing all aspects of its mandate.³⁴

On 24 July 2017, the Council issued a presidential statement welcoming the submission of the peacebuilding plan by the Secretary-General,³⁵ and urged UNMIL, the Government and the Country Team to continue to coordinate closely in the transfer of responsibilities in view of the Mission's drawdown and closure.³⁶

³³ *Ibid.*, para. 13.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 8.

³⁵ [S/2017/282](#).

³⁶ [S/PRST/2017/11](#), first and seventh paragraphs.

United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was established by the Security Council on 27 February 2004 by resolution [1528 \(2004\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter. UNOCI was authorized, inter alia, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire; assist in the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement of combatants; protect United Nations personnel, equipment and civilians; facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance; facilitate the re-establishment of state authority; provide electoral assistance; assist in the promotion and protection of human rights; and assist in the restoring of a civilian policing presence and the re-establishment of the authority of the judiciary.³⁷

During 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2260 \(2016\)](#) of 20 January 2016 and [2284 \(2016\)](#) of 28 April 2016 in relation to UNOCI. By resolution [2260 \(2016\)](#), the Council took note of the report of the Secretary-General³⁸ of 8 December 2015 on the drawdown of UNOCI and, acting under Chapter VII, decreased the authorized ceiling of the Mission’s military component from 5,437 to 4,000 personnel by 31 March 2016.³⁹ The Council further recalled its request to the Secretary-General to provide, no later than 31 March 2016, recommendations reviewing the mandate, the further downsizing and possible termination of UNOCI; and reaffirmed its intention to consider those recommendations, taking into account the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.⁴⁰

³⁷ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

³⁸ [S/2015/940](#).

³⁹ Resolution [2260 \(2016\)](#), second preambular paragraph and para 1. For more information about the previous structure of UNOCI see resolution [2226 \(2015\)](#), paras. 23 and 24.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 2. See for further background information, part I, sect. 9 on “The situation in Côte d’Ivoire”.

Taking note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General,⁴¹ and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, by resolution [2284 \(2016\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of UNOCI for a final period of 14 months until 30 June 2017.⁴² The Council also endorsed the withdrawal plan of the Secretary-General providing for the phased decrease of uniformed personnel with a view to their complete withdrawal by 30 April 2017 and the gradual reduction of the civilian component until the completion of the Mission's mandate on 30 June 2017.⁴³

By resolution [2284 \(2016\)](#), the Council authorized UNOCI until 30 April 2017 to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate⁴⁴ which would focus on the following activities: (i) supporting the Ivorian security forces to protect civilians in the event of a deterioration of the security situation, (ii) providing political facilitation and support to the Ivorian authorities to address the root causes of the conflict and consolidate peace, (iii) supporting the Government in the implementation of the national security sector reform strategy and in addressing border security challenges, (iv) contributing to the promotion and protection of human rights, (v) facilitating humanitarian assistance, (vi) contributing to the overall effort to promote sustainable peace, (vii) and protecting United Nations personnel and equipment.⁴⁵

Upon the withdrawal of uniformed personnel, from 1 May to 30 June 2017, the Council mandated UNOCI to complete the closure of the Mission and finalize the transition process to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations Country Team, including through any remaining political facilitation that may be required.⁴⁶ The Council encouraged UNOCI, the

⁴¹ [S/2016/297](#).

⁴² Resolution [2284 \(2016\)](#), second preambular paragraph and para. 14.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, paras. 17, 18, 22 and 23.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 16.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 15(a)-(g).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 18.

Government, the United Nations Country Team and bilateral and multilateral partners to map the international community's support to Côte d'Ivoire, in particular regarding any residual functions currently provided by UNOCI which may be needed after the Mission's closure.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the Council requested UNOCI to work closely with the United Nations Country Team to accelerate preparations for the closure of UNOCI by reinforcing programmatic cooperation for the transition of remaining mandated responsibilities and scaling up the activities of the Country Team, including assistance to the Government in the areas of refugee returns, security reforms, human rights, and social cohesion.⁴⁸

On 30 June 2017, upon the completion of the UNOCI mandate, the Council issued a presidential statement recognizing the Mission's contribution in promoting peace, stability and development in Côte d'Ivoire throughout its thirteen years of existence.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Ibid., para. 19.

⁴⁸ Ibid., para. 20.

⁴⁹ [S/PRST/2017/8](#), fifth paragraph.

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

The Security Council established the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) by resolution [1769 \(2007\)](#) of 31 July 2007 and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized UNAMID to take the necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of its own personnel and humanitarian workers.⁵⁰

During 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2296 \(2016\)](#) of 29 June 2016 and [2363 \(2017\)](#) of 29 June 2017 in relation to UNAMID. The Council extended the mandate of UNAMID twice for periods of one year each, the latter until 30 June 2018.⁵¹

By resolution [2296 \(2016\)](#), the Council extended the mandated tasks of UNAMID as set out in resolution [1769 \(2007\)](#). In the context of the limited progress made on the benchmarks of UNAMID and continuing insecurity in Darfur,⁵² the Council reiterated its endorsement of the Mission's strategic priorities as defined in previous resolutions, namely protection of civilians, facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel, mediation between the Government of Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD); and support to the mediation of community conflict.⁵³ Within the framework of the priorities, the Council urged the Mission to maximize the use of its capabilities, in cooperation with the United Nations Country Team and other relevant actors, in the implementation of its mission-wide comprehensive strategy for the protection of

⁵⁰ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

⁵¹ Resolutions [2296 \(2016\)](#), para. 1 and [2363 \(2017\)](#), para. 1.

⁵² See for further background information, part I, sect. 11 on "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

⁵³ Resolution [2296 \(2016\)](#), para. 2.

civilians⁵⁴ and to work with the Government, the Country Team and civil society to develop an action plan to prevent and resolve inter-community conflict in each state of Darfur.⁵⁵

The Council added several mandated tasks, as set out in the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission,⁵⁶ to the list of tasks that were no longer relevant or that were being undertaken by or would transition to other entities with “comparative advantage”.⁵⁷ Specifically, the Council referred to tasks such as assisting in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for strengthening an independent judiciary and prison system;⁵⁸ supporting the Government’s efforts to maintain public order as well as capacity-building of Sudanese law enforcement;⁵⁹ and supporting the capacity-building of the police service.⁶⁰

With reference to the development of an exit strategy for UNAMID in accordance with the Mission’s benchmarks, the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit recommendations on practical steps needed to be taken by all Sudanese parties, with the support of UNAMID, in order to make tangible progress towards achieving these benchmarks.⁶¹ On 28 October 2016, in his letter addressed to the President of the Council, the Secretary-General proposed that a joint African Union-United Nations strategic review of UNAMID be undertaken in order to provide recommendations on the Mission’s priorities and configuration.⁶²

⁵⁴ Ibid, para. 4.

⁵⁵ Ibid, para. 15.

⁵⁶ [S/2007/307/Rev. 1](#).

⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., paras. 54(g) and 55(c)(iv).

⁵⁹ Ibid., para. 55(b)(x).

⁶⁰ Ibid., paras. 55(c)(iii).

⁶¹ Resolution [2296 \(2016\)](#), para. 33.

⁶² [S/2016/915](#), para. 21.

By resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#), the Council took note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission⁶³ and expressed support for the recommendation for “a two-pronged approach” with a focus on peacekeeping in the Jebel Marra area and on peacebuilding in other areas of Darfur (outside Jebel Marra) where there had not been recent fighting.⁶⁴ According to the resolution, the focus in the Jebel Marra would be military protection, explosive remnants of war clearance and emergency relief; while in other areas of Darfur efforts would centre around stabilising the situation, supporting the police and helping to build rule of law institutions whilst continuing to protect civilians, mediate inter-communal conflict and follow up on security sector reform-related issues.⁶⁵

The Council reaffirmed, by the same resolution, the Mission’s strategic priorities as set out in resolution [2296 \(2016\)](#)⁶⁶ and included additional elements to the mandate of UNAMID.⁶⁷ For instance, as part of its protection of civilians tasks, the Council requested the Mission to identify and report threats to and attacks against civilians and to strengthen civil-military cooperation.⁶⁸ UNAMID was further requested to support the capacity-building of transitional justice, human rights and criminal justice institutions and rural courts,⁶⁹ and to support the Government in finding sustainable solutions for the voluntary return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁷⁰ Additionally, the Council requested UNAMID to provide technical and logistical support to local

⁶³ [S/2017/437](#).

⁶⁴ Resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#), para. 2. See also, [S/2017/437](#), paras. 49-51.

⁶⁵ Resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#), para. 2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 10.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 15.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 15(a)(ii).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 15(a)(vii).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 15(a) (xiii).

conflict resolution mechanisms⁷¹ and specified that the plans to address inter-communal conflict should focus on its underlying drivers and root causes.⁷² In terms of its support to the political process, the Council requested UNAMID to support the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel-led peace process, in coordination with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan;⁷³ and the implementation of DDPD provisions related to returns, internal dialogue, justice, reconciliation and land.⁷⁴

The Council *further* requested all UNAMID force, police and civilian components to work together in an integrated way and encouraged the Mission to strengthen its integration with the United Nations Country Team and with other United Nations entities operating in Darfur.⁷⁵ The Council also urged close cooperation among missions in the region, including UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNSMIL and MINUSCA.⁷⁶

In line with the recommendations of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson, by resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#), the Council decided to reduce the UNAMID authorized ceiling from 15,845 to 11,395 military personnel and, with respect to police, from 1,583 personnel and 13 formed police units of up to 140 personnel each to 2,888 police personnel including individual police officers and formed police units within a period of six months.⁷⁷ Following an assessment to be conducted after six months, according to the same resolution, the Mission's authorized

⁷¹ Ibid., para. 15(a)(viii).

⁷² Ibid., paras. 15(c)(i) and (ii).

⁷³ Ibid., para. 15(b)(i).

⁷⁴ Ibid., paras. 15(b)(ii) and (iv).

⁷⁵ Ibid., para. 11.

⁷⁶ Ibid., para. 19.

⁷⁷ Resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#), para. 5. For more information about the previous force structure for UNAMID see resolution [2173 \(2014\)](#), para. 4.

ceiling would be further reduced to 8,735 military personnel and 2,500 police personnel from 31 January to 30 June 2018 unless otherwise decided by the Council.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#), paras. 6-7.

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was established by the Security Council on 28 May 2010 by resolution [1925 \(2010\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter, to succeed the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).⁷⁹ MONUSCO was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out “its protection mandate” as set out in the resolution and tasked with, inter alia, ensuring the effective protection of civilians and supporting Government stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.

During 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2277 \(2016\)](#) of 30 March 2016, [2293 \(2016\)](#) of 23 June 2016, [2296 \(2016\)](#) of 29 June 2016, [2348 \(2017\)](#) of 31 March 2017, and [2360 \(2017\)](#) of 21 June 2017 in relation to MONUSCO. The Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO twice, for respective periods of one year, the last of which was until 31 March 2018.⁸⁰

By resolution [2277 \(2016\)](#), acting under Chapter VII, the Council decided that the strategic priorities of MONUSCO would be to contribute to the following objectives: (a) protection of civilians, through a comprehensive approach involving all Mission components, including through reduction of the threat posed by Congolese and foreign armed groups; and (b) stabilization through the establishment of functional, professional, and accountable state institutions and support to the creation of an environment conducive to peaceful, credible and timely elections.⁸¹ In pursuit of

⁷⁹ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

⁸⁰ Resolutions [2277 \(2016\)](#), para. 24 and [2348 \(2017\)](#) para. 26.

⁸¹ Resolution [2277 \(2016\)](#), para. 29(a) and (b).

these objectives, the Council further authorized MONUSCO to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate.⁸²

In addition to reiterating some of the Mission's existing tasks as priority,⁸³ the Council also mandated MONUSCO to monitor and report on human rights violations and on restrictions on political space and violence in the context of elections,⁸⁴ and to provide technical assistance and logistical support for the revision of the electoral register.⁸⁵ Moreover, besides the provision of good offices, advice and support to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the implementation of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS), the Mission was also requested to lead coordination and oversight of the Strategy⁸⁶ and to support the implementation of appropriate recommendations for justice and prison sector reforms, including with respect to accountability.⁸⁷ The Council further called on MONUSCO to urgently resume joint operations with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) to neutralize armed groups.⁸⁸

Against the backdrop of the signing of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement by Congolese political actors on 31 December 2016, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), under Chapter VII.⁸⁹ By this resolution, the Council decided that the strategic priorities of MONUSCO, would be to contribute to the protection of civilians as defined

⁸² *Ibid.*, para. 34.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, para 35.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 35(ii)(b).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, para 35 (ii)(c).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 35(iii).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 36(i)(d).

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 18.

⁸⁹ See for further background information, part I, sect. 6 on "The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo".

in the resolution, and to support the implementation of the 31 December 2016 agreement and the electoral process.⁹⁰

Consistent with the above strategic objectives, the Council reiterated a number of existing priority tasks as defined in resolution [2277 \(2016\)](#), along with several additions.⁹¹ Specifically, the Council requested MONUSCO, in coordination with regional and international partners, to provide technical and political support to relevant national institutions for the implementation of the 31 December 2016 agreement, with a view to furthering reconciliation and democratization and to pave the way for the holding of elections before the end of 2017.⁹² Additionally, the Council requested MONUSCO to include elections security in its training support to the national police.⁹³

On the protection of civilians, the Council included the task of ensuring “effective and dynamic” protection by, inter alia, preventing armed groups from inflicting violence on the populations and supporting and undertaking local mediation.⁹⁴ The Council further requested MONUSCO to guarantee effective protection of civilians, including in support of operations conducted by the Intervention Brigade to neutralize armed groups and in areas where these had been neutralized.⁹⁵ In that regard, the Secretary-General was requested to include in his quarterly reports to the Council on the implementation of the mandate of MONUSCO information on “any instances where the Mission [was] not effectively fulfilling its protection of civilians mandate”.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ Resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), para. 28.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 34.

⁹² *Ibid.* paras. 34(ii)(a).

⁹³ *Ibid.*, para. 34(ii)(d).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 34 (i)(a).

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 34(i)(d).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 52(ii).

Beyond these priority tasks, the Council requested MONUSCO to carry out its existing tasks related to stabilization, security sector reform, support to the sanctions regime and demining activities as defined previously, with several amendments.⁹⁷ In terms of stabilization, MONUSCO was tasked with providing good offices, advice and assistance to the Government in disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating Congolese combatants into civilian life as part of a community violence reduction approach under the framework of the ISSSS.⁹⁸ The Council authorized MONUSCO to work with the Government to encourage and accelerate national ownership of security sector reform, including through the development of a common national vision to be encapsulated in a national security policy.⁹⁹ Moreover, the Mission was also tasked to work with the Government in the reform of the police and to advocate for the establishment of a secretariat that would coordinate security institutions with a law enforcement mission.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, the Council stressed that any support for army reform provided by the United Nations should be for joint operations and subject to “appropriate oversight and scrutiny”.¹⁰¹ Concerning child protection, by resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), the Council requested MONUSCO to ensure the protection of children’s rights during interventions leading to the separation of children from “armed groups”,¹⁰² whilst previous resolutions also made reference to the separation of children from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC).¹⁰³ In regard to the Mission’s assistance to the Government in ensuring the representation of women at all levels, the Council

⁹⁷ Ibid., para. 35.

⁹⁸ Ibid., para. 35(i)(c).

⁹⁹ Ibid., para. 35(ii)(b).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., para. 35(ii)(a).

¹⁰¹ Ibid., para. 35(ii)(c).

¹⁰² Ibid., para. 36.

¹⁰³ Resolution [2211 \(2015\)](#), para. 11.

requested MONUSCO to take gender considerations into account in the creation of conditions conducive to the holding of elections, protection of civilians and support to stabilization efforts through, inter alia, the provision of gender advisers.¹⁰⁴ The Council also called on MONUSCO to ensure the continued work of Women Protection Advisers in supporting the Government to address sexual violence in conflict at both the strategic and operational levels.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, the Council requested MONUSCO to consider the environmental impacts of its operations when fulfilling its mandated tasks.¹⁰⁶

During the period under review, the Council modified the composition of MONUSCO. By resolution [2277 \(2016\)](#), the Council recalled the reduction of the MONUSCO Force by 2,000 troops in resolution [2211 \(2015\)](#) and reaffirmed its intention to make the reduction permanent through a revised troop ceiling and to consider further reductions once significant progress had been achieved regarding the Mission's mandate priorities.¹⁰⁷ By resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), further to the recommendations of the Secretary-General,¹⁰⁸ the Council lowered the Mission's troop ceiling, reducing authorized military personnel from 19,815 to 16,215 and military observers and

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., para. 37.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., para. 39.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., para. 48.

¹⁰⁷ Resolution [2277 \(2016\)](#), para. 27. By resolution [2211 \(2015\)](#), the Council had endorsed the recommendation of the Secretary-General to reduce the MONUSCO Force by 2,000 troops, while maintaining an authorized troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel and 760 military observers and staff officers. By resolution [2277 \(2016\)](#), the Council also took note of the recommendation of the Secretary-General in his letter of 16 December 2015 ([S/2015/983](#)) to reduce MONUSCO force levels by 1,700 troops. For further information about the composition of MONUSCO prior to the reporting period, refer to the 19th Supplement.

¹⁰⁸ In his report on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 10 March 2017 ([S/2017/206](#)), the Secretary-General recommended adjustment to the military component within existing resources and force levels by replacing existing units with more specialized capabilities.

staff officers from 760 to 660.¹⁰⁹ Further, whilst maintaining the Mission's 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units, the resolution requested the Secretary-General to explore the possibility of inter-mission cooperation through the appropriate transfer of troops from other missions.¹¹⁰

The Secretary-General was also requested to conduct a strategic review of the Mission to adapt its mandate to the specific needs of the post-election phase with a view to providing the Council with options, no later than 30 September 2017, concerning the reduction of the MONUSCO Force and civilian components following the implementation of the 31 December 2016 agreement and providing advice to the Council on an exit strategy.¹¹¹ The strategic review was submitted by the Secretary-General on 29 September 2017 but was not considered by the Council during the reporting period.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), para. 27.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., para. 49. In his report ([S/2017/206](#)), the Secretary-General had recommended an increase in the authorized ceiling for the police component from 1,050 to 1,370 personnel.

¹¹¹ Ibid. paras. 51(a) and (b).

¹¹² [S/2017/827](#). In his special report on the strategic review of MONUSCO of 29 September 2017, given the uncertainty surrounding the elections, the Secretary-General recommended for the Mission to take further steps to reorient its activities around two key strategic priorities, namely: (a) support for the implementation of the 31 December 2016 agreement, in order to pave the way for credible elections; and (b) protection of civilians and human rights monitoring and reporting, to mitigate, to the extent possible, the impact of the prevailing crisis on the civilian population. The report further recommended possible adjustments to the mandate and composition of MONUSCO upon the holding of credible elections and the peaceful transfer of power.

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

The Security Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by resolution [1990 \(2011\)](#) of 27 June 2011, taking into account the Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area of 20 June 2011 signed between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. The resolution mandated UNISFA to, inter alia, monitor and verify the redeployment of Sudanese Armed Forces, Sudan People's Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei Area, participate in relevant bodies as stipulated in the Agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized UNISFA to take "the necessary actions," inter alia, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, ensure security, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protect United Nations and humanitarian personnel and property. By resolution [2024 \(2011\)](#) of 14 December 2011, the Council expanded the mandate of UNISFA to assist Sudan and South Sudan in the observance of their border security agreement and support the operational activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM).¹¹³

During 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2287 \(2016\)](#) of 12 May 2016, [2296 \(2016\)](#) of 29 June 2016, [2318 \(2016\)](#) of 15 November 2016, [2352 \(2017\)](#) of 15 May 2017, [2363 \(2017\)](#) of 29 June 2017 and [2386 \(2017\)](#) of 15 November 2017 in relation to UNISFA.

The Council extended the existing mandate of UNISFA four times for periods of six months each, the last being until 15 May 2018,¹¹⁴ without modification to the mandate of the Mission.¹¹⁵ The Council reiterated the language of previous resolutions in that UNISFA's protection of civilians mandate would include taking the necessary actions to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of violence,¹¹⁶ and reaffirmed the Mission's tasks in ensuring that the Abyei area remained weapons free.¹¹⁷ The Council reiterated its support for the initiatives of UNISFA to facilitate inter-communal dialogue between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka and to support community policing.¹¹⁸ The

¹¹³ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

¹¹⁴ Resolutions [2287 \(2016\)](#), para. 1; [2318 \(2016\)](#), para. 1; [2352 \(2017\)](#), para. 1; and [2386 \(2017\)](#), para. 1.

¹¹⁵ See for further background information, part I, sect. 11 on "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

¹¹⁶ Resolutions [2287 \(2016\)](#), para. 9; [2318 \(2016\)](#), para. 9; [2352 \(2017\)](#), para. 11; and [2386 \(2017\)](#), para. 11.

¹¹⁷ Resolutions [2287 \(2016\)](#), paras. 12 and 13; [2318 \(2016\)](#), paras. 12 and 13; [2352 \(2017\)](#), paras. 14 and 15; and [2386 \(2017\)](#), paras. 14 and 15.

¹¹⁸ Resolutions [2287 \(2016\)](#), paras. 15-16; [2318 \(2016\)](#), paras. 16-17; [2352 \(2017\)](#), paras. 19-20; and [2386 \(2017\)](#), para. 19-20.

Council also urged close cooperation among missions in the region, including UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMISS and MINUSCA.¹¹⁹

By resolution [2352 \(2017\)](#), regretting the lack of significant progress made by Sudan and South Sudan on the benchmarks for the JBVMM and the unnecessary impediments to its operations,¹²⁰ the Council decided to extend the Mission's mandate to support the JBVMM for a final six-month period unless the parties demonstrated through their actions clear commitment and steadfast guarantees for its implementation.¹²¹ Six months thereafter, by resolution [2386 \(2017\)](#), noting a similar lack of progress, the Council decided to extend the mandate of UNISFA to support the JBVMM for a final period of five months until 15 April 2018 unless Sudan and South Sudan met a series of conditions, including facilitating the full freedom of movement of UNISFA air and ground patrols and the operationalization of the JBVMM team sites.¹²²

With respect to the composition of UNISFA, by resolution [2352 \(2017\)](#), the Council decreased the authorized troop ceiling from 5,326 to 4,791 personnel.¹²³ In the subsequent resolution [2386 \(2017\)](#), the Council decided to maintain the troop ceiling until 15 April 2018, the date at which the UNISFA authorized troop ceiling would decrease to 4,235 personnel unless a decision was made to extend the UNISFA mandate in support of the JBVMM.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹ Resolutions [2296 \(2016\)](#), para. 26.

¹²⁰ Resolution [2352 \(2017\)](#), twelfth preambular paragraph.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 1 and 8.

¹²² Resolution [2386 \(2017\)](#), paras. 2 and 9.

¹²³ Resolution [2352 \(2017\)](#), para. 9. The Council also took note of the recommendations of the strategic review of UNISFA as presented by the Secretary-General in his report of 5 April 2017 which provided that the Mission "as it currently stands is optimally suited to successfully discharged the security and other aspects of its mandate" ([S/2017/293](#), para. 58). For further information about the composition of UNISFA prior to the reporting period, refer to the 19th Supplement.

¹²⁴ Resolution [2386 \(2017\)](#), para. 3.

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

By resolution [1996 \(2011\)](#) of 8 July 2011, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with the mandate to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term state-building and economic development; support the Government of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and to protect civilians; and support the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations Country Team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors. Moreover, UNMISS was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its “protection mandate”.¹²⁵

During the review period and against the backdrop of changing circumstances for the Mission,¹²⁶ the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS in a variety of ways. In 2016, the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS twice for periods of four months and one year,¹²⁷ and agreed to the technical rollover of the Mission’s mandate in two instances for one and twelve days.¹²⁸ In 2017, the Council again decided to extend the mandate for three months until 15 March 2018.¹²⁹

During 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2296 \(2016\)](#) of 29 June 2016, [2302 \(2016\)](#) of 29 July 2016, [2304 \(2016\)](#) of 12 August 2016, [2326 \(2016\)](#) of 15 December 2016, [2327 \(2016\)](#) of 16 December 2016, [2363 \(2017\)](#) of 29 June 2017 and [2392 \(2017\)](#) of 14 December 2017 in relation to UNMISS. After the intensification of fighting between the Government of South Sudan and opposition forces in Juba in July 2016 resulting in attacks on civilians and United Nations and humanitarian personnel and premises, the Council adopted non-unanimously resolution [2304 \(2016\)](#),¹³⁰ taking note of the decisions of the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and decided to authorize, under Chapter VII, a Regional Protection Force (RPF) as part of UNMISS consisting of 4,000 troops.¹³¹ The RPF was mandated to “provide a secure environment in and around Juba” and

¹²⁵ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

¹²⁶ See for further background information, part I, sect. 11 on “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”.

¹²⁷ Resolution [2304 \(2016\)](#), paras. 4, 8 and 16, extending the mandate for a period of four months with authorization of a Regional Protection Force as part of UNMISS and requesting the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment of the UNMISS mandate during that period; and resolution [2327 \(2016\)](#), para. 5, extending the mandate for one year.

¹²⁸ Resolutions [2326 \(2016\)](#), para. 1 and [2302 \(2016\)](#), para. 1.

¹²⁹ Resolution [2392 \(2017\)](#), para. 1.

¹³⁰ See for further details, part I, sect. 11 on “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”.

¹³¹ Resolution [2304 \(2016\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph and paras. 8 and 14.

to use “all necessary means, including undertaking robust action where necessary” to accomplish its mandate to facilitate the conditions for safe and free movement into, out of, and around Juba; protect the airport and other key facilities; and engage any actor found to be “preparing attacks, or engag[ing] in attacks” against United Nations protection of civilians sites or other premises, United Nations personnel, humanitarian actors, or civilians.¹³² Accordingly, the Council increased the force levels of UNMISS up to a ceiling of 17,000 to include the RPF.¹³³

In the same resolution, the Council renewed the mandate of UNMISS as defined in resolution [2252 \(2015\)](#), including the authorization to use all necessary means, inter alia, to protect United Nations personnel and property and to protect civilians.¹³⁴ In relation to ceasefire monitoring, the Council urged IGAD, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, UNMISS and the parties to the Agreement to review the status of the security arrangements as provided thereunder and to develop proposals to ensure their efficacy.¹³⁵

Four months later, further to the recommendations of the Secretary-General on steps to adapt UNMISS to the situation on the ground requested by the Council in resolution [2304 \(2016\)](#)¹³⁶ and acting under Chapter VII, by resolution [2327 \(2016\)](#), the Council reiterated the existing priorities and tasks of UNMISS and made several modifications regarding the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, in particular against women and girls;¹³⁷ the establishment and operationalization of an inclusive Joint Integrated Police;¹³⁸ the support to the national constitution-making process, in coordination with the United Nations Country Team;¹³⁹ and the monitoring, investigation and reporting on incidents of hate speech and incitement to violence in cooperation with the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.¹⁴⁰ The Council also increased the level of police personnel from 2,001 to 2,101, including individual police officers, formed police units and 78 corrections officers.¹⁴¹

¹³² Ibid, paras. 8 and 10.

¹³³ Ibid, para. 14.

¹³⁴ Resolution [2304 \(2016\)](#), paras. 4 and 5.

¹³⁵ Ibid., para. 3.

¹³⁶ Ibid., para. 18. See also [S/2016/950](#) and [S/2016/951](#).

¹³⁷ Resolution [2327 \(2016\)](#), paras. 7(a)(v).

¹³⁸ Ibid., para. 7(d)(viii).

¹³⁹ Ibid., paras. 7(d)(ii) and (iii).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., para. 7(b)(iii).

¹⁴¹ Ibid., para. 6. For further information about the composition of UNMISS prior to the reporting period, refer to the 19th Supplement.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

The Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by resolution [2100 \(2013\)](#) of 25 April 2013, under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSMA was authorized to use all necessary means to stabilize population centres and support the re-establishment of state authority, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property, support humanitarian assistance and national and international justice, and support cultural preservation.¹⁴²

During 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2284 \(2016\)](#) of 28 April 2016, [2295 \(2016\)](#) of 29 June 2016, [2359 \(2017\)](#) of 21 June 2017, [2364 \(2017\)](#) of 29 June 2017, [2374 \(2017\)](#) of 5 September 2017 and [2391 \(2017\)](#) of 8 December 2017 concerning MINUSMA.¹⁴³ During this period, the Council extended the mandate of MINUSMA twice, as per previous practice, for periods of one year each, the last until 30 June 2018.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, by resolution [2295 \(2016\)](#), the Council increased the Mission's force levels from 11,240 to 13,289 military personnel and from 1,440 to 1,920 police personnel.¹⁴⁵

By resolution [2295 \(2016\)](#), acting under Chapter VII, the Council decided that the strategic priority of MINUSMA would be to support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali signed on 20 June 2015 (the Agreement), including the gradual restoration

¹⁴² For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

¹⁴³ See for further background information, part I, sect. 15 on "The situation in Mali".

¹⁴⁴ Resolutions [2295 \(2016\)](#), para. 14 and [2364 \(2017\)](#), para. 15.

¹⁴⁵ Resolution [2295 \(2016\)](#), para. 15. For further information about the composition of MINUSMA prior to the reporting period, refer to the 18th and 19th Supplements.

of state authority, particularly in the central and northern parts of the country.¹⁴⁶ Given the complex security environment, the Council requested the Mission to “move to a more proactive and robust posture to carry out its mandate”.¹⁴⁷ The Council redefined as priority the existing MINUSMA tasks related to support for the implementation of the Agreement, the provision of good offices, the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, along with several modifications.¹⁴⁸

Specifically, MINUSMA was authorized to take “robust and active steps” to protect civilians, including through its support to the Malian authorities to stabilize key population centres by “active and effective patrolling”, and to engage in direct operations pursuant only to “serious and credible” threats.¹⁴⁹ The Mission was further requested to update its protection of civilians strategy accordingly and to identify threats to civilians, implement prevention plans and accelerate monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements.¹⁵⁰ In terms of the Mission’s mandate in relation to the political process and the extension of state authority, the resolution highlighted support for the establishment of interim administrations in the North of Mali, the redeployment of the “reformed and reconstituted” Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF), the integration of elements of the signatory armed groups into the MDSF, the establishment of an international commission of inquiry and operationalization of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the holding of a constitutional referendum, and the consideration of the needs of women associated

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., para. 16. In his report of 31 May 2016 ([S/2016/498](#)), the Secretary-General presented the recommendations of the integrated strategic review of MINUSMA conducted in March 2016.

¹⁴⁷ Resolution [2295 \(2016\)](#), para. 18.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., paras. 19(a) to (g).

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., paras. 19(c)(ii) and (d).

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 22.

with armed groups.¹⁵¹ The resolution also requested enhanced reporting by MINUSMA on the participation of women in the implementation of the Agreement.¹⁵²

Reiterating the language from previous resolutions, the Council also authorized MINUSMA to use its existing capacities to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for projects aimed at stabilizing the North of Mali; assist the Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and with the protection of cultural and historical sites from attacks; and assist the Security Council Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#), and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning ISIL(Da'esh) and Al-Qaida, and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution [1526 \(2004\)](#).¹⁵³ By resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), the Council expanded the latter tasks to include supporting the Committee and Panel of Experts established thereunder to monitor the assets freeze and travel ban on individuals and entities responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threatened the peace, security, or stability of Mali.¹⁵⁴

By resolution [2364 \(2017\)](#), acting under Chapter VII, the Council reiterated the priorities and tasks defined in resolution [2295 \(2016\)](#) with several additions. In connection with the extension of state authority, the Council requested MINUSMA to support the deployment of joint security patrols in the North of Mali and underlined that support to the MDSF in that context continued to include, inter alia, coordinated operations, operational and logistical support,

¹⁵¹ Ibid., paras. 19(a)(i) to (v).

¹⁵² Ibid. para. 26.

¹⁵³ Ibid., para. 20.

¹⁵⁴ Resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), para. 8. See part IX, sect. I, with regard to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) and part VII, sect. III with regard to measures not involving the use of armed force in accordance with Article 41.

mentoring and strengthened information sharing.¹⁵⁵ MINUSMA was further tasked to utilize its good offices to support the holding of the upcoming elections and the constitutional referendum¹⁵⁶ and to improve operational, planning and intelligence coordination between its civil, military and police components.¹⁵⁷ Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to develop a mission-wide strategic plan for a concrete phased approach to the implementation of the mandate of MINUSMA and a transition plan to hand over relevant tasks to the United Nations Country Team.¹⁵⁸

With respect to inter-mission cooperation, by resolution [2284 \(2016\)](#), the Council encouraged MINUSMA and UNOCI to continue their efforts in that regard.¹⁵⁹ By resolutions [2359 \(2017\)](#) and [2391 \(2017\)](#), the Council further called upon MINUSMA, the Group of Five Sahel joint force (Force conjointe du G5 Sahel - FC-G5S) and the French forces deployed in Mali to ensure adequate coordination and exchange of information within their respective mandates.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ Resolution [2364 \(2017\)](#), paras. 20(a)(ii) and 21.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* para. 8.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 30.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 48(i) and (ii).

¹⁵⁹ Resolution [2284 \(2016\)](#), para. 29.

¹⁶⁰ Resolutions [2359 \(2017\)](#), para. 5 and [2391 \(2017\)](#), para. 16.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was established by the Security Council on 10 April 2014 by resolution [2149 \(2014\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSCA was authorized to take “all necessary means” to, inter alia, protect civilians, United Nations personnel and property; support the implementation of the transition process; facilitate humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; support justice and the rule of law; and support the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and repatriation (DDRR) strategy.¹⁶¹

During 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2262 \(2016\)](#) of 27 January 2016, [2264 \(2016\)](#) of 9 February, [2281 \(2016\)](#) of 26 April 2016, [2296 \(2016\)](#) of 29 June 2016, [2301 \(2016\)](#) of 26 July 2016, [2339 \(2017\)](#) of 27 January 2017, [2363 \(2017\)](#) of 29 June 2017, and [2387 \(2017\)](#) of 15 November 2017 in relation to MINUSCA. Moreover, the Council extended the mandate of MINUSCA twice for periods of 15 and 12 months, the last of which was until 15 November 2018.¹⁶² By resolution [2281 \(2016\)](#), acting under Chapter VII, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of MINUSCA to ensure that its future mandate was properly adapted to a post-transition stabilization environment that would enable peacebuilding efforts in the Central African Republic and also authorized a three-month technical roll-over of the Mission’s existing mandate.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

¹⁶² Resolutions [2301 \(2016\)](#), para. 23 and [2387 \(2017\)](#), para. 31.

¹⁶³ Resolution [2281 \(2016\)](#), paras. 1 and 4. See for further details, part I, sect. 7 on “The situation in the Central African Republic”.

Further to the Special Report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of MINUSCA¹⁶⁴ and acting under Chapter VII, by resolution [2301 \(2016\)](#), the Council decided that the Mission’s mandate should be implemented based on a “prioritization of tasks” and in a “phased manner”.¹⁶⁵ Specifically, the Council defined the Mission’s existing tasks relating to the protection of civilians and the protection of United Nations personnel and property, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance as “immediate priority tasks”.¹⁶⁶ The Council also indicated that MINUSCA should maintain a proactive deployment, a mobile and flexible posture, and active patrolling, including in areas of displacement and eventual return as well as at risk communities;¹⁶⁷ and requested the Mission to identify and report threats to and attacks against civilians and implement prevention and response plans and strengthen civil-military cooperation.¹⁶⁸

According to the same resolution, the strategic objective of MINUSCA would be to support the creation of conditions conducive to the sustainable reduction of the presence of, and threat posed by, armed groups through a “comprehensive approach” and a “proactive and robust posture” that would combine and include the following “core priority tasks”: support for the reconciliation and stabilization political processes, the extension of State authority and the preservation of territorial integrity; security sector reform (SSR); disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDR and DDRR); and assistance to advance the rule of law and combat impunity.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ [S/2016/565](#).

¹⁶⁵ Resolution [2301 \(2016\)](#), para. 31.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 33(a) to (d).

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 33(a)(i).

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 33(a)(iii).

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 34(a) to (d).

Within the framework of these “core priority tasks”, the Council made several modifications to MINUSCA’s existing stabilization mandate requesting the Mission, *inter alia*, to support the authorities in addressing marginalization and local grievances through dialogue with armed groups and civil society, including women and youth groups;¹⁷⁰ support the immediate redeployment of police and gendarmerie in priority areas and main supply routes;¹⁷¹ and assist the authorities in the development and implementation of a nationally-owned strategy to address illegal taxation and exploitation of natural resources related to the presence of armed groups.¹⁷²

On security sector reform, MINUSCA was mandated to take a leading role in supporting the authorities of the Central African Republic on the reform and development of the police and the gendarmerie,¹⁷³ and to support the Government in the recruitment, vetting and training of at least 500 new personnel with the support of the United Nations Country Team and in full compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).¹⁷⁴ The Mission was requested to coordinate with the authorities in designing a plan for the re-operationalization of the Central African Republic Armed Forces (FACA) and other internal security forces in close coordination with the European Union training mission (EUTM-RCA).¹⁷⁵ The DDR mandate of MINUSCA was broadened to include support for dialogue on community security and local development with a view to addressing the root causes of conflict,¹⁷⁶ and technical assistance for the development and operationalization of a national commission for

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 34(a)(ii).

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, para. 34(a)(v).

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, paras. 34(a) (vii).

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, para. 34(b)(iii).

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, paras. 34(b)(iv).

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 34(b)(vi).

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 34(c)(ii).

small arms and light weapons to address civilian disarmament and prevent weapons proliferation.¹⁷⁷ In connection with the rule of law, the Council specified that MINUSCA should provide the authorities with technical assistance to identify, investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes involving violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights;¹⁷⁸ and conduct a mapping of human rights violations and abuses committed in the country since 2003, to inform efforts to fight impunity.¹⁷⁹

Besides the above outlined “immediate” and “core priority tasks”, the Council further authorized MINUSCA to use its capacities to assist the authorities in implementing “essential tasks” related to enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of the national judicial and penitentiary system and tackling illicit exploitation and trafficking networks of natural resources;¹⁸⁰ as well as “additional tasks” in support of the Committee and Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#).¹⁸¹ The Council requested MINUSCA to continue to utilize tailored communication tools to build trust with the actors on the ground as part of an effective political strategy.¹⁸²

In 2017, by resolution [2387 \(2017\)](#), acting under Chapter VII, the Council defined the tasks of MINUSCA related to the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel and property, good offices, support to peace and reconciliation, and facilitation of humanitarian assistance as “priority tasks” and made several modifications in that regard.¹⁸³ In particular, the

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., paras. 34(c)(v).

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., para. 34(d)(iv).

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., para. 33 (b)(i).

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., paras. 35(a)(i) and (b).

¹⁸¹ Ibid., para. 36. See part IX, sect. I, with regard to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#).

¹⁸² Resolution [2301 \(2016\)](#), para. 39.

¹⁸³ Resolution [2387 \(2017\)](#), para. 42.

Council called on the Mission to enhance its support for inclusive political dialogue, under the leadership of the Government, and in partnership with the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR,¹⁸⁴ and to assist the national authorities in their efforts for an increased participation of political parties, civil society, and women to the peace process.¹⁸⁵ The Council further mandated MINUSCA to provide the Government with technical expertise in its engagement with neighboring countries, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the African Union, in consultation and coordination with the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA).¹⁸⁶ As part of the protection civilians mandate, the Council called on MINUSCA to take “active steps” to anticipate, deter and effectively respond to serious and credible threats to the civilian population and to enhance early warning.¹⁸⁷

The Council further reiterated MINUSCA’s previously mandated tasks with several amendments related to the support for stabilization and the extension of State authority,¹⁸⁸ SSR,¹⁸⁹ DDR and DDRR,¹⁹⁰ and the rule of law.¹⁹¹ Additionally, the Mission was mandated to consider the “environmental impacts” of its operations and to manage them as appropriate.¹⁹²

Finally, the configuration of MINUSCA was adjusted twice during the review period.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., para. 42(b)(i).

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., para. 42(b)(ii).

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., para. 42(b)(v).

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., paras. 42(a)(ii).

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., para. 43(a)(i) and (iv).

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., para. 43(b)(iii).

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. para. 43(c)(i).

¹⁹¹ Ibid. para. 43(e)(x).

¹⁹² Ibid. para. 48.

Further to the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council of 21 December 2015,¹⁹³ by resolution [2264 \(2016\)](#), the Council increased the number of corrections officers deployed in the Mission's police component, from 40 to 108.¹⁹⁴ By resolution [2387 \(2017\)](#), in order to increase the flexibility and mobility of MINUSCA to improve the efficient implementation of its full mandate and, in particular, the protection of civilians, the Council authorized an increase in military personnel from 10,750 to 11,650, including 480 military observers and military staff officers.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ [S/2016/145](#).

¹⁹⁴ Resolution [2264 \(2016\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁹⁵ Resolution [2387 \(2017\)](#), para. 32. For further information about the composition of MINUSCA prior to the reporting period, refer to the 19th Supplement.

Americas

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

The Security Council established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) by resolution [1542 \(2004\)](#) of 30 April 2004, and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, decided that its mandate would be to, inter alia, ensure a secure and stable environment, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, support the constitutional and political process, assist the Transitional Government in extending state authority, and monitor and support the promotion and protection of human rights.¹⁹⁶

During 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2313 \(2016\)](#) of 13 October 2016 and [2350 \(2017\)](#) of 13 April 2017 in relation to MINUSTAH, extending its mandate for periods of six months each.¹⁹⁷ By resolution [2313 \(2016\)](#), the Council, acting under Chapter VII, renewed the Mission's mandate as defined under previous resolutions and requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic assessment mission of the situation in Haiti, preferably after the inauguration of a newly elected president and, on that basis, to present recommendations to the Council on the future presence and role of the United Nations in Haiti.¹⁹⁸ Based on the Council's review of Haiti's overall capacity to ensure security and stability, and on the security conditions on the ground, the Council affirmed its intention to consider the possible withdrawal of MINUSTAH and transition to a future United Nations presence.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

¹⁹⁷ Resolutions [2313 \(2016\)](#), para. 1 and [2350 \(2017\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁹⁸ Resolution [2313 \(2016\)](#), para. 3.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 4. See for further details, part I, sect. 16 on "The question concerning Haiti".

Following the peaceful completion of the electoral process on 7 February 2017 as well as the issuance of the report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment,²⁰⁰ by resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#), the Council, acting under Chapter VII, renewed the mandate of MINUSTAH for a final six-month period until 15 October 2017.²⁰¹ Further to the recommendations of the Secretary-General, by the same resolution, the Council established the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) as a follow-on peacekeeping mission to support the Government of Haiti in improving the rule of law and in building police capacity, as well as to monitor human rights.²⁰²

The Council requested that the gradual withdrawal of the military component, downsizing of police personnel, and reduction and transfer of the remaining tasks of MINUSTAH based on a transition plan developed with the United Nations Country Team be completed by 15 October 2017.²⁰³ During the Mission's final six months, the Council requested MINUSTAH to prioritize efforts and to ensure a successful and responsible transition to MINUJUSTH, and to further strengthen the institutional and operational capacities of the Haitian National Police.²⁰⁴

Following the completion of the MINUSTAH mandate, on 17 October 2017, the Council issued a presidential statement recognizing the Mission's contribution in restoring security and stability in Haiti since its deployment in 2004.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁰ [S/2017/223](#).

²⁰¹ Resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#), para. 1.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, paras. 5 and 6.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, paras. 2, 5, 9 and 20.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

²⁰⁵ [S/PRST/2017/20](#), first and fourth paragraphs.

United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

By resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#) of 13 April 2017, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,²⁰⁶ the Security Council established the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), as a follow-on peacekeeping mission in Haiti subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on 15 October 2017, for an initial period of six months from 16 October 2017 until 15 April 2018.²⁰⁷

The Council mandated MINUJUSTH to assist the Government of Haiti in strengthening the rule of law institutions and supporting and developing the Haitian National Police (HNP) and to conduct human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis.²⁰⁸ MINUJUSTH was authorized to use “all necessary means” to carry out its mandate in support of the HNP and in protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.²⁰⁹ The Mission was requested to take fully into account gender mainstreaming and to assist the Government in ensuring the participation and representation of women at all levels.²¹⁰ As provided for in the resolution, MINUJUSTH would be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General who would play a good offices and advocacy role at the political level to ensure the full implementation of the Mission’s mandate.²¹¹ The resolution also underscored the importance of coordination between the Mission and the United Nations Country Team.²¹²

²⁰⁶ Despite the unanimous adoption of the resolution, a number of Council members questioned the application of Chapter VII in resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#). See for further details, part I, sect. 16 on “The question concerning Haiti”.

²⁰⁷ Resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#), para. 5.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 12 and 13.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 15.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

²¹² *Ibid.*, para. 19.

The Council established that MINUJUSTH would be composed of up to seven formed police units (or 980 personnel) deployed to five regional departments to safeguard the security gains of the past years through the provision of operational support to the HNP; as well as 295 individual police officers and 38 Government-provided corrections personnel.²¹³ The Council requested the Secretary-General to submit, in his progress report on the implementation of the Mission's mandate, a well-developed and clearly benchmarked projected two-year exit strategy to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence in Haiti to continue supporting the efforts of the Government in sustaining peace and peacebuilding.²¹⁴

²¹³ Ibid, paras. 5, 8, 9 and 10.

²¹⁴ Ibid, para. 22.

Asia

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

The first team of military observers, who eventually formed the nucleus of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), was deployed in January 1949 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan established by Security Council resolutions [39 \(1948\)](#) and [47 \(1948\)](#) of 20 January and 21 April 1948, respectively. Following the termination of the Commission, by resolution [91 \(1951\)](#) of 30 March 1951, the Council decided that UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. After renewed hostilities in 1971, the task of UNMOGIP has been to monitor developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. The mandate of UNMOGIP is open-ended.

In 2016 and 2017, the Council did not discuss UNMOGIP or make changes to its mandate or composition.²¹⁵

²¹⁵ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

Europe

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established by the Security Council on 4 March 1964 by resolution [186 \(1964\)](#), to preserve international peace and security, use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.²¹⁶

During the period under review, the Council adopted resolutions [2263 \(2016\)](#) of 28 January 2016, [2300 \(2016\)](#) of 26 July 2016, [2338 \(2017\)](#) of 26 January 2017 and [2369 \(2017\)](#) of 27 July 2017 in relation to UNFICYP. From 2016 to 2017, the Council extended the mandate of the Mission four times for periods of six months, as per previous practice, the last of which was until 31 January 2018.²¹⁷

By resolution [2263 \(2016\)](#), further to the recommendation of the Secretary-General to close the capability gap which had emerged in the areas of UNFICYP military police,²¹⁸ headquarters analytical and planning functions, and patrols across the sectors to sustain current operations, the Council increased the force levels of UNFICYP from 860 to 888 military personnel.²¹⁹ The Council welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to keep the operations of UNFICYP under close review and noted the importance of transition planning in relation to a possible settlement between the parties, including recommendations, as appropriate, for further adjustments to the Mission's mandate, force levels and other resources and concept of operations, taking into account developments on the ground and the views of the parties.²²⁰

By resolution [2369 \(2017\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of UNFICYP focused on findings and recommendations for how the Mission should be optimally configured to implement its existing mandate, and to report in that regard

²¹⁶ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

²¹⁷ Resolutions [2263 \(2016\)](#), para. 7; [2300 \(2016\)](#), para. 8; [2338 \(2017\)](#), para. 8; and [2369 \(2017\)](#), para. 8. See for further background details on the, part I, sect. 21 on "The situation in Cyprus".

²¹⁸ [S/2016/11](#), para. 60.

²¹⁹ Resolution [2263 \(2016\)](#), para. 7. For further information about the composition of UNFICYP prior to the reporting period, refer to resolution [1568 \(2004\)](#) and Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 24 September 2004 ([S/2004/756](#)).

²²⁰ Resolution [2263 \(2016\)](#), sixteenth preambular paragraph.

within four months.²²¹ During the reporting period, the Council did not formally consider the report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of UNFICYP, which was submitted to the Council on 28 November 2017.²²²

²²¹ Resolution [2369 \(2017\)](#), para. 12.

²²² [S/2017/1008](#). In his report on the strategic review of UNFICYP, the Secretary-General recommended maintaining the preventive and deterrence capabilities of UNFICYP, with minor reductions, while expanding its observation, liaison and engagement capabilities. The report recommended a reduction of actual strength from 888 to 802 military personnel, while maintaining an authorized strength of 860.

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the Security Council on 10 June 1999 by resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter.²²³ The Council mandated UNMIK to carry out a range of tasks, including promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions, and organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any decision relating to UNMIK and there were no changes to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.²²⁴

²²³ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

²²⁴ See for further information on developments in relation to Kosovo during the period under review, part I, sect. 22 under “Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)”.

Middle East

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Security Council on 29 May 1948, by resolution [50 \(1948\)](#), to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine, following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. UNTSO military observers have since remained in the Middle East and have continued to assist and cooperate with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in monitoring ceasefires and supervising armistice agreements.²²⁵

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any decisions concerning UNTSO or make changes to its mandate, which remained open-ended, or to its composition.

²²⁵ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Security Council on 31 May 1974 by resolution [350 \(1974\)](#), following the Agreement on Disengagement between the Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to supervise the implementation of the Agreement and the areas of separation and limitation.²²⁶

During the period under review, the Council adopted resolutions [2294 \(2016\)](#) of 29 June 2016, [2330 \(2016\)](#) of 19 December 2016, [2361 \(2017\)](#) of 29 June 2017; and [2394 \(2017\)](#) of 21 December 2017 in relation to UNDOF. Consistent with prior practice, the Council extended the mandate of the Mission for periods of six months each, the last of which was until 30 June 2018.²²⁷ During the 2016 to 2017 period, in spite of the incidents registered in the area of separation,²²⁸ there were no changes to the mandate or the composition of UNDOF.

²²⁶ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

²²⁷ Resolutions [2294 \(2016\)](#), para. 11; [2330 \(2016\)](#), para. 11; [2361 \(2017\)](#), para.11; and [2394 \(2017\)](#), para. 11.

²²⁸ See resolutions [2294 \(2016\)](#), paras. 2-4; [2330 \(2016\)](#), paras. 2-4; [2361 \(2017\)](#), paras. 2-4; and [2394 \(2017\)](#), paras. 2-4. See also for further details on the developments in the area of operations, part I, sect. 25, on “The situation in the Middle East”.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Security Council on 19 March 1978 by resolutions [425 \(1978\)](#) and [426 \(1978\)](#) to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in restoring its effective authority in the area.²²⁹

During the review period, the Council adopted resolutions [2305 \(2016\)](#) of 30 August 2016 and [2373 \(2017\)](#) of 30 August 2017 in relation to UNIFIL and extended the mandate of the Mission twice for periods of one year each, the last of which was until 31 August 2018.²³⁰

In 2016, the mandate of UNIFIL remained largely unchanged. By resolution [2305 \(2016\)](#), the Council reiterated the language used in prior resolutions with regard to some of the core aspects of the Mission's mandate, in particular, on security monitoring and patrolling and on the support to the Lebanese Armed Forces to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon.²³¹

In 2017, amidst allegations of enhanced activities of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon,²³² the mandate of UNIFIL was revisited. By resolution [2373 \(2017\)](#), the Council recalled—for the first time since 2006—its authorization to UNIFIL to take “all necessary action”, inter alia, to ensure that its area of operations was not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect civilians as well as United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers.²³³ The Council requested the Secretary-General to look at ways to enhance the efforts of UNIFIL in this regard, including ways to increase its visible presence through patrols and inspections.²³⁴ The resolution also reiterated previous language concerning security monitoring and patrolling and the Mission's support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.²³⁵ In relation to the role of UNIFIL in supporting the military, the Council reaffirmed the necessity of an effective and durable deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon and the territorial waters of Lebanon; requested the Secretary-General to include assessments of progress made in that regard in his future reports; and

²²⁹ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

²³⁰ Resolutions [2305 \(2016\)](#), para. 1 and [2373 \(2017\)](#), para. 1.

²³¹ Resolution [2305 \(2016\)](#), paras. 2, 3 and 8.

²³² See for further details in this regard, part I, sect.. 25, on “The situation in the Middle East”.

²³³ Resolution [2373 \(2017\)](#), para. 14.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 15.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 2, 10 and 16.

called for a renewed engagement of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Strategic Dialogue.²³⁶

The composition of UNIFIL was not modified during the period under review.

²³⁶ Ibid., para. 5.

II. Special Political missions²³⁷

Note

This section focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of special political missions, as well as the changes to their mandates.²³⁸

Overview of special political missions during 2016 and 2017

During the period under review, the Council oversaw 11 special political missions. Five were based in Africa and two in the Americas, two in Asia and two in the Middle East. Their size varied from relatively small missions such as the United Nations Regional Office for Central Asia (UNRCCA) to larger assistance missions deployed in highly complex and volatile security environments such as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

Newly established special political missions and mandate terminations and extensions

By resolution [2261 \(2016\)](#) of 25 January 2016, the Council established the United Nations Mission in Colombia to monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire and security arrangements signed between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC-EP). Following the completion of this process, by resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#) of 10 July 2017, the Council terminated the mandate of the Mission and established a new United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia to verify the implementation

²³⁷ Special political missions under this chapter include regional offices and offices in support of political processes. Other types of special political missions and good offices of the Secretary-General, such as special and personal envoys, advisers or representatives of the Secretary-General or sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other entities and mechanisms, are included in other parts.

²³⁸ For information on the envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General whose mandates relate to the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, other than those appointed as heads of peacekeeping, political or peacebuilding missions, see part IX, sect. VI.

of the next phases of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace.

By an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 14 and 28 January 2016, the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel was merged into the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) to become the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS).²³⁹

In addition, the mandates of the following five missions were extended during 2016 and 2017: the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), the UNSMIL, UNSOM, UNAMA and UNAMI. The mandate of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) had previously been extended for a three-year period until 31 August 2018²⁴⁰, while the mandates of UNRCCA and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) remained open-ended.

Mandates of political and peacebuilding missions

Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the mandates of political missions and peacebuilding offices in 2016 and 2017, showing the range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables for each mission include: (i) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; (ii) tasks mandated in previous periods which the Council specifically reiterated during the current period; and (iii) tasks of missions with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions from previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.

During the period under review, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review or assessment of the four largest political missions, namely UNSMIL, UNSOM, UNAMA and UNAMI.²⁴¹ For most missions, priority tasks continued to focus on early warning and the provision of good offices for peacebuilding and sustaining peace; supporting peace

²³⁹ [S/2016/88](#) and [S/2016/89](#).

²⁴⁰ [S/2015/554](#) and [S/2015/555](#).

²⁴¹ See, in connection with UNSMIL, resolution [2323 \(2016\)](#), para. 4; in connection with UNSOM, resolution [2275 \(2016\)](#), para. 6; in connection with UNAMA, resolution [2344 \(2017\)](#), para. 7; and in connection with UNAMI, resolution [2367 \(2017\)](#), para. 7.

agreements and political transitions, including through the provision of electoral assistance as well as through enhancing regional and local capacities in conflict prevention and mediation; and ensuring coordination with other international actors, including the Peacebuilding Commission, United Nations country teams and regional actors. In addition, missions also undertook a range of tasks related to supporting state institutions in the promotion of good governance and the rule of law, security sector reform and enhancing capacity for the protection of human rights.

During the biennium, the Council made modifications to the mandates of eight of the 11 special political missions, namely UNOWAS, UNIOGBIS, UNOCA, UNSMIL, UNSOM, the United Nations Mission in Colombia, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and UNAMA.

In most of these modifications, the Council placed particular emphasis on the crucial importance of United Nations political mission and peacebuilding offices support for inclusive peace, reconciliation and political transition processes.²⁴² In relation to UNOWAS, UNIOGBIS and UNSOM, the Council emphasized the importance of supporting the conduct of timely, credible and transparent electoral and constitutional review processes as part of overall conflict prevention and resolution efforts.²⁴³ Moreover, the Council also underscored the role of UNOWAS, UNIOGBIS, UNSMIL and UNAMA in promoting good governance and supporting the strengthening of national institutions particularly with a view to enhancing the rule of law, the protection of human rights and accountability of state institutions and national security forces.²⁴⁴

The Council continued to highlight the importance of coordination and cooperation by United Nations missions with United Nations country teams, international partners, regional and subregional organizations. In this regard, the Council requested UNIOGBIS and UNAMA to strengthen the coordination of international assistance.²⁴⁵ Further, in relation to regional offices

²⁴² In connection with UNOWAS, [S/2016/1128, annex](#) and [S/2016/1129, annex](#); in connection with UNIOGBIS, resolution [2343 \(2017\)](#), para. 2(a); in connection with UNSMIL, resolution [2376 \(2017\)](#), para. 1(i); in connection with UNSOM, resolutions [2275 \(2016\)](#), para. 2 and [2358 \(2017\)](#), para. 3; and, in connection with UNAMA, resolution [2344 \(2017\)](#), para. 13.

²⁴³ In connection with UNOWAS, [S/2016/1128, annex](#) and [S/2016/1129, annex](#); in connection with UNIOGBIS, resolution [2343 \(2017\)](#), para. 2(b); and, in connection with UNSOM, resolution [2275 \(2016\)](#), para. 2.

²⁴⁴ In connection with UNOWAS, [S/2016/1128, annex](#) and [S/2016/1129, annex](#); in connection with UNIOGBIS, resolution [2343 \(2017\)](#), para. 7; in connection with UNSMIL, resolution [2323 \(2016\)](#), paras. 1(iii) and 2(v); and, in connection with UNAMA, resolution [2274 \(2016\)](#), para. 8.

²⁴⁵ In connection with UNIOGBIS, resolution [2343 \(2017\)](#), para. 2(d); and, in connection with UNAMA, resolution [2274 \(2016\)](#), para. 7(a).

such as UNOWAS, the Council underscored the need for sub-regional cooperation and cross-border responses to address challenges to address cross-border challenges such as security sector reform, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking and, together with UNOCA, the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism.²⁴⁶

Modifying the mandates of UNOWAS and UNSMIL, the Council requested the missions to fully take into account a gender perspective in the implementation of their respective mandates, including the participation of women in peace and political transition processes.²⁴⁷ Further, the Council encouraged UNOWAS and UNOCA to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalization for women and the impact of counter-terrorism strategies on women's human rights.²⁴⁸ UNSOM, in turn, was requested to work to ensure that women and girls were protected from sexual violence, including sexual exploitation and abuse; while UNAMA was requested to continue to support efforts to strengthen the protection of children affected by armed conflict.²⁴⁹

Finally, during the review period, the mandates of UNRCCA, UNAMI and UNSCOL remained largely unchanged.

²⁴⁶ In connection with UNOWAS, [S/2016/1128, annex](#) and [S/2016/1129, annex and, in connection with UNOWAS and UNOCA](#), resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#), para. 8.

²⁴⁷ In connection with UNOWAS, [S/2016/1128, annex](#) and [S/2016/1129, annex](#); and, in connection with UNSMIL, resolution [2376 \(2017\)](#), para. 4.

²⁴⁸ Resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#), para. 8.

²⁴⁹ In connection with UNSOM, resolution [2372 \(2017\)](#), para. 43; and, in connection with UNAMA, resolution [2274 \(2016\)](#), para. 40.

Table 4
Mandates of political and peacebuilding missions, 2016-2017: Africa

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNOWAS</i>	<i>UNIOGBIS</i>	<i>UNOCA</i>	<i>UNSMIL</i>	<i>UNSOM</i>
Chapter VII					X
Civil-military coordination					
Demilitarization and arms management				X	X
Electoral assistance	X	X	X		X
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support	X			X	
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Maritime security	X		X		X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Public information	X				
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X			X
Security sector reform	X	X			X
Support to police					X
Support to sanctions regimes				X	
Support to State institutions	X	X	X	X	X

Abbreviations: UNOWAS - United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNIOGBIS – United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau; UNOCA - United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNSMIL - United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM - United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia.

Table 5
Mandates of political and peacebuilding missions, 2016-2017: Americas, Asia and Middle East

Mandate	UN Mission in Colombia	UN Verification Mission in Colombia	UNAMA	UNRCCA	UNAMI	UNSCOL
Chapter VII						
Ceasefire monitoring	X	X				
Civilian-military coordination			X			
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X		X	
Electoral assistance			X		X	
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict			X		X	
Humanitarian support			X		X	
International cooperation and coordination		X	X	X	X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians			X			
Public information						
Rule of law/judicial matters			X		X	
Security sector reform			X			
Support to sanctions regimes			X		X	
Support to State institutions			X		X	

Abbreviations: UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNRCCA - United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; UNAMI - United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNSCOL- Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon.

Africa

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

Further to the recommendations of the Secretary-General, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council of 14 and 28 January 2016,²⁵⁰ the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel was merged into the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), which had been established in 2001,²⁵¹ and renamed the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS).

During the period under review, given the regional character of the office and the multiple items of the agenda of the Council concerning West Africa, the Council adopted a total of three resolutions and five presidential statements in connection with UNOWAS.²⁵² Furthermore, the mandate of UNOWAS was extended once for a period of three years until 31 December 2019.²⁵³

By an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council of 27 and 29 December 2016, UNOWAS was mandated to undertake the following tasks in close collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Mano River Union and other regional and subregional partners: (a) monitor political developments and carry out good offices and special assignments on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation in countries of West Africa and the Sahel; (b) enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel, in particular election-related instability and challenges related to security sector reform, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, terrorism and violent extremism; (c) support the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements in the Sahel; and (d) promote good governance and respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender,

²⁵⁰ [S/2016/88](#) and [S/2016/89](#).

²⁵¹ For further information on the history of the mandate of UNOWA, please refer to previous Supplements.

²⁵² Resolutions [2284 \(2016\)](#), [2295 \(2016\)](#), and [2349 \(2017\)](#); [S/PRST/2016/4](#), [S/PRST/2016/11](#), [S/PRST/2017/2](#), [S/PRST/2017/8](#) and [S/PRST/2017/10](#).

²⁵³ [S/2016/1128](#) and [S/2016/1129](#). The mandate of UNOWA had previously been extended for three years until 31 December 2016 ([S/2013/759](#)).

including with respect to electoral processes, into conflict prevention and management initiatives in West Africa and the Sahel.²⁵⁴

In 2016 and 2017, the Council welcomed the merger of the two offices and encouraged the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOWAS to take the necessary steps for further progress in the merger and to maximize synergies by ensuring a unified management and structure.²⁵⁵ The Council, in particular, emphasized the work of UNOWAS on peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the region, including in cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission,²⁵⁶ and requested the office to contribute to efforts aimed at sustaining international engagement on the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and to provide the necessary support to the Ministerial Coordination Platform for the Sahel and its Technical Secretariat as well as to the Group of 5 for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel).²⁵⁷

In the context of the preparations for the closure of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the Council requested UNOWAS to make available its good offices, as necessary, to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the future United Nations Resident Coordinator.²⁵⁸ The Council further called on the Office, as well as on UNOCA and the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), to redouble their support for the Governments in the region, as well as subregional and regional organizations, to address the impact of the violence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on the peace and stability of the region by addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism, in line with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.²⁵⁹ The Council further encouraged those offices to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalization for women, and the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women's human rights and women's organizations, in order to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁴ [S/2016/1128](#) and [S/2016/1129](#). See for further details and political background in relation to UNOWAS, part I, sect. 9 on "The situation in Côte d'Ivoire", sect. 12 on "Peace consolidation in West Africa", and sect. 13 on "Peace and security in Africa".

²⁵⁵ [S/PRST/2016/11](#), second paragraph.

²⁵⁶ [S/PRST/2016/11](#), eighth paragraph; [S/PRST/2017/2](#), fifth and fifteenth paragraphs; and [S/PRST/2017/10](#), seventeenth and twenty-third paragraphs.

²⁵⁷ [S/PRST/2016/11](#), nineteenth paragraph; [S/PRST/2017/2](#), nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first paragraphs; and [S/PRST/2017/10](#), twenty-third and twenty-fourth paragraphs.

²⁵⁸ Resolution [2284 \(2016\)](#), para. 20; [S/PRST/2017/8](#), twelfth paragraph; and [S/PRST/2017/10](#), sixth paragraph.

²⁵⁹ Resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#), para. 8.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) was established by the Security Council on 26 June 2009, by resolution [1876 \(2009\)](#) to succeed UNOGBIS, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau. UNIOGBIS was mandated to, inter alia, assist the work of the Peacebuilding Commission in Guinea-Bissau, strengthen the capacities of national institutions to maintain constitutional order, public security and the full respect for the rule of law, support an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process, provide strategic and technical support in security sector reform, undertake human rights promotion, protection and monitoring, and enhance cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.²⁶¹

During the period under review, the Council adopted resolutions [2267 \(2016\)](#) and [2343 \(2017\)](#) as well as one presidential statement in relation to UNIOGBIS.²⁶² In accordance with previous practice, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNIOGBIS twice for periods of 12 months each, the last of which was until 28 February 2018.²⁶³

Against the backdrop of ongoing political and institutional tensions,²⁶⁴ by resolution [2267 \(2016\)](#), the Council reiterated the mandate priorities of UNIOGBIS as defined in 2015 namely, supporting the Government in conducting an inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation process, implementing national security sector reform and rule of law strategies, and mobilizing and coordinating international assistance.²⁶⁵ The Council also reaffirmed the role of the office and of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNIOGBIS in leading international efforts in a series of “priority areas”, including strengthening democratic institutions and state capacity, developing rule of law institutions to combat crime and impunity, promoting and protecting human rights, and supporting national peacebuilding priorities, while incorporating a gender perspective.²⁶⁶

²⁶¹ For further information on the history of the mandate of UNIOGBIS, please refer to previous Supplements.

²⁶² [S/PRST/2017/17](#).

²⁶³ Resolutions [2267 \(2016\)](#), para. 1 and [2343 \(2017\)](#), para. 1.

²⁶⁴ See for further details, part I, sect. 8 on “The situation in Guinea Bissau”.

²⁶⁵ Resolution [2267 \(2016\)](#), para. 2 (a)-(c).

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a)-(f).

In 2017, by resolution [2343 \(2017\)](#), the Council endorsed the Conakry Agreement of 14 October 2016, based on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) road map, as the primary framework for a peaceful resolution of the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau.²⁶⁷ The Council further endorsed the recommendations of the strategic review mission as outlined in the report of the Secretary-General of 7 February 2017 ([S/2017/111](#)) regarding the need for UNIOGBIS to refocus its efforts towards political capacities in support of the good offices and political facilitation role of the Special Representative, and to streamline its management structure.²⁶⁸ In addition to retaining the priorities listed in resolution [2267 \(2016\)](#), the Council mandated UNIOGBIS to support the national authorities in expediting and completing the constitutional review process.²⁶⁹ In the context of the upcoming legislative and presidential elections scheduled in 2018 and 2019, respectively, the Council requested UNIOGBIS to work closely with national authorities and the United Nations Country Team in support of the timely conduct of those elections and to strengthen democracy and good governance in Guinea-Bissau,²⁷⁰ as well as to enhance cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission in mobilizing, harmonizing and coordinating international assistance.²⁷¹

²⁶⁷ Resolution [2343 \(2017\)](#), para. 4.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (b).

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (d).

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was established by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 11 December 2009 and 30 August 2010. The mandate of UNOCA included the following tasks: to cooperate with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other regional partners in the promotion of peace and stability in the broader subregion, to provide good offices in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region, to promote an integrated subregional approach and facilitate coordination and information exchange among United Nations and partners in the subregion, and to report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance.²⁷²

With the three-year mandate of UNOCA expiring on 31 August 2018, the Council did not renew the mandate of the office during the period under review.²⁷³

In 2016 and 2017, the Council modified the mandate of UNOCA. In its presidential statement of 25 April 2016, the Council encouraged UNOCA and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) to continue to assist States and subregional organizations in their efforts to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea.²⁷⁴ By resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#), the Council called upon UNOCA, UNOWAS and the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), to redouble their support for governments in the region, as well as subregional and regional organizations, to address the impact of the violence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on the peace and stability of the region, including by addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism, in line with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.²⁷⁵ The Council further encouraged those offices to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalization for women, and the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women's human rights and women's

²⁷² [S/2009/697](#) and [S/2010/457](#).

²⁷³ The mandate of UNOCA was renewed for a three-year period until 31 August 2018 by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 16 and 21 July 2015 ([S/2015/554](#) and [S/2015/555](#)). For further information on the history of the mandate of UNOCA, please refer to previous Supplements.

²⁷⁴ [S/PRST/2016/4](#), twentieth paragraph.

²⁷⁵ Resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#), para. 8.

organizations, in order to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

United Nations Support Mission in Libya

By resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#) of 16 September 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) with the mandate to support Libyan national efforts to restore public security and order and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, extend state authority, promote and protect human rights and support transitional justice, initiate economic recovery, and coordinate international support.²⁷⁷

In 2016 and 2017, the Council adopted resolutions [2273 \(2016\)](#) of 15 March 2016, [2278 \(2016\)](#) of 31 March 2016, [2291 \(2016\)](#) of 13 June 2016, [2323 \(2016\)](#) of 13 December 2016, [2362 \(2017\)](#) of 29 June 2017, [2363 \(2017\)](#) of 29 June 2017, [2376 \(2017\)](#) of 14 September 2017 in relation to UNSMIL. The Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL three times for periods of six months, nine months, and one year, the last of which was until 15 September 2018.²⁷⁸ Further to the recommendation of the Secretary-General,²⁷⁹ by resolution [2273 \(2016\)](#), the Council also provided for a three-month technical roll-over of the Mission's mandate to enable the Mission to continue to assist the Presidency Council in establishing the Government of National Accord and in implementing the Libyan Political Agreement and requested the Secretary-General to report following consultations with the Libyan authorities on recommendations for UNSMIL's support to the subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process and the Mission's security arrangements.²⁸⁰

With the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement on 17 December 2015 and the arrival of the Government of National Accord in the country on 30 March 2016,²⁸¹ by resolution [2291 \(2016\)](#), the Council decided to extend the mandate of UNSMIL to support the implementation of the Agreement, the Government, the formation of its security arrangements, and subsequent phases of the transition process.²⁸² Beyond that task, the Council reiterated the previously mandated tasks of UNSMIL to, “within operational and security constraints”, monitor and report on human rights,

²⁷⁷ For further information on the history of the mandate of UNSMIL, please refer to previous Supplements.

²⁷⁸ Resolutions [2291 \(2016\)](#), para. 1; [2323 \(2016\)](#), para. 1; and [2376 \(2017\)](#), para. 1.

²⁷⁹ [S/2016/182](#).

²⁸⁰ Resolution [2273 \(2016\)](#), tenth preambular paragraph and para. 1 and 2.

²⁸¹ See for further details, part I, sect. 14 on “The situation in Libya”.

²⁸² Resolution [2291 \(2016\)](#), para. 1.

support the securing of uncontrolled arms, support key Libyan institutions, support the provision of essential services and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and co-ordinate international assistance.²⁸³ Moreover, the Council encouraged the Mission to re-establish a permanent presence in the country through a phased return, provided that security conditions allowed.²⁸⁴

By resolution [2323 \(2016\)](#), the Council added support for the consolidation of governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord as a key element of the mandate of UNSMIL.²⁸⁵ Furthermore, with regard to other tasks to be undertaken by UNSMIL “within operational and security constraints” as provided by resolution [2291 \(2016\)](#), the Council added to the existing mandate of UNSMIL the provision of advice and assistance to the Government-led efforts to stabilize post-conflict zones, including those liberated from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).²⁸⁶

In 2017, by resolution [2376 \(2017\)](#), the Council welcomed the recommendations from the Secretary-General’s strategic assessment review for UNSMIL²⁸⁷ to implement a comprehensive political strategy as well as for greater integration and strategic coordination with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Libya to support Government-led efforts towards stabilizing the country.²⁸⁸ The Council reiterated the Mission’s existing mandate, adding as a key element the support for an inclusive political process within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement.²⁸⁹ UNSMIL was also requested to fully take into account a gender perspective throughout its mandate and to assist the Government in ensuring the full and effective participation of women in the democratic transition, reconciliation efforts, the security sector and in national institutions in line with resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#).²⁹⁰

By resolutions [2278 \(2016\)](#) and [2362 \(2017\)](#), the Council also reiterated the mandate of UNMSIL to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).²⁹¹ Further, by resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#), the Council urged close cooperation between UNSMIL, UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMISS and MINUSCA.²⁹²

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, para. 1 (i)-(v).

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.* para. 2.

²⁸⁵ Resolution [2323 \(2016\)](#), para. 1(ii).

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 2(v).

²⁸⁷ [S/2017/726](#).

²⁸⁸ Resolution [2376 \(2017\)](#), para. 6.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.* para. 1(i).

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

²⁹¹ Resolutions [2278 \(2016\)](#), para. 14 and [2362 \(2017\)](#), para. 15.

²⁹² Resolution [2363 \(2017\)](#), para. 19.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was established by the Security Council on 2 May 2013 by resolution [2102 \(2013\)](#) with the mandate to, inter alia, support the Federal Government of Somalia by providing good offices for the peace and reconciliation process and strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and statebuilding; assist in the coordination of international donor support on security sector assistance and maritime security; help build the capacity of the Federal Government to promote respect for human rights, women's empowerment, child protection and the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence; and monitor, help to investigate and report on abuses or violations of human rights.²⁹³

During the period under review, the Council adopted resolutions [2275 \(2016\)](#) of 24 March 2016, [2297 \(2016\)](#) of 7 July 2016, [2346 \(2017\)](#) of 23 March 2017, [2358 \(2017\)](#) of 14 June 2017 and [2372 \(2017\)](#) of 30 August 2017 in relation to UNSOM. In this period, the Council extended the mandate of UNSOM twice for periods of one year and nine months, respectively; the last of the extensions prescribed was until 31 March 2018.²⁹⁴ By resolution [2346 \(2017\)](#), the Council provided for a three-month technical roll-over of the Mission's mandate, noting that, as a result of delays in the electoral process in Somalia, the review of the United Nations presence in the country requested in resolution [2275 \(2016\)](#) had been deferred until the conclusion of the electoral process.²⁹⁵

By resolution [2275 \(2016\)](#), the Council renewed the mandate of UNSOM as defined in resolution [2158 \(2014\)](#).²⁹⁶ The Council also underscored the importance of the Mission's support to the political process, including the provision of good offices for the peace and reconciliation process, as well as to the preparation for the electoral process in 2016 and universal elections by 2020.²⁹⁷ In addition, the Council reiterated several aspects of the Mission's mandate, including the need to enhance the Mission's interactions across Somali civil society as part of its support to the political process;²⁹⁸ the need to strengthen and maintain a presence in all capitals of Interim

²⁹³ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

²⁹⁴ Resolutions [2275 \(2016\)](#), para. 1 and [2358 \(2017\)](#), para 1.

²⁹⁵ Resolution [2346 \(2017\)](#), para. 1 and second preambular paragraph. For further background information, see part I, sect. 3 on "The situation in Somalia".

²⁹⁶ Resolution [2275 \(2016\)](#), para. 1.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.* para. 4. See also resolution [2297 \(2016\)](#), para. 42.

Regional Administrations to support the political, peace and reconciliation process and security sector reform;²⁹⁹ and the importance of cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).³⁰⁰ The Council further requested the Secretary-General to conduct a review of the United Nations presence in Somalia after the 2016 electoral process, to ensure that it was properly configured to support the next phase of state-building in the country.³⁰¹

Further to the recommendations of the strategic assessment submitted by the Secretary-General in his letter dated 5 May 2017,³⁰² by resolution [2358 \(2017\)](#), the Council emphasized that the Mission's support to the political process should include the provision of good offices functions in regards to, inter alia, the consolidation of the state formation, mediation, prevention and resolution of conflicts, constitutional review processes, resource and revenue-sharing, improved accountability of Somali institutions, and the preparation of inclusive, credible and transparent, one person, one vote elections in 2021.³⁰³ UNSOM was further requested to support the Government in the implementation of the National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and the system-wide implementation of the Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy across all United Nations support to AMISOM and the Somali security sector.³⁰⁴ Additionally, the Council requested the Mission to provide strategic advice in support of a comprehensive approach to security in line with the Security Pact and New Partnership for Somalia, and underlined the importance of strengthened cooperation between UNSOM, AMISOM and the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS).³⁰⁵

By resolution [2372 \(2017\)](#), while extending its authorization for the deployment of AMISOM under Chapter VII of the Charter,³⁰⁶ the Council requested UNSOM to support the implementation of the federal policing model, especially at the Federal Member State level.³⁰⁷ The resolution further called on the Federal Government, its Member States, AMISOM and UNSOM to work to ensure that women and girls were protected from sexual violence, including sexual exploitation and abuse.³⁰⁸

²⁹⁹ Resolution [2275 \(2016\)](#), para. 5.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

³⁰² [S/2017/404](#).

³⁰³ Resolution [2358 \(2017\)](#), paras. 3.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.* paras. 6 and 7.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 5 and 8.

³⁰⁶ Resolution [2372 \(2017\)](#), para. 5.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 41.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 43.

Americas

United Nations Mission in Colombia

By resolution [2261 \(2016\)](#) of 25 January 2016, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Mission in Colombia as a political mission to participate, for a period of 12 months, as the international component and coordinator of the tripartite mechanism to monitor and verify the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC-EP).³⁰⁹ The Mission was requested to begin all monitoring and verification activities following the signing of the Final Peace Agreement between the two parties.³¹⁰ The Council further requested the Secretary-General to initiate preparations for the Mission and to present detailed recommendations regarding the size and operational aspects and mandate of the Mission.³¹¹

Subsequent to the announcement by the parties of their successful negotiations,³¹² by resolution [2307 \(2016\)](#) of 13 September 2016, the Council approved the recommendations of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Mission in Colombia to, as part of its responsibilities under the Agreement, verify the laying down of arms through their retrieval and destruction; coordinate the national, regional and local headquarters of the tripartite mechanism established thereunder to monitor and verify the ceasefire; settle disputes between the parties; and formulate recommendations with regard to the implementation of the Agreement.³¹³ Recognizing the need for the expeditious deployment of the mechanism, the Council authorized the Mission to share equally with the Government the support required for preparation and facilities management of the Transitional Local Zones for Normalisation and the Transitional Local Points for Normalisation.³¹⁴

After the rejection of the Agreement by Colombian voters in a plebiscite held on 2 October 2016, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security

³⁰⁹ Resolution [2261 \(2016\)](#), para. 1.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

³¹² See for further background, part I, sect. 17 on “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))”.

³¹³ Resolution [2307 \(2016\)](#), para. 1. See also [S/2016/729](#), paras. 2, 8 to 10.

³¹⁴ Resolution [2307 \(2016\)](#), para. 2.

Council of 26 and 31 October 2016,³¹⁵ further to the recommendation of the Secretary-General and the request of the parties, the Council noted that the Mission was authorized, pursuant to resolutions [2261 \(2016\)](#) and [2307 \(2016\)](#), to verify the implementation of a temporary ceasefire protocol signed by the parties on 13 October 2016.

In 2017, by resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#), the Council welcomed the signing on 24 November 2016 of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace by the parties and the completion of the laying down of individual arms by FARC-EP on 27 June 2017, as verified by the Mission.³¹⁶ The Council further requested the United Nations Mission in Colombia to begin the provisional work anticipated by the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia within the existing configuration and capacity until the completion of its mandate on 25 September 2017.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ [S/2016/902](#) and [S/2016/923](#).

³¹⁶ Resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#), second and third preambular paragraphs.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

The Security Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia by resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#) of 10 July 2017 for a period of 12 months, starting on 26 September immediately after the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia featured above.³¹⁸ The Verification Mission was mandated to, inter alia, verify the implementation of the political, economic and social reincorporation of the FARC-EP and of the personal and collective security guarantees as provided under the Final Agreement signed between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP on 24 November 2016.³¹⁹ The Council further decided that the Mission would work closely with verification bodies established under the Final Agreement, in particular the Commission for Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement, the National Reincorporation Council and the National Commission for Security Guarantees; and requested it to work in coordination with the United Nations Country Team.³²⁰ The Council further requested the Secretary-General to present detailed recommendations regarding the size and operational aspects and mandate of the Mission,³²¹ which were subsequently approved by resolution [2377 \(2017\)](#).³²²

By resolution [2381 \(2017\)](#), the Council welcomed the temporary, bilateral, national ceasefire announced on 4 September 2017 between the Government and the National Liberation Army (ELN) and, acknowledging the request by the parties in their 29 September 2017 Joint Communiqué for United Nations support, decided to expand the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, on a temporary basis until 9 January 2018, to include support to the monitoring and verification agreement established thereunder.³²³ Specifically, the Mission would verify compliance with the ceasefire with the ELN, endeavor to prevent incidents through enhanced coordination between the parties and the resolution of disagreements, enable timely

³¹⁸ Resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#), paras. 1 and 3.

³¹⁹ Ibid. See for further background, part I, sect. 17 on “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))”

³²⁰ Resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#), paras. 4 and 5.

³²¹ Ibid., para. 6.

³²² Resolution [2377 \(2017\)](#), para. 1.

³²³ Resolution [2381 \(2017\)](#), first and second preambular paragraphs and para. 2.

response by the parties to incidents, and verify and report publicly and to the parties on compliance with the ceasefire.³²⁴

³²⁴ Ibid, para. 2.

Asia

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by Security Council resolution [1401 \(2002\)](#) of 28 March 2002 and was mandated to fulfill the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (also known as the Bonn Agreement) of 5 December 2001.³²⁵

During the period under review, the Council adopted resolutions [2274 \(2016\)](#) of 15 March 2016 and [2344 \(2017\)](#) of 17 March 2018 in connection with UNAMA. In accordance with previous practice, the Council extended the mandate of UNAMA twice for periods of one year each, the last of which was until 17 March 2018.³²⁶

By resolution [2274 \(2016\)](#), the Council reiterated the mandate of UNAMA as defined previously, namely to lead and coordinate international civilian efforts to support the National Unity Government in the implementation of its reform agenda through, inter alia, electoral assistance, the provision of good offices, support to efforts to improve governance and the rule of law, the promotion and monitoring of human rights, the coordination of efforts to prevent the trafficking of illegal drugs, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance.³²⁷ As part of the Mission's role as co-chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, the Council added the task for UNAMA to support the development and monitoring of frameworks of mutual accountability, and to promote coherent information sharing and analysis, design and delivery of development assistance.³²⁸ Similarly, the resolution requested UNAMA to continue to lead international civilian efforts aimed at reinforcing the role of Afghan institutions to perform their responsibilities, with an increased focus on capacity building in key areas identified by the Afghan Government.³²⁹ In addition, the Council requested UNAMA to continue to support efforts to strengthen the protection of children affected by armed conflict, including engagement with the

³²⁵ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

³²⁶ Resolutions [2274 \(2016\)](#), para. 4 and [2344 \(2017\)](#), para. 3.

³²⁷ Resolutions [2274 \(2016\)](#), paras. 4, 7 and 8. See for further background, part I, sect. 18 on "The situation in Afghanistan".

³²⁸ Resolution [2274 \(2016\)](#), para. 7(a).

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 8.

Government to fully implement the Action Plan and Road Map and actions to address other violations and abuses, including sexual violence against children.³³⁰

By resolution [2344 \(2017\)](#), the Council reiterated the existing mandate of UNAMA³³¹ and specified that the mandate component related to the monitoring of human rights included the task of monitoring places of detention.³³² The Council further requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of UNAMA, examining mandated tasks, priorities, and related resources, assessing the Mission's efficiency and effectiveness, in order to optimize the division of labour and configuration to ensure better cooperation and minimize duplication with other United Nations related organizations.³³³

³³⁰ Ibid., para. 40.

³³¹ Resolution [2344 \(2017\)](#), paras. 3, 5 and 6.

³³² Ibid., para. 5(e).

³³³ Ibid., para. 7.

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) was authorized by the Security Council through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 7 and 15 May 2007,³³⁴ at the initiative of the Governments of the region. The Centre was mandated to strengthen the United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia through the implementation of a range of tasks, including liaising with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy, monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground, and maintaining contact with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. UNRCCA was established with an open-ended mandate and during the period under review, there were no changes to its mandate.

³³⁴ [S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#).

Middle East

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

The Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003 by resolution [1500 \(2003\)](#) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate under resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#) in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of 17 July 2003.³³⁵ Those responsibilities included coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development; and supporting efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions.³³⁶

During the period under review, the Council adopted resolutions [2299 \(2016\)](#) of 25 July 2016 and [2367 \(2017\)](#) of 14 July 2017 in relation to UNAMI. Consistent with previous practice, the Council extended the mandate of UNAMI twice for periods of one year, the last of which was until 31 July 2018.³³⁷ The mandate of UNAMI remained largely unchanged.³³⁸ By resolution [2367 \(2017\)](#), the Council called upon the Secretary-General to conduct an independent, external assessment of the structure and staffing of the Mission, related resources, priorities, and areas in which it had comparative advantages and synergies with other United Nations entities, in order to ensure that the Mission and the United Nations Country Team were configured to most appropriately and efficiently fulfil mandated tasks.³³⁹

³³⁵ [S/2003/715](#).

³³⁶ For further information on the history of the mandate of the Mission, please refer to previous Supplements.

³³⁷ Resolutions [2299 \(2016\)](#), para. 1 and [2367 \(2017\)](#), para 1.

³³⁸ See for further background, part I, sect. 26 on “The situation in Iraq”.

³³⁹ Resolution [2367 \(2017\)](#), para. 7.

Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

The establishment of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) was authorized by the Security Council by means of an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 8 and 13 February 2007.³⁴⁰ The Office was established with an open-ended mandate and replaced the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon, which had been created in the year 2000.³⁴¹ During the period under review, there were no changes to the mandate of UNSCOL.³⁴²

³⁴⁰ [S/2007/85](#) and [S/2007/86](#).

³⁴¹ [S/2000/718](#), para. 34.

³⁴² For further information on the history of the mandate of the office, please refer to previous Supplements. See for further background, part I, sects. 24 and 25 on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” and “The situation in the Middle East”.