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## Part X

# Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

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## **Introductory note**

### *Article 29*

*The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.*

### *Rule 28*

*The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.*

The powers of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs are set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and reflected in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part X of the present Supplement covers decisions of the Council relating to field-based subsidiary organs that the Council established for the performance of its functions under the Charter and that were active during 2022. These field-based subsidiary organs are divided into two categories: peacekeeping operations (covered in section I); and special political missions (covered in section II).

Other subsidiary organs, such as committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, special advisers, envoys, representatives and coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, are covered in part IX. Peace operations led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII, which also covers the Council's cooperation with regional organizations.

Peacekeeping operations and special political missions covered in part X are presented by region and in the order in which they were established. Successor missions are listed immediately after their predecessors. The introduction to each main section includes overview tables identifying the mandates assigned to each mission (tables 1, 2, 4 and 5) and provides an analysis of the key trends and developments during the reporting period. The mandates of the missions are presented in those tables according to 21 categories of mandated tasks, which are based exclusively on the language of the decisions of the Council and do not necessarily reflect the specific structure or

activities of the mission. The categories are provided only as a convenience for readers and do not reflect any practice or position of the Council. The introduction to section I includes an overview table of changes to the composition of peacekeeping operations during the reporting period (table 3).

Subsections provide a summary of major developments concerning the mandate and composition of each mission, reflecting the decisions of the Council adopted during the period under review. For information on the mandate and composition of missions in the past, see previous supplements to the *Repertoire*.

## I. Peacekeeping operations

### Note

Section I is focused on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of peacekeeping operations, as well as changes to their mandates and composition.

### Overview of peacekeeping operations during 2022

During the period under review, the Council oversaw 12 peacekeeping operations.<sup>1</sup> Six of the operations were in Africa, three in the Middle East, two in Europe and one in Asia. The Council did not establish or terminate any operations in 2022.

#### *Extensions of mandates*

The Council extended the mandates of the following nine peacekeeping operations:

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
- United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

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<sup>1</sup> For Council decisions and deliberations relating to the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations,” see part I, sect. 24. For Council discussions concerning individual peacekeeping operations, see the respective country-specific studies in part I.

The resolutions concerning the mandate of four peacekeeping operations which were extended by the Council in 2022, namely MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MINURSO and UNMISS, were adopted non-unanimously. The mandates of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) remained open-ended.

*Mandates of peacekeeping operations: differences in scope*

In 2022, the mandates of peacekeeping operations continued to vary considerably depending on their scope and complexity. In that regard, the Council reauthorized the four largest missions, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to use all necessary means to implement their mandates which covered a broad array of tasks.<sup>2</sup> The mandates of all four missions continued to include the protection of civilians, the protection and promotion of human rights, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the protection of United Nations personnel and equipment. The Council also retained the implementation of peace agreements and political transitions as priorities for MINUSCA, MINUSMA and UNMISS, while MINUSCA, MINUSMA and MONUSCO remained focused on supporting the stabilization and the extension of State authority.

The mandates of the remaining eight peacekeeping operations remained relatively narrow by comparison. UNIFIL and UNISFA, as interim security forces, remained focused on observing the redeployment of forces and maintaining security within their areas of responsibility. Both missions were reauthorized to use force in fulfilling only specific tasks such as the protection of civilians, United Nations personnel and equipment, the protection of their freedom of movement and that of humanitarian workers, and the protection of the mission's area of responsibility.<sup>3</sup> UNFICYP continued to support the maintenance of the ceasefire and bicomunal contacts in Cyprus, while longstanding observer missions such as MINURSO, UNDOF, UNMOGIP and

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<sup>2</sup> In connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 34; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 17; in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), paras. 22 and 24 (i)(b); and, in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), para. 3.

<sup>3</sup> In connection with UNIFIL, resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), para. 23; and, in connection with UNISFA, resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) and [2660 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

UNTSO concentrated on the monitoring of ceasefires and the implementation of armistice and disengagement agreements.<sup>4</sup>

*Mandates of peacekeeping operations: modifications*

During the period under review, the Council modified the mandates of five of the 12 existing peacekeeping operations. The most significant changes concerned provisions on the protection of civilians, human rights and joint operations with national security forces, electoral support, gender and conflict-sensitive analysis in the work of missions and the use of strategic communications.

In light of the deteriorating security situations in north and central Mali and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and inter-communal violence in South Sudan in 2022, the Council modified the tasks relating to the protection of civilians and support to national security forces by MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS. Specifically, the Council added new language to the protection mandate of MONUSCO by requesting the Mission to take all necessary measures to ensure effective, timely, dynamic and integrated protection of civilians by preventing, deterring and stopping all armed groups and local militias.<sup>5</sup> Further, the Council introduced new language on the obligation of MINUSMA and MONUSCO to ensure that their security support was provided in strict compliance with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, the Council stressed the requirement for UNMISS to operate at all times consistent with the policy in its coordination with police services, security and Government institutions and civil society actors in relevant and protection-focused activities.<sup>7</sup>

The Council expanded the human rights mandate of UNMISS with two new elements. First, UNMISS was requested to ensure that arrangements for the monitoring, analysis and reporting on conflict-related sexual violence served to promote action to deter, prevent and

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<sup>4</sup> In connection with MINURSO, resolution [2654 \(2022\)](#), para. 1; in connection with UNDOF, resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and [2671 \(2022\)](#), para. 15; and, in connection with UNFICYP, resolutions [2618 \(2022\)](#) and [2646 \(2022\)](#), para. 10. See also, in connection with UNMOGIP, resolutions [47 \(1948\)](#) and [91 \(1951\)](#); and, in connection with UNTSO, resolution [48 \(1948\)](#).

<sup>5</sup> Resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 24 (i)(a).

<sup>6</sup> In connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 32; and, in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 24 (i)(c).

<sup>7</sup> Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), para. 3 (a)(viii).

respond to such violence.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, the Council requested UNMISS to include capacity-building in its coordination, information-sharing and technical support for international, regional and national mechanisms and relevant stakeholders engaged in monitoring, investigating and reporting on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses.<sup>9</sup>

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council tasked MONUSCO with providing support for the 2023 electoral process, including limited logistical support.<sup>10</sup> In Mali, as part of its support to the implementation of the peace agreement and the full realization of the political transition, the Council requested MINUSMA to assist the Transition Government with the holding of free and fair elections and a constitutional referendum, in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).<sup>11</sup> In South Sudan, UNMISS was requested to provide technical assistance, capacity-building and logistical support for the electoral process, as well as to protect civilians under the threat of physical violence in the context of the elections and to mitigate the potential for tensions throughout the electoral period.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, the Council requested UNMISS to use technical assistance and capacity-building to support the constitutional drafting process, transitional security arrangements and the development of a sound regulatory framework.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, the Council newly emphasized the importance of gender and conflict-sensitive analysis in various aspects of the mandate of UNMISS, including in the implementation of its early warning and response strategy, support to community-led peace dialogue processes and capacity-building support for the rule of law and justice sector.<sup>14</sup> Further, UNMISS was also requested to provide gender-sensitive risk assessments on the adverse effects of climate change as part of its mandate to support the creation of conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (d)(ii).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (d)(iv).

<sup>10</sup> Resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 26 (a).

<sup>11</sup> Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 26 (a)(vi).

<sup>12</sup> Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), paras. 3 (a)(i) and 3 (c)(v).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (c)(iv).

<sup>14</sup> Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), paras. 3 (a)(ii), (v) and (vii).

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (b)(i).



*Strategic communications*

On 12 July 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement underscoring the importance of the use of strategic communications by peacekeeping operations for the effective implementation of their mandates.<sup>16</sup> In this context, many of the mandate renewals during the reporting period defined new tasks related to the use of strategic communications. For example, the Council requested MONUSCO to enhance its use of strategic communications, including through joint communications with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities to protect civilians, strengthen its early warning mechanism, including to prevent disinformation campaigns and misinformation.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, the Council requested MINUSCA and UNIFIL to improve communication efforts in support of their mandates through strategic communications strategies and strategies to counter disinformation and misinformation.<sup>18</sup> In relation to the mandate of UNISFA, the Council requested the Secretary-General to ensure the Mission's use of strategic communications to counter disinformation and misinformation that could hinder its ability to implement its mandate and the mandate of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.<sup>19</sup>

*Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations*

As a means of enhancing effectiveness, the Council continued to request the Secretary-General to implement existing obligations and utilize capacities in the planning and conduct of operations of MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNFICYP and UNMISS.<sup>20</sup> In 2022, the Council added new obligations such as the implementation of more effective casualty and medical evacuation procedures, taking measures to improve the planning and functioning of safety and security facilities and arrangements, improving intelligence and analysis capacities, including intelligence processes specific to explosive ordnance disposal and strengthened

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<sup>16</sup> See [S/PRST/2022/5](#).

<sup>17</sup> Resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 24 (i)(f).

<sup>18</sup> In connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 32; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), para. 24.

<sup>19</sup> Resolution [2630 \(2022\)](#), para. 5.

<sup>20</sup> In connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 43; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 41; in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 36; in connection with UNFICYP, resolution [2618 \(2022\)](#), para. 16; and, in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), para. 20.

forensics exploitation, and strengthening capacities to monitor and counter disinformation and misinformation. With regard to MONUSCO, the Council underscored that the primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and assets rested with the host State and requested the Secretary-General to implement the provisions of resolution [2589 \(2021\)](#) to establish accountability for crimes against peacekeepers.<sup>21</sup>

Further, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the mandates of MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNFICYP and UNMISS using the data collected and analyzed through the Comprehensive Planning and Performance System, the implementation of the Integrated Peacekeeping Performance and Accountability Framework and through other strategic planning and performance measurement tools to describe impact and overall performance, as well as information on the actions and impact of strategic communications for mandated activities.<sup>22</sup>

Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the mandates of peacekeeping operations in 2022 and show the wide range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; and (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and reiterated by the Council during reporting period. The tables include the tasks of peacekeeping operations with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions during previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the operations concerned.

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<sup>21</sup> Resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 35.

<sup>22</sup> In connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 58; in connection MINUSMA, resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 57; MONUSCO, resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 43; in connection with UNFICYP, resolutions [2618 \(2022\)](#), para. 19 and [2646 \(2022\)](#), para. 20; and, in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), para. 30.

Table 1  
**Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2022: Africa**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>
Chapter VII		X	X	X	X	X
Authorization of the use of force		X	X	X	X	X
Ceasefire monitoring	X			X	X	X
Civil-military coordination		X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X	X	X	X
Electoral assistance	X	X		X	X	X
Human rights-related <sup>a</sup>		X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support	X	X	X	X	X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mission impact assessment		X			X	X
Political process		X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians		X	X	X	X	X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment		X	X	X	X	X
Public information		X		X	X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters		X	X	X	X	X
Security monitoring; patrolling; deterrence		X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform		X			X	X
Support to military		X			X	X
Support to police	X	X	X	X	X	X
Support to sanctions regimes		X		X	X	X
Support to State institutions		X		X	X	X

*Abbreviations:* MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan; MINUSMA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

Table 2  
**Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2022: Asia, Europe and Middle East**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNMOGIP</i>	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNTSO</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>
Chapter VII			X			
Authorization of the use of force						X
Ceasefire monitoring	X	X		X	X	X
Civil-military coordination			X			
Demilitarization and arms management						X
Electoral assistance						
Human rights-related <sup>b</sup>		X	X			X
Humanitarian support		X	X			
International cooperation and coordination		X	X	X	X	X
Political process		X	X			
Protection of civilians						X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment						X
Public information						X
Rule of law/judicial matters						
Security monitoring-patrolling-deterrence						X
Security sector reform						
Support to military						X
Support to police		X	X			
Support to sanctions regimes						
Support to State institutions			X			X

*Abbreviations:* UNMOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNFICYP, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNMIK, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

### *Authorized strength of peacekeeping operations*

As illustrated in table 3, during the period under review, the Council modified the composition of MONUSCO and authorized an increase from 1,050 to 1,410 personnel of formed police units which encompassed the previous temporary deployment of up to 360 formed police unit personnel.

Table 3  
**Changes in composition of peacekeeping operations, 2022**

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Changes in composition</i>	<i>Decision</i>
MONUSCO	The Council decided to increase the number of formed police units personnel from 1,050 to 1,410 personnel, while maintaining 13,500 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers and 591 police personnel	Resolution <a href="#">2666 (2022)</a>

*Abbreviations:* MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

## Africa

### United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

The Council established the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by resolution [690 \(1991\)](#) of 29 April 1991, in accordance with the settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). MINURSO was mandated to monitor the ceasefire, provide security for the repatriation of refugees and support the organization of a free and fair referendum.<sup>23</sup>

In 2022, by resolution [2654 \(2022\)](#) of 27 October, the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO for one year, until 31 October 2023.<sup>24</sup> The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and abstentions by Kenya and the Russian Federation.<sup>25</sup> The Council did not modify the mandate or composition of MINURSO during the period under review.

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<sup>23</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MINURSO, see previous supplements covering the period 1991-2021. For more information on the situation concerning Western Sahara, see part I, sect. 1.

<sup>24</sup> Resolution [2654 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. See also report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara dated 3 October 2022 ([S/2022/733](#)).

<sup>25</sup> See [S/PV.9168](#). Explaining the abstention, the representative of Kenya expressed concern that the resolution did not substantively reflect the Council's commitment, as was previously reflected in resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#) and other resolutions, to "provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements and consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect". The representative of the Russian Federation pointed out that in the previous few years, the resolutions of the renewal of the mandate of MINURSO included amendments that harmed the unbiased and impartial approach needed to resolve the issue of Western Sahara. He added that the resolution did not reflect the real situation on the ground with regard to the settlement of the Western Sahara issue and was unlikely to facilitate the efforts of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General to resume the direct negotiation process in order to reach a mutually acceptable solution.

## **United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

The Council established the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) by resolution [1925 \(2010\)](#) of 28 May 2010, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to succeed the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). MONUSCO was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection mandate as set out in the resolution and tasked with, inter alia, ensuring the effective protection of civilians and supporting the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with stabilization and peace consolidation.<sup>26</sup>

By resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#) of 20 December 2022, acting under Chapter VII, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of MONUSCO for one year, until 20 December 2023.<sup>27</sup> In the resolution, the Council reiterated the two strategic priorities of MONUSCO, namely, to protect civilians and to support the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms, as well as the decision that the Mission's mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks, with the protection of civilians to be given priority.<sup>28</sup> In addition to modifying their content, the Council defined the following order of priority tasks of MONUSCO as follows: (i) protection of civilians; (ii) disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and stabilization; and (iii) security sector reform.

Against the backdrop of the deteriorating security situation in the east of the country following the resurgence of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) and the continued attacks by other armed groups, the Council adjusted the Mission's protection of civilians' mandate. Specifically, the Council provided that MONUSCO should take all necessary measures to ensure effective, timely, dynamic and integrated protection of civilians by preventing, deterring and stopping all armed groups and local militias from invading, attacking, or surrounding major population centres, including in support of the Congolese authorities, by

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<sup>26</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MONUSCO, see previous supplements covering the period 2010-2021. For more information on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part I, sect. 4.

<sup>27</sup> Resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 19. See also the reports of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/252](#), [S/2022/503](#), [S/2022/709](#) and [S/2022/892](#)).

<sup>28</sup> Resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), paras. 21 and 24.

disarming them, using good offices and supporting and undertaking local mediation efforts and national level advocacy to prevent the escalation of violence and to counter hate speech, disinformation and misinformation.<sup>29</sup> The Council decided that MONUSCO should conduct increased and effective joint operations with the Congolese security forces in accordance with its mandate and in strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy,<sup>30</sup> and enhance its community engagement with civilians and use of strategic communications.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, the Council encouraged support to the East African Community Regional Force (deployed in August 2022 to counter armed groups in the east of the country), stressing the importance of the protection of civilians and the close coordination and information sharing between the Force and MONUSCO, among other actors.<sup>32</sup>

With respect to the second priority task, the Council expanded the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and stabilization mandate of MONUSCO to include the provision of good offices, advice and assistance, in close cooperation with international and local partners, including the East African Community-led Nairobi process.<sup>33</sup> Regarding security sector reform, the Council underlined the role of MONUSCO in supporting women's full, equal, effective and meaningful participation and safety and tasked the Mission to enhance the capacities of the Congolese security forces on basic investigation and forensics exploitation related to improvised explosive devices.<sup>34</sup>

By resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), the Council further authorized MONUSCO to provide support for the 2023 electoral process in the three provinces where the Mission was still deployed, including limited logistical support.<sup>35</sup> As part of the Mission's non-priority tasks, the Council included human rights monitoring and reporting, support for the national judicial system and the fight against impunity, the protection and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, child protection and the cross-cutting issues of gender and sexual violence.<sup>36</sup>

Regarding the effectiveness of the Mission and safety and security of peacekeepers, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide MONUSCO with the necessary

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 24 (i)(a).

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 24 (i)(c).

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 24 (i)(f).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 17.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 24 (ii)(a).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 24 (iii)(l).

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 26 (a).

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 26 (b)-(c) and 27-30.



capacities to fulfil its mandate in a complex security environment.<sup>37</sup> The Council also reiterated its requested to the Secretary-General to implement the activities set out in paragraph 42 of resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#) in the planning and conduct of MONUSCO's operations.<sup>38</sup>

Concerning the exit strategy, the Council took note of the call by the Government to review the transition plan for MONUSCO and encouraged the United Nations and the Government, in liaison with civil society, to identify concrete and realistic steps to create the minimum security conditions to enable the responsible and sustainable exit of MONUSCO.<sup>39</sup> In addition, the Council called upon MONUSCO to work closely with the United Nations country team to identify ways to address gaps in capabilities to prepare for the exit and to clarify roles and responsibilities for all relevant United Nations stakeholders in line with resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#).<sup>40</sup>

By resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), the Council maintained the Mission's authorized troop ceiling of 13,500 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, as well as the police ceiling of 591 police personnel.<sup>41</sup> The Council further authorized a ceiling of 1,410 personnel of formed police units which encompassed the previous temporary deployment of up to 360 formed police unit personnel.<sup>42</sup> Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide, once the joint review of the transition plan was concluded and no later than July 2023, options for adapting the Mission's configuration of its civilian, police and military components and on the future configuration of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo beyond the current mandate of MONUSCO.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., para. 35.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., para. 36.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., para. 38.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., para. 40.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., para. 20.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., para. 20.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., para. 44.

## **United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei**

The Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by resolution [1990 \(2011\)](#) of 27 June 2011, taking into account the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area of 20 June 2011. The Council mandated UNISFA to, inter alia, monitor and verify the redeployment of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei Area, participate in relevant bodies as stipulated in the Agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized UNISFA to take the actions necessary to, inter alia, protect United Nations and humanitarian personnel and property, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and ensure security in the Abyei Area. By resolution [2024 \(2011\)](#) of 14 December 2011, the Council expanded the mandate of UNISFA to include assisting the Sudan and South Sudan in ensuring the observance of their agreement on border security and supporting the operational activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.<sup>44</sup>

In 2022, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) of 12 May and [2660 \(2022\)](#) of 14 November by which it extended the mandate of UNISFA for periods of six months and one year respectively, the latter time until 15 November 2023.<sup>45</sup>

The Council did not modify the mandate of UNISFA during the period under review. By resolution [2630 \(2022\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General, consistent with resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), to ensure UNISFA's use of confidence-building, facilitation, mediation, community engagement and strategic communications to support the implementation of the Mission's mandate and its protection, information gathering, and situational awareness activities, as well as to counter disinformation and misinformation that could hinder its ability to implement its mandate and the mandate of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNISFA, see previous supplements covering the period 2011-2021. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I, sect. 7.

<sup>45</sup> Resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) and [2660 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. See also reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/316](#) and [S/2022/760](#)).

<sup>46</sup> Resolution [2630 \(2022\)](#), para. 5.

By resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) and [2660 \(2022\)](#), while maintaining the authorized troop and police ceilings as set out in resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), the Council expressed its intention to remain seized of the recommendations of the strategic review as contained in the letter dated 17 September 2021 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council.<sup>47</sup>

By an exchange of letters dated 26 January and 1 February 2022, the Secretary-General appointed Major General Benjamin Olufemi Sawyerr as Force Commander of UNISFA.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) and [2660 \(2022\)](#), para. 3. See also [S/2021/805](#).

<sup>48</sup> [S/2022/78](#) and [S/2022/79](#).

## United Nations Mission in South Sudan

By resolution [1996 \(2011\)](#) of 8 July 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with a mandate to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term State-building and economic development; support the Government of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution and to protect civilians; and support the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations country team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, establish the rule of law and strengthen the security and justice sectors. UNMISS was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection of civilians' mandate.<sup>49</sup>

In 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2625 \(2022\)](#) of 15 March and [2633 \(2022\)](#) of 26 May in connection with UNMISS. By resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year, until 15 March 2023.<sup>50</sup> The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and abstentions by China and the Russian Federation.<sup>51</sup>

By resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), the Council reiterated that the mandate of UNMISS was designed to advance the three-year strategic vision defined in resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#) to prevent a return to civil war in South Sudan, build durable peace at the local and national levels and support inclusive and accountable governance and free, fair and peaceful elections in accordance with the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.<sup>52</sup> Within the framework of the strategic vision, the Council introduced several modifications to the tasks of UNMISS related to the following (a)

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<sup>49</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMISS, see previous supplements covering the period 2011-2021. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan," see part I, sect. 7.

<sup>50</sup> Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. See also reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/156](#), [S/2022/468](#), [S/2022/689](#) and [S/2022/918](#)).

<sup>51</sup> See [S/PV.8994](#). In her statement after the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation asserted that the Council and UNMISS did not have the appropriate resources to fulfil the functions of human rights capacity-building, combating sexual violence, defending the rights of women and fighting corruption, which were South Sudanese internal matters. She added that, while the Mission could, at the request of the host country, provide technical and logistical assistance for the conduct of elections, its core function was to stabilize the security situation and assist the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement. The representative of China objected to the inclusion of human rights-related provisions in the draft resolution and the assignment of climate change-related mandates to a peacekeeping operation. For more detail on the discussion, see part I, sect. 7.

<sup>52</sup> Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

protection of civilians; (b) creating the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance; (c) supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the peace process; and (d) monitoring, investigating and reporting on violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights.

Specifically, regarding the protection of civilians, the Council indicated that the Mission would be responsible for the protection of civilians under threat of physical violence which would include protection against violence in the context of elections, and that the best practices in this context should be shared with relevant local stakeholders for the purpose of capacity-building.<sup>53</sup> Further, the Council called for the continued and consistent use and deployment of the Mission's child protection, women protection and uniformed and civilian gender advisers.<sup>54</sup> The Council adjusted the mandate of UNMISS to deter, prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence by adding the task of facilitating access to organizations that provided services and support to survivors.<sup>55</sup> The Council also placed particular emphasis on the Mission's use of conflict-sensitive and gender-based analysis in the implementation of its early warning and response strategy, support to community-led peace dialogue processes and capacity-building in connection with rule of law and justice sector reform.<sup>56</sup> Further, UNMISS was requested to provide support for the development and implementation of gender-responsive community violence reduction programmes to help de-escalate inter-communal violence, with a particular focus on members of armed groups ineligible or unwilling to be integrated into the Necessary Unified Forces.<sup>57</sup> The Council also stressed the requirement for UNMISS to operate at all times consistent with the human rights due diligence policy in its coordination with police services, security and Government institutions and civil society actors in relevant and protection-focused activities.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, as part of the group of tasks related to the creation of conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the Council requested UNMISS to provide gender-sensitive risk assessments on the adverse effects of climate change.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a)(i).

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a)(iv).

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 3 (a)(ii), (v) and (vii).

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a)(vi).

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a)(viii).

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (b)(i).

With respect to the Mission's support for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, taking note of the needs assessment transmitted by the Secretary-General in his letter dated 15 July 2021, the Council requested UNMISS to provide technical assistance, including capacity-building and logistical support for the electoral process, in coordination with the United Nations country team and regional and international partners, as well as security support.<sup>60</sup> The Council also requested UNMISS, using technical assistance, to include capacity-building, to support support mechanisms of the Revitalized Agreement including with regard to the constitution drafting process, transitional security arrangements and the development of a sound regulatory framework.<sup>61</sup> Further, UNMISS was tasked with assisting all parties with ensuring the participation of women and inclusion of youth, faith groups and civil society in the transitional justice and constitution-making process.<sup>62</sup>

The Council expanded the human rights mandate of UNMISS to include ensuring that arrangements for the monitoring, analysis and reporting on conflict-related sexual violence served to promote action to deter, prevent and respond to such violence.<sup>63</sup> In addition, the Mission was requested to include capacity-building in its coordination, information-sharing and technical support for international, regional and national mechanisms and relevant stakeholders engaged in monitoring, investigating and reporting on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses.<sup>64</sup> Finally, with respect to the Mission's operations, the Council requested the Secretary-General to fully implement 18 substantive and operational capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of UNMISS operations.<sup>65</sup>

By resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), the Council reiterated its request to UNMISS to assist the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan Committee and the Panel of Experts.<sup>66</sup>

By resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), the Council decided to maintain the overall force levels of UNMISS with a troop ceiling of 17,000 personnel and a police ceiling of 2,101 personnel,

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<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (c)(v). See also [S/2021/661](#).

<sup>61</sup> Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), para. 3 (c)(iv).

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (c)(ii).

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (d)(ii).

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4 (d)(iv).

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 20 (a)-(r).

<sup>66</sup> Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), paras. 18 and 22. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), see part IX, sect. I. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning South Sudan, see part VII, sect. III.

including 88 corrections officers.<sup>67</sup> The Council further expressed its readiness to consider adjustment to UNMISS force levels and capacity-building tasks based on security conditions on the ground and implementation of priority measures by the Government of South Sudan and all relevant stakeholders, as set out in the resolution.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), para. 4.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

## **United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali**

The Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by resolution [2100 \(2013\)](#) of 25 April 2013, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council authorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means to stabilize population centres and support the re-establishment of State authority, support the implementation of a transitional road map, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property, assist the Malian authorities in promoting and protecting human rights, and support humanitarian assistance, national and international justice, and cultural preservation.<sup>69</sup>

In 2022, by resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#) of 29 June, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of MINUSMA by one year, until 30 June 2023.<sup>70</sup> The Council maintained the strategic priorities of MINUSMA to, first, support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and the political transition and, secondly, to facilitate the implementation by Malian actors of a comprehensive, inclusive, politically-focused strategy which addressed the root causes and drivers of conflict, protected civilians, reduced intercommunal violence, and re-established State presence and authority as well as basic social services in central Mali.<sup>71</sup> Further, while requesting MINUSMA to continue to carry out its peacekeeping mandate with a proactive, robust, flexible and agile posture, the Council emphasized that this should be done with a clear understanding and interpretation of roles and responsibilities among its civilian and uniformed personnel.<sup>72</sup> Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and abstentions by China and the Russian Federation.<sup>73</sup>

The Council largely maintained the priority tasks of MINUSMA with a few adjustments. As part of its first priority task to support to the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the

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<sup>69</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2012-2021. For more information on the situation in Mali, see part I, sect. 11.

<sup>70</sup> Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 15. See also reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali submitted during the period under review ([S/2021/1117](#), [S/2022/278](#), [S/2022/446](#) and [S/2022/731](#)) and letter dated 1 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council ([S/2022/448](#)) on the progress in Mission operations, Mission performance and the implementation of the force adaptation plan, submitted further to resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#).

<sup>71</sup> Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 18.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 19.

<sup>73</sup> See [S/PV.9082](#). In explaining their decision to abstain in the vote, the representatives of China and the Russian Federation expressed disagreement with the addition of new language in the resolution on human rights, particularly with respect to the support of MINUSMA to the Malian Defence and Security Forces. For further detail on the discussion, see part I, sect. 14.



full realization of the political transition, the Council requested the Mission to assist the Malian Transition Government, together with the United Nations country team, in the holding of free and fair elections and of a constitutional referendum, in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).<sup>74</sup> Within the framework of the second priority task to support the stabilization and restoration of State authority in central Mali, MINUSMA was requested to support the authorities in agreeing on and implementing a comprehensive, inclusive, politically-focused strategy which addressed the root causes and drivers of violent conflict.<sup>75</sup> Under the third priority task to protect civilians, the Council requested MINUSMA to strengthen community engagement and protection mechanisms, including through the use of quick impact projects.<sup>76</sup> Finally regarding the fourth priority task to promote and protect human rights, MINUSMA was requested to report publicly and quarterly to the Council on violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights.<sup>77</sup>

Beyond the priority tasks, the Council made several adjustments to the responsibilities of MINUSMA to support of the Malian Defence and Security Forces. The Council urged MINUSMA to ensure that its support was provided in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy across all phases of operations.<sup>78</sup> The Council further urged MINUSMA to ensure that such support was subject to appropriate oversight.<sup>79</sup>

With regard to the effectiveness of MINUSMA, the Council encouraged the Mission to implement the Integrated Peacekeeping Performance and Accountability Framework and the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System to ensure that the whole-of-mission performance was assessed against the delivery of the mandate.<sup>80</sup> The Council also reiterated its request to the Secretary-General, originally outlined in resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), to fully implement a number of capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of the operations of MINUSMA.<sup>81</sup> In this regard, the Council added new requirements to improve explosive ordnance disposal specific intelligence, to verify that contingents were trained and

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<sup>74</sup> Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 26 (a)(vi).

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 26 (b)(i).

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 26 (c)(ii).

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 26 (d)(ii).

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 32.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 40.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 41.

equipped to counter explosive devices and to strengthen capacities to monitor and counter disinformation and misinformation.

Regarding the Mission's configuration, the Council decided that MINUSMA would continue to comprise up to 13,289 military personnel and 1,920 police personnel.<sup>82</sup> Finally, the Council expressed its support to the proposal of the Secretary-General to conduct an internal review of MINUSMA to be conveyed no later than 13 January 2023.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid., para. 16.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., para. 58. In his report on the situation in Mali dated 2 June 2022 ([S/2022/446](#)), the Secretary-General underscored that the increasingly complex and fluid security situation was such that it would be difficult for the Mission to cope with the related challenges in the northern part of Mali within the currently authorized strength. He further expressed his intention to conduct a thorough analysis of the situation, with a view to presenting recommendations to the Council on how best MINUSMA could continue to deliver on its priorities.

## **United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic**

The Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) by resolution [2149 \(2014\)](#) of 10 April 2014, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSCA was authorized to take all necessary means to, inter alia, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property; support the implementation of the transition process; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; support justice and the rule of law; and support the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation strategies.<sup>84</sup>

In 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2648 \(2022\)](#) of 29 July and [2659 \(2022\)](#) of 14 November concerning MINUSCA. By resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of MINUSCA for a period of one year, until 15 November 2023.<sup>85</sup> The resolution was adopted with 12 votes in favour and abstentions by China, Gabon and the Russian Federation.<sup>86</sup>

The Council did not make major changes to the mandate of MINUSCA during the period under review. By resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), the Council reiterated that the mandate was designed to advance a multiyear strategic vision to create the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to national reconciliation through the implementation of the Political Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the elimination of the threat posed by armed groups through a comprehensive approach and proactive and robust posture without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping.<sup>87</sup> The Council requested MINUSCA to

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<sup>84</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2014-2021. For more information on the situation in the Central African Republic, see part I, sect. 5.

<sup>85</sup> Resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 29. See also reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/119](#), [S/2022/491](#) and [S/2022/762](#)) and letter dated 1 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council ([S/2022/449](#)) on the logistical support provided by MINUSCA to the Central African Republic defence and security forces submitted further to resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#).

<sup>86</sup> See [S/PV.9190](#). In explaining the vote of their delegations, the representatives of China, Gabon and the Russian Federation expressed the view that the new mandate of MINUSCA should have included, among other tasks, stronger support for the restoration of State authority. The representatives of Gabon and the Russian Federation further objected to a lack of differentiated treatment in the resolution between the national authorities and armed groups in the Central African Republic. For further detail on the discussion, see part I, sect. 5.

<sup>87</sup> Resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 31.

improve its communication efforts to support the implementation of its mandate and enhance its protection and raise awareness on its mandate and its role.<sup>88</sup>

Furthermore, the Council recalled that the mandate of MINUSCA should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks and, when relevant, in a sequenced manner, and reiterated the Mission's priority tasks to: (a) protect civilians; (b) provide good offices and support to the peace process; (c) facilitate the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance; and (d) protect United Nations personnel, installations, equipment, goods and associated personnel, with certain modifications.<sup>89</sup>

Beyond the priority tasks, the Council reiterated, with one addition, the other tasks of MINUSCA to: (a) support the extension of State authority, the deployment of security forces, and the preservation of territorial integrity; (b) promote and protect human rights; (c) to assist in the follow-up to the Republic Dialogue and with the 2023 elections; (d) security sector reform; (e) disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation; and (f) support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity, and the rule of law.<sup>90</sup> Specifically, with respect to reintegration, the Council requested MINUSCA to support the Government to provide security and appropriate protection to demobilized ex-combatants.<sup>91</sup> The Council reiterated the additional tasks of MINUSCA to support the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concerning the Central African Republic and its Panel of Experts.<sup>92</sup> By resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#), the Council further reiterated the task of MINUSCA to report to the Committee on the contribution to security sector reform of the sanctions exemption related to supplies and assistance intended solely for this purpose.<sup>93</sup>

Regarding the Mission's operations, by resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), the Council recognized that the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates was contingent upon several critical factors, including, among others, strategic communications and integration across mission components.<sup>94</sup> The Council further reiterated its request to the Secretary-General, originally

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid., para. 32.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., para. 35.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., para. 36 (a)-(f)

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., para. 36 (e)(i).

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., para. 37 (a) (c). For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#), see part IX, sect. I. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>93</sup> Resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#), para. 1 (b).

<sup>94</sup> Resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 41.

outlined in resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), to fully implement a number of capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of the operations of MINUSCA and, in this regard, added improving explosive ordnance disposal specific intelligence and strengthened forensics exploitation capacity and to verify that contingents were trained and equipped to counter explosive devices as per United Nations standards.<sup>95</sup>

The Council recalled its decision in resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#) to increase the authorized size of MINUSCA's military and police components and stressed the need for the rest of those reinforcements to be deployed as quickly as possible, especially quick reaction forces, and sequenced through a phased approach.<sup>96</sup> Finally, the Council expressed its intention to request an independent strategic review of MINUSCA, assessing the challenges to peace and security in the Central African Republic, including constraints on the Mission's operations and providing detailed recommendations on the continued relevance of all mandate tasks, priorities and related resources, realistic, relevant and clearly measurable benchmarks and options for adapting the configuration of its civilian, police and military components.<sup>97</sup>

By an exchange of letters dated 17 and 22 February 2022 with the President of the Council, the Secretary-General appointed Ms. Valentine Rugwabiza as his Special Representative for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid., para. 43.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., para. 39.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., para. 58 (c).

<sup>98</sup> [S/2022/149](#) and [S/2022/150](#).

## Asia

### United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

The Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) by resolution [47 \(1948\)](#) of 21 April 1948. The first team of military observers, who eventually formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP, was deployed in January 1949 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan established by resolution [39 \(1948\)](#). Following the termination of the Commission, the Council, by resolution [91 \(1951\)](#), decided that UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the renewed hostilities in 1971, the task of UNMOGIP has been to monitor developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. In 2021, the Council did not discuss UNMOGIP or make changes to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.<sup>99</sup>

By an exchange of letters dated 8 and 10 August 2022 with the President of the Council, the Secretary-General appointed Rear Admiral Guillermo Pablo Rios as Head of Mission and Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMOGIP, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1946-1951*, and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952-2021.

<sup>100</sup> [S/2022/612](#) and [S/2022/613](#).

## Europe

### United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by resolution [186 \(1964\)](#) of 4 March 1964. In the interest of preserving international peace and security, UNFICYP was mandated to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.<sup>101</sup>

In 2022, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions [2618 \(2022\)](#) of 27 January and [2646 \(2022\)](#) of 28 July in relation to UNFICYP. The Council extended the mandate of the Mission twice for a period of six months, the second time until 31 January 2023.<sup>102</sup>

During the period under review, the Council did not modify the mandate or composition of UNFICYP. By resolution [2618 \(2022\)](#), regarding the Mission's operations, the Council stressed that the mandated authority of UNFICYP extended throughout Cyprus and requested the Secretary-General, Member States and all parties to continue to take all measures to ensure the safety and security and freedom of movement of its personnel in line with resolution [2518 \(2020\)](#).<sup>103</sup> The Council further requested the Secretary-General to implement six activities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of the operations of UNFICYP within the limits of the mandate and operations, including (a) women and peace and security requirements under resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#); (b) peacekeeping performance requirements under resolutions [2378 \(2017\)](#) and [2436 \(2018\)](#); (c) the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on serious misconduct, sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment; (d) more effective casualty and medical evacuation procedures; (e) active and effective measures to improve the planning and functioning of safety and security facilities and arrangements; and (f) youth, peace and security requirements under resolutions [2250 \(2015\)](#), [2419 \(2018\)](#) and [2535 \(2020\)](#).<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> For further information on the history of the mandate of UNFICYP, see previous supplements covering the period 1964-2021. For more information on the situation in Cyprus, see part I, sect. 17.

<sup>102</sup> Resolutions [2618 \(2022\)](#) and [2646 \(2022\)](#), para. 10. See also report of the Secretary-General dated 5 July 2022 on the United Nations operation in Cyprus ([S/2022/533](#)).

<sup>103</sup> Resolution [2618 \(2022\)](#), para. 13.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 16 (a)-(f).

## **United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo**

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the Council on 10 June 1999, by resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council mandated UNMIK to carry out a range of tasks, including promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions, and organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.<sup>105</sup> In 2022, the Council did not adopt any decisions relating to UNMIK and made no change to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMIK, see previous supplements covering the period 1996-2021.

<sup>106</sup> For more information on Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#), see part I, sect. 18 B. See also reports of the Secretary-General on UNMIK submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/313](#) and [S/2022/739](#)).



## **Middle East**

### **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Council on 29 May 1948, by resolution [50 \(1948\)](#), to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the establishment of UNTSO, the Council has assigned it different tasks without formally changing its mandate, including the supervision of the General Armistice, the supervision of the armistice following the Suez war, the supervision of the armistice between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai, and the supervision of the truce between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, in collaboration with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), respectively.<sup>107</sup>

In 2022, the Council did not make changes to the composition or mandate of UNTSO, which remained open-ended. By resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) of 27 June and [2671 \(2022\)](#) of 22 December, the Council encouraged the Department of Peace Operations, UNDOF and UNTSO to continue relevant discussions on recommendations from the 2018 independent review of UNDOF to improve that Mission's performance and the implementation of its mandate.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNTSO, see *Repertoire 1946-1951* and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952-2021. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 20.

<sup>108</sup> Resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and [2671 \(2022\)](#), para. 12.

## United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Council on 31 May 1974, by resolution [350 \(1974\)](#), following the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to supervise the implementation of the Agreement and the areas of separation and limitation.<sup>109</sup>

In 2022, the Council did not make changes to the mandate or composition of UNDOF. By resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) of 27 June and [2671 \(2022\)](#) of 22 December, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of the Mission twice for a period of six months, the second time until 30 June 2023.<sup>110</sup>

In resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and [2671 \(2022\)](#), the Council reiterated its request to UNDOF, within existing capacities and resources, to take all appropriate steps to protect the safety, security and health of all mission personnel, in line with resolution [2518 \(2020\)](#), taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>111</sup> The Council further requested the Department of Peace Operations, UNDOF and UNTSO to continue relevant discussions on recommendations from the 2018 independent review of UNDOF to improve mission performance and implementation of the mandate of UNDOF.<sup>112</sup>

By an exchange of letters dated 5 and 7 July 2022 with the President of the Council, the Secretary-General appointed Major General Nirmal Kumar Thapa as Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNDOF.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNDOF, see previous supplements covering the period 1972-2021.

<sup>110</sup> Resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and [2671 \(2022\)](#), para. 15. See also reports of the Secretary-General on UNDOF submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/247](#), [S/2022/447](#), [S/2022/711](#) and [S/2022/887](#))

<sup>111</sup> Resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and [2671 \(2022\)](#), para. 8.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 12. See also [S/2018/1088](#), in which the Secretary-General provided an overview of the recommendations of the independent review of the Mission's mandate.

<sup>113</sup> [S/2022/558](#) and [S/2022/559](#).

## United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Council on 19 March 1978, by resolutions [425 \(1978\)](#) and [426 \(1978\)](#), to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. By resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), to address the continuing hostilities in Lebanon, the Council expanded the mandate of UNIFIL to include monitoring the cessation of hostilities; accompanying and supporting the Lebanese armed forces; extending its assistance to help to ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; and assisting the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry of arms or related materiel.<sup>114</sup>

In 2022, by resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#) of 31 August, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNIFIL for one year, until 31 August 2023.<sup>115</sup> The resolution was adopted further to the letter dated 9 August 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council recommending the extension of the mandate of the Mission.<sup>116</sup>

By resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), the Council reiterated the mandate of UNIFIL, with one addition. Specifically, the Council requested UNIFIL to improve its communication efforts to support the implementation of its mandate, enhance its protection and raise awareness on its mandate, role and authority to operate independently, as well as to underscore the role and responsibilities of the Lebanese authorities in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).<sup>117</sup> Moreover, the Council requested UNIFIL to prioritize the development of a strategic communications strategy outlining how it would improve these efforts and requested it to strengthen its efforts to monitor and counter disinformation and misinformation that might hinder its ability to implement its mandate or threaten the safety and security of peacekeepers and to develop a strategy to counter

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<sup>114</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIFIL, see previous supplements covering the period 1975-2021. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question and the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sects. 19 and 20.

<sup>115</sup> Resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, fifth preambular paragraph. See letter dated 9 August 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council regarding the renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL ([S/2022/607](#)) and the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/214](#), [S/2022/556](#) and [S/2022/858](#))

<sup>117</sup> Resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), para. 24.

disinformation and misinformation.<sup>118</sup>

The Council requested UNIFIL, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and following the letter dated 15 March 2022 from the Government of Lebanon addressed to the President of the Council, as well as per the recommendations of the Secretary-General, to exceptionally extend the temporary and special measures to support and assist the Lebanese Armed Forces with the provision of relevant additional non-lethal material (fuel, food and medicine) and logistical support.<sup>119</sup> The support would be provided for a period of six months and no longer than 28 February 2023, within existing resources, for the Lebanese Armed Forces-UNIFIL joint activities and in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy.<sup>120</sup>

Finally, the Council reiterated the tasks of UNIFIL to support and cooperate with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Tripartite Mechanism, ensure enhanced cooperation with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), to take all necessary action in areas of deployment to ensure that its area of operations was not utilized for hostile activities, protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate.<sup>121</sup>

The Council maintained the composition of UNIFIL during the reporting period.

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., para. 11. See also [S/2022/235](#) and [S/2022/556](#).

<sup>120</sup> Resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), para. 11.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., paras. 2, 5, 13-15, 23 and 27.

## II. Special political missions

### Note

Section II focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of special political missions,<sup>122</sup> as well as the changes to their mandates.<sup>123</sup>

### Overview of special political missions during 2022

In 2022, the Council oversaw 12 special political missions considered in this part of the *Repertoire*. Five were based in Africa, three in the Middle East, and two each in the Americas and Asia. Their nature varied from regional offices such as the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), missions with limited mandates to monitor and support the implementation of ceasefires and peace agreements such as the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), to larger assistance missions such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the United Nations Integrated Transition Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

#### *Newly established special political missions, terminations and extensions of mandates*

The Council did not establish new or terminate existing special political missions during the period under review. The Council extended the mandates of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), UNAMA, UNAMI, UNITAMS, UNMHA, UNSMIL, UNSOM and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. The mandates of UNOCA and UNOWAS

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<sup>122</sup> Special political missions described in the present part include regional offices and offices in support of political processes. Other types of special political missions, such as offices of special and personal envoys, advisers or representatives of the Secretary-General, sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels and other entities and mechanisms, are covered in parts VII and IX of the present Supplement.

<sup>123</sup> For information on the envoys, advisers, and representatives of the Secretary-General whose mandates relate to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, other than those appointed as heads of peacekeeping operations or special political missions, see part IX, sect. VI.

were renewed respectively in 2020 and 2021 for periods of three years until 31 January 2023 and 31 August 2024.<sup>124</sup> The mandates of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) and the Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) remained open-ended.

*Mandates of special political missions: differences in scope*

In 2022, for most special political missions, the Council reiterated without significant modification existing mandates which prioritized good offices and technical support for the implementation of peace agreements, political dialogue and national and local-level reconciliation, and political transitions involving elections and constitutional review processes. The Council underlined the importance of strengthening good governance and the capacity of national institutions to deliver basic services and implement reform agendas, including justice and security sector reform, as well as providing support for the promotion and protection of human rights and of ensuring accountability. As part of those priorities, most missions were mandated to coordinate and support the mobilization of humanitarian and development assistance among a broad spectrum of United Nations, international, regional, and sub-regional partners and stakeholders. Moreover, gender mainstreaming, including ensuring the full, equal, meaningful, and effective participation of women in political-decision making, as well as the protection of children, were the most common cross-cutting element of mandates.

Regional offices, such as UNOCA and UNOWAS, continued to monitor and analyse emerging threats to peace and security, support conflict prevention and management and early warning, promote inclusive political dialogue and reform processes and provide electoral support. The two Missions also continued to help address cross-border and cross-cutting issues and challenges such as transnational organized crime, terrorism and violent extremism, illicit trafficking, transhumance and conflicts between farmers and herders, and the security implications of climate change. The mandates of BINUH and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia continued to place particular emphasis on, respectively, capacity-building of national justice and rule of law institutions and the political, economic, and social

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<sup>124</sup> See [S/2019/1009](#), [S/2020/85](#), [S/2021/719](#) and [S/2021/720](#). See also *Repertoire, Supplement 2020 and 2021*, part X, sect. II.

reincorporation of former members of armed groups. UNMHA further retained its relatively narrow mandate to oversee and facilitate the implementation of ceasefire arrangements.

*Mandates of special political missions: modifications*

In 2022, the Council defined new priorities for the mandate of UNAMA and made modifications to the mandates of BINUH, UNAMI, UNSMIL and UNSOM. The mandates of UNITAMS, UNMHA and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, which were also extended during the period under review, were not modified as defined in previous resolutions.

With regard to the mandate of UNAMA, for the first time since the takeover of the country by the Taliban in August 2021, the Council introduced new priorities for the Mission, including among others, the coordination and facilitation of humanitarian assistance, the protection and promotion of the human rights, gender mainstreaming and supporting and promoting the full protection of human rights of women and girls, monitoring and supporting the protection of children, and providing outreach and good offices with a focus on inclusive governance.<sup>125</sup>

In amending the mandate of UNAMI and focusing on its humanitarian support, the Council requested the Mission to support the transition of humanitarian services to government systems and the timely access to legal assistance and civil documentations for internally displaced persons and displaced Iraqis in the Syrian Arab Republic.<sup>126</sup>

Changes to the mandates of BINUH and UNSOM primarily focused on strengthening their support for State institutions and stabilization. In the context of the deteriorating security situation in Haiti resulting from the activities of armed gangs, the Council amended the mandate of BINUH to include working with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and other relevant United Nations agencies in support of combatting illicit financial flows and trafficking and diversion of arms and with the management and control of borders and ports.<sup>127</sup> In Somalia, the Council encouraged UNSOM to support the national authorities to ensure that plans were in place to protect civilians, accelerate the implementation of national stabilization plans and

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<sup>125</sup> Resolution [2626 \(2022\)](#), para. 5(a)-(h).

<sup>126</sup> Resolution [2631 \(2022\)](#), para. 2 (c)(i) and (ii).

<sup>127</sup> Resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 8.

promote expansion of governance and service delivery.<sup>128</sup> Following the reconfiguration of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the Council requested the United Nations to increase coordination and collaboration between the Federal Government of Somalia, the federal member states, ATMIS, UNSOM, the United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS), the United Nations country team and Somalia's other partners.<sup>129</sup>

Furthermore, the Council continued to introduce new tasks related to addressing the impact of climate change in the mandates of special political missions. Specifically, the Council provided that UNAMI should support the Government of Iraq with facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation on the adverse impacts of climate change, in particular those that contributed to desertification and drought.<sup>130</sup> In relation to UNSOM, the Council, requested the United Nations, the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states to consider the adverse implications of climate change, environmental degradation, other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors in their programmes in Somalia, including by undertaking comprehensive risk assessments and risk management strategies.<sup>131</sup> Finally, consistent with its approach to the mandates of peacekeeping operations as described above in section 1, the Council requested BINUH and UNSMIL to strengthen and enhance the use of strategic communications in support of their mandates and activities.<sup>132</sup>

Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the mandates of special political missions in 2022, showing the range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the period under review; (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and specifically reiterated by the Council during the period under review; and (c) tasks of missions with open-ended or multi-year mandates adopted in previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.

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<sup>128</sup> Resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), para. 7 (a)-(d).

<sup>129</sup> Resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#), para. 48 (c).

<sup>130</sup> Resolution [2631 \(2022\)](#), para. 2 (b)(iv).

<sup>131</sup> Resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), para. 14.

<sup>132</sup> In connection with BINUH, resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 6; and, in connection with UNSMIL, resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#), para. 3.



Table 4  
**Mandates of special political missions, 2022: Africa**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNOCA</i>	<i>UNSMIL</i>	<i>UNSOM</i>	<i>UNOWAS</i>	<i>UNITAMS</i>
Chapter VII					
Ceasefire monitoring		X			X
Civil-military coordination					
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X		X
Electoral assistance	X	X	X	X	X
Human rights-related <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support		X		X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Maritime security	X		X	X	
Mission impact assessment					
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians			X		X
Public information		X		X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform			X	X	X
Support to military			X		X
Support to police			X		X
Support to sanctions regimes		X			X
Support to State institutions		X	X		X

*Abbreviations:* UNOCA, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNITAMS, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

Table 5  
**Mandates of special political missions, 2022: Americas, Asia and Middle East**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</i>	<i>BINUH</i>	<i>UNAMA</i>	<i>UNRCCA</i>	<i>UNAMI</i>	<i>UNSCOL</i>	<i>UNMHA</i>
Chapter VII							
Ceasefire monitoring	X						X
Civilian-military coordination			X				
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X		X		X
Electoral assistance		X	X		X		
Human rights-related <sup>a</sup>		X	X		X		
Humanitarian support			X		X		
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Protection of civilians			X				
Public information		X			X		
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X	X		X		
Security monitoring – patrolling – Deterrence							X
Security sector reform					X		
Support to police		X					
Support to sanctions regimes			X				
Support to State institutions		X	X		X		

*Abbreviations:* BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNRCCA, United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; UNAMI, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNSCOL, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; UNMHA, United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

## Africa

### United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was established by an exchange of letters dated 11 December 2009 and 30 August 2010 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.<sup>133</sup> The functions of UNOCA included cooperating with the Economic Community of Central African States and other regional partners in the promotion of peace and stability in the broader subregion, to carry out good offices roles in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region, to promote an integrated subregional approach and facilitate coordination and information exchange among United Nations organizations and partners in the subregion, and to report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance. UNOCA was subsequently mandated to promote efforts to address emerging security and cross-border threats, incorporate gender perspectives in the implementation of its mandate and to take into consideration in its activities the adverse implications of climate and ecological change and natural disasters on the stability of the Central African region.<sup>134</sup>

In 2022, the Council did not adopt any decisions concerning UNOCA, including with regard to its mandate, which had been renewed from 1 September 2021 to 31 August 2024 by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.<sup>135</sup>

In a letter dated 28 July 2022 addressed to the President of the Council, the Secretary-General informed the Council of his decision to appoint Mr. Abdou Abarry as his Special Representative for Central Africa and Head of UNOCA.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> [S/2009/697](#) and [S/2010/457](#).

<sup>134</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNOCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2008-2021. For more information on the situation in the Central African region, see part I, sect. 6.

<sup>135</sup> [S/2021/719](#) and [S/2021/720](#). See also reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of UNOCA submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/436](#) and [S/2022/896](#))

<sup>136</sup> [S/2022/582](#).

## United Nations Support Mission in Libya

By resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#) of 16 September 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) with a mandate to support Libyan national efforts to restore public security and order and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, extend State authority, promote and protect human rights and support transitional justice, initiate economic recovery, and coordinate international support.<sup>137</sup>

In 2022, the Council adopted resolutions [2619 \(2022\)](#) of 31 January, [2629 \(2022\)](#) of 29 April, [2644 \(2022\)](#) of 13 July, [2647 \(2022\)](#) of 28 July and [2656 \(2022\)](#) of 28 October concerning the mandate of UNSMIL. By resolutions [2619 \(2022\)](#), [2629 \(2022\)](#) and [2647 \(2022\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL as set out in resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#) and paragraph 16 of [2570 \(2021\)](#), respectively for periods of three months each.<sup>138</sup> Resolution 2647 (2022) was adopted with 12 votes in favour and abstentions by Gabon, Ghana and Kenya.<sup>139</sup> By resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate for a period of one year, until 31 October 2023.<sup>140</sup>

By resolution [2629 \(2022\)](#), the Council took note of the independent strategic review of UNSMIL, requested the Mission to implement its recommendations and decided that it should be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL in Tripoli, supported by two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.<sup>141</sup> The Council further called on the Secretary-General to appoint his Special Representative

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<sup>137</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSMIL, see previous supplements covering the period 2010–2021. For more information on the situation in Libya, see part I, sect. 10.

<sup>138</sup> Resolutions [2619 \(2022\)](#), [2629 \(2022\)](#) and [2647 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1.

<sup>139</sup> See [S/PV.9103](#). After the vote, the representatives of these three Council members expressed regret regarding the Council's decision to again extend the mandate of UNSMIL for a shorter period of time and underscored the need for progress on the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the Mission.

<sup>140</sup> Resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. See also reports of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/31](#), [S/2022/409](#), [S/2022/632](#) and [S/2022/932](#))

<sup>141</sup> Resolution [2629 \(2022\)](#), para. 2. See also [S/2021/716](#), annex, in which the independent expert who conducted the independent strategic review recommended, inter alia, that: the good offices of the Mission be intensified; the Head of Mission be relocated to Tripoli from Geneva; the Mission return to its previous configuration consisting of a Special Representative instead of a Special Envoy, to be supported by two Deputy Special Representatives; an immediate surge capacity be put in place to reinforce the Mission; and women and child protection advisers be deployed swiftly.

promptly.<sup>142</sup> In the implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review, UNSMIL was requested to explore all avenues to increase efficiency and redeploy existing resources, including through prioritization and the reconfiguration of tasks and resources, as needed and where appropriate.<sup>143</sup>

By resolution [2644 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the mandate of UNSMIL to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya and its Panel of Experts and called on UNSMIL and the Government of Libya to support the Panel's investigatory work inside Libya.<sup>144</sup>

By resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#), the Council welcomed the appointment of Abdoulaye Bathily as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL.<sup>145</sup> Further, the Council reiterated its request for UNSMIL to implement the recommendations of the independent strategic review, including by strengthening the use of strategic communications to support the Mission's activities.<sup>146</sup> The Council requested the Secretary-General to update it on the implementation of the recommendations in his reporting period as provided in the resolution.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Resolution [2629 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

<sup>144</sup> Resolution [2644 \(2022\)](#), para. 14. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), see part IX, sect. I. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Libya, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>145</sup> Resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#), para. 2. See also the exchange of letters dated 6 September 2022 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council ([S/2022/669](#) and [S/2022/670](#)).

<sup>146</sup> Resolution [2656 \(2022\)](#), para. 3.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

## United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

By resolution [2102 \(2013\)](#) of 2 May 2013, the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) with the mandate, inter alia, to provide good offices functions to support the Federal Government of Somalia in the peace and reconciliation process and to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and state building; assist in the coordination of international donor support, in particular on security sector assistance and maritime security; to help to build the capacity of the Federal Government to promote respect for human rights, women's empowerment, child protection and the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and the strengthening of justice institutions; and to monitor, help to investigate and report on abuses or violations of human rights.<sup>148</sup>

In 2022, the Council adopted resolutions [2628 \(2022\)](#) of 31 March, [2632 \(2022\)](#) of 26 May and [2657 \(2022\)](#) of 31 October regarding UNSOM. By resolutions [2632 \(2022\)](#) and [2657 \(2022\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNSOM as set out in resolution [2158 \(2014\)](#) for periods of five months and one year, the latter time until 31 October 2023.<sup>149</sup>

By resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council endorsed the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to reconfigure AMISOM into ATMIS and authorized its deployment for an initial period of 12 months.<sup>150</sup> With regard to UNSOM, the Council requested the United Nations, in coordination with the Federal Government, African Union and European Union, to establish a technical partnership coordination function to increase coordination and collaboration between the Federal Government, federal member states, ATMIS, UNSOM, UNSOS, the United Nations country team and Somalia's other multilateral, regional and bilateral partners.<sup>151</sup>

By resolution [2632 \(2022\)](#), the Council decided that UNSOM was to continue to implement its mandate in accordance with resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#).<sup>152</sup> The Council requested the Secretary-General, following consultations with the Federal Government of Somalia, to

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<sup>148</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSOM, see previous supplements covering the period 2013-2021. For more information on the situation in Somalia, see part I, sect. 2.

<sup>149</sup> Resolutions [2632 \(2022\)](#), para. 1 and [2657 \(2022\)](#), para. 4. See also reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/101](#), [S/2022/392](#) and [S/2022/665](#)).

<sup>150</sup> Resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#), para. 22.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 48 (c).

<sup>152</sup> Resolution [2632 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

undertake a strategic review of UNSOM to include recommendations for clearly defined, measurable and realistic benchmarks to track the Mission's timely execution and achievement of its mandate and to report to the Council by 30 September 2022.<sup>153</sup>

By resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), the Council welcomed the strategic review of UNSOM, endorsed the proposed benchmarks set out in the annex to its report and modified the Mission's mandate.<sup>154</sup> The Council encouraged UNSOM to support Somalia to ensure that plans were in place to protect civilians and communities in areas which were the focus of military operations; accelerate implementation of the national stabilization strategy and state-level stabilizations plans, promote expansion of a governance and service delivery to areas and districts where fragility persisted; and ensure timely, balanced support to areas newly or recently recovered from Al-Shabaab.<sup>155</sup> Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide an update in due course on progress made in implementing the recommendations set out in the strategic review.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid., para. 3.

<sup>154</sup> Resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), para. 2. See also [S/2022/716](#), annex, in which the independent expert who conducted the independent strategic review recommended, inter alia, that UNSOM accord top priority to providing support for an agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and the leaders of the federal member states regarding the federal model to be implemented in Somalia and to ensuring that the agreement was codified in the Constitution. Other priorities included support for reconciliation, democratic participation, security sector reform and the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan with respect to human rights, the rule of law and the women and peace and security agenda. The report recommended for the partnership with ATMIS to be further strengthened by engaging in joint analysis and establishing joint co-located teams in overlapping mandate areas, commencing planning for the security transition and the withdrawal of ATMIS and for a review of UNSOM staffing and configuration be carried out following the renewal of its mandate.

<sup>155</sup> Resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), para. 7 (a)-(e).

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., para. 15 (b).

## **United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel**

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) was established by an exchange of letters dated 14 and 28 January 2016 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, merging the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel with the United Nations Office for West Africa.<sup>157</sup> The Council mandated UNOWAS to, inter alia, monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security; support the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements; and promote good governance, respect for the rule of law, and human rights and the mainstreaming of gender into conflict prevention and management initiatives. The mandate of UNOWAS was subsequently modified and most recently extended for a period of three years from 1 February 2020 to 31 January 2023.<sup>158</sup>

In 2022, the Council did not adopt any decisions related to UNOWAS or modify its mandate.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> [S/2016/88](#) and [S/2016/89](#).

<sup>158</sup> For more information on the mandate of UNOWAS, see previous supplements covering the period 2016-2021. For more information on peace consolidation in West Africa, see part I, sect. 8.

<sup>159</sup> See reports of the Secretary-General on the activities of UNOWAS submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/521](#) and [S/2022/1019](#)).



## **United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan**

By resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#) of 3 June 2020, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) for an initial period of 12 months, in the context of the drawdown and exit of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).<sup>160</sup> The Council decided that UNITAMS, as part of an integrated and unified United Nations structure in the Sudan, would have four strategic objectives, namely to assist the political transition in the Sudan, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace; to support peace processes and the implementation of future peace agreements; to assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and Blue Nile and South Kordofan (Two Areas); and to support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

In 2022, by resolution [2636 \(2022\)](#) of 3 June 2022, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNITAMS as contained in resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#) for one year, until 3 June 2023, without any modifications.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNITAMS, see previous supplements covering the period from 2020-2021. For more information on the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, see part I, sect. 7.

<sup>161</sup> Resolution [2636 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. See also reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of UNITAMS submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/172](#), [S/2022/400](#), [S/2022/667](#) and [S/2022/898](#))

## Americas

### United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

The Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia by resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#) of 10 July 2017 after the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The Verification Mission was mandated to, inter alia, verify the implementation of the process of political, economic and social reincorporation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) and of the personal and collective security guarantees provided under the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace of 24 November 2016 between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP.<sup>162</sup>

In 2022, by resolution [2655 \(2022\)](#) of 27 October, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of the Verification Mission for a period of one year, until 31 October 2023, without any modification.<sup>163</sup> The Council acknowledged the request from the Foreign Minister of Colombia for the Mission's extension and for the Council to consider tasking it to verify the implementation of Section 1 on comprehensive rural reform and Section 6.2 on the Ethnic Chapter of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace as a shared request from the Government of Colombia and the party of the former FARC-EP.<sup>164</sup> In that regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide detailed recommendations on how those additional tasks would be carried out and to confirm any implications for the configuration of the Mission and expressed its intent to consider those recommendations swiftly.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, see previous supplements covering the period 2016-2021. For more information on the item entitled "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))", see part I, sect. 13.

<sup>163</sup> Resolution [2655 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. See also reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/267](#), [S/2022/513](#), [S/2022/715](#) and [S/2022/1004](#)).

<sup>164</sup> Resolution [2655 \(2022\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2. See also the letter dated 9 December 2022 ([S/2022/940](#)) in which the Secretary-General presented his recommendations regarding the additional tasks of the Verification Mission focusing, among other issues, on access to land and its adequate use, national plans for comprehensive rural reform, the functioning of dialogue mechanisms to resolve conflicts in the implementation of ethnic priorities and the linkage between the ethnic chapter and the gender provisions of the Agreement, ethnic perspective to rural reform, and strengthened engagement with Indigenous and Afro-Colombian representatives in the Congress.

## United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

By resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) of 25 June 2019, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). BINUH was mandated to advise the Government of Haiti in promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; preserving and advancing a peaceful and stable environment, including through supporting an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue; and promoting and protecting human rights. BINUH was further tasked with assisting the Government in planning and executing free, fair and transparent elections; reinforcing the capacity of the Haitian National Police; developing an inclusive approach to reduce community violence; addressing human rights abuses and violations and complying with international human rights obligations; improving penitentiary administration management and oversight of prison facilities; and strengthening the justice sector.<sup>166</sup>

In 2022, by resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#) of 15 July, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of BINUH in accordance with resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) for a period of one year until 15 July 2023.<sup>167</sup> The Council acknowledged the letter of the Secretary-General of 29 April 2022 providing recommendations, as requested in resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), for adjustments to the mandate and resources of BINUH to increase its effectiveness and made several changes to the Mission's mandate and configuration.<sup>168</sup>

Specifically, the Council encouraged continued close collaboration and enhanced coordination between BINUH, the United Nations country team in Haiti, regional organizations and international financial institutions with a view to helping the Government of Haiti to take responsibility to realize the long-term stability, sustainable development and economic self-sufficiency of the country.<sup>169</sup> The Council further encouraged enhanced public strategic

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<sup>166</sup> For more information on the mandate of BINUH, see previous supplements covering the period 2019-2021. For more information on the situation concerning Haiti, see part I, sect. 12.

<sup>167</sup> Resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. See also reports of the Secretary-General on BINUH submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/117](#) and [S/2022/481](#)).

<sup>168</sup> See [S/2022/369](#).

<sup>169</sup> Resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 6.

communication regarding the mandate and specific role of BINUH.<sup>170</sup> The Council requested BINUH to work with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and other relevant United Nations agencies to support Haitian authorities in combatting illicit financial flows as well as trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel and in enhancing management and control of borders and ports.<sup>171</sup>

The Council adjusted the Mission's configuration by increasing the number of civilian and seconded personnel serving as police and corrections advisors in the police and corrections unit from 30 to 42 and decided that the human rights unit would include dedicated capacity to address sexual and gender-based violence, including the identification of women's protection advisors, as applicable.<sup>172</sup> Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to consult with the Government of Haiti, relevant countries, and regional organizations regarding possible options for enhanced security support for the efforts of the Haitian National Police to combat high levels of gang violence, and to submit a written report to the Council regarding those consultations by 15 October 2022.<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., para. 8.

<sup>172</sup> Resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., para. 10. See letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council, transmitting the report on possible options for enhanced security support for the Haitian National Police ([S/2022/747](#)).

## Asia

### United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by the Council by resolution [1401 \(2002\)](#) of 28 March 2002 with the core mandate to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001, as well as to promote national reconciliation and rapprochement through its good offices and manage all United Nations humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.<sup>174</sup>

In 2022, by resolution [2626 \(2022\)](#) of 17 March 2022, the Council extended the mandate of UNAMA for one year, until 17 March 2023.<sup>175</sup> The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour and an abstention by the Russian Federation.<sup>176</sup>

By the resolution, the Council decided that UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the Mission were to continue to carry out their mandate in close consultation with all relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, including relevant authorities as needed, in support of the people of Afghanistan in a manner consistent with Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership.<sup>177</sup> Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General dated 28 January 2022 on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, the Council defined ten new priorities for the Mission.<sup>178</sup>

Specifically, the Council requested UNAMA to coordinate and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and financial resources to support humanitarian activities, taking into

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<sup>174</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2000-2021. For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 14.

<sup>175</sup> Resolution [2626 \(2022\)](#), para. 4. See also reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security ([S/2022/64](#), [S/2022/485](#), [S/2022/692](#) and [S/2022/916](#)).

<sup>176</sup> See [S/PV.8997](#). In the explanation of his delegation's vote, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret that the resolution did not mention the importance of ensuring more substantive cooperation between the Mission and the Taliban authorities as a result of which its effectiveness in achieving its mandate and international efforts to stabilize the situation could be undermined.

<sup>177</sup> Resolution [2626 \(2022\)](#), para. 5.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 5 (a)-(j). See also [S/2022/64](#). In his report, further to resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), the Secretary-General submitted strategic and operational recommendations for the mandate of UNAMA in light of recent political, security and social developments.

account resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#), as well as to coordinate international donors and organizations in relation to basic human needs, support efforts to increase accountability, transparency and the effective use of aid without discrimination, support community-based systems for meeting basic human needs and increasing resilience, and support the provision of essential services to the Afghan population.<sup>179</sup> Further, the Council requested UNAMA to provide outreach and good offices with a focus on promoting inclusive, representative, participatory and responsive governance at the national and subnational levels, without any discrimination based on gender, religion or ethnicity, and with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and the meaningful participation of minorities and people with disabilities.<sup>180</sup> UNAMA was also requested to promote responsible governance and the rule of law, including transitional justice, monitor and report on political, security and economic developments, including the adverse impacts of the drought in Afghanistan, provide assistance as appropriate to the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution [1526 \(2004\)](#), monitor and analyze security dynamics, the political economy and developments relating to the rule of law, and liaise with all relevant political actors, civil society representatives and other stakeholders to promote political inclusion and broad participation in the conduct of public affairs.<sup>181</sup>

Regarding human rights, the Council tasked UNAMA with engaging with all stakeholders at the national and subnational levels and civil society and international non-governmental organizations in the protection and promotion of human rights of all Afghans, monitoring, reporting and advocating with regard to the situation for civilians, the prevention and elimination of violence, the prevention of torture, monitoring of places of detention and the promotion of the human rights of detainees, monitoring and reporting on civil, political, social economic and cultural rights, supporting and advising on Afghanistan's implementation of the implementation of instruments concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms to which Afghanistan was a State party, including the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and as appropriate providing technical advice to duty bearers on international human rights standards.<sup>182</sup> UNAMA was additionally requested to integrate gender

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<sup>179</sup> Resolution [2626 \(2022\)](#), paras. 5 (a) and (b).

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5 (c).

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5 (d).

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5 (e).

mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue throughout the implementation of its mandate, support and promote gender equality, the empowerment and the full protection of the human rights of women and girls, including education, and engaging with diverse Afghan women's organizations and networks, as well as to monitor and report specifically on violations, abuses and reprisals committed against women, journalists, health care and humanitarian workers.<sup>183</sup> The Council also requested UNAMA to monitor and report on violations and abuses against children and support efforts to strengthen the protection of children.<sup>184</sup>

As part of the efforts of UNAMA to support regional cooperation, the Council added the task of facilitating coordinated approaches by countries and organizations in the region to contribute to a stable and prosperous Afghanistan.<sup>185</sup> Moreover, the Council requested UNAMA to support, within its mandate, existing mechanisms to improve the overall security situation in Afghanistan, provide assessments of the explosive ordnance threat and its impact on civilians, including children, advise and coordinate explosive ordnance threat mitigation measures, and support regional and international efforts to prevent and address the illicit trade in and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons.<sup>186</sup> Finally, the Council requested UNAMA to coordinate the overall risk management approach of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including the risk of aid diversion.<sup>187</sup>

The Council also stressed in the resolution the critical importance of a continued presence of UNAMA and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes across Afghanistan, and called upon all relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, including relevant authorities as needed, as well as international actors to coordinate with the Mission in the implementation of its mandate and to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country.<sup>188</sup>

Finally, by an exchange of letters dated 31 August and 2 September 2022 with the President of the Council, the Secretary-General appointed Ms. Roza Otunbayeva as his Special Representative for Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> Ibid., para. 5 (f).

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., para. 5 (g).

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., para. 5 (h).

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., para. 5 (j).

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., para. 5 (i).

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., para. 6.

<sup>189</sup> [S/2022/669](#) and [S/2022/671](#).

### **United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia**

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia was authorized by the Council through an exchange of letters dated 7 and 15 May 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,<sup>190</sup> at the initiative of the Governments of the region. With a view to strengthening the United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia, the Centre was assigned a number of tasks, including liaising with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground; and maintaining contact with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Centre was established with an open-ended mandate. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to its mandate.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> [S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#).

<sup>191</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, see previous supplements covering the period 2007-2021.



## Middle East

### United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

The Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003 by resolution [1500 \(2003\)](#) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate under resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#) in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of 17 July 2003.<sup>192</sup> Those responsibilities included coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development; and supporting efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions.<sup>193</sup>

In 2022, by resolution [2631 \(2022\)](#) of 27 May, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNAMI for one year, until 31 May 2023.<sup>194</sup> By the resolution, the Council commended the Government of Iraq and the Independent High Electoral Commission for executing a technically well-managed and generally peaceful election on 10 October 2021 and called for the swift and peaceful formation of a new government.<sup>195</sup> The Council reiterated that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and UNAMI, at the request of the Government, were to continue to prioritize the provision of advice, support and assistance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation, taking into account civil society input, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women.<sup>196</sup>

Furthermore, the Council made several modifications to the mandate of UNAMI with regard to electoral preparation, humanitarian support, gender mainstreaming and support for regional dialogue and dialogue between the national Government and the Kurdistan regional government. Specifically, the Council tasked the Mission to advise, support and assist the Government, the Independent High Electoral Commission and other Iraqi institutions with

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<sup>192</sup> See [S/2003/715](#).

<sup>193</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMI, see previous supplements covering the period 2003-2021. For more information on the situation concerning Iraq, see part I, sect. 22.

<sup>194</sup> Resolution [2631 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. See also reports of the Secretary-General on UNAMI submitted during the period under review ([S/2022/103](#), [S/2022/368](#) and [S/2022/714](#)).

<sup>195</sup> Resolution [2631 \(2022\)](#), sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, para 2 (a).

efforts to strengthen electoral preparation and processes.<sup>197</sup> With respect to the Mission's support for regional dialogue and cooperation, the Council provided that this should include dialogue on the adverse impacts of climate change, in particular those contributing to desertification and drought.<sup>198</sup> Furthermore, the Council requested UNAMI to promote, support and facilitate the transition of humanitarian services to Government systems and the timely access to legal assistance and civil documentation for internally displaced persons and displaced Iraqis in the Syrian Arab Republic.<sup>199</sup> Regarding gender mainstreaming, the Council requested UNAMI to advise and assist the Government to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation and involvement of women at all levels of decision-making.<sup>200</sup> The Council further requested UNAMI to actively support the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan regional government to work together and engage in regular and structured dialogue in order to resolve outstanding issues, including security provisions, budgetary arrangements and the management of Iraq's oil and gas resources, and to implement existing agreements, including the 2020 Sinjar Agreement.<sup>201</sup> The Council also reiterated the remaining tasks of UNAMI concerning the support for constitutional review, security sector reform, the provision of basic services, economic reform, capacity-building and the coordination of humanitarian assistance, promoting human rights and child protection, as outlined in resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#).<sup>202</sup>

Finally, the Council expressed its intention to review the mandate and reporting cycle of UNAMI by 31 May 2023, or sooner, if requested by the Government of Iraq.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> Ibid., para. 2 (b)(i).

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., para. 2 (b)(iv).

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., paras 2 (c)(i) and (ii).

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., para. 2 (e).

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., para. 2 (g).

<sup>202</sup> Ibid., paras. 2 (b)(ii)-(iii), (c)(iii)-(v), (d) and (f).

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., para. 4.

## **Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon**

The establishment of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon was authorized by the Council by means of an exchange of letters dated 8 and 13 February 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.<sup>204</sup> The Office was established with an open-ended mandate. The position of Special Coordinator was created to replace the position of Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon, which had been created in 2000.<sup>205</sup> The Special Coordinator was tasked with coordinating the work of the United Nations in the country and representing the Secretary-General on all political aspects of the Organization's work. The Special Coordinator was also responsible to ensure that the activities of the United Nations country team in Lebanon were well coordinated with the Government of Lebanon, donors and international financial institutions. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to the mandate of the Office.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> [S/2007/85](#) and [S/2007/86](#).

<sup>205</sup> See [S/2000/718](#).

<sup>206</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, see previous supplements covering the period 2004-2021. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 20. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, see part I., sect. 21.

## United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

The Security Council established the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) by resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#) of 16 January 2019 to support the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa as set out in the Stockholm Agreement. UNMHA succeeded the work of an advance team which was established by resolution [2451 \(2018\)](#) of 21 December 2018 and deployed to begin monitoring and to support and facilitate the immediate implementation of the Stockholm Agreement.<sup>207</sup> UNMHA was mandated to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces and mine action operations; to monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire and the mutual redeployment of forces; to work with the parties so that security was assured by local security forces; and to facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties in fully implementing the Hudaydah Agreement.<sup>208</sup>

In 2022, by resolution [2643 \(2022\)](#) of 13 July, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNMHA for a period of one year, until 14 July 2023.<sup>209</sup>

By the resolution, the Council reiterated the existing mandate of the Mission without any modifications. The Council requested the Secretary-General to fully deploy UNMHA expeditiously and reiterated its call on the parties to the Hudaydah Agreement to support the United Nations.<sup>210</sup> In that connection, the Council demanded an end to the hindrances to the movement of UNMHA personnel in the Hudaydah governorate, particularly in conflict-affected districts, and expressed support for the efforts by UNMHA to reactivate the Redeployment Coordination Committee and its joint mechanisms to implement the Hudaydah Agreement and to meet the access needs of all parties and be equally responsive to their requests.<sup>211</sup> Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to present to the Council a further review of UNMHA at least one month before UNMHA's mandate was due to expire.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> See resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>208</sup> For more information on the mandate of UNMHA, see previous supplements covering the period 2019-2021. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 20.

<sup>209</sup> Resolution [2643 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 9. See also [S/2022/484](#) containing the review of UNMHA requested by the Council in resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#), prior to the extension of the Mission's mandate by resolution [2643 \(2022\)](#).