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117th Congress } { Exec. Rept.
SENATE
2d Session } { 117-5
======================================================================
PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON THE ACCESSION OF
FINLAND AND SWEDEN
_______
July 19, 2022.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Menendez, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following
REPORT
[To accompany Treaty Doc. 117-3]
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which were referred
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the
Accession of the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden,
adopted at Brussels on behalf of the United States of America,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon subject
to six declarations and one condition, as indicated in the
resolution of advice and consent, and recommends the Senate
give its advice and consent to ratification thereof, as set
forth in this report and the accompanying resolution of advice
and consent.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose..........................................................1
II. Background.......................................................2
III. Qualifications of Finland and Sweden for NATO Membership.........2
(A) The Republic of Finland......................................3
(B) The Kingdom of Sweden........................................4
IV. Entry into Force.................................................5
V. Committee Action.................................................5
VI. Committee Recommendation and Comments............................6
VII. Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification.................8
VIII.Annex 1.--Hearing of June 22, 2022, ``NATO Enlargement: Examining
the Proposed Accession of Sweden and Finland.''.................13
I. Purpose
These Protocols are a vehicle for inviting the Republic of
Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to accede to the North
Atlantic Treaty (also referred to as the ``Treaty'') in
accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty and thus become
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (``NATO''),
with all of the privileges and responsibilities that apply to
current Allies. The core commitment made among the Allies is
embodied in the text of the Treaty, including the collective
defense provision in Article 5.
II. Background
The Treaty entered into force on August 24, 1949, with
twelve states having ratified the Treaty. The original parties
of the Treaty, and thus the original members of NATO, were the
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and
Luxembourg. The alliance has expanded eight times: in 1952,
Greece and Turkey became members; in 1955, West Germany; in
1982, Spain; in 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic;
in 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia; in 2009, Albania and Croatia; in 2017,
Montenegro; and in 2020, North Macedonia.
The process leading to the enlargement of the alliance has
been refined since the Cold War, but NATO remains a political-
military alliance, that is an agent of peace, holding new
members to higher democratic and economic standards and
creating a secure space for newly-free nations to develop.
Military reform and achieving interoperability with NATO
remains essential, but the character of the new allied country
is also important. The debate over the last several
enlargements has centered on what standard of political
development is adequate for accession to the alliance.
Since the 1990s, NATO has followed guidelines and
established benchmarks used to assess new members.
Considerations include democratic elections, individual
liberty, and the rule of law; commitment to economic reform and
a market economy; adherence to the norms of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with respect to
the treatment of ethnic minorities and social justice;
resolution of territorial disputes with neighbors; and the
establishment of democratic control of the military. Finland
and Sweden have clearly addressed these benchmarks, including
in the course of their respective applications, and the
committee considers them below.
III. Qualifications of Finland and Sweden
for NATO Membership
Consistent with the requirements set forth in the Senate's
resolution of advice and consent to the ratification of
Accession Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the
Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (see
Executive Report 105-14) and the Senate's resolution of advice
and consent to the ratification of the Accession Protocols to
the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia
(see Executive Report 108-6), the Executive Branch has provided
reports to the Senate describing the candidacies of Finland and
Sweden and the value each would contribute to the Alliance.
These reports in addition to voluminous publicly-available
information and the testimony of witnesses before this
committee, which makes clear that Finland and Sweden are well
qualified to contribute positively to the NATO alliance, both
as robust military powers but also as vigorous democracies that
are committed to the rule of law and good governance.
The Executive Branch's reports to the Senate, in addition
to public reporting, make clear that each country either
already spends more than two-percent of its GDP on defense or
is in the process of doing so soon, and the membership of each
will spread burden-sharing requirements more broadly across the
alliance. Further, consistent with the aforementioned reporting
requirements, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reviewed the Executive Branch's reports to the Senate and found
that it provided necessary information establishing the
suitability of Finland and Sweden for NATO membership. For
instance the GAO reinforced the Executive Branch's
determination of how Finland and Sweden ``would be net
providers of security and military power to NATO, thus
enhancing the national security interests of the United
States.''
Additional information regarding the respective
qualifications of each is detailed below.
A. THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND
Finland is an established democracy, a leading military
power in Europe, and is one of NATO's most active partners.
Since 1994, Finland has contributed forces to a wide range of
NATO-led operations or training missions, including in the
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Finland has a well-trained
military with significant reserve forces, advanced multi-role
combat aircraft, a large and well-equipped artillery force, and
extensive military intelligence capabilities. Finland's
military is also one of Europe's last remaining conscription
armies. In addition, the Finnish Navy is well suited to help
maintain security in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. Their ships
are capable of operating in waters that limit access to other
NATO allied navies. Finland's defense forces are regarded as
having a high level of interoperability with NATO forces, in
terms of both materiel and familiarity with NATO processes and
procedures. Finnish forces provide certain types of training to
the United States including arctic, cold weather training. The
Finnish military regularly participates in training exercises
with NATO and U.S. forces, and Finland and NATO also cooperate
on cyber defense. Finland is home to the Centre of Excellence
for Countering Hybrid Threats, which collaborates with NATO and
the European Union on training and exercises.
Defense spending in Finland is already higher than the 2
percent asked of NATO members. Spending on equipment and
capabilities is about 30 percent of its overall defense budget,
and will approach 50 percent in the next few years as a result
of modernization and expansion. Finland recently decided to
replace its entire fleet of
F/A-18 fighters with the new F-35 fighter, continuing its
military modernization and interoperability with U.S. and NATO.
The Finnish population overwhelmingly supports NATO
membership; in light of Russia's unprovoked and unlawful
February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, public support in Finland
for joining NATO increased significantly, with polling in May
2022 indicating that 76 percent of the population supports
membership. The government, as well as opposition politicians,
have made clear their commitment to membership.
In all measures of democratic strength, Finland is highly
rated. According to the 2021 Freedom House Country Report on
Finland, its ``parliamentary system features free and fair
elections and robust multiparty competition,'' and its
``judiciary is independent under the constitution and in
practice.'' Moreover, ``corruption is not a significant
problem''; it ranks first in the world in Transparency
International's ``Corruption Perceptions Index,'' a snapshot of
the relative degree of corruption in countries and territories
around the world.
On the question of fundamental freedoms and human rights of
members of minority groups, the Department of State's 2021
Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Finland stated that
``[t]he government strongly encouraged tolerance and respect
for minority groups, sought to address racial discrimination,
and assisted victims.''
Finland's economy is likewise strong and possesses
components likely to be of great use to enhancing NATO's
defense capacity. As of late 2021, the OECD projects Finland's
economy will grow by 2.9 percent in 2022 and 1.5 percent in
2023. Finland is home to Nokia, one of a handful of companies
worldwide that can produce full-scale 5G telecommunications
systems. It also has a strong defense industry, most of which
are small and medium enterprises.
Finland has long sought to avoid territorial disputes and
has contributed to efforts aimed at peace and security in the
region. It joined the Partnership for Peace program in 1994,
and in 1997, it joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, a
multilateral forum for dialogue among NATO members and partners
in the Euro-Atlantic area. Finland has been a valued
contributor to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan,
and Iraq, and it is one of six ``Enhanced Opportunity
Partners'' that make particularly significant contributions to
NATO operations and other objectives. Since Russia's unprovoked
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Finland has further
strengthened relations with NATO, engaging in regular political
dialogue and consultations; exchanges of information on hybrid
warfare; coordinating training and exercise; and developing
better joint situational awareness to address common threats
and develop joint actions, if needed. Finland is also an active
member of the Arctic Council.
B. THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN
Similarly, Sweden is already well integrated and
interoperable with NATO allies. Sweden has contributed troops
and assets to numerous NATO-led military operations and
training missions, from Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq. Sweden
also participated in the 2011 United Nations-mandated, NATO-led
no-fly zone over Libya. Swedish forces frequently train with
NATO and U.S. forces. It joined NATO's Partnership for Peace
program in 1994, in 1997 it joined the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council, and it is one of NATO's six ``Enhanced
Opportunity Partners'' that make particularly significant
contributions to NATO operations and other objectives.
Since Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February
2022, Sweden also has further strengthened relations with NATO,
engaging in regular political dialogue and consultations;
exchanges of information on hybrid warfare; coordinating
training and exercise; and developing better joint situational
awareness to address common threats and develop joint actions,
if needed.
In December 2020, Sweden's parliament approved raising
defense spending by 40 percent for 2021-2025, and following
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Prime Minister
Andersson asserted that Sweden would seek to increase its
defense spending to 2 percent of GDP ``as soon as possible.''
It is currently on track to reach that mark by 2028, but may
reach it as soon as 2025.
The Swedish population supports Sweden's entry into NATO,
with public opinion in support of accession galvanizing further
in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February
2022. Only after significant deliberation and analysis and with
broad support from its parliament, the Riksdag, that Sweden
decided to apply for NATO membership.
Sweden is a constitutional monarchy with a robust,
consolidated democracy. In its 2021 Country Report, Freedom
House described Sweden as a country with ``free and fair
elections and a strong multiparty system,'' where ``[c]ivil
liberties and political rights are legally guaranteed and
respected in practice, and the rule of law prevails.'' Sweden
also scores 100 out of 100 in Freedom House's Global Freedom
Score. It ranks fourth in the world in Transparency
International's ``Corruption Perceptions Index.''
According to the Department of State's 2021 Sweden Country
Report on Human Rights Practices, Sweden's constitution charges
public institutions with promoting equality in society and
combating discrimination and ``prohibits unfavorable treatment
of anyone based on ethnic origin, color, or other similar
circumstances,'' which rights ``the government generally
respected.''
Sweden is home to a strong indigenous defense industry that
sells worldwide. The largest Swedish defense company, Saab,
produces Gripen fighter jets, which are used by NATO allies
Hungary and Czech Republic. Sweden is also known for its
expertise in the construction of submarines and other maritime
equipment, while its Carl Gustav and Next Generation Light
Anti-Tank Weapon (``NLAW''), co-produced with the United
Kingdom, have been used to great effect by the Ukrainian army.
Like Finland, Sweden remains committed to the resolution of
territorial disputes and maintaining regional peace and
security. For instance, Sweden served as OSCE Chair over the
course of 2021; upon taking over as Chair, the Swedish Foreign
Minister explained that Sweden's priorities in the role were to
``emphasize the fundamental tasks of the OSCE, defending the
European security order, upholding the OSCE concept of
comprehensive security, and to contribute to resolving the
conflicts in our region.''
IV. Entry Into Force
Each Protocol will enter into force when all of the current
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have notified the
Government of the United States of America, which is the
depositary for the North Atlantic Treaty, of their acceptance
of each Protocol. Once each Protocol has entered into force,
the Secretary General of NATO shall extend an invitation to the
named state to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and in
accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, that state shall
become a Party to the Treaty on the date it deposits its
instrument of accession with the Government of the United
States of America.
V. Committee Action
The committee held a public hearing on the candidacies of
Finland and Sweden for NATO membership on June 22, 2022.
Testimony was received from Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs Karen Donfried and Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander. A
transcript of this hearing is attached to this report as Annex
I.
On July 19, 2022, the committee considered the resolution
of advice and consent to ratification of these protocols and
ordered it favorably reported by voice vote, with a quorum
present. The committee considered and voted on one amendment
offered by Senator Paul. The amendment did not pass by a vote
of 3-15.
VI. Committee Recommendation and Comments
The Committee on Foreign Relations believes that these two
countries have the significant potential to make substantial
contributions as members of the NATO alliance. Finland and
Sweden have regularly participated in NATO missions including
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and military
training in Iraq. Since the United States, Finland, and Sweden
made a trilateral defense cooperation commitment in 2018, the
United States has benefitted from increased integration with
both nations. Most specifically, the three nations have
together undertaken a series of Arctic exercises that has
greatly benefitted the United States, augmenting our
capabilities to operate in the High North. On Arctic issues,
both nations have been key partners at the Arctic Council.
The admission of Finland and Sweden to the alliance will
have a stabilizing effect in Europe at a time of critical
importance in the face of Russia's unprovoked and unlawful
aggression. Finland and Sweden's accessions to NATO would be a
boon for NATO's eastern flank, and in particular for Baltic
security. Should the two countries join NATO, the ability of
NATO to defend its Baltic member nations from potential Russian
invasion would be greatly augmented as the Baltic Sea littorals
would be nearly entirely under the control of NATO member
nations. Defending NATO from threats that emerge from the high
North will also be made easier by the admission of Sweden and
Finland to NATO. With their inclusion, Russia will be the only
Arctic Ocean littoral state that is not a NATO member.
Finland's and Sweden's contributions to ongoing NATO
operations will augment NATO's resources, reducing the resource
burden on existing NATO members, including the United States.
They are both committed to continuing to strengthen their
militaries and means of defense. Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander testified
before the committee that Finland and Sweden bring similar
strengths in their democracies, in their market economies, in
their strengths as European countries, and they each bring its
own complementary military capabilities that will further
strengthen the NATO Alliance. Meanwhile, in her testimony
before the Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs Karen Donfried reaffirmed that Finland, Sweden, and the
United States are fundamentally united in respect for democracy
and human rights.
In the face of increased threats to peace and security in
Europe, it is important that the Open Door policy for NATO
membership indeed remains open to countries willing to shoulder
the responsibilities of membership. The committee is confident
that as NATO members, Finland and Sweden would be positioned to
make significant contributions to NATO and regional peace,
security, and stability, through their military and economic
strength and their commitments to rule of law, democracy, and
human rights.
RESOLUTION
The committee has included in proposed resolution six
declarations and one condition, which are discussed below.
A. DECLARATIONS
Declaration 1. Reaffirmation that Membership in NATO Remains a Vital
National Security Interest of the United States
Declaration 1 restates that U.S. membership in NATO is a
vital national security interest for the United States. For
more than seventy years, NATO has served as the foremost
organization to defend the territory of the countries in the
North Atlantic area against all external threats. NATO was
successful in ensuring the survival of democratic governments
throughout the Cold War, and NATO has established a process of
cooperative security planning that enhances the security of the
United States and its allies, while distributing the financial
burden of defending the democracies of Europe and North America
among the Allies.
Declaration 2. Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement
Declaration 2 lays out the strategic rationale for the
inclusion of the Finland and Sweden in NATO. NATO members have
determined that, consistent with Article 10 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, Finland and Sweden are in a position to
further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, and that
extending membership to Finland and Sweden will enhance the
stability of Northeast Europe, which is in the interests of the
United States.
Declaration 3. Support for NATO's Open Door Policy
Declaration 3 expresses support for NATO's Open Door Policy
for any European country that expresses interest in the
alliance and is able to meet the obligations of membership.
Declaration 4. Future Consideration of Candidates for Membership in
NATO
Declaration 4 declares that the consideration of future
members in NATO provided for under Article 10 of the Senate-
approved North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the requirement
for advice and consent under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of
the United States Constitution. Article 10 of the North
Atlantic Treaty provides for an open door to the admission into
NATO of other European countries that are in a position to
further the principles of the Treaty and that can contribute to
the security of the North Atlantic area.
The United States will not support any subsequent
invitation for admission to NATO if the prospective member
cannot fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of NATO
membership in a manner that serves the overall political and
strategic interests of the United States. The Senate emphasizes
that no state will be invited to become a member of NATO unless
the Executive Branch fulfills the Constitutional requirement
for seeking the advice of the Senate, a consensus decision to
proceed is reached in NATO, and ratification is achieved
according to the national procedures of each NATO member,
including the consent to ratification by the Senate.
Declaration 5. Influence of Non-NATO Members on NATO Decisions
Declaration 5 states that non-NATO members shall not have
the ability to impact the decision-making process of the
alliance in relation to NATO enlargement. The Senate notes
concerns regarding non-NATO members seeking to influence public
opinion in prospective members or otherwise stand in the way of
enlargement efforts, and the Senate emphasizes that non-NATO
members shall not have the ability to influence the decision-
making process of NATO enlargement.
Declaration 6. Support for 2014 Wales Summit Defense Spending Benchmark
Declaration 6 reaffirms support for the resource
commitments by alliance members outlined in the 2014 Wales
Summit Declaration. These commitments obligate each NATO member
to spend a minimum of two percent of GDP on defense and twenty
percent of their defense budget on major equipment, including
research and development. The Senate encourages all members of
NATO to satisfy their commitments and address any shortcomings
with respect to defense spending.
B. CONDITION
Condition 1. Presidential certification
Condition 1 requires the President to certify, prior to the
deposit of the instrument of ratification for the Protocol,
that (1) the inclusion of the Finland and Sweden in NATO will
not have the effect of increasing the overall percentage share
of the United States in the NATO common budget; and (2) the
inclusion of Finland and Sweden in the alliance will not
detract from the ability of the United States to meet or fund
its military requirements outside the North Atlantic area.
VII. Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification
Text of Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein),
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO DECLARATIONS AND
CONDITIONS.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession
of the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, subject
to the declarations of section 2 and the condition of section
3.
SEC. 2. DECLARATIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is
subject to the following declarations:
(1) Reaffirmation That United States Membership in
NATO Remains a Vital National Security Interest of the
United States.--The Senate declares that--
(A) for more than 70 years the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as the
preeminent organization to defend the countries
in the North Atlantic area against all external
threats;
(B) through common action, the established
democracies of North America and Europe that
were joined in NATO persevered and prevailed in
the task of ensuring the survival of democratic
government in Europe and North America
throughout the Cold War;
(C) NATO enhances the security of the United
States by embedding European states in a
process of cooperative security planning and by
ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role
for the United States in European security
affairs;
(D) the responsibility and financial burden
of defending the democracies of Europe and
North America can be more equitably shared
through an alliance in which specific
obligations and force goals are met by its
members;
(E) the security and prosperity of the United
States is enhanced by NATO's collective defense
against aggression that may threaten the
security of NATO members; and
(F) United States membership in NATO remains
a vital national security interest of the
United States.
(2) Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement.--The
Senate declares that--
(A) the United States and its NATO allies
face continued threats to their stability and
territorial integrity;
(B) an attack against Finland or Sweden, or
the destabilization of either arising from
external subversion, would threaten the
stability of Europe and jeopardize United
States national security interests;
(C) Finland and Sweden, having established
democratic governments and having demonstrated
a willingness to meet the requirements of
membership, including those necessary to
contribute to the defense of all NATO members,
are in a position to further the principles of
the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to
the security of the North Atlantic area; and
(D) extending NATO membership to Finland and
Sweden will strengthen NATO, enhance stability
in Europe, and advance the interests of the
United States and its NATO allies.
(3) Support for NATO's Open Door Policy.--The policy
of the United States is to support NATO's Open Door
Policy that allows any European country to express its
desire to join NATO and demonstrate its ability to meet
the obligations of NATO membership.
(4) Future Consideration of Candidates for Membership
in NATO.--
(A) Senate Finding.--The Senate finds that
the United States will not support the
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of, or
the invitation to begin accession talks with,
any European state (other than Finland and
Sweden), unless--
(i) the President consults with the
Senate consistent with Article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution
of the United States (relating to the
advice and consent of the Senate to the
making of treaties); and
(ii) the prospective NATO member can
fulfill all of the obligations and
responsibilities of membership, and the
inclusion of such state in NATO would
serve the overall political and
strategic interests of NATO and the
United States.
(B) Requirement for Consensus and
Ratification.--The Senate declares that no
action or agreement other than a consensus
decision by the full membership of NATO,
approved by the national procedures of each
NATO member, including, in the case of the
United States, the requirements of Article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the
United States (relating to the advice and
consent of the Senate to the making of
treaties), will constitute a commitment to
collective defense and consultations pursuant
to Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
(5) Influence of Non-NATO Members on NATO
Decisions.--The Senate declares that any country that
is not a member of NATO shall have no impact on
decisions related to NATO enlargement.
(6) Support for 2014 Wales Summit Defense Spending
Benchmark.--The Senate declares that all NATO members
should continue to fulfill or move towards the
guideline outlined in the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration
to spend a minimum of 2 percent of their Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) on defense and 20 percent of their
defense budgets on major equipment, including research
and development, by 2024.
SEC. 3. CONDITIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is
subject to the following condition:
(1) Presidential Certification.--Prior to the deposit
of the instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the Senate as follows:
(A) The inclusion of Finland and Sweden in
NATO will not have the effect of increasing the
overall percentage share of the United States
in the common budgets of NATO.
(B) The inclusion of Finland and Sweden in
NATO does not detract from the ability of the
United States to meet or to fund its military
requirements outside the North Atlantic area.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this resolution:
(1) NATO Members.--The term ``NATO members'' means
all countries that are parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty.
(2) Non-NATO Members.--The term ``non-NATO members''
means all countries that are not parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
(3) North Atlantic Area.--The term ``North Atlantic
Area'' means the area covered by Article 6 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, as applied by the North Atlantic
Council.
(4) North Atlantic Treaty.--The term ``North Atlantic
Treaty'' means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at
Washington April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964), as
amended.
(5) United States Instrument of Ratification.--The
term ``United States instrument of ratification'' means
the instrument of ratification of the United States of
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on
the Accession of the Republic of Finland and Kingdom of
Sweden.
NATO ENLARGEMENT: EXAMINING
THE PROPOSED ACCESSION OF
SWEDEN AND FINLAND
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:52 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Kaine, Van
Hollen, Risch, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order.
As we sit here, Putin's forces continue to fire missiles at
innocent Ukrainians, his generals continue to bombard cities,
and his soldiers are committing war crimes.
And, still, brave Ukrainians are fighting back, proving
time and again that Putin gravely miscalculated the resolve of
the Ukrainian people. He also grossly miscalculated how the
rest of the world would respond to his brutal, unprovoked
aggression.
The United States, the overwhelming majority of Europe,
and, indeed, of the entire free world, are now more united in
support of not just Ukraine but of our collective resolve to
support democracies, the rule of law, and defend against brazen
authoritarian aggression--indeed, the very values that drove
the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the
first place.
Perhaps, more than ever it is crystal clear that NATO plays
a vital role not only in the security of the United States but
as a bulwark protecting peace and democracy, and I feel
confident when I say both the ranking member and I believe
carefully considering new candidates for NATO expansion is one
of the most important responsibilities this committee has.
Today, we will learn more about Finland and Sweden's
candidacies for NATO membership. These are two steadfast NATO
and U.S. allies with strong, durable military institutions and
democratic institutions.
They have every reason to participate in collective defense
against Russian aggression, and NATO has every reason to
embrace and welcome them into the Alliance without delay.
In many ways, Finland and Sweden are ideal candidates for
NATO membership. NATO is a defensive military alliance designed
to preserve, in part, by holding members to high democratic
governance and economic transparency standards.
Indeed, further to that point, democratic processes in both
countries have shown that the Finnish and Swedish people
themselves are strongly supportive of joining NATO.
While NATO has not yet formally prepared the accession
protocols for Finland and Sweden, we expect it will very soon.
There is tremendous urgency and a strong case for inviting
these countries. Expansion of NATO requires unanimous agreement
by all NATO member states, of course, and with time of the
essence, the eleventh-hour concerns by Turkey standing in the
way of this process only serve Putin's interests.
In the meantime, and as members prepare to meet next week
in Madrid, it is imperative that we press ahead with our own
approval process, which is why we are having this hearing
today.
This may very well be one of the most important decisions
this committee and this Senate makes in the decade and beyond
as it relates to foreign policy.
Finland and Sweden are well positioned to integrate into
NATO. Both have large, technologically advanced, and growing
militaries. They have long partnered with NATO and have
contributed to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan,
and Iraq.
Since Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, they have
strengthened their relations with NATO even further, engaging
in regular dialogue and consultations, exchanging information,
and coordinating training and exercises.
In fact, given geography and history, Finland and Sweden
have long equipped their militaries and prepared their
societies for the prospect of Russian aggression.
Their participation in NATO would actively contribute to
burden sharing with the United States and the whole military
alliance.
Belonging to NATO is not just a measurement of military
capability. We were established as a club of democracies that
abide by a certain set of principles.
All U.S. administrations have used certain criteria for
assessing candidates for NATO membership: a functioning
democratic political system based on a market economy, fair
treatment of minority populations, a commitment to resolve
conflicts peacefully, an ability and willingness to make
military contributions to NATO operations, and a commitment to
democratic civil military relations.
I would like our witnesses to address how Finland and
Sweden fulfill these criteria. The required information the
departments have already provided give me great confidence, but
I believe it is important to address them in an open setting.
We thank Sweden and Finland for their partnership and
support. I look forward to welcoming you into NATO.
With that, I welcome Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs Karen Donfried and Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander.
And, finally, it is my great pleasure to welcome
Ambassadors Karin Olofsdottir from Sweden and Mikko Hautala--is
that the right pronunciation?
All right. From Finland here today for this hearing. We
appreciate both ambassadors being here with us, probably the
first outside guests that we have had. I could not think of
better guests to have for a better cause and a better moment.
With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member
for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Assistant Secretaries. We are glad to have you
here to discuss this important subject, and welcome to both of
you ambassadors, and I want to thank you personally for
spending the time, both of you, and other officials from your
countries in discussing these important issues.
The Ambassador from Finland and I were early to the party,
having met on this long before the invasion occurred, but with
the obvious view that this day might come.
With that, let me say also that the chairman and I have
discussed this matter at length between ourselves and there is
no daylight between us as to our view of this matter either.
About four months ago, Russia's invasion of Ukraine sent a
seismic shock through the transatlantic community and it made
it abundantly clear that the assumptions many had made about
security in the 21st century were false or at least
misperceived and forced us to reconsider how we will restore
peace and preserve it.
Our immediate response has been strong, but there is no
doubt NATO needs serious updates and reforms if we hope to face
these emerging challenges over the long term, and it is going
to be a long term, obviously. One of these proposed changes is
the enlargement of our alliance to include Finland and Sweden.
In this hearing today, I look forward to a deep and
thorough discussion of Finland and Sweden's potential accession
to NATO. Any country that meets the requirements like Sweden
and Finland should be able to join if they want.
Sweden and Finland both have strong democracies and capable
militaries that will contribute immediately to NATO. Through
their participation in multiple joint combat operations they
have both proven their willingness and their ability to fight
alongside NATO allies, and through multiple NATO partnerships
programs they have proven their commitment to NATO's goals and
developed highly interoperable NATO standard forces.
Let us also be clear. Sweden and Finland in particular,
have been guarding NATO's High North for decades. They have
been doing the mission of NATO from the outside. This has been
an asset to NATO and transatlantic security. It is fair that
they be allowed to finally sit at the table with everyone else.
With this hearing, the Senate will take its first official
step in considering this next wave of NATO enlargement.
Throughout this entire process, we must remember to take the
utmost care as we examine the details and implications of this
decision.
In my mind, both countries have fully demonstrated their
worthiness to join NATO and the value they each will bring to
it. But we cannot leave any room for doubt about their place
and commitment in our alliance.
I also want to reiterate my expectation that once the North
Atlantic Council agrees and sends out the accession protocols
that the Biden administration will swiftly prepare the final
reports and submit everything to the Senate quickly so we can
begin our consideration.
In closing, let me say, raising the issue that the chairman
also raised regarding Turkey's remarks about not being in favor
of accession at this time, we are told and assured by both
Sweden and Finland that they have been in good faith involved
with Turkey in discussions to resolve that.
I think that is best left to them, between they and Turkey,
without us at this point in time. But let there be no mistake,
this must be done. This is so important it must be done.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
We will start with our witnesses. Both of your statements
will be included fully in the record, without objection.
Secretary Donfried, we will start with you. We would ask
you to summarize--both--in about five minutes or so so that we
can have a conversation with you.
And the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF KAREN DONFRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC.
Ms. Donfried. Thank you so much.
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the critical role NATO plays
in our security and the safeguarding of our freedom and
democratic values, and Finland and Sweden's future place in the
Alliance.
I welcome the opportunity to share with you today why the
administration strongly and unequivocally supports Finland and
Sweden membership in NATO.
We strongly support NATO's open door policy and firmly
believe that these two countries' membership in the Alliance
would benefit the national security of the United States and
strengthen the collective defense of NATO and the broader
security of the Euro-Atlantic region.
As President Biden said when he welcomed Finnish President
Nisto and Swedish Prime Minister Anderson to the White House
last month, we are proud to offer, quote, ``the strong support
of the United States for the applications of two great
democracies and two close highly capable partners to join the
strongest, most powerful defensive alliance in the history of
the world,'' end quote.
Likewise, I want to thank the more than 80 Senators who
signaled their full support for Sweden and Finland's
applications for NATO membership in a letter to the President,
as well as the bipartisan Senate Resolution 646 in support of
their NATO accession.
This provided yet another endorsement for these two strong
and capable democracies. The administration has provided
reports to Congress on Finland and Sweden's accession as called
for in the Senate's resolution of ratification of the NATO
accession protocols for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic.
Russia's unprovoked February 24 full-scale invasion of
Ukraine caused a seismic change in both Swedish and Finnish
public support for NATO membership.
Each country carried out inclusive and thorough democratic
processes, leading to the decision to apply for NATO
membership.
In an historic foreign and security policy shift, Finland
and Sweden together officially applied for NATO membership on
May 18. Since its inception, NATO's goal is to achieve a
lasting peace in the North Atlantic area through collective
security based on the common values of democracy, the rule of
law, and individual liberty.
As advanced democracies that uphold the rule of law and
world leaders in protecting and promoting global human rights,
Finland and Sweden would strengthen NATO as an alliance of
values and expand the circle of North American and European
democracies committed to defending each other.
The United States has close bilateral defense relationships
with both Finland and Sweden and has built robust cooperation
and interoperability with these two countries through exercises
and presence in the Baltic Sea region and elsewhere.
In addition, Finland and Sweden both are already active in
NATO political dialogues, exercises and operations, and are
highly interoperable with NATO.
Since Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in February
Finland and Sweden have drawn even closer through enhanced
political dialogue and sharing of information with the
Alliance.
The two countries began cooperating with NATO in 1994
through the Partnership for Peace program. In 2014, Finland and
Sweden were granted Enhanced Opportunities Partner status,
which affords partners the closest level of cooperation short
of being a member.
Sweden has participated in NATO missions since 1995,
including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Libya, share cyber
defense information, is home to a world-class defense industry,
and is steadily increasing defense spending with the stated
goal of reaching 2 percent of GDP as soon as possible.
Finland has contributed to NATO missions in Afghanistan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo, and will spend 2.16
percent of its GDP on defense in 2022.
In 2026, Finland will receive the first of its 65 F-35As
from its $12 billion deal, the largest national procurement in
Finland's history and one that will give Finland a significant
military capability, increase interoperability with the United
States and other NATO allies, and have a positive economic
impact on both the U.S. and Finnish economies. Both countries
will enhance NATO's situational awareness and capabilities in
the High North.
In short, I concur with what you both and many other
Senators have said already. NATO enlargement that includes
Finland and Sweden would further bolster the Alliance. They
would be net providers of security to NATO and would enhance
the national security interests of the United States.
Turkey has raised concerns about some of Finland and
Sweden's policies in advance of NATO accession. We recognize
Turkey's legitimate concerns regarding terrorism, which NATO
Secretary General Stoltenberg has also highlighted.
We continue to encourage Stockholm, Ankara, and Helsinki to
work together to find a path forward that addresses the
security concerns of all allies and urge the Alliance to reach
consensus on the accession process in an expeditious manner.
We are confident Sweden and Finland would be net
contributors to the alliance and their membership will bolster
the security of every NATO member.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Donfried follows:]
Prepared Statement of Karen E. Donfried
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members
of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the critical role NATO plays in our security and the
safeguarding of our freedom and democratic values, and Finland and
Sweden's future place in the Alliance. I welcome the opportunity to
share with you today why the administration strongly and unequivocally
supports Finland and Sweden's membership in NATO. We strongly support
NATO's Open Door policy and firmly believe that these two countries'
membership in the Alliance would benefit the national security of the
United States and strengthen the collective defense of NATO and the
broader security of the Euro-Atlantic region. As President Biden said
when he welcomed Finnish President Niinisto and Swedish Prime Minister
Andersson to the White House last month, we are proud to offer ``the
strong support of the United States for the applications of two great
democracies and two close, highly capable partners to join the
strongest, most powerful defensive alliance in the history of the
world.'' Likewise, I want to thank the more than eighty Senators who
signaled their full support for Sweden and Finland's applications for
NATO membership in a letter to the President, as well as the bipartisan
Senate Resolution 646 in support of their NATO accession. This provided
yet another endorsement for these two strong and capable democracies.
The administration has provided reports to Congress on Finland and
Sweden's accession, as called for in the Senate's Resolution of
Ratification of the NATO Accession protocols for Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic.
Russia's unprovoked February 24 full scale invasion of Ukraine
caused a seismic change in both Swedish and Finnish public support for
NATO membership. Each country carried out inclusive and thorough
democratic processes leading to the decision to apply for NATO
membership. In an historic foreign and security policy shift, Finland
and Sweden together officially applied for NATO membership on May 18.
Since its inception, NATO's goal is to achieve a lasting peace in
the North Atlantic area through collective security based on the common
values of democracy, the rule of law, and individual liberty. As
advanced democracies that uphold the rule of law and world leaders in
protecting and promoting global human rights, Finland and Sweden would
strengthen NATO as an alliance of values and expand the circle of North
American and European democracies committed to defending each other.
The United States has close bilateral defense relationships with
both Finland and Sweden and has built robust cooperation and
interoperability with these two countries through exercises and
presence in the Baltic Sea region and elsewhere. In addition, Finland
and Sweden both are already active in NATO political dialogues,
exercises, and operations, and are highly interoperable with NATO.
Since Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in February, Finland and
Sweden have drawn even closer through enhanced political dialogue and
sharing of information with the Alliance. The two countries began
cooperating with NATO in 1994 through the Partnership for Peace
program. In 2014, Finland and Sweden were granted ``Enhanced
Opportunities Partner'' status, which affords partners the closest
level of cooperation short of being a member. Sweden has participated
in NATO missions since 1995 including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and
Libya; shares cyber defense information; is home to a world-class
defense industry, and is steadily increasing defense spending with the
stated goal of reaching 2 percent of GDP as soon as possible. Finland
has contributed to NATO missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo and will spend 2.16 percent of its GDP on
defense in 2022. In 2026, Finland will receive the first of its 64 F-
35As from its $12 billion deal--the largest national procurement in
Finland's history--and one that will give Finland a significant
military capability, increase interoperability with the United States
and other NATO Allies, and have a positive economic impact on both the
U.S. and Finnish economies. Both countries will enhance NATO's
situational awareness and capabilities in the High North.
In short, I concur with what many of you have said already: NATO
enlargement that includes Finland and Sweden would further bolster the
Alliance. They would be net providers of security to NATO and would
enhance the national security interests of the United States.
Turkey has raised concerns about some of Finland and Sweden's
policies in advance of NATO accession. We recognize Turkey's legitimate
concerns regarding terrorism, which NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg
has also highlighted. We continue to encourage Stockholm, Ankara, and
Helsinki to work together to find a path forward that addresses the
security concerns of all Allies, and urge the Alliance to reach
consensus on the accession process in an expeditious manner. We are
confident Sweden and Finland would be net contributors to the Alliance
and their membership will bolster the security of every NATO member.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of this
committee, Finland and Sweden are NATO's closest partners, and we look
forward to welcoming them into the Alliance. Neither country's
membership would detract from the ability of the United States to meet
or fund its military requirements outside the North Atlantic area. We
believe U.S. and overall Transatlantic security will be strengthened by
their membership. Once the accession protocols are signed, we urge the
Senate at the earliest opportunity to provide its advice and consent.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Wallander?
STATEMENT OF THE HON. CELESTE WALLANDER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC.
Ms. Wallander. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you
today alongside Assistant Secretary Donfried to express the
Department of Defense's unwavering support for NATO membership
for the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden.
Thank you for holding this important hearing. This historic
moment builds on the positive relationship that the Department
of Defense enjoys with Ministries of Defense and Armed Forces
of both Finland and Sweden.
DOD strongly assesses that the membership of both Sweden
and Finland would be an asset to the North Atlantic Treaty as a
values-based organization for defense and security.
Both countries maintain a high degree of interoperability
and cooperation with NATO and are capable military partners
whose values align closely with that of the United States.
A few key points on each of these NATO aspirants.
On Finland, general conscription, a well manned and trained
reserve, and a strong will to defend the country are the
foundations of Finland's defense. Finland's location on the
Baltic Sea, diplomatic experience with Russia, and advanced
capabilities make it an asset to the Alliance.
Finland spends more than 2 percent of its GDP on defense
and possesses unique military capabilities and expertise,
particularly operating in the Arctic environment.
As a democracy and market economy, Finland's foreign policy
is underpinned by a commitment to and the promotion of
democracy, individual freedom, and rule of law. Finland is a
modern, highly industrialized democratic country with one of
the highest standards of living in the world.
The country has a well educated and media savvy population,
making its citizenry and institutions resilient to
misinformation and malign influence while serving as a model to
others.
In particular, Finland would augment NATO's capacity to
defend critical infrastructure, operate in the cyber domain,
and strengthen individual and collective resilience.
Finland first participated in a NATO-led operation in 1996
and became a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner in 2014. It
has contributed to or otherwise supported NATO missions in
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo.
The Finnish Defense Forces comprise a total active and
reserve force and strength of 280,000 with an additional
900,000 trained individuals available for military service.
Unlike many other European countries, Finland has
maintained a general conscription model for defense. This
allows Finland to rapidly call up its reserve force when needed
at a lower overall training cost.
On Sweden, Swedish accession to NATO would further the
principles of the North Atlantic Treaty by combining a first
rate and rapidly growing military with a principled foreign
policy that ardently defends democracy and human rights.
Sweden is both a highly capable military partner and home
to a world-class defense industry. Its military expertise in
the Arctic and undersea environments would substantially
advance Alliance capabilities.
Sweden already maintains a high degree of interoperability
and cooperation with NATO, having become a NATO Partnership for
Peace member in 1994 and a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner
in 2014.
Sweden has contributed to or supported NATO missions in
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Kosovo, and Libya.
Sweden's membership in NATO will strengthen the security of the
Baltic Sea region, which remains an active area for Russian
military activity, and accelerate regional maritime and air
domain awareness.
Our bilateral defense relationship currently focuses on
deepening interoperability, enhancing Sweden's defense
capabilities, building regional air and maritime domain
awareness, increasing Swedish contributions to multinational
operations, and aligning strategic communications.
In particular, Sweden has an acknowledged level of
competency in domestic crisis resilience and preparedness that
distinguishes it as a leader among European nations.
The Department of Defense is confident the accession of
Sweden to NATO will have a positive effect on the Alliance's
military effectiveness based on Sweden's defense capabilities,
support of U.S. and allied actions in multiple theaters, and
expectation that Sweden will be able to contribute available
capabilities to operations.
In closing, the Department of Defense assesses that Finland
and Sweden are ready for NATO membership. Their accession will
provide additional security and stability in Europe.
They already have close bilateral defense relationships
with the United States, close working relationships and
military interoperability with NATO as enhanced opportunity
partners, and are thriving democracies that share our values
and fit the ideals of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wallander follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dr. Celeste Wallander
introduction
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to express the Department of
Defense's support for NATO membership for the Republic of Finland and
the Kingdom of Sweden. This historic moment builds on the positive
relationship that the Department of Defense enjoys with Ministries of
Defense of Finland and Sweden and the interoperability we have worked
to develop with each country's Armed Forces. The Department fully
supports both countries' sovereign choice to apply for NATO membership.
finland
Finland is a highly capable military partner whose democratic
values align closely with those of the United States. General
conscription, a well-prepared and trained reserve, and a strong will to
defend the country are the foundations of Finland's defense
capabilities. At the core of Finland's will to defend itself is the
belief that the Finnish way of life is worth protecting. Finland's
location on the Baltic Sea, experience with Russia as a frontline
state, and advanced capabilities would make it an asset to the
Alliance. Finland spends more than two percent of its GDP on defense
and possesses unique military capabilities and expertise, particularly
its experience operating in the Arctic environment.
In 2016, DoD and the Finnish Defense Ministry signed a Statement of
Intent to increase practical cooperation. Our bilateral defense
relationship currently focuses on deepening interoperability, enhancing
Finland's defense capabilities, building regional air and maritime
domain awareness, increasing Finnish contributions to multinational
operations, and aligning strategic communications. Finland and the
United States have enjoyed strong military-to-military cooperation
dating to Finland's acquisition of F/A-18 Hornets in the mid-1990s. In
December 2021, Finland announced plans to purchase 64 F-35A fighter
jets, which will only deepen our cooperation and ensure another
generation of close bilateral defense ties.
Finland also maintains a high degree of interoperability and
cooperation with NATO. Finland first participated in a NATO-led
operation in 1996 and became a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner in
2014, the closest level of partnership with the Alliance. It has
contributed to or otherwise supported NATO missions in Afghanistan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo.
Finnish membership in NATO would further the principles of the
North Atlantic Treaty and enhance the security of the North Atlantic
area. As a democracy and market economy, Finland's foreign policy is
underpinned by a commitment to and the promotion of democracy,
individual freedom, and rule of law. Finland is a modern, highly
industrialized democratic country with one of the highest standards of
living in the world. Finland has a well-educated and media-savvy
population, making its citizenry and democratic institutions resilient
to misinformation and malign influence while serving as a model to
others. As an advanced democracy, Finland's support of values enshrined
in NATO's founding Washington Treaty--including--democracy, human
rights, and respect for territorial integrity--align strongly with
those of the United States.
Finland's NATO membership will be an asset to the Alliance as a
values-based security organization. Finland is a world leader in
advanced telecommunications. As a NATO Ally, Finland would augment
NATO's capacity to defend critical infrastructure, operate in the cyber
domain, and strengthen individual and collective resilience. A founding
member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and a member of the European Union (EU) since 1995, Finland has
demonstrated for decades its commitment to individual liberty,
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Finland emphasizes the
importance of international cooperation to collectively resolve the
world's most pressing global challenges, including climate change,
international terrorism, defending human rights, and promoting open and
fair trade. Finland has a seat on the UN Human Rights Council from
2022-2024, will serve as OSCE Chair in 2025, and has ambitions to join
the UN Security Council in 2029-2030.
The Finnish Defense Forces comprise a total active and reserve
force end-strength of 280,000, with an additional 900,000 trained
individuals available for military service. Unlike many other European
countries, Finland has maintained a general conscription model for
defense. This allows Finland to rapidly call up its reserve force when
needed, at a lower overall training cost.
In addition to military forces, Finland maintains a comprehensive
security model with a whole-of-society approach to security and
preparedness. Vital societal functions are handled together by
government authorities, businesses, NGOs, and citizens ensuring that
every part of society is invested and understands the role they play in
defense of the country.
Finland's accession to NATO is likely to decrease the United
States' overall cost-share percentage of NATO's common funded budgets.
Relative to other accessions, Finland's modem military forces and
existing close partnership with NATO will reduce the time, effort, and
costs associated with its integration into NATO structures. Finland
would provide a net increase in security and military power to the
Alliance. Given Finland's capable military forces, high level of
readiness, and ability to provide for its self-defense, Finland's NATO
membership presents no discernable additional cost requirements to the
U.S. defense budget.
The Department of Defense is confident the accession of Finland to
NATO will have a positive impact on the Alliance's military
effectiveness. This high level of confidence is based on Finland's
defense capabilities, its support of U.S. and NATO actions in multiple
theaters, and its ability contribute available capabilities to
operations.
sweden
Swedish accession to NATO would further the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty as Sweden will combine a first-rate and rapidly growing
military that will contribute to the collective defense of the North
Atlantic area, with a principled foreign policy that ardently defends
democracy and human rights.
Sweden is a modern, highly industrialized democratic country with
one of the highest standards of living in the world. A member of the
European Union (EU) since 1995, Sweden's commitment to democracy,
individual freedom, and rule of law align closely with those of the
United States.
Sweden is a highly capable military partner and home to a world-
class defense industry. Sweden's military expertise in the Arctic and
undersea environments would further the Alliance's capabilities. The
Swedish Armed Forces, which has about 60,000 personnel, set a goal in
2020 to reach 90,000 by 2025. Sweden is working to increase military
spending to two percent of GDP as soon as practically possible,
expecting to meet this benchmark not later than 2028.
Sweden also maintains a high degree of interoperability and
cooperation with NATO, having become a member of Partnership for Peace
in 1994. Sweden first participated in a NATO-led operation in 1995 and
became a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner in 2014, the closest level
of partnership with the Alliance. Sweden has contributed to or
supported NATO missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq,
Kosovo, and Libya.
Sweden is a capable military partner that would be a net
contributor to Alliance and transatlantic security should it be
approved for NATO membership. Sweden has an acknowledged level of
competency in domestic crisis resilience and preparedness that
distinguishes it as a leader among European nations. In 2016, the
Department of Defense and Swedish Ministry of Defense signed a
Statement of Intent (SOI) to increase practical cooperation. Our
bilateral defense relationship currently focuses on deepening
interoperability, enhancing Sweden's defense capabilities, building
regional air and maritime domain awareness, increasing Swedish
contributions to multinational operations, and aligning strategic
communications.
Sweden would be a net provider of security and military power to
the Alliance area, thus enhancing the national security interests of
the United States and all NATO Allies. Sweden considers the United
States and Finland to be its two most significant strategic partners.
Both the governing coalition and the opposition are committed to strong
ties with the United States. Sweden's inclusion will not detract from
the ability of the United States to meet or fund its military
requirements.
Sweden's membership in NATO will strengthen the security of the
Baltic Sea region, which remains an active area for Russian military
activity. Swedish NATO membership will accelerate regional maritime and
air domain awareness.
Sweden's accession to NATO is likely to decrease the United States'
overall cost-share percentage of NATO's common funded budgets. Sweden's
modern military forces and existing close partnership with NATO will
reduce the time, effort, and costs associated with Sweden's integration
into NATO structures, relative to other recent accessions. Given
Sweden's capable military forces, high level of readiness, and ability
to provide for its self-defense, its NATO membership presents no
discernable additional cost requirements to the U.S. defense budget.
The Department of Defense is confident the accession of Sweden to
NATO will have a positive impact on the Alliance's military
effectiveness. This high level of confidence is based on Sweden's
defense capabilities, Sweden's support of U.S. and Allied actions in
multiple theaters, and expectation that Sweden will be able to
contribute available capabilities to operations.
In closing, the Department of Defense assesses Finland and Sweden
are ready for NATO membership. Finland and Sweden's accession will
provide additional security and stability in Europe. They have close
bilateral defense relationships with the United States; already enjoy
close working relationships and military interoperability with NATO as
Enhanced Opportunity Partners; and are thriving democracies that share
our values and fit the ideals of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Chairman. Thank you both for very comprehensive
testimony.
We have votes going on on the floor. It is the chair's
intention to just continue through and rotate to somebody
presiding so we can get through the hearing.
So let me start with you, Assistant Secretary Wallander.
Some of this you have--both have referred to but I want to
just detail the record. Is it accurate to say that Finland and
Sweden have large, technologically advanced militaries and both
have long partnered with NATO contributing to NATO operations,
including in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and also understand
that both countries either meet or have plans to meet the 2
percent NATO spending benchmark?
Ms. Wallander. Yes, Senator. That is accurate.
The Chairman. Since Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine,
popular support for joining NATO in Finland and Sweden and
their governments' commitments to NATO have grown
significantly.
Secretary Donfried, can you speak to how attitudes towards
joining NATO in Finland and Sweden have changed and where those
countries stand today on the subject?
Ms. Donfried. Yes. I agree with your analysis that February
24th fundamentally changed the perspective of both Finland and
Sweden. We saw Finland very decisively make a decision then to
move on NATO membership, and Sweden shortly joined Finland in
that membership aspiration.
And I think--it is interesting, there is a colleague of
mine who works for the European Union who has talked about
February 24 as Europe's 9/11, and I think for many Europeans it
was unthinkable before February 24 that Russia would undertake
a full-scale, brutal, unprovoked invasion of its neighbor,
Ukraine, and that action fundamentally shifted security
perspectives.
I agree with you that is how to understand the change in
public opinion that we have seen in both countries and the
strong support for NATO membership.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Respect for human rights, commitments to
transparency, rule of law, democracy, are values that NATO
members share and which are important to look at in assessing
candidates for NATO membership.
Assistant Secretary Donfried, can you speak to how Finland
and Sweden exemplify those values?
Ms. Donfried. I would be happy to do so.
And when we are talking about Finland and Sweden, we are
talking about two of our closest partners, and one of the
fundamental things that unites us is our respect for democracy
and human rights.
And if you look at Sweden, there are so many examples that
we could point to. One would be Sweden's one-year OSCE
chairpersonship in 2021 where they played an important
invisible role on so many issues--Ukraine already at that time,
Belarus, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Transnistria--and
Sweden brought to all of these conflicts its deep commitment to
global democracy and human rights.
We also see gender equality as a fundamental aim of Swedish
foreign policy and we also see Sweden as having been an active
contributor to last December's Summit for Democracy where
Sweden co-hosted a side event on women's economic empowerment.
I think there is no question that Sweden is deeply
committed to advancing democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law, and will do so also in its upcoming presidency of the
European Council of the European Union in 2023.
And then if we shift our attention to Finland, Finland,
too, in all of its foreign policy has shown a deep commitment
to promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
Finland has emphasized the importance of the rules-based
international system to collectively resolve the world's most
pressing global challenges.
Finland, too, has been a leader in international fora,
whether it is the number of Finns in the U.N. system and other
key international organizations, whether it is promoting
democracy in the OSCE in the Human Rights Council, and I
believe that we will see Finland continue to cooperate strongly
with the United States, with the EU, and will bring that
sensibility to NATO membership.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Wallander, Finland has a long history of opposing
Russian military advances and Sweden has a well-equipped
fighting force.
Could you confirm that enlarging NATO to include Finland
and Sweden will reduce the burdens including defense burden on
the United States rather than increase them?
Ms. Wallander. Senator, membership in NATO of Sweden and
Finland would enhance the capabilities of the NATO Alliance on
both the ground, air, and sea domain and in new domains of
importance, including the cyber domain and combating Russian
malign influence in the area of disinformation, and both
countries bring strong economies and strong democratic support
for defense spending.
The Department of Defense sees no negatives in the
membership of Sweden and Finland on burden sharing or on the
capabilities of the Alliance.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Congress has a long and bipartisan track record of support
for Baltic security as well as a more generally robust defense
of NATO's eastern flank.
How would Sweden and Finland's membership in NATO affect
our security posture in the eastern part of the Alliance?
Ms. Wallander. We have already seen in just the last month
the potential of an improved, enhanced capability of NATO from
the membership of Sweden and Finland with a participation in
the BALTOPS exercise, which is vital for the ability of the
NATO Alliance to enhance the security in the Baltic region
where Russia is active and often irresponsible in its military
presence.
Already BALTOPS has benefited from Swedish and Finnish
participation as partners. But having a higher degree of
interoperability and integration from members of the Alliance
would further support those kinds of planning and exercises.
The Chairman. Finally, Secretary Donfried, even though we
do not yet have texts of accession protocols, all NATO
accession protocols are substantively identical and we are well
positioned to assess the candidacies of Finland and Sweden even
prior to the signature of the protocols.
Would you say that that is your understanding as well as it
relates to the protocols?
Ms. Donfried. Yes. My understanding is that once the
accession protocols are signed we would then urge the Senate at
its earliest opportunity to provide its advice and consent.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I am strongly supportive of accession and will work both
with the ranking member through the committee and on the floor
to get this ratified.
Senator Risch?
The Chairman. And I am going to ask Senator Kaine to
preside so I can go vote.
Thank you.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I think we have had a really good robust
discussion here and one of the reasons is because we are all
ready and we have all been expecting this, and as the chairman
just pointed out, I wrote a letter--I do not know--two weeks
ago--maybe it is three weeks ago now--to both the White House
and State directing your attention to the fact that this was
coming down the pipe pretty quickly and to start work on it.
Can you give us any kind of a time frame? You talked about
as early as possible and what have you. How quickly can you get
that material to us, I guess, is the question I would have?
Ms. Donfried. What is happening now, as was already
mentioned, is there is a conversation happening among Turkey,
Finland, and Sweden, and the decision within NATO is a
consensus decision, and Turkey has raised some concerns
relating to terrorism in the approach of Sweden and Finland.
Of course, the United States, along with Turkey, shares a
desire to end the scourge of terrorism and we all take this
very seriously. My understanding is those conversations are
moving at pace. They are happening among those three countries.
But what we saw this week is that NATO Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg also invited the parties to have a
conversation that he mediated. That was on Monday. We
understand that was constructive.
We are confident that there will be progress here and that
will allow the accession protocols to be signed and the
ratification process here to move forward.
Senator Risch. Are you intending to be in Madrid next week?
Ms. Donfried. Yes, sir. I am.
Senator Risch. Okay.
Again, I come back to time. We all want to work as quickly
as possible. Let us assume that we get this one wrinkle ironed
out next week. How quickly can we expect to see something here
in the Senate?
Ms. Donfried. I think, to use your term, Ranking Member
Risch, once that wrinkle is ironed out I think it would move
immediately.
Senator Risch. That is important.
And I think you indicated about consensus. By the word
consensus did you mean unanimously, essentially?
Ms. Donfried. Yes. Yes.
Senator Risch. So have a clear understanding of that.
All right. That is clear, and as you have heard from the
chairman and I, we are all in on this and we want this to
happen as rapidly as possible.
It is something that is--it will be a great addition for
NATO, for the North Atlantic, and I appreciate your work on it.
And with that, I am going to yield back, Mr. Chairman, as
we have had a--or Mr. Acting Chairman.
Senator Kaine [presiding]. Mr. Acting Chairman. Thank you,
Mr. Ranking, and to our witnesses and others.
I, actually--oh, excuse me, do we have either--anyone on by
WebEx right now?
All right. That means I am next.
I want to thank, actually, Chairman Menendez and Ranking
Member Risch. Apropos of this discussion, this committee acted
in the last couple of months on a resolution I have with
Senator Rubio to make clear that no President of the United
States can withdraw from NATO without congressional approval.
The Constitution is silent about exiting treaties. It is
very clear about entering treaties. A two-thirds Senate vote is
needed.
It is squarely within the jurisdiction of this committee,
and the chair and ranking had a markup on this and it passed
overwhelmingly in the committee. They gave me permission--a
clearance--to try to get it added to the annual defense
authorizing bill, which we passed out of the SASC Committee
last week overwhelmingly.
But because SASC will not consider matters in the
jurisdiction of another committee, even with the agreement of
the chair and ranking, I was not able to get it added.
I was trying to get it added because I thought it would
send a really powerful signal about congressional support for
NATO on the verge of this next NATO meeting.
But we can have another opportunity.
Senator Risch. There is other ways of doing that, as the
Senator well knows.
Senator Kaine. Yeah. We will look for other ways to do it.
But I just wanted to thank the chair and ranking for being
willing to let us try it in the Armed Services bill. We will
look for another way.
One of the things that, I think, is interesting about
Sweden and Finland--and we have talked about their respective
capacities, economic strength, worked together with the United
States in the past--is the fact that on these defense matters
they also have a really significant cooperation among them.
So you are not just getting two different new allies. You
are getting two allies that have significant capacity but that
also do a lot together, and the fact that they would both
approach this NATO membership together is also interesting to
me.
Talk a little bit about the long-term defense and
diplomatic relationship between Sweden and Finland, because I
think that actually brings an additional element to the table
as we consider NATO accession for the two countries.
Ms. Donfried. I am happy to start, and you may want to
weigh in as well.
I think your observation is on point, and it is striking
how closely Finland and Sweden do cooperate in the security and
defense area, and, interestingly, we saw Finland be the first
to announce its intention to seek NATO membership and then
Sweden followed.
But if you look at public opinion in Sweden, you saw about
a 10 percentage point jump when the Finns announced their
commitment to pursuing this, and I think that gets to your
point of how joined up these two countries are when they think
about their own security, and it also relates to how current
NATO member states see this.
There was a question earlier about the BALTOPS, and it is
interesting because if Finland and Sweden or when Finland and
Sweden join NATO, the Baltic littoral, with the exception of
the Russian coast on the Gulf of Finland and Kaliningrad, would
be ally territory, which enables NATO to better monitor
activity in and plan the defense of the entire vital region.
You have seen the Baltic foreign ministers state publicly
that they and NATO will benefit from Finland and Sweden's
strong military capabilities so I think you see that benefit
both on the diplomacy side and on the military side.
Over to you.
Senator Kaine. Secretary Wallander, do you have anything to
add to that?
Ms. Wallander. Thanks. Yes.
Finland and Sweden bring not only common advantages as
strong potential allies but have, through their own
complementary capabilities, worked together, participated in
NATO-led or, simply, multinational exercises in really
constructive ways.
I will give you a couple of examples. One is Finland,
obviously, has a very strong territorial defense capability,
very important for a country with an over 800-mile border with
Russia and experience of fighting the Soviet Union in the 1930s
and doing so effectively.
And Sweden has substantial capabilities in the maritime
domain and has carefully monitored Russian maritime and air
activity over the Baltics, and Sweden also has participated in
bilateral programs and cooperation with the United States in
the area of Special Operations Forces as well.
The two potential allies--aspirant allies bring similar
strengths in their democracies, in their market economies, in
their strengths as European countries, and then they each bring
their own complementary military capabilities that will further
strengthen the NATO Alliance.
Senator Kaine. That is excellent.
And, Secretary Donfried, I want to ask you a question. You
said that some of your colleagues in Europe have described this
moment, the February 24 attack of Ukraine, as Europe's 9/11,
and I am pretty sure I know what you mean by that. But I kind
of wanted to dig into it further.
People who are not spending a lot of time in Europe and do
not know the European reality might think, oh, but Finland and
Sweden, they are quite a ways away from Ukraine so why would
they view an attack on Ukraine as the equivalent of a 9/11
style attack on Europe.
Just dig into that a little bit more. I think I know what
you mean but I think it would be important to get this
testimony out there.
Ms. Donfried. Thank you for the question.
I will tell you how I heard it, in fairness to the
individual who said it. But the way I heard it was just the
sense of shock that Russia, in 2022, would undertake this full-
scale, unprovoked, unjustified brutal invasion of its neighbor,
Ukraine.
And, of course, in the first instance, that has tragic
implications for Ukraine, and I think we have all been inspired
by the bravery of Ukrainians in meeting that challenge and
their resilience.
But it also fundamentally alters the European security
landscape, and so that is how I understood it, that every
country in Europe recalculated its own assessment of its
security, and I think Finland and Sweden in so doing, whereas
in the past they always believed their security interests were
best served by having a NATO partnership but not being members,
that changed almost overnight.
That was how I understood the comment.
Thanks.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much for that.
This is one where in my 10 years here I have never seen a
bigger gulf between the United States and our European allies
on our predictions about what was going to happen.
We shared the hopes for what would happen or would not
happen and we were sharing the same set of facts upon which to
make a prediction.
But I agree, I think there was a degree--and I can,
certainly, understand that wishful thinking is a somewhat
derogatory phrase, a deep hope that, of course, Russia is not
going to invade. I mean, it is a muscle flexing exercise.
But when it became a reality, which much of U.S. intel was
saying it was going to become a reality, I can see that that
caused this kind of continent wide recalibration as you
describe.
I am going to--oh, please.
Ms. Donfried. And I should just--I should not lump all of
Europe together. I want to be clear.
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
Ms. Donfried. I do think there were differences in
perception----
Senator Kaine. Yes.
Ms. Donfried [continuing]. Across the European continent,
just to be clear. I do not mean to say all of them.
Senator Kaine. Yeah. I hear you.
There being no Senators on WebEx now, Senator Hagerty, you
are up next.
Senator Hagerty. Okay. Thank you very much, and to our
witnesses here today, Assistant Secretaries Donfried and
Wallander, welcome to you. Thank you for being here to discuss
an important topic regarding strengthening the NATO Alliance.
I would like to take you back to my service as U.S.
Ambassador to Japan. There, I spent a tremendous amount of my
time and effort in increasing the capabilities of the U.S.-
Japan alliance on a military front, trying to ensure that the
agility, the interoperability, and the overall military
capability was being maximized for our combined forces.
I worked very often with then Prime Minister Abe on this
topic. I support our current Ambassador Emanuel as he works
with current Prime Minister Kishida in the same arena. It is
very important.
Up front I would like to say I support Finland and Sweden's
accession to NATO because their addition will be accretive to
the overall capabilities of the Alliance, and I appreciate
that.
But as the United States advances its NATO policy in the
21st century I believe it is going to be important to get back
to the basics. There, I mean, in the very first instance, NATO
is a military alliance that needs to focus on deterring
military threats with real military capabilities, and if the
last year has demonstrated anything it is that the NATO
Alliance must stand stronger to better deter Russia's military
threat to us and to our allies.
My first question will be to you, Assistant Secretary
Wallander.
When will Finland and Sweden, respectively, meet the goals
of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense? And I know that
Finland is closer than Sweden but both were on track, as I
understand it.
Can you give me your sense of when they will meet their
goals?
Ms. Wallander. Sure. It is a great question, Senator, and I
share your commitment to making sure that NATO allies are
contributing to security of the Alliance.
Finland already in 2022 does meet the 2 percent floor--the
Wales Pledge. Finland's defense spending is at 2.2 percent of
GDP and Sweden is----
Senator Hagerty. That is projected for 2022?
Ms. Wallander. This is for 2022. And Sweden's government
has committed to meeting the 2 percent pledge as soon as
possible and no later than 2028.
And I would note also that Sweden meets the NATO--the less
cited but no less important NATO standard of spending at least
20 percent of its defense budget on acquisition of capability.
Senator Hagerty. I met with Sweden's Ambassador recently
and she told me in very encouraging terms that they were doing
everything they could to accelerate their progress toward that
goal. So thank you for that.
Assistant Secretary Wallander, you also talked with Senator
Kaine about some of the current capabilities that Finland and
Sweden will contribute to the Alliance.
Can you give me a sense of what you would like to see them
develop for the future?
Ms. Wallander. Certainly, one of the hopes would be that
both countries would contribute and, I believe, will contribute
to the battle groups on the eastern flank, the eight eastern
front countries of NATO.
Finland and Sweden both have very strong bilateral
relations with the Baltic countries, in particular----
Senator Hagerty. Yes. Yes.
Ms. Wallander [continuing]. And they--Sweden and Finland--
can become not just strong defense partners or allies of the
Alliance but strong contributors as those countries face
Russian aggression right on their borders.
Senator Hagerty. I hope you will work to guide their
acquisition strategies in that direction and I look forward to
their contributions.
I want to sum it up, though, with you, Assistant Secretary
Wallander.
It is your testimony today, I presume, that from the
Defense Department's perspective that adding both Sweden and
Finland to the NATO Alliance will, indeed, strengthen NATO's
military capabilities and, therefore, their deterrence
capabilities?
Ms. Wallander. Yes, Senator. That is the Department of
Defense assessment.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you very much.
I would like to turn to you, Assistant Secretary Donfried.
I support adding Finland and Sweden to the NATO Alliance,
as you know, but I also want to ask you about other important
things that the United States should be doing to counter and,
to frankly, defund Russia's military aggression.
The Biden administration's energy policies have perversely
helped to fund Putin's war machine in Ukraine. Do you dispute
the fact or the assessment, at least, that despite
international sanctions Vladimir Putin's regime has earned
nearly $100 billion from energy exports during the first 100
days of Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion of
Ukraine?
Ms. Donfried. Senator Hagerty, thank you for that question.
And what I would say is I think it is a complicated
equation because what we have seen is that as more Russian oil
is going off the market we are also seeing that Russia has
declining oil profits as a result of being forced to sell its
oil at steep discounts.
And so there is a calculation about what is the discounted
price of that Russian oil and then how does that affect the
scarcity of supply. So I----
Senator Hagerty. Actually, what has happened is there has
been a windfall that has come to Russia. Do you accept the fact
that oil and gas markets are global markets?
Ms. Donfried. Yes, they are.
Senator Hagerty. And all other things being equal, if the
United States were to actually ramp up its oil and gas
production would the increase of energy supplies actually lower
the global price of energy?
Ms. Donfried. An increase in energy supply should reduce
the price.
Senator Hagerty. It, certainly, should. And if you think
about Russia's energy exports, they made up half of Russia's
budget--more than half of their budget before the windfall that
has come into the marketplace took place.
Is a price increase actually helpful or hurtful to Vladimir
Putin?
Ms. Donfried. A price increase is helpful. But if you are
having a challenge selling Russian oil because of the
sanctions, that is what has forced some price decline on
Russian oil, in particular.
Senator Hagerty. The reports are that Russia has actually
had a massive increase in its revenues from oil sales just in
the first five months of this year. Its oil sales are up close
to $100 billion. That is more than enough--in fact, almost one
and a half times its annual military budget.
In effect, we are inadvertently funding Vladimir Putin's
war machine. That is the point that I am trying to make, and I
want to encourage you to please take the message back home that
when President Biden decided to wage the war on fossil fuels
here in America it has a global impact and that global impact
not only hurts American consumers here at home but it also is
hurting the brave Ukrainians that are trying to fight right now
because they are also a casualty of President Biden's anti----
The Chairman [presiding]. The time of the Senator has
expired. I just want him to acknowledge I have given him a
significant amount of time over the time.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope this will
change.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I was watching part of the hearing on WebEx and, of course,
we were interrupted by votes.
Let me, first, thank our witnesses for their work.
As has been already demonstrated in this hearing, there is
strong support for NATO expansion in Finland and Sweden, and we
recognize there is a process we go through and we also
recognize, as you have already pointed out, that all NATO
members have to agree and you want to give space for Turkey to
be able to have the conversations it needs with the aspirant
countries.
We all appreciate that. But we certainly urge that we have
to make sure that that is constructive and timely and we would
hope that our leadership would help provide that type of
accommodations so that those conversations take place but they
do not unnecessarily delay the considerations of their entry
into NATO.
I want to sort of follow up on the impact that this is
having on Russia's calculation--Mr. Putin's calculation. He is,
obviously, watching very closely what is happening with Sweden
and Finland. He is also watching what is happening with the
European Union and their invitations in regards to Moldova and
Ukraine.
And can you just tell us how you feel these expansions,
whether of the EU or of NATO, would affect Mr. Putin's
calculations in regards to his aspirations for a greater
Russia?
Ms. Wallander. Let me start on the defense and military
side.
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO would
significantly complicate Russian military planning for any kind
of military operations against NATO by doubling the length of
Russia's front border with NATO allies and by strengthening
NATO-allied capabilities in the Baltic Sea region and in the
Arctic High North.
There is no question that this accession of Finland and
Sweden is something that is not welcome in Moscow as it plans
for a hostile relationship with NATO. NATO is a defensive
alliance, but the Russian military would have to take this into
account.
And I would, simply, also note that for 20 years Russia has
sought to divide the NATO Alliance on multiple issues, sought
to fracture it in order to paralyze it diplomatically and
militarily, and the strength with which the--and the public and
political strength of the desire to accede to NATO by both
Finland and Sweden has further strengthened the Alliance and
has shown to the Kremlin that its efforts to weaken the
Alliance have not only failed but have actually reverberated
negatively.
Ms. Donfried. And if I could just make two quick comments
in response to your question, Senator Cardin.
First, in terms of your question about the impact on
Russia's calculation, the irony here is that Vladimir Putin
said one of the reasons he was engaging in this brutal assault
on Ukraine was his concern about NATO getting too close to
Russia's borders.
Well, what a miscalculation. What a strategic
miscalculation. If that was his concern, he now has Finland
with an 830-mile border with Russia and Sweden saying they want
to join NATO. That is quite striking.
And the second point is, of course, we are concerned also
about the security of Finland and Sweden in this interval
between their application and accession. We are confident that
we and our allies are well positioned to help these two
countries address their security needs and any concerns that
they might have in this interim period, and President Biden
said on May 18 that while their applications for NATO
membership are being considered the United States will work
closely with both countries to remain vigilant against any
threats to our shared security and to deter and confront
aggression or the threat of aggression.
As has already been mentioned, we exercise regularly
together in the Baltic Sea region and the U.S. military
routinely maintains presence in the vicinity of both countries.
We feel that we are also being vigilant during this interim
period.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Let me just make a comment. We are, today,
concerned about the expansion as it relates to Finland and
Sweden. But we also need to be concerned of the focus in the
Black Sea.
Russia, clearly, is interested in dominating the Black Sea,
and with Ukraine being compromised by the Russian presence it
even makes it more urgent for us to shore up NATO's capacity
within the Black Sea.
I just mention that because I think we need to look at that
as the next chapter of our challenges in regards to national
security threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen?
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Great to see both of you here. Thank you for your service.
And just for the record, President Biden has been calling
upon oil refiners in the United States to increase their
capacity. In fact, the other day he said he might--he is
looking at the Defense Production Act as a potential tool to
push that in the right direction.
I am a strong believer that having both Sweden and Finland
as part of the NATO Alliance would be good for the Alliance and
good for those countries. They are both democracies. They both
believe in the rule of law.
We already have strong security partnerships and they would
be great additions, in my view, to the NATO Alliance.
My question to you, Assistant Secretary Donfried, we have
the Madrid Conference coming up. What is the likelihood that we
will be in a position to offer a formal invitation to Sweden
and Finland to join the Alliance at the upcoming Madrid
Conference?
Ms. Donfried. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen, for that
question.
What has been happening is that Turkey, which has expressed
its concerns about, in particular, Swedish and Finnish stances
with regard to the fight against terrorism, has been engaged in
conversations with Finland and Sweden to find a resolution to
their concerns, and this week we saw the NATO Secretary General
help in mediating that conversation. On Monday there were
meetings among those parties, which we heard were quite
constructive.
And so we are confident that this will be resolved in a
positive way. There is broad and deep support across the NATO
Alliance for Finnish and Swedish accession. We are hopeful that
we will soon achieve a positive resolution.
Senator Van Hollen. Look, I am hopeful as well and I am
glad to hear the talks are coming along. But let us be clear on
what we mean by Turkey's so-called concerns about Sweden and
Finnish positions in the fight against terrorism.
We are specifically talking about President Erdogan's
concerns about support for the SDF and elements of the SDF,
right?
Ms. Donfried. It is a concern, in the first instance, about
the PKK, which we all recognize is a terrorist organization,
and then you are right, it has to do with those PKK-affiliated
groups.
Senator Van Hollen. Right. But just to be clear, Sweden
already has a law on the books that recognizes or identifies
the PKK as a terrorist organization, correct?
Ms. Donfried. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. They are in line with the United States
and most of our other partners. And is it not the case that the
United States has been a strong partner with the SDF in the
fight against ISIS?
Ms. Donfried. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. Right.
Just to be clear, I mean, we want to work this out. But we
should make clear to President Erdogan that they are
criticizing Sweden and Finland for taking actions the United
States government has taken.
President Erdogan also wants to extradite Gulen. We are a
country that recognizes the rule of law. So are Sweden and
Finland. And, again, you know, we have had concerns here about
the deployment of Russian S-400s by Turkey and have taken
action in this committee and the Congress.
I want to, amen, support the ongoing talks. But let us
recognize, I think, that the positions that Sweden and Finland
have taken are pretty much on the same page with the position
the United States has taken with respect to the SDF and the
very important fight against ISIS and terrorism.
Sweden and Finland have been, in my view, on the right side
in that fight against ISIS.
Can you just lay out what you see as the time line, again,
whether you are--whether you believe that we will be successful
at getting everybody on the same page, including Turkey, by the
time the Madrid Conference comes around?
Ms. Donfried. I will say that we, certainly, are pushing
for that.
Senator Van Hollen. All right. I am going to end there.
Again, I think we all recognize what the challenge is here. We
want to make sure these are constructive talks.
Sweden and Finland have already taken measures in response
to Turkey's concern. Is that not correct?
Ms. Donfried. That is correct. Finland and Sweden have been
engaging very constructively in these talks and they have been
forward leaning in terms of being responsive to the concerns
raised.
Senator Van Hollen. Right. I mean, Sweden, as I understand
it, ended their arms embargo against Turkey. Is that right?
Ms. Donfried. That is correct.
Senator Van Hollen. Got it. All right.
Thank you both. I think we would all like to see for the
good of the Alliance and to make sure we send a strong signal
to Putin that what he is doing is an attack on democracy, on
the rule of law, and I would hate to see--this moment, which
you described, would underscore the fact that Putin's invasion
of Ukraine is a strategic failure because it actually
encouraged Sweden and Finland to join this defensive alliance.
I would hate to see that moment squandered because of an
inability to address the issues that we are talking about
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me just echo Senator Van Hollen's bit of frustration
about the comments we make about Turkey, Sweden, and Finland as
it relates to urging them to work together.
As, Secretary Donfried, you know I had the opportunity to
speak to the chiefs of missions this morning--all of our
ambassadors around the world and several others. I know you
were there.
I am not constrained by the constraints maybe you all feel
you have at the State Department. I believe you call out
whoever is wrong on something, and if there are multiple
parties that are wrong then you call out multiple parties.
But as Senator Van Hollen has said, Secretary, there is a
possibility in the future--as Senator Van Hollen has said, the
reality is is that Finland and Sweden are aligned with our own
policies as it relates to the PKK and the SDF and our fight
against ISIS. So it is a little disingenuous to suggest we urge
all parties to work together.
Of course, it would be great for them all to work together
and come to a conclusion. I do not know what Turkey is trying
to extract from them.
But, at the end of the day, that is what this is about, and
maybe if we get in the game they want to extract from us, too,
which I will be vehemently opposed to.
We do not need for any extraction to take place or any
concessions to take place to have two great democracies join
NATO.
But having said that, I just think, for the record, it is
one of the things that for 30 years of doing foreign policy
irks me about the State Department, regardless of which
administration is in, that we call upon all parties to do
something when not all parties are responsible, at the end of
the day, for the conflict that we have, with the issue that we
have, or the problem that we have.
I have extended the time here to--I know there are some
members who had an interest but there is no member presently
before me either on--virtually or in the committee.
So with the thanks of the committee for your participation
and for your insights, this record will remain open until the
close of business tomorrow.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]
