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110th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 110-31
_______________________________________________________________________
Calendar No. 68
AVIATION SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
__________
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
on
S. 509
DATE deg.March 5, 2007.--Ordered to be printed
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
one hundred tenth congress
first session
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice-Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
Virginia TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
THOMAS CARPER, Delaware JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret Cummisky, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Helms, Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Margaret Spring, General Counsel
Lisa Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Kenneth Nahigian, Republican Chief Counsel
Calendar No. 68
110th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 110-31
======================================================================
AVIATION SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
_______
March 5, 2007.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Inouye, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 509]
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to
which was referred the bill (S. 509) TITLE deg. to
provide improved aviation security, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with
amendments and recommends that the bill (as amended) do pass.
Purpose of the Bill
The Aviation Security Improvement Act, S. 509, as reported,
would strengthen aviation security by addressing unimplemented
air transportation security recommendations of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attack Upon the United States (9/11
Commission). The legislation proposes new security measures,
assessments and programs focused on air cargo, baggage and
checkpoint screening, passenger pre-screening, and general
aviation.
Background and Needs
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11),
Congress acted promptly to address immediate threats to our
Nation's transportation infrastructure system and passed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) (P.L. 107-71).
ATSA was signed into law on November 19, 2001, and created the
Transportation Security Administration within the Department of
Transportation (TSA), which took control over all aspects of
transportation security. On November 25, 2002, Congress passed
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), which created
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) into which TSA was
incorporated.
On November 27, 2002, Congress passed H.R. 4628, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-
306). Title VI of P.L. 107-306 created the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, now known as the
``9/11 Commission''. The 9/11 Commission was established as an
independent, bipartisan commission tasked with preparing a
complete account of the circumstances surrounding the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, including analysis of the
preparedness for, and the immediate response to, the attacks.
The 9/11 Commission's mandate was to provide recommendations
designed to guard against future terrorist attacks.
On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its public
report on the events of 9/11. Among its key findings, the 9/11
Commission concluded that al Qaeda operatives had exploited
known weaknesses in U.S. aviation security to carry out the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although legislative
and administrative actions to strengthen aviation security were
implemented immediately following the terrorist attacks, the 9/
11 Commission concluded that several weaknesses continued to
exist. These weaknesses included inadequate screening and
access controls at airports and perceived vulnerabilities in
cargo and general aviation security.
As part of its initial report, the 9/11 Commission issued a
variety of recommendations designed to strengthen aviation
security by: enhancing passenger pre-screening, improving
measures to detect explosives on passengers, addressing human
factors issues at screening checkpoints, expediting deployment
of in-line baggage screening systems, intensifying efforts to
identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo, and
deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In
addition to these specific recommendations, an overarching
recommendation for transportation security policy asserted that
priorities should be based on risk, and the most practical and
cost-effective deterrents should be implemented, assigning
appropriate roles and missions to Federal, State, and local
authorities, as well as private stakeholders.
After the 9/11 Commission formally ceased on August 21, 2004,
its 10 members initiated a nationwide public education campaign
known as the ``9/11 Public Discourse Project''. This effort was
aimed at fulfilling the 9/11 Commission's original mandate of
guarding against future terrorist attacks. On December 5, 2005,
through the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, the 9/11 Commission
published a report card on the Federal Government's efforts to
implement the 41 primary recommendations of the Commission. Of
those 41 recommendations, only 3 focused specifically on
aviation security and a fourth called for a national strategy
for transportation security. The 9/11 Public Discourse Project
issued the following grades on Federal implementation of the 9/
11 Commission's aviation security recommendations: checked
baggage and cargo screening received a ``D'', airline passenger
explosive screening received a ``C'', and airline passenger
prescreening received an ``F''.
All of the 9/11 Commission's primary recommendations on
aviation security focus on key elements of the layered approach
that TSA adopted to defend the U.S. airspace system following
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The TSA has
continued working to address the 9/11 Commission's primary
recommendations on aviation security, but the agency has faced
significant challenges in moving forward on aspects of these
recommendations.
Checked baggage and cargo screening requirements have placed
a considerable burden on the security regime due to the sheer
volume of items that need to be processed on a daily basis.
Currently, TSA uses 2 types of devices in U.S. airports to
screen the annual 535 million parcels of checked baggage for
explosives: explosive detection systems (EDS), and explosive
trace detection machines (ETD). Since TSA's creation in
November 2001, more than 1,678 EDS machines, and 7,478 ETDs
have been installed in airports nationwide.
EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS
EDS machines are the primary method used to screen checked
baggage for threat items. One of the advantages of this
technology is that it is able to screen up to 500 bags per
hour. However, the bulky size of the equipment also makes it a
burden to install in airports, usually requiring considerable
adjustment of the layout of the airport, thus triggering
additional cost expenditures.
To meet the deadline imposed by ATSA for the electronic
screening of all checked baggage transported by commercial
passenger aircraft, TSA placed many EDS machines in airport
lobbies, which resulted in overcrowding, inefficient service,
and generally unsafe conditions. Analysis by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has suggested that a practical
solution would involve the integration of EDS equipment into
the checked baggage conveyor system, or ``in-line'' EDS. This,
however, only has occurred at a limited number of airports due
to the high cost of reconfiguring airports, including
reinforced floors, electrical upgrades, information technology
(IT) networking, and new conveyor systems.
The TSA's own reviews indicate broader application of in-line
EDS at the majority of commercial airports could provide
significant savings and other cost and personnel benefits
through the integration of such systems into an airport's
baggage conveyor process. Research conducted on the airports
that have undergone this transition indicates that the
government would recoup these implementation costs in 1 to 5
years, primarily through lower TSA staffing and maintenance
costs. In February 2006, TSA delivered a Strategic Planning
Framework for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP).
That framework details TSA's long-term planning philosophy for
the development and implementation of optimal baggage screening
solutions at the Nation's top 250 airports, where over 99
percent checked baggage originates, and guides TSA's investment
and deployment decisions. Currently, 51 airports are either
operational or deploying some form of advanced in-line baggage
screening system.
The GAO and the 9/11 Commission both called for more rapid
integration of in-line baggage systems as part of a streamlined
screening methodology. The installment of such in-line systems,
however, has been hindered by funding constraints, despite the
fact that Congress envisioned a cost-sharing and reimbursement
program conducted through letters of intent (LOI).
Under the LOI program, airports fund EDS projects and are
subsequently reimbursed by TSA for their non-match amount over
a 3 to 5 year period, subject to the availability of Federal
funds. Congress first authorized LOIs for security projects in
the fiscal year (FY) 2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill (P.L.
108-7) for 5 years, at $500 million annually. The Vision-100
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization bill
(P.L. 108-176) established a security capital fund also
authorized at $500 million per year, of which $250 million was
mandatory spending for 4 years to fund LOIs and to meet other
airport security-related capital improvements. To date, TSA has
issued LOIs to nine airports.
EXPLOSIVE TRACE DETECTION
In comparison to the EDS equipment, ETD machines are smaller
and relatively cheaper. Instead of using radiation to scan a
piece of baggage, these machines are able to detect vapors and
residue from explosives. A screener is able to collect a sample
by rubbing a bag or piece of luggage with a swab, and the
sample is then chemically analyzed for traces of explosive
material. While ETD devices have higher detection rates and a
lower number of false positives than EDS, the screening process
is much slower. Therefore, ETD machines ideally would be best
deployed in low baggage throughput airports. Currently, ETDs
are used as a major screening method in over 300 airports
nationwide, but are located at most airports as a secondary
screening method for both passengers and baggage.
S. 509 would improve and expedite the deployment of in-line
baggage systems at our Nation's airports by providing TSA with
a stable and long-term funding stream which would significantly
improve the current LOI process. Congress, TSA, and airports
have all struggled to find a workable funding solution to the
in-line baggage problem. By utilizing and extending the current
mandatory funding process established through the Aviation
Security Capital Fund, the bill would strengthen TSA's ability
to improve aviation security.
AIR CARGO SCREENING
While all passenger baggage is screened prior to placement in
airplane cargo, this is not the case for shipped cargo on
passenger planes. The vast amount of air cargo, the speed at
which it is required to be delivered, and the numerous entry
points to the supply chain have created a difficult environment
in which to develop a comprehensive cargo security system. The
U.S. supply chain handles more than 50,000 tons of air cargo
each day, of which approximately one quarter is designated for
passenger air carriers.
Currently, TSA relies on a ``Known Shipper'' program for
which shipping companies may qualify if they meet certain
security requirements. The TSA prohibits passenger aircraft
from transporting cargo not from a Known Shipper. A recent GAO
report highlighted weaknesses in this program, citing
unreliability of shipper data, and questioned TSA's methodology
of identifying risky shippers. Some members of Congress have
called for screening of all cargo on passenger planes.
In November 2004, TSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) in the Federal Register for enhanced air cargo security
requirements throughout the air cargo supply chain. The Air
Cargo Final Rule, published on May 26, 2006, affects the air
cargo supply chain by consolidating approximately 4,000 private
industry Known Shipper lists into 1 central database managed by
TSA. The rule also requires background checks of approximately
51,000 off-airport freight forwarder employees and extends
secure areas of airports to include ramps and cargo facilities.
As with its other programs, TSA has followed a layered
approach to air cargo security, by: allowing only known
shippers to offer cargo for passenger-carrying aircraft, using
canine teams throughout the cargo system, screening the most
high-risk cargo with electronic EDS, deploying hundreds of
dedicated cargo-only aviation security inspectors to conduct
scheduled and unscheduled compliance inspections in cargo
facilities, requiring air carriers to physically inspect some
cargo, and utilizing transportation security officers at over
250 small airports to screen all cargo at these airports, and
requiring random screening in addition to the above measures.
In November 2006, TSA implemented new rules were to require
100 percent of high risk cargo to be screened with the same
degree of scrutiny as checked baggage before being placed on
passenger aircraft. This includes packages presented to air
carriers at the airport or other facilities and packages
requested to be placed on a specific flight. Additionally, TSA
removed all exceptions for screening air cargo on passenger
planes.
S. 509 would require TSA to provide for the screening of all
cargo being carried on commercial passenger aircraft within 3
years after the date of enactment of this Act. The system must
allow for a level of screening ``comparable'' to that of
checked baggage screening and ensure the security of all cargo
that is shipped on passenger aircraft. The bill also included
language directing TSA to evaluate the use of blast resistant
cargo containers and develop a program to make such containers
available to air carriers as needed to address threats, as
recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
The Committee believes TSA should consider establishing a
system whereby aviation ground service providers that perform
cargo security screening services for passenger aircraft are
compensated for costs incurred as a result of increased cargo
security requirements.
PASSENGER CHECKPOINT SCREENING TECHNOLOGY
Over the past year, evolving security threats have increased
the urgency of screening air passengers for explosives at
checkpoints. A terrorist plot that targeted several U.S. air
carriers with liquid explosives was foiled in London on August
10, 2006. The TSA responded to the scheme by enacting enhanced
security measures at all airports to limit the amount of liquid
materials that could be carried on commercial aircraft. This
step was necessary because the agency had, and continues to
have, only a limited ability to use advanced technology to
detect such threat items.
Congress sought to establish a framework in ATSA for enhanced
aviation security measures that incorporate advanced
technology. Among the mandates included in ATSA are several
provisions that are noteworthy, including stipulations for
research, development, and deployment of technologies that
would advance aviation security, especially explosive detection
technology used for both people and baggage. In addition, ATSA
establishes Federal requirements for airports to maximize the
use of technology and equipment designed to detect or
neutralize chemical or biological weapons.
The Committee believes the best way to provide for the
research and development of technologies and techniques to
prevent explosives from being placed onto passenger aircraft is
to pilot these technologies at a diverse group of airports. The
Committee directs the Secretary to give priority for these
pilot projects to airports that have demonstrated their
expertise as pilot sites and were selected by TSA as model
airports for the deployment of technology to detect explosives.
In implementing ATSA, TSA proposed layers of security, such
as advanced screener training and installation of new
machinery, that have demonstrated some progress; nevertheless,
assessments by the 9/11 Commission, the DHS Office of Inspector
General (OIG), as well as GAO, indicate that more improvement
is still necessary. In addition to screening checked baggage,
TSA has awarded contracts to private companies to create
technology capable of detecting explosives, weapons, and other
items carried by passengers on commercial aircraft. These
devices include ``backscatter'' machines that screen
individuals for hidden items, ``puffer'' machines that analyze
air particles for explosives, document scanners, advanced
checkpoint x-ray devices, and enhanced metal detectors.
The 9/11 Commission commented that while more advanced
screening technology is being developed, Congress needs to
provide the funding for, and TSA needs to move as expeditiously
as possible with, the appropriate installation of explosives
detection trace portals or other appropriate technology at more
of the Nation's commercial airports. Backscatter technology
evaluated by DHS over the last few years has demonstrated that
it can provide significant improvements in threat detection at
airport passenger screening checkpoints for both carry-on
baggage and the screening of passengers. The Committee urges
TSA to deploy this technology quickly and broadly to address
security shortcomings at passenger screening checkpoints.
The Committee believes steps must be taken to improve the
survivability of Flight Data and Cockpit Voice Recorders (FDRs,
CVRs) to assure that complete flight information is quickly
available to investigators following civil aviation accidents
to determine the potential role of terrorism. Most of the FDRs
and CVRs on the 9/11 flights did not survive, depriving
investigators, policymakers, and the public of valuable
information. The Committee also is concerned that locating and
recovering FDRs and CVRs from civilian air accidents over water
have proven time consuming and difficult, often taking days and
weeks to recover from the ocean depths. The Committee
understands deployable FDRs and CVRs avoid the crash site, and
can float indefinitely over water, increasing their
survivability and recoverability. Therefore, S. 509 directs the
DHS Secretary, in conjunction with the Secretary of
Transportation, to establish a grant program to test and
certify deployable flight data, cockpit voice recorder, and
emergency locator beacon technology on a civilian passenger
aircraft.
S. 509 recognizes the threat presented by passengers
transporting explosives through security checkpoints and
addresses this risk. Under the bill, TSA must produce and fully
implement a strategic plan to deploy explosive detection
equipment at airport checkpoints within 1 year of its
submission. The agency also must provide specialized training
to the screener workforce in the areas of behavior observation,
and explosives detection.
In addressing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, TSA has
been subject to harsh criticism for its efforts to develop a
new, advanced system to improve passenger prescreening, which
have experienced consistent delays and confronted numerous
privacy concerns.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, ATSA required
the DOT to ensure that all commercial aviation passengers were
prescreened using a system that evaluated the security risks of
each passenger and potential need for additional screening upon
the passenger's arrival at the airport. In accordance with that
mandate, TSA began to develop a ``second generation''
prescreening program known as Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System II (CAPPS II). In contrast to its
predecessor program, CAPPS II was intended to be operated by
the Government, rather than by the air carriers. In 2004, 3
years after ATSA was passed, and after numerous delays and
challenges, DHS was compelled to cancel the CAPPS II program
and continued to utilize its existing passenger prescreening
system.
Upon termination of the CAPPS II project, TSA began
development of a successor program known as Secure Flight, a
modified version of CAPPS II. In August 2004, TSA announced
that Secure Flight would be utilized to compare passenger
information, provided by aircraft operators to the agency
whenever reservations for domestic flights are made, against
data from consolidated watchlist databases maintained by the
government. Like its predecessor, Secure Flight has faced
numerous challenges and has encountered major opposition from
privacy advocates.
Under the Secure Flight program, TSA plans to take over from
commercial air carriers the responsibility for comparing
identifying information on passengers against the records of
known or suspected terrorists. However, TSA took steps to
reassess or ``re-baseline'' Secure Flight in February of 2006,
and has not yet completed that process. Under the current
system, TSA has indicated that over 30,000 individuals have
contacted the agency with verification forms and supporting
documentation under this process.
In its original design, Secure Flight was an amalgamation of
components from CAPPS I, CAPPS II and recommendations from the
9/11 Commission report. Secure Flight is intended only to
prescreen passengers flying within the United States; a
separate program for screening international flights exists
within the Customs & Border Protection (CBP) division of DHS.
The DHS Appropriations Act of 2005 (Public Law 108-334)
identified 10 critical aspects of the development and
implementation of Secure Flight, and mandated that GAO assess
and report on TSA's progress. The GAO report, published in
March 2005, indicated that TSA only had accomplished 1 out of
the 10 goals, with various stages of progress on the remaining
nine. Overall, the report was fairly critical of TSA's slow
action and expressed concern that overarching policies,
technical frameworks, and cost structures had yet to be
developed.
Over the course of 2006, both TSA and GAO have reported
informally that progress is being made with respect to each of
the 10 goals. Among the significant problems hindering the
implementation of Secure Flight are the following: privacy,
redress, management oversight, management policies, operations
and performance goals, and life-cycle costs.
To address ongoing problems in developing an advanced
passenger pre-screening system, S. 509 would ensure that a
system is in place to coordinate passenger redress for those
individuals misidentified against the ``No-Fly'' or
``Selectee'' watchlists, and also would require TSA to submit a
strategic plan to Congress for the testing and implementation
of its advanced passenger prescreening system.
In addition, to address general aviation (GA) security, S.
509 would direct TSA to develop a threat assessment program
that is standardized and focused on GA facilities. The bill
also would require foreign-based GA aircraft entering U.S.
airspace to have their passengers checked against appropriate
watch lists.
Summary of Provisions
S. 509 would seek to fully address the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations on aviation security with a focus on improving
TSA's layered aviation security approach and available tools.
As such, the bill authorizes an extension of funding for key
aviation security programs to assist with aviation security
research and development (R&D) and EDS installation.
S. 509 further would require TSA to develop and implement a
system to provide for the screening of all cargo being carried
on passenger aircraft, and develop a system by which TSA would
provide blast-resistant cargo containers to such air carriers
at the discretion of the agency.
The bill directs DHS to expedite R&D pilot projects that
advance technologies that can more effectively protect
passenger planes from the threat of explosive devices, and
requires the establishment of a grant program to fund projects
the agency develops through this process.
S. 509 would mandate the continued annual dedication of $250
million of the amounts currently collected in aviation security
fees to the Aviation Security Capital Fund for the installation
of in-line screening systems for the enhanced screening of
checked baggage at airports. The bill would bolster the
existing LOI program through changes in funding allocation
requirements and by requiring a prioritization schedule for
planned projects, and requiring the submission of an overdue
cost-sharing study on in-line EDS.
S. 509 also would remove the existing screener cap of 45,000
full-time equivalent (FTE) employees that is currently imposed
on TSA's screener workforce, and require TSA to provide
specialized training to Transportation Security Officers (TSOs)
for the development of advanced security skills, including
behavior observation, explosives detection, and document
verification.
The bill would direct DHS to issue a strategic plan for the
deployment of explosive detection equipment at airport
checkpoints and would require TSA to implement the strategic
plan within 1 year of its submission.
To address ongoing concerns about passenger pre-screening
redress procedures, S. 509 would require DHS to create an
Office of Appeals and Redress to establish and administer a
timely and fair process for airline passengers who believe they
been misidentified against the ``No-Fly'' or ``Selectee''
watchlists. DHS also would be required to submit a strategic
plan to Congress that would include timelines for the testing
and implementation of its advanced passenger prescreening
system.
S. 509 would require that security rules be put in place at
foreign aircraft repair stations, and that TSA develop a
program under which foreign registered GA aircraft must submit
passenger information to TSA to be checked against appropriate
watch list databases prior to entering the United States. TSA
also would be directed to develop a standardized threat and
vulnerability assessment program for GA airports, to perform
such assessments at GA airports in the United States on a risk-
assessed basis, and to study the feasibility of a grant program
for GA airport operators to fund key projects to upgrade
security at such facilities.
The bill would require a report on efforts to institute a
sterile area access system that would grant flight deck and
cabin crews expedited access to secure areas through screening
checkpoints, and to deploy such system within 1 year of the
report's submission.
S. 509 further would require a doubling of DHS's existing dog
team capacity to be used for explosive detection across the
Nation's transportation network.
Legislative History
Chairman Inouye, along with Vice-Chairman Stevens, and
Senators Rockefeller, Lott and Lautenberg, introduced S. 509,
the Aviation Security Improvement Act, on February 6, 2007.
On January 17, 2007, the Senate Commerce Committee held a
hearing to review the status of TSA's efforts to address the 9/
11 Commission's air security recommendations and to consider
options for strengthening the Nation's aviation security
system. The Committee received testimony from Mr. Edmund
``Kip'' Hawley, Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security for
TSA.
During the 109th Congress, the Committee held several other
hearings related to aviation security. On February 15, 2005,
the Committee held a hearing to examine the President's FY 2006
budget request for TSA, during which the Committee heard
testimony from TSA, GAO, and various trade associations. On
Thursday, June 9, 2005, the Committee held a hearing to review
GA security with witnesses from DHS, FAA, and GA industry
interests. The Committee held a hearing on December 12, 2005,
to review TSA's proposal to implement enhanced aviation
security procedures and remove some previous objects from the
agency's ``Prohibited Items List'' with witnesses representing
TSA, the air carriers and labor interests. On February 9, 2006,
the Committee held a hearing on the status of TSA's primary
passenger pre-screening programs, Secure Flight and Registered
Traveler (RT) at which TSA and various stakeholder
representatives testified. The Committee also held a hearing on
April 4, 2006, to review TSA's physical screening of airline
passengers and baggage at which TSA, GAO, and a representative
of domestic airports testified.
On February 13, 2007, the Committee met in Executive Session
during which S. 509 was considered. Three additional amendments
were filed to the bill, but only 2 were offered at the
Executive Session and subsequently accepted. An amendment
offered by Senator Hutchison to maximize the use of DHS's
National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program, and an
amendment offered by Senator Kerry to require a GAO assessment
of the Secure Flight program. S. 509, as amended, was adopted
unanimously by the Committee and the bill as amended was
ordered reported.
Estimated Costs
In compliance with subsection (a)(3) of paragraph 11
of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee
states that, in its opinion, it is necessary to dispense with
the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) of that subsection
in order to expedite the business of the Senate. deg.
In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee provides the
following cost estimate, prepared by the Congressional Budget
Office:
March 2, 2007.
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
completed the enclosed cost estimate for S. 509, the Aviation
Security Improvement Act.
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Megan Carroll
(for federal costs), Sarah Puro (for the state and local
impact), and Paige Piper/Bach (for the private-sector impact).
Sincerely,
Peter R. Orszag.
Enclosure.
S. 509--Aviation Security Improvement Act
Summary: S. 509 would extend and reauthorize certain
federal programs related to aviation security that are
primarily implemented by the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). CBO estimates that implementing the legislation would
result in new discretionary spending of $6.8 billion over the
2008-2012 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary
amounts.
In addition, S. 509 would affect direct spending by
authorizing TSA to collect, over the 2008-2028 period, $250
million annually in fees from airline passengers and spend
those amounts to improve security measures at airports. CBO
estimates that such fees would initially exceed spending,
resulting in a net reduction in direct spending of $225 million
in 2008 and $500 million over the next 10 years. Those savings
would eventually be fully offset by corresponding increases in
direct spending after the agency's authority to collect fees
expires in 2028, resulting in no net change in direct spending
over the long run.
S. 509 would authorize airports to leverage, by issuing
tax-exempt bonds, certain funds they receive as grants from
TSA. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that
resulting reductions in revenues would total $98 million over
the 2008-2017 period.
S. 509 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no
costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
S. 509 could impose private-sector mandates as defined in
UMRA. The bill would require DHS to implement a system to
screen all cargo transported on passenger aircraft operated by
certain air carriers. The requirements established under the
bill could impose mandates on entities that send cargo on
passenger aircraft or certain air carriers. Because the
screening system has not been established, CBO does not have
enough information to determine whether the system would impose
mandates or whether the direct cost would exceed the annual
threshold established by UMRA for private-sector mandates ($131
million in 2007, adjusted annually for inflation).
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of S. 509 is shown in Table 1. The costs of
this legislation fall within budget function 400
(transportation).
TABLE 1.--BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF S. 509
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Net Spending Under Current Law for
Aviation Security:
Estimated Budget Authority a...... 2,367 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................. 3,075 773 221 97 30 20
Proposed Changes:
Net Funding for Aviation Security:
Estimated Authorization Level... 0 2,493 2,571 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............... 0 1,255 2,286 1,169 252 102
In-Line Baggage Screening:
Authorization Level............. 0 450 450 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............... 0 45 150 248 248 158
Cargo Security Provisions:
Estimated Authorization Level... 0 102 114 106 98 100
Estimated Outlays............... 0 72 111 104 97 99
Other Activities:
Estimated Authorization Level... 0 72 79 87 96 104
Estimated Outlays............... 0 47 72 86 95 104
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorization Level. 0 3,117 3,214 193 194 204
Estimated Outlays............. 0 1,419 2,619 1,607 692 463
Net Spending Under S. 509 for Aviation
Security:
Estimated Authorization Level a... 2,367 3,117 3,214 193 194 204
Estimated Outlays................. 3,075 2,192 2,840 1,704 722 483
CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING AND REVENUES
Net Aviation Security Fees and
Spending b:
Estimated Budget Authority........ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................. 0 -225 -162 -88 -25 0
Estimated Revenues.................... 0 * * -2 -4 -8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Negative numbers indicate reductions in spending or reductions in revenues; * = between -$500,000 and zero.
a The 2007 level is the net amount appropriated for that year for aviation security.
b The legislation's changes in direct spending would have no net effect over time.
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Joint Committee on Taxation.
Basis of estimate: CBO estimates that implementing S. 509
would cost $6.8 billion over the 2008-2012 period, assuming
appropriation of the amounts authorized and estimated to be
necessary. In addition, over the next 10 years, CBO estimates
that the bill would increase both offsetting receipts and
direct spending by about $2.5 billion, resulting in a net
reduction in direct spending of $500 million over that time.
(Over the long run, however, we estimate that the bill would
have no net effect on direct spending.) Finally, S. 509 would
result in forgone revenues totaling $98 million over the next
10 years. For this estimate, we assume that the legislation
will be enacted before the end of fiscal year 2007 and that the
necessary amounts will be appropriated each year. Estimated
outlays are based on historical spending patterns for existing
or similar programs.
Spending subject to appropriation
CBO estimates that implementing S. 509 would cost about
$6.8 billion over the 2008-2012 period, assuming appropriation
of the necessary amounts. Most of that funding would be used to
continue TSA's existing aviation security programs. Other
amounts would be used for in-line baggage screening systems at
airports, activities related to cargo security, and other
aviation security activities.
Aviation Security. The bill would authorize the
appropriation of sums necessary for TSA's aviation security
programs for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, particularly for
salaries for screeners of passengers and baggage, and for
related expenses. CBO estimates that implementing those
programs would require gross appropriations totaling $10.1
billion over the next two years. (The gross appropriation level
for aviation security programs in 2007 is $4.8 billion.) That
estimate is based on information from TSA regarding the cost of
continuing existing programs and implementing certain new
provisions of S. 509. Those provisions would lift the existing
cap on the number of full-time equivalent staff TSA may employ
and require TSA or DHS to:
Strengthen passenger prescreening and security
at airport checkpoints;
Establish certain appeal and redress
procedures for passengers wrongly delayed or prohibited
from boarding a flight;
Certify aviation security programs at foreign
repair stations; and
Implement systems to grant airline crews
expedited access through airport screening checkpoints.
CBO assumes that a portion of the $10.1 billion authorized
for aviation security over the 2008-2009 period would come from
certain fees that TSA is authorized to collect to offset the
agency's costs. Most of those collections would result from
fees charged on tickets sold by commercial airlines. Additional
collections would result from security fees paid directly to
TSA by air carriers. Under existing law, TSA's authority to
collect and spend such fees is subject to appropriation.
Based on information from TSA about the anticipated numbers
of airline passengers and travel patterns, CBO estimates that
such fees would offset nearly $5 billion of the amounts
provided for aviation security over the 2008-2009 period, thus
reducing the net appropriation that would be necessary to
implement the legislation. Accordingly, we estimate that fully
funding aviation security programs under S. 509 would require
net appropriations totaling about $5.1 billion over the 2008-
2009 period--averaging about $2.5 billion a year. (By
comparison, net appropriations totaled a little under $2.4
billion for 2007.) We estimate that the net outlays resulting
from such funding would total $5.1 billion over the 2008-2009
period.
In-Line Baggage Screening. S. 509 would authorize the
appropriation of $450 million in each of fiscal years 2008 and
2009 for grants to airports. Airports would use those amounts
to install in-line systems to screen checked baggage. (These
systems allow checked baggage to be screened within an
airport's baggage conveyor system.) Based on information from
TSA and historical spending patterns for such grants, CBO
estimates that fully funding this provision would cost $45
million in 2008 and $849 million over the 2008-2012 period,
with additional spending of $51 million occurring in later
years.
Cargo Security. S. 509 would direct TSA and DHS to
undertake efforts to enhance the security of cargo transported
aboard passenger aircraft. Specifically, the legislation would
require the TSA to establish a system for screening such cargo
that provides a level of security comparable to the level of
effort for passenger-checked baggage. The legislation also
would require DHS to expedite certain research and establish a
pilot program to support projects to improve the safety of
cargo transported aboard passenger aircraft. Finally, S. 509
would direct TSA to purchase blast-resistant cargo containers
and distribute them to certain air carriers. Taken together,
CBO estimates that those provisions would cost $72 million in
2008 and $483 million over the next five years.
Enhanced Cargo Screening. S. 509 does not specify how TSA
should enhance cargo screening. According to the agency, it is
currently in the process of evaluating a range of technologies
and systems that could be used to strengthen its current risk-
based techniques to selectively screen air cargo. For this
estimate, CBO assumes that, under S. 509, the agency would
double its current level of effort related to screening air
cargo. Under the legislation, the agency would hire more cargo
inspectors and program managers and develop a program to
certify cargo shippers. Based on current levels of spending for
cargo screening, CBO estimates that those activities would cost
$45 million in 2008 and $298 million over the next five years.
DHS research programs. The bill would require DHS to
establish a program to fund projects to deploy and test certain
technologies, particularly to mitigate the risk of explosions
aboard passenger aircraft. S. 509 specifies that technologies
studied should include blast-resistant cargo containers and
other technologies to enhance the security of cargo. Based on
information from DHS about the cost of similar programs, CBO
estimates the proposed projects would cost $15 million in 2008
and $135 million over the next five years.
Blast-Resistant Cargo Containers. Based on information from
TSA, CBO estimates that purchasing and distributing blast-
resistant cargo containers to air carriers would cost $12
million in 2008 and $50 million over the 2008-2012 period, with
additional spending continuing beyond that time. That estimate
assumes that the containers are provided to nearly 600 wide-
body aircraft over a three-year period and includes annual
costs to repair and maintain them.
Other Provisions. CBO estimates that implementing other
provisions of S. 509 would require appropriations totaling $438
million over the next five years. That amount includes:
$258 million for DHS programs to conduct
research and develop technologies related to
transportation security;
$105 million to train and expand the use of
canine teams in detecting explosives at airports, and;
$75 million for grants to enhance security at
general aviation airports.
Those estimates are based on information from TSA regarding
costs of existing or similar programs. Based on historical
spending patterns, CBO estimates that fully funding those
activities would cost $47 million in 2008 and $404 million over
the next five years, assuming appropriation of the necessary
amounts.
Direct spending and revenues
The legislation's effect on direct spending and revenues
over the next 10 years is shown in Table 2.
Direct Spending. S. 509 would authorize TSA to spend,
without further appropriation, $250 million annually over the
2008-2028 period from TSA' s aviation security capital fund.
TSA would use amounts in that fund to help airports install
certain equipment to screen checked baggage. CBO estimates that
this provision would increase direct spending by $25 million in
2008 and $2 billion over the next 10 years.
To offset the cost of those activities, the legislation
would authorize the agency to collect passenger fees totaling
$250 million a year over the 2008-2028 period. Under current
law, such fees may be collected only to the extent provided for
in advance in appropriations acts, and income from those fees
is recorded as an offset to appropriated spending for TSA' s
existing aviation security programs. S. 509 would require TSA
to collect $2.5 billion over the 2008-2017 period from
passengers without subsequent legislation. Because S. 509 would
cause such fees to be used to finance activities related to
installing screening equipment and improving explosives
detection at airport checkpoints, such fees would not be
available to reduce the costs of other TSA spending. In other
words, the collections under S. 509 would lead to a reduction
in the amount of fees recorded as offsets to appropriated
spending--essentially changing some discretionary offsetting
collections into mandatory offsetting receipts. By doing so,
those collections would no longer be available to offset annual
discretionary appropriations.
TABLE 2.--ESTIMATED CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING AND REVENUES UNDER S. 509
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING a
Aviation Security Capital Fund: Gross Spending:
Estimated Budget Authority................................ 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
Estimated Outlays......................................... 25 88 162 225 250 250 250 250 250 250
Offsetting Receipts:
Estimated Budget Authority................................ -250 -250 -250 -250 -250 -250 -250 -250 -250 -250
Estimated Outlays......................................... -250 -250 -250 -250 -250 -250 -250 -250 -250 -250
Net Spending:
Estimated Budget Authority................................ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays......................................... -225 -163 -88 -25 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHANGES IN REVENUES
Estimated Revenues............................................ * * -2 -4 -8 -11 -14 -17 -19 -22
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Negative numbers indicate reductions in spending or reductions in revenues. * = between -$500,000 and zero.
\a\ The legislation's changes in direct spending would have no net effect over time.
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Joint Committee on Taxation.
Based on historical spending patterns for similar
activities, CBO estimates that fees collected under this
provision would exceed the amounts spent for installation of
screening equipment over the next few years. Hence, we estimate
that enacting S. 509 would reduce net direct spending by $225
million in 2008 and $500 million over the next 10 years. (After
TSA's authority to collect fees expires in 2028, those savings
would eventually be offset by corresponding increases in direct
spending.)
Revenues. S. 509 would authorize airports to leverage
certain funds they receive as grants from TSA. The Joint
Committee on Taxation estimates that, under the legislation,
airports would use this authority to issue additional tax-
exempt bonds, and that consequent reductions in revenues would
total $98 million over the 2008-2017 period.
Estimated impact on state, local, and tribal governments:
S. 509 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in
UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal
governments. The bill would authorize grants for which state
and local governments would be eligible to apply. Any resulting
costs to those entities would result from complying with
conditions of aid.
Estimated impact on the private sector: S. 509 could impose
private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. The bill would
require DHS to implement a system to screen all cargo
transported on passenger aircraft within three years of
enactment. The system would be required, at a minimum, to
provide a level of security comparable to the level of security
in effect for passenger checked baggage. The requirements
established under the bill could impose mandates on entities
that send cargo on passenger aircraft or certain air carriers.
Under current law, DHS is required to provide for the screening
of all property, including cargo and other articles, that are
carried aboard a passenger aircraft. According to government
sources, however, DHS would have to enhance its current
screening system to meet the requirements of the bill and such
enhancements could impose mandates on the private sector.
Because the screening system has not been established, CBO
does not have enough information to determine whether the
system would impose new mandates or whether the direct cost
would exceed the annual threshold established by UMRA for
private-sector mandates ($131 million in 2007, adjusted
annually for inflation).
Previous CBO estimate: On February 2, 2007, CBO transmitted
a cost estimate for H.R. 1, the Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007, as passed by the House
of Representatives on January 9, 2007. Title IV of that
legislation contains provisions that would affect aviation
security programs.
Differences in our estimates of discretionary spending
under title IV of H.R. 1 and S. 509 result primarily because
H.R. 1 would authorize appropriations to continue existing
aviation programs over a longer period of time. In addition, we
estimate that implementing provisions of H.R. 1 that would
require TSA to inspect 100 percent of all cargo transported
aboard passenger aircraft would cost significantly more than
provisions of S. 509 related to air cargo security.
Differences in the estimates of direct spending under H.R.
1 and S. 509 result because the two pieces of legislation would
extend TSA's Aviation Capital Security Fund for different
periods of time.
S. 509 contains provisions that the Joint Committee on
Taxation estimates would increase the level of tax-exempt
bonds, causing reductions in revenues. Title IV of H.R. 1 would
not affect revenues.
Neither title IV of H.R. 1 nor S. 509 contain
intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA. H.R. 1 would
require DHS to establish a system to inspect 100 percent of
cargo carried aboard certain passenger aircraft by the end of
fiscal year 2009. Because the system has not been established,
CBO did not have enough information to determine if the system
would impose new mandates on private-sector entities or whether
the direct cost would exceed the annual threshold.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Megan Carroll; Impact
on State, local, and tribal governments: Sarah Puro; Impact on
the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Regulatory Impact Statement
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the
following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the
legislation, as reported:
NUMBER OF PERSONS COVERED
The reported bill would take steps to improve aviation
security in the United States through the development of new
Federal programs and modification of existing law. The bill
affects DHS, TSA, FAA, and other entities already subject to
DHS and FAA rules and regulations, thus the number of persons
covered should be consistent with the current levels of
individuals impacted under existing DHS and FAA regulations.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
S. 509 is not expected to have a negative impact on the U.S.
economy. Proper application of the key provisions of the
legislation on cargo security should not impede the movement of
air cargo while providing a significantly heightened level of
security. The bill would authorize the necessary funding in key
areas to establish a more secure system by requiring DHS to
take steps to protect the system.
PRIVACY
The reported bill would have a minimal impact on the privacy
rights of individuals, and provisions that seek to improve the
redress process for the commercial airline passenger
prescreening system should provide improved government support
for individuals who have been falsely identified as a potential
threat against existing passenger watchlists.
PAPERWORK
It is not anticipated that there would be a major increase in
paperwork burdens resulting from the enactment of S. 509. In
those areas where the legislation requires additional
paperwork, such as reporting requirements for general aviation
aircraft entering the United States from foreign locations, it
is aimed at improving the security of the national air
transportation system.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title; Table of contents
This section would provide a title for the bill, the
``Aviation Security Improvement Act'', and a table of contents.
Section 2. Extension of authorization for aviation security funding
This section would provide an extension of funding for
aviation security at a level of such sums as necessary through
FY 2009.
Section 3. Passenger aircraft cargo screening
This section would require the Secretary of Homeland
Security, within 3 years, to act through the TSA Administrator
to develop a system that would provide for the screening of all
cargo being transported on passenger aircraft. This system
would be required to meet minimum standards using equipment,
technology, procedures, personnel, or other methods identified
by TSA that would provide a level of security comparable to
that used for passenger checked baggage. The Secretary of
Homeland Security also would be directed to provide a report to
Congress that details the system within 1 year of its
implementation.
Under this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security would
be permitted to issue an interim final rule as a temporary
regulation to implement the cargo screening system without
regard to standard administrative rulemaking procedures. If an
interim final rule is issued, the Secretary of Homeland
Security then would be required to issue a final rule that is
in accordance with standard administrative rulemaking
procedures within 1 year of the effective date of the interim
final rule. If the Secretary of Homeland Security does not
issue a final rule within the mandated period, the Secretary
would be required to submit a report to Congress explaining why
the final rule was not issued and continue to issue reports to
Congress every 2 months until a final rule is implemented. Upon
its issuance, the final rule would displace the interim final
rule.
This section further would require the Secretary of Homeland
Security, working through TSA Administrator, to submit a report
to Congress and to GAO that provides an assessment of the
exemptions granted from the required screening under the
agency's passenger aircraft cargo security system. This report
would be required to be submitted within 6 months of the bill's
enactment, and GAO would be required to review the report and
provide Congress an assessment of the exemptions.
Section 4. Blast resistant cargo containers
This section would require the TSA Administrator to evaluate
the results of its blast resistant cargo container pilot
program and develop a system under which TSA would make such
containers available for use by commercial passenger aircraft
on a random or risk-assessed basis as determined by the TSA
Administrator. The Administrator, based on the pilot
feasibility results, must implement the program before January
1, 2008, and acquire, provide for the storage, maintenance and
distribution of the blast-resistant containers to air carriers
as necessary within 3 months of the system's development.
Section 5. Protection of air cargo on passenger planes from explosives
This section would require the Secretary of Homeland Security
to expedite research and development for technology that can
more effectively address the threat of explosives to passenger
aircraft. The Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the
Department of Transportation, would be directed to establish a
grant program to fund pilot projects to deploy such advanced
technologies, and to test technology that may improve the
ability to recover and analyze information from aircraft
accidents. This section would authorize such sums as necessary
to carry out the section for FY 2008.
Section 6. In-line baggage screening
This section would extend the authorization for discretionary
spending on in-line baggage screening systems at a level of
$450,000,000 through FY 2009, and require the Secretary of
Homeland Security to submit a report on alternative funding
concepts within 30 days.
Section 7. Enhancement of in-line baggage system deployment
This section would extend the Aviation Security Capital Fund
through FY 2028 at a level of $250,000,000, and adjust the
allocation amounts to provide 80 percent of the annual funding
to fulfill letters of intent (LOIs) for in-line baggage
screening projects and 20 percent to be distributed on a
discretionary basis with priority consideration for small and
non-hub airports. The TSA Administrator would be directed to
create a priority schedule for airport security projects
permitted under this section and report that schedule, a
timeline, and proposed funding allocations for each project to
the Senate Commerce Committee, the Homeland Security Committee
and Transportation and Infrastructure Committee of the House of
Representatives within 180 days. Airports that have already
initiated such projects would be eligible to receive a grant
under the program, and grants would be permitted to service
obligations for airports that receive such grants under this
program.
Section 8. Research and development of aviation and transportation
security technology
This section would extend the authorization of research and
development for aviation security technology at the current
level of $50,000,000 through FY 2009, and would allow for a
broadened application of these technologies to transportation
security where applicable, although the grants would remain
focused on aviation threats.
Section 9. Certain TSA personnel limitations not to apply
This section would remove any limitations on the number of
employees permitted to be employed by TSA after FY 2007, and
require the Secretary of Homeland Security to recruit and hire
the necessary workforce to provide appropriate levels of
aviation security while ensuing that the average security delay
at airports is fewer than 10 minutes.
Section 10. Specialized training
This section would require TSA to provide advanced training
to its screener workforce for the development of specialized
security skills such as behavior observation, explosive
detection, and document verification to improve the
effectiveness of the aviation security system.
Section 11. Explosive detection at passenger screening checkpoints
This section would require the Secretary of Homeland
Security, within 3 months after the date of enactment, to issue
a strategic plan regarding the utilization of advanced
explosive detection screening systems at passenger checkpoints.
The agency would be further directed to fully deploy the
strategic plan within 1 year of the date of enactment of the
legislation.
Section 12. Appeal and redress process for passengers wrongly delayed
or prohibited from boarding a flight
This section would direct the Secretary of Homeland Security
to create the Office of Appeals and Redress to establish and
administer a timely and fair process for airline passengers who
believe they have been delayed or prohibited from boarding a
flight because that individual was misidentified against the
``No Fly'' and ``Selectee'' watch lists. The office must
establish a method for maintaining records of those
misidentified by the watch list process, ensure that the record
keeping includes information to determine the identity of such
individuals, and provide such information to the necessary
agencies to assist in the clearance of passengers.
Section 13. Strategic plan to test and implement advance passenger
prescreening system
This section would direct the Secretary of Homeland Security,
in consultation with the TSA Administrator, to submit a plan to
Congress within 6 months after the date of enactment that
describes the agency's intended advanced passenger prescreening
system, provides a timeline for each phase of testing and
implementation, explains how it would be integrated into
international flights, and describes how it complies with
existing Federal requirements for maintaining records on
individuals.
Section 14. Repair station security
This section would preclude the Administrator of the FAA from
certifying any new foreign repair stations under part 145 of
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), if the TSA
Administrator does not issue the regulations required by
section 44924(e) of title 49, U.S.C., within 90 days of the
enactment of this Act.
Section 15. General aviation security
This section would require the TSA Administrator to develop a
standardized threat and vulnerability assessment program for GA
airports and implement a program within 1 year to perform such
assessments on a risk-assessed basis at GA airports in the
United States. The TSA Administrator is further directed,
within 6 months after the date of enactment, to study the
feasibility of a grant program to provide grants to GA airport
operators for projects to upgrade security at their facilities,
and if determined to be feasible, to establish such a program.
This section also would require the TSA Administrator to
develop a system, within 6 months, under which foreign-
registered GA aircraft that are identified through risk-based
assessment, in conjunction with FAA, are required to submit
passenger information to TSA and have that information checked
against appropriate terrorist databases prior to entering U.S.
airspace.
This section would authorize such sums as necessary to carry
out any GA grant program.
Section 16. Security credentials for airline crews
This section would direct TSA to work with airline, airport,
and flight crew representatives to transmit a report to the
Senate Commerce Committee and the House of Representatives
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on the status of
efforts to develop a sterile area access system to more
effectively identify airline flight deck and cabin crew
representatives to grant them more efficient access through
screening checkpoints. The report must include recommendations
on the feasibility of implementing the system for the domestic
airline industry within 1 year of the report being submitted,
and the TSA Administrator must begin full implementation of the
system not later than 1 year after the report is transmitted to
Congress.
Section 17. National explosive detection canine team training center
This section would direct the Secretary of Homeland Security,
as soon as practicable, to enhance the National Explosive
Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) and maximize canine
training capacity so that up to 100 additional dogs can be
certified each year. The Secretary would be given flexibility
across transportation modes to use as needed and deemed
necessary and encourages the Secretary to review potential
benefits of potential benefits of establishing new canine
training partnerships throughout the United States.
Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill,
as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be
omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new material is printed
in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown
in roman):
TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE
SUBTITLE VII--AVIATION PROGRAMS
PART A--AIR COMMERCE AND SAFETY
SUBPART III--SAFETY
CHAPTER 449. SECURITY
SUBCHAPTER I. REQUIREMENTS
Sec. 44901. Screening passengers and property
[49 U.S.C. 44901]
(a) In General.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for
Security shall provide for the screening of all passengers and
property, including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and
checked baggage, and other articles, that will be carried
aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or
foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation. In the case of flights and flight segments
originating in the United States, the screening shall take
place before boarding and shall be carried out by a Federal
Government employee (as defined in section 2105 of title 5,
United States Code), except as otherwise provided in section
44919 or 44920 and except for identifying passengers and
baggage for screening under the CAPPS and known shipper
programs and conducting positive bag-match programs.
(b) Supervision of Screening.--All screening of passengers
and property at airports in the United States where screening
is required under this section shall be supervised by uniformed
Federal personnel of the Transportation Security Administration
who shall have the power to order the dismissal of any
individual performing such screening.
(c) Checked Baggage.--A system must be in operation to screen
all checked baggage at all airports in the United States as
soon as practicable but not later than the 60th day following
the date of enactment of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act.
(d) Explosive Detection Systems.--
(1) In general.--The Under Secretary of
Transportation for Security shall take all necessary
action to ensure that--
(A) explosive detection systems are deployed
as soon as possible to ensure that all United
States airports described in section 44903(c)
have sufficient explosive detection systems to
screen all checked baggage no later than
December 31, 2002, and that as soon as such
systems are in place at an airport, all checked
baggage at the airport is screened by those
systems; and
(B) all systems deployed under subparagraph
(A) are fully utilized; and
(C) if explosive detection equipment at an
airport is unavailable, all checked baggage is
screened by an alternative means.
(2) Deadline.--
(A) In general.--If, in his discretion or at
the request of an airport, the Under Secretary
of Transportation for Security determines that
the Transportation Security Administration is
not able to deploy explosive detection systems
required to be deployed under paragraph (1) at
all airports where explosive detection systems
are required by December 31, 2002, then with
respect to each airport for which the Under
Secretary makes that determination--
(i) the Under Secretary shall submit
to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the
House of Representatives Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure a
detailed plan (which may be submitted
in classified form) for the deployment
of the number of explosive detection
systems at that airport necessary to
meet the requirements of paragraph (1)
as soon as practicable at that airport
but in no event later than December 31,
2003; and
(ii) the Under Secretary shall take
all necessary action to ensure that
alternative means of screening all
checked baggage is implemented until
the requirements of paragraph (1) have
been met.
(B) Criteria for determination.--In making a
determination under subparagraph (A), the Under
Secretary shall take into account--
(i) the nature and extent of the
required modifications to the airport's
terminal buildings, and the technical,
engineering, design and construction
issues;
(ii) the need to ensure that such
installations and modifications are
effective; and
(iii) the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of deploying explosive
detection systems in the baggage
sorting area or other non-public area
rather than the lobby of an airport
terminal building.
(C) Response.--The Under Secretary shall
respond to the request of an airport under
subparagraph (A) within 14 days of receiving
the request. A denial of request shall create
no right of appeal or judicial review.
(D) Airport effort required.--Each airport
with respect to which the Under Secretary makes
a determination under subparagraph (A) shall--
(i) cooperate fully with the
Transportation Security Administration
with respect to screening checked
baggage and changes to accommodate
explosive detection systems; and
(ii) make security projects a
priority for the obligation or
expenditure of funds made available
under chapter 417 or 471 until
explosive detection systems required to
be deployed under paragraph (1) have
been deployed at that airport.
(3) Reports.--Until the Transportation Security
Administration has met the requirements of paragraph
(1), the Under Secretary shall submit a classified
report every 30 days after the date of enactment of
this Act to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation and the House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
describing the progress made toward meeting such
requirements at each airport.
(e) Mandatory Screening Where EDS Not Yet Available.--As soon
as practicable but not later than the 60th day following the
date of enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act and until the requirements of subsection (b)(1)(A) are met,
the Under Secretary shall require alternative means for
screening any piece of checked baggage that is not screened by
an explosive detection system. Such alternative means may
include 1 or more of the following:
(1) A bag-match program that ensures that no checked
baggage is placed aboard an aircraft unless the
passenger who checked the baggage is aboard the
aircraft.
(2) Manual search.
(3) Search by canine explosive detection units in
combination with other means.
(4) Other means or technology approved by the Under
Secretary.
(f) Cargo Deadline. --A system must be in operation to
screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all cargo
that is to be transported in all-cargo aircraft in air
transportation and intrastate air transportation as soon as
practicable after the date of enactment of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act.
(g) Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 3 years after the
date of enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement
Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through
the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration, shall establish a system to screen all
cargo transported on passenger aircraft operated by an
air carrier or foreign air carrier in air
transportation or intrastate air transportation to
ensure the security of all such passenger aircraft
carrying cargo.
(2) Minimum standards.--The system referred to in
paragraph (1) shall require, at a minimum, that the
equipment, technology, procedures, personnel, or other
methods determined by the Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration, provide a level
of security comparable to the level of security in
effect for passenger checked baggage.
(3) Regulations.--
(A) Interim final rule.--The Secretary of
Homeland Security may issue an interim final
rule as a temporary regulation to implement
this subsection without regard to the
provisions of chapter 5 of title 5.
(B) Final rule.--
(i) In general.--If the Secretary
issues an interim final rule under
subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall
issue, not later than 1 year after the
effective date of the interim final
rule, a final rule as a permanent
regulation to implement this subsection
in accordance with the provisions of
chapter 5 of title 5.
(ii) Failure to act.--If the
Secretary does not issue a final rule
in accordance with clause (i) on or
before the last day of the 1-year
period referred to in clause (i), the
Secretary shall submit a report to the
Congress explaining why the final rule
was not timely issued and providing an
estimate of the earliest date on which
the final rule will be issued. The
Secretary shall submit the first such
report within 10 days after such last
day and submit a report to the Congress
containing updated information every 60
days thereafter until the final rule is
issued.
(iii) Superseding of interim final
rule.--The final rule issued in
accordance with this subparagraph shall
supersede the interim final rule issued
under subparagraph (A).
(4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date on
which the system required by paragraph (1) is
established, the Secretary shall transmit a report to
Congress that details and explains the system.
[(g)] (h) Deployment of Armed Personnel.--
(1) In general.--The Under Secretary shall order the
deployment of law enforcement personnel authorized to
carry firearms at each airport security screening
location to ensure passenger safety and national
security.
(2) Minimum requirements.--Except at airports
required to enter into agreements under subsection (c),
the Under Secretary shall order the deployment of at
least 1 law enforcement officer at each airport
security screening location. At the 100 largest
airports in the United States, in terms of annual
passenger enplanements for the most recent calendar
year for which data are available, the Under Secretary
shall order the deployment of additional law
enforcement personnel at airport security screening
locations if the Under Secretary determines that the
additional deployment is necessary to ensure passenger
safety and national security.
[(h)] (i) Exemptions and Advising Congress on Regulations.--
The Under Secretary--
(1) may exempt from this section air transportation
operations, except scheduled passenger operations of an
air carrier providing air transportation under a
certificate issued under section 41102 of this title or
a permit issued under section 41302 of this title; and
(2) shall advise Congress of a regulation to be
prescribed under this section at least 30 days before
the effective date of the regulation, unless the Under
Secretary decides an emergency exists requiring the
regulation to become effective in fewer than 30 days
and notifies Congress of that decision.
(j) Blast-resistant Cargo Containers.--
(1) In general.--Before January 1, 2008, the
Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration shall--
(A) evaluate the results of the blast-
resistant cargo container pilot program
instituted before the date of enactment of the
Aviation Security Improvement Act;
(B) based on that evaluation, begin the
acquisition of a sufficient number of blast-
resistant cargo containers to meet the
requirements of the Transportation Security
Administration's cargo security program under
paragraph (2); and
(C) develop a system under which the
Administrator--
(i) will make such containers
available for use by passenger aircraft
operated by air carriers or foreign air
carriers in air transportation or
intrastate air transportation on a
random or risk-assessment basis as
determined by the Administrator, in
sufficient number to enable the
carriers to meet the requirements of
the Administration's cargo security
system; and
(ii) provide for the storage,
maintenance, and distribution of such
containers.
(2) Distribution to air carriers.--Within 90 days
after the date on which the Administrator completes
development of the system required by paragraph (1)(C),
the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration shall implement that system and begin
making blast-resistant cargo containers available to
such carriers as necessary.
(i) (k) General Aviation Airport Security Program.--
(1) In general.--Within 1 year after the date of
enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement Act the
Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration shall--
(A) develop a standardized threat and
vulnerability assessment program for general
aviation airports (as defined in section
47135(m)); and
(B) implement a program to perform such
assessments on a risk-assessment basis at
general aviation airports.
(2) Grant program.--Within 6 months after date of
enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement Act the
Administrator shall initiate and complete a study of
the feasibility of a program, based on a risk-managed
approach, to provide grants to general aviation airport
operators for projects to upgrade security at general
aviation airports (as defined in section 47135(m)). If
the Administrator determines that such a program is
feasible, the Administrator shall establish such a
program.
(3) Application to foreign-registered general
aviation aircraft.--Within 180 days after the date of
enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement Act, the
Administrator shall develop a risk-based system under
which--
(A) foreign-registered general aviation
aircraft, as identified by the Administrator,
in coordination with the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration, are required
to submit passenger information to the
Transportation Security Administration before
entering United States airspace; and
(B) such information is checked against
appropriate databases maintained by the
Transportation Security Administration.''.
(4) Authorization of appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of
Homeland Security such sums as may be necessary to
carry out any program established under paragraph (2).
Sec. 44923. Airport security improvement projects
[49 U.S.C. 44923]
(a) Grant Authority.--Subject to the requirements of this
section, the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation
Security of the Department of Homeland Security [may] shall
make grants to airport sponsors--
(1) for projects to replace baggage conveyer systems
related to aviation security;
(2) for projects to reconfigure terminal baggage
areas as needed to install explosive detection systems;
(3) for projects to enable the Under Secretary to
deploy explosive detection systems behind the ticket
counter, in the baggage sorting area, or in line with
the baggage handling system; and
(4) for other airport security capital improvement
projects.
(b) Applications.--A sponsor seeking a grant under this
section shall submit to the Under Secretary an application in
such form and containing such information as the Under
Secretary prescribes.
(c) Approval.--The Under Secretary, after consultation with
the Secretary of Transportation, may approve an application of
a sponsor for a grant under this section only if the Under
Secretary determines that the project will improve security at
an airport or improve the efficiency of the airport without
lessening security.
(d) Letters of Intent.--
(1) Issuance.--The Under Secretary [may] shall issue
a letter of intent to a sponsor committing to obligate
from future budget authority an amount, not more than
the Federal Government's share of the project's cost,
for an airport security improvement project (including
interest costs and costs of formulating the project).
(2) Schedule.--A letter of intent under this
subsection shall establish a schedule under which the
Under Secretary will reimburse the sponsor for the
Government's share of the project's costs, as amounts
become available, if the sponsor, after the Under
Secretary issues the letter, carries out the project
without receiving amounts under this section.
(3) Notice to under secretary.--A sponsor that has
been issued a letter of intent under this subsection
shall notify the Under Secretary of the sponsor's
intent to carry out a project before the project
begins.
(4) Notice to congress.--The Under Secretary shall
transmit to the Committees on Appropriations and
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations
and Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate
a written notification at least 3 days before the
issuance of a letter of intent under this section.
(5) Limitations.--A letter of intent issued under
this subsection is not an obligation of the Government
under section 1501 of title 31, and the letter is not
deemed to be an administrative commitment for
financing. An obligation or administrative commitment
may be made only as amounts are provided in
authorization and appropriations laws.
(6) Statutory construction.--Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to prohibit the
obligation of amounts pursuant to a letter of intent
under this subsection in the same fiscal year as the
letter of intent is issued.
(e) Federal Share.--
(1) In general.--The Government's share of the cost
of a project under this section shall be 90 percent for
a project at a medium or large hub airport and 95
percent for a project at any other airport.
(2) Existing letters of intent.--The Under Secretary
shall revise letters of intent issued before the date
of enactment of this section to reflect the cost share
established in this subsection with respect to grants
made after September 30, 2003.
(f) Sponsor Defined.--In this section, the term ``sponsor''
has the meaning given that term in section 47102.
(g) Applicability of Certain Requirements.--The requirements
that apply to grants and letters of intent issued under chapter
471 (other than section 47102(3)) shall apply to grants and
letters of intent issued under this section.
(h) Aviation Security Capital Fund.--
(1) In general.--There is established within the
Department of Homeland Security a fund to be known as
the Aviation Security Capital Fund. The first
$250,000,000 derived from fees received under section
44940(a)(1) in each of fiscal years 2004 through [2007]
2028 shall be available to be deposited in the Fund.
The Under Secretary shall impose the fee authorized by
section 44940(a)(1) so as to collect at least
$250,000,000 in each of such fiscal years for deposit
into the Fund. Amounts in the Fund shall be available
to the Under Secretary to make grants under this
section.
[(2) Allocations.--Of the amount made available under
paragraph (1) for a fiscal year, $125,000,000 shall be
allocated in such a manner that--
[(A) 40 percent shall be made available for
large hub airports;
[(B) 20 percent shall be made available for
medium hub airports;
[(C) 15 percent shall be made available for
small hub airports and nonhub airports; and
[(D) 25 percent shall be distributed by the
Secretary to any airport on the basis of
aviation security risks.
[(3) Discretionary grants.--Of the amount made
available under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year,
$125,000,000 shall be used to make discretionary
grants, with priority given to fulfilling intentions to
obligate under letters of intent issued under
subsection (d).]
(2) Allocation.--Of the amount made available under
paragraph (1) for a fiscal year, not less than
$200,000,000 shall be allocated to fulfill letters of
intent issued under subsection (d).
(3) Discretionary grants.--Of the amount made
available under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year, up to
$50,000,000 shall be used to make discretionary grants,
with priority given to small hub airports and non-hub
airports.
(i) Leveraged Funding.--For purposes of this section, a grant
under subsection (a) to an airport sponsor to service an
obligation issued by or on behalf of that sponsor to fund a
project described in subsection (a) shall be considered to be a
grant for that project.
[(i)] (j) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--In addition to amounts made
available under subsection (h), there is authorized to
be appropriated to carry out this section $400,000,000
for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and [2007.] 2007,
and $450,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2008 and
2009. Such sums shall remain available until expended.
(2) Allocations.--50 percent of amounts appropriated
pursuant to this subsection for a fiscal year shall be
used for making allocations under subsection (h)(2) and
50 percent of such amounts shall be used for making
discretionary grants under subsection (h)(3).
Sec. 44924. Repair station security
[49 U.S.C. 44924]
(a) Security Review and Audit.--To ensure the security of
maintenance and repair work conducted on air carrier aircraft
and components at foreign repair stations, the Under Secretary
for Border and Transportation Security of the Department of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration, shall complete a security
review and audit of foreign repair stations that are certified
by the Administrator under part 145 of title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations, and that work on air carrier aircraft and
components. The review shall be completed not later than [18
months] 6 months after the date on which the Under Secretary
issues regulations under subsection (f).
(b) Addressing Security Concerns.--The Under Secretary shall
require a foreign repair station to address the security issues
and vulnerabilities identified in a security audit conducted
under subsection (a) within 90 days of providing notice to the
repair station of the security issues and vulnerabilities so
identified and shall notify the Administrator that a deficiency
was identified in the security audit.
(c) Suspensions and Revocations of Certificates.--
(1) Failure to carry out effective security
measures.--If, after the 90th day on which a notice is
provided to a foreign repair station under subsection
(b), the Under Secretary determines that the foreign
repair station does not maintain and carry out
effective security measures, the Under Secretary shall
notify the Administrator of the determination. Upon
receipt of the determination, the Administrator shall
suspend the certification of the repair station until
such time as the Under Secretary determines that the
repair station maintains and carries out effective
security measures and transmits the determination to
the Administrator.
(2) Immediate security risk.--If the Under Secretary
determines that a foreign repair station poses an
immediate security risk, the Under Secretary shall
notify the Administrator of the determination. Upon
receipt of the determination, the Administrator shall
revoke the certification of the repair station.
(3) Procedures for appeals.--The Under Secretary, in
consultation with the Administrator, shall establish
procedures for appealing a revocation of a certificate
under this subsection.
(d) Failure to Meet Audit Deadline.--If the security audits
required by subsection (a) are not completed on or before the
date that is [18 months] 6 months after the date on which the
Under Secretary issues regulations under subsection (f), the
Administrator shall be barred from certifying any foreign
repair station until such audits are completed for existing
stations.
(e) Priority for Audits.--In conducting the audits described
in subsection (a), the Under Secretary and the Administrator
shall give priority to foreign repair stations located in
countries identified by the Government as posing the most
significant security risks.
(f) Regulations.--Not later than 240 days after the date of
enactment of this section, the Under Secretary, in consultation
with the Administrator, shall issue final regulations to ensure
the security of foreign and domestic aircraft repair stations.
(g) Report to Congress.--If the Under Secretary does not
issue final regulations before the deadline specified in
subsection (f), the Under Secretary shall transmit to the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate a report containing an explanation
as to why the deadline was not met and a schedule for issuing
the final regulations.
Sec. 44925. Deployment and use of detection equipment at airport
screening checkpoints
[49 U.S.C. 44925]
(a) Weapons and Explosives.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall give a high priority to developing, testing,
improving, and deploying, at airport screening checkpoints,
equipment that detects nonmetallic, chemical, biological, and
radiological weapons, and explosives, in all forms, on
individuals and in their personal property. The Secretary shall
ensure that the equipment alone, or as part of an integrated
system, can detect under realistic operating conditions the
types of weapons and explosives that terrorists would likely
try to smuggle aboard an air carrier aircraft.
(b) Strategic Plan for Deployment and Use of Explosive
Detection Equipment at Airport Screening Checkpoints.
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of enactment of this section, the Assistant
Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security
Administration) shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a strategic plan to promote
the optimal utilization and deployment of explosive
detection equipment at airports to screen individuals
and their personal property. Such equipment includes
walk-through explosive detection portals, document
scanners, shoe scanners, and backscatter x-ray
scanners. The plan may be submitted in a classified
format.
(2) Content.--The strategic plan shall include, at
minimum--
(A) a description of current efforts to
detect explosives in all forms on individuals
and in their personal property;
(B) a description of the operational
applications of explosive detection equipment
at airport screening checkpoints;
(C) a deployment schedule and a description
of the quantities of equipment needed to
implement the plan;
(D) a description of funding needs to
implement the plan, including a financing plan
that provides for leveraging of non-Federal
funding;
(E) a description of the measures taken and
anticipated to be taken in carrying out
subsection (d); and
(F) a description of any recommended
legislative actions.
(3) Full deployment.--The Secretary shall fully
implement the strategic plan within 1 year after the
date of enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement
Act.
(c) Portal Detection Systems.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security for the use
of the Transportation Security Administration $250,000,000, in
addition to any amounts otherwise authorized by law, for
research, development, and installation of detection systems
and other devices for the detection of biological, chemical,
radiological, and explosive materials.
(d) Interim Action.--Until measures are implemented that
enable the screening of all passengers for explosives, the
Assistant Secretary shall provide, by such means as the
Assistant Secretary considers appropriate, explosives detection
screening for all passengers identified for additional
screening and their personal property that will be carried
aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or
foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation.
PART C--FINANCING
CHAPTER 483. AVIATION SECURITY FUNDING
Sec. 48301. Aviation security funding
[49 U.S.C. 48301]
(a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated for
fiscal years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, [and 2006] 2006, 2007,
2008, and 2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out
chapter 449 and related aviation security activities under this
title. Any amounts appropriated pursuant to this section for
fiscal year 2002 shall remain available until expended.
(b) Grants for Aircraft Security.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $500,000,000 for fiscal year 2002 to the Secretary
of Transportation to make grants to or other agreements with
air carriers (including intrastate air carriers) to--
(1) fortify cockpit doors to deny access from the
cabin to the pilots in the cockpit;
(2) provide for the use of video monitors or other
devices to alert the cockpit crew to activity in the
passenger cabin;
(3) ensure continuous operation of the aircraft
transponder in the event the crew faces an emergency;
and
(4) provide for the use of other innovative
technologies to enhance aircraft security.
AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
TITLE I--AVIATION SECURITY
SEC. 137. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF AVIATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY.
[49 U.S.C. 44912 note]
(a) Funding.--To augment the programs authorized in section
44912(a)(1) of title 49, United States Code, there is
authorized to be appropriated an additional $50,000,000 for
each of fiscal years [2002 through 2006,] 2006 through 2009,
and such sums as are necessary for each fiscal year thereafter
to the Transportation Security Administration, for research,
development, testing, and evaluation of the following
technologies which may enhance [aviation] transportation
security in the future. Grants to industry, academia, and
Government entities to carry out the provisions of this section
shall be available for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for--
(1) the acceleration of research, development,
testing, and evaluation of explosives detection
technology for checked baggage, specifically,
technology that is--
(A) more cost-effective for deployment for
explosives detection in checked baggage at
small- to medium-sized airports, and is
currently under development as part of the
Argus research program at the Transportation
Security Administration;
(B) faster, to facilitate screening of all
checked baggage at larger airports; or
(C) more accurate, to reduce the number of
false positives requiring additional security
measures;
(2) acceleration of research, development, testing,
and evaluation of new screening technology for carry-on
items to provide more effective means of detecting and
identifying weapons, explosives, and components of
weapons of mass destruction, including advanced x-ray
technology;
(3) acceleration of research, development, testing,
and evaluation of threat screening technology for other
categories of items being loaded onto aircraft,
including cargo, catering, and duty-free items;
(4) acceleration of research, development, testing,
and evaluation of threats carried on persons boarding
aircraft or entering secure areas, including detection
of weapons, explosives, and components of weapons of
mass destruction;
(5) acceleration of research, development, testing
and evaluation of integrated systems of airport
security enhancement, including quantitative methods of
assessing security factors at airports selected for
testing such systems;
(6) expansion of the existing program of research,
development, testing, and evaluation of improved
methods of education, training, and testing of key
airport security personnel; and
(7) acceleration of research, development, testing,
and evaluation of aircraft hardening materials, and
techniques to reduce the vulnerability of aircraft to
terrorist attack.
(b) Grants.--Grants awarded under this subtitle shall
identify potential outcomes of the research, and propose a
method for quantitatively assessing effective increases in
security upon completion of the research program. At the
conclusion of each grant, the grant recipient shall submit a
final report to the Transportation Security Administration that
shall include sufficient information to permit the Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security to prepare a cost-
benefit analysis of potential improvements to airport security
based upon deployment of the proposed technology. The Under
Secretary shall begin awarding grants under this subtitle
within 90 days of the date of enactment of this Act.
(c) Budget Submission.--A budget submission and detailed
strategy for deploying the identified security upgrades
recommended upon completion of the grants awarded under
subsection (b), shall be submitted to Congress as part of the
Department of Transportation's annual budget submission.
(d) Defense Research.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$20,000,000 to the Transportation Security Administration to
issue research grants in conjunction with the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. Grants may be awarded under this
section for--
(1) research and development of longer-term
improvements to airport security, including advanced
weapons detection;
(2) secure networking and sharing of threat
information between Federal agencies, law enforcement
entities, and other appropriate parties;
(3) advances in biometrics for identification and
threat assessment; or
(4) other technologies for preventing acts of
terrorism in aviation.''.
* * * * * * *
HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
TITLE IV--DIRECTORATE OF BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
SUBTITLE C--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
``SEC. 431. APPEAL AND REDRESS PROCESS FOR PASSENGERS WRONGLY DELAYED
OR PROHIBITED FROM BOARDING A FLIGHT.
(a) In General.--The Secretary shall establish a timely and
fair process for individuals who believe they have been delayed
or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft because they
were wrongly identified as a threat under the regimes utilized
by the Transportation Security Administration, the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection, or any other Department entity.
(b) Office of Appeals and Redress.--
(1) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish an
Office of Appeals and Redress to oversee the process
established by the Secretary pursuant to subsection
(a).
(2) Records.--The process established by the
Secretary pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the
establishment of a method by which the Office of
Appeals and Redress, under the direction of the
Secretary, will be able to maintain a record of air
carrier passengers and other individuals who have been
misidentified and have corrected erroneous information.
(3) Information.--To prevent repeated delays of an
misidentified passenger or other individual, the Office
of Appeals and Redress shall--
(A) ensure that the records maintained under
this subsection contain information determined
by the Secretary to authenticate the identity
of such a passenger or individual; and
(B) furnish to the Transportation Security
Administration, the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection, or any other appropriate
Department entity, upon request, such
information as may be necessary to allow such
agencies to assist air carriers in improving
their administration of the advanced passenger
prescreening system and reduce the number of
false positives.
