

House Financial Services Committee. Over the years that I have been in Congress, I have been on the Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing and the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance. Today, once again, we come to this House floor to tackle a new form of illicit finance.

It was shocking to a lot of people in America to read in *The Wall Street Journal* that Hamas is now using digital assets in order to raise funds and move money around. Just as we tackle illicit charitable use, illicit cash use, illicit bank use, this committee is dedicated to tackling this new form of escaping our anti-money laundering Bank Secrecy Act laws in order to fund terror.

□ 1445

I expect all of my colleagues to be together, working together to pass this bill and, in fact, standing up against this new form of terror finance by using digital assets.

We look forward to working on that issue in both the Financial Services Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, and I congratulate the gentleman from Florida for his leadership.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Speaker, I have no more speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MAST).

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I will address some of the comments that were brought up about the bill and exemptions, and exemptions that do not exist. I think it is important to recognize there are some exemptions. There are exemptions for food and medicine.

Those exemptions exist, but there are not exemptions for pieces of equipment that might be considered dual-use items that were used to knock over the barricades, the fences, and the barriers that were preventing the Palestinian terrorists from making it into Israel.

There are not exemptions to allow those kinds of pieces of equipment that might come in under agricultural exemptions in this bill. Why? Because they can be dual-use items. That is a reason to not have them.

When we look at this as a whole, I encourage the other side to not so lightly throw around the idea of innocent Palestinian civilians, as is frequently said. I don't think we would so lightly throw around the term "innocent Nazi civilians" during World War II.

We are going to speak later about a bill related to Palestinian education and the fact that in their schools, schools run by the Palestinian Authority, not Hamas, not Palestinian Islamic Jihad, not al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, not Lions' Den, not any of the other groups run by the Palestinian Authority, they have anti-Semitic teachings that they put within their own schools.

The list goes on and on of the examples we could give of what somebody

might call a rank-and-file Gazan or a rank-and-file person in the West Bank or just a Palestinian that maybe doesn't fall under that name of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad but by any classical definition would absolutely be considered a terrorist, somebody that in the last couple of weeks had been conducting kidnappings, murders, brutality that is nearly unspeakable.

As we look at this and what kind of exemptions should and should not exist, I ask that it be looked at through that lens, that there is not this far stretch to say there are very few innocent Palestinian civilians.

I haven't seen the videos of the innocent Palestinian civilians who were out there trying to protect the Israelis, who were out there trying to stop the attacks and trying to get the captives returned instead of being taken into the tunnel systems.

We need to look at that as well when we think about the equipment, whether agricultural or otherwise, that might be put in the hands of those terrorists.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 340 is an important effort to strengthen sanctions on Hamas, a genocidal terrorist organization that showed its true intent and core evil on October 7, when it crossed over a border and savagely massacred 1,400 people, took more than 240 people hostage, wounded thousands of others, and continues its assault, as it is written in its charter, to destroy the State of Israel and to murder Jews.

I will remind my colleagues, if I can, that what we saw on October 7 was the worst day for the murder of Jews since the Holocaust, but I also believe it is important that, unless we are talking about Nazis and the Holocaust, we are very careful and avoid making comparisons.

I also think it is important that as Israel prosecutes its war against Hamas—and it is against Hamas, not against the Palestinian people—we recognize the humanity of the civilians, all the civilians who are caught in the middle of this horrific war.

Hamas is a terrorist organization and must be eliminated from being a threat to Israel, an oppressor of its people, and in control of Gaza. That is why this legislation is so critically important. We have to see the humanity of people.

I am a co-chair of the bipartisan, bicameral Abraham Accords Caucus. I have committed my life to seeking and pursuing peace for Israel and its neighbors. The Abraham Accords Caucus recognizes for the first time that both Arabs and Jews belong to the same land and records in its essence and in its being that by embracing each other, Arabs and Jews cannot only live together but lift each other up and lift up the future for the same land.

Hamas does not see that future. Hamas is a terrorist organization. It is a threat to peace, a threat to Israel, a threat to democracy.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. SCHNEIDER for his strong, passionate support, as well as Ms. MANNING and the author, Mr. MAST.

Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman makes a great argument. Hamas stands between the expansion of the Abraham Accords and the destruction of the Abraham Accords. They are the ones standing between peace in the Middle East and war, a war that they provoked, a war that was barbaric against our friend and ally, Israel. It is impossible to overstate just how violent and horrific the terrorist attacks in Israel were. I have seen it. Don't tell me it didn't happen because it is real.

We can't underestimate the determination of Hamas itself. Their covenant explicitly states: "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it."

I don't think it can be any more clear about their intent. Hamas has told us who they are and what they plan to do. We need to act here in Congress, and we need to act now.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MCCAUL) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 340, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

STOP HARBORING IRANIAN PETROLEUM ACT

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3774) to impose additional sanctions with respect to the importation or facilitation of the importation of petroleum products from Iran, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 3774

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act" or the "SHIP Act".

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to deny Iran the ability, by limiting Iran's export of petroleum and petroleum products, to—

(A) engage in destabilizing activities;
 (B) support international terrorism; or
 (C) fund the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and weapons delivery systems;

(2) to deny Iran funds to oppress and commit human rights violations against the Iranian people assembling to peacefully redress the Iranian regime;

(3) to fully enforce sanctions against those entities which provide support to the Iranian energy sector; and

(4) to counter Iran's actions to finance and facilitate the participation of foreign terrorist organizations in ongoing conflicts and illicit activities due to the threat such actions pose to the vital national interests of the United States.

SEC. 3. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRANIAN PETROLEUM.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and except as provided in subsection (e)(2), the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to each foreign person that the President determines, on or after such date of enactment, engages in an activity described in subsection (b).

(b) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A foreign person engages in an activity described in this subsection if the foreign person—

(1) owns or operates a foreign port and has knowingly facilitated or accommodated at least 1 designated vessel in landing at such port on or after the date of enactment of this Act for the purpose of transporting Iranian crude oil;

(2) knowingly transports, offloads, or otherwise engages in transactions involving petroleum or petroleum products, including petrochemicals, originating from Iran;

(3) knowingly owns or operates a vessel used to conduct ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum or petroleum products, including petrochemicals, originating from Iran;

(4) owns or operates a refinery that knowingly processes, refines, or otherwise engages in transactions involving petroleum or petroleum products, including petrochemicals, originating from Iran;

(5) is an adult family member of a foreign person described in any of paragraphs (1) through (4), unless the President determines there is clear and convincing evidence that such adult family member has disassociated themselves from the foreign person described in such paragraph and has not assisted such foreign person in concealing assets; or

(6) is owned, as such term is defined by section 510.411 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, by a foreign person described in any of paragraphs (1) through (5) that has been designated for such conduct.

(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection with respect to a foreign person described in subsection (a) are the following:

(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien described in subsection (a) is—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;
 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive

any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in subsection (a) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.

(C) EXCEPTIONS.—Sanctions under this paragraph shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

(i) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or

(ii) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(3) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulations promulgated to carry out this section to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For purposes of determinations under subsection (a) that a foreign person engaged in activities described in subsection (b), a foreign person shall not be determined to know that petroleum or petroleum products originated from Iran if such person relied on a certificate of origin or other documentation confirming that the origin of the petroleum or petroleum products was a country other than Iran, unless such person knew or had reason to know that such documentation was falsified.

(e) IMPLEMENTATION; REGULATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may exercise all authorities under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) for purposes of carrying out this section.

(2) DEADLINE FOR REGULATIONS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary for the implementation of this Act.

(3) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 10 days before the prescription of regulations under paragraph (2), the President shall brief and provide written notification to the appropriate congressional committees regarding—

(A) the proposed regulations; and

(B) the specific provisions of this Act that the regulations are implementing.

(f) WAIVER.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may, on a case-by-case basis and for periods not to exceed 180 days each, waive the application of sanctions imposed with respect to a foreign person under this section if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, not later than 15 days before such waiver is to take effect, that the waiver is vital to the national interests of the United States.

(2) SPECIAL RULE.—The President shall not be required to impose sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person described in subsection (a) if the President certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that the foreign person—

(A) is no longer engaging in activities described in subsection (b); or

(B) has taken and is continuing to take significant, verifiable steps toward permanently terminating such activities.

(f) TERMINATION.—The authorities provided by this section shall cease to have effect on and after the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1) the Government of Iran no longer repeatedly provides support for international terrorism as determined by the Secretary of State pursuant to—

(A) section 1754(c)(1)(A) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4318(c)(1)(A));

(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);

(C) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780); or

(D) any other provision of law; and

(2) Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and development of, and verifiably dismantled, its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile launch technology.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON IRANIAN PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS EXPORTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until the date described in subsection (d), the Administrator of the Energy Information Administration shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing Iran's growing exports of petroleum and petroleum products, that includes the following:

(1) An analysis of Iran's exports and sale of petroleum and petroleum products, including—

(A) an estimate of Iran's petroleum export and sale revenue per year since 2018;

(B) an estimate of Iran's petroleum export and sale revenue to China per year since 2018;

(C) the amount of petroleum and crude oil barrels exported per year since 2018;

(D) the amount of petroleum and crude oil barrels exported to China per year since 2018;

(E) the amount of petroleum and crude oil barrels exported to countries other than China per year since 2018;

(F) the average price per petroleum and crude oil barrel exported per year since 2018; and

(G) the average price per petroleum and crude oil barrel exported to China per year since 2018.

(2) An analysis of Iran's labeling practices of exported petroleum and petroleum products.

(3) A description of companies involved in the exporting and sale of Iranian petroleum and petroleum products.

(4) A description of ships involved in the exporting and sale of Iranian petroleum and petroleum products.

(5) A description of ports involved in the exporting and sale of Iranian petroleum and petroleum products.

(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(c) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) shall be posted on a publicly available website of the Energy Information Administration.

(d) TERMINATION.—The requirement to submit reports under this section shall be terminated on the date on which the President makes the certification described in section 3(f).

SEC. 5. EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions authorized under this Act shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(b) GOOD DEFINED.—In this section, the term “good” means any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

SEC. 6. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. LAWLER) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. SCHNEIDER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, it is an honor to be here today as we gather to pass the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act, or the SHIP Act, which I introduced earlier this year with my colleague from Florida, Congressman JARED MOSKOWITZ.

In the wake of the appalling terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, it is clear that we must work to confront Iran and its proxies in the region with a strong sanctions regime. Iran is the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world and, unfortunately, has the coffers to back this up. Iran spends its money on terror, on developing nuclear capabilities, on taking hostages to use for bargaining purposes, and on funding the criminal IRGC.

We must cut off Iran’s funding and stop these illicit activities at their source, and that is where Iranian oil comes in.

Iran currently engages in a massive global oil trade, exporting its blood-stained petroleum in exchange for money and influence abroad. In the past year alone, Iran has made tens of billions off of their illicit oil trade, and this August, China imported a staggering 1.5 million barrels per day.

China is the largest importer of Iranian oil and, in doing so, has become complicit in the nefarious acts carried out with that funding. While the U.S. already sanctions Iranian petroleum, it is absolutely critical that we expand our sanctions regime to not only target Iran but Iran’s enablers that are complicit in the nefarious acts committed with that money.

The SHIP Act specifically expands these sanctions to cover foreign ports and refineries that process Iranian oil. Individuals and entities that knowingly accept shipments of Iranian oil, refine Iranian oil, transport or offload Iranian oil, or otherwise transact with Iranian oil should be held accountable for their actions, for their willingness to pay for Iranian-backed terrorism.

The SHIP Act has been bipartisan from the start and continues to show a united front between Republicans and Democrats to limit Iran’s global influence and protect those the Iranian regime seeks to harm, such as our Jewish and Israeli friends.

The SHIP Act sends a message to those who trade in Iranian oil that they will have the United States to deal with if they continue to do so. They can’t pretend they don’t know where the money is going. They can’t pretend to separate Iranian oil from the very terrorism it supports. Now, we are putting it in writing that they are going to be held accountable if they keep enabling Iran.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support H.R. 3774, and I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC, October 26, 2023.

Hon. MICHAEL McCAUL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN McCAUL: I write regarding H.R. 3774, the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act. Provisions of this bill fall within the Judiciary Committee’s Rule X jurisdiction, and I appreciate that you consulted with us on those provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that it shall be discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

The Committee takes this action with the understanding that forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in any way alter the Committee’s jurisdiction or waive any future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar legislation.

I ask that you please include this letter in your committee’s report to accompany this legislation or insert this letter in the Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 3774 on the House floor. I appreciate the cooperative manner in which our committees have worked on this matter, and I look forward to working collaboratively in the future on matters of shared jurisdiction. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

JIM JORDAN,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, October 31, 2023.

Hon. JIM JORDAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN JORDAN: Thank you for consulting with the Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 3774, the “Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act,” so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference on this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work together as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL T. McCAUL,
Chairman.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3774.

The goal of this legislation is simple: to prevent Iran from profiting off of its petroleum reserves.

The tyrannical Iranian regime uses these profits to fund its terrorism and proxy activities, as well as to make advancements in its nuclear program.

The SHIP Act aims to apply unilateral, mandatory sanctions on anyone who does any of the following with Iranian oil: operate a port that accepts or transfers the oil; operate a refinery that possesses Iranian oil; run a business that purchases, sells, or finances Iranian oil; ships Iranian oil; or knowingly works at any facility that handles Iranian oil.

Without a doubt, the target of these sanctions is China, the largest purchaser of Iranian oil. If China stopped buying oil from Iran, Iran would be starved of the funds it uses to destabilize its region and the world.

This is not something we can achieve overnight without impacting the global energy and shipping economy. In today’s interconnected world, where China is a major player and a trading partner of the United States, we cannot be shielded from the economic impacts these sanctions might cause. That is why if this legislation is signed into law, we must be both smart and forceful during its implementation, and we must be honest with the American people about why we are willing and why we must take this risk.

Sanctions are a diplomatic tool. They are not an end in themselves. The bold petroleum and financial sanctions that drove Iran to the table to negotiate JCPOA were multilateral, and we did the hard work of uniting the world behind the policy before the implementation of those sanctions.

As it stands today, we would be going at this policy alone. That is why Congress should work with this and any future administration to do the hard diplomatic work of bringing allies and partners into the plan. That is what will ultimately increase our chances of succeeding.

□ 1500

While I am a proud cosponsor of this bill, I am also concerned by the very

limited flexibility the administration would have with the waiver in this bill. It is one of the strictest standards that can be found in law. I am open to addressing that aspect of the bill if this measure goes to conference with the Senate to ensure that the waiver provision isn't virtually unusable.

Due to the clear and present threat posed by Iran to the United States and our allies, I believe we must use every tool at our disposal to address the challenge. The new sanctions offered by the SHIP Act provide important tools in our toolbox that could end Chinese purchases of oil.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. HILL), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. HILL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from New York for managing the time and my friend from Illinois on this very important bill.

I am so glad to see that it is a bipartisan effort on H.R. 3774, the SHIP Act, because this bill is critical to countering the long record of continued mistakes by President Biden of appeasing the regime in Iran.

The Biden administration continues a foreign policy offering carrots to the world's number one state sponsor of terrorism and getting nothing to show for it in return. Due to this administration's appeasement through sanctions relief, Iran's oil production is now backed up at a 5-year high and is estimated to be producing 1.5 million barrels a day, and that is worth, Mr. Speaker, \$40 billion annualized.

Now, nearly all of that is being sold to China, completely as a counter to the rest of the world's effort to cut off money going to Russia directly through Russian oil and indirectly through Iran backing Russia—these are leaked; Iran backing Hezbollah in Lebanon; Iran backing Syria and Assad; Iran backing Hamas in the Gaza.

Are you getting the picture?

Iran is the problem here, Mr. Speaker—a partner to Russia fighting Ukraine, a partner in defeating Israel through Gaza. It is because they are selling oil on the market against global sanctions.

This bill is important. It goes far beyond the administration's \$6 billion of sanction relief to return Americans.

Secondary sanctions are essential, and America's diplomacy, as Mr. SCHNEIDER from Illinois said, to get Europe on board with secondary sanctions is important too, because it is about defeating this global network of evil: Russia, Iran, and China.

I encourage all of my colleagues to support this important bill.

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Speaker, I do want to reflect on the comments of my friend, Mr. HILL, because he brings up a really important point.

It is vitally important to understand that Iran connects a lot of dots:

Iran is funding Hamas that attacked Israel and massacred 1,400 people and took 240 hostages, including Americans.

Iran is providing weapons to Russia in their attack on Ukraine.

Iran is selling oil to China.

The war in Gaza and the war in Ukraine have a lot of common denominators. Both are wars against democracies with the intent of wiping out those democracies, but no intent, either with Putin in Russia or Hamas against Israel, in stopping there.

The United States has an important role in leading and bringing together the world to support our allies in Ukraine and Israel. That is why it is so important that, as we stand here in a most perilous time, we unite as a body in this Congress to support our allies, not to divide, not to use political gamesmanship to use Israel as a partisan wedge, but to say we will stand together and support our allies. That is why I call our folks to come to this body and support the President's supplemental request.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LAWLER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MAST), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Accountability.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to rise in support and say thank you for the great work on this piece of legislation.

It is very important, as both sides have spoken about, the idea if you were to make a comparison, such as if a farmer had to be sanctioned but we were thinking about sanctioning the farmer without sanctioning their crops, or the truck that they would use to transport them, or the dock workers, or the market that they would bring the crops to, it would be nonsensical. This is essentially the situation that we have going on between Iran, China, Russia, an entire axis of evil, that they are getting their crops to market.

In my opinion, it is one of the most important things that we can work to prevent in order to have the greatest impact on Iran and their ability to finance terror across the globe.

In that, I thank the gentleman for his work and for yielding me the time.

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3774 is an important effort to cut funding off from the Iranian regime. I strongly urge my colleagues to support this measure.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, I introduced this bill earlier this year with Congressman JARED MOSKOWITZ of Florida. It has over 230 bipartisan co-sponsors because Congress recognizes

the need to sanction Iranian petroleum even further.

Since President Biden took office, relaxed enforcement of oil sanctions has contributed to increased Iranian oil revenues worth approximately \$25.9 billion.

In 2019, Iran's oil exports fell below 500,000 barrels per day as a result of the prior administration's oil sanctions pressure.

As of September 2023, Iranian oil exports had increased to nearly 1.5 million barrels per day. Most of these increased sales have gone to Chinese buyers.

Exports are up 59 percent since January of 2021. The administration's refusal to list entities enabling the trade for secondary sanctions—in other words, imposing sanctions on the buyers—has contributed to this.

I wish we didn't need to do this, but we have to. HSI and OFAC should be enforcing these sanctions.

On October 11, 2023, NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications, John Kirby, responded to a question about the weak enforcement of sanctions on Iranian oil by stating, quote, "The President has been concerned about making sure we have a viable global market for oil, working hard to keep the prices of gasoline down here in the United States. Part of that is making sure you remove some of the volatility in that global supply and demand."

Are you kidding me? First of all, the United States doesn't get Iranian petroleum. Our refineries aren't able to process it, and we already have sanctions in place against it. This administration has prohibited U.S. oil and gas development more strenuously than it has Iranian. It is absurd.

Macquarie, a leading financial services advisory firm, recently advised its clients that: "In our assessment, the Biden administration's policy approach has been to limit oil supply disruptions, regardless of the situation. Given that policy objectives did not target Russian oil flows even at the height of the Russian-Ukraine conflict, we do not expect Iranian oil exports to be constrained either."

Now, there are Members of this body that are going to oppose this legislation because it is too strenuous, doesn't give enough wiggle room to the administration. There is a reason we are not giving wiggle room to the administration. It is because they have been incapable of enforcing the sanctions against Iran and Iranian petroleum, which has been used as the funding source for the greatest state sponsor of terrorism in the world.

Lest anyone think otherwise, the attacks by Hamas, by Hezbollah over the course of time have been funded by Iran. We must be stringent in enforcing these sanctions. It is critically important.

When you look at what is happening in the world and the unholy alliance that has been brought about by Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia to undermine and destabilize the free world,

to undermine the United States and our allies, we must enforce these sanctions, which is why it is critically important that we pass H.R. 3774 so that we can enact sanctions on the buyer.

China has been the largest buyer of Iranian petroleum. Their refineries are built to refine that oil. Our allies around the world must recognize and understand the threats that are emanating from this unholy alliance.

I urge all of my colleagues in both parties to support this bipartisan, commonsense legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. LAWLER) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3774, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

URGING THE EUROPEAN UNION TO DESIGNATE HIZBALLAH IN ITS ENTIRETY AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H. Res. 599) urging the European Union to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H. RES. 599

Whereas, in April 1983, a Hizballah terror attack against the United States Embassy in Beirut killed 63 people;

Whereas, in October 1983, a Hizballah terror attack against the United States Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killed 241 American and 58 French servicemembers supporting the Multinational Force peacekeeping mission;

Whereas, in July 2012, a Hizballah terror attack, carried out by an operative with dual Lebanese-French citizenship, in Burgas, Bulgaria, killed 5 Israeli tourists and 1 Bulgarian;

Whereas, in March 2013, a Swedish-Lebanese Hizballah operative in Cyprus was convicted of planning terror attacks against Israeli tourists;

Whereas, in June 2015, a Hizballah operative was sentenced to 6 years in prison after he stockpiled more than 8 tons of ammonium nitrate in Cyprus;

Whereas the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-102) and the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-272) broadened financial sector sanctions against Hizballah to compel foreign financial institutions to refrain from supporting the terrorist group;

Whereas, in May 2018, the Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Abdullah Safi-Al-Din, Hizballah's representative to Iran, Mohammad Ibrahim Bazzi, a Hizballah

financier, and blacklisted 5 of Bazzi's companies, including Belgian energy services conglomerate Global Trading Group NV;

Whereas, in October 2018, French police raided the Islamic Zahra Centre on suspicion of supporting Hizballah, freezing the organization's funds, and seizing illegal weapons;

Whereas, in September 2020, 4 former leaders of the Zahra Centre France were arrested on suspicion of continuing to run that association and supporting Hizballah;

Whereas, in July 2019, the Department of the Treasury designated 2 Hizballah-backed members of Lebanese Parliament, Amin Sherri and Muhammad Hasan Ra'd, and Hizballah security official Wafiq Safa, stating that Hizballah uses its operatives in parliament to advance its violent activities;

Whereas, as of April 2021, Germany believed there to be 1,250 people with suspected links to Hizballah in the country;

Whereas Europol's June 2022 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report outlined that Hizballah "has been using the EU as a base for fundraising, recruitment, and criminal activities", and the report also stated that Hizballah "is suspected of managing the transportation and distribution of illegal drugs into the EU, dealing with firearms trafficking and running professional money laundering operations that include the provision of money laundering services for other criminal organizations";

Whereas United States-led Project Cassandra and Operation Cedar exposed the criminal-business wing of Hizballah, the Business Affairs Component (BAC) of Hezbollah's External Security Organization;

Whereas, during Project Cassandra, Hizballah elements involved in drug trafficking were arrested in the United States, South America, and several European countries, including France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy;

Whereas Hizballah's criminal activity in Europe is run by the BAC, which reports to the External Security Organisation, also known as Unit 910, or the Islamic Jihad Organization, and Abdallah Safieddine, Hizballah's representative in Iran, is also involved in this activity;

Whereas, in August 2020, United Nations Secretary General Guterres called on Lebanon to disarm Hizballah, citing the terror group's persistent violation of Resolution 1701 (2006);

Whereas Iran is the prime sponsor of Hizballah, harboring, financing, training, and arming the group;

Whereas the Department of the Treasury and Department of State estimate that Iran provides as much as \$700,000,000 per year to Hizballah in the form of financial and logistical support, weapons, and training;

Whereas Hizballah now has an arsenal of approximately 150,000 missiles and rockets, with increased sophistication and many of which can reach deep into Israel;

Whereas Hizballah fighters have been supporting the Assad regime in Syria, often leading operations in the conflict which has left more than 500,000 dead;

Whereas Hizballah trains and provides weapons for militias in Iraq and Yemen, further destabilizing the region and perpetuating violence in those countries;

Whereas Hizballah activities continue to plague Lebanon with profound economic and political instability and violence;

Whereas Hizballah's cross border illicit arms and drugs trafficking undermines the Lebanese Armed Forces, the legitimate security establishment of the country as outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006);

Whereas, in October 2012, Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem stated that "[Hizballah does not] have a military wing

and a political one . . . Every element of Hizballah, from commanders to members as well as our various capabilities, are in the service of the resistance";

Whereas the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Serbia, and Kosovo, among others, have declared Hizballah in its entirety as a terror organization;

Whereas, in March 2016, the Gulf Cooperation Council formally branded Hizballah, in its entirety, a terrorist organization, and the League of Arab States shortly thereafter adopted the same designation;

Whereas the Department of the Treasury has diligently added persons and entities to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists who have provided material support to the Hizballah terrorist organization, thereby hampering its financing and logistical capabilities;

Whereas the European Union, in July 2013, designated Hizballah's so-called "military wing", but not the organization as a whole, as a terrorist organization;

Whereas, despite restrictions put on Hizballah since the designation of its military wing, the group continues to conduct illicit narcotrafficking, money laundering, and weapons trafficking throughout Europe and the world; and

Whereas the House of Representatives has previously called on the European Union to fully designate Hizballah as a terrorist organization, passing House Resolution 359 in October 2017 and House Resolution 558 on September 20, 2022; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives—

(1) applauds and expresses support for the continued, increased cooperation between the United States and the European Union (EU) in thwarting Hizballah's criminal and terrorist activities;

(2) supports transcontinental efforts within Europe to share intelligence information among police and security services to facilitate greater cooperation in tracking, apprehending, and prosecuting terrorists, foreign fighters, and potential offenders;

(3) encourages the European Union to implement sanctions against Hizballah-affiliated terrorists in tandem with the United States;

(4) recommends greater civil society engagement in both the United States and Europe to underscore Hizballah's malign regional influence; and

(5) urges the European Union to designate Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist organization and increase pressure on the group, including through—

(A) facilitating better cross-border cooperation between European Union members in combating Hizballah;

(B) issuing arrest warrants against members and active supporters of Hizballah;

(C) freezing Hizballah's assets in Europe, including those masquerading as charities; and

(D) prohibiting fundraising activities in support of Hizballah.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. CLINE). Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. LAWLER) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. SCHNEIDER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise