

UKUSA COMINT AGREEMENT
AND APPENDICES THERETO

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-08-2010 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended. ST56834

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Directorate Minute Sheet.

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Reference No. :

D/3629

26th June, 1951.

APPENDICES TO BRUSA AGREEMENT

Subject:

Copy of a revised edition of the Appendices (Third Edition dated 1st June, 1951) is enclosed, together with copy of a memorandum detailing the differences in lay-out between this and the present edition.

2. You will note that pages 125, 126, 127, 132 and 133 are missing. The documents entitled Appendix M, Annexure A(5), Exhibit 1(125), Exhibit 2 pages 1 and 2 (126/127), Exhibit 4 (132) and Exhibit 5 (133) in the present edition should be transferred to the revised edition and numbered accordingly.

Referred to

OGA EO 1.4.(c) EO 1.4.(d)

After Action

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1 November 1945
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OUTLINE OF

DEADY BRITISH-U.S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

- 1. Parties to the Agreement
- 2. Scope of the Agreement
- 3. Extent of the Agreement Products
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- 5. Third parties to the Agreement
- 6. The Dominions
- 7. Channels between U.S. and British Empire Legencies.
- 8. Dissemination and Security -
- 9. Dissemination and Security Commercial
- 10. Previous Agreements
- 11. Amendment and Termination of Agreement
- 12. Activation and Implementation of Agreement

DEST BRITISH-U.S. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

1. Parties to the Agreement

The fellowing agreement is made between the Army-Navy
Communication Intelligence Board (ANCIE) (representing the
U.S. State, Navy and War Departments and all other U.S.

Communication Intelligence authorities which may function)

and the London Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Board (representing the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry,

and all other British Empire Communication Intelligence

authorities which may function).

2. Scope of the Agreement

The agreement governs the relations of the above-mentioned parties in Communication Intelligence untters only. However, the exchange of such collateral material as is applicable for technical purposes and is not prejudicial to national interests will be effected between the Communication Intelligence agencies in both countries.

^{1.-} Throughout this agreement <u>Communication Intelligence</u> is understood to comprise all processes involved in the collection, production and dissemination of information derived from the communications of other nations.

^{2 -} For the purposes of this agreement British Empire is understood to mean all British territory other than the Dominions.

3. Extent of the Agreement - Products

- (a) The parties agree to the exchange of the products of the following operations relating to foreign communications:
 - (1) collection of traffic
 - (2) acquisition of communication documents and equipment
 - (3) traffic analysis
 - (4) oryptanalysis
 - (5) decryption and translation
 - (6) acquisition of information regarding communication organisations, practices, procedures and equipment
- (b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken except when specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party and with the agreement with the other. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute minimum and to exercise no restrictions other than those reported and initially agreed upon.
- Throughout this agreement Foreign Communications are understood to mean all communications of the Government, or of any Military, Air or Naval force, faction, party, department, agency or bureau of a foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefore, and shall include OGA communications of a foreign country which EO 1.4.(c) may contain information of Military, Pelitical or EO 1.4.(d) Economic value. Foreign country as used herein is understood to include any country, whether or not its government is recognised by the U.S. or the British Empire, excluding only the U.S., the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British Empire.

4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques

- (a) The parties agree to the exchange of information regarding methods and techniques involved in the operations outlined in paragraph 3(a).
- (b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken except that, upon notification of the other party information
 may be withheld by either party when its special interests so
 require. Such notification will include a description of the
 information being withheld, sufficient, in the opinion of the
 withholding party, to convey its significance. It is the intention of each party to limit such exceptions to the absolute
 minimum.

5. Third Parties to the Agreement

Both parties will regard this agreement as precluding 4 action with third parties on any subject appertaining to Communication Intelligence except subject to the following understanding::

- (a) A It will be contrary to this Agreement to reveal its existence to any third party whatever.
- (b) Each party will seek the agreement of the other to any action with third parties, and will take no such action with its advisability is agreed upon.
- (c) The agreement of the other having been obtained, it will be left to the party concerned to carry out the agreed action in the most appropriate way, without obligation to disclose precisely the channels through which action is taken.

^{4 -} Throughout this Agreement third parties are understood to mean all individuals or authorities other than those of the United States, the British Empire and the British Dominions.

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(d) Each party will ensure that the results of any such action are made available to the other.

6. The Dominions

- (a) While the Dominions are not parties to this Agreement they will not be regarded as third parties.
- (b) The London SIGINT Board will, however, keep the U.S. informed of any arrangements or proposed arrangements with any Dominion agencies.
- (c) ANCIB will make no arrangements with any Dominion agency other than Canadian except through, or with the prior approval of, the london SEGINT Board.
- (d) As regards Canada, ANCIB will complete no arrangements with any agency therein without first obtaining the views of the London SIGINT Board.
- (e) It will be conditional on any Dominion agencies with whom collaboration takes place that they abide by the terms of paragraphs 5, 8 and 9 or this agreement and to the arrangements laid down in paragraph 7.

7. Channels Between U.S. and British Expire Agencies

- (a) ANCIB will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any British Empire agency except through, or with the prior approval of, the London SIGINT Board.
- (b) The London SIGINT Board will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any U.S. agency except through, or with the prior approval of, ANCIB.

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8. Dissemination and Security

matters connected therewith will be disseminated in accordance with identical security regulations to be drawn up and kept under review by ANCIB and the London SIGINT Board in collaboration. Within the terms of these regulations dissemination by either party will be made to U.S. recipients only as approved by ANCIB; to British Empire recipients and to Dominion recipients other than Canadian only as approved by the London SIGINT Board; to Canadian recipients only as approved by either ANCIB or the London SIGINT Board; and to third party recipients only as jointly approved by ANCIB and the London SIGINT Board.

Dissemination and Security - Commercial

ANCIB and the Lendon SIGINT Board will ensure that, without prior notification and consent of the other party in each instance, no dissemination of information derived from Communication Intelligence sources is made to any individual or agency, governmental or otherwise, that will exploit it for commercial purposes.

10. Previous Agreements


This agreement supersedes all previous agreements between British and U.S. authorities in the Communication Intelligence field.

11. Amendment and Termination of Agreement.

This agreement may be amended or terminated completely or in part at any time by mutual agreement. It may be terminated completely at any time on notice by either party, should either consider its interests best served by such action.

12. Activation and Implementation of Agreement

This agreement becomes effective by signature of duly authorized representatives of the London SEGINT Board and ANCIB. Thereafter, its implementation will be arranged between the Communication Intelligence authorities concerned, subject to the approval of the London SIGINT Board and ANCIB.



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INTRODUCTION - sheet 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE

APPENDICES TO THE

U.S. - BRITISH COMINT AGREEMENT

(Introduction agreed at Technical Conference 31st October - 15th November, 1950, amending Introductions agreed at Technical Conferences 11th - 27th March, 1946 and 15th - 26th July, 1948).

- 1. The following arrangements governing the collaboration between the U.S. and British Comint Agencies have been agreed between USCIB and ISIB in implementation of and as Appendices to the U.S. British Comint Agreement of 5th March, 1946.
- 2. None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of that agreement but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.
- The object of these arrangements is to ensure that maximum advantage is obtained from the combined available personnel and facilities of both parties.
- In accordance with these arrangements, each party will continue to make available to the other, continuously, currently, and without request, all raw traffic, Comint items and technical matter acquired or produced, and all pertinent information concerning its activities, priorities and facilities, both present and planned, subject only to the proviso contained in paragraphs 3(b) and 4(b) of the Agreement.
- 5. In addition, each party will continue to maintain liaison personnel at the agency or agencies of the other party.
- 6. The two parties will continue to effect such standardisation e.g. of technical terminology, layout, procedure and organisation as may be possible.
- The suggestion, agreement and arrangement, the two parties will continue to eliminate unnecessary duplication in all fields in order to ensure maximum exploitation of foreign communications. However, the activities undertaken by each party must be basically suited to its own needs and in many cases therefore neither is in a position to accept any formal and fixed commitments for the allocation of specific tasks to their respective agencies. Such an allocation would often prevent the shifting of emphasis to tasks which those agencies may themselves wish to undertake or

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INTRODUCTION - sheet 2

which they may be required to undertake by the consumers of their product. It is agreed, however, that an informal and flexible allocation of tasks, subject to alteration by either party at need and sometimes without prior notification, is often possible and desirable; that where one party accepts the informal allocation of the specific task it will make available by radio when desired by the receiving party the end-products of that task; that, if the party which accepts an informal allocation is compelled to relinquish it, it will inform the other party as soon as possible; and that, in the event of either party giving up a task to the other, every endeavour will be made by the surrendering party to maintain such portions of its intercept coverage on the task surrendered as were producing unique material.

- 8. In the field of interception, the two parties agree that this informal allocation can be extended by a firm division of "main responsibility" for coverage of certain specific tasks. The same conditions as above apply, except that where such agreement has been reached the party assuming "main responsibility" will not, except in emergency, make major changes in cover or exchange arrangements without prior consultation with the other party.
- 9. Each party may call upon the other for assistance when necessary and such requests will be met whenever practicable.
- 10. Although progress has been made in the provision of adequate Comint telecommunication facilities, it is agreed that each party will continue to keep under review this, and the associated problem of safe hand routes for the passage of Comint material of all kinds, and will take all reasonable steps towards further improvement.
- 11. Since the two parties have foreseen the need for combined emergency plans, they have gone into considerable detail in planning for the re-location and tasking of threatened intercept stations.
- 12. Each party will provide the other with copies as requested of all reports mentioned in the following Appendices and of such-like documents.
- 13. All arrangements are subject to review and to modification by agreement.
- 14. The agreements concluded at the 1950 Conference will become effective on approval by USCIB and LSIB, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the U.S. British Comint Agreement.
- 15. The Annex to this Introduction shows the origins and modifications of the various Appendices (with Annexures thereto) to the U.S. British Comint Agreement which have been produced as the result of the Conferences of 1946, 1948 and 1950, and of other arrangements.



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INTRODUCTION - sheet 3

16. In addition to continuing liaison, the two parties agree that these Appendices (and the Annexures and Exhibits thereto) should be comprehensively reviewed annually. Each party therefore undertakes to make such a review and to notify the other party during January 1952 of those contents which in its view require revision. By an exchange through liaison channels, the parties will then decide whether the necessary revision can be made through those channels or whether another conference is necessary.

"On 1st May 1955 USCIB and LSIB agreed that a general revision of the Appendices was required. They further agreed that as a first step toward such revision USCIB would furnish LSIB, for comment, detailed proposals which are being prepared by USCIB. Pending agreement by both parties on a general revision of the Appendices, the Directors, NSA and GCHQ will:

- (a) determine jointly any changes which may be required in Appendices C, D, E, F, K, L, and M and
- (b) implement any such changes which they agree to be necessary.

Although this interim authorization enables the Directors, NSA and GCHQ, to change or interpret specified Appendices by mutual agreement, it does not require USCIB or ISIB to approve such changes or interpretations provided these are within the spirit and intent of current UKUSA policy."

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1st June, 1951




INTRODUCTION

ANNEX

(Showing the origins and modifications of the various Appendices (with Annexures thereto) which have been produced as a result of working arrangements reached at the 1946, 1948 and 1950 Technical Conference etc.)

APPENDIX	1946 Conference	1948 Conference	1950 Conference	Other Arrangements
A (Terms to be used)	Produced	Unchanged	Unchanged	•
B (Principles of Security and Dissemination)	Produced	Revised. Annexure A(1) (later Annexure B1 added.	Unchanged	
C (Collection and exchange of Raw Material) 1st June, 1951	Produced	Paragraphs 1 - 3 (Exchange of information on intercept facilities) superseded by Appendix L. Paragraphs 4 - 13 (Division of interception tasks and search programs, exchange of reports et cetera) revised and transferred to 1948 Appendix D. Paragraphs 14 - 19 (Designation of intercept targets) revised in 1948 Appendix C. Paragraphs 20 - 33 (Exchange of raw traffic and standardization of raw material format) superseded by 1948 Appendix M.	Unchanged	





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INTRODUCTION

ANNEX

				
AFPENDIX	1946 Conference	1948 Conference	1950 Conference	Other Arrangements
Co-ordination of and Exchange of Information on T/A, D/F,	Produced	Revised.	Amended, Annexure D1 added.	
Co-ordination of and Exchange of Information on Cryptanalysis and Associated Techniques)	Produced	Revised. Annexure A(2) (later Annexure E1) added.	Unchanged.	
F (Exchange of COMINT and Co-ordination in Translation)	Produced	Revised	Unchanged.	
(Exchange of Collateral Material)	Produced	Unchanged	Unchanged.	
H (Communications)	Produced	Revised. Annexure A(3) added.	Revised. Annexure A(3) replaced by Annexure H1	
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	APPENDIX	1946 Conference	1948 Conference	1950 Conference	Other Errangements
I	(Liaison and Methods of Exchange)	Produced	Revised,	Unchanged	
J	(Interpretation of Certain Provisions of Agreement)	(Produced in interim)	Unchanged.	Unchanged.	
K	(Collaboration in Plain Text Field)		Produced (with Annexure A(4) - later Annexure K1). (Subject matter not covered in 1946.)	Unchanged.	
Ļ	(Exchange of Information on Intercept Equipment, Facilities, Et cetera.)		Produced from paragraphs 1 - 3 of 1946 Appendix C.	Unchanged.	o.
M	(Exchange of Raw Material and Standardization of Raw Material Format)		Produced from paragraphs 20 - 33 of 1946 Appendix C (with Annexure A(5) - later Annexure M1).	Amended.	
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
INTRODUCTION

ANNEX

	APPENDIX	1946 Conference	1948 Conference	1950 Conference	Other Arrangements
Ŋ	(Interim Emergency Plan - later (1950), Emergency Planning for Mobilization)		Produced. (Subject matter not covered in 1946. Revised in interim.)	Revised. Annexure N1 added.	3
0	(Supplementary Arrangements for Co-operation between Specified U.S. and U.K. Comint Units)		-		Produced (with Annexure 01) subsequent to 1950 Conference.

1st June, 1951

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AGREEMENT OF 5TH MARCH, 1946.

[THIRD EDITION - issued 1st June, 1951.]

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
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ERUSA AFFENDICES (THIRD EDITION - 1ST JUNE, 1951) REARRANGEMENT OF ANNEXURES ETC.

- The terms Annexure A (1948 Conference results) and Annexure C (1950 Conference results) have been dropped, and the various parts of the conference results have been incorporated as Annexures to the individual Appendices concerned, e.g. the "1948 working arrangements" for Appendix B, formerly Annexure A(1) (i.e. first part of a composite Annexure A), are now found directly behind Appendix B as Annexure B1 (i.e. first Annexure to Appendix B).
- 2. Annexure B (items not resolved at the 1948 Conference) has been omitted, being regarded as no longer necessary.
- 3. Appendix 0 has been introduced, with Annexure 01 based on UC 000313 of 21.12.50 and SB/815 (paras 1(b) & 2) of 12.2.51. Other similar "Supplementary Arrangements" may be added later as further Annexures to this Appendix.
- 4. The previous "List of Appendices" and Table 2 of the Annex to the Introduction have been combined to form a "List of Contents" at the beginning of the new volume.
- 5. The heading and para. 15 of the Introduction have been reworded, and the Annex to the Introduction has been modified to conform to alterations mentioned above.
- 6. (a) The document is page-numbered consecutively throughout at the foot of the page. In addition, each appendix, innexure and Exhibit is sheet-numbered individually in the top right-hand corner. New pages which may be inserted later will, if necessary, be numbered (e.g.) 35(a), 35(b) etc.
- (b) Each page bears the date of this edition (1st June, 1951) in the bottom left-hand corner. Amended and new pages which may be issued later will bear the new date of issue. It is suggested that future cancelled pages should be placed behind the Register of Amendments for reference purposes.




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AMENDMENT NO. 1

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APPENDICES TO THE U.S.-BRITISH COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE ACREEMENT [THERD EDITION]



Please add as footnote to paragraph 14 of Introduction (Shoet 2):

On 12th February 1951, U.S.C.I.B. was informed that L.S.I.B. ratified the recommendations of the 1950 conference, subject to the omission of the word "direct" in paragraph 4(d) of Annexure H1 of Appendix H.

On 16th July, L.S.I.B. was informed that U.S.C.I.B. approved the recommendations, concurring with the L.S.I.B. amendment.

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27th July, 1951.

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
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For Freedom of Information questions in GCHQ Contact the CK Information Legislation Team

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ATTENDIX A - sheet 1

A XIOMETA

TERMS TO DE USED

- 1. CHANNEL: A unit or sub-division of a circuit will be known as a channel.
- 2. <u>CIRCUIT</u>: A telecommunications system between two points will be known as a circuit.
- 3. COMINT AGENCY (AGENCIES) or AGENCY (AGENCIES) where used in this document will be understood to mean an authorised government agency engaged directly and exclusively in the collection and processing of foreign communications for intelligence purposes.
- 4. COMIN' ITEM: Any item of Special Intelligence or of Traffic Intelligence wich is distributed or released by a COMINT agency will be known as a COMINT Item.
- 5. CONTINUE: A summary or commentary produced by a Comint Agency based on related COMINT items, which may interpret those items in the light on one another or of information from other sources; will be known as a COMINISUM.
- 6. COMMENT: Information appended to COMENT items either in emendation or elucidation, or in expansion of the information contained therein, will be known as a comment.
- 7. <u>DECRYFT</u>: A foreign communication which has passed through the stages of cryptanalysis and decryption and is in its original language prior to translation will be known as a decrypt.
- 8. DIGRAFH: A two character group will be known as a digraph.
- · 9. EXTRICT: A translation in part only of a decrypt or plain text will be known as an extract.
- 10. GIST: A statement of the essential substance of a decrypt or plain text or an abridged version of a translated text or extract will be known as a sist.
- 11. HEADING: Communication instructions for the delivery of a foreign communication, such as call-signs, serial numbers, external addresses, delivery instructions, indications of priority, group counts, date/time of crigin, etectera, will be known as a heading.
- 12. LANGUAGE EUIVALENT: A word or phrase and its proposed or agreed rendering in English as found in a Supplemental Glossary will be known as a Language Equivalent.

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1st June, 1951.

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AFFENDIX A - sheet 2


- 13. FLAIN TEXT: An unencrypted foreign communication will be known as a plain text.
- 14. <u>POSITION</u>: The total assemblage of equipment used as a unit for an interception or transcription purpose will be known as a position.
- 15. SCANNING: The process of examining decrypts or plain texts to determine if they shall be issued and, if so, in what form and with what priority, will be known as scanning.
- 16. SUPPLEMENTAL GLOSSARY: A list prepared by a COMINT agency containing the proposed or agreed renderings in English of words or phrases which, though appearing in Standard Dictionaries, have additional meanings not given in those dictionaries, and of words or phrases of which the meanings are not to be found in a Standard Dictionary, will be known as a Supplemental Glossary.
- 17. TRANSLATED TEXT: A translation of a decrypt or plain text will be known as a translated text.
- 18. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: A remark or remarks added to a translated text, extract or gist by the translator, in expansion, clarification or annotation of his rendering of the text, will be known as a translator's note.

(It differs from a "Comment" in that it should not bear upon the Intelligence implications of the text).

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1st June, 1951.





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APPENDIX B - Sheet 1

APPENDIX B

PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

INTRODÚCTION

- These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the security and dissemination of Communication Intelligence issued by or under the authority of U.S.C.I.B. or L.S.I.B. and other appropriate officials of the Governments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such regulations may vary in accordance with the requirements of the Parties, Agencies, Departments and Ministries to whom they are designed to apply, but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect. To ensure uniform interpretation of what constitutes such accord, each party shall forward all such regulations to the other for information.
- It is recognised that, while the following principles are in general of universal application, certain of those primarily applicable to peacetime must be modified in time of war or emergency, to ensure that the maximum operational benefit consistent with security is derived from the source. Provision is made hereunder for the necessary modifications. In time of war or emergency, or exceptionally as agreed by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B., Emergency Regulations embodying the emergency principles contained herein shall be brought into force by the respective parties.

DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES (Further details in Annexure B1)

- Communication Intelligence (COMINT) is the name given to products derived from the work of agencies, the operations of which are co-ordinated by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B. and which study radio transmissions and other communications not originated by United States or British authorities. The terms Communication Intelligence (COMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) are synonymous. Communication Intelligence is divided into two categories, as follows:-
 - (a) Special Intelligence.
 - (b) Traffic Intelligence.

4. Special Intelligence is

- (a) that Communication Intelligence which results from:-
 - (i) the decryption of texts in whole or in party (except as provided in para. 5(b) below);

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1st June, 1951.
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APPENDIX B - sheet 2

- (iv) the interception of certain types of transmission as may be specified by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B.;
 - (v) plain texts as provided in paragraph 6 below:
- (b) that Traffic Intelligence which:-
 - (i) indicates success in the production of Special Intelligence as defined in paragraph 4(a) above;
 - (ii) is, in the case of individual items, specifically upgraded to Special Intelligence by either party if it is considered that its content is such as to warrant this action.

- 5. Traffic Intelligence is that Communication Intelligence which results from:-
 - (a) the study of procedure signals, callsigns, message headings, D/F bearings and other externals of communications (except as provided in paragraph 4(a)(iii) above);
 - (b) the decryption of the whole or parts of communications in codes or cyphers of such low security grading that they are specifically classed as Traffic Intelligence by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B.; or

Traffic Intelligence shall be designated by a separate codeword agreed on from time to time by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B.

6. Communication Intelligence derived from plain texts (including R/T) may be classed by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B. as either Special Intelligence or Traffic Intelligence according to the needs of either and preferably after agreement between them, except that, in time of emergency, plain texts derived from tactical Armed Forces circuits shall be treated as Traffic Intelligence.

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<u>APPENDIX B</u> - sheet 3

In time of war or emergency, or exceptionally as agreed by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B., the Traffic Intelligence category as defined in paragraph 5 above shall be extended to include the products of certain field and medium-grade cyphers which shall be downgraded from Special Intelligence: and, if required, Traffic Intelligence may then be subdivided into separate categories in order to permit tactical Communication Intelligence (the compromise of which would not endanger the more important sources) to be disseminated to special agencies and lower echelons of the Armed Forces. In order to prepare for this contingency, mutually agreed lists shall be prepared and maintained in current status by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B. to indicate which field and mediumgrade cyphers fall within the provisions of this paragraph. In the event that it is found necessary to subdivide Traffic Intelligence as contemplated above, it may be necessary to institute an additional Traffic Intelligence codeword to permit differentiation in the dissemination of the products of medium-and low-grade cyphers.

CENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

- 8. The value of Communication Intelligence in war and in peace cannot be over-estimated; conservation of the source is of supreme importance. It is essential, therefore, that the dissemination accorded to all related or resultant information be strictly controlled and limited. The physical security of related documents is not alone sufficient; it is essential that all reference to its existence either direct or indirect be avoided except among those whom the knowledge is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. The time limit for the safe-guarding of Communication Intelligence never expires.
- 9. Every effort shall be made to ensure that, unless special authority is given:-
 - (a) in time of peace, no person who is a current recipient of Special or Traffic Intelligence or who is engaged in its production shall be assigned to or be engaged in activities which might reasonably be expected to place him in a position where he might be forced to submit to questioning by a third party;
 - (b) in time of war or in a state of emergency, no person who is a current recipient of Special Intelligence or who is engaged in its production shall be committed to a hazardous undertaking which might subject him to capture by the enemy or a third party.

It is considered, on the basis of present communications techniques, that a person who has ceased to be a recipient or producer of Communication Intelligence should not be so assigned or committed before the lapse of a period of one year in the case of Special Intelligence, or of three months in the case of Traffic Intelligence.

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APPENDIX B - sheet 4

- 10. It is of the utmost importance that complete and absolute silence on all Communication Intelligence matters be maintained by those who have ever been connected with the Communication Intelligence organisation, and by all individual recipients of Communication Intelligence, whether past or present, unless they are freed from this obligation by unmistakeable and categorical order of proper authority as shall be designated by the respective parties. If at any time indiscreet matter referring to Communication Intelligence is broadcast or published, even by prominent people, this does not free those other persons who are, or have ever been producers or recipients of communication Intelligence from maintaining absolute silence, and special precautions may have to be taken.
- In time of war, the full value of Communication Intelligence cannot be realised unless operational use is made of it. However, before the decision is made to take action based on Communication Intelligence, studied effort shall be made to ensure that such action cannot be attributed to this source alone. In every case, unless completely impracticable, action against a specific target revealed by Communication Intelligence shall be preceded by appropriate reconnaissance or other suitable cover to which the enemy can reasonably be expected to attribute the action. Any action taken in the absence of such safeguards must be considered in the light of the possibility of compromising the source. The extent of military advantage to be gained must be weighed carefully against the risk of losing the particular source and related Communication Intelligence sources and against the effect of such a loss on other Commands and on future operations. Only after it has been decided that the overall military advantage to be gained clearly outweighs the irretrievable loss which would probably result from a compromise of the source should action be taken in the absence of suitable cover.
- 12. When action as contemplated in para. 11 above is finally ordered, particular care shall be taken on all occasions to ensure that personnel who may become engaged with the enemy in the course of such action are given only the minimum information, with no unnecessary detail.
- 13. In time of peace the principle that the conservation of Communication Intelligence sources is a paramount consideration affecting any action taken in the light of Communication Intelligence shall be rigidly upheld.
- 14. The principle of dissemination is based on "the need to know". Each item of Communication Intelligence shall therefore be made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties and who have been appropriately indoctrinated. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of indoctrinated persons to an absolute minimum.

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APPENDIX B - sheet 5

15. Any Intelligence including in whole or in part items which can be traced solely to Communication Intelligence sources is to be handled in accordance with these regulations. If, however, it should

- 16. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the other party's Comint agencies or to the products, or knowledge of the existence thereof, unless he be approved by his parent agency or Board and be properly indoctrinated.
- 17. It is recognised that both parties will produce Special Intelligence which by virtue of its source or content will require exceptional safeguards and which should therefore be limited strictly in dissemination. Such special Intelligence will fall into two categories:
 - (a) Individual items which must be restricted in dissemination to the highest level only. The procedure in such cases will be as prescribed in para. 22 below.
 - (b) Particular classes of Comint which it is necessary to restrict to limited categories of personnel. Such a class may, with the consent of U.S.C.I.B. or L.S.I.B. as appropriate, be indicated by an agreed subsidiary codeword.

It is for the originating party to request that the other party should afford similarly restricted distribution to such individual items or classes of Communication Intelligence.

- 18. Except in categories and individual cases agreed upon from time to time by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B., personnel to be indoctrinated as recipients of Communication Intelligence or assigned to Communication Intelligence duties shall be the subject of special security enquiries. However, in time of war or emergency, exceptional occasions may arise when it is considered essential for an individual to take up his duties before the special security enquiries can be completed., In such cases, the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the authority of such senior officers or officials as are designated by the respective parties. In all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure that special security enquiries are completed as soon as possible after indoctrination.
- 19. U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B. shall maintain complete lists of persons currently indoctrinated for Special Intelligence under their respective Governments.

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APPENDIX B - sheet 6

- 20. U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B. shall keep each other fully informed of the Departments, Ministries, Agencies, Offices, Headquarters and Commands receiving Special Intelligence and of the approximate number of indoctrinated persons in each.
- 21. Communication Intelligence shall never under any circumstances or in any form be disseminated to any Ministry, Department, Agency, Organisation, Office, or individual from which or from whom it might reasonably be expected to find its way, officially or extra-officially, into the possession of any person or group who could use it for commercial competition or commercial gain or advantage.

CLASSIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES

22. Special Intelligence. Special Intelligence is classified TOP SECRET. The words TOP SECRET and the appropriate codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains, or discloses the existence of, this class of Communication Intelligence. This rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from Special Intelligence.

In

order to indicate that the specially limited dissemination referred to in para. 17(a) above has been applied, either party will prefix the Special Intelligence codeword with the word "Special".

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- 24. Codewords. The Special Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence codewords used as such bear the TOP SECRET and SECRET classification respectively. These codewords and their implications shall not be made known to non-indoctrinated persons, nor shall these codewords be used in their codeword sense in the presence of non-indoctrinated persons.
- 25. Technical Matter. Technical matter appertaining to the production of Special Intelligence is normally classified TOP SECRET and designated by the appropriate codeword. Technical matter appertaining to the production of Traffic Intelligence is normally classified SECRET and designated by the Traffic Intelligence codeword. The appropriate classification and codeword shall appear on every sheet

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APPENDIX B - sheet 7

of paper which contains or discloses the existence of such technical matter.

- Raw Traffic. Raw traffic (i.e. intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes) is normally classified CONFIDENTIAL, except where a higher classification is mutually agreed upon. The inclusion of a case number in an item of raw traffic shall not be seemed to show evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes.
- 27. Technical Success. Communications among cognizant officials of the British and U.S. Governments which reveal actual success, progress or processes in the production of Special Intelligence or Traffic Intelligence in specific instances or fields shall bear the appropriate codeword designations even though they do not themselves reveal Communication Intelligence as such.
- 28. Documents. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of paragraphs 15 above and 29(a) below, documents containing Communication Intelligence and technical matter shall memain exclusively in the custody of persons who have been appropriately indoctrinated, secure from examination by non-indoctrinated persons.
- 29. Special Intelligence and TOP SECRET technical matter shall not be transmitted in plain language (unencrypted) except as follows:-
 - (a) sealed, be safe-hand channels over routes specifically approved by U.S.C.I.B. or L.S.I.B. Such approval will be the exception where such routes involve air or land transport over the territory of a third party;
 - (b) via completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to Agencies or Offices producing or utilising Communication Intelligence of the appropriate categories;
 - (c) via completely protected external landlines only as specifically approved by U.S.C.I,B. or L.S.I.B. in each instance.
- 30. Traffic Intelligence and SECRET technical matter shall not be transmitted in plain language (unencrypted) except as follows:-
 - (a) as provided in paragraph 29 above;
 - (b) by protected postal channels over routes approved by U.S.C.I.B. or L.S.I.B.
- 31. Rew Traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL and CONFIDENTIAL technical matter shall not be transmitted unencrypted except as follows:-
 - (a) as provided in paragraphs 29 and 30 above;
 - (b) via external landlines only as specifically approved by U.S.C.I.B. or L.S.I.B. in each instance;

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APPENDIX B - sheet 8

- (c) in the case of raw traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL only, the restrictions on the conveyance of CONFIDENTIAL material over the territory of a third party may be relaxed at the discretion of U.S.C.I.B. or L.S.I.B. to permit such transport by air or land. Such relaxation will be the exception in the case of raw traffic originated by nationals of the third party in question.
- 32. Except in circumstances contemplated in paragraph 15 above:-
 - (a) Special Intelligence and TOP SECRET technical matter transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels or cyphers expressly provided for these subjects.
 - (b) Traffic Intelligence and SECRET technical matter transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels or cyphers expressly provided for these subjects, those listed in para. 32(a) above, or in the highest grade cypher available.

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EXCEPTIONS

- 33. The guiding principle of the expression "the need to know" shall be rigidly upheld in all circumstances. However, certain limited exceptions from other provisions of these principles shall be recognised:
 - (a) With the approval of U.S.C.I.B. or L.S.I.B., dissemination need not be confined to indoctrinated persons, and the applicable codeword need not be employed in connection with the exchange, use and dissemination contemplated in the following instances.
 - (i) Certain D/F fixes and bearings graded CONFIDENTIAL.

(ii) Certain categories and series of alain text
which must be graded at
least CONFIDENTIAL.

(b) An Agency engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence may, without encrypting the appropriate codeword in the encrypted text, transmit TOP SECRET and SECRET technical matter over cryptographic channels or cyphers expressly and exclusively provided for such technical matters.



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APPENDIX B - sheet 9

(ø)	An Agency engaged in the production of Communication
•	Intelligence may, at the discretion of the Senior
	Officer concerned, after full consideration of the
	risks involved to the source, omit the classification
	and the appropriate codewords from its worksheets
	and similar documents used within the Agency or
	within intercept or D/F stations in technical
	operations. The classification may be omitted
	from raw traffic passed between Agencies or from
	intercept and D/F stations to Agencies.

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APPENDIX B

Annexure BI - sheet 1

APPENDIX B

ANNEXURE BY

WORKING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED AT THE 1948 CONFERENCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX B (PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION)

- (i) Handling of Communication Intelligence disseminated to intercept stations. (Reference paragraph 4(a) (iii) and paragraph 5).
- (ii) Classification of plain texts. (Reference paragraph 6).
- (iii) Indication in of those field and medium grade cyphers to be downgraded from Special to Traffic Intelligence in time of war or emergency. (Reference paragraph 7).

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APPENDIX B

Annexure By - sheet 2

(1) HANDLING OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATED TO INTERCEPT STATIONS

- 1. Intercept stations require detailed technical and T/A information, relating to the methods of operation of the circuits allotted to them, in order to be able to recognise and carry out their tasks efficiently.
- 2. It is agreed that none of the callsign and procedure systems, message headings etc., at present known is of sufficient complexity to justify the upgrading of information resulting from its solution to the Special Intelligence category as provided under paragraph 4(a) (iii) of Appendix B. Such information is therefore classed as Traffic Intelligence and is subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Appendix B.
- 3. All such items of Traffic Intelligence disseminated to Intercept stations will bear the appropriate codeword and will be passed, in this form, only to individuals appropriately indoctrinated.
- 4. Within the stations, however, such items may be further diseminated, with the codeword omitted, to intercept personnel not so indoctrinated. This is subject to the understanding that the provisions of paragraph 18 of Appendix B regarding special security enquiries apply equally to intercept operators as to other members of the Communication Intelligence family, and that all unindoctrinated operators shall be suitably briefed as to the security aspect of their work.
- 5. All other Communication Intelligence items disseminated to Intercept stations shall bear the appropriate classification and codeword and shall be handled in the manner prescribed for normal Intelligence recipients.

(ii) CLASSIFICATION OF PLAIN TEXT

- 6. With reference to paragraph 6 of Appendix B to the U.S. British Communication Intelligence Agreement as revised at the 1948 Technical Conference it is mutually agreed that the present peacetime practice with regard to the grading of plain text, including R/T, in dissemination to Intelligence recipients is as follows:
 - (a) all are treated as Special Intelligence by both parties.
 - (b) all other plain texts are normally treated as Traffic Intelligence by L.S.I.B. and as Special Intelligence by U.S.C.I.B.. On exchange, it is open to either party to alter the grading to conform with its own practice.

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APPENDIX B

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
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7. With reference to paragraph 7 of Appendix B, it is agreed to include in the parties an indication of those field and medium grade cyphers the products of which should, in time of war or emergency, or exceptionally as agreed by U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B., be downgraded from Special to Traffic Intelligence in order to permit the dissemination of tactical Comint (the compromise of which would not endanger the more important sources) to special agencies and lower schelons of the Armed Forces.


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
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APPENDIX D

CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS MATERIAL

(For details see Annexure DI).

- 1. It will be the joint objective of the parties to ensure that the required field of traffic analysis problems is covered as thoroughly as possible but general rules cannot be laid down for the division of T/A responsibility between the two parties.
- 2. With this objective in view, unproductive duplication of detailed work will be eliminated and it is recognised that the best method of furthering this process of elimination is to exchange information wherever possible in the form of partly or fully processed material. .
- 3. Published reports on Traffic analysis will always be made available to the other party.
- Where the exchange of published reports is inadequate the requirements for a more detailed exchange will be stated. These requirements will be satisfied as far as possible from the material being currently produced e.g. work sheets, log digests, daily diagrams and other predigested material but both parties will endeavour to meet any additional requirements by modifying the form or content of these partly-processed reports.
- 5. Where in any specific case the exchange of material provided for in paras. 3 and 4 above is inadequate either party may request copies of the unprocessed logs or chatter sheets. Such requests will be satisfied within the limits of the resources available.
- 6. The method of exchange in all cases will be by radio or by bag according to the nature and urgency of the material.
- 7. In order to facilitate the exchange of material a degree of standardisation will be aimed at in the use of names or abbreviations to describe T/A features, e.g., transmission-systems, call-sign systems, procedure codes, traffic types etc.
- 8. The methods used to indicate validity should be extended from their present limited application to all suitable T/A material, so that the weight of evidence attached to the component elements of any T/A conclusion may be assessed on a common basis.

CO-ORDINATION OF INTERCETT CONTROL

9. The objective of both parties will be to ensure that the total intercept resources available are used so as to give as efficient cover as is possible to the whole field of intercept tasks required by them both. There will be co-ordination between the parties to eliminate any avoidable duplication by continuous suggestion as to changes and by mutual agreement. Some duplication of cover may remain necessary to secure complete and accurate interception, or for training purposes, or where the arrangement for the exchange of T/A information and raw material connot meet both parties' requirements.

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APPENDIX D - sheet 2

- 10. The basis for the continuous co-ordination involved will be an exchange of reports consisting of:-
 - (1) reports on intercept results as requested by either party.
 - (ii) lists of tasks allotted to stations (on a monthly or weekly basis as is required).
 - (iii) information on major changes in the cover situation (exchanged by signal).

CO-ORDINATION OF EFFORT ON D/F

- 11. In general the division of work must fall naturally according to the locations of D/F and intercept stations, and the intercept tasks and search programmes undertaken by each party.
- 12. Collaboration between the parties in the field of D/F shall be in the form of:-
 - (i) requests from any agency direct to any other for bearings and fixes on specified targets and
 - (ii) the exchange of results.

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
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


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
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AFFENDIX E - sheet 1

AFFENDIX E

ON CRYPTANALYSIS AND ASSOCIATED TECHNIQUES

(for details see Annexure E)

ATLOCATION OF TASKS

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Allocation of major tasks, conferring a one-sided responsibility, is undesirable and impracticable. As a main principle, however, in order that the widest possible cover of foreign cypher communications be achieved, the two parties shall exchange proposals for the elimination of duplication in cases where certain portions of a task or related tasks are not being worked. In addition collaboration between the parties will take the form of suggestion and mutual arrangement as to the undertaking of new tasks and

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
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
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
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AFPENDIX F - sheet 1

APPENDIX F

EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AND CO-ORDINATION IN TRANSLATION

- Decrypts of foreign communications will not be exchanged between the two parties, except as provided in paragraph 6 of Appendix E or as may be arranged for cryptanalytic or other technical reasons, but any decrypt or series of decrypts will be made available on specific request by one party to the other, if not prohibitively inconvenient.
- 2. Scanning, translating and exchanging material in the field is covered in Appendix K. In other fields, the Agencies will probably be unable to translate all decrypts, plain texts or R/T intercepts in full or even in extract, each will carry out a process of scanning such as to meet its own requirements. The liaison officers will therefore be free to scan this material to ensure that any particular interests of their own party are being served.
- 3. Translation will be assumed to be in full unless labelled "gist" or "extract".
- 4. If either party considers that decrypts or plain texts serw its intelligence needs without translation, such decrypts or plain texts will be regarded by the other as if they were translated texts and their exchange between the Agencies will be precisely the same as that of translated texts and extracts (see paragraph 6 below). It is the intention of each party to limit such cases to the minimum.
- 5. Comments will be clearly distinguishable as such and will be prefaced by the word "comment".
- Unless excepted in Appendix K, all translated texts, extrac gists (unless excepted by paragraph 7 below), items of Traffic Intell gence, and comments appended thereto, will be exchanged continuously, currently and without request unless otherwise arranged in specific instances. Such exchange, complete or partial, will be effected by radio when specifically requested by the parties and in addition a complete exchange will be effected with the least possible delay through the regular liaison channels.
- 7. Gists which are made by an agency for its own use but not issued will not be exchanged but will be at the disposal of the liaison officers who may ask for such decrypts or plain texts as may be required.
- 8. All Comintsums will be exchanged whenever they are issued and without request.

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1st June, 1951



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APPENDIX F - sheet 2

- 9. LSIC will be the channel through which all Communication Intelligence items produced by the other British Commonwealth Agencies (except Ottawa) will be forwarded to the U.S. Agencies and through which the same materials produced by the U.S. Agencies will be forwarded, whenever appropriate, to other British Commonwealth recipients (except Canadian).
- 10. The U.S. Agencies will be the channel through which all Communication Intelligence items produced by British Commonwealth Agencies will be forwarded, whenever appropriate, to U.S. recipients.

DIVISION OF LABOUR IN TRANSLATION

- 11. Each Agency will undertake such scanning and translation tasks as are suited to its own requirements and those of its recipients. Any exception will be by prior agreement.
- 12. The continuous exchange of translated material will allow either party to eliminate unwanted duplication in translation.

STANDARDISATION OF TRANSLATION FORM

To avoid ambiguity and to promote ease of reading, reference and recording, it will be the aim of the U.S. and British Agencies to adopt a standard style and layout for headings, translated texts, gists, extracts, comments and translators' notes.


STANDARDISATION OF TRANSLATION CONTENT

- Each Agency will furnish to the other, continuously, currently and without request, copies of all Supplemental Glossaries and other compilations which it prepares as a result of and for use in its translation processes. The materials thus exchanged will be the basis for continuous discussion between the Agencies with a view to increasing standardisation.
- 15. In order to develop a common standard of validity-grading in language equivalents, each Agency will inform the other of the significance of such gradings as it currently uses in its Supplemental Glossaries.

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APPENDIX G

EXCHANCE OF COILLATERAL MATERIAL AND COMINT
MATERIAL

- 1. Paragraph 2 of the British U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement specifies that the Agreement governs the relations of the contracting parties "in Communication Intelligence matters only".
- 2. In that paragraph it is agreed that the exchange of such collateral material as is applicable for technical purposes and is not prejudicial to national interests will, however, be effected between the Comint Agencies in both countries.
- J. In accordance with that paragraph, collateral material is defined as that material from any source other than Comint which, though of assistance to the Comint Agencies (i.e. "applicable for technical purposes"), is not directly a Communication Intelligence matter.

- 5. Products of arrangements with Third Party Governments or Comint authorities negotiating on an official basis are excluded from the provisions of paragraph 4 above. (See Appendix P)
- 6. Information concerning Comint methods and techniques, which are developed by the Comint Agencies under U.S. or British patent, is not collateral material, and its exchange is governed by paragraph 4 of the Agreement OGA

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
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APTENDIX H - sheet 1

PPENDIX H

COMMUNICATIONS

(For details See Annexure H1)

1. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REQUIRED

Exclusive and readily extensible telecommunications between Agencies, and between Agencies and their outlying stations, will be maintained in order to make possible the rapid flow of all types of raw traffic from the points of interception to the several Agencies; the rapid exchange of all types of raw traffic, technical matter and Communication Intelligence between the Agencies; and the efficient In addition lateral control of interception coverage. communications between stations of one party and Agencies or stations of the other may be provided for the same purposes as necessary and cutually agreed.

INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF 2. TERMINALS

The terminals of circuits or channels intended exclusively to carry Comint traffic between the Pritish Commonwealth and the United States will be installed, maintained and operated as arranged by the appropriate Comint Authorities of the countries concerned and, although normally such terminals will be installed, maintained and operated by the appropriate U.S. or Tritish Commonwealth authority on whose territory the terminals are situated, this will not be obligatory.

PROVISION OF EXULPMENT 3.

The provision of equipment of all types will be by nutual assistance where necessary and practicable and as agreed in each specific case,

CRYFTOGRAPHIC AIDS

(a) Common cryptographic aids will be used for combined Comint communications. The matter of cryptographic aids will be kept continuously under review with the object of maintaining and increasing security and of facilitating communications.

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1st June, 1951.

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APPENDIX H - sheet 2

(b) In order to reduce the number of personnel required for communication and cryptographic operations and thereby to augment the forces available for direct intercept operations, and also to improve speed and accuracy, the ultimate goal should be the transmission of all Comint naterial in on-line cryptosystems. Every effort should be made towards this end, consistent with the policies of the services of both countries.

5. IAG ROUTES

Dag routes will be kept under review with the object of taking full advantage of sea and air services.

6. MICROFILM

All agencies will be equipped to handle microfilm so that it may be available for use when it is not practicable to send the original material.

7. COMMUNICATIONS LIAISON

A representative of the Director, GCHC, and a representative of the USCID Co-ordinator will be given the specific duty of keeping under review Comint communications problems and of raising and advising on such problems as they occur.




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
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APPENDIX I - sheet 1

APPENDIX I

LIAISON AND METHODS OF EXCHANGE

LIAISON PERSONNEL

- 1. Each party shall maintain, in the country of the other, a senior liaison officer accredited to the other. Such officers shall be responsible each in the country to which he is accredited for all liaison matters.
- 2. Upon agreement between USCIB and LSIB, additional liaison personnel may be accredited, and working groups may be assigned, to agencies of either party by the other. All such additional liaison personnel shall be under the control and direction of the senior liaison officer.
- 3. Suitable office facilities will be made available as necessary by the party to whom the liaison officers are accredited.
- Liaison officers of one party shall normally have unrestricted access to those parts of the other's agencies which are engaged directly in the production of Comint, except such parts thereof which contain unexchangeable information. The points of contact of liaison officers within agencies for requests and inquiries shall be as determined, established and delimited by the party to which they are accredited.
- 5. In addition to the above regularly assigned personnel, visits by selected personnel for short periods of time to deal with special problems will be encouraged.

METHODS OF EXCHANGE

- 6. Requests by one party for information or material small be made by that party via its senior liaison officer who shall act through prescribed liaison channels. The senior liaison officer of the requesting party shall forward whatever information or material is made available to him, normally by means of facilities under the control of his own country. Normally the senior liaison officer of the providing party shall be kept informed.
- 7. When the request by one party is for information or material to be supplied as a matter of routine procedure, the supply, after the initial request, may be direct between the parties by means of facilities available to the senior liaison officer of the requesting party. The senior liaison officers of both parties shall be kept fully informed of all such routine exchanges and shall be given access to the information or material as may be agreed locally.

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
APPENDIX I - sheet 2

- 8. Exceptionally, technical exchanges between the parties may be effected directly over "on demand" quick exchange communication channels jointly and exclusively maintained for that purpose. But the use of these direct channels will be kept to the minimum and in each case the senior liaison officers of the two parties will be kept informed.
- 9. No provision of paragraphs 6 and 7 above shall be construed as preventing either party from accommodating the other by transporting or communicating material for the other party.
- 10. Each party shall normally assist the other's senior liaison officer by making available to him facilities for packaging and preparing material for transportation. Each party shall, to the extent of facilities operated by or available to it, assist the other's senior liaison officer with safe-hand and other transportation within its own country.

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1st June, 1951





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APPENDIX J

INTERPRETATION OF

CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE

U.S. - BRITISH COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGRESMENT

INTRODUCTION

Consequent on meetings held in December 1947 between USCIB and the Director ISIC representing the London Signal Intelligence Board, the following interpretations to certain paragraphs of the British - U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement, dated March, 1946 and of the Appendices thereto are hereby agreed to by USCIB and ISIB and will become Appendix J to the aforementioned Agreement.

INTERPRETATIONS

- 1. It is understood that the LSTB will not initiate or pursue any contact with any nation of the British Commonwealth on Comint matters other than with the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand (with each of which agreements already exist) without first obtaining the views of USCIB. (It is noted that at the present time LSIB does not envisage any collaboration with Commonwealth Nations other than the above).
- 2. It is noted that the Melbourne Sigint Centre (MSIC) is, in contrast to the Communications Branch at Ottawa, not a purely national Centre. It is and will continue to be a joint W.K. Australian New Zealand organisation, manned by an integrated staff.
- It is noted that a pre-requisite for collaboration by Canada, Australia and New Zealand with U.K. was an unequivocal acceptance of the provisions of the "Explanatory Instructions and Regulations concerning the Handling of Signal Intelligence (IRSIG)" which has already been given by the Comint Governing Bodies of the Nations of more and that continued collaboration is dependent upon their adherence to these regulations.
- 4. It is the intention of LSIB to obtain from the Sigint authorities of the collaborating Dominions formal assurance that they will abide by the terms of paragraphs 5, 8 and 9 of the British U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement and of paragraph 5 of Appendix E of that agreement. Such assurance will be transmitted to USCIB from LSIB*.
- 5. LSIB will notify USCIB of the present assignment of cryptanalytic tasks for MSIC and will notify USCIB in advance before authorising any new or altered cryptanalytic tasks for that Centre.
 - * Chairman ISIB transmitted this assurance to Chairman USCIB in SB/409 of 17th February 1948.

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APPENDIX J - sheet 2

6. Both USCIB and LSIB will:

- (a) Not pass to any of the collaborating Dominions' Agencies COMENT items originated by agencies of the other party without the consent of that party, except as laid down in paragraphs 7(c) and (d) below or as may be from time to time mutually agreed.
- (b) Pass to the collaborating Dominions via the agreed channels only such technical matter and portions of the Status Reports as are deemed by the originating agency to be relevant to the agreed tasks upon which each Dominion is engaged.

7. USCIB takes note that, as regards LSIB's policy towards the integrated Centre at Melbourne, ISIB intends in future:

- (a) To give every encouragement and assistance to pursue as the main cryptanalytic task of the Centre together with minor tasks of local interest.
- (b) To employ Melbourne-controlled interception stations (some of which are U.K. manned) on tasks to which they are best suited by reason of their location, which inevitably
- (c) To pass to MSIC (in order that MSIC may carry out (a) above), the technical and background matter relevant to these tasks, whether it be obtained from U.S. or British sources, except matter of U.S. origin designated by U.S. authorities as for U.K. use only.
- (d) To pass to MSIC for its internal use only (and to enable that Centre to carry out (b) above) the necessary technical matter required for such interception control, whether obtained from British or U.S. traffic analysis or cryptanalytic sources, except matter of U.S. origin designated by U.S. authorities as for U.K. use only.


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
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
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
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
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
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




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
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
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APJENDIX L - sheet 1

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT FACILITIES, PRODUCTION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

l. INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT FACILITIES AND PRODUCTION

A comprehensive report (to be known as the Annual Technical Report) concerning

- (a) all interception facilities installed and available for use at intercept and D/F stations, whether or not such facilities are in use,
- (b) details of the numbers, types and descriptions of intercept equipment under contract and/or in production, together with probable delivery dates.

will be exchanged annually. Reports are to show the position as at 1st July in each year, and should normally be exchanged by 1st August.

Section I of the Report will be arranged to provide information to cover the items set out in paragraph 3, for each Intercept and D/F station. Types, Makes and numbers (and where applicable, normal and maximum speeds) of equipments should be included. No attempt has been made to lay down an exact format for the Report, as such a format might soon become out of date, and might prevent flexibility.

3. HAND SPEED MORSE EQUIPMENTS

- (i) Single Positions (H/F)
- (ii)
- (iii)
- Single Positions (L/F)
 Single Positions (All-wave)
 Double Positions (H/F or All-wave) (iv)
- (v)Which of the above (i) to (iv) are capable
- of double or triple diversity working Which of the above (i) to (iv) are fitted (vi) with wire, tape or wax recorders

HIGH SPEED MORSE EQUIPMENTS

- Single Fositions (H/F) (i.)
- ii) Single Positions (L/F)
- (iii) Single rositions (All-wave)
- iv) Double Positions (H/F or All-wave) Which of the above (i) to (iv) are capable (∀)
- of double or triple, diversity working Types of recording (i.e. undulator) (vi)
- apparatus fitted (vii) Types of recording bridge fitted, and whether capable of accepting frequency shift transmissions
- (viii) Any other High Speed equipment

1st June, 1951



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APPENDIX L - sheet 2

C. TELEGRAPHIC FRINTING EQUIEMENTS

- (i) Single Channel Radio Telepri ter (International)
- (ii) Single Channel Radio Teleprinter (National)
- (iii) Multi-channel or Multipler T/P (International)
- (iv) 3-channel T/P (Netional)
- (v) 2-channel Baudot
- (vi) 6 and 9-channel Bendot
- (vii) (i) to (vi) above refer to 5 unit systems.

 Equipments fitted for any other systems
 (6, 7-unit etc.)
- D. V.H/F AND U.H/F EQUIPMENTS
- E. FACSIMILE OR FICTURE EQUILMENTS
- F. HELLSCHREIBER EQUIPMENTS
- G. DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENTS

Whether fixed or nobile.

- H. TRENSMITTER IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENTS
- I. FREQUENCY MELSURING EQUIFMENTS
- J. AERILIS

Information to include number, types, whether used in diversity, frequency to which cut, directivity, associated amplification equipment.

- K. AERIAL EXCHANGES
- L. CONTROL EQUIPMENT

Details and use of equipment fitted for control of interception within a station.

- M. SPECIALISED TEST EQUIPMENT

 Not to include standard maintenance equipment
 for general use.
- N. AUDIO FREQUENCY RECORDING EQUITMENT
- P. ANY OTHER SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
- Q. SHORTCOMINGS EXPERIENCED ON OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT

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1st June, 1951.

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APPENDIX L - sheet 3

R. SPECIAL MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS, IF ANY

Notes:

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- (i) A Single Position may consist of 2 or more receivers, used in diversity, or in order to increase the frequency range.
- (ii) A Double Position is one at which a single operator can cover two ends of a duplex circuit, where this is possible.

INTERCEL'T EQUIPMENT RESTARCH AND DEVELOIMENT

(a) Intercept Equipment Reports will be exchanged the twiss yearly on let funct and let December.

These Reports will be in the sections.

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This to the include details of all projects on which development is being conducted together with a statement of the object to be attained.

- (ii) Research and Development trends. This to include a statement of all outstanding problems together with an indication of trends in research and development aimed at their solution. In the event that no work is contemplated on certain specific problems, these problems should nevertheless be listed amongst those current.
- (b) Technical Notes will be exchanged as and when necessary on specific subjects. These notes to be designed primarily for the information of personnel actually engaged on engineering and research and development work on interception equipment. These notes also to include data on signal analysis, frequency lists, and other material associated with intercept problems.




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


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APPENDIX M Annexure M - sheet 1

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APPENDIX M Annexure M1 Exhibit 3 - sheet 2

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
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


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1st June, 1951



Directorate Minute Sheet.



Reference No.: D/7763.

16th February, 1955.

APPENDIX P TO UKUSA AGREEMENT.

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EO 1.4.(c) EO 1.4.(d) 14th February 1952

APPENDIX P

COMINT RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES,

AFFECTING BRUSA RELATIONSHIPS

I

BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ANY COMINI ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MAY BE MADE WITH THIRD PARTIES OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF ALLIED COMMANDS

- 1. For purposes of this Appendix, arrangements with Third Parties are defined as only those which are negotiated with Third Party Governments or COMINI authorities negotiating on an official basis.

 The products of these arrangements should be completely exchangeable.
- 2. Fither party may negotiate independently with Third Parties, subject to the provisions of this appendix. The negotiating Party should, as far as possible, keep the other party currently informed of the progress of the negotiations.
- 3. Wherever and whenever security considerations permit, the U.S. and U.K. national authorities may enter into relationships with Third Party Governments or COMENT authorities with the object of obtaining:
 - (a) raw traffic (including of type or quality not readily available through BRUSA intercept facilities;
 - (b) end-product and technical material which cannot readily be obtained through BRUSA facilities;
 - (c) interception sites.

4•	Normally,	ei ther	party ma	y, without	prior	consent'	of the	other
and	subject on	Ly to p	rompt not	ification,	arrang	e with a	my	

for the purposes stated in paragraph 3 above. In this connection

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BFC/F/1 (continued)

the possible security compromise involved in merely presenting requirements should be considered.

- 5. Either party may conclude an agreement which involves the supply to a Third Party of
 - (a) raw traffic selected in accordance with identification criteria established by the Third Party, (such selection not being retrospective), or taken on circuits using fixed callsigns and/or fixed frequencies, i.e. circuits from which the provision of traffic does not disclose the solution of complex callsign and frequency systems;
 - (b) D/F results on the transmissions involved in (a) above;
 - (e) T/A data (i.e. callsigns, frequencies, schedules and procedures) in respect to the transmissions involved in (a) above;
 - (d) interception steerage or guidance upon transmissions of the type involved in (a) above;
 - (e) general advice not revealing knowledge of specific techniques or current problems;

provided only that before implementing such an agreement, the other party is consulted on the technical problems involved, such as the sterilization of raw traffic.

/6.

* 'Releasable' equipment is defined as that equipment which is releasable under the national policies of the country making the delivery. In general, releasable equipment is considered to be that which either can be purchased cornercially or is available through governmental sources and classified not higher than CONFIDENTIAL.



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6. Before entering into exchange arrangements involving the furnishing of end-product, or of row traffic, D/F results, technical raterial, or guidance beyond those specified in paragraph 5 above, each party must obtain the consent of the other. The decision to release such data will be based on a consideration of the risk factors involved and the benefit likely to accrue in the technical or intelligence fields. Due weight must be given to the technical competence of, and knowledge already available to, the Third Party.

8. In negotiations with Third Parties all possible assurances should be obtained that the Third Party will safeguard all materials received, will not make them available to any other Power, and will conceal the existence of its agreement with the U.S. or U.K. The precise terms of these assurances must be left within the discretion of the U.S. or U.K. negotiating authority according to the circumstances of each case.

9. Both parties to the BRUSA agreement will pool their knowledge of foreign COMINT organizations up to the agreed limits of exchange of collateral.

10. In negotiations with Third Parties every effort should be made to avoid disclosure of U.S./U.K. collaboration in the COMINT field. If and when the question is raised by a Third Party, admission of the extent and nature of such collaboration must be kept to a minimum and

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BPC/F/1 (continued)

in no case reveal collaboration exceeding the scope of the arrangement existing or under negotiation with the Third larty concerned.

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BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ANY COMINT ARE INCLUENTS WHICH MAY BE MADE WITH THIRD PARTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ALLIED COMMANDS

- Il. The following principles will govern any arrangement which may be made with Third Parties within the framework of allied commands.
- 12. Prior to entering into any COMINT co-operation with Third Parties within an allied command, which may necessitate disclosure of information regarding or resulting from U.S. and U.K. COMINT activities and collaboration, specific arrangements for such co-operation will be agreed by the U.S./U.K.

 COMINT authorities in advance. Specific arrangements for any allied command which have a bearing on U.S./U.K. collaboration arrangements under the BRUSA agreement will be made Annexures to this Appendix.
 - .13. Participation in an Allied COMINT structure should be limited to
 - (a) contributing substantial forces to that allied command and adequate COMINT support to those forces or,
 - (5) capable of making a significant contribution to the U.S. and U.K. COMENT effort within the command.
 - 14. Co-operation with Third Parties within the allied command structure should be confined within the limits necessary to meet the essential needs of the command. The release of U.S. and U.K. COMINT end-product to Third Party nationals in allied commands should be avoided if possible and in any event should only be made after agreement between U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities. If such material must be released to Third Parties, the need-to-know principle must be applied strictly and the material limited as follows:

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BPC/F/1 (continued)

(a) Peacetime

- (i) Traffic Intelligence needed for planning purposes provided it is effectively disguised.
- (ii) Special Intelligence only when embodied in general intelligence summaries from which no information can be traced back to COMINT.

(b) Warting

Ä.

- (i) Traffic Intelligence in categories mutually agreed as releasable in undisguised form by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities, and other Traffic Intelligence when effectively disguised.
- (ii) Special Intelligence effectively disguised, in categories mutually agreed as releasable by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities.
- 15. As a condition of participation, there should be prior acceptance of agreed security principles based on Appendix B and similar to those given at Exhibit 2 to Annexure P1 to this Appendix and agreed by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities.
- 16. In any allied COMINT arrangements there must be no revolation that U.S./U.K. COMINT collaboration exists outside the particular command concerned, or that within the command U.S./U.K. COMINT collaboration is more extensive than that to which Third Party nations are admitted.
- 17. COMINT units of participating nations would be at liberty to pass COMINT available to them to their national COMINT organizations and to units of other participating nations but not to units or nationals of non-participating nations.





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BPC53/P/Final 049

19 March 1953

APPENDIX P

ANNEXURE PI

COMINI ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACEUR

I. GENERAL

- 1. The following principles affecting the COMINT arrangements for SACEUR apply to planning for wartime except insofar as provision is made in paragraphs 26 29 below for additional peacetime co-operation. They will be the basis on which the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities will negotiate with SACEUR and on which subsequent negotiations with Third Party nations should be conducted. Any alterations of principle which may become necessary as the result of these negotiations will be agreed between the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities and appropriate amendment made herein.
- 2. In order that the arrangements contained herein may be effective on the outbreak of war, it will be necessary to initiate planning in peacetime with the Third Party nations concerned. This planning activity should begin as soon as possible.
- In order to promote the greatest possible readiness for war, it may be necessary to extend this peace time co-operation beyond the stage of planning. The decision when to enter upon this second stage will be taken by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities at some later date in the light of the then prevailing international situation and of the experience gained in the course of co-operation with Third Party nations on COMINT planning.

NOTE: Pertinent definitions for the purposes of this paper are given at Exhibit 1 hereto.

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19 March 1953
APPENDIX P
ANNEXURE P1 (continued)

II. DETAILED PROPOSALS

SACEUR Y STRUCTURE

- 4. The SACEUR Y Structure should have the following elements:
 - (a) A senior Y officer at SHAFE (SACEUR Y officer) assisted by a Y staff.
 - (b) Y staffs, where required, at headquarters of major subordinate Force Commanders under SACEUR.
 - (c) National armed forces Y units provided specifically for direct support of their own national forces operating under SACEUR.
- 5. The responsibility for formulating and implementing SACEUR'S Y policy should lie with A.C. of S. (I), SHAPE.

 PARTICIPATION IN SACEUR Y STRUCTURE
- 6. Participation in the SACEUR Y Structure, including Y staffs, should be open to all nations contributing to SACEUR command, as a normal minimum, combat forces equivalent to a U.S. or British Corps, together with Y units adequate for their direct support, provided that these nations undertake to enforce appropriate security measures as set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto, and also undertake to apply the principles set forth therein, as a minimum, to all other COMINT activities under their control.
- 7. Each participating nation should provide and maintain the Y units needed for the direct support of its forces under SiCEUR and should ensure their operational efficiency.



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APPENDIX P ANNEXURE P1 (continued)

FUNCTIONS OF THE SHAPE Y STAFF

- 8. The functions of the SHAPE Y Staff under A.C. of S.(I) should include:
 - (a) effecting any necessary general co-ordination of the SACEUR Y effort;
 - (b) establishing as far as national differences permit uniform operational procedures between Y units of different nations:
 - (c) giving technical advice as required to the SHAPE Intelligence
 Staff on the interpretation of Y information received by
 SHAPE, and arranging for the the SHAPE Intelligence Staff
 to receive all the Y information available in the SACEUR
 Command which may be of value to it;
 - (d) formulating and supervising compliance with security regulations and policies governing the production, handling and dissemination of Y material within the SACFUR Command in accordance with the agreed security principles in Exhibit 2 hereto:
 - (e) arranging for Y units to receive such technical material and end-product, whether produced in the SACHUR Command or received from national sources, as may be necessary for efficient conduct of their operations:
 - between Y units within the SACHUR Y Structure and for the flow of traffic from Y units in that structure to national COMINT authorities as required;

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APPENDIX P
ANNEXURE PM (continued)

- (g) arranging for naterial of technical COMINT interest,
 including prisoner of war interrogations, prisoner of war
 reports, and captured documents and equipment to be made
 immediately available as appropriate to the elements of the
 SACEUR Y Structure and to national COMINT authorities;
- (h) establishing and stating to the appropriate authorities requirements for such special communications and cryptochannels as may be necessary to meet the operational and security requirements of the Y effort within the SACEUR command.

FUNCTIONS OF Y STAFFS AT SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

9. Y staffs at subordinate commands should perform functions corresponding to those of the Y staff at SHAPE.

FUNCTIONS OF Y UNITS

- 10. The main task of a Y unit should be to serve its own command or formation with information of immediate value about forces directly opposing that command or formation.
- 11. When necessary a Y unit may support a command or formation of a different participating nation. Any arrangements for such support or any combination of Y units of one nationality with those of another nationality will be subject to agreement of the military commanders of the forces for whose support the units were provided, or of the cognizant national COMINT authority if required.





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APPENDIX P
ANNEXURE P1 (continued)

COMENT UNITS IN THE SACEUR AREA NOT ENGAGED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF FORCES UNDER SACEUR

- Each nation with forces serving under SACEUR may individually arrange with the authorities concerned to operate in the theatre national COMINT units not provided specifically or exclusively for direct support of the forces under SACEUR. These units will not operate as part of the SACEUR Y Structure and will not be subject to the arrangements for inter-allied co-operation.
- 13. The U.S. and the U.K. will maintain an operational separation and, insofar as practicable, a physical separation between the Y units and their national COMINT units.
- 14. It is recognized that certain COMENT units at the higher levels (e.g. army Group) would be directly supporting both SACEUR and their national COMENT organizations. Each participating nation would have discretion about such matters as the right of access of other nationals to these units.

CO-OPERATION WITH THIRD PARTIES WITHIN SACEUR Y STRUCTURE

15. Co-operation with Third Parties within the SICEUR Y Structure should be confined within the limits necessary to neet the essential Y needs of the armed Forces contributed by them to SACEUR and must not reveal that there is COMINT collaboration between the U.S. and U.K. outside the sphere of Y. Within the limits agreed for the release of COMINT material produced by U.S. and U.K. organizations (see paragraphs 20 and 21 below), co-operation with Third Parties should be wholehearted.



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APPENDIX P ANNEXURE P/ (continued)

- 16. The channels for the provision of technical assistance to Third Parties from U.S./U.K. national COMINT sources should be via the highest levels of U.S. and U.K. Theatre COMINT organizations or via the SHAPE Y staff whichever is more appropriate in individual cases.
- In so far as consistent with the agreed limits for the release of U.S. and U.K. COMINT, and in order to secure the necessary degree of uniformity, Third Parties should be persuaded to adopt certain common operational procedures (e.g. those parts of the BRUSA notation system used by the U.S. and U.K. Y units supporting forces under SACEUR).

 MOVEMENT OF Y MATERIAL BETWEEN UNITS UNDER SACEUR AND THIRD PARTY

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

18. The Y units and Y staffs of the participating actions would be at liberty to pass to their own national COMINT organizations and to other participating nations, but to those nations only, the technical material and traffic produced or received by themselves. The national COMINT organizations of the participating nations should in turn provide such technical support both to their own Y units and through the SHAPE Y staff to the Y units of other participating nations as they may consider would be appropriate and of assistance to the Y effort under SACEUR. Such material shall be handled in accordance with the regulations in Exhibit 2 hereto.

EXCHANGE OF INTERNALLY PRODUCED COMINT END-PRODUCT BETWEEN SACEUR AND OTHER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS

19. Exchange with other major Commanders of NATO of internally produced COMINT end-product and appreciations should be as agreed be



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APPENDIX P
ANNEXIRE P1 (continued)

the Supreme Allied Commanders concerned and should be confined to the highest levels practicable. Such exchange should take place in a secure oryptographic channel provided exclusively for that purpose. As a condition of such exchange, the security principles set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto shall be applied as a minimum for the handling of the material in the Commands concerned.

RELEASE OF TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY U.S. AND U.K. ORGANIZATIONS

20. The release to Third Parties in the SACEUR Command of Traffic

Intelligence produced by U.S. and U.K. organizations will, within the

limitations of the need-to-know and the provisions of Exhibits 2 and 3

hereto, be subject to the following conditions:

(a) First (releasable) Category

Class I

This consists of Y material, both end-product and technical material, produced by U.S. and U.K. Y units, and material of the same kind and supplementary to it produced by U.S. and U.K. COMINI organizations. This class will normally be released automatically in wartine but the decision to commence automatic release of this class will be subject to mutual agreement between the cognizant U.S. and U.K. COMINI authorities. All or any part of this material will be withheld at any time by both parties if either party declares that release would be hazardous to its national interests.

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APPENDIX P ANNEXURE P1 (continued)

Class II

This consists of COMINT raterial, both end-product and technical material which, although produced by a U.S. or U.K. COMINT organization other than a Y unit, would be capable of production by Y units, and which, if passed to a Y unit, would enable that unit to achieve a significantly higher degree of exploitation of its normal tasks. Both U.S. and U.K. national COMINT authorities must be in agreement before material in this class may be released. They will continuously review the class and maintain agreed lists of the material included in it.

(b) Second (Non-releasable) Category

This consists of the remainder of Traffic Intelligence not included above. It may not be released to Third Parties except as indicated in Exhibit 3 hereto.

RETEASE OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

21. Special Intelligence will only be released to Third Parties in the SACTUR Command in accordance with the provisions of Exhibit 3 hereto.

FRINCIPLES FOR DEALING WITH COMINT END-FRODUCT INTRODUCED INTO ALLIED CHANNELS BY THIRD PARTIES

22. COMINT end-product introduced by Third Parties into Allied Intelligence channels will be handled in accordance with paragraphs 20 and 21 of Exhibit 2 hereto.

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APPENDIX P ANNEXURE P1 (continued)

CO-OFFRATION IN PLANNING OF WARTIME Y STRUCTURE

It is agreed that co-operation with Third Parties in planning the wartime structure should begin in peacetime and as soon as possible, and that there should be step-by-step implementation of the SACEUR Y programme in consonance with satisfactory testing of each successive step. It is considered advantageous to establish relations with one Third Party nation at a time until all those considered eligible are included. Before making any proposals to individual Third Party nations which may necessitate the disclosure of information regarding U.S. or U.K. plans for Y, SACEUR should seek the concurrence of the U.S. or U.K. COMINT authorities.

In any approach to Third Parties within the SACEUR Command with regard to the planning of a wartime Y structure the following principles should apply:

- (a) There must be no disclosure to Third Parties of any U.S./U.K. COMINT collaboration outside the SACEUR Command, and co-operation in planning should be conducted without revealing present U.S. and U.K. COMINT successes or the scale and nature of their present and planned COMINT effort.
- (b) as a condition of co-operation in planning the

 SACEUR Y Structure Third Party nations must accept and adhere
 to minimum security regulations governing the production
 and handling of Y material.





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APPENDIX P ANNEXURE Pi (continued)

- (c) Knowledge of the details of the planning of the SACEUR Y
 Structure must be restricted to nationals of those nations
 taking part in that planning.
- 25. The planning and negotiations in any approach should be done by the SACEUR Y officer, assisted by such officers of the U.S. and U.K. services concerned as it may prove necessary to appoint. He and his staff should establish, within the framework of the agreed wartime arrangements, a skeleton organization and communications network designed to ensure the orderly expansion and effective operation of the Y structure on the outbreck of war. They should also develop such common or similar procedures as may be desirable and practicable.
- 26. In order to carry out his planning task, and in order to advise Third Party nations, the SACEUR Y officer should be provided with pertinent information on the subjects listed below. The nations concerned should each designate the authority with whom he may communicate on these and other Y matters.

Types of Y units

Number of units planned

Administration

Basic operational organization

Manpower complements (by function)

Number of intercept positions

(in broad categories, e.g. H/F Voice, D/F)
Frequency ranges of intercept equipment
Communications equipment of Y units

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APPENDIX P ANNEXURE PM (continued)

LIMITS OF PEACETIME CO-OPERATION BEYOND PLANNING THE WARTIME STRUCTURE

- 27. As planning of the wartime structure proceeds, it may become necessary to undertake further peacetime co-operation with Third Party nations contributing forces to SACEUR in order to ensure the greatest possible readiness for war.
- 28. The first phase of this further co-operation will consist of a limited exchange with Third Party nations of traffic and technical material. The raterial provided by U.S. and British COMINT authorities will consist of selected traffic and technical data designed to assist Third Party nations to train Y and Intelligence personnel for eventual service with forces under SACEUR. The commencement of this phase will be subject to the agreement of the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities and the provision of the material may be progressively expanded, within the following limitations, as specifically agreed by U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities in each case and in the following order:
 - (a) Raw traffic selected in accordance with identification criteria known to be available to the Third Party.
 - (b) Raw traffic selected in accordance with identification criteric not known to be available to the Third Party, and not involving revelation of more than low grade technical success.
 - (c) Results of traffic analysis and plain text not involving solution of complex callsign or procedure systems.
- 29. As a second phase and depending upon developments in the international situation, co-operation may later be extended by agreement of the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities within the limits agreed for warting

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APPENDIX P ANNEXURE P1 (continued)

co-operation. This second phase will be designed to cover actual needs which will by then have become apparent. It will be conditioned by the greater knowledge of Third Party activities and of the security risks involved which will have been acquired during the earlier stages of peacetime co-operation.

30. COMINT dissemination to Third Parties in peacetime, beyond that provided for above, will be governed by the principles and regulations contained in Exhibit 3 herete, and will commence on a date to be agreed by the U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities and SACEUR.

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14th February 1952

APPENDIX P Annexure Pl

DEFINITIONS

COMMUNICATION

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END-PRODUCT:

PARTICIPATING 3. NATIONS:

PROCESSING:

RAW TRAFFIC:

6.

Intelligence information and technical material resulting from the interception and study of telecommunications. (COMINT includes Y, q.v.) Intelligence information produced by COMINT activities.

Nations contributing Y activities to the SACEUR Y structure and entitled to receive the results of the COMINT arrangements for SACEUR in

The action required to produce COMINT from traffic.

Traffic showing no evidence of processing for COMINT purposes.

That COMINT which results from:

- (a) The decryption of texts in whole or in part except as provided in paragraph 11(b) below;
- (c) The decryption of callsigns or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security gradings as may be specified by USCIB and LSIB; or
- (d) The interception of certain types of transmission as may be specified by USCIB and LSIB;

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- (e) Certain categories of plain toxts, as agreed by USCIB and LSIB.
- 7. TECHNICAL MATERIAL.

Data concerning cryptographic systems, communications procedures and methods of target countries and related information.

- 8. THIRD PARTIES: =
- All individuals or authorities other than those of the United States, the British Empire, and the British Dominions.
- 9. TRAFFIC:

Interception telecommunications activity (including messages, chatter, procedure, etc.).

10. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS:™

Study of communications networks, procedure signals, callsigns, D/F bearings and other technical aids to produce information by all means short of actual decoding or decrypting of the text of intercepted communications.

11. TRAFFIC: INTELLIGENCE: That COMINT which results from

- (a) The study of procedure signals, callsigns, message headings, D/F bearings
 and other externals of communications,
 except the decryption of callsigns or
 message headings encrypted in codes or
 ciphers of high security grading as may
 be specified by USCIB and LSIB;
- (b) The decryption of the whole or parts of communications in codes or ciphers of such low security grading that they are specifically classed as Traffic Intelligence by USCIB and LSIB:

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(d) Certain categories of plain texts, as agreed by USCIB and LSIB.

- 12. WARTIME A period of actual hostilities involving SACEUR's command.
- 13. Y COMINT which mobile field units can derive from the timely processing of traffic procured by them by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing intelligence for the commanders of the forces which they are directly supporting.
- 14. Y UNITS Mobile military field units exclusively engaged in Y activity.
- Definitions marked with an asterisk will require modification or omission before being used by the Y Staff Officer in discussing arrangements with non-U.S./U.K. parties.

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APPENDIX P

Annexure Pl

EXHIBIT 2

PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF Y

INTRODUCTION

1... These principles shall be the basis in peace and war of all security regulations and policies governing the production, handling and dissemination of Y.

DEFINITION

2. Y is Communication Intelligence which mobile field units can derive from the timely processing of traffic procured by them by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing intelligence for the commanders of the forces which they are directly supporting.

It includes raw traffic, end-product, technical material, working documents and captured material used in its production. It also includes intelligence reports, appreciations and summaries based on Y unless the information is so generalized that it cannot be traced back to a particular item of Y or to Y in general.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

- Nations participating in the SACEUR Y effort must, as a condition of participation, agree to accept and adhere to these regulations.
- 4. Each country participating in the SACEUR Y effort will designate a national authority to deal with all questions of Y security and enforce these regulations.
- 5. Each national authority will designate a Y Security Officer to ... whom Y materials and communications relating thereto shall be addressed.
- 6. SACEUR will formulate and supervise compliance with security regulations and policies for Y within the SACEUR command.

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APPENDIX P Annexure P1 Exhibit 2 (continued)

7. Before an individual in any capacity has access to the knowledge or results of the SACRUR Y effort, he must be screened and cleared as being of unquestioned loyalty by his national authority. The screening must be as thorough as possible and at least as thorough as that given to individuals having access to COSMIC information. In addition to such clearance, each individual serving under SACEUR command must be specifically nominated to receive Y either by SACEUR or by the concerned national authority. Latter case the nomination must be approved by SMCHUR. In exceptional circumstances under operational conditions the above requirements for screening, clearance and nomination may be waived for those individuals appointed to certain key posts, a list of which should be drawn up by SACEUR. personnel may be given access to Y upon the authority of the appropriate . J. 198 commander.

- 8. Prior to being given access to Y, each individual will be Y indoctrinated by a special warning on the sensitivity of Y sources to compromise and be required to sign a document drawing attention to his special responsibility for safeguarding Y and to the consequences which the law or administrative or executive order of his country, or order of SACEUR, provides, if either by intent or negligence he allows Y to come to the notice of unauthorized persons. It must be stressed that there is no time limit in that the information must be safeguarded indefinitely.

 9. Distribution of Y must be on the need-to-know principle, i.e. each item of Y shall be made known only to those Y indoctrinated individuals who
- item of Y shall be made known only to those Y indoctrinated individuals who require it in the performance of their duties. SACEUR will maintain control lists of indoctrinated Y recipients in forces under his command other than those engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence.

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APPENDIX P Annexure Pi Exhibit 2 (continued)

He will ensure that the number is kept to the minimum consistent with essential intelligence and operational needs. National authorities will maintain similar lists of their own nationals and apply similar restrictions.

- 10. Y indoctrinees must not be allowed to run a greater risk of capture or interrogation by enemies or potential enemies than is absolutely necessary for the efficient performance of their duties. This must also apply to a period of six months after they have ceased to receive Y material except during active operations in cases of impelling necessity.
- 11. The greatest care must be taken not to betray Y success by actions based on it. Efforts should be made, if at all possible, to devise suitable cover, such as reconnaissance. The source should on no account be needlessly risked.
- 12. SACEUR will determine the level to which Y will be disseminated. Normally, in ground forces this will not be below a Corps. In exceptional instances, where it is essential for immediate operational purposes, information based on Y may, as specifically authorized by a Y indoctrinated commander, be disseminated below the normal level to unindoctrinated individuals provided the source is not disclosed. Where possible, names, time, positions and other data identical with that from the original text must be omitted, or, if the retention of such an item or items is essential, must be carefully paraphrased. Such information

*Note: Throughout this paper where level of command is expressed in army torns, it shall be understood to include commands in other services with equivalent requirements.

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APPENDIX P Annexure Pl Exhibit 2 (continued)

must be passed by a secure despatch service, by a secure line or in a cipher system approved by SACEMR. It must not be passed in clear by radio (including radio telephone).

13. Knowledge of the methods and scope of, and the technical material resulting from, the SACEUR Y effort will be restricted to the nations of the nations which participate in the SACEUR Y effort. Access to the Y end-product should, as far as possible, be similarly restricted.

CLASSIFICATION AND PROCEDURES:

14. All Y resulting from the SACEUR Y effort will be classified SECRET and designated by a codeword (except as provided in paragraph 19 below). The classification and the codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of Y, except that, at the discretion of the unit commender, this provision need not be applied to purely working documents within a Y unit. The codeword indicates that the material must be handled in accordance with

these principles, and used in its meaning, the codeword for Y will also bear the classification SYRFT. The codeword and its implication shall not be made known to persons not indoctrinated in Y nor shall it be used in its codeword sense in the presence of such persons.

15. In peacetime, if Y documents are to be transmitted by bag within SACEIR's Command, the route and procedure must be specially authorized by SACEIR having regard to the adequacy of the security of the route and procedure. Documents should be double-wrapped and addressed to a Y indoctrinated officer (by name, not function); the

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APPENDIX P Amerire P1 Exhibit 2 (continued)

inner envelope should bear the appropriate security classification but not the codeword. In wartime, discretion will be left to the local commander to make the most secure arrangements possible. As a minimum, documents must be sent by hand of officer or by a secure despatch service.

means or by any physical means not completely secure, a secure cryptographic channel reserved exclusively for this requirement must be used.

Participating nations must additionally ensure that when Y is similarly transmitted into, out of, or externally to the SACEUR command the cryptographic system or systems specially provided are used exclusively.

17. The highest standard of physical security must be applied to the custody of Y by national authorities and within SACEUR's command. Normally, except when in transit under conditions prescribed herein, Y materials and communications relating thereto must at all times be:

- (a) under the direct surveillance of a Y indoctrinated person responsible for their safe-keeping, or
- (b) locked in a three-combination safe accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel, or
- (c) stored in a looked compartment which is under constant surveillance by an armed sentry and which is accessible only to Y indectrinated personnel.
- 18. Y documents must be destroyed as soon as they have reased to be of use. This is particularly important in field conditions where destruction must be by fire.

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APPENDIX P Annexure Pl Exhibit 2 (continued)

- 19. In order that necessary operational use can be made of certain types of low-level tactical Y (such as D/F bearings and plain text messages) on which immediate action must obviously be taken in combat operations, SACEUR may prescribe less stringent security regulations which will permit the dissemination of such Y, without a codeword and at a classification not below Confidential, to unindoctrinated recipients who need to know.
- 20. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties participating in the Y-structure of the command should be handled in Y-channels and subjected to the security measures prescribed for handling Y. Where such Third Party COMINT is furnished by a participating National COMINT authority or organization and is of a higher grade than Y naterial produced within the Y-structure or than the COMINT supplied to the Y-organization by U.S./U.K. COMINT authorities, it will be passed through Y-channels and its distribution will be kept to a minimum.
- 21. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties not participating in the Y-structure of the command should, whenever possible, be transferred to Y-channels at the first point at which such end-product or intelligence come to the attention of Y personnel, and from that point transmitted directly to the Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer. Care should be taken not to compromise the existence of Y-channels as such. The Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer should bring any such material to the attention of the AC of S (I) for decision as to further action or dissemination.

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APPENDIX P Anneoure Pl Exhibit 2 (continued)

In deciding on such further action or dissemination the AC of S (I) will give full consideration to the need to protect COMENT.

22. National authorities and SACHIR must expand these principles into a set of regulations adapted to local conditions. Copies of the Y security regulations of each national authority will be forwarded to SACHIR through Y channels.

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BPC/F/1 14th February, 1952.

APPENDIX P

Annexure Pl

EXHIBIT 3

RELEASE OF U.S. AND U.K. COMINT END-PRODUCT TO THIRD

PARTY NATIONALS IN SACIUR COMMANDS IN PEACE

AND WAR

I. PEACETIME

TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE

- (a) Traffic Intelligence (as currently defined by USCIB and LSIB) may be passed in peacetime to Third Party nationals in SHAPE on a need-to-know basis for planning purposes under the conditions set forth below.
 - (b) When passed to Third Party nationals, Traffic
 Intelligence must be disguised effectively, in such
 a way as not to be attributable in whole or in part
 to COMINI, and must be ascribed in precise and
 positive terms to another source chosen for its
 plausibility. The disguise will include as a
 minimum:
 - (i) removing inessentials;
 - (ii) paraphrasing any remaining text, numbers and times being rounded off and, whenever possible, approximations being substituted for precise statements.
 - (c) Indoctrinated U.S. or British recipients or undisguised

 Traffic Intelligence in each Staff Division in SHAPE

 will recommend to A.C. of S. (I) SHAPE which Traffic

 Intelligence should be disseminated for planning

 purposes to Third Party nationals. A.C. of S. (I)

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will refer each case to the cognizant U.S. or U.K. national authority which originated the Traffic Intelligence (or whose COMINI units did so), asking for clearance to pass this particular Traffic Intelligence to Third Party nationals and forwarding a copy of the disguised form in which it is proposed to disseminate the information together with the proposed distribution, or requesting that it be furnished to him in disguised form.

Disguised Traffic Intelligence will not carry the Traffic (d) Intelligence codeword. When it has been disguised, and when the source to which it is to be attributed has been chosen, it will carry the security grading appropriate to that source and will normally be disseminated and handled in the manner customary for that source. Where it is considered that disguise may not be fully effective and that the intelligence should not be withheld, it shall be given special handling through S.S.O./G.C.U. channels in accordance with the following provisions:-

> the disguised Traffic Intelligence must be shown to designated Third Party nationals by the G2 or Chief Intelligence Officer or by an indoctrinated U.S. or British officer on the Staff, in order not to draw attention to the function of the S.S.O./G.C.U.; copies should not be passed to Third Party nationals for retention by them.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

2. Special Intelligence items as such will not be disseminated to Third Party nationals in peacetime in any form; however information derived from such Intelligence may be disseminated to Third Parties,

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SHAPE if it can be embodied in general intelligence summaries in such a manner as to ensure that the information carriet be traced back to COMINT in general or any specific item of COMINT. A.C. of S. (I) should inform the cognizant U.S. and U.K. national authorities of any Special Intelligence he considers should be made available, and they will make every effort to make it available in this form.

CO-ORDINATION

The U.S. and U.K. national authorities will ensure that each is informed of any action taken by the other under the above provisions, and material may be excluded from these arrangements at the request of either authority. The U.S. and U.K. national authorities will keep these arrangements under review.

II. WARTIME

TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE

``. Y.

- (a) Traffic Intelligence, as such, whether produced within SACEUR's Command or received from U.S. or U.K. national authorities, will only be disseminated to Third Parties if it falls into the first (releasable) category as defined in paragraph 20 of "COMINT APRANGEMENTS FOR SACEUR".
 - (b) Dissemination of such Traffic Intelligence to Third Parties shall be by whichever of the following channels is appropriate:
 - (i) via S.S.O./G.C.U. channels;
 - (ii) in the case of commands which contain no integrated U.S./British personnel, from the appropriate inter-allied SACEUR command;
 - (iii) from a U.S. or U.K. Y unit or COMINT unit direct to the integrated SACEUR command or formation which it supports.

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of COMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACRER) shall not be disseminated as Traffic Intelligence to Third Farty nationals in interallied SACRER commands but may be disseminated, when necessary, in accordance with the regulations set forth below for the dissemination of Special Intelligence.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

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- 5. (a) For purposes of wartime dissemination to Third Party
 nationals in inter-allied SACEUR Commands, Special Intelligence
 will be divided into two categories:
 - (i) conditionally releaseable (disguised),
 - (ii) umreleasable.
 - (b) The U.S. and U.K. COMINT authorities will currently maintain an agreed list of the material in both categories.

CONDITIONALLY RELEASABLE (DISCUISED) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

only to commands which contain an integrated U.S. or
British element, but the U.S. and U.K. national COMENT
authorities will review the situation in the light of
later circumstances. Under the conditions set forth
below disguised Special Intelligence will be passed in
wartime in inter-allied SACEUR Commands which include
U.S. and British elements down to Army level for ground
forcest on a strict need-to-know basis through the
S.S.O./G.C.U. system.

*Note: Throughout this paper where level of command is expressed in army terms, it shall be understood to include commands in other services with equivalent requirements.

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- (b) Except as provided for in paragraph 8(a) below, disguised Special Intelligence may only be disseminated to Third Party nationals in such a way as not to be attributable in whole or in part to COMINT. Disguising shall include as a minimum:
 - (i) removing inessentials;
 - (ii) paraphrasing the remaining text, numbers and times being rounded off and, whenever possible, approximations being substituted for precise statements;
 - (iii) ascribing the item in precise and positive terms to another source which is chosen for its plausibility and which, by the special security handling arrangements normally prescribed for it, will permit retention only by U.S. or British nationals.
- (c) Disguising of conditionally releasable Special Intelligence will be the responsibility of the cognizant U.S. and U.K. national authorities who will make suitable arrangements to prevent the circulation of more than one disguised version of the same item.
- (d) Disguised Special Intelligence will be disseminated with a security grading appropriate to its ascribed source and handled in a manner consistent with that source. Copies of disguised Special Intelligence will not be passed to Third Parties for their retention.
- (e) Disguised Special Intelligence will not carry the Special Intelligence codeword and will be the only version used for inter-allied purposes in all inter-allied SACEUR commands. The disguised version will also be made available to U.S. and U.K. national Intelligence agencies.

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(f) The undisguised versions of these items will also be passed to the S.S.O./G.C.U. They will carry the Special Intelligence codeword

(g)

need-to-know basis to:

- (i) officers of Third Parties holding the posts of
 Commander, Deputy Commander, Thief of Staff, G2,
 G3, G5 and Signals Officer (or their equivalents);
- (ii) additional Third Party officers, nominated by

 MCEUR on the recommendation of an appropriate highranking British or U.S. Officer. Such Third Party

 officers must be approved by name by USCIB and

 LSIB, or in exceptional circumstances by one of these
 only.
- (h) A list of Third Party officers entitled to see disguised

 Special Intelligence will be maintained by the S.S.O./.G.C.U.

 and reported back periodically to USCIB and LSTB.
 - (i) Except as provided for in the above paragraphs relevant to Third Party nationals, disguised.

 Special Intelligence must be given the same treatment as any other form of Special Intelligence.

FMERGENCY PROCEDURE

7. In exceptional instances indoctrinated U.S. or British commanders at the level of Army or higher may pass releasable Special Intelligence in operational orders or other communications to Third Party nationals

See note on page 4.

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who urgently require it for purposes of vital operational importance. Such orders or communications will be so worded that if they be captured the source could not be identified as Special Intelligence. Only essential specific items will be transmitted, and names, times positions and other data from the original texts will be paraphrased as far as possible.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ESSENTIAL TO THE SACTER Y EFFORT

- 8. Information from Special Intelligence essential to the SACEUR
 Y effort may be disseminated by U.S./U.K. national authorities in either
 of two ways:
 - (a) if it can plausibly be represented as the result of further processing of Y material at national centres, or if it can be represented as arising from captured documents, and if there is no reason why it should not come to the knowledge of Third Parties, it will be made available, on a need-to-know basis, to Third Party as well as U.S. and British participants in the SACEMR Y effort,
 - (b) if the above is not applicable, it will be passed by

 TOP SECRET COMINT channels to an authorized Special

 Intelligence Recipient addressed by name at U.S. and

 British Y units with a need to know; the recipient will

 exercise the utmost discretion when applying if he

 considers it necessary to apply the Special Intelligence

 information to the Y effort of his unit. Under no

 circumstances will raterial in this second category

 be made available to Third Party nationals.

SPECIAL WEATHER INTELLIGENCE

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10. It is realized that the arrangements for the wartime dissemination of Special Intelligence as defined above may need revision in the light of experience and future conditions, even to the extent of indoctrinating fully a limited number of specified foreign nationals in highly responsible positions within the SACEUR Command.

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APPENDIX P

ANNEXURE P2

COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACLANT

I. GENERAL

- 1. The following principles affecting the COMINT arrangements for SACLANT apply to planning for wartime except insofar as provision is made in paragraphs 26 28 below for additional peacetime cooperation. They will be the basis on which Chandian/U.K./U.S. COMINT authorities will negotiate with SACLANT and on which subsequent negotiations with Third Party nations should be conducted. They alterations in principle: which may become necessary as the result of these negotiations will be agreed among Candian/U.K/U.S. COMINT authorities and appropriate amendment made herein.
- 2. In order that the arrangements contained herein may be effective on the outbreak of war, it will be necessary to initiate planning in peacetime with the Third Party nations concerned. This planning activity should begin as soon as possible.
- 3. In order to promote the greatest possible readiness for war, it may be necessary to extend this peacetime cooperation beyond the stage of planning. The decision when to enter upon this second stage will be taken by Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT authorities at some later date in the light of the then prevailing international situation and of the experience gained in the course of cooperation with Third Party nations on COMINT planning.

NOTE: Pertinent definitions for the purpose of this paper are given in Exhibit 1 hereto.



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II. DETAILED PROPOSALS

SACIANT Y STRUCTURE

- 4. The SACIANT Y Structure should have the following elements:
- a. A senior Y officer at SACIANT Headquarters (SACIANT Y Officer) assisted by a Y staff.
- b. Y Officers and Y Staffs, where required, at headquarters of major subordinate Commanders under SACIANT.
 - National Y units provided for support of SACLANT forces.
- 5. It is recommended that the responsibility for formulating and implementing SACIANT Y policy lie with A. C. of S. (I), SACIANT.

 PARTICIPATION IN SACIANT Y STRUCTURE
- Participation in the SACLANT Y Structure, including Y staffs, should be open to all nations contributing combat forces to SACLANT command, together with Y units adequate for their direct support, or contributing Y units for general support of the SACLANT command. shall be a condition of participation that these nations undertake to enforce appropriate security measures as set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto, and also undertake to apply the principles set forth therein, as a Participation minimum, to all other COMINT activities under their control. in the activities of the S.CLANT Y Structure should be limited to those nations whose geographical location and Y units can, in SACLANT's opinion, contribute to the overall effectiveness of the structure. Participation only in the shore-based direction finder operations will • : .. • not necessarily entitle a nation or its nationals to receive other types of Y information.
- 7. Each participating nation should provide and maintain its own Y units contributed for the support of SACLANT, or of forces under his command, and should ensure their operational efficiency.





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FUNCTIONS OF THE SACIANT HEADQUARTERS Y STAFF

- 8. Within the limits of agreed cooperation, the functions of the SACLANT Headquarters Y Officer and Staff should include:
- a. Effecting any necessary general coordination of the SACIANT Y effort;
- b. Establishing as far as national differences permit uniform operational procedures between Y units of different nations;
- c. Giving technical advice as required to the SACLANT

 Headquarters Intelligence Staff on the interpretation of Y information

 received by SACLANT Headquarters, and arranging for the SACLANT

 Headquarters Intelligence Staff to receive all the Y information available in

 the SACLANT Command which may be of value to it;
- d. Formulating and supervising compliance with security regulations and policies governing the production, handling, and dissemination of Y material within the Saclant Command in accordance with the agreed security principles in Exhibit 2 hereto.
- e. Arranging for Y units to receive such technical material and end-products, whether produced in the SACLANT Command or received from national sources, as may be necessary for efficient conduct of their operations.
- f. Establishing and stating to the appropriate authorities requirements for special communications and crypto-channels as necessary to meet operational and security requirements of the Y effort within SACLANT's Command.
- g. Subject to security regulations, maintaining effective liaison with other activities, such as radio warfare, which may relate to or affect the discharge of his COMINT responsibilities. (Arrangements in this paper do not include radio warfare.)





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h. Arranging, within the procedures stipulated by NATO, for material of technical COMINT interest, including prisoner of war interrogations, prisoner of war reports, and captured documents and equipment to be made immediately available as appropriate to the elements of the SACIANT Y Structure and to national COMINT authorities.

FUNCTIONS OF Y STAFFS AT SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

- 9. Y Officers and Y Staffs at subordinate commands should perform functions corresponding to those of the Y staff at SACLANT Headquarters.

 FUNCTIONS OF Y UNITS
- 10. Y units should intercept and process material and provide D/F information to meet the requirements prescribed by SACLANT. Any combination of Y units of one nationality with those of another will be subject to agreement of cognizant national COMINT authorities if required.

 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
- 11. International cooperation in Y within SaCLANT's Command is expected to consist of:
- a. Coordinated shore-based direction finder operations by national nets and stations organized and controlled as mutually agreed among the participating nations.
- b. Direction finder and intercept operations in allied vessels.
- c. Interception and processing by national Y units of enemy communications of tactical interest to Saclant.
- d. Certain exchange and coordination with SACEUR'S Y structure.



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COMINT UNITS IN THE SACLANT AREA NOT ENGAGED IN SUPPORT OF FORCES UNDER SACLANT

- 12. Each nation with forces serving under SACLANT may individually arrange to operate in SACLANT's area national COMINT units not provided specifically or exclusively for support of the forces under SACLANT.

 These units will not operate as part of the SACLANT Y structure, and will not be subject to the arrangements for inter-allied cooperation unless agreed by the nations providing them.
- 13. Canada, U.K., and U.S. will maintain an operational separation and, insofar as practicable, a physical separation between the Y units and their national COMINT units.
- 14. It is recognized that certain COMINT units at the higher levels would be directly supporting both SACIANT and their national COMINT organizations. Each participating nation would have discretion about such matters as the right of access of other nationals to these units.

 COOPERATION WITH THIRD PARTIES WITHIN SACIANT Y STRUCTURE
- 15. Gooperation with Third Parties within the SACLANT Y structure should be confined within the limits necessary to neet the essential Y needs of SACLANT and the forces under his command and must not reveal that there is COMINT collaboration among Canada, U.K., and U.S. outside the sphere of Y. Within the limits agreed for the release of COMINT material produced by Canadian/U.K./U.S. organizations (see paragraphs 20 and 21 below), cooperation with Third Parties should be wholehearted.
- 16. The channels for the provision of technical material to Third Parties from Canadian/U.K./U.S. national COMINT sources should be via the SACLANT Y staff.

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17. Insofar as consistent with the agreed limits for the release of Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT, and in order to secure the necessary degree of uniformity, Third Parties should be persuaded to adopt certain common operational procedures.

MOVEMENT OF Y MATERIAL BETWEEN UNITS UNDER SACIANT AND THIRD PARTY NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

18. The Y units and Y staffs of the participating nations would be at liberty to pass to their own national COMINT organizations and to other participating nations, but to those nations only, the technical material and traffic produced or received by themselves. The national COMINT organizations of the participating nations should in turn provide such technical support both to their own Y units and through the SACLANT Y staff to the Y units of other participating nations as they may consider would be appropriate and of assistance to the Y effort under SACLANT.

Such material shall be handled in accordance with the regulations in Exhibit 2 hereto.

EXCHANGE OF INTERNALLY PRODUCED COMINT END-PRODUCTS BETWEEN SACLANT AND OTHER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS

produced COMINT end-products and intelligence summaries based thereon should be as agreed between the Supreme Allied Commanders concerned and should be confined to the highest levels practicable. Such exchange should take place in a secure cryptographic channel provided exclusively for such material. As a condition of such exchange, the security principles set forth in Exhibit 2 hereto shall be applied as a minimum for the handling of the material in the Commands concerned.

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RELEASE OF TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY CANADIAN/U.K./U.S. ORGANIZATIONS

20. The release to Third Parties in the SACLANT Command of Traffic Intelligence produced by Canadian/U.K./U.S. organizations will, within the limitations of the need-to-know and the provisions of Exhibit 2 and 3 hereto, be subject to the following conditions:

a. First (releasable) Category

Class I

This commists of Y material, both end-products and technical material, produced by Canadian/U.K./U.S. Y units, and material of the same kind and supplementary to it produced by national Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT organizations. This class will normally be released automatically in martise but the decision to commence automatic release of this class will be subject to mutual agreement among the cognizant Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINF authorities. All or any part of this material will be withheld at any time by these parties if one party declares that release would be hazardous to its mational interests. Class II

This consists of COMINT material, both end-products and technical material which, although produced by a Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMINT Organization other than a Y unit, would be capable of production by Y units, and which, if passed to a Y unit, would enable that unit to achieve a significantly higher degree of exploitation of its normal tasks.

Canadian/U.K./U.S. national COMINT authorities must be in agreement before material in this class may be released. They will continuously review the class and maintain agreed lists of the material included in it.

b. Second (Non-releasable) Category

This consists of the remainder of Traffic Intelligence not included above. It may not be released to Third Parties except a findicated in Exhibit 3 hereto.

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RELEASE OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

21. Special Intelligence will only be released to Third Parties in the SACLANT Command in accordance with the provisions of Exhibit 3 bereto

PRINCIPLES FOR DEALING WITH COMINT END-PRODUCT INTRODUCED INTO ALLIED CHANNELS BY THIRD PARTIES

22. COMINT end-product introduced by Third Parties into Allied Intelligence channels will be handled in accordance with paragraphs 20 and 21 of Exhibit 2 hereto.

COOPERATION IN PLANNING OF WARTIME Y STRUCTURE

- 23. It is agreed that cooperation with Third Parties in planning the wartine structure should begin in peacetime and as soon as possible, and that there should be step-by-step implementation of the SACLANT Y program in consonance with satisfactory testing of each successive step. It is considered advantageous to establish relations with one Third Party nation at a time until all those considered eligible are included. Before making any proposals to individual Third Party nations which may necessitate the disclosure of information regarding Canadian/U.K. or U.S. plans for Y. SACLANT should seek the concurrence of Canadian, U.K. or U.S. COMENT authorities.
- 24. In any approach to Third Parties within the SACLANT Command with regard to the planning of a wartime Y structure the following principles should apply:
- Canadian/U.K./U.S. COMENT collaboration outside the SACIANT

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revealing present Conndian/U.K./U.S. COMINT successes or the scale and nature of their present and planned COMINT effort.

- b. As a condition of cooperation in planning the SACLANT Y structure Third Party nations must accept and adhere to minimum security regulations governing the production and handling of Y material.
- c. Knowledge of the details of the planning of the SACLINT Y structure must be restricted to nationals of those nations taking part in that planning.
- 25. The planning and negotiations in any approach should be done by the SACLANT Y officer, assisted by such officers of the Canadian/U.K./U.S. Services concerned as it may prove necessary to appoint. He and his staff should establish, within the framework of the agreed wartime arrangements, a skeleton organization designed to ensure the orderly expansion and effective operation of the Y structure on the outbreak of war. They should also develop such common or similar procedures as may be desirable and practicable.
- 26. In order to carry out his planning task, and in order to advise Third Party nations, the SACLANT Y officer should be provided with pertinent information on the subjects listed below. The nations concerned should each designate the authority with whom he may communicate on these and other Y matters.

Types of Y units

Number of units planned

Administration

Basic operational organization

Manpower complements (by function)





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Number of intercept positions
(in broad categories, e.g., H/F Voice, D/F
Frequency ranges of intercept equipment
Communications equipment of Y units

PEACETIME COMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACLANT

- 27. It is recognized that in addition to the necessity to plan for wartime COMINT cooperation within SACIANT, peacetime COMINT arrangements for SACIANT should be developed in order to promote readiness for wartime operations. The progressive of phased implementation of such arrangements should be accomplished, within the limits of agreed wartime cooperation, in accordance with the procedures described below.
- 28. The Yactivities included in the SACLANT Y structure, should be organized and conducted in peacetime as follows:

a. Phase I -

A SACIANT Y Officer should be appointed to begin laying the groundwork for agreed wartime arrangements, for SACIANT to obtain the results of national shore-based direction finder operations. SACIANT should keep COMINT authorities of participating nations advised of the progress of any planning or arrangements with other NATO members that affects them. Nations concerned should each designate an authority with whom the SACIANT Y Officer can communicate on direction finder matters.

b. Phase II -

When the above arrangements for shorebased direction finder operations are made, the SACLANT Y Officer should arrange for



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operational drills during NATO exercises or maneuvers.+

+ The use of information based on D/F and shipborne intercept operations will be in accordance with the following provisions:

- 1. Shorebased D/F Operations. Fixes and the fully evaluated results of shorebased D/F operations, during NATO exercises or maneuvers, may be passed to nationals of those nations participating in the D/F operations. During the exercises, information resulting irom D/F fixes may be passed to nationals of nations participating in the exercises, even though these nations do not participate in the D/F operations, when the following conditions are fulfilled:
 - (i) When specifically authorized by SACLANT.
 - (ii) When a real advantage to the exercise then in progress would accrue, and
 - (iii) When the intelligence can be attributed to another source, or, if this is not possible, the true source is not stated.

During post-exercise conference, shorebased D/F information or results may be disclosed to nationals of nations not participating in the D/F operations only as already disclosed in the course of the exercise. (This is not to prohibit the use, during post-exercise conferences, of intelligence or situation summaries issued to all participating units in the exercise).

2. Shipborne D/F and Interception. During exercises, results of shipborne D/F operations and the shipborne interception of plain text or self-evident code messages may be passed to nationals of those nations participating in the exercise. The analyzed results of shipborne D/F and interception operations may be made available in post-exercise conference without restriction.

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Phase III

Depending on developments in the international situation, cooperation may later be extended within the agreed limits of wartime cooperation by Canadian/U.K./U.S. agreement as actual needs develop and as increased knowledge of Third Party activities, acquired during organization and planning, provides a better basis for assessing the security risks involved.

Coordination between SACEUR and SACIANT to ensure consonance of practices will be required.

29. The dissemination of COMINT to Third Parties in SACIANT's Command in peacetime will be as indicated in Exhibit 3.







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Annexure P2

EXHIBIT 1

DEFINITIONS

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

Information and technical material resulting from the interception and study of telecommunications for intelligence purposes. (COMINT includes Y, q.v.)

- Intelligence information produced by COMINT activities.
- PARTICIPATING NATIONS:
- Nations contributing Y activities to the SACLANT Y structure and entitled to receive the results of the COMINT arrangements for SACLANT in accordance with agreed conditions.
- PROCESSING:
- The action required to produce COMENT from
- RAW TRAFFIC:
- Traffic showing no evidence of processing for
- That COMINT which results from:
- INTELLIGENCE:
- (a) The decryption of texts in whole or in part except as provided in paragraph 11(b)

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- (c) The decryption of callsigns or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security gradings as may be specified by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB; or
- (d) The interception of certain types of transmission as may be specified by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB;
- (e) Certain categories of plain texts, as agreed by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB.
- 7. TECHNICAL Data concerning cryptographic systems,

 Communications procedures and methods of target


 countries, and related information.
- 8. THIRD PARTIES: * All individuals or authorities other than those of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 9. TRAFFIC: Intercepted telecommunications activity (including messages, chatter, procedure, etc.).
- Study of communications networks, procedure signals, callsigns, D/F bearings, and other technical aids to produce information by all means short of actual decoding or decrypting of the text of intercepted communications.
- 11. TRAFFIC That COMINT which results from:
 - (a) The study of procedure signals, callsigns, message headings, D/F bearings, and other

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externals of communications, except the decryption of callsigns or message headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security grading as may be specified by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB;

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are specifically classed as Traffic Intelligence
by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB;

- (d) Certain categories of plain texts, as agreed by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB.
- 12. WARTIME: A period of actual hostilities involving SACLANT's command.
- 13. I: COMENT derived from the timely processing of traffic procured by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing tactical intelligence for the commanders of the combat forces.
- 14. Y UNITS: COMINT units engaged in the production of Y.
- * Definitions marked with an asterisk will require modification or omission before being used by the Y Staff Officer in discussing arrangements with non-Canadian/U.K./U.S. parties.

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APPENDIX P

Amnexire P2

EXFIBIT 2

SUCURITY PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF Y

INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis in peace and war of all security regulations and policies governing the production, landling, and dissemination of Y.

DEFINITION

- 2. Y is Communication Intelligence derived from the timely processing of traffic produced by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of providing tactical intelligence for the commanders of combat forces. It includes raw traffic, end-products, technical material, working documents, and captured material used in its production. It also includes intelligence reports and summeries based on Y unless the information is so generalized that it cannot be traced back to a particular item of Y or to Y in general.

 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION
- 3. Nations participating in the SACLANT Y effort must, as a condition of participation agree to accept and adhere to these principles.
- 4. Each country participating in the SACLANT Y effort will designate a national authority to deal with all questions of Y security and enforce these principles.
- 5. Each national authority will designate a Y Security
 Officer to whom Y materials and communications relating thereto
 shall be addressed.

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- 6. SACLANT will formulate and supervise compliance with security regulations and policies for Y within the SACLANT command.
- Before an individual in any capacity has access to the 7. knowledge or results of the Saclant Y effort, he must be screened and cleared as being of unquestioned loyalty by his national authority. The screening must be as thorough as possible and at least as thorough as that given to individuals having access to COSMIC information. addition to such clearance, these individuels serving under SACLANT's Command must be specifically nominated to receive Y either by SACHANT or by the concerned national authority. In the latter case the nomination must be approved by SACIANT. In exceptional circumstances under operational conditions the above requirements for screening. clearance and nomination may be waived for those individuals appointed to certain key posts, a list of which should be drawn up by SMCTANT. personnel may be given access to Y upon the authority of the appropriate commander.
- 8. Prior to being given access to Y, each individual will be Y indoctrinated by a special warning on the sensitivity of Y sources to compromise and be required to sign a document drawing attention to his special responsibility for safeguarding Y and to the consequences which the law or administrative or executive order of his country, or order of SACIANT, provides, if either by intent or negligence he allows Y to come to the notice of unauthorized persons. It must be stressed that there is no time limit in that the information must be safeguarded indefinitely.
- 9. Distribution of Y must be on the need-to-know principle,
 i.e., each item of Y shall be made known only to those Y indoctrinated
 individuals who require it in the performance of their duties. SACIANT
 will maintain control lists of indoctrinated Y recipients in forces under

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his command other than those engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence. He will ensure that the number is kept to the minimum consistent with essential intelligence and operational needs. National authorities will maintain similar lists of their own nationals and apply similar restrictions.

- 10. Y indoctriness must not be allowed to run a greater risk of capture or interrogation by enemies or potential enemies than is absolutely necessary for the efficient performance of their duties. This must also apply to a period of six months after they have ceased to receive Y material except during active operations in cases of impalling necessity.
- 11. The greatest care must be taken not to betray Y success by actions based on it. Efforts should be made, if at all possible, to devise suitable cover, such as reconnaissance. The source should on no account be needlessly risked.
- seminated. In exceptional instances, where it is essential for immediate operational purposes, information based on Y may, as specifically authorized by a Y indoctrinated commander, be disseminated below the normal level to unindoctrinated individuals provided the source is not disclosed. Where possible, names, times, positions, and other data identical with that from the original text must be omitted, or, if the retention of such an item or items is essential, must be carefully paraphrased. Such information must be passed by a secure courier service, by a secure line, or in a cipher system approved by SACIANT. It must not be passed in clear by radio (including radio telephone).

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- 13. Knowledge of the methods and scope of, and the technical material resulting from the SACIANT Y effort will be restricted to the nationals of the nations which participate in the SACIANT Y effort. Access to the Y end-products should, as far as possible, be similarly restricted.
- classified SECRET and designated by a codeword (except as provided in paragraph 19 below). The classification and the codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of Y, except that, at the discretion of the unit commander, this provision need not be applied to purely working documents within a Y unit. The codeword indicates that the material must be handled in accordance with regulations based on these principles and when used in its codeword sense will also bear the classification SECRET. The codeword and its implication shall not be made known to persons not indoctrinated in Y nor shall it be used in its codeword sence in the presence of such persons.
- by bag within SACLANT's Command, the route and procedure must be specially authorized by SACLANT, having regard to the adequacy of the security of the route and procedure. Documents should be double-wrapped and addressed to a Y indoctrinated officer (by name, not function); the inner envelope should bear the appropriate security classification but not the codeword. In wartime, discretion will be left to the local commander to make the most secure arrangements possible. As a minimum, documents must be sent by hand of officer or by a secure courier service.

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- 16. Except in the exceptional instances described in Peregraph 12, if Y is transmitted within SACLANT's command by electrical means or by any physical means not completely secure, it must be encrypted in a secure cryptographic channel reserved exclusively for this requirement. Participating nations must additionally ensure that when Y is transmitted into, out of, or externally to the SACIANT command it is encrypted in a cryptographic channel specially approved by SACLANT for this purpose.
- The highest standard of physical security must be 17. applied to the custody of Y by national authorities and within SacianT's command. Normally, except when in transit under conditions prescribed herein. Y materials and communications relating thereto must at all times be:
- (a) under the direct surveillance of a Y indoctrinated person responsible for their safe-keeping, or
- (b) locked in a three-combination safe accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel, or
- stored in a locked compartment which is under (a) constant surveillance by an armed sentry and which is accessible only to Y indoctrinated personnel.
- Y documents must be destroyed as soon as they have ceased to be of use. This is particularly important under hazardous conditions.
- In order that necessary operational use can be made of certain types of low-level tactical Y (such as Direction finder results and plain text messages) on which immediate action must obviously be taken in combat operations, SACLANT may permit the

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dissemination of such Y, without a codeword and at a classification not below Confidential, to unindoctrinated recipients who need to know.

20. COMINT and-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties participating in the Y-structure of the command should be handled in Y-channels and subjected to the security measures prescribed for handling Y. Where such Third Party COMINT is furnished by a participating National COMINT authority or organization and is of a higher grade than Y material produced within the Y-structure or than the COMINT supplied to the Y-organization by US/UK/Canadian COMINT authorities, it will be passed through Y channels and its distribution will be kept to a minimum.

21. COMINT end-product or intelligence based on COMINT introduced into Allied intelligence channels by Third Parties not participating in the Y-structure of the command should, whenever possible, be transferred to Y-channels at the first point at which such end-product or intelligence come to the attention of Y personnel, and from that point transmitted directly to the Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer. Care should be taken not to compromise the existence of Y channels as such. The Supreme Allied Commander's Y Officer should bring any such material to the attention of the AC of S(I) for decision as to further action or dissemination. In deciding on such further action or dissemination, the AC of S(I) will give full consideration to the need to protect COMENT.

22. National authorities and SACLANT must expand these principles into a set of regulations adapted to local conditions. Copies of the Y security regulations of each national authority will be forwarded to SACLANT through Y channels.

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Annexure P2

EXHIBIT 3

RELEASE OF CANADIAN/U.K./U.S. COMINT END-

PRODUCTS TO THIRD PARTY NATIONALS IN SACLANT COMMANDS

IN PEACE AND WAR

I. PEACETIME

TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE

- la. Traffic Intelligence (as currently defined by CRC, LSIB, and USCIB) may be passed in peacetime to Third Party nationals in SACLANT's Headquarters on a need-to-know basis for planning purposes under the conditions set forth below.
- b. When passed to Third Party nationals, Traffic Intelligence must be disguised effectively, in such a way as not to be attributable in whole or in part to COMINT, and must be ascribed in precise and positive terms to another source chosen for its plausibility. The disguise will include as a minimum:
 - removing inessentials:
 - (2) paraphrasing any remaining text; rounding off numbers and times; and, whenever possible, substituting approximations for precise statements.
- c. Indootrinated Canadian/U.K./U.S. recipients of undisguised Traffic Intelligence in each Staff Division in SACLANT Headquarters will recommend to Λ.C. of S.(I), which Traffic Intelligence should be disseminated for planning purposes to Third Perty nationals. Λ.C. of S.(I) will refer each case to the cognizant Canadian/U.K./U.S. national





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authority which originated the Traffic Intelligence (or whose COMINT units did so), asking for clearance to pass this particular Traffic Intelligence to Third Party nationals and either forwarding a copy of the disguised form in which it is proposed to disseminate the information, together with the proposed distribution, or requesting that it be furnished to him in disguised form.

d. Disguised Traffic Intelligence will not carry the Traffic Intelligence codeword. When it has been disguised, and when the source to which it is to be attributed has been chosen, it will carry the security grading appropriate to that source and will normally be disseminated and handled in the manner customary for that source. Where it is considered that disguise may not be fully effective but that the intelligence should not be withheld, it may be shown to designated Third Party nationals by the A.C. of S.(I) or Chief Intelligence Officer, or by an indoctrinated Canadian/U.K./U.S. officer on the Staff, provided that the national COMINT authority concerned has approved; copies may not be passed to Third Party nationals for retention by them.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

2. Special Intelligence items as such will not be disseminated to Third Party nationals in peacetime in any form; however, information derived from such intelligence may be disseminated to nationals of Third Farties in SACLANT's Headquarters on a need-to-know basis for planning purposes if it can be embodied in general intelligence summaries in such a manner as to ensure that the information cannot be traced back to COMINT in general or any specific item of COMINT. A.C. of S.(I) should inform the cognizant

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Canadian/U.K./U.S. national authorities of any Special Intelligence he considers should be made available, and they will make every effort to make it available in this form.

COORDINATION

3. Cognizant Canadian/U.K./U.S. national authorities will ensure that each is informed of any action taken by the others under the above provisions, and material may be excluded from these arrangements at the request of one of the authorities. Canadian/U.K./U.S. national authorities will keep these arrangements under review.

II. WARTIME

TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE

- La. Direction finder results may be transmitted without a COMINT codeword, but suitably classified, to allied commanders and units who need to know. Intelligence based on or incorporating D/F results but containing no material requiring the COMINT codeword, suitably classified may also be so transmitted.
- b. Traffic Intelligence, as such, received from Canadian/U.K./U.S. national authorities, will only be disseminated to nationals of Third Parties if it falls into the first (releasable) category as defined in paragraph 20 of "COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACIANT."
- c. Dissemination of such Traffic Intelligence to Third Parties: shall be by whichever of the following channels is appropriate: :
 - (1) via special COMINT chamnels (i.e. U.S.-SSO System, U.K.-GCU System, etc)







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- (2) In the case of commands which contain no integrated Canadian/U.K./U.S. personnel, from the appropriate inter-allied SACLANT command;
- (3) from a Canadian/U.K./U.S. Y unit or COMINT unit direct to the integrated SACLANT command or formation which it supports.
- d. Second Category Traffic Intelligence (see paragraph 20 of COMINT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACLANT) shall not be disseminated as Traffic Intelligence to Third Party nationals in inter-allied SACLANT Commands; however information derived from such traffic intelligence may be disseminated on a strict need-to-know basis to nationals of Third Parties in SACLANT's Command if it can be embodied in general intelligence surmaries or operation plans and orders in such a manner as to ensure that the information cannot be traced back to COMINT in general or to any specific item of COMINT.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

5. Special intelligence as such may not be disseminated to any national of Third Parties in SACLANT's Command in any form except as provided in paragraph 8 below; however, information derived from special intelligence may be disseminated to nationals of Third Parties in SACLANT's Command on a strict need-to-know basis if it can be embodied in general intelligence summaries or operation plans and orders in such a manner as to ensure that the information cannot be traced back or attributed to COMINT in general or to any specific item of COMINT.



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EMERGENCY PROCEDURE

6. In exceptional instances indoctrinated Canadian/U.K./U.S. commanders may pass releasable Special Intelligence in operational orders or other communications to Third Party nationals who urgently require it for purposes of vital operational importance. Such orders or communications will be so worded that if they be compromised the source could not be identified as Special Intelligence. Only essential specific items will be transmitted, and names, times, positions, and other data from the original texts will be paraphrased as far as possible.

DISSEMINATION BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIRD PARTY ARRANGEMENTS

- 7. Special Intelligence will be passed to SACLANT Commands in accordance with separate arrangements for exchange and dissemination within SACLANT's Command of COMINT beyond the scope of Third Party collaboration.

 SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ESSENTIAL TO THE SACLANT Y RELORT
- 8. Information from Special Intelligence essential to the SACLANT Y effort may be disseminated by CANADIAN/U.K./U.S. national authorities in either of two ways:
- a. if it can plausibly be represented as the result of further processing of Y material at national centres, or if it can be represented as arising from captured documents, and if there is no reason why it should not come to the knowledge of nationals of Third Farties, it will be made available on a need-to-know basis and appropriately classified to Third Party as well as Canadian, U.K., and U.S. participants in the SACLANT Y effort;
- b. if it cannot be represented as in a, above, it will be passed by TOP SECRET COMINT channels to an authorised Special Intelligence Recipient addressed by name at Canadian, U.K., and U.S. Y units with a





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
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need-to-know; the recipient will exercise the utnost discretion when applying-if he considers it necessary to apply-the Special Intelligence information to the Y effort of his unit. Under no circumstances will material in this second category be made available to Third Party nationals.

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CHANGES IN PHRASEOLOGY IN APPENDIX Q

- 1. The Conference recommends the following changes in phraseology to clarify references to British Commonwealth Countries in paragraphs 11 16 of Appendix Q. The changes, which are in fact insertions in all cases, are underlined below:
 - a. The title of para. 11 to read:

 "PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION AMONG COMINT CENTRES OF THE

 U.S., AND THE U.K. AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES".
 - b. The first sentence of para. 11 to begin:"Other British Commonwealth etc."
 - c. The second sentence of para. 11 to read in part: "traffic and technical material with other Commonwealth centres etc."
 - d. The subheading within para. 11 to read:

 "PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION AMONG THE U.S., AND THE U.K.

 AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OVERSEAS NATIONAL COMINT CENTRES.
 - e. The title of para. 13 to read in part:

 "PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION AMONG THE U.S., AND THE U.K.

 AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH etc."
 - f. The first sentence of para. 13 to read in part:
 "involving both U.S. and British Commonwealth forces etc."
 - g. The first sentence of para. 14 to read in part:

 "co-operation among the U.S., and the U.K. and other

 Commonwealth etc."

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12th February, 1952.

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ORGANIZATION OF U.S. -BRITISH COMMUNICATION

INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION IN WAR.

INTRODUCTION

- 1. The U.S.-British Communication Intelligence Agreement of 1946, the Appendices thereto, and the operating arrangements based thereon will continue to be the main basis of relations between the two parties in war.
- 2. In interpretation of this agreement and as an additional Appendix thereto, the general principles and considerations stated below provide for particular spheres of wartime collaboration between the two parties.
- The implementation of these principles will be conditioned by theatres of operation involved, by international agreements in specific cases and by enemy communications and cryptographic practices. These factors will affect such important particulars as geographical locations, the responsibilities of the COMINT units involved, and the degree and scope of exchange and COMINT distribution.
- 4. The aim of the two parties is to ensure that the greatest possible contribution consistent with security is made by their combined COMINT effort to the prosecution of a war.
- 5. Normally, collaboration will be effected through co-ordination of the appropriate COMINT organizations. However, where necessary and feasible, COMINT organizations may be integrated on a U.S.-British basis.
- 6. Arrangements in national territories or in theatres in which the forces of only one of the nations are engaged are not subject to the special principles stated in this Appendix.

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PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL COMINT

- 7. Both parties will remain free to require their national COMINT Centres both at home and overseas to undertake any task relevant to their national worldwide interests, and to set up such additional centres as may be necessary. Subject to this overriding principle, there will be a broad division of tasks between the national Centres which will undertake the greatest possible number of fixed commitments, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Introduction to these Appendices.
- In view of the geographical location of GCHQ with respect to the European theatre, and in consideration of the U.S. Forces involved, the U.S., in the event of a general war in Europe or the Middle East between the Western Powers and the Russian Bloc, will immediately undertake to augment that part of GCHQ producing COMINT relevant to the war in these areas by the provision of a substantial number of COMINT processing personnel as required, and of such equipment as may then be determined to be both feasible and profitable. The U.S. will participate with an equal voice in the determination of priorities and allocation of resources with respect to the combined COMINT effort at GCHQ. . The intercept resources of the U.S. and U.K. which are essential for coverage of EUROPE and contiguous areas will become available to the combined COMINT effort at GCHQ, except for those required and reserved for direct support of the field forces of either nation or reserved for other purposes by either party. That part reserved for the latter purpose will be co-ordinated with those supporting the combined effort at GCHQ. Traffic from all sources will be made available to both ABSA and GCHQ to the extent required and possible.

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The complete end-product of the combined effort at CCHQ will be made immediately available to the intelligence organizations of both nations.

9. In the event of GCHQ being disabled for any reason during the war, the combined effort will be transferred to such other centre as may be mutually agreed.

In addition to undertaking tasks on a worldwide basis, AFSA will in particular be the principal centre for U.S. and British exploitation of all grades of COMINT relevant to the British personnel may be integrated in it to assist in this work. It is recognized that its greater invulnerability to enemy action will make it necessary for it to duplicate much of the work undertaken at GCHQ.

PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION AMONG COMINT CENTRES OF THE U.S., U.A. AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

II. British Commonwealth countries may be included in the collaboration of U.S. and U.K. National COMINT Centres as agreed by the National COMINT authorities of all parties concerned. Within the limits so agreed, exchanges of end-product, traffic, and technical material with Commonwealth centres will be as complete as required and mutually agreed. In addition, working parties of one nation may be assigned to national COMINT centres of another nation as mutually agreed.

PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION AMONG U.S., U.K. AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OVERSEAS NATIONAL COMINT CENTRES

(Note: "Overseas National COMINT Centre" as used in this section is intended to mean any centre of one nation not provided solely for the direct support of a single service, regardless of the authority or agency responsible for local management of such a centre.)



12. It may be necessary to establish overseas national COMINT centres to ensure timely processing of certain high level COMINT intercepted there. This includes establishment by either party of additional centres to support the prosecution of the war in the European and Middle East areas. Where necessary or desirable, working parties of one nation may be assigned as mutually agreed to overseas centres of another. Exchange of end-product, traffic, and technical material will be as complete as required.

PRINCIPLES OF GOLLABORATION AMONG U.S., U.K. AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SERVICE COMMINT UNITS PROVIDED FOR DIRECT SUPPORT OF COMBAT FORCES (INCLUDING SERVICE OR THEATRE CENTRES)

- 13. The degree of integration of COMENT activities within any theatre involving both U.S. and British forces will depend on the degree of integration of operations and command in that theatre. Upon this basis local co-ordination and co-operation will be effected in accordance with the policies of the national COMENT authorities concerned.
 - 14. Normally, lateral exchange and other direct lateral co-operation among U.S., U.K. and Commonwealth Service COMINT units provided for direct support of Combat Forces will be earried on at the highest levels that will meet easential operating requirements.
- for, and obtain necessary material from, Service units of other nations as required and as mutually agreed.
 - 16. Subject to the agreement of the appropriate authorities the parties concerned may operate in any theatre of war interception and exploitation units working for their national COMINT Centres.

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DISSEMINATION OF END-PRODUCT

17. In any command involving U.S. and British forces, levels of dissemination for both forces will be identical as agreed by the U.S. and U.K. national COMINT authorities. Such dissemination of end-product will nermally be via national channels; any other means of dissemination will be mutually agreed upon by the national authorities. For purposes of such dissemination, a common secure crypto-channel is essential.

COMMUNICATIONS

18. Implementation of the provisions of this Appendix will require extensive communications, plans for which should be drawn up at the earliest feasible time.

PLANS FOR COMINT WAR MOBILISATION

- 19. Following upon the determination of the command structure for may theatre involving both U.S. and British forces, the parties concerned will proceed forthwith to draw up plans for the COMINI structure for the theatre in question.
- 20. Although arrangements in national territories or in theatres in which the forces of only one of the nations are engaged are not subject to the special principles stated in this Appendix, each party will inform the others of plans made and organizations set up in these areas.
- 21. The parties concerned will from time to time review the plans made for COMINT war mobilisation; insofar as the U.S. and U.K. are concerned, this has special reference to the scale of the anticipated U.S. COMINT effort in the U.K. and vice versa.

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APPENDIX Q

ANNEXURE Q1

COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS

INTRODUCTION

- 1. This Annexure sets forth agreed arrangements for the implementation of the principles of collaboration contained in paragraphs 7 10 of Appendix Q to the BRUSA Agreement. Although these principles apply in particular to a wartime situation, at least two stages are involved in the effective implementation of the provisions of this Appendix. These are:
 - a. Peacetime Augmentation Program to be effective up to the day of full mobilization.
 - b. Wartime combined effort at full scale.

PEACETIME AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

2. During peacetime, combined NSA-GCHQ efforts will be established on specific problems, as agreed between USCIB and LSIB. Arrangements for combined efforts will be made for those problems which under existing conditions can be most effectively processed at one center. These arrangements will be kept under continuing review and are subject to change by either party. Any additional increases in the peacetime augmentation program will be as agreed upon between USCIB and LSIB.

WARTIME COMBINED EFFORT AT GCHQ

3. That part of GCHQ producing COMINT relevant to a war in Europe and contiguous areas will be augmented with U.S. COMINT resources and will form a combined operation to be named the Combined Center, Europe (CCE).

ORGANIZATION

4.	The	organization	of	the	CCE	will	Ъe	8.8	follows:	
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CONTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES TO THE CCE

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- b. Director, GCEQ, will be assisted by two Deputy Directors, one appointed by the Director, NSA, and the other by the U.K. The U.S. Deputy will be primarily concerned with the Groups assigned to the CCE, the U.K. Deputy primarily with those GCHQ elements which will remain outside the CCE.
- c. Director, GCHQ, will be further assisted by a number of Assistant Directors, of whom one, appointed by the Director, NSA, will have major responsibilities for Production within the CCE.
- d. Below Directorate level, the CCE will be organized into a series of groups, each responsible for a specific sphere of operations.

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* i.e. Investigation of transmissions with unknown technical characteristics.

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- for such purposes as special exploitation or dissemination tasks required by U.K. intelligence consumers, particularly with reference to subjects outside Europe and contiguous areas.
- c. The U.S. will contribute substantial COMINT resources to the CCE, details of which are given in Exhibit 1 to this Annexure.

TASKS OF THE CCE

- 6. The main tasks of the CCE will be:
 - a. Technical COMINT support of U.S., U.K., and other British

 Commonwealth field resources in Europe and contiguous areas.
 - b. Technical COMINT support of the Y units of Third Party Nations participating in the Y structure of Allied Commands in Europe and contiguous areas, in accordance with the provisions of Appendix P.
 - c. Operational control of U.S., U.K., and other British
 Commonwealth field resources essential to the coverage of
 Europe and contiguous areas, except those required and
 reserved for close support of the field forces of the
 contributing nation or otherwise reserved by the
 contributing nation.
 - d. Processing and exploitation of COMINT material relevant to Europe and contiguous areas.
 - e. Research in support of such processing and exploitation.
 - f. Production of COMINT information and the distribution of such information directly to appropriate national or combined COMINT centers.

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DISSEMINATION ARRANGEMENTS

8. a. Paragraph 8 of Appendix Q provides that the complete end product of the CCE will be made immediately available to the intelligence organizations of both nations. To this end, the US intelligence liaison officers at the CCE will receive the end-product of the CCE.

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- b. The CCE will endeavor to produce end products in the form or forms acceptable to the US and the UK for dissemination to all authorized intelligence recipients and this will be the form in which the information will normally be disseminated.
- c. The US intelligence liaison officers will be responsible for dissemination to US Commands and other US recipients abroad and for the dissemination of selected items to their parent US intelligence organizations; GCHQ will continue to be responsible for dissemination to UK Commands and UK Intelligence Organizations.
- d. The US service intelligence liaison officers and GCHQ will collaborate in dissemination to Allied Commands, and combined cryptographic channels will normally be used. In exceptional cases where there is disagreement between GCHQ and US service intelligence liaison officers on addressees or on the substance of the information to be disseminated to Allied Commands, either may disseminate provided that it is made clear that the other is not committed and that the relationship to any other disseminated version is stated. Every effort will be made to avoid or to resolve such disagreements. Copies of CCE end products disseminated by electrical means to Allied Commands will be immediately disseminated to the appropriate intelligence organizations of both nations, as required.
- e. The US intelligence liaison officers will have access to those points in the CCE activities where the CCE end product becomes available for dissemination.
- f. The U.S. Intelligence Organizations do not intend to establish intelligence production groups at the CCE. No exact estimate of the number of intelligence liaison personnel necessary can be made at this time; however, it is expected that they will be in such numbers as to operate a watch in connection with each point of dissemination.

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INTEGRATION OF FERSONNEL EXCHANGED BETWEEN CENTRES

10. Personnel exchanged between NSA and GCHQ will be integrated organizationally within each center, will remain assigned to their home agency, and will be otherwise responsible to a resident head from this home agency. In the case of a problem which is to be worked as a primary commitment at one center by a combined NSA-GCHQ

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group, the exchanged personnel will be integrated in both technical and operational management positions within the group. In the case of a problem worked jointly at both centers, exchanged personnel will be integrated technically into the groups at each center. An equal voice in technical and operational management will be exercised only on these problems being worked as a primary commitment at one center by a combined group.

ESTIMATE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR WARTIME AUGMENTATION PROGRAMME

11. Exhibit 1 to this Annexure contains the estimate of personnel and equipment required for the wartime augmentation program. Its details will be reviewed from time to time by both parties and revised as necessary.

STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTINUATION OF COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT OF DISRUPTION THROUGH ENEMY ACTION

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APPENDIX Q Annexure Q1 EXHIBIT 1

OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE WARTIME AUGMENTATION

OF GCHQ

1. It is estimated that a total operational strength of 9000 w	lll be
needed for the CCE in war to deal with the	problems
assigned to it. The UK intends to contribute about 6000 of this	total.
In view of the importance of the CCE to the US intelligence effor	rt it
is felt that the US should endeavor to supply the additional 3000) persons
who would be required.	

- 2. Existing UK mobilization manpower plans allow for an increase of 5500 to GCHQ's peacetime establishment of 4000 in the first twelve months of war. Of this 5500, 3200 will be provided during the first three months of war.
- 3. The bulk of the increase is intended for the reinforcement of the CCE and supporting groups, which may be expected to give these groups a total strength of about 4000 by M \neq 3 months, and of the final 6000 by M \neq 12 months
- 4. A small proportion (at present estimated at 300) of the GCHQ staff may be sent overseas and would thus not be available to the CCE.
- 5. During the period M / 12 months, the U.S. target should be to reinforce the CCE by 2000 persons. It is recommended that this increase be phased as follows: --
- (a) By M / 6. The provision of at least 500 persons, of whom the majority should have had training and experience in COMINT production and reporting activities.
- (b) By M / 12. The provision of a further 1500 persons. It is realised that for practical reasons the majority of these will not have had extensive training or experience in COMINT activities. Nevertheless, every effort should be made to ensure that as many as possible have at

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least had basic COMINT training and that a cadre of trained COMINT personel be included in this group to ensure the effective integration of the group with the CCE.

6.	It	is	recognized	that	the	u.s.	contri	lbuti	on to	the	CCE	may	Ъe	
reduc	ed	in	accordance	with	any	allo	cation	of p	erson	nel	to ot	ber	nat	ional
or co	mbi	ned	l centers i	r.							worki	ng o	n C	CMINT
probl	ems	pe	ertaining t	o Euro	pe a	and co	ontiguo	ous a	reas.					

Equipment requirements for the Centre should be considered in detail so far as possible in advance of war by N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q. In this connection it is intended that G.C.H.Q. should make the maximum possible contribution in the development and use of analytical machinery for research and exploitation. The U.S. contribution of standard IRM equipment should be commensurate with the U.S. contribution of personnel to the CCE, based upon existing proportions of such equipment to processing personnel within NSA.

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APPENDIX Q

ANNEXURE Q2

PRINCIPLES OF WARTIME COLLABORATION AMONG COMINT CENTERS OF THE U.S., U.K., AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

- 1. In the event of hostilities involving the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, hereinafter referred to as collaborating nation the COMINT collaboration among these nations will be such as to ensure the greatest possible contribution to the prosecution of the war consistent wit security.
- 2. Normally, collaboration will be effected through direct coordination between the appropriate COMINT organizations. Where necessary and feasible, however, COMINT organizations may be integrated as mutually agreed.
- 3. Field COMINT resources of one or more of the collaborating nations operating in a theatre supported by a national or combined center will be provided by that center with such technical assistance as may be required and mutually agreed. In order to facilitate such arrangements the national authorities may assign liaison and working groups to these centers as necessary.
- 4. Arrangements in theaters in which the forces of only one of the nations are engaged are not subject to the special principles stated in this annexure.
- 5. The COMINT authorities of the collaborating nations will remain free to require their National COMINT Centers both at home and overseas to undertake any task relevant to their national worldwide interests, and to set up such additional Centers as may be necessary. Subject to this over-riding principle, there will be a broad division of tasks between the National COMINT Centers in order to insure the maximum timely interception and production of COMINT information.

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- 6. In accordance with the above the following arrangements are projected:
 - and the U.S. National COMINT Centers, and of the close relationships which will exist between the military forces of the two nations in time of war, an integrated effort on specific problems may be required. Such collaboration may involve an exchange of technical personnel between the two Centers and the provision by NSA of technical support to the integrated effort to the extent desirable and feasible.
 - b. In the Pacific Area collaboration is required to minimize the need of duplicate interception and processing facilities. The U.S. rather than establishing a National COMINT Center in the Southwest Pacific, will coordinate its COMINT operations in this theater with the center in Australia as required.
 - c. The U.S. National COMINT Center(s) concerned with the Pacific area will have direct communication with the COMINT authorities of the collaborating nations in order to effect rapid exchange of COMINT material as required and as mutually agreed.
 - d. The U.S. envisages the assignment of a U.S. working party to the center in Australia immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities involving both parties. This working party will take part in the operations of the Center in Australia and will serve as the cadre for any further augmentation of the center in Australia which may become desirable as the war progresses.

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The U.K. will increase its contribution of personnel to the center in Australia on the outbreak of hostilities.

ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERSEAS NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS

7. Current plans consider the possible establishment of COMINT Centers as set forth in Exhibit 1 to this Annexure. Its details will be reviewed from time to time by the parties concerned and revised as necessary.

ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERSEAS COMBINED CENTERS

8. With refer	ence to U.S. and U.I	K. plans to establ	ish National
COMINT Centers in			eireum-
stances may require	the establishment	of a combined UK-U	S center in this
area.	OGA EO 1.4.(c) EO 1.4.(d)	,	

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12th February, 1952.

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APPENDIX Q

ORGANIZATION OF U.S. -BRITISH COMMUNICATION

INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION IN WAR.

INTRODUCTION

As awanded by BPC 53/Q/Final 048 of 19/3/53

- The U.S.-British Communication Intelligence Agreement of 1946, the Appendices thereto, and the operating arrangements based thereon will continue to be the main basis of relations between the two parties in war.
- 2. In interpretation of this Agreement and as an additional Appendix thereto, the general principles and considerations stated below provide for particular spheres of wartime collaboration between the two parties.
- The implementation of these principles will be conditioned by theatres of operation involved, by international agreements in specific cases and by enemy communications and cryptographic practices. These factors will affect such important particulars as geographical locations, the responsibilities of the COMINT units involved, and the degree and scope of exchange and COMINT distribution.
- 4. The aim of the two parties is to ensure that the greatest possible contribution consistent with security is made by their combined COMINT effort to the prosecution of a war.
- Normally, collaboration will be effected through co-ordination of the appropriate COMINT organizations. However, where necessary and feasible, COMINT organizations may be integrated on a U.S.-British basis.
- 6. Arrangements in national territories or in theatres in which the forces of only one of the nations are engaged are not subject to



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the special principles stated in this Appendix.

PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL COMINT CENTRES IN WARTIME.

- 7. Both parties will remain free to require their national COMINT Centres both at home and overseas to undertake any task relevant to their national worldwide interests, and to set up such additional centres as may be necessary. Subject to this overriding principle, there will be a broad division of tasks between the national Centres which will undertake the greatest possible number of fixed commitments, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Introduction to these Appendices.
- In view of the geographical location of GCHQ with respect to the European theatre, and in consideration of the U.S. Forces involved, the U.S., in the event of a general war in Europe or the Middle East between the Western Powers and the Russian Bloc, will immediately undertake to augment that part of GCHQ producing COMINT relevant to the war in these areas by the provision of a substantial number of COMINT processing personnel as required, and of such equipment as may then be determined to be both feasible and profitable. The U.S. will participate with an equal voice in the determination of priorities and allocation of resources with respect to the combined COMINT effort at GCHQ. The intercept resources of the U.S. and U.K. which are essential for coverage of EUROPE and contiguous areas will become available to the combined COMINT effort at CONQ, except for those required and reserved for direct support of the field forces of either nation or reserved for other purposes by either party. That part reserved for the latter purpose will be co-ordinated with those supporting the combined effort at GCHQ. Traffic from all sources will be made available to both NSA and GCHQ to the extent required and possible. The complete end-product

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of the combined effort at GCHQ will be made immediately available to the intelligence organizations of both nations.

9. In the event of GCHQ being disabled for any reason during the war, the combined effort will be transferred to such other centre as may be mutually agreed.

10. In addition to undertaking tasks on a worldwide basis, NSA
will in particular be the principal centre for US and UK exploitation or
all grades of COMINT relevant to the area. UK personnel mag
be integrated in it to assist in this work. The US will take account of
UK views in the determination of priorities and allocation of resources
with respect to the effort relevant to a general war in
that area. It is recognised that NSA's greater invulnerability to
enemy action will make it necessary for it to duplicate much of the world
undertaken at GCHQ.
PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION MONG COMINT CENTRES OF THE U.S., U.K.
AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

11. Other British Commonwealth countries may be included in the collaboration of U.S. and U.K. National COMINT Centres as agreed by the National COMINT authorities of all parties concerned. Within the limits so agreed, exchanges of end-product, traffic, and technical material with other Commonwealth centres will be as complete as required and mutually agreed. In addition, working parties of one nation may be assigned to national COMINT centres of another nation as mutually agreed.

PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION AMONG THE U.S., AND THE U.K. AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OVERSELS NATIONAL COMENT CENTRES

(Note: "Overseas National COMINT Centre" as used in this section is

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intended to mean any centre of one nation not provided solely for the direct support of a single service, regardless of the authority or agency responsible for local management of such a centre.)

12. It may be necessary to establish overseas national COMINT centres to ensure timely processing of certain high level COMINT intercepted there. This includes establishment by either party of additional centres to support the prosecution of the war in the European and Middle East areas. Where necessary or desirable, working parties of one nation may be assigned as mutually agreed to overseas centres of another. Exchange of end-product, traffic, and technical material will be as complete as required.

PRINCIPIES OF COLLABOR TION MONG THE U.S. AND THE U.K. MD OTHER
BRITISH COMMONWE LITH SERVICE COMINT UNITS PROVIDED FOR DIRECT SUPPORT
OF COMBAT FORCES (INCLUDING SERVICE OR THEATRE CENTRES)

- 13. The degree of integration of COMINT activities within any theatre involving both U.S. and British Commonwealth forces will depend on the degree of integration of operations and command in that theatre. Upon this basis local co-ordination and co-operation will be effected in accordance with the policies of the national COMINT authorities concerned.
- Normally, lateral exchange and other direct lateral co-operation among U.S., U.K. and other Commonwealth Service COMINT units provided for direct support of Combat Forces will be carried on at the highest levels that will meet essential operating requirements.
- 15. National Centres will provide appropriate technical support for, and obtain necessary material from, Service units of other nations as required and as mutually agreed.
- 16. Subject to the agreement of the appropriate authorities the parties concerned may operate in any theatre of war interception and exploitation units working for their national COMINT Centres.

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DISSEMINATION OF END-PRODUCT

17. In any command involving U.S. and U.K. forces, levels of dissemination for both forces will be identical as agreed by the U.S. and U.K. national COMINT authorities. Such dissemination of end-product will normally be via national channels; any other means of dissemination will be mutually agreed upon by the national authorities. For purposes of such dissemination, a common secure crypto-channel is essential.

COMMUNICATIONS

18. Implementation of the provisions of this Appendix will require extensive communications, plans for which should be drawn up at the earliest feasible time.

PLANS FOR COMENT WAR MOBILITS ATTON

- 19. Following upon the determination of the command structure for any theatre involving both U.S. and U.K. forces, the parties concerned will proceed forthwith to draw up plans for the COMINT structure for the theatre in question.
- 20. Although arrangements in national territories or in theatres in which the forces of only one of the nations are engaged are not subject to the special principles stated in this appendix, each party will inform the others of plans made and organizations set up in these areas.
- 21. The parties concerned will from time to time review the plans made for COMINT war mobilisation; insofar as the U.S. and U.K. are concerned, this has special reference to the scale of the anticipated U.S. COMINT effort in the U.K. and vice versa.

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APPENDIX Q

ANNEXURE Q1

COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS INTRODUCTION:

- 1. This Annexure sets forth agreed arrangements for the implementation of the principles of collaboration contained in paragraphs 7 10 of Appendix Q to the BRUSA Agreement. Although these principles apply in particular to a wartime situation, at least two stages are involved in the effective implementation of the provisions of this Appendix. These are:
 - a. Peacetime Augmentation Program to be effective up to the day of full mobilization.
 - b. Wartime combined effort at full scale.

PEACETIME AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

2. During peacetime, combined NSA-GCHQ efforts will be established on specific problems, as agreed between USCIB and ISTB. Arrangements for combined efforts will be made for those problems which under existing conditions can be most effectively processed at one center. These arrangements will be kept under continuing review and are subject to change by either party. Any additional increases in the peacetime augmentation program will be as agreed upon between USCIB and ISIB.

WARTIME COMBINED EFFORT AT GCHQ

3. That part of GCHQ producing COMINT relevant to a war in Europe and contiguous areas will be augmented with U.S. COMINT resources

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and will form a combined operation to be named the Combined-Center.

Burope (CCE).

ORG_NIZATION

4.	The	organization	of	the	CCE	will be	28	follows:

- b. Director, GCHQ, will be assisted by two Deputy
 Directors, one appointed by the Director, NSA,
 and the other by the U.K. The U.S. Deputy will be
 primarily concerned with the Groups assigned
 to the CCE, the U.K. Deputy primarily with those
 GCHQ elements which will remain outside the CCE.
- c. Director, GCHQ, will be further assisted by a number of Assistant Directors, of whom one, appointed by the Director, NSA, will have major responsibilities for Production within the CCE.
- d. Below Directorate level, the CCE will be organized into a series of groups, each responsible for a specific sphere of operations.

CONTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES TO THE COR

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i.e. Investigation of transmissions with unknown technical characteristics.

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- b. Small portions of GCFO may be retained outside the CCE for such purposes as special exploitation or dissemination tasks required by U.K. intelligence consumers, particularly with reference to subjects outside Europe and contiguous areas.
- c. The U.S. will contribute substantial COMENT resources to the CCE, details of which are given in Exhibit 1 to this Annexure.

TASKS OF THE CCE

- 6. The main tasks of the CCE will be:
 - a. Technical COMINT support of U.S., U.K., and other British Commonwealth field resources in Europe and contiguous areas.
 - b. Technical COMINT support of the Y units of Third

 Party Nations participating in the Y structure of

 Allied Commands in Europe and contiguous areas, in

 accordance with the provisions of appendix P.
 - c. Operational control of U.S., U.K., and other British
 Commonwealth field resources essential to the
 coverage of Europe and contiguous areas, except
 those required and reserved for close support
 of the field forces of the contributing nation
 or otherwise reserved by the contributing nation.
 - d. Processing and exploitation of COMINT material relevant to Europe and contiguous areas.



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- c. Research in support of such processing and exploitation.
- f. Production of COMINT information and the distribution of such information directly to appropriate national or combined COMINT centers.

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DISSELIN.TION RRANGEMENTS

- 8. a. Paragraph 8 of appendix Q provides that the complete end product of the CCE will be made immediately available to the intelligence organizations of both nations. To this end, the US intelligence liaison officers at the CCE will receive the end-product of the CCE.
- b. The CCE will endeavour to produce end products in the form or forms acceptable to the US and the UK for dissemination to all authorized intelligence recipients and this will be the form in which the information will normally be disseminated.
- c. The US intelligence liaison officers will be responsible for dissemination to US Commands and other US recipients abroad and for the dissemination of selected items to their parent US intelligence organizations; GCHQ will continue to be responsible for dissemination to UK Commands and UK Intelligence Organizations.
- d. The US service intelligence liaison officers and GCHQ will collaborate in dissemination to allied Commands, and combined cryptographic channels will normally be used. In exceptional cases where there is disagreement between GCHQ and US service intelligence liaison officers on addressees or on the substance of the information to be disseminated to Allied Commands, either may disseminate provided that it is made clear that the other is not committed and that the relationship to any other disseminated version is stated. Every effort will be made to avoid or to resolve such disagreements. Copies of CCE end products disseminated by electrical means to Allied Commands will be immediately disseminated to the appropriate intelligence





organizations of both nations, as required.

- e. The US intelligence liaison officers will have access to those points in the CCE activities where the CCE and product becomes available for dissemination.
- f. The U.S. Intelligence Organizations do not intend to establish intelligence production groups at the CCE. No exact estimate of the number of intelligence liaison personnel necessary can be made at this time; however, it is expected that they will be in such numbers as to operate a watch in connection with each point of dissemination.

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INTEGRATION	OI	PERSONNEL	EXCHANGED	BETWEEN	CENTRES

integrated organizationally within each center, will remain assigned to their home agency, and will be otherwise responsible to a resident head from this home agency. In the case of a problem which is to be worked as a primary commitment at one center by a combined NSA-GCHQ group, the exchanged personnel will be integrated in both technical and operational management positions within the group. In the case of a problem worked jointly at both centers, exchanged personnel will be integrated technically into the groups at each center. An equal voice in technical and operational management will be exercised only on these problems being worked as a primary commitment at one center by a combined group.

ESTIM TE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR WARRING AUGMENT. FION PROCRAMME

11. Exhibit 1 to this Annexure contains the estimate of personnel and equipment required for the wartime augmentation program. Its details will be reviewed from time to time by both parties and revised as necessary.

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OPERATION L AND LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE WARTIME AUGMENTATION OF GCHO

1. It is estimated that a total operational strength of 9000 wi	ll be
needed for the CCE in war to deal with the	problems
assigned to it. The UK intends to contribute about 6000 of this	total.
In view of the importance of the CCE to the US intelligence effor	t it
is felt that the US should endeavour to supply the additional 300	0 persons
who would be required.	•

- 2. Existing UK mobilization manpower plans allow for an increase of 5500 to GCHQ's peacetime establishment of 4000 in the first twelve months of war. Of this 5500, 3200 will be provided during the first three months of war.
- 3. The bulk of the increase is intended for the reinforcement of the CCE and supporting groups, which may be expected to give these groups a total strength of about 4000 by $M \neq 3$ months, and of the final 6000 by $M \neq 12$ months.
- 4. A small proportion (at present estimated at 300) of the GCHQ staff may be sent overseas and would thus not be available to the CCE.
- 5. During the period M / 12 months, the U.S. target should be to reinforce the CCE by 2000 persons. It is recommended that this increase be phased as follows: --
 - (a) By M / 6. The provision of at least 500 persons, of whom the majority should have had training and experience in COMINIT production and reporting activities.

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(b) By M / 12. The provision of a further 1500 persons. It is					
realised that for practical reasons the majority of these will not have					
had extensive training or experience in COMINT activities. Nevertheless,					
every effort should be made to ensure that as many as possible have at					
least had basic COMINT training and that a cadre of trained COMINT personal					
be included in this group to ensure the effective integration of the group					
with the CCE.					

6.	1t	is re	ecogni	ized t	hat	the	U.S.	cont	ribut	tion	to	the O	CE i	ay	Ъę
reduced :	in ac	corde	ence 7	vith a	ny e	allo	cation	or	perso	onnel	l to	othe	r n	at.io	nal
or combi	ned c	enter	rs in							•	wc	rking	on	COM	INT
problems	pert	aini:	ng to	Eurog	e ar	1d. co	ontigu	ous	areas	š.,					

7. Equipment requirements for the Centre should be considered in detail as far as possible in advance of war by N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q. In this connection it is intended that G.C.H.Q. should make the maximum possible contribution in the development and use of analytical machinery for research and exploitation. The U.S. contribution of standard IBM equipment should be commensurate with the U.S. contribution of personnel to the GCE, based upon existing proportions of such equipment to processing personnel within NSA.

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APPENDIX Q

ANNEXURE 02

PRINCIPLES OF WARTIME COLLABORATION AMONG COMINT CENTERS OF THE U.S., U.K., AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

- 1. In the event of hostilities involving the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, hereinafter referred to as collaborating nations the COMINT collaboration among these nations will be such as to ensure the greatest possible contribution to the prosecution of the war consistent with security.
- 2. Normally, collaboration will be effected through direct coordination between the appropriate COMINT organizations. Where necessary
 and feasible, however, COMINT organizations may be integrated as mutually
 agreed.
- 3. Field COMINT resources of one or more of the collaborating nations operating in a theatre supported by a national or combined center will be provided by that center with such technical assistance as may be required and mutually agreed. In order to facilitate such arrangements the national authorities may assign liaison and working groups to these centers as necessary.
- 4. Arrangements in theaters in which the forces of only one of the nations are engaged are not subject to the special principles stated in this annexure.
- 5. The COMINI authorities of the collaborating nations will remain free to require their National COMINI Centers both at home and overseas to undertake any task relevant to their national worldwide interests, and to set up such additional Centers as may be necessary.

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Subject to this over-riding principle, there will be a broad division of tasks between the National COMMET centers in order to insure the maximum timely interception and production of COMMET information.

- 6. In accordance with the above the following arrangements are projected:
 - a. In view of the geographic proximity of the Canadian and the U.S. National COMINT Centers, and of the close relationships which will exist between the military forces of the two nations in time of war, an integrated effort on specific problems may be required. Such collaboration may involve an exchange of technical personnel between the two Centers and the provision by NSA of technical support to the integrated effort to the extent desirable and feasible.
 - b. In the Pacific Area collaboration is required to minimize the need of duplicate interception and processing facilities. The U.S. rather than establishing a National COMINT Center in the Southwest Pacific, will coordinate its COMINT operations in this theater with the center in Australia as required.
 - e. The U.S. National COMINT Center(s) concerned with the Pacific area will have direct communication with the COMINT authorities of the collaborating nations in order to effect rapid exchange of COMINT material as required and as mutually agreed.
 - d. The U.S. envisages the assignment of a U.S. working party to the center in Australia immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities involving both parties. This working party will take part in the operations of the Center



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in Australia and will serve as the cadre for any further augmentation of the center in Australia which May become desirable as the war progresses.

e. The U.K. will increase its contribution of personnel to the center in justicalia on the outbreak of hostilities.

ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERSELS NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS

7. Current plans consider the possible establishment of COMINT Centers as set forth in Exhibit 1 to this immexure. Its details will be reviewed from time to time by the parties concerned and revised as necessary.

EST. BLISHMENT OF OVERSE. S COMBINED CENTERS

8. With reference to U	S. and U.K. plans to establish Mational
COMENT Centers in	(see Exhibit 1, paras. 1 and 6)
eircunstances may require the	establishment of a combined UK-US center
in this area. OGA EO1.4.(c) EO1.4.(d)	





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APPENDIX Q

ANNEXURE Q1

COLLABORATION BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS

INTRODUCTION

- 1. This Annexure sets forth agreed arrangements for the implementation of the principles of collaboration contained in paragraphs 7 10 of Appendix Q to the BRUSA Agreement. Although these principles apply in particular to a wartime situation, at least two stages are involved in the effective implementation of the provisions of this Appendix. These are:
 - a. Peacetime Augmentation Program to be effective up to the day of full mobilization.
 - b. Wartime combined effort at full scale.

PEACETIME AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

2. During peacetime, combined NSA-GCHQ efforts will be established on specific problems, as agreed between USCIB and LSIB. Arrangements for combined efforts will be made for those problems which under existing conditions can be most effectively processed at one center. These arrangements will be kept under continuing review and are subject to change by either party. Any additional increases in the peacetime augmentation program will be as agreed upon between USCIB and LSIB.

WARTIME COMBINED EFFORT AT CCHQ

3. That part of GCHQ producing COMINT relevant to a war in Europe and contiguous areas will be augmented with U.S. COMINT resources and will form a combined operation to be named the Combined Center, Europe (CCE).

ORGANIZATION

4.	The	organ	izatio	on of	the	CCE	will	Ъe	as	follows:		
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- b. Director, GCHQ, will be assisted by two Deputy Directors, one appointed by the Director, NSA, and the other by the U.K. The U.S. Deputy will be primarily concerned with the Groups assigned to the CCE, the U.K. Deputy primarily with those GCHQ elements which will remain outside the CCE.
- c. Director, GCHQ, will be further assisted by a number of Assistant Directors, of whom one, appointed by the Director, NSA, will have major responsibilities for Production within the CCE.
- d. Below Directorate level, the CCE will be organized into a series of groups, each responsible for a specific sphere of operations.

CONT	RIBUTION OF RESOURCES TO THE CCE
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* i.e. Investigation of transmissions with unknown technical characteristics.

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- b. Small portions of GCHQ may be retained outside the CCE for such purposes as special exploitation or dissemination tasks required by U.K. intelligence consumers, particularly with reference to subjects outside Europe and contiguous areas.
- c: The U.S. will contribute substantial COMINT resources to the CCE, details of which are given in Exhibit 1 to this Annexure.

TASKS OF THE CCE

- 6. The main tasks of the CCE will be:
 - a. Technical COMINT support of U.S., U.K., and other British

 Commonwealth field resources in Europe and contiguous areas.
 - b. Technical COMINT support of the Y units of Third Party Nations participating in the Y structure of Allied Commands in Europe and contiguous areas, in accordance with the provisions of Appendix P.
 - c. Operational control of U.S., U.K., and other British

 Commonwealth field resources essential to the coverage of

reserved for close support of the field forces of the contributing nation or otherwise reserved by the contributing nation.

- d. Processing and exploitation of COMINT material relevant
- e. Research in support of such processing and exploitation.
- f. Production of COMINT information and the distribution of such information directly to appropriate national or combined COMINT centers.

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DISSEMINATION ARRANGEMENTS

8. a. Paragraph 8 of Appendix Q provides that the complete and product of the CCE will be made immediately available to the intelligence organizations of both nations. To this end, the US intelligence liaison officers at the CCE will receive the end-product of the CCE.

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- b. The CCE will endeavor to produce end products in the form or forms acceptable to the US and the UK for dissemination to all authorized intelligence recipients and this will be the form in which the information will normally be disseminated.
- c. The US intelligence liaison officers will be responsible for dissemination to US Commands and other US recipients abroad and for the dissemination of selected items to their parent US intelligence organizations; GCHQ will continue to be responsible for dissemination to UK Commands and UK Intelligence Organizations.
- d. The US service intelligence liaison officers and GCHQ will collaborate in dissemination to Allied Commands, and combined cryptographic channels will normally be used. In exceptional cases where there is disagreement between GCHQ and US service intelligence liaison officers on addressees or on the substance of the information to be disseminated to Allied Commands, either may disseminate provided that it is made clear that the other is not committed and that the relationship to any other disseminated version is stated. Every effort will be made to avoid or to resolve such disagreements. Copies of CCE end products disseminated by electrical means to Allied Commands will be immediately disseminated to the appropriate intelligence organizations of both nations, as required.
- e. The US intelligence liaison officers will have access to those points in the CCE activities where the CCE end product becomes available for dissemination.
- f. The U.S. Intelligence Organizations do not intend to establish intelligence production groups at the CCE. No exact estimate of the number of intelligence liaison personnel necessary can be made at this time; however, it is expected that they will be in such numbers as to operate a watch in connection with each point of dissemination.

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INTEXRATION OF PERSONNEL EXCHANGED BETWEEN CENTRES

10. Personnel exchanged between NSA and GCHQ will be integrated organizationally within each center, will remain assigned to their home agency, and will be otherwise responsible to a resident head from this home agency. In the case of a problem which is to be worked as a primary commitment at one center by a combined NSA-GCHQ

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group, the exchanged personnel will be integrated in both technical and operational management positions within the group. In the case of a problem worked jointly at both centers, exchanged personnel will be integrated technically into the groups at each center. An equal voice in technical and operational management will be exercised only on these problems being worked as a primary commitment at one center by a combined group.

ESTIMATE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR WARTIME AUGMENTATION PROGRAMME

11. Exhibit 1 to this Annexure contains the estimate of personnel and equipment required for the wartime augmentation program. Its details will be reviewed from time to time by both parties and revised as necessary.

STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTINUATION OF COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT OF DISRUPTION THROUGH ENEMY ACTION

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APPENDIX Q. Annexure Ql EXHIBIT 1

OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE WARTIME AUGMENTATION

OF GCUQ

1. It is estimated that a total operational strength of 9000 w	ill be
needed for the CCE in war to deal with the	probleme
assigned to it. The UK intends to contribute about 6000 of this	total.
In view of the importance of the CCE to the US intelligence effor	t it
is felt that the US should endeavor to supply the additional 3000) persons
who would be required.	

- 2. Existing UK mobilization manpower plans allow for an increase of 5500 to GCHQ's peacetime establishment of 4000 in the first twelve months of war. Of this 5500, 3200 will be provided during the first three months of war.
- 3. The bulk of the increase is intended for the reinforcement of the CCE and supporting groups, which may be expected to give these groups a total strength of about 4000 by M \neq 3 months, and of the final 6000 by M \neq 12 months
- 4. A small proportion (at present estimated at 300) of the GCHQ staff may be sent overseas and would thus not be available to the CCE.
- 5. During the period M / 12 months, the U.S. target should be to reinforce the CCE by 2000 persons. It is recommended that this increase be phased as follows: --
- (a) By M / 6. The provision of at least 500 persons, of whom the majority should have had training and experience in COMINT production and reporting activities.
- (b) By M / 12. The provision of a further 1500 persons. It is realised that for practical reasons the majority of these will not have had extensive training or experience in COMINT activities. Nevertheless, every effort should be made to ensure that as many as possible have at

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least had basic COMINT training and that a cadre of trained COMINT personel be included in this group to ensure the effective integration of the group with the CCE.

6.	It	18	recognize	ed ti	hat t	he	U.S.	contr	ibut	tion	to the	e CC	E may	_ b∈	:	
redi	iced	in	accordan	ce w	ith a	ny	allo	cation	of	pers	onnel	to	other	ne	tional	
or o	dmo	ined	l centers	111								wor	king	on	COMINI	1
prol	lema	з ре	ertaining	to I	Europ	ęε	and co	ntigu	BUC	area	s. /					

7. Equipment requirements for the Centre should be considered in detail so far as possible in advance of war by N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q. In this connection it is intended that G.C.H.Q. should make the maximum possible contribution in the development and use of analytical machinery for research and exploitation. The U.S. contribution of standard IBM equipment should be commensurate with the U.S. contribution of personnel to the CCE, based upon existing proportions of such equipment to processing personnel within NSA.

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APPENDIX Q

ANNEXURE Q2

PRINCIPLES OF WARTIME COLLABORATION AMONG COMINT CENTERS OF THE U.S., U.K., AND OTHER BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

- 1. In the event of hostilities involving the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, hereinafter referred to as collaborating nation the COMINT collaboration among these nations will be such as to ensure the greatest possible contribution to the prosecution of the war consistent wit security.
- 2. Normally, collaboration will be effected through direct coordination between the appropriate COMINT organizations. Where necessary and feasible, however, COMINT organizations may be integrated as mutually agreed.
- 3. Field COMINT resources of one or more of the collaborating nations operating in a theatre supported by a national or combined center will be provided by that center with such technical assistance as may be required and mutually agreed. In order to facilitate such arrangements the national authorities may assign liaison and working groups to these centers as necessary.
- 4. Arrangements in theaters in which the forces of only one of the nations are engaged are not subject to the special principles stated in this annexure.
- 5. The COMINT authorities of the collaborating nations will remain free to require their National COMINT Centers both at home and overseas to undertake any task relevant to their national worldwide interests, and to set up such additional Centers as may be necessary. Subject to this over-riding principle, there will be a broad division of tasks between the National COMINT Centers in order to insure the maximum timely interception and production of COMINT information.

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- 6. In accordance with the above the following arrangements are projected:
 - and the U.S. National COMINT Centers, and of the close relationships which will exist between the military forces of the two nations in time of war, an integrated effort on specific problems may be required. Such collaboration may involve an exchange of technical personnel between the two Centers and the provision by NSA of technical support to the integrated effort to the extent desirable and feasible.
 - b. In the Pacific Area collaboration is required to minimize the need of duplicate interception and processing facilities. The U.S. rather than establishing a National COMINT Center in the Southwest Pacific, will coordinate its COMINT operations in this theater with the center in Australia as required.
 - c. The U.S. National COMINT Center(s) concerned with the Pacific area will have direct communication with the COMINT authorities of the collaborating nations in order to effect rapid exchange of COMINT material as required and as mutually agreed.
 - d. The U.S. envisages the assignment of a U.S. working party to the center in Australia immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities involving both parties. This working party will take part in the operations of the Center in Australia and will serve as the cadre for any further augmentation of the center in Australia which may become desirable as the war progresses.

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e. The U.K. will increase its contribution of personnel to the center in Australia on the outbreak of hostilities.

ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERSEAS NATIONAL COMINT CENTERS

7. Current plans consider the possible establishment of COMINT Centers as set forth in Exhibit 1 to this Annexure. Its details will be reviewed from time to time by the parties concerned and revised as necessary.

ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERSEAS COMBINED CENTERS

8. With reference to U.S. and U.K. plans to establish National	
COMINT Centers in see Exhibit 1, paras. 1 and 6) circum-	
stances may require the establishment of a combined UK-US center in this	
area.	

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APPENDIX Q Annexure Q2 EXHIBIT I

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