

Token Kidnapping Cesar Cerrudo Argeniss

## Who am I?

- Argeniss Founder and CEO
- I have been working on security for 7 years
- I have found and helped to fix hundreds of vulnerabilities in software such as MS Windows, MS SQL Server, Oracle Database Server, IBM DB2, and many more...
- I have researched and created novel attacks and exploitation techniques
- I have spoken around the world at most important security conferences

I have never written a book

## Agenda

- Introduction
- What is impersonation and what are tokens?
- Windows XP and 2003 services security
- Windows XP and 2003 services security weaknesses
- Windows Vista and 2008 services security
- Windows Vista and 2008 services security weaknesses
- Token Kidnapping in action
- Conclusions

### Introduction

 In the beginning all Windows services ran as Local SYSTEM account

– Compromise of a service == full system compromise

 Then MS introduced NETWORK SERVICE and LOCAL SERVICE accounts

- Compromise of a service! = full system compromise

 Then with Windows Vista and 2008 new protections were introduced and some previous weaknesses were corrected


• But as we are going to see Windows is still not perfect...

## What is impersonation and what are tokens?

- Impersonation is the ability of a thread to execute using different security information than the process that owns the thread
  - Threads impersonate to run code under another user account, ACL checks are done against the impersonated users
  - Impersonation can only be done by processes with the following privilege:
    - "Impersonate a client after authentication" (SeImpersonatePrivilege)
  - When a thread impersonates it has an associated impersonation token

## What is impersonation and what are tokens?

- An access token is an object that describes the security context of a process or thread
  - It includes the identity and privileges of the user account associated with the process or thread
    - -They can be Primary or Impersonation tokens
      - Primary ones are those that are assigned to processes
      - Impersonation ones are those that can be get when impersonation occurs
        - Four impersonation levels: SecurityAnonymous,
          - SecurityIdentity, SecurityImpersonation, SecurityDelegation



## Windows XP and 2003 services security

- Services run under
  - -LOCAL SYSTEM, NETWORK SERVICE, LOCAL SERVICE and user accounts
- Services seemed to be armoured
  - Processes are created with "special" permissions
    - A service running under "X" account can't directly access another service running under the same account
    - Gentle Security found that services were improperly protected and that service account has WRITE\_DAC permissions on service

# Windows XP and 2003 services security

All services can impersonate


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- If a service can get a SYSTEM impersonation token the game is over
  - This doesn't happen always in all services
- Impersonation takes place mostly during Inter Process Communication (IPC) using Local Procedure Call (LPC), Named Pipes, etc.
- Impersonation can be limited by clients by setting proper options in the used functions

- While service processes are not well protected, threads aren't either\*
  - Service threads have default account permissions
  - A service running under X account can access threads of another services running under the same account
    - Service X can run arbitrary code on service Y
    - Service X can get impersonation tokens from service Y

\*Brett Moore from Insomnia Security (www.insomniasec.com) independently found the services thread permissions issue

- While service processes are not well protected, threads aren't either
  - Threads from RpcSs service process (runs under NetworkService) can be accessed
    - This process always has impersonation tokens from many different accounts including SYSTEM
    - Services will need first to get NetworkService impersonation token and then use it to access RpCSs threads



- Calling APIs that interacts with a service ends up getting the service account impersonation token
  - Calling process only needs to be able to "impersonate"
  - If impersonation tokens have higher privileges then calling process can elevate privileges
  - Problem present in MSDTC (runs under NetworkService)
    - Call DtcGetTransactionManagerEx() to get NetworkService impersonation token
      - The function starts MSDTC if not running

- Both weaknesses combined lead to full system compromise just having Impersonation rights
  - -Any service can run code as SYSTEM
  - Any ASP web page, CGI, etc. on IIS can run code as SYSTEM
  - Any SQL Server administrator can run code as SYSTEM
  - Etc.

### Windows Vista and 2008 services security

- Huge improvements in latest Windows versions (at least in theory)
- Session 0 isolation


   Not big deal, mostly protect against Shatter attacks
- Least privilege
  - Not big deal, most Windows services requires Impersonation privileges
- Per service SID
  - Nice feature, now the service process it's really protected and its resources can be armoured

### Windows Vista and 2008 services security

- Per service SID
  - Service running under X account can't access other service resources no matter the service is running under same account
    - -Threads are now properly protected
- Write restricted token
  - Nice feature, service can have write access to resources only if explicitly granted to the service SID, logon SID, Everyone SID or write-restricted SID

### Windows Vista and 2008 services security

- Restricted network access
  - -Nice feature
  - Services can only accept connections on specified ports and protocols
  - Services can only make connections to specified ports and protocols
  - Services can be restricted to have no network access
  - -Implemented as firewall rules
    - Can't be disabled after service starts



- Per service SID weaknesses
  - While regular threads are properly protected, threads from thread pools are not
  - Service running under X account can submit work to thread pools on other services running under same account
    - This means arbitrary code execution bypassing per service SID protection

- Per service SID weaknesses
  - While service processes are protected some regular processes running under LOCAL SERVICE and NETWORK SERVICE are not
    - Service process running under X account can access regular processes running under same account
      - Services can execute arbitrary code on other processes
      - WMI processes have this problem
        - » They impersonate SYSTEM account

- Write restricted token weaknesses
  - Just a couple of services are restricted by default
    - These restricted services can and do Impersonate SYSTEM account and administrative accounts
      - eg.: when an administrator configures Windows
         Firewall, the Windows Firewall service impersonates
         the administrator and SYSTEM account
      - No sense in make them restricted since them can own Windows after impersonating SYSTEM
- Restricted network access weaknesses
  - A service can easily bypass all restrictions by executing code under another process

- Windows XP & 2003
  - Since threads are not protected they can be easily manipulated
  - Using SetThreadContext() the thread can execute any code in target process
    - Need to have the some code already on target process
      - Brett Moore cool technique using WLSI to build a call stack and then set proper thread context
    - Using thread manipulation techniques from c0de90e7
    - Code can be executed without putting any code on target process
      - Techniques needs to find proper op codes

- Windows XP & 2003
  - -An APC can be submitted to a thread
    - QueueUserAPC() can be called with ImpersonateSelf() as parameter
      - Thread starts to impersonate service account
      - Impersonation token is get by OpenThreadToken()
      - Token is used to access the process
      - Token handles are brute forced in target process until SYSTEM token is found
      - SYSTEM token is used to run code

- Windows XP & 2003
  - RpcSs service is the best target for getting SYSTEM token
    - Attacker must have a NetworkService impersonation token
      - Attacker can get NetworkService impersonation token just calling DtcGetTransactionManagerEx()
  - SQL Server exploit demo
  - IIS 6 exploit demo

- Windows Vista & 2008
  - Unprotected thread on pools don't resume execution unless work is submitted to the pool
  - We have to wait in order to manipulate the thread, it can take arbitrary time unless we can trigger some action to get a thread executing
  - APC can be used to get code executed
    - APC on a thread from a pool can't be manipulated by SetThreadContext()
    - Calling ImpersonateSelf() crashes target process, an APC in a thread from a pool can't end impersonating

- Windows Vista & 2008
  - APC can be used to get code executed
    - Need to call a useful function that allows to execute code in order to elevate privileges
    - LoadLibrary() can be called to get code executed
      - We only need to find a pointer to a letter in memory for dll name
        - » .dll extension is automatically appended
      - DII must be in dlls search paths or full path must be provided

» We need permissions to copy dll or we need a way to put a string in target process

 Code can be executed in this way but there is an easier way...

- Windows Vista & 2008
  - Getting SYSTEM token from WMI process (WmiPrvSE.exe)
  - This process runs under NetworkService, LocalService or SYSTEM accounts
    - This process is not protected and it impersonates SYSTEM account
    - Services running under NetworkService and LocalService can get SYSTEM token from it
      - Invoke WMI functionality
      - Patch CloseHandle() and OpenThreadToken() on WMI process
        - Brute force token handles until SYSTEM token is found

- Windows Vista & 2008
  - RpcSs Dll injection demo
    - A DII is injected into RpcSs service from an ASP .NET web page, the site is running under NetworkService account (default)
      - Bypass per service SID
      - RpcSs injects the same Dll into IIS service (runs as SYSTEM), this service then runs a reverse shell
        - Bypass least privilege
        - Bypass restricted network access
  - IIS 7 exploit demo

\*All demos are with Windows 2008 default firewall settings, just World Wide Web Services (HTTP Traffic-In) enabled

### Recomendations

- Windows XP and Windows 2003
  - On IIS 6 don't run ASP .NET in full trust and if classic ASP is enabled don't allow users to execute binaries
- On Windows Vista and 2008
  - On IIS 7 don't run ASP .NET in full trust or don't run web sites under NetworkServer or LocalService accounts
  - Don't run services under NetworkService or LocalService accounts
    - Use regular user accounts to run services



### Conclusions

- On Windows XP and Windows 2003
  - -If a user can impersonate then game is over
  - User can execute code as SYSTEM
- On Windows Vista and 2008
  - -LocalService==SYSTEM
  - -NetworkService==SYSTEM
  - -New services protections are almost useless

### References

- Impersonate a client after authentication http://support.microsoft.com/kb/821546
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- Thread manipulation http://www.rootkit.com/vault/c0de90e7/gw\_ng.c
- The weakness in the Windows impersonation model http://www.gentlesecurity.com/04302006.html
- Process explorer
   http://www.sysinternals.com

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