# The Sustainable Development Goals Extended Report 2023



Note: This unedited 'Extended Report' includes all indicator storyline contents as provided by the SDG indicator custodian agencies as of 30 April 2023. For instances where the custodian agency has not submitted a storyline for an indicator, please see the custodian agency focal point information for further information. The 'Extended Report' aims to provide the public with additional information regarding the SDG indicators and is compiled by the Statistics Division (UNSD) of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

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# Target 16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere

# Indicator 16.1.1 Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age

# In 2021, more than 450,000 people were victims of intentional homicide, the highest number of victims in the last 20 years

Globally, homicides account for many more deaths than conflict-related killings and terrorist killings combined. Significantly reducing all forms of violence and related death therefore cannot be done without reducing intentional homicides. Unfortunately, the year 2021 was an exceptionally lethal year, with approximately 457,000 people killed intentionally – more than in any other year in the previous two decades. The noticeable spike in killings in 2021 can be partly attributed to the economic repercussions of Covid-related restrictions, as well as an escalation of gang-related and socio-political violence in several countries. Nonetheless, when considering the number of homicide victims in relation to the population, and taking a longer-term view, the global homicide rate declined by -16% between 2000 and 2021 (from 6.9 homicides to 5.8 homicides per 100,000 population).


Projecting trends in the homicide rate for 2015 - 2021 to future years up to 2030, suggests that if the current patterns of violence persist, the global rate of homicides per 100,000 population could stand at around 5.1 in 2030, resulting in an overall decrease limited to 14%. This projected decrease in the global homicide rate would fall short of the target to "significantly" reduce violence - translated as a decrease in the homicide rate of at least 50% by 2030.

Homicidal violence has a clear gender dimension. In 2021, the vast majority of homicides worldwide were committed against men and boys (82%), while women and girls accounted for a much smaller share of all homicide victims (18%). This means that, as of 2021, the global homicide rate was more than four times higher amongst men (at 9.4 victims per 100,000 male population) compared to women (at 2.1 victims per 100,000 female population).


In all world regions the male homicide rates exceed the female homicide rates. However, there are significant differences between regions in relation to the "gender gap" in homicides (Figure 1). As of 2021, the highest male homicide rates are observed in Latin America and the Caribbean (36.6) and Sub-Saharan Africa (23.7), while the lowest rates are observed in Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia (2.2), Central Asia and Southern Asia (3.5) and Oceania (4.1). By contrast, there is much less variability between regions when it comes to female homicide rates. In 2021, the highest female homicide rate was recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa (4.4) and the lowest was recorded in Eastern Asia and South-eastern Asia (0.6).


In general, regions with high overall levels of homicidal violence, such as the Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, also record bigger differences between male and female homicide rates, and consequently higher shares of male homicide victims.

Similar to the victims, the vast majority of the persons suspected of intentional homicide and brought into formal contact with the police are men. In the 101 countries in the world with data, more than 9 in 10 suspects of intentional homicides are men or boys (Figure 2). Compared to the victims, differences between countries are much more limited. Nevertheless, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, which have higher homicidal violence, have higher shares of male suspects, representing 93% of the suspects in the 28 countries of the region with data. By contrast, European and Northern American countries tend to have slightly lower shares of male suspects, representing 88% of the suspects in the 40 countries of the region with data. Since the identity of the perpetrator is unknown in many cases, especially for homicides taking place outside of the home where men are more likely to be victims, it is possible the share of male perpetrators is even higher.



### Homicide rate, by region and victim sex, 2021





- https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-intentional-homicide-victims
  - A new 'Global Study on Homicide' will be released later in 2023.

Storyline authors(s)/contributor(s): David Rausis, UNODC; Maurice Rene Dunaiski, UNODC

Custodian agency(ies): UNODC,WHO

# Indicator 16.1.2 Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause


# Unprecedented increase in civilian deaths in conflicts since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda

Between 2021 and 2022, the UN recorded a 53% increase in civilian deaths directly associated with 12 of the world's deadliest armed conflicts, the first increase since the adoption in 2015 of the 2030 Agenda. At least 16,988 civilians were killed in war operations. One in five victims was a woman. The proportion of deaths caused by heavy weapons and explosive munitions increased significantly, from 13% in 2021 to 39% in 2022, highlighting a shift in conflict dynamics, with the use of more lethal weapons in indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks.


Conflict violence affected regions of the world unevenly, with sub-Saharan Africa and Europe accounting for 90% of deaths. Of the total number of civilian deaths worldwide in 2022, four out of ten occurred in Ukraine. However, deadly incidents against civilians persist in other parts of the world. A 23% increase was recorded in sub-Saharan Africa, stressing the need for a new global commitment to peace and security.

These shocking figures highlight an increased risk to civilians in conflict situations. They should be a further call to all parties involved in conflicts to do everything to protect the lives of civilians, including children and women, in line with international humanitarian and human rights law.


### Proportion of documented conflict-related deaths (civilians) by cause of death



\*The 'Other' category refers to: Incendiary weapons; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Weapons (CBRN); Denial of access/destruction of objects indispensable for survival; Accident; Use of objects and other means



### Change in documented conflict-related deaths (civilians)



### Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

- Statistical estimation of civilian deaths in 10 years of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic (Human Rights Council Resolution 50/68, June 2022) https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/ahrc5068-civilian-deaths-syrian-arab-republic-report-united-nations-high
- Ukraine: Civilian casualties as of 24 April 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/04/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-24-april-2023

Storyline authors(s)/contributor(s): Guilherme Leonardo Miranda Dutra, OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights); Nicolas Fasel, OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights)

Custodian agency(ies): OHCHR

Indicator 16.1.3 Proportion of population subjected to (a) physical violence, (b) psychological violence and (c) sexual violence in the previous 12 months

Indicator 16.1.4 Proportion of population that feel safe walking alone around the area they live after dark

Custodian agency(ies): UNODC

# Target 16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children

Indicator 16.2.1 Proportion of children aged 1–17 years who experienced any physical punishment and/or psychological aggression by caregivers in the past month

Custodian agency(ies): UNICEF

# Indicator 16.2.2 Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation


Trafficking in Persons in time of crises: as the number of victims detected falls for the first time, new methods are being tested to estimate the hidden share of the crime

Trafficking in persons is a hidden crime. Available data has so far only captured the number of victims *detected* per 100,000 population, i.e. those who came to the attention of the authorities. Many more remain unassisted, invisible to the eyes of the authorities and anti-trafficking community. Despite these limitations, the available time series, now dating back 20 years even if based on changing sample composition, provide interesting insights into the evolution of the anti-trafficking response. Data from 141 countries encompassing over 95 per cent of the world's population was collected by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for indicator 16.2.2, including data on 187,915 victims detected between 2017 and 2020 – 162,411 of these disaggregated by age and sex and 152,485 by form of exploitation (Figure 1).


For the first time in the 20 years that UNODC has collected data on trafficking in persons, the number of victims detected globally decreased (by 11 per cent) from 2019 to 2020 (Figure 2). This decrease is attributable to a few trends linked to the COVID-19 pandemic: a lower institutional capacity of member states to detect victims, COVID-19 mobility restrictions constraining opportunities for traffickers, and some forms of trafficking moving to more hidden and less likely to be detected locations due to COVID-19 lockdown measures. This tendency may explain a worrying 24 per cent drop in detection of victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation between 2019 and 2020.

As some forms of exploitation were increasingly detected over the last years, men and boys – typically more identified as victims of forced criminality and mixed forms of exploitation – were increasingly reported as trafficking victims. For the first time since 2003, in 2020 trafficking for forced labour was just as detected as trafficking detected for sexual exploitation (Figure 3). This change in patterns and profiles of the detected victims calls for better estimates of the undetected part of the population. What are the profiles of, and forms of exploitation experienced by those that remain invisible?


New methodologies are being tested in order to bridge this gap between the detected and undetected victims, and estimate the prevalence of trafficking in persons. In one of the most recent efforts, the national authorities of Fiji conducted a pioneering prevalence study in 2022, using the Network Scale-Up Method (NSUM) to estimate the prevalence rate of trafficking in persons in Fiji at 0.60 percent. Other global efforts include the SDG 16 Survey Initiative, which provides a tool that countries can use to measure progress on many of the survey-based indicators under this goal, including trafficking in persons, and the use of the Multiple Systems Estimation (MSE).



# Total victims of trafficking in persons detected per 100,000 population, 2003-2020



Percentage change in the number of detected victims of trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation from 2019 to 2020, by region





### Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

- UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022 UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022 press release UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022 data portal <a href="https://www.undp.org/publications/sdg16-survey-initiative">https://www.undp.org/publications/sdg16-survey-initiative</a>
- <u>https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/tip.html</u>

Storyline authors(s)/contributor(s): Giulia Serio, UNODC; Fabrizio Sarrica, UNODC

Custodian agency(ies): UNODC

Indicator 16.2.3 Proportion of young women and men aged 18–29 years who experienced sexual violence by age 18

Custodian agency(ies): UNICEF

# Target 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all

Indicator 16.3.1 Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms

Custodian agency(ies): UNODC

## Indicator 16.3.2 Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population


Ensuring fair access to justice remains crucial, as one out of three prisoners in the world are unsentenced. Inadequate conditions for unsentenced detainees underscore the importance of proper prison resources for rehabilitation, reduced recidivism, and societal welfare.

Access to justice is a fundamental human right, and monitoring progress towards reducing the number of unsentenced detainees is critical. The global number of people held in prison has been steadily increasing from 2015 to 2019 but saw a decrease in 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, the number of prisoners returned to the increasing trend resulting in a total of 11.2 million prisoners.


About one third (3.4 million) of the global prison population is being held in pretrial detention. Among the various subregions, Central Asia and Southern Asia have the highest percentage of unsentenced detainees (60%) and Western Asia and Northern Africa the lowest (21%) (Figure 1). The overall share remained at around 30% between 2015 and 2021. However, there are high variations across regions. For instance, in Oceania, the proportion of incarcerated individuals awaiting trial or sentencing increased from 27% in 2015 to 34% in 2021, while Latin America and the Caribbean saw a decrease from 41% to 33% during the same period.

Amid the need for additional space to accommodate the high volume of unsentenced detainees, the worldwide prison capacity has seen a significant increase of 19%, between 2015 and 2021. However, despite this increase, overcrowding continues to pose a challenge in many parts of the world. In fact, almost half the countries with relevant data (46 out of 96) countries with data reported operating at over 100% of their intended capacity. Furthermore, a smaller proportion of countries (18%) functioned at over 150% of their planned capacity (Figure 2). The situation is particularly concerning in Latin America and the Caribbean, where 80% of countries with data are grappling with issues of overcrowding in their prison systems, in about 25% of countries with data the prison population is more than 50% higher than the available capacity.

The adverse effects of overcrowding on prisoner health<sup>1</sup> and mortality<sup>2</sup> in prison have been documented. While suicide and homicide collectively account for less than 2% of all deaths in the general population<sup>3</sup>, suicide and homicide are major contributors to mortality in prison. The share of deaths by suicide in the nine European and Northern American countries with data fluctuated between 9% and 22% from 2016 to 2020. While in the four Latin American and Caribbean countries with data, the percentage of deaths caused by homicide remained stable at 13% to 19% during the same period. Overall, data on unsentenced detainees, capacity and mortality suggests a need for countries to provide adequate space and resources for prisoners, which is critical for promoting rehabilitation, reducing recidivism, and ensuring the well-being of both prisoners and society<sup>4</sup>.



Percentage of countries where prisoners outnumber the prison capacity (2021 or latest year available)



Note: Overcrowding is defined as the number of prisoners in a country exceeds the official prison capacity by 0-19% (Low), 20-49% (Middle) or 50% or more (High).

• <u>https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-prisons-persons-held</u>

Storyline authors(s)/contributor(s): Melissa Arango, UNODC; Markus Schwabe, UNODC; Maurice Rene Dunaiski, UNODC <u>Custodian agency(ies):</u> UNODC

Indicator 16.3.3 Proportion of the population who have experienced a dispute in the past two years and who accessed a formal or informal dispute resolution mechanism, by type of mechanism

Custodian agency(ies): UNDP,OECD,UNODC

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Møller, L., Gatherer, A., & Jürgens, R. 2016. Health in prisons: A WHO guide to the essentials in prison health. World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Fazel, S., Ramesh, T., Hawton, K. 2017. Suicide in prisons: An international study of prevalence and contributory factors. The Lancet Public Health, 2(3), e120-e126; Wolff, N., Jing Shi, J., & Bachman, R. 2008. The impact of prison crowding on inmate violence. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 45(2), 200-220.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> UNODC computations based on data on homicide (UNODC, 2022, UNODC Research - Data Portal – Intentional Homicide. <u>https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-intentional-homicide-victims</u>), data on suicide (WHO, 2021, Suicide – Key facts, <u>https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/suicide</u>) and data on deaths (UN, DESA, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/suicide) and data on deaths (UN, DESA, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/suicide) and data on deaths (UN, DESA, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/suicide) and data on deaths (UN, DESA, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/suicide) and data on deaths (UN, DESA, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/suicide) and data on deaths (UN, DESA, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/suicide) accessed on 30/03/2023.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> UNODC. 2013. Handbook on Strategies to Reduce Overcrowding in Prisons, pp. iii, 14, 32, 141, 149; UNODC. 2018. Introductory Handbook on The Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders, p. 7.

# Target 16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime

# Indicator 16.4.1 Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars)

# Illicit financial flows (IFFs) deprive countries of essential resources to guarantee peace, justice and strong institutions

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) deprive countries of essential resources to guarantee peace, justice and strong institutions, as they fuel corruption and facilitate investment of criminal proceeds in legal and illegal economic activities. They are also a major obstacle to mobilize resources to recover from the serious social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and guarantee social justice with adequate resource redistribution.


Drug trafficking is a major proceeds-generating crime, and in countries affected by intensive cross-border drug flows it generates significant inward and outward IFFs. Since 2018, UNODC has supported countries in the production of estimates for IFFs related to drug trafficking, following the Conceptual Framework for the Statistical Measurement of Illicit Financial Flows<sup>5</sup>. First estimates reveal that for example Mexican drug cartels generated inward IFFs for an estimated \$12.1 billion USD<sup>6</sup> on average between 2015 and 2018, an amount comparable to the value of agricultural products exports in the country<sup>7</sup>. Similarly, in Colombia, cocaine trafficking between 2015 and 2019 was estimated to have generated inward IFFs between \$1.2 and \$8.6 billion USD (3% to 23% of legal commodity exports), while in Peru cocaine trafficking-related inward IFFs (\$1.3-\$1.7 billion USD) represents 3.5% to 4.5% percent of total exports.

Significant IFFs are generated also in the context of opiates trafficking. According to latest estimates, traffickers have generated inward IFFs worth between \$5.8 and \$9.8 billion USD in the three countries with the highest opiates production - Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Mexico. In Mexico, the value of heroin exports in 2018 was comparable to that of beer exports, amounting to over \$4 billion USD (Figure 1). In Afghanistan, opiates are the most valuable commodity exported, with a value estimated between1.5 to 2.5 times that of total legal commodity exports in 2021. In Myanmar, opiate exports have generated IFFs averaging between 3% and 7.5% of total legal exports between 2018 and 2021, or a value comparable to legal corn exports.


Opiates trafficking in Asia has spillover effects in countries close to major opiates cultivation and manufacturing areas, where opiates are traded for local consumption and further re-exports to other destination countries. Opiates imports are at the origin of outward IFFs in South Asian countries, where they represent values equivalent to those of imports of sugar cane, beets and chemical pure sucrose in the Maldives, and to imports of pharmaceutical goods in Nepal (Figure 2). In Bangladesh, outward IFFs due to the import of opiates represent between \$15.6 and \$310 million USD.

Measuring the value of inward and outward IFFs due to crimes such as drug trafficking is crucial to understand the incentives behind these illegal activities and develop policies to address them. Properly addressing these issues would result not only in decreased IFFs, but also potentially reduce criminal activities related to drug trafficking and positively affect use patterns.

Inward illicit financial flows from the export of opiates in the three major countries with opiates manufacture



Illicit financial flows from the import of heroin in Nepal and Bangladesh (2021)



Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

• https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/iff.html

Storyline authors(s)/contributor(s): Diana Camerini, UNODC; Hernan Epstein, UNODC

Custodian agency(ies): UNODC, UNCTAD

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See <u>https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/iff.html</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> From the trafficking of heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine. The estimate does not include other important drugs such as cannabis exports.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Data on legal imports for comparison were obtained from UN Comtrade.

# Indicator 16.4.2 Proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instruments


# Countries still face significant challenges when establishing the illicit origin of firearms


Establishing the illicit origin of weapons seized, found, and surrendered in the context of conflict, armed violence and crime is crucial in preventing and combatting the illicit trade in small arms and constitutes a key step towards reducing illicit arms flows. National authorities undertake tracing of these weapons to identify their origin as well as their point of diversion to the illicit market. However, tracing remains a challenge for many States due to the lack of resources and capacity, and of effective international cooperation.


Based on data from 65 States, on average around 77% of firearms seized are potentially traceable<sup>8</sup>, consisting mainly of firearms that have unique markings that can be used for identifying their illicit origin. Levels of successful tracing (SDG indicator) vary widely between and within regions and are partly influenced by the volume of arms seized. In States where the yearly average number of firearm seizures exceed 10.000 - the majority of which are in Latin America and the Caribbean - the indicator value falls below the global average of 33 per cent<sup>9</sup>, potentially highlighting the burden of establishing the illicit context of seized arms (Figure 1). By contrast, countries with low levels of arms seized exhibit great variability in the proportion of their successful tracing. In Northern America and Europe, a relatively low success rate<sup>10</sup> of firearms tracing was reported for seven out of ten countries.

In the majority of successful tracing cases, firearms are traced domestically to a national registry (21 out of 33 per cent) but a significant share are traced internationally to a foreign registry (9 out of 33 per cent)<sup>11</sup>, meaning that cooperative practices at the international level are very important, even if improvements in this area are still needed.


While the destruction of weapons<sup>12</sup> constitutes an effective method of reducing the number of small arms on the illicit market (more than 1 million weapons destroyed between 2018 and 2021<sup>13</sup>), States can implement several actions to prevent potential diversion of weapons to the illicit market. Marking and recordkeeping are the prerequisites for effective tracing operations. As such, efforts taken by States to mark and record the weapons collected constitute key measures to reducing illicit arms flows in accordance with SDG Target 16.4. In 2020- 2021, national authorities marked on average 63% and recorded 75% of the weapons seized, found, and surrendered in that period<sup>14</sup>, highlighting an increase compared to 2018-2019<sup>15</sup> (Figure 2). In order to reduce illicit arms flows, information on specific cases and incidents, in which weapons are diverted to illicit markets also needs to be collected and shared by national authorities. The two main sources of weapons diversion are 'diversion during international transfers' and 'diversion from national stockpile'. In 2020-2021, national authorities reported 22 incidents of diversion related to international arms transfers, and 21 incidents of weapons diverted from national stockpiles<sup>16</sup> (Figure 3).








Source : 2022 national reports of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA). Simple averages calculated based on data submitted by 35 Member States for the period 2020-2021.





#### Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

<u>https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-seized</u> ...

Storyline authors(s)/contributor(s): Camelia Abdelgelil, UNODC; Hernan Epstein, UNODC

Custodian agency(ies): UNODC, UNODA

Target 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms

 $^{9}$  Based on simple average on data from 24 Member States between 2016 and 2021 reported through the Illicit Arms Flow Questionnaire (UN-IAFQ).

<sup>10</sup> Below the average of 33 per cent.

<sup>12</sup> The terms "arms" and "weapons" refer to small arms and light weapons and can be used interchangeably.

<sup>13</sup> Overall, considering also weapons collected in previous years and obsolete weapons from national stockpiles, more than 1,046,000 weapons were destroyed between 2018 and 2021. Based on data from 96 countries for the 2020 national reports and 90 countries for the 2022 national reports on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons.

<sup>14</sup> Simple average based on data from 35 Member States reported through the 2022 national reports on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons.

<sup>15</sup> In 2018-2019, national authorities marked on average 14% of the weapons collected and recorded 58% of the weapons. Simple average based on data from 29 Member States reported through the 2020 national reports on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons.

<sup>16</sup> Among 90 States which submitted PoA/ITI national reports 2022, 28 States provided information on diversion incidents related to international transfers, and 38 countries shared data on diversion incidents related to national stockpile management.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Potentially traceable firearms exclude firearms seized from their legitimate owners. Firearms whose marking status was not recorded are also included and considered as "unsuccessful" instances of the efforts to identify the illicit origin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For 3 over 33 per cent of the successfully traced arms, the point of diversion was otherwise established by a competent authority.

Indicator 16.5.1 Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months

Custodian agency(ies): UNODC

Indicator 16.5.2 Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months

Custodian agency(ies): World Bank,UNODC

## Target 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels

### Indicator 16.6.1 Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar)

# Multiple Crises Undermine Budget Credibility Across all Regions

# 1. SDG 16.6.1 world performance in the period 2015-2021

Based on data collected for SDG indicator 16.6.1 for 171 countries, there has been a noticeable improvement in budget credibility, as reflected in average budget deviations compared with the original approved budget from FY 2015 to FY 2019. Average budget deviation reduced from 5 percent in FY 2015 to zero in FY 2019, reaching the targeted goal for the indicator. However, performance has deteriorated since 2019 in the background of multiple crisis. Since then, the impact of COVID-19 has been the main factor in the widening gap between approved and achieved expenditures. As shown in Chart 1, the global shock impacted progress in reducing deviations, breaking a four-year trend toward minimizing differences between approved and executed budgets.

### 2. Performance by regions in the period 2015-2021

Success in achieving low deviation between approved and executed expenditure varies considerably across countries and regions. Chart 2 shows that the regions North


America and Europe and East Asia and South-East Asia performed best before the COVID-19 pandemic. However, North America and Europe region experienced substantial deviations during the pandemic, reporting significant overspending in 2020 and 2021. In contrast, East Asia and South Asia region maintained low deviations. Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania showed high volatility throughout the period while other regions were more stable, even during the years affected by the pandemic.

A comparison of country experiences in the pre-COVID-19 and during-COVID-19 periods shows that in most regions, budget expenditure performance deteriorated in the latter period, as shown in Chart 3. The exceptions to the general deterioration of budget expenditure performance occurred in the Western Asia and Northern Africa and Oceania regions, where in both regions the proportion of countries (57%) with large deviations from approved budget reduced during the 2020-21 period. The largest decline in expenditure performance occurred in North America and Europe, where 13 out of the 33 analyzed countries moved from very good to weak performers.


### 3. Response to COVID and measures


Countries that performed worse during the period affected by the COVID-19 pandemic generally reported that budget expenditures were affected by emergency increases in health and income support programs after the original budgets were approved. In 2021, there were higher allowances for emergency support payments, which often were not fully used as the impact of the pandemic on health treatments, hospitalization, and economic outturn subsided.

The PEFA 2022 Global Report on PFM provides insights into some of the factors that influence budget deviations during crises. The report reiterates that crises can create significant challenges for budget performance, particularly because of the high uncertainty and changing circumstances associated with crises. Based on a series of trend analyses and case studies, the report emphasizes that expenditures typically rise while revenue typically falls during a crisis, leading to larger fiscal deficits than anticipated. A salient message from the report is that many PFM systems were not sufficiently resilient, which contributed to the widespread adoption of crisis budgeting measures during the pandemic.












Chart 3: Comparison of the deviations between approved and executed expenditure, 2015-19 and 2020-21, by region and category

Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

Global Report on PFM: <u>https://www.pefa.org/global-report-2022/en/</u>

Storyline authors(s)/contributor(s): Srinivas Gurazada, WB; Lewis Hawke, WB; Silvia Kirova, WB; Ashikur Rahman, WB

Custodian agency(ies): World Bank

# Indicator 16.6.2 Proportion of population satisfied with their last experience of public services

Custodian agency(ies): UNDP

# Target 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels

Indicator 16.7.1 Proportions of positions in national and local institutions, including (a) the legislatures; (b) the public service; and (c) the judiciary, compared to national distributions, by sex, age, persons with disabilities and population groups


(1) In almost every region of the world, people under age 45 are significantly underrepresented in parliament relative to their share of national populations; (2) Women's representation in parliament is growing too slowly to reach parity by 2030.

In almost every region of the world, people under age 45 are significantly underrepresented in parliament relative to their share of national populations. The only exception is Europe, where the proportion of young MPs is in on par with this age group's representation in the general population (Chart 3). Between 2022 and 2023, gains were made in Africa and Oceania. The ratio of young MPs fell marginally in the Americas - although it is still higher than the global average - and remained largely unchanged both in Asia and globally.


Although the average age of eligibility to serve in parliament is 23 years, the share of MPs age 30 and under has lingered at about 2–2.6%<sup>17</sup> for the past five years. And while the global median age is just over 30 years<sup>18</sup>, the average age of an MP is 51 years<sup>19</sup>. In leadership roles, young MPs account for just under 9% of Speakers and 17.4% of committee chairs<sup>20</sup>. As with women's representation, recognizable change can only be achieved through efforts to enhance youth participation, from adopting youth quotas to lowering the age of eligibility to stand for office.

Women's representation in parliament is growing too slowly to reach parity by 2030 (Chart 2). The average rate of change from the past five years tells us that, in the absence of specific policies, women will not achieve parity in parliaments until after 2060. The figures also suggest that gender parity among Speakers will not be reached until 2048. The position of Speaker is a powerful one - in 40% of countries, the Speaker is second in line to the Head of State<sup>21</sup>.


In terms of women's representation as committee chairs, there has been no significant change in the past three years, with the figures fluctuating between 25.7% and 26.8%. Notably, women chair 65.9% of gender equality committees. But when these are taken out of the equation, only 17.4% of other committees defence, foreign affairs, finance and human rights - are chaired by women (Chart 3). There has been no change in this regard since 2021.



### Women's representation in parliament growing too slowly to reach parity by 2030



#### Women still chronically underrepresented as committee chairs



Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links

- IPU. Parline database on national parliaments, <a href="https://data.ipu.org">https://data.ipu.org</a>. •
- IPU. Parline database on national parliaments, https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking.
- IPU, "Data on age: Global and regional averages," Parline database on national parliaments, <u>https://data.ipu.org/age-brackets-aggregate</u>. •
- IPU, "Data on age: By country," Parline database on national parliaments, https://data.ipu.org/age-brackets/. •
- IPU, "Specialized bodies," Parline database on national parliaments, https://data.ipu.org/specialized-bodies/.
- IPU, "Compare data on parliaments," Parline database on national parliaments, https://data.ipu.org/compare. •
- IPU (2022). Women in parliament in 2021, www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2022-03/women-in-parliament-in-2021. •
- IPU (2021). Youth participation in national parliaments, https://www.ipu.org/youth2021. •
- IPU (2021). Women in parliament in 2020, www.ipu.org/women-in-parliament-2020. •
- IPU (2020). Women in parliament: 1995–2020 25 years in review, www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2020-03/women-in-parliament-1995-2020-25-years-in-• review.
- IPU (2018). Women in parliament in 2018: The year in review, www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2019-03/women-in-parliament-in-2018-year-in-review. •
- IPU (2018). Youth participation in national parliaments, www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2018-12/youth-participation-in-national-parliaments-2018. .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> IPU Parline, "Rank of the Speaker in the hierarchy of the State": <u>https://data.ipu.org/compare?field=chamber%3A%3Afield\_speaker\_rank&structure=any\_lower\_chamber#map;</u> IPU Parline, "Data on age: Global and regional averages": https://data.ipu.org/age-brackets-aggregate/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser, "Age Structure" (2019), in Our World in Data, University of Oxford: https://ourworldindata.org/age-structure; based on United Nations World Population Prospects 2017.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Average across 160 parliamentary chambers for which this information has been reported.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Includes data for committees on foreign affairs, defence, finance, human rights and gender equality only.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> IPU Parline, "Rank of the Speaker in the hierarchy of the State": <u>https://data.ipu.org/compare?field=chamber%3A%3Afield\_speaker\_rank&structure=any\_lower\_chamber#map;</u> IPU Parline, "Data on age: Global and regional averages": <u>https://data.ipu.org/age-brackets-aggregate/</u>.

• IPU (2017). Women in parliament in 2017: The year in review, www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2018-03/women-in-parliament-in-2017-year-in-review.

Storyline authors(s)/contributor(s): Addie Erwin, Inter-Parliamentary Union

Custodian agency(ies): IPU, UNDP

Indicator 16.7.2 Proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group

Custodian agency(ies): UNDP

Target 16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance Indicator 10.6.1/16.8.1 Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organizations

Custodian agency(ies): DESA/FFD0

Target 16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration

Indicator 16.9.1 Proportion of children under 5 years of age whose births have been registered with a civil authority, by age

Custodian agency(ies): UNSD,UNICEF

Target 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements

Indicator 16.10.1 Number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months

Custodian agency(ies): OHCHR

Indicator 16.10.2 Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information

# In 2022 the number of access to information legal frameworks reached 136 which is nearly ten times more than in 1990.

In 2022, a number of countries which provide legal guarantees for Access to Information reached one hundred thirty-six (136) laws adopted worldwide. Oversight mechanisms, which are crucial for the implementation of the guarantees, raised in numbers and expanded in scope, indicating the broadness of mandates to implement the laws. Information Commission/ers were the most common type of oversight mechanism.

As custodian agency for SDG indicator 16.10.2, UNESCO since 2019 invites all UN Member States, to participate in annual survey on SDG indicator 16.10.2. The two last surveys took place from April to June 2021 and from April to May 2022. As many as 102 countries and territories, responded to the survey in 2021, while in 2022 the number of respondent countries and territories reached 123.

Out of the 123 countries and territories that responded to the survey in 2022, 93% (114) indicated that they have constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for Access to Information. In 2021, out of the 102 respondent countries and territories, 89% or 91 jurisdictions indicated having such guarantees.

The statistics of the survey also point to the importance of oversight bodies for the implementation of the ATI legal framework and to the requirement for the public bodies to appoint officers handling Access to Information issues.

Implementation mechanisms are strengthening on a global scale. Firstly, in 2022, out of the 114 responding countries and territories with Access to Information guarantees, 90% (103) reported that these guarantees specify the need of a dedicated oversight institution(-s). In 2021, 87% (79) of the 91 countries and territories with Access to Information guarantees at the time confirmed that their guarantees recognized such a need.

Secondly, out of these 114 jurisdictions, 79% (90) pointed in their 2022 reports that these guarantees specifically provide for the need for public bodies (ministry/agency/department) to appoint public information officers or a specific unit/s to handle Access to Information. Out of the 90, 89% (80) said that these requirements are for all public bodies, while the rest – only to some of the bodies. In 2021, 71% (65) countries and territories (out of the 91 with Access to Information guarantees at the time) reported the need to appoint public information officers or units. In 62 countries and territories, this provision applied to 'all public bodies' and in three more – only to 'some public bodies.'

In 2022, Information Commission/ers were the most common type of oversight mechanism (47 countries/territories reported having an Information Commission/er), followed by governmental departments/ministries/agencies (33) and ombudspersons/institutions (29). Other oversight mechanisms include converged bodies that combine data/privacy protection and Access to Information (27), data protection or privacy commission/ers (16), and human rights commissions (10). In 22 cases, the reports of the countries and territories with Access to Information guarantees pointed to 'Other' in the list of oversight institutions. The picture from the 2021 report is not much different, with the exception of the executive bodies, which had a less prominent role at the time.

Oversight and monitoring of the implementation of the Access to Information legal guarantees remain the prime task of the oversight institutions in the majority of countries and territories that responded to the surveys. Other important tasks cited by respondents are the review of appeals and the enforcement of compliance. Mediation is still largely undeveloped as a mandated role of such bodies.

The independence of oversight institutions is essential for them to play an effective role. Appointment process of the head of the oversight institution, the way institution is financed, and to whom it reports determines the independence of the oversight body.

The 2022 survey revealed that, out of the 103 responding countries and territories with Access to Information legal guarantees that specify the need of a dedicated oversight institution(-s), the majority (63) indicated that the **head** of the Access to Information oversight institution is appointed by the 'Executive'.<sup>22</sup> The 'Legislative' branch is the second most answered (36), followed with 'Other' (21)'<sup>23</sup> and 'Judiciary' (3).

In response to the survey question about the approval of the budget for the access to information oversight institution, 62 respondents indicated that this budget is approved by the 'Legislative' branch, while 47 indicated that it is approved by the 'Executive', and three indicated that it is approved by the 'Judiciary'. Meanwhile, 12 countries indicated 'Other' in their responses, explaining, for example, that the budget of the Access to Information institution comes from that of the Ministry of Justice, or is approved through a complex procedure involving different stakeholders.

In response to the survey question about to whom the Access to Information oversight institution directly reports about its activities<sup>24</sup>, 68 respondents indicated that the budget is approved by the 'Legislative' branch, while 49 indicated that it is approved by the 'Executive', and four indicated that it is approved by the 'Judiciary'

### Additional resources, press releases, etc. with links:

- SDG 16.10.2 Report of 2022: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000383160SDG
- 16.10.2 Report of 2019, 2020, 2021 reports: <u>https://www.unesco.org/reports/access-to-information/2021/en/resources</u>
- Metadata for SDG Indicator 16.10.2: <u>https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/files/Metadata-16-10-02.pdf</u>

Custodian agency(ies): UNESCO-UIS

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> For this question, respondents could choose one or more branches of government, as applicable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Such as the Head of State or a complicated procedure involving several branches of power.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> For this question, respondents could choose one or more branches of government, as applicable.

Target 16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime

# Indicator 16.a.1 Existence of independent national human rights institutions in compliance with the Paris Principles

Custodian agency(ies): OHCHR

### Target 16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development

Indicator 10.3.1/16.b.1 Proportion of population reporting having personally felt discriminated against or harassed in the previous 12 months on the basis of a ground of discrimination prohibited under international human rights law


Racial discrimination is one of the most common grounds of discrimination

Globally, close to one in six people experience discrimination based on any grounds, according to the latest available data. For both women and men, racial discrimination, based on ethnicity, colour or language, is among the most common grounds of discrimination. When racial discrimination is combined with discrimination based on individuals' socioeconomic status, one in eight people report having experienced discrimination.

Women continue to be more discriminated against than men. Simply because of their sex, women are twice as likely to be discriminated against as men.

One in three people with disabilities experience discrimination, which is twice more than persons without disability. These data, although related to a limited number of countries, point to the need to do more to assess discrimination worldwide. Despite the commitment to leave no one behind and to eliminate discrimination as part of the 2030 Agenda, less than a third of countries have measured the prevalence of discrimination.

Proportion of the overall population experiencing discrimination, by selected grounds and sex, 2015–2022 (percentage)



Storyline authors(s)/contributor(s): Guilherme Leonardo Dutra, OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights); Nicolas Fasel, OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights)

Custodian agency(ies): OHCHR