

The Internet: We deserve a GNU one!


Christian Grothoff



June 2, 2018


“The means of defense against foreign danger historically have become the instruments of tyranny at home.” –James Madison

The Internet (1/2)



Internet Architecture Model

Design theory: “rough consensus and running code”



The IETF culture requires that new layers provide a protocol specification and at least two or three running implementations.

Likely, the four layer model will not grow in complexity (unless the internet does first.)

Internet Design Goals, David Clark, 1988

1. **Internet communication must continue despite loss of networks or gateways.**
2. The Internet must support multiple types of communications service.
3. The Internet architecture must accommodate a variety of networks.
4. The Internet architecture must permit *distributed management* of its resources.
5. The Internet architecture must be cost effective.
6. The Internet architecture must permit host attachment with a low level of effort.
7. **The resources used in the internet architecture must be accountable.**

Mass Surveillance



(U) What is TREASUREMAP?



(U//FOUO) Capability for building a near real-time, interactive map of the global internet.

Map the entire Internet – Any device*, anywhere, all the time

(U//FOUO) We enable a wide range of missions:

- Cyber Situational Awareness – *your own network plus adversaries'*
- Common Operation Pictures (COP)
- Computer Attack/Exploit Planning / Preparation of the Environment
- Network Reconnaissance
- Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)

(* limited only by available data)

“Wer nicht mit hinreichender Sicherheit überschauen kann, welche ihn betreffende Informationen in bestimmten Bereichen seiner sozialen Umwelt bekannt sind, und wer das Wissen möglicher Kommunikationspartner nicht einigermaßen abzuschätzen vermag, kann in seiner Freiheit wesentlich gehemmt werden, aus eigener Selbstbestimmung zu planen oder zu entscheiden.”

—Bundesverfassungsgericht zum Volkszählungsurteil

Legitimizing Surveillance

Legitimacy

Effective governance uses the appearance of legitimacy to justify their actions:

- ▶ Voting legitimizes sham democracies
- ▶ Laws legitimize the executive protecting the status quo

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- ▶ Strategy of tension (counter insurgency tactics) legitimizes the deep state

Legitimacy

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- ▶ Voting legitimizes sham democracies
- ▶ Laws legitimize the executive protecting the status quo
- ▶ Strategy of tension (counter insurgency tactics) legitimizes the deep state

Italian terrorist Vincenzo Vinciguerra explained about the strategie of tension in Italy:

“Man musste Zivilisten angreifen, (...), unschuldige Menschen, unbekannte Menschen, die weit weg vom politischen Spiel waren. Der Grund dafür war einfach. Die Anschläge sollten das italienische Volk dazu bringen, den Staat um größere Sicherheit zu bitten. Diese politische Logik liegt all den Massakern und Terroranschlägen zu Grunde, welche ohne richterliches Urteil bleiben, weil der Staat sich ja nicht selber verurteilen kann.”


—Daniele Ganser, *Der Bund*, 20.12.2004.

Commercial tools: The crime fighting genie!

<http://www.stealthgenie.com/> (6'2013)

Warum ist Überwachung gerechtfertigt?

“Wir sind die Guten.” —Die Anstalt



Risks of Mass Surveillance

Societal control technology: Analytics

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL



**SKYNET: Applying Advanced
Cloud-based Behavior Analytics**

A Collaborative Project
by S2I, R6, T12, T14,
SSG, and S22

Presenters:
S2I51
R66F

Design/Print: 2014/02/28 1:52
Image: 2008/12/28
Deployment On: 2013/04/21

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Statistics

- ▶ mathematical techniques for drawing general conclusions from data samples
- ▶ means, medians, distributions, samples, significance, bias
- ▶ resulting aggregates may have meaning, or not
- ▶ no hard assurances about individual inputs, only probabilities

Machine Learning

We have too much (statistical) data for humans to determine which ones have meaning, so:

- ▶ Ask computer to figure out which inputs matter!
- ▶ Different techniques:
 - ▶ Supervised learning: given example inputs and desired outputs, derive “general rule”
 - ▶ Unsupervised learning: find hidden structure in data
 - ▶ Reinforcement learning: algorithm selects actions, receives feedback based on result(s)
- ▶ Shared outcome: data in, statistical predictors out

Big Data

- ▶ “big” = too large for “standard” methods
- ▶ uses parallel-processing (CPU and data storage) – “Cloud”
- ▶ focus on decision-making based on quantitative information
- ▶ commercially use: model customers to increase sales



Cloud Analytic Building Blocks

- Travel Patterns
 - Travel phrases (Locations visited in given timeframe)
 - Regular/repeated visits to locations of interest
- Behavior-Based Analytics
 - Low use, incoming calls only
 - Excessive SIM or Handset swapping
 - Frequent Detach/Power-down
 - Courier machine learning models
- Other Enrichments
 - Travel on particular days of the week
 - Co-travelers
 - Similar travel patterns
 - Common contacts
 - Visits to airports
 - Other countries
 - Overnight trips
 - Permanent move



RT-RG Analytics




Meetings – who is at the same ucellid at the same time as the potential courier at the destination city?...Multiple times.




Sidekicks – is there a pair traveling together to the destination city?


From GSM metadata, we can measure aspects of each selector's **pattern-of-life**, **social network**, and **travel behavior**



This presentation describes our search for AQSL couriers using behavioral profiling



Behavioral Feature Extraction




Cross Validation Experiment
on AQSL Couriers




Preliminary SIGINT Findings

Counting unique UCELLIDs shows that couriers travel more often than typical Pakistani selectors




By examining multiple features at once, we can see some indicative behaviors of our courier selectors



Statistical algorithms are able to find the couriers at very low false alarm rates, if we're allowed to miss half of them

Random Forest Classifier

- 7 MSISDN/IMSI pairs
- Hold each pair out and then try to find them after learning how to distinguish remaining couriers from other Pakistanis (using 100k random selectors here)
- Assume that random draws of Pakistani selectors are nontargets
- 0.18% False Alarm Rate at 50% Miss Rate



We've been experimenting with several error metrics on both small and large test sets

Training Data	Classifier	Features	100k Test Selectors		55M Test Selectors	
			False Alarm Rate at 50% Miss Rate	Mean Reciprocal Rank	Tasked Selectors in Top 500	Tasked Selectors in Top 100
None	Random	None	50%	1/23k (simulated)	0.64 (active/Pak)	0.13 (active/Pak)
Known Couriers	Centroid	All	20%	1/18k		
		Outgoing	43%	1/27k		
+ Anchory Selectors	Random Forest		0.18%	1/9.9	5	1
			0.008%	1/14	21	6


Random Forest trained on Known Couriers + Anchory Selectors:

- 0.008% false alarm rate at 50% miss rate
- 46x improvement over random performance when evaluating its tasked precision at 100

Preliminary results indicate that we're on the right track, but much remains to be done


Cross Validation Experiment:

- Random Forest classifier operating at 0.18% false alarm rate at 50% miss
- Enhancing training data with Anchory selectors reduced that to 0.008%
- Mean Reciprocal Rank is ~1/10



Preliminary SIGINT Findings:

- Behavioral features helped discover similar selectors with “courier-like” travel patterns
- High number of tasked selectors at the top is hopefully indicative of the detector performing well “in the wild”



192 Million people live in Pakistan.

- ▶ 0.18% of the Pakistani population = 343,800 innocent citizens
- ▶ 0.008% of the Pakistani population = 15,280 innocent citizens

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This is with half of AQSL couriers surviving the genocide.

“We kill based on metadata.”

—Michael Hayden (former NSA & CIA director)

The NSA mathematician's presentation only gives the percentages.

Compartmentalization

The NSA mathematician's presentation only gives the percentages.

Compartmentalization is an unconscious psychological defense mechanism used to avoid cognitive dissonance, or the mental discomfort and anxiety caused by a person's having conflicting values, cognitions, emotions, beliefs, etc. within themselves.

Societal control technology: Adaptation and Attack

“Angela Merkel lässt sich sehr stark von der Meinungsforschung leiten. Das zeigen Umfragen im Auftrag des Bundespresseamtes, die der SPIEGEL ausgewertet hat. Sätze der Demoskopen schafften es fast wortgleich in eine Regierungserklärung.”

<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/angela-merkel-meinungsforscher-beeinflussen-arbeit-der-kanzlerin.html>

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“Germany is a digitally failed state.” —Sasha Lobo

Surveillance is just step 1

Let's look at how the US professionals do it...




The Hacking Process

1. (R)econnaissance
2. (I)nfection
3. (C)ommand And Control
4. (E)xfiltration




Reconnaissance



Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control Exfiltration




Infection



Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control Exfiltration



Command and Control



Reconnaissance Infection **Command and Control** Exfiltration



Exfiltration

Exfil using known and custom protocols
(Known: HTTP, SMTP, ICMP, FTP, etc)



Exfiltration is just step 4...

Let's look at how the IT professionals do it...


```
11 def content(*args)
12   hash = [args].flatten.first || {}
13
14   process = hash[:process] || ["Explorer.exe\0", "Firefox.exe\0", "Chrome.exe\0"].sample
15   process.encode!("US-ASCII")
16
17   path = hash[:path] || ["C:\\Utenti\\pippo\\pedoporno.mpg", "C:\\Utenti\\pluto\\Documenti\\childporn.avi", "C:\\secrets\\bomb"]
18   path = path.to_utf16le_binary_null
19
20   content = StringIO.new
21   t = Time.now.getutc
22   content.write [t.sec, t.min, t.hour, t.mday, t.mon, t.year, t.wday, t.yday, t.isdst ? 0 : 1].pack('l*')
23   content.write process
24   content.write [ 0 ].pack('L') # size hi
25   content.write [ hash[:size] || 123456789 ].pack('L') # size lo
26   content.write [ 0x80000000 ].pack('l') # access mode
27   content.write path
28   content.write [ ELEM_DELIMITER ].pack('L')
29   content.string
30 end
```

That was fun, let's scale it up

Let's look at how the UK professionals do it...

Introducing the Joint Threat Research and Intelligence Group (JTRIG)

2.3 (...) *Generally, the language of JTRIG's operations is characterised by terms such as "discredit", promote "distrust", "dissuade", "deceive", "disrupt", "delay", "deny", "denigrate/degrade", and "deter".*

<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jun/behavioural-science-support-for-jtrigs-effects.pdf>

- “Using online techniques to make something happen in the real or cyber world”
- Two broad categories:
 - Information Ops (influence or disruption)
 - Technical disruption
- Known in GCHQ as Online Covert Action
- The 4 D's: Deny / Disrupt / Degrade / Deceive

- Set up a honey-trap
- Change their photos on social networking sites
- Write a blog purporting to be one of their victims
- Email/text their colleagues, neighbours, friends
etc

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Discredit a company

- Leak confidential information to companies / the press via blogs etc
- Post negative information on appropriate forums
- Stop deals / ruin business relationships

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Join Threat Research and Intelligence Group (JTRIG)

“3.2 Theories and research in the field of social psychology may prove particularly useful for informing JTRIG’s effects and online HUMINT operations. The following topics would be particularly relevant for social influence:

- ▶ *Social cognition (including social perception and attribution)*
- ▶ *Attitudes*
- ▶ *Persuasive communications*
- ▶ *Conformity*
- ▶ *Obedience*
- ▶ *Interpersonal relationships*
- ▶ *Trust and distrust*
- ▶ *Psychological profiling*

In addition, the application of social psychological ideas to marketing and advertising would be useful.” —Behavioural Science Support for JTRIG’s Effects and Online HUMINT Operations (2011)

<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jun/behavioural-science-support-for-jtrigs-effects.pdf>

Mirroring

People copy each other while in social interaction with them.

- body language
- language cues
- expressions
- eye movements
- emotions


Accommodation

Adjustment of speech, patterns, and language towards another person in communications

- People in conversation tend to converge
- Depends on empathy and other personality traits
- Possibility of over-accommodation and end up looking condescending

Mimicry

adoption of specific social traits by the communicator from the other participant




Question: Can I game this?

DISRUPTION

Operational Playbook

- Infiltration Operation
- Ruse Operation
- Set Piece Operation
- False Flag Operation
- False Rescue Operation
- Disruption Operation
- Sting Operation

Identifying & Exploiting fracture points



Gambits for Deception

Attention	Control attention Conspicuity & Expectancies	The big move covers the little move	The Target looks where you look	Attention drops at the perceived end	Repetition reduces vigilance
Perception	Mask/Mimic Eliminate - Blend Recreate - Imitate	Repackage/Invent Modify old cues Create new cues	Dazzle/Decoy Blur old cues Create alternate cues	Make the cue dynamic	Stimulate multiple sensors
Sensemaking	Exploit prior beliefs	Present story fragments	Repetition creates expectancies	Haversack Ruse (The Piece of Bad Luck)	Swap the real for the false, & vice versa
Affect	Create Cognitive Stress	Create Physiological Stress	Create Affective Stress (+/-)	Cialdini+2	Exploit shared affect
Behaviour	Simulate the action	Simulate the outcome	Time-shift perceived behaviour	Divorce behaviour from outcome	Channel behaviour

10 Principles for Influence

The **Time** Principle

The **Need and Greed** Principle

The **Deception** Principle

The **Social Compliance/ Authority** Principle

The **Dishonesty** Principle

The **Herd** Principle

The **Distraction** Principle

The **Consistency** Principle

The **Reciprocity** Principle

The **Flattery** Principle

The Distraction principle

“While you are distracted by what retains your interest, hustlers can do anything to you and you won’t notice.”

—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Herd principle

“Even suspicious marks will let their guard down when everyone next to them appears to share the same risks. Safety in numbers? Not if they’re all conspiring against you.”

—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Dishonesty principle

“Anything illegal you do will be used against you by the fraudster, making it harder for you to seek help once you realize you’ve been had.”

—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Deception principle

“Things and people are not what they seem. Hustlers know how to manipulate you to make you believe that they are.”

—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Need and Greed principle

“Your needs and desires make you vulnerable. Once hustlers know what you really want, they can easily manipulate you.”

—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Time principle

“When you are under time pressure to make an important choice, you use a different decision strategy. Hustlers steer you towards a strategy involving less reasoning.”

—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Social Compliance principle / Authority

“Society trains people not to question authority. Hustlers exploit this ‘suspension of suspiciousness’ to make you do what they want.”

—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

This is related to Cialdini’s principle of persuasion on Authority:

“People respect authority. They want to follow the lead of real experts. Business titles, impressive clothing, and even driving an expensive, high-performing automobile are proven factors in lending credibility to any individual.” —Dr. Robert Cialdini

Reciprocity


“The implication is you have to go first. Give something: give information, give free samples, give a positive experience to people and they will want to give you something in return.” —Dr. Robert Cialdini

Consistency

“People do not like to back out of deals. We’re more likely to do something after we’ve agreed to it verbally or in writing. People strive for consistency in their commitments. They also prefer to follow pre-existing attitudes, values and actions.” —Dr. Robert Cialdini

Liking — The Flattery Principle (?)

“People prefer to say ‘yes’ to those they know and like.” —Dr. Robert Cialdini



JTRIG “Collection” Tools

AIRWOLF Youtube profile, command and video **collection**.

BIRDSTRIKE Twitter monitoring and profile **collection**.

SPRING BISHOP **Find private** photographs of targets on Facebook.

FUSEWIRE Provides 24/7 **monitoring** of forums for target postings/online activity. Also allows **staggered postings** to be made.

BIRDSONG Automated **posting** of Twitter updates.

SYLVESTER Framework for **automated interaction** / alias management on online social networks.

JTRIG “Effects” Capabilities

CLEAN SWEEP Masquerade Facebook wall posts for individuals or entire countries

BOMB BAY is the capability to **increase** website hits/**rankings**.

UNDERPASS **Change outcome** of online polls

GESTATOR **amplification** of a given message, normally video, on popular multimedia websites.

PITBULL enabling **large scale delivery** of a tailored message to users of instant messaging services.

BADGER **mass delivery** of email messaging to support an information operations campaign.

WARPATH **mass delivery** of SMS messages to support an information operations campaign.

CANNONBALL is the capability to **send repeated** text messages to a single target.

BURLESQUE is the capability to **send spoofed** SMS text messages.

SCRAPHEAP CHALLENGE **Perfect spoofing** of emails from Blackberry targets

JTRIG “Effects” Capabilities

CHINESE FIRECRACKER overt **brute login** attempts against online forums.

TORNADO ALLEY delivery method that can silently extract and **run** an executable on a target’s machine

SWAMP DONKEY silently locate files and **encrypt** them on a target’s machine.

ANGRY PIRATE permanently **disables** target’s account on their computer.

PREDATORS FACE Targeted **denial** of service against Web servers.

ROLLING THUNDER Distributed **denial** of service using P2P.

SILENT MOVIE Targeted **denial** of service against SSH servers.

VIPERS TONGUE silently **denial** of service calls on a Satellite or GSM phone

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NEWTONS CAT



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The world is interdisciplinary

- ▶ Marketing
- ▶ Politics
- ▶ Psychology
- ▶ Computer science
- ▶ Statistics
- ▶ Warfare
- ▶ Gamification
- ▶ Espionage

Five-Eye Victims

- ▶ United Nations
- ▶ European Union
- ▶ UK (listed by GCHQ as an operations area!)
- ▶ Argentina (Falklands)
- ▶ Zimbabwe (“regime change”)
- ▶ Africa (listed by GCHQ as a “country”)
- ▶ Leaders of colonies (Hollande, Sarkozy, Merkel)
- ▶ Amnesty International
- ▶ Greenpeace
- ▶ Journalists (Spiegel, Wikileaks)
- ▶ Terrorists (Sebastian Hahn)
- ▶ Occupy activists

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- ▶ Terrorists (Sebastian Hahn)
- ▶ Occupy activists
- ▶ plus 9:10 unintended targets¹

¹http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are-2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html

Summary

GCHQ paid to train 150+ staff to perform a range of criminal acts:

- ▶ Technical: manipulate messages, censor access, spam with information
- ▶ Psychological: deprivation, emotional distress, deception, abuse of authority

with victims in other countries but also domestic to further UK political agenda:

- ▶ overthrow governments
- ▶ stifle dissent
- ▶ provide economic advantages

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Full roll out complete by early 2013
150+ JTRIG and Ops staff fully trained

Mainstreaming work – push reduced
"level 1" Tradecraft to 500+ GCHQ
Analysts

"Relentlessly Optimise Training
and Tradecraft"

SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

The UK merely joins the club

- ▶ Salutin Putin: inside a Russian troll house²
- ▶ Ukraine's new online army in media war with Russia³
- ▶ Congress vs BJP: The curious case of trolls and politics⁴
- ▶ China's Paid Trolls: Meet the 50-Cent Party⁵

“Das ist das Geheimnis der Propaganda; den, den die Propaganda fassen will, ganz mit den Ideen der Propaganda zu durchtränken, ohne dass er überhaupt merkt, dass er durchtränkt wird.”

—Joseph Goebbels

“Propaganda techniques include: Using stereotypes; substituting names/labels for neutral ones; censorship or systematic selection of information; repetition; assertions without arguments; and presenting a message for and against a subject.”


—TOP SECRET JTRIG Report on Behavioural Science

²<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-house>

³<http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring/ukraines-new-online-army-in-media-war-with-russia>

⁴<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Congress-vs-BJP-The-curious-case-of-trolls-and-politics/articleshow/23970818.cms>

⁵<http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/10/china%E2%80%99s-paid-trolls-meet-50-cent-party>



Legitimacy (Reprise)

So what about transnational organized crime?

Legitimacy (Reprise)

So what about transnational organized crime?

Let's start with the worst.

Terrorism

- ▶ A terrorist is someone who uses violence to create fear to achieve political objectives.

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States

- ▶ Leaders of states have political objectives.

Terrorism

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State Terrorism

- ▶ A state using violence to achieve political objectives.
- ▶ States may use violence abroad or domestically.

Terrorism

- ▶ A terrorist is someone who uses violence to create fear to achieve political objectives.

States

- ▶ Leaders of states have political objectives.

State Terrorism

- ▶ A state using violence to achieve political objectives.
- ▶ States may use violence abroad or domestically.

“To initiate a war of aggression [...] is the supreme international crime, only different from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of all the others. To initiate a war of aggression is a crime that no political or economic situation can justify.”

–Declaration of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, 1945.

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SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY




Do you  your brand?


SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

What NOT to do.

(a)



(b)



- P Path server
- B Beacon server
- C Certificate server
- AS border router
- AS internal router

Grundzüge von SCION

- ▶ Isolation des ISP-Zusammenschlusses nach Aussen
- ▶ “Security” (für DNS, BGP)
- ▶ Privacy ist kein Designziel
- ▶ Migration auf Level ISP, keine Änderungen beim Endnutzer

Wenn im Zuge der NSA-Affäre über ein “Schlandnetz” gesprochen werde, sei dieser Umbau zu einem nationalen Internet ohne Umgehungsmöglichkeiten für den Einzelnen eine Ausprägung des tiefen Staates. Neben dieser Verstaatlichung und der “Militarisierung des Internet” werde eine Strategie der “Cyber-Counterinsurgency” entwickelt: Hierbei geht es darum, das Netz als äußerst bedrohlich darzustellen, um die Zustimmung der Bevölkerung zu einschneidenden technischen Maßnahmen zu gewinnen. –Andreas Lehner

Geldspielgesetz

- ▶ Pretext
 - ▶ Netzwerzensur
 - ▶ Technische Umsetzung
- ⇒ Schritt 1 für das Swissnet!

What to do?

Liberty

*“When governments fear the people, there is liberty. When the people fear the government, there is tyranny. The strongest reason for the people to retain the right to keep and **bear arms** is, as a last resort, to protect themselves against tyranny in government.”*


—Thomas Jefferson

Modern arms

- ▶ Offensive: surveillance- and **cracking**-tools (“Staatstrojaner”)
- ▶ Defensive: privacy-enhancing technologies (encryption)

Supreme Alternatives Advertising

Let's do something about it!



Design Choices for a Civil Network!

Internet Design Goals (David Clark, 1988)

1. **Internet communication must continue despite loss of networks or gateways.**
2. The Internet must support multiple types of communications service.
3. The Internet architecture must accommodate a variety of networks.
4. The Internet architecture must permit *distributed management* of its resources.
5. The Internet architecture must be cost effective.
6. The Internet architecture must permit host attachment with a low level of effort.
7. **The resources used in the internet architecture must be accountable.**

GNUet Design Goals

1. GNUet must be implemented as free software.
2. **The GNUet must only disclose the minimal amount of information necessary.**
3. **The GNUet must be decentralised and survive Byzantine failures in any position in the network.**
4. **The GNUet must make it explicit to the user which entities must be trustworthy when establishing secured communications.**
5. **The GNUet must use compartmentalization to protect sensitive information.**
6. The GNUet must be open and permit new peers to join.
7. **The GNUet must be self-organizing and not depend on administrators.**
8. The GNUet must support a diverse range of applications and devices.
9. The GNUet architecture must be cost effective.
10. **The GNUet must provide incentives for peers to contribute more resources than they consume.**

Let's Implement It!

Internet

Google
DNS/X.509
TCP/UDP
IP/BGP
Ethernet
Phys. Layer

Let's Implement It!

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GNUnet

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Applications (being) built using GUNet

- ▶ Anonymous and non-anonymous file-sharing
- ▶ IPv6-IPv4 protocol translator and tunnel
- ▶ GNU Name System: censorship-resistant replacement for DNS
- ▶ Conversation: secure, decentralised VoIP
- ▶ SecuShare, a social networking application
- ▶ GNU Taler: privacy-preserving payments
- ▶ ...



Modern economies need a currency.

Motivation



Modern economies need an online payment system.

Credit cards?



SWIFT/Mastercard/Visa are too transparent.



- ▶ ZeroCoin/ZeroCash is a decentralized online currency
- ▶ Designs offer fully decentralized transactions with full anonymity



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
Is society ready for an anarchistic economy?

We can make cash **digital** and **socially responsible**.

<Taler>

Taxable, Anonymous, Libre, Practical, Resource Friendly

Architecture of GNU Taler



More tools and technologies exist

- ▶ Tor
- ▶ GnuPG
- ▶ OTR+XMPP
- ▶ Pond
- ▶ I2P
- ▶ ...

*“**Obedience** is a direct form of social influence where an individual submits to, or complies with, an authority figure. Obedience may be explained by factors such as **diffusion of responsibility**, perception of the authority figure being **legitimate**, and **socialisation** (...). (...)*

*Conversely, efforts to reduce obedience may be effectively based around **educating** people about the **adverse consequences of compliance**; encouraging them to **question authority**; and exposing them to **examples of disobedience**.”*

—TOP SECRET JTRIG Report on Behavioural Science

Conclusion

- ▶ Computers have no sense of ethics.
- ▶ Code is stronger than law.

⇒ We need to be careful about which technology we adopt.

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- ▶ consider the economic and social *benefits* of having private information
- ▶ deploy technological systems that encode our ethical principles

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AND

We **MUST** defund the deep state and end its wars.

Questions?

Find more information at:

- ▶ <http://www.taler.net/>
- ▶ Slides will be at
<http://grothoff.org/christian/>.

