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Line 12: == E2EE and privacy == In many messaging systems, including [[email]] and many chat networks, messages pass through intermediaries and are stored by a third party,<ref>{{Cite web\|title=Cryptography Concepts -– Fundamentals -– E3Kit {{!}} Virgil Security\|url=https://developer.virgilsecurity.com/docs/e3kit/fundamentals/cryptography/#end-to-end-encryption\|access-date=2020-10-30\|website=developer.virgilsecurity.com}}</ref> from which they are retrieved by the recipient. Even if the messages are encrypted, they are only encrypted 'in transit', and are thus accessible by the service provider,<ref>{{Cite web\|last=Mundhenk\|first=Ben Rothke and David\|date=2009-09-10\|title=End-to-End Encryption: The PCI Security Holy Grail\|url=https://www.csoonline.com/article/2124346/end-to-end-encryption--the-pci-security-holy-grail.html\|access-date=2020-11-04\|website=CSO Online\|language=en}}</ref> regardless of whether server-side disk encryption is used. Server-side disk encryption simply prevents unauthorized users from viewing this information. It does not prevent the company itself from viewing the information, as they have the key and can simply decrypt this data. This allows the third party to provide search and other features, or to scan for illegal and unacceptable content, but also means they can be read and misused by anyone who has access to the stored messages on the third-party system, whether this is by design or via a [[backdoor (computing)\|backdoor]]. This can be seen as a concern in many cases where privacy is very important, such as businesses whose reputation depends on their ability to protect third party data, negotiations and communications that are important enough to have a risk of targeted 'hacking' or surveillance, and where sensitive subjects such as [[health]], and information about minors are involved{{Explain\|reason=how E2EE definition is distinct from Forward secrecy or DTLS\|date=June 2020}}. Line 38: ==== Authentication ==== {{see also\|Key Transparency}} Most end-to-end encryption protocols include some form of endpoint [[Authentication cookie\|authentication]] specifically to prevent MITM attacks. For example, one could rely on [[Certificate Authority Security Council\|certification authorities]] or a [[web of trust]].<ref>{{cite web\|title=What is man-in-the-middle attack (MitM)? -– Definition from WhatIs.com\|url=http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/man-in-the-middle-attack-MitM\|website=IoT Agenda\|access-date=7 January 2016\|language=en-US\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160105000628/http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/man-in-the-middle-attack-MitM\|archive-date=5 January 2016}}</ref> An alternative technique is to generate cryptographic hashes (fingerprints) based on the communicating users’ public keys or shared secret keys. The parties compare their [[Public key fingerprint\|fingerprints]] using an outside (out-of-band) communication channel that guarantees integrity and authenticity of communication (but not necessarily secrecy{{citation needed\|date=June 2020}}), before starting their conversation. If the fingerprints match, there is, in theory, no man in the middle.<ref name="Wired Lexicon" /> When displayed for human inspection, fingerprints usually use some form of [[Binary-to-text encoding]]{{citation needed\|date=June 2020}}.<ref>{{cite journal\|last=Dechand\|first=Sergej\|date=10–12 August 2016\|title=An Empirical Study of Textual Key-Fingerprint Representations\|url=https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_paper_dechand.pdf\|journal=The Advanced Computing System Association\|pages=1–17}}</ref> These strings are then formatted into groups of characters for readability. Some clients instead display a [[natural language]] representation of the fingerprint.<ref name="pEp-whitepaper">{{cite web\|url=https://pep.foundation/docs/pEp-whitepaper.pdf\|title=pEp White Paper\|publisher=pEp Foundation Council\|date=18 July 2016\|access-date=11 October 2016\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161001160110/https://pep.foundation/docs/pEp-whitepaper.pdf\|archive-date=1 October 2016}}</ref> As the approach consists of a [[one-to-one mapping]] between fingerprint blocks and words, there is no loss in [[entropy]]. The protocol may choose to display words in the user's native (system) language.<ref name="pEp-whitepaper"/> This can, however, make cross-language comparisons prone to errors.<ref name="Marlinspike-2016-04-05"/> Line 82: {{DEFAULTSORT:End-To-End Encryption}} [[Category:Cryptography]] [[Category:End-to-end encryption\| ]] [[Category:Telecommunications]] [[Category:Secure communication]]