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Additional artifacts:
This prose specification is one component of a Work Product that also includes PKCS #11 header files:

- pkcs11.h: https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-spec/v3.1/os/include/pkcs11-v3.1/pkcs11.h
- pkcs11f.h: https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-spec/v3.1/os/include/pkcs11-v3.1/pkcs11f.h
- pkcs11t.h: https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-spec/v3.1/os/include/pkcs11-v3.1/pkcs11t.h

Related work:
This specification replaces or supersedes:

- *PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Base Specification Version 3.0*. Edited by Chris Zimman and Dieter Bong. Latest stage: https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-base/v3.0/pkcs11-base-v3.0.html.
- *PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Current Mechanisms Specification Version 3.0*. Edited by Chris Zimman and Dieter Bong. Latest stage: https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-curr/v3.0/pkcs11-curr-v3.0.html.

This specification is related to:

- *PKCS #11 Profiles Version 3.1.* Edited by Tim Hudson. Latest stage: https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-profiles/v3.1/pkcs11-profiles-v3.1.html.

Abstract:
This document defines data types, functions and other basic components of the PKCS #11 Cryptoki interface.

Status:
This document was last revised or approved by the membership of OASIS on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the "Latest stage" location noted above for possible later revisions of this document. Any other numbered Versions and other technical work produced by the Technical Committee (TC) are listed at https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=pkcs11#technical.

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Key words:
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

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1 Introduction

This document describes the basic PKCS#11 token interface and token behavior.

The PKCS#11 standard specifies an application programming interface (API), called “Cryptoki,” for devices that hold cryptographic information and perform cryptographic functions. Cryptoki follows a simple object based approach, addressing the goals of technology independence (any kind of device) and resource sharing (multiple applications accessing multiple devices), presenting to applications a common, logical view of the device called a “cryptographic token”.

This document specifies the data types and functions available to an application requiring cryptographic services using the ANSI C programming language. The supplier of a Cryptoki library implementation typically provides these data types and functions via ANSI C header files. Generic ANSI C header files for Cryptoki are available from the PKCS#11 web page. This document and up-to-date errata for Cryptoki will also be available from the same place.

Additional documents may provide a generic, language-independent Cryptoki interface and/or bindings between Cryptoki and other programming languages.

Cryptoki isolates an application from the details of the cryptographic device. The application does not have to change to interface to a different type of device or to run in a different environment; thus, the application is portable. How Cryptoki provides this isolation is beyond the scope of this document, although some conventions for the support of multiple types of device will be addressed here and possibly in a separate document.

Details of cryptographic mechanisms (algorithms) may be found in the associated PKCS#11 Mechanisms documents.

1.1 Definitions

For the purposes of this standard, the following definitions apply:

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard, as defined in FIPS PUB 197.
API	Application programming interface.
Application	Any computer program that calls the Cryptoki interface.
ASN.1	Abstract Syntax Notation One, as defined in X.680.
Attribute	A characteristic of an object.
BER	Basic Encoding Rules, as defined in X.690.
BLOWFISH	The Blowfish Encryption Algorithm of Bruce Schneier, www.schneier.com.
CAMELLIA	The Camellia encryption algorithm, as defined in RFC 3713.
CBC	Cipher-Block Chaining mode, as defined in FIPS PUB 81.
Certificate	A signed message binding a subject name and a public key, or a subject name and a set of attributes.
CDMF	Commercial Data Masking Facility, a block encipherment method specified by International Business Machines Corporation and based on DES.
CMAC	Cipher-based Message Authenticate Code as defined in [NIST sp800-38b] and [RFC 4493].
CMS	Cryptographic Message Syntax (see RFC 5652)

Cryptographic Device	A device storing cryptographic information and possibly performing cryptographic functions. May be implemented as a smart card, smart disk, PCMCIA card, or with some other technology, including software-only.
Cryptoki	The Cryptographic Token Interface defined in this standard.
Cryptoki library	A library that implements the functions specified in this standard.
CT-KIP	Cryptographic Token Key Initialization Protocol (as defined in [CT-KIP])
DER	Distinguished Encoding Rules, as defined in X.690.
DES	Data Encryption Standard, as defined in FIPS PUB 46-3.
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm, as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4.
EC	Elliptic Curve
ECB	Electronic Codebook mode, as defined in FIPS PUB 81.
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve DSA, as in ANSI X9.62.
ECMQV	Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone
GOST 28147-89	The encryption algorithm, as defined in Part 2 [GOST 28147-89] and [RFC 4357] [RFC 4490], and RFC [4491].
GOST R 34.11-94	Hash algorithm, as defined in [GOST R 34.11-94] and [RFC 4357], [RFC 4490], and [RFC 4491].
GOST R 34.10-2001	The digital signature algorithm, as defined in [GOST R 34.10-2001] and [RFC 4357], [RFC 4490], and [RFC 4491].
IV	Initialization Vector.
MAC	Message Authentication Code.
Mechanism	A process for implementing a cryptographic operation.
MQV	Menezes-Qu-Vanstone
OAEP	Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding for RSA.
Object	An item that is stored on a token. May be data, a certificate, or a key.
PIN	Personal Identification Number.
PKCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards.
PRF	Pseudo random function.
PTD	Personal Trusted Device, as defined in MeT-PTD
RSA	The RSA public-key cryptosystem.
Reader	The means by which information is exchanged with a device.
Session	A logical connection between an application and a token.
SHA-1	The (revised) Secure Hash Algorithm with a 160-bit message digest, as defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.
SHA-224	The Secure Hash Algorithm with a 224-bit message digest, as defined in RFC 3874. Also defined in FIPS PUB 180-2 with Change Notice 1.

SHA-256	The Secure Hash Algorithm with a 256-bit message digest, as defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.
SHA-384	The Secure Hash Algorithm with a 384-bit message digest, as defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.
SHA-512	The Secure Hash Algorithm with a 512-bit message digest, as defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.
Slot	A logical reader that potentially contains a token.
SSL	The Secure Sockets Layer 3.0 protocol.
Subject Name	The X.500 distinguished name of the entity to which a key is assigned.
SO	A Security Officer user.
TLS	Transport Layer Security.
Token	The logical view of a cryptographic device defined by Cryptoki.
User	The person using an application that interfaces to Cryptoki.
UTF-8	Universal Character Set (UCS) transformation format (UTF) that represents ISO 10646 and UNICODE strings with a variable number of octets.
WTLS	Wireless Transport Layer Security.

1.2 Symbols and abbreviations

The following symbols are used in this standard:

Table 1, Symbols

Symbol	Definition
N/A	Not applicable
R/O	Read-only
R/W	Read/write

The following prefixes are used in this standard:

Table 2, Prefixes

Prefix	Description
C_	Function
CK_	Data type or general constant
CKA_	Attribute
CKC_	Certificate type
CKD_	Key derivation function
CKF_	Bit flag
CKG_	Mask generation function
CKH_	Hardware feature type
CKK_	Key type
CKM_	Mechanism type
CKN_	Notification
CKO_	Object class

Prefix	Description
CKP_	Pseudo-random function
CKS_	Session state
CKR_	Return value
CKU_	User type
CKZ_	Salt/Encoding parameter source
h	a handle
ul	a CK_ULONG
p	a pointer
pb	a pointer to a CK_BYTE
ph	a pointer to a handle
pul	a pointer to a CK_ULONG

Cryptoki is based on ANSI C types, and defines the following data types:

```
/* an unsigned 8-bit value */
typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE;

/* an unsigned 8-bit character */
typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR;

/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */
typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR;

/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */
typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL;

/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */
typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;

/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */
typedef long int CK_LONG;

/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */
typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS;
```

Cryptoki also uses pointers to some of these data types, as well as to the type void, which are implementation-dependent. These pointer types are:

```
CK_BYTE_PTR      /* Pointer to a CK_BYTE */
CK_CHAR_PTR      /* Pointer to a CK_CHAR */
CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR  /* Pointer to a CK_UTF8CHAR */
CK_ULONG_PTR     /* Pointer to a CK_ULONG */
CK_VOID_PTR      /* Pointer to a void */
```

Cryptoki also defines a pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR, which is implementation-dependent:

```
CK_VOID_PTR_PTR  /* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR */
```

In addition, Cryptoki defines a C-style NULL pointer, which is distinct from any valid pointer:

```
NULL_PTR         /* A NULL pointer */
```


It follows that many of the data and pointer types will vary somewhat from one environment to another (*e.g.*, a CK_ULONG will sometimes be 32 bits, and sometimes perhaps 64 bits). However, these details should not affect an application, assuming it is compiled with Cryptoki header files consistent with the Cryptoki library to which the application is linked.

All numbers and values expressed in this document are decimal, unless they are preceded by "0x", in which case they are hexadecimal values.

The **CK_CHAR** data type holds characters from the following table, taken from ANSI C:

Table 3, Character Set

Category	Characters
Letters	A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
Numbers	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Graphic characters	! " # % & ' ( ) * + , - . / : ; < = > ? [\ ] ^ _ { | } ~
Blank character	' '

The **CK_UTF8CHAR** data type holds UTF-8 encoded Unicode characters as specified in RFC2279. UTF-8 allows internationalization while maintaining backward compatibility with the Local String definition of PKCS #11 version 2.01.

In Cryptoki, the **CK_BBOOL** data type is a Boolean type that can be true or false. A zero value means false, and a nonzero value means true. Similarly, an individual bit flag, **CKF**_..., can also be set (true) or unset (false). For convenience, Cryptoki defines the following macros for use with values of type **CK_BBOOL**:

```
#define CK_FALSE 0
#define CK_TRUE  1
```

For backwards compatibility, header files for this version of Cryptoki also define TRUE and FALSE as (CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE may be set by the application vendor):

```
#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
#ifndef FALSE
#define FALSE CK_FALSE
#endif

#ifndef TRUE
#define TRUE CK_TRUE
#endif
#endif
```

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2 Platform- and compiler-dependent directives for C or C++

There is a large array of Cryptoki-related data types that are defined in the Cryptoki header files. Certain packing and pointer-related aspects of these types are platform and compiler-dependent; these aspects are therefore resolved on a platform-by-platform (or compiler-by-compiler) basis outside of the Cryptoki header files by means of preprocessor directives.

This means that when writing C or C++ code, certain preprocessor directives MUST be issued before including a Cryptoki header file. These directives are described in the remainder of this section.

Plattform specific implementation hints can be found in the pkcs11.h header file.

2.1 Structure packing

Cryptoki structures are packed to occupy as little space as is possible. Cryptoki structures SHALL be packed with 1-byte alignment.

2.2 Pointer-related macros

Because different platforms and compilers have different ways of dealing with different types of pointers, the following 6 macros SHALL be set outside the scope of Cryptoki:

- **CK_PTR**

`CK_PTR` is the "indirection string" a given platform and compiler uses to make a pointer to an object. It is used in the following fashion:

```
typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
```

- **CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION**

`CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name)`, when followed by a parentheses-enclosed list of arguments and a semicolon, declares a Cryptoki API function in a Cryptoki library. returnType is the return type of the function, and name is its name. It SHALL be used in the following fashion:

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
  CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
);
```

- **CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER**

`CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name)`, when followed by a parentheses-enclosed list of arguments and a semicolon, declares a variable or type which is a pointer to a Cryptoki API function in a Cryptoki library. returnType is the return type of the function, and name is its name. It SHALL be used in either of the following fashions to define a function pointer variable, myC_Initialize, which can point to a C_Initialize function in a Cryptoki library (note that neither of the following code snippets actually assigns a value to myC_Initialize):

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, myC_Initialize)(
  CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
);
```

or:

```
typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, myC_InitializeType)(
```

```
  CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
);
myC_InitializeType myC_Initialize;
```

♦ CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION

CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name), when followed by a parentheses-enclosed list of arguments and a semicolon, declares a variable or type which is a pointer to an application callback function that can be used by a Cryptoki API function in a Cryptoki library. returnType is the return type of the function, and name is its name. It SHALL be used in either of the following fashions to define a function pointer variable, myCallback, which can point to an application callback which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV (note that neither of the following code snippets actually assigns a value to myCallback):

```
CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args);
```

or:

```
typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args);
myCallbackType myCallback;
```

♦ NULL_PTR

NULL_PTR is the value of a NULL pointer. In any ANSI C environment—and in many others as well—NULL_PTR SHALL be defined simply as 0.

3 General data types

The general Cryptoki data types are described in the following subsections. The data types for holding parameters for various mechanisms, and the pointers to those parameters, are not described here; these types are described with the information on the mechanisms themselves, in Section 6.

A C or C++ source file in a Cryptoki application or library can define all these types (the types described here and the types that are specifically used for particular mechanism parameters) by including the top-level Cryptoki include file, pkcs11.h. pkcs11.h, in turn, includes the other Cryptoki include files, pkcs11t.h and pkcs11f.h. A source file can also include just pkcs11t.h (instead of pkcs11.h); this defines most (but not all) of the types specified here.

When including either of these header files, a source file MUST specify the preprocessor directives indicated in Section 2.

3.1 General information

Cryptoki represents general information with the following types:

♦ CK_VERSION; CK_VERSION_PTR

CK_VERSION is a structure that describes the version of a Cryptoki interface, a Cryptoki library, or an SSL or TLS implementation, or the hardware or firmware version of a slot or token. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_VERSION {
  CK_BYTE major;
  CK_BYTE minor;
} CK_VERSION;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

major major version number (the integer portion of the version)

minor minor version number (the hundredths portion of the version)

Example: For version 1.0, *major* = 1 and *minor* = 0. For version 2.10, *major* = 2 and *minor* = 10. Table 4 below lists the major and minor version values for the officially published Cryptoki specifications.

Table 4, Major and minor version values for published Cryptoki specifications

Version	major	minor
1.0	0x01	0x00
2.01	0x02	0x01
2.10	0x02	0x0a
2.11	0x02	0x0b
2.20	0x02	0x14
2.30	0x02	0x1e
2.40	0x02	0x28
3.0	0x03	0x00

Minor revisions of the Cryptoki standard are always upwardly compatible within the same major version number.

CK_VERSION_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_VERSION**.

♦ CK_INFO; CK_INFO_PTR

CK_INFO provides general information about Cryptoki. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_INFO {
  CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion;
  CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32];
  CK_FLAGS flags;
  CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32];
  CK_VERSION libraryVersion;
} CK_INFO;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

cryptokiVersion	Cryptoki interface version number, for compatibility with future revisions of this interface
manufacturerID	ID of the Cryptoki library manufacturer. MUST be padded with the blank character (‘ ‘). Should *not* be null-terminated.
flags	bit flags reserved for future versions. MUST be zero for this version
libraryDescription	character-string description of the library. MUST be padded with the blank character (‘ ‘). Should *not* be null-terminated.
libraryVersion	Cryptoki library version number

For libraries written to this document, the value of *cryptokiVersion* should match the version of this specification; the value of *libraryVersion* is the version number of the library software itself.

CK_INFO_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_INFO**.

♦ CK_NOTIFICATION

CK_NOTIFICATION holds the types of notifications that Cryptoki provides to an application. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION;
```

For this version of Cryptoki, the following types of notifications are defined:

```
CKN_SURRENDER
```

The notifications have the following meanings:

CKN_SURRENDER	Cryptoki is surrendering the execution of a function executing in a session so that the application may perform other operations. After performing any desired operations, the application should indicate to Cryptoki whether to continue or cancel the function (see Section 5.21.1).

3.2 Slot and token types

Cryptoki represents slot and token information with the following types:

♦ CK_SLOT_ID; CK_SLOT_ID_PTR

CK_SLOT_ID is a Cryptoki-assigned value that identifies a slot. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID;
```

A list of **CK_SLOT_ID**s is returned by **C_GetSlotList**. A priori, *any* value of **CK_SLOT_ID** can be a valid slot identifier—in particular, a system may have a slot identified by the value 0. It need not have such a slot, however.

CK_SLOT_ID_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_SLOT_ID**.

♦ CK_SLOT_INFO; CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR

CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO {
  CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64];
  CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32];
  CK_FLAGS flags;
  CK_VERSION hardwareVersion;
  CK_VERSION firmwareVersion;
} CK_SLOT_INFO;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

slotDescription	character-string description of the slot. MUST be padded with the blank character (‘ ’). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
manufacturerID	ID of the slot manufacturer. MUST be padded with the blank character (‘ ’). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
flags	bits flags that provide capabilities of the slot. The flags are defined below
hardwareVersion	version number of the slot’s hardware
firmwareVersion	version number of the slot’s firmware

The following table defines the *flags* field:

Table 5, Slot Information Flags

Bit Flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT	0x00000001	True if a token is present in the slot (*e.g.*, a device is in the reader)
CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE	0x00000002	True if the reader supports removable devices
CKF_HW_SLOT	0x00000004	True if the slot is a hardware slot, as opposed to a software slot implementing a “soft token”

For a given slot, the value of the **CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE** flag *never changes*. In addition, if this flag is not set for a given slot, then the **CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT** flag for that slot is *always* set. That is, if a slot does not support a removable device, then that slot always has a token in it.

CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_SLOT_INFO**.

♦ CK_TOKEN_INFO; CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR

CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO {
  CK_UTF8CHAR label[32];
  CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32];
  CK_UTF8CHAR model[16];
  CK_CHAR serialNumber[16];
  CK_FLAGS flags;
  CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount;
  CK_ULONG ulSessionCount;
```



```
  CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount;
  CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount;
  CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen;
  CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen;
  CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory;
  CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory;
  CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory;
  CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory;
  CK_VERSION hardwareVersion;
  CK_VERSION firmwareVersion;
  CK_CHAR utcTime[16];
} CK_TOKEN_INFO;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

label	application-defined label, assigned during token initialization. MUST be padded with the blank character (‘ ‘). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
manufacturerID	ID of the device manufacturer. MUST be padded with the blank character (‘ ‘). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
model	model of the device. MUST be padded with the blank character (‘ ‘). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
serialNumber	character-string serial number of the device. MUST be padded with the blank character (‘ ‘). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
flags	bit flags indicating capabilities and status of the device as defined below
ulMaxSessionCount	maximum number of sessions that can be opened with the token at one time by a single application (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
ulSessionCount	number of sessions that this application currently has open with the token (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
ulMaxRwSessionCount	maximum number of read/write sessions that can be opened with the token at one time by a single application (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
ulRwSessionCount	number of read/write sessions that this application currently has open with the token (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
ulMaxPinLen	maximum length in bytes of the PIN
ulMinPinLen	minimum length in bytes of the PIN
ulTotalPublicMemory	the total amount of memory on the token in bytes in which public objects may be stored (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
ulFreePublicMemory	the amount of free (unused) memory on the token in bytes for public objects (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
ulTotalPrivateMemory	the total amount of memory on the token in bytes in which private objects may be stored (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
ulFreePrivateMemory	the amount of free (unused) memory on the token in bytes for private objects (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
hardwareVersion	version number of hardware
firmwareVersion	version number of firmware

utcTime current time as a character-string of length 16, represented in the format YYYYMMDDhhmmssxx (4 characters for the year; 2 characters each for the month, the day, the hour, the minute, and the second; and 2 additional reserved '0' characters). The value of this field only makes sense for tokens equipped with a clock, as indicated in the token information flags (see below)

The following table defines the *flags* field:

Table 6, Token Information Flags

Bit Flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_RNG	0x00000001	True if the token has its own random number generator
CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED	0x00000002	True if the token is write-protected (see below)
CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED	0x00000004	True if there are some cryptographic functions that a user MUST be logged in to perform
CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED	0x00000008	True if the normal user's PIN has been initialized
CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED	0x00000020	True if a successful save of a session's cryptographic operations state *always* contains all keys needed to restore the state of the session
CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN	0x00000040	True if token has its own hardware clock
CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH	0x00000100	True if token has a "protected authentication path", whereby a user can log into the token without passing a PIN through the Cryptoki library
CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS	0x00000200	True if a single session with the token can perform dual cryptographic operations (see Section 5.14)
CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED	0x00000400	True if the token has been initialized using C_InitToken or an equivalent mechanism outside the scope of this standard. Calling C_InitToken when this flag is set will cause the token to be reinitialized.
CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION	0x00000800	True if the token supports secondary authentication for private key objects. (Deprecated; new implementations MUST NOT set this flag)
CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW	0x00010000	True if an incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once since the last successful authentication.

Bit Flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY	0x00020000	True if supplying an incorrect user PIN will cause it to become locked.
CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED	0x00040000	True if the user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not possible.
CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED	0x00080000	True if the user PIN value is the default value set by token initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been expired by the card.
CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW	0x00100000	True if an incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since the last successful authentication.
CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY	0x00200000	True if supplying an incorrect SO PIN will cause it to become locked.
CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED	0x00400000	True if the SO PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible.
CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED	0x00800000	True if the SO PIN value is the default value set by token initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been expired by the card.
CKF_ERROR_STATE	0x01000000	True if the token failed a FIPS 140-2 self-test and entered an error state.

Exactly what the **CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED** flag means is not specified in Cryptoki. An application may be unable to perform certain actions on a write-protected token; these actions can include any of the following, among others:

- Creating/modifying/deleting any object on the token.
- Creating/modifying/deleting a token object on the token.
- Changing the SO's PIN.
- Changing the normal user's PIN.

The token may change the value of the **CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED** flag depending on the session state to implement its object management policy. For instance, the token may set the **CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED** flag unless the session state is R/W SO or R/W User to implement a policy that does not allow any objects, public or private, to be created, modified, or deleted unless the user has successfully called C_Login.

The **CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW**, **CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW**, **CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY**, and **CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY** flags may always be set to false if the token does not support the functionality or will not reveal the information because of its security policy.

The **CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED** and **CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED** flags may always be set to false if the token does not support the functionality. If a PIN is set to the default value, or has expired, the appropriate **CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED** or **CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED** flag is set to true. When either of these flags are true, logging in with the corresponding PIN will succeed, but only the C_SetPIN function can be called. Calling any other function that required the user to be logged in will cause CKR_PIN_EXPIRED to be returned until C_SetPIN is called successfully.

CK_TOKEN_INFO Note: The fields ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount, ulRwSessionCount, ulTotalPublicMemory, ulFreePublicMemory, ulTotalPrivateMemory, and ulFreePrivateMemory can have the special value CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION, which means that the token and/or library is unable or unwilling to provide that information. In addition, the fields ulMaxSessionCount and ulMaxRwSessionCount can have the special value CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE, which means that there is no practical limit on the number of sessions (resp. R/W sessions) an application can have open with the token.

It is important to check these fields for these special values. This is particularly true for CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE, since an application seeing this value in the ulMaxSessionCount or ulMaxRwSessionCount field would otherwise conclude that it can't open any sessions with the token, which is far from being the case.

The upshot of all this is that the correct way to interpret (for example) the ulMaxSessionCount field is something along the lines of the following:

```
CK_TOKEN_INFO info;
.
.
if ((CK_LONG) info.ulMaxSessionCount
    == CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION) {
  /* Token refuses to give value of ulMaxSessionCount */
  .
  .
} else if (info.ulMaxSessionCount == CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE) {
  /* Application can open as many sessions as it wants */
  .
  .
} else {
  /* ulMaxSessionCount really does contain what it should */
  .
  .
}
```

CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR is a pointer to a CK_TOKEN_INFO.

3.3 Session types

Cryptoki represents session information with the following types:

♦ CK_SESSION_HANDLE; CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR

CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that identifies a session. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE;
```

Valid session handles in Cryptoki always have nonzero values. For developers' convenience, Cryptoki defines the following symbolic value:

```
CK_INVALID_HANDLE
```

CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR is a pointer to a CK_SESSION_HANDLE.

♦ CK_USER_TYPE

CK_USER_TYPE holds the types of Cryptoki users described in **[PKCS11-UG]** and, in addition, a context-specific type described in Section 4.9. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE;
```

```

```

For this version of Cryptoki, the following types of users are defined:

```
CKU_SO
CKU_USER
CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC
```

♦ CK_STATE

CK_STATE holds the session state, as described in **[PKCS11-UG]**. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE;

```

For this version of Cryptoki, the following session states are defined:

```
CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION
CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS
CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION
CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS
CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS
```

♦ CK_SESSION_INFO; CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR

CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO {
  CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
  CK_STATE state;
  CK_FLAGS flags;
  CK_ULONG ulDeviceError;
} CK_SESSION_INFO;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

slotID	ID of the slot that interfaces with the token
state	the state of the session
flags	bit flags that define the type of session; the flags are defined below
ulDeviceError	an error code defined by the cryptographic device. Used for errors not covered by Cryptoki.

The following table defines the *flags* field:

Table 7, Session Information Flags

Bit Flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_RW_SESSION	0x00000002	True if the session is read/write; false if the session is read-only
CKF_SERIAL_SESSION	0x00000004	This flag is provided for backward compatibility, and should always be set to true

CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR is a pointer to a CK_SESSION_INFO.

3.4 Object types

Cryptoki represents object information with the following types:

♦ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR

CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an object. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE;
```

When an object is created or found on a token by an application, Cryptoki assigns it an object handle for that application's sessions to use to access it. A particular object on a token does not necessarily have a handle which is fixed for the lifetime of the object; however, if a particular session can use a particular handle to access a particular object, then that session will continue to be able to use that handle to access that object as long as the session continues to exist, the object continues to exist, and the object continues to be accessible to the session.

Valid object handles in Cryptoki always have nonzero values. For developers' convenience, Cryptoki defines the following symbolic value:

```
CK_INVALID_HANDLE
```

CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR is a pointer to a CK_OBJECT_HANDLE.

♦ CK_OBJECT_CLASS; CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR

CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS;
```

Object classes are defined with the objects that use them. The type is specified on an object through the CKA_CLASS attribute of the object.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```
CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Object classes **CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED** and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their object classes through the PKCS process.

CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_OBJECT_CLASS**.

♦ CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE

CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a value that identifies a hardware feature type of a device. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE;
```

Hardware feature types are defined with the objects that use them. The type is specified on an object through the CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE attribute of the object.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```
CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Feature types **CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED** and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their feature types through the PKCS process.

♦ CK_KEY_TYPE

CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE;
```

Key types are defined with the objects and mechanisms that use them. The key type is specified on an object through the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of the object.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```
CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Key types **CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED** and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their key types through the PKCS process.

♦ CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE

CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate type. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
```

Certificate types are defined with the objects and mechanisms that use them. The certificate type is specified on an object through the CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE attribute of the object.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```
CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Certificate types **CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED** and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their certificate types through the PKCS process.

♦ CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY

CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY is a value that identifies a certificate category. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY;
```

For this version of Cryptoki, the following certificate categories are defined:

Constant	Value	Meaning
CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED	0x00000000UL	No category specified
CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_TOKEN_USER	0x00000001UL	Certificate belongs to owner of the token
CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_AUTHORITY	0x00000002UL	Certificate belongs to a certificate authority
CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_OTHER_ENTITY	0x00000003UL	Certificate belongs to an end entity (i.e.: not a CA)

♦ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE

CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute type. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
```


Attributes are defined with the objects and mechanisms that use them. Attributes are specified on an object as a list of type, length value items. These are often specified as an attribute template.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```
CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Attribute types **CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED** and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their attribute types through the PKCS process.

♦ CK_ATTRIBUTE; CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR

CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, value, and length of an attribute. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE {
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type;
  CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
  CK_ULONG ulValueLen;
} CK_ATTRIBUTE;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

type	the attribute type
pValue	pointer to the value of the attribute
ulValueLen	length in bytes of the value

If an attribute has no value, then *ulValueLen* = 0, and the value of *pValue* is irrelevant. An array of **CK_ATTRIBUTE**s is called a "template" and is used for creating, manipulating and searching for objects. The order of the attributes in a template *never* matters, even if the template contains vendor-specific attributes. Note that *pValue* is a "void" pointer, facilitating the passing of arbitrary values. Both the application and Cryptoki library MUST ensure that the pointer can be safely cast to the expected type (*i.e.*, without word-alignment errors).

The constant CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION is used in the ulValueLen field to denote an invalid or unavailable value. See C_GetAttributeValue for further details.

CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_ATTRIBUTE**.

♦ CK_DATE

CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_DATE {
  CK_CHAR year[4];
  CK_CHAR month[2];
  CK_CHAR day[2];
} CK_DATE;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

year	the year ("1900" - "9999")
month	the month ("01" - "12")
day	the day ("01" - "31")

The fields hold numeric characters from the character set in Table 3, not the literal byte values.

When a Cryptoki object carries an attribute of this type, and the default value of the attribute is specified to be "empty," then Cryptoki libraries SHALL set the attribute's *ulValueLen* to 0.

Note that implementations of previous versions of Cryptoki may have used other methods to identify an "empty" attribute of type CK_DATE, and applications that needs to interoperate with these libraries therefore have to be flexible in what they accept as an empty value.

♦ CK_PROFILE_ID; CK_PROFILE_ID_PTR

CK_PROFILE_ID is an unsigend ulong value represting a specific token profile. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_PROFILE_ID;
```

Profiles are defines in the PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Profiles document. s. ID's greater than 0xffffffff may cause compatibility issues on platforms that have CK_ULONG values of 32 bits, and should be avoided.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```
CKP_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Profile IDs **CKP_VENDOR_DEFINED** and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their object classes through the PKCS process.

Valid Profile IDs in Cryptoki always have nonzero values. For developers' convenience, Cryptoki defines the following symbolic value:

```
CKP_INVALID_ID
```

CK_PROFILE_ID_PTR is a pointer to a CK_PROFILE_ID.

♦ CK_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN

CK_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN is a value that identifies the Java MIDP security domain of a certificate. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN;
```

For this version of Cryptoki, the following security domains are defined. See the Java MIDP specification for further information:

Constant	Value	Meaning
CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_UNSPECIFIED	0x00000000UL	No domain specified
CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_MANUFACTURER	0x00000001UL	Manufacturer protection domain
CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_OPERATOR	0x00000002UL	Operator protection domain
CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_THIRD_PARTY	0x00000003UL	Third party protection domain

3.5 Data types for mechanisms

Cryptoki supports the following types for describing mechanisms and parameters to them:

♦ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR

CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism type. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
```

Mechanism types are defined with the objects and mechanism descriptions that use them.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```
CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Mechanism types **CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED** and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their mechanism types through the PKCS process.

CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_MECHANISM_TYPE**.

♦ CK_MECHANISM; CK_MECHANISM_PTR

CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular mechanism and any parameters it requires. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_MECHANISM {
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter;
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen;
} CK_MECHANISM;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

mechanism	the type of mechanism
pParameter	pointer to the parameter if required by the mechanism
ulParameterLen	length in bytes of the parameter

Note that *pParameter* is a “void” pointer, facilitating the passing of arbitrary values. Both the application and the Cryptoki library MUST ensure that the pointer can be safely cast to the expected type (*i.e.*, without word-alignment errors).

CK_MECHANISM_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_MECHANISM**.

♦ CK_MECHANISM_INFO; CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR

CK_MECHANISM_INFO is a structure that provides information about a particular mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO {
  CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize;
  CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize;
  CK_FLAGS flags;
} CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

ulMinKeySize	the minimum size of the key for the mechanism (whether this is measured in bits or in bytes is mechanism-dependent)
ulMaxKeySize	the maximum size of the key for the mechanism (whether this is measured in bits or in bytes is mechanism-dependent)
flags	bit flags specifying mechanism capabilities

929 For some mechanisms, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields have meaningless values.

930 The following table defines the *flags* field:

931 *Table 8, Mechanism Information Flags*

Bit Flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_HW	0x00000001	True if the mechanism is performed by the device; false if the mechanism is performed in software
CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT	0x00000002	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_MessageEncryptInit**
CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT	0x00000004	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_MessageDecryptInit**
CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN	0x00000008	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_MessageSignInit**
CKF_MESSAGE_VERIFY	0x00000010	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_MessageVerifyInit**
CKF_MULTI_MESSAGE	0x00000020	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_*MessageBegin**. One of CKF_MESSAGE_* flag must also be set.
CKF_FIND_OBJECTS	0x00000040	This flag can be passed in as a parameter to **C_SessionCancel** to cancel an active object search operation. Any other use of this flag is outside the scope of this standard.
CKF_ENCRYPT	0x00000100	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_EncryptInit**
CKF_DECRYPT	0x00000200	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_DecryptInit**
CKF_DIGEST	0x00000400	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_DigestInit**
CKF_SIGN	0x00000800	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_SignInit**
CKF_SIGN_RECOVER	0x00001000	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_SignRecoverInit**
CKF_VERIFY	0x00002000	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_VerifyInit**
CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER	0x00004000	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_VerifyRecoverInit**
CKF_GENERATE	0x00008000	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_GenerateKey**
CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR	0x00010000	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_GenerateKeyPair**
CKF_WRAP	0x00020000	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_WrapKey**
CKF_UNWRAP	0x00040000	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_UnwrapKey**
CKF_DERIVE	0x00080000	True if the mechanism can be used with **C_DeriveKey**

Bit Flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_EXTENSION	0x80000000	True if there is an extension to the flags; false if no extensions. MUST be false for this version.

CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR is a pointer to a CK_MECHANISM_INFO.

3.6 Function types

Cryptoki represents information about functions with the following data types:

♦ CK_RV

CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a Cryptoki function. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV;
```

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```
CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Section 5.1 defines the meaning of each **CK_RV** value. Return values **CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED** and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their return values through the PKCS process.

♦ CK_NOTIFY

CK_NOTIFY is the type of a pointer to a function used by Cryptoki to perform notification callbacks. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_NOTIFICATION event,
  CK_VOID_PTR pApplication
);
```

The arguments to a notification callback function have the following meanings:

hSession	The handle of the session performing the callback
event	The type of notification callback
pApplication	An application-defined value. This is the same value as was passed to **C_OpenSession** to open the session performing the callback

♦ CK_C_XXX

Cryptoki also defines an entire family of other function pointer types. For each function **C_XXX** in the Cryptoki API (see Section 4.12 for detailed information about each of them), Cryptoki defines a type **CK_C_XXX**, which is a pointer to a function with the same arguments and return value as **C_XXX** has. An appropriately-set variable of type **CK_C_XXX** may be used by an application to call the Cryptoki function **C_XXX**.

♦ CK_FUNCTION_LIST; CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR

CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure which contains a Cryptoki version and a function pointer to each function in the Cryptoki API. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST {
  CK_VERSION version;
  CK_C_Initialize C_Initialize;
  CK_C_Finalize C_Finalize;
  CK_C_GetInfo C_GetInfo;
  CK_C_GetFunctionList C_GetFunctionList;
  CK_C_GetSlotList C_GetSlotList;
  CK_C_GetSlotInfo C_GetSlotInfo;
  CK_C_GetTokenInfo C_GetTokenInfo;
  CK_C_GetMechanismList C_GetMechanismList;
  CK_C_GetMechanismInfo C_GetMechanismInfo;
  CK_C_InitToken C_InitToken;
  CK_C_InitPIN C_InitPIN;
  CK_C_SetPIN C_SetPIN;
  CK_C_OpenSession C_OpenSession;
  CK_C_CloseSession C_CloseSession;
  CK_C_CloseAllSessions C_CloseAllSessions;
  CK_C_GetSessionInfo C_GetSessionInfo;

  CK_C_GetOperationState C_GetOperationState;
  CK_C_SetOperationState C_SetOperationState;
  CK_C_Login C_Login;
  CK_C_Logout C_Logout;
  CK_C_CreateObject C_CreateObject;
  CK_C_CopyObject C_CopyObject;
  CK_C_DestroyObject C_DestroyObject;
  CK_C_GetObjectSize C_GetObjectSize;
  CK_C_GetAttributeValue C_GetAttributeValue;
  CK_C_SetAttributeValue C_SetAttributeValue;
  CK_C_FindObjectsInit C_FindObjectsInit;
  CK_C_FindObjects C_FindObjects;
  CK_C_FindObjectsFinal C_FindObjectsFinal;
  CK_C_EncryptInit C_EncryptInit;
  CK_C_Encrypt C_Encrypt;
  CK_C_EncryptUpdate C_EncryptUpdate;
  CK_C_EncryptFinal C_EncryptFinal;
  CK_C_DecryptInit C_DecryptInit;
  CK_C_Decrypt C_Decrypt;
  CK_C_DecryptUpdate C_DecryptUpdate;
  CK_C_DecryptFinal C_DecryptFinal;
  CK_C_DigestInit C_DigestInit;
  CK_C_Digest C_Digest;
  CK_C_DigestUpdate C_DigestUpdate;
  CK_C_DigestKey C_DigestKey;
  CK_C_DigestFinal C_DigestFinal;
  CK_C_SignInit C_SignInit;
  CK_C_Sign C_Sign;
  CK_C_SignUpdate C_SignUpdate;
  CK_C_SignFinal C_SignFinal;
  CK_C_SignRecoverInit C_SignRecoverInit;
  CK_C_SignRecover C_SignRecover;
  CK_C_VerifyInit C_VerifyInit;
  CK_C_Verify C_Verify;
  CK_C_VerifyUpdate C_VerifyUpdate;
  CK_C_VerifyFinal C_VerifyFinal;
  CK_C_VerifyRecoverInit C_VerifyRecoverInit;
  CK_C_VerifyRecover C_VerifyRecover;
```



```
  CK_C_DigestEncryptUpdate C_DigestEncryptUpdate;
  CK_C_DecryptDigestUpdate C_DecryptDigestUpdate;
  CK_C_SignEncryptUpdate C_SignEncryptUpdate;
  CK_C_DecryptVerifyUpdate C_DecryptVerifyUpdate;
  CK_C_GenerateKey C_GenerateKey;
  CK_C_GenerateKeyPair C_GenerateKeyPair;
  CK_C_WrapKey C_WrapKey;
  CK_C_UnwrapKey C_UnwrapKey;
  CK_C_DeriveKey C_DeriveKey;
  CK_C_SeedRandom C_SeedRandom;
  CK_C_GenerateRandom C_GenerateRandom;
  CK_C_GetFunctionStatus C_GetFunctionStatus;
  CK_C_CancelFunction C_CancelFunction;
  CK_C_WaitForSlotEvent C_WaitForSlotEvent;
} CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
```

Each Cryptoki library has a static **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure, and a pointer to it (or to a copy of it which is also owned by the library) may be obtained by the **C_GetFunctionList** function (see Section 5.2). The value that this pointer points to can be used by an application to quickly find out where the executable code for each function in the Cryptoki API is located. Every function in the Cryptoki API MUST have an entry point defined in the Cryptoki library's **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure. If a particular function in the Cryptoki API is not supported by a library, then the function pointer for that function in the library's **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure should point to a function stub which simply returns CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED.

In this structure 'version' is the cryptoki specification version number. The major and minor versions must be set to 0x02 and 0x28 indicating a version 2.40 compatible structure. The updated function list table for this version of the specification may be returned via **C_GetInterfaceList** or **C_GetInterface.**

An application may or may not be able to modify a Cryptoki library's static **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure. Whether or not it can, it should never attempt to do so.

PKCS #11 modules must not add new functions at the end of the **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** that are not contained within the defined structure. If a PKCS#11 module needs to define additional functions, they should be placed within a vendor defined interface returned via **C_GetInterfaceList** or **C_GetInterface**.

CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_FUNCTION_LIST**.

CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR**.

♦ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0; CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0_PTR; CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0_PTR_PTR

CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0 is a structure which contains the same function pointers as in **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** and additional functions added to the end of the structure that were defined in Cryptoki version 3.0. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0 {
  CK_VERSION version;
  CK_C_Initialize C_Initialize;
  CK_C_Finalize C_Finalize;
  CK_C_GetInfo C_GetInfo;
  CK_C_GetFunctionList C_GetFunctionList;
  CK_C_GetSlotList C_GetSlotList;
  CK_C_GetSlotInfo C_GetSlotInfo;
  CK_C_GetTokenInfo C_GetTokenInfo;
  CK_C_GetMechanismList C_GetMechanismList;
  CK_C_GetMechanismInfo C_GetMechanismInfo;
  CK_C_InitToken C_InitToken;
  CK_C_InitPIN C_InitPIN;
```



```
  CK_C_SetPIN C_SetPIN;
  CK_C_OpenSession C_OpenSession;
  CK_C_CloseSession C_CloseSession;
  CK_C_CloseAllSessions C_CloseAllSessions;
  CK_C_GetSessionInfo C_GetSessionInfo;
  CK_C_GetOperationState C_GetOperationState;
  CK_C_SetOperationState C_SetOperationState;
  CK_C_Login C_Login;
  CK_C_Logout C_Logout;
  CK_C_CreateObject C_CreateObject;
  CK_C_CopyObject C_CopyObject;
  CK_C_DestroyObject C_DestroyObject;
  CK_C_GetObjectSize C_GetObjectSize;
  CK_C_GetAttributeValue C_GetAttributeValue;
  CK_C_SetAttributeValue C_SetAttributeValue;
  CK_C_FindObjectsInit C_FindObjectsInit;
  CK_C_FindObjects C_FindObjects;
  CK_C_FindObjectsFinal C_FindObjectsFinal;
  CK_C_EncryptInit C_EncryptInit;
  CK_C_Encrypt C_Encrypt;
  CK_C_EncryptUpdate C_EncryptUpdate;
  CK_C_EncryptFinal C_EncryptFinal;
  CK_C_DecryptInit C_DecryptInit;
  CK_C_Decrypt C_Decrypt;
  CK_C_DecryptUpdate C_DecryptUpdate;
  CK_C_DecryptFinal C_DecryptFinal;
  CK_C_DigestInit C_DigestInit;
  CK_C_Digest C_Digest;
  CK_C_DigestUpdate C_DigestUpdate;
  CK_C_DigestKey C_DigestKey;
  CK_C_DigestFinal C_DigestFinal;
  CK_C_SignInit C_SignInit;
  CK_C_Sign C_Sign;
  CK_C_SignUpdate C_SignUpdate;
  CK_C_SignFinal C_SignFinal;
  CK_C_SignRecoverInit C_SignRecoverInit;
  CK_C_SignRecover C_SignRecover;
  CK_C_VerifyInit C_VerifyInit;
  CK_C_Verify C_Verify;
  CK_C_VerifyUpdate C_VerifyUpdate;
  CK_C_VerifyFinal C_VerifyFinal;
  CK_C_VerifyRecoverInit C_VerifyRecoverInit;
  CK_C_VerifyRecover C_VerifyRecover;
  CK_C_DigestEncryptUpdate C_DigestEncryptUpdate;
  CK_C_DecryptDigestUpdate C_DecryptDigestUpdate;
  CK_C_SignEncryptUpdate C_SignEncryptUpdate;
  CK_C_DecryptVerifyUpdate C_DecryptVerifyUpdate;
  CK_C_GenerateKey C_GenerateKey;
  CK_C_GenerateKeyPair C_GenerateKeyPair;
  CK_C_WrapKey C_WrapKey;
  CK_C_UnwrapKey C_UnwrapKey;
  CK_C_DeriveKey C_DeriveKey;
  CK_C_SeedRandom C_SeedRandom;
  CK_C_GenerateRandom C_GenerateRandom;
  CK_C_GetFunctionStatus C_GetFunctionStatus;
  CK_C_CancelFunction C_CancelFunction;
  CK_C_WaitForSlotEvent C_WaitForSlotEvent;
  CK_C_GetInterfaceList C_GetInterfaceList;
  CK_C_GetInterface C_GetInterface;
  CK_C_LoginUser C_LoginUser;
  CK_C_SessionCancel C_SessionCancel;
  CK_C_MessageEncryptInit C_MessageEncryptInit;
  CK_C_EncryptMessage C_EncryptMessage;
  CK_C_EncryptMessageBegin C_EncryptMessageBegin;
```



```
  CK_C_EncryptMessageNext C_EncryptMessageNext;
  CK_C_MessageEncryptFinal C_MessageEncryptFinal;
  CK_C_MessageDecryptInit C_MessageDecryptInit;
  CK_C_DecryptMessage C_DecryptMessage;
  CK_C_DecryptMessageBegin C_DecryptMessageBegin;
  CK_C_DecryptMessageNext C_DecryptMessageNext;
  CK_C_MessageDecryptFinal C_MessageDecryptFinal;
  CK_C_MessageSignInit C_MessageSignInit;
  CK_C_SignMessage C_SignMessage;
  CK_C_SignMessageBegin C_SignMessageBegin;
  CK_C_SignMessageNext C_SignMessageNext;
  CK_C_MessageSignFinal C_MessageSignFinal;
  CK_C_MessageVerifyInit C_MessageVerifyInit;
  CK_C_VerifyMessage C_VerifyMessage;
  CK_C_VerifyMessageBegin C_VerifyMessageBegin;
  CK_C_VerifyMessageNext C_VerifyMessageNext;
  CK_C_MessageVerifyFinal C_MessageVerifyFinal;
} CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0;
```

For a general description of **CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0** see **CK_FUNCTION_LIST**.

In this structure, *version* is the cryptoki specification version number. It should match the value of *cryptokiVersion* returned in the **CK_INFO** structure, but must be 3.0 at minimum.

This function list may be returned via **C_GetInterfaceList** or **C_GetInterface**

CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0**.

CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0_PTR_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0_PTR**.

♦ CK_INTERFACE; CK_INTERFACE_PTR; CK_INTERFACE_PTR_PTR

CK_INTERFACE is a structure which contains an interface name with a function list and flag.

It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_INTERFACE {
  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pInterfaceName;
  CK_VOID_PTR     pFunctionList;
  CK_FLAGS        flags;
} CK_INTERFACE;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pInterfaceName	the name of the interface
pFunctionList	the interface function list which must always begin with a CK_VERSION structure as the first field
flags	bit flags specifying interface capabilities

The interface name “PKCS 11” is reserved for use by interfaces defined within the cryptoki specification.

Interfaces starting with the string: “Vendor ” are reserved for vendor use and will not oetherwise be defined as interfaces in the PKCS #11 specification. Vendors should supply new functions with interface names of “Vendor {vendor name}”. For example “Vendor ACME Inc”.

The following table defines the flags field:

Table 9, CK_INTERFACE Flags

Bit Flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_INTERFACE_FORK_SAFE	0x00000001	The returned interface will have fork tolerant semantics. When the application forks, each process will get its own copy of all session objects, session states, login states, and encryption states. Each process will also maintain access to token objects with their previously supplied handles.

CK_INTERFACE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_INTERFACE**.

CK_INTERFACE_PTR_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_INTERFACE_PTR**.

3.7 Locking-related types

The types in this section are provided solely for applications which need to access Cryptoki from multiple threads simultaneously. *Applications which will not do this need not use any of these types.*

♦ CK_CREATEMUTEX

CK_CREATEMUTEX is the type of a pointer to an application-supplied function which creates a new mutex object and returns a pointer to it. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)(
  CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex
);
```

Calling a CK_CREATEMUTEX function returns the pointer to the new mutex object in the location pointed to by ppMutex. Such a function should return one of the following values:

```
CKR_OK, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR
CKR_HOST_MEMORY
```

♦ CK_DESTROYMUTEX

CK_DESTROYMUTEX is the type of a pointer to an application-supplied function which destroys an existing mutex object. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)(
  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex
);
```

The argument to a CK_DESTROYMUTEX function is a pointer to the mutex object to be destroyed. Such a function should return one of the following values:

```
CKR_OK, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR
CKR_HOST_MEMORY
CKR_MUTEX_BAD
```

♦ CK_LOCKMUTEX and CK_UNLOCKMUTEX

CK_LOCKMUTEX is the type of a pointer to an application-supplied function which locks an existing mutex object. **CK_UNLOCKMUTEX** is the type of a pointer to an application-supplied function which unlocks an existing mutex object. The proper behavior for these types of functions is as follows:

- If a CK_LOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is not locked, the calling thread obtains a lock on that mutex and returns.
- If a CK_LOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is locked by some thread other than the calling thread, the calling thread blocks and waits for that mutex to be unlocked.
- If a CK_LOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is locked by the calling thread, the behavior of the function call is undefined.
- If a CK_UNLOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is locked by the calling thread, that mutex is unlocked and the function call returns. Furthermore:
    - If exactly one thread was blocking on that particular mutex, then that thread stops blocking, obtains a lock on that mutex, and its CK_LOCKMUTEX call returns.
    - If more than one thread was blocking on that particular mutex, then exactly one of the blocking threads is selected somehow. That lucky thread stops blocking, obtains a lock on the mutex, and its CK_LOCKMUTEX call returns. All other threads blocking on that particular mutex continue to block.
- If a CK_UNLOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is not locked, then the function call returns the error code CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED.
- If a CK_UNLOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is locked by some thread other than the calling thread, the behavior of the function call is undefined.

CK_LOCKMUTEX is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)(
  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex
);
```

The argument to a CK_LOCKMUTEX function is a pointer to the mutex object to be locked. Such a function should return one of the following values:

```
CKR_OK, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR
CKR_HOST_MEMORY,
CKR_MUTEX_BAD
```

CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)(
  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex
);
```

The argument to a CK_UNLOCKMUTEX function is a pointer to the mutex object to be unlocked. Such a function should return one of the following values:

```
CKR_OK, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR
CKR_HOST_MEMORY
CKR_MUTEX_BAD
CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED
```


♦ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR

CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS is a structure containing the optional arguments for the **C_Initialize** function. For this version of Cryptoki, these optional arguments are all concerned with the way the library deals with threads. **CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS** is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS {
  CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
  CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
  CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
  CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
  CK_FLAGS flags;
  CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

CreateMutex	pointer to a function to use for creating mutex objects
DestroyMutex	pointer to a function to use for destroying mutex objects
LockMutex	pointer to a function to use for locking mutex objects
UnlockMutex	pointer to a function to use for unlocking mutex objects
flags	bit flags specifying options for **C_Initialize**; the flags are defined below
pReserved	reserved for future use. Should be NULL_PTR for this version of Cryptoki

The following table defines the flags field:

Table 10, C_Initialize Parameter Flags

Bit Flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS	0x00000001	True if application threads which are executing calls to the library may *not* use native operating system calls to spawn new threads; false if they may
CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK	0x00000002	True if the library can use the native operation system threading model for locking; false otherwise

CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS.

4 Objects

Cryptoki recognizes a number of classes of objects, as defined in the **CK_OBJECT_CLASS** data type. An object consists of a set of attributes, each of which has a given value. Each attribute that an object possesses has precisely one value. The following figure illustrates the high-level hierarchy of the Cryptoki objects and some of the attributes they support:



Figure 1, Object Attribute Hierarchy

Cryptoki provides functions for creating, destroying, and copying objects in general, and for obtaining and modifying the values of their attributes. Some of the cryptographic functions (*e.g.*, **C_GenerateKey**) also create key objects to hold their results.

Objects are always "well-formed" in Cryptoki—that is, an object always contains all required attributes, and the attributes are always consistent with one another from the time the object is created. This contrasts with some object-based paradigms where an object has no attributes other than perhaps a class when it is created, and is uninitialized for some time. In Cryptoki, objects are always initialized.

Tables throughout most of Section 4 define each Cryptoki attribute in terms of the data type of the attribute value and the meaning of the attribute, which may include a default initial value. Some of the data types are defined explicitly by Cryptoki (*e.g.*, **CK_OBJECT_CLASS**). Attribute values may also take the following types:

Byte array	an arbitrary string (array) of **CK_BYTE**s
Big integer	a string of **CK_BYTE**s representing an unsigned integer of arbitrary size, most-significant byte first (*e.g.*, the integer 32768 is represented as the 2-byte string 0x80 0x00)
Local string	an unpadded string of **CK_CHAR**s (see Table 3) with no null-termination
RFC2279 string	an unpadded string of **CK_UTF8CHARs** with no null-termination

A token can hold several identical objects, *i.e.*, it is permissible for two or more objects to have exactly the same values for all their attributes.

In most cases each type of object in the Cryptoki specification possesses a completely well-defined set of Cryptoki attributes. Some of these attributes possess default values, and need not be specified when creating an object; some of these default values may even be the empty string (“”). Nonetheless, the object possesses these attributes. A given object has a single value for each attribute it possesses, even if the attribute is a vendor-specific attribute whose meaning is outside the scope of Cryptoki.

In addition to possessing Cryptoki attributes, objects may possess additional vendor-specific attributes whose meanings and values are not specified by Cryptoki.

4.1 Creating, modifying, and copying objects

All Cryptoki functions that create, modify, or copy objects take a template as one of their arguments, where the template specifies attribute values. Cryptographic functions that create objects (see Section 5.18) may also contribute some additional attribute values themselves; which attributes have values contributed by a cryptographic function call depends on which cryptographic mechanism is being performed (see section 6 Mechanisms and [PKCS11-Hist] for specification of mechanisms for PKCS #11). In any case, all the required attributes supported by an object class that do not have default values MUST be specified when an object is created, either in the template or by the function itself.

4.1.1 Creating objects

Objects may be created with the Cryptoki functions **C_CreateObject** (see Section 5.7), **C_GenerateKey**, **C_GenerateKeyPair**, **C_UnwrapKey**, and **C_DeriveKey** (see Section 5.18). In addition, copying an existing object (with the function **C_CopyObject**) also creates a new object, but we consider this type of object creation separately in Section 4.1.3.

Attempting to create an object with any of these functions requires an appropriate template to be supplied.

1. If the supplied template specifies a value for an invalid attribute, then the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID. An attribute is valid if it is either one of the attributes described in the Cryptoki specification or an additional vendor-specific attribute supported by the library and token.

2. If the supplied template specifies an invalid value for a valid attribute, then the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID. The valid values for Cryptoki attributes are described in the Cryptoki specification.

3. If the supplied template specifies a value for a read-only attribute, then the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY. Whether or not a given Cryptoki attribute is read-only is explicitly stated in the Cryptoki specification; however, a particular library and token may be even more restrictive than Cryptoki specifies. In other words, an attribute which Cryptoki says is not read-only may nonetheless be read-only under certain circumstances (*i.e.*, in conjunction with some combinations of other attributes) for a particular library and token. Whether or not a given non-Cryptoki attribute is read-only is obviously outside the scope of Cryptoki.

4. If the attribute values in the supplied template, together with any default attribute values and any attribute values contributed to the object by the object-creation function itself, are insufficient to fully specify the object to create, then the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE.

5. If the attribute values in the supplied template, together with any default attribute values and any attribute values contributed to the object by the object-creation function itself, are inconsistent, then the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT. A set of attribute values is inconsistent if not all of its members can be satisfied simultaneously *by the token*, although each value individually is valid in Cryptoki. One example of an inconsistent template would be using a template which specifies two different values for the same attribute. Another example would be trying to create a secret key object with an attribute which is appropriate for various types of public keys or private keys, but not for secret keys. A final example would be a template with an attribute that violates some token

specific requirement. Note that this final example of an inconsistent template is token-dependent—on a different token, such a template might *not* be inconsistent.

6. If the supplied template specifies the same value for a particular attribute more than once (or the template specifies the same value for a particular attribute that the object-creation function itself contributes to the object), then the behavior of Cryptoki is not completely specified. The attempt to create an object can either succeed—thereby creating the same object that would have been created if the multiply-specified attribute had only appeared once—or it can fail with error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT. Library developers are encouraged to make their libraries behave as though the attribute had only appeared once in the template; application developers are strongly encouraged never to put a particular attribute into a particular template more than once.

If more than one of the situations listed above applies to an attempt to create an object, then the error code returned from the attempt can be any of the error codes from above that applies.

4.1.2 Modifying objects

Objects may be modified with the Cryptoki function **C_SetAttributeValue** (see Section 5.7). The template supplied to **C_SetAttributeValue** can contain new values for attributes which the object already possesses; values for attributes which the object does not yet possess; or both.

Some attributes of an object may be modified after the object has been created, and some may not. In addition, attributes which Cryptoki specifies are modifiable may actually *not* be modifiable on some tokens. That is, if a Cryptoki attribute is described as being modifiable, that really means only that it is modifiable *insofar as the Cryptoki specification is concerned*. A particular token might not actually support modification of some such attributes. Furthermore, whether or not a particular attribute of an object on a particular token is modifiable might depend on the values of certain attributes of the object. For example, a secret key object's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute can be changed from CK_FALSE to CK_TRUE, but not the other way around.

All the scenarios in Section 4.1.1—and the error codes they return—apply to modifying objects with **C_SetAttributeValue**, except for the possibility of a template being incomplete.

4.1.3 Copying objects

Unless an object's CKA_COPYABLE (see Table 17) attribute is set to CK_FALSE, it may be copied with the Cryptoki function **C_CopyObject** (see Section 5.7). In the process of copying an object, **C_CopyObject** also modifies the attributes of the newly-created copy according to an application-supplied template.

The Cryptoki attributes which can be modified during the course of a **C_CopyObject** operation are the same as the Cryptoki attributes which are described as being modifiable, plus the four special attributes **CKA_TOKEN**, **CKA_PRIVATE**, **CKA_MODIFIABLE and CKA_DESTROYABLE**. To be more precise, these attributes are modifiable during the course of a **C_CopyObject** operation *insofar as the Cryptoki specification is concerned*. A particular token might not actually support modification of some such attributes during the course of a **C_CopyObject** operation. Furthermore, whether or not a particular attribute of an object on a particular token is modifiable during the course of a **C_CopyObject** operation might depend on the values of certain attributes of the object. For example, a secret key object's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute can be changed from CK_FALSE to CK_TRUE during the course of a **C_CopyObject** operation, but not the other way around.

If the CKA_COPYABLE attribute of the object to be copied is set to CK_FALSE, C_CopyObject returns CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED. Otherwise, the scenarios described in 10.1.1 - and the error codes they return - apply to copying objects with C_CopyObject, except for the possibility of a template being incomplete.

4.2 Common attributes

Table 11, Common footnotes for object attribute tables

[1] MUST be specified when object is created with **C_CreateObject**.

[2] MUST *not* be specified when object is created with **C_CreateObject**.

[3] MUST be specified when object is generated with **C_GenerateKey** or **C_GenerateKeyPair**.

[4] MUST *not* be specified when object is generated with **C_GenerateKey** or **C_GenerateKeyPair**.

[5] MUST be specified when object is unwrapped with **C_UnwrapKey**.

[6] MUST *not* be specified when object is unwrapped with **C_UnwrapKey**.

[7] Cannot be revealed if object has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE or its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE.

[8] May be modified after object is created with a **C_SetAttributeValue** call, or in the process of copying object with a **C_CopyObject** call. However, it is possible that a particular token may not permit modification of the attribute during the course of a **C_CopyObject** call.

[9] Default value is token-specific, and may depend on the values of other attributes.

[10] Can only be set to CK_TRUE by the SO user.

[11] Attribute cannot be changed once set to CK_TRUE. It becomes a read only attribute.

[12] Attribute cannot be changed once set to CK_FALSE. It becomes a read only attribute.

Table 12, Common Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_CLASS[1]	CK_OBJECT_CLASS	Object class (type)

Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The above table defines the attributes common to all objects.

4.3 Hardware Feature Objects

4.3.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_HW_FEATURE for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

4.3.2 Overview

Hardware feature objects (**CKO_HW_FEATURE**) represent features of the device. They provide an easily expandable method for introducing new value-based features to the Cryptoki interface.

When searching for objects using **C_FindObjectsInit** and **C_FindObjects**, hardware feature objects are not returned unless the **CKA_CLASS** attribute in the template has the value **CKO_HW_FEATURE**. This protects applications written to previous versions of Cryptoki from finding objects that they do not understand.

Table 13, Hardware Feature Common Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE[1]	CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE	Hardware feature (type)

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

4.3.3 Clock

4.3.3.1 Definition

The CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE attribute takes the value CKH_CLOCK of type CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE.

4.3.3.2 Description

Clock objects represent real-time clocks that exist on the device. This represents the same clock source as the **utcTime** field in the **CK_TOKEN_INFO** structure.

Table 14, Clock Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE	CK_CHAR[16]	Current time as a character-string of length 16, represented in the format YYYYMMDDhhmmssxx (4 characters for the year; 2 characters each for the month, the day, the hour, the minute, and the second; and 2 additional reserved '0' characters).

The **CKA_VALUE** attribute may be set using the **C_SetAttributeValue** function if permitted by the device. The session used to set the time MUST be logged in. The device may require the SO to be the user logged in to modify the time value. **C_SetAttributeValue** will return the error CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN to indicate that a different user type is required to set the value.

4.3.4 Monotonic Counter Objects

4.3.4.1 Definition

The CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE attribute takes the value CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER of type CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE.

4.3.4.2 Description

Monotonic counter objects represent hardware counters that exist on the device. The counter is guaranteed to increase each time its value is read, but not necessarily by one. This might be used by an application for generating serial numbers to get some assurance of uniqueness per token.

Table 15, Monotonic Counter Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_RESET_ON_INIT[1]	CK_BBOOL	The value of the counter will reset to a previously returned value if the token is initialized using **C_InitToken**.
CKA_HAS_RESET[1]	CK_BBOOL	The value of the counter has been reset at least once at some point in time.
CKA_VALUE[1]	Byte Array	The current version of the monotonic counter. The value is returned in big endian order.

[1]Read Only

The **CKA_VALUE** attribute may not be set by the client.

4.3.5 User Interface Objects

4.3.5.1 Definition

The CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE attribute takes the value CKH_USER_INTERFACE of type CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE.

4.3.5.2 Description

User interface objects represent the presentation capabilities of the device.

Table 16, User Interface Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PIXEL_X	CK_ULONG	Screen resolution (in pixels) in X-axis (e.g. 1280)
CKA_PIXEL_Y	CK_ULONG	Screen resolution (in pixels) in Y-axis (e.g. 1024)
CKA_RESOLUTION	CK_ULONG	DPI, pixels per inch
CKA_CHAR_ROWS	CK_ULONG	For character-oriented displays; number of character rows (e.g. 24)
CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS	CK_ULONG	For character-oriented displays: number of character columns (e.g. 80). If display is of proportional-font type, this is the width of the display in “em”-s (letter “M”), see CC/PP Struct.
CKA_COLOR	CK_BBOOL	Color support
CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL	CK_ULONG	The number of bits of color or grayscale information per pixel.
CKA_CHAR_SETS	RFC 2279 string	String indicating supported character sets, as defined by IANA MIBenum sets (www.iana.org). Supported character sets are separated with “;”. E.g. a token supporting iso-8859-1 and US-ASCII would set the attribute value to “4;3”.
CKA_ENCODING_METHODS	RFC 2279 string	String indicating supported content transfer encoding methods, as defined by IANA (www.iana.org). Supported methods are separated with “;”. E.g. a token supporting 7bit, 8bit and base64 could set the attribute value to “7bit;8bit;base64”.
CKA_MIME_TYPES	RFC 2279 string	String indicating supported (presentable) MIME-types, as defined by IANA (www.iana.org). Supported types are separated with “;”. E.g. a token supporting MIME types "a/b", "a/c" and "a/d" would set the attribute value to “a/b;a/c;a/d”.

The selection of attributes, and associated data types, has been done in an attempt to stay as aligned with RFC 2534 and CC/PP Struct as possible. The special value CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION may be used for CK_ULONG-based attributes when information is not available or applicable.

None of the attribute values may be set by an application.

The value of the **CKA_ENCODING_METHODS** attribute may be used when the application needs to send MIME objects with encoded content to the token.

4.4 Storage Objects

This is not an object class; hence no CKO_ definition is required. It is a category of object classes with common attributes for the object classes that follow.

1466 *Table 17, Common Storage Object Attributes*

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_TOKEN	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if object is a token object; CK_FALSE if object is a session object. Default is CK_FALSE.
CKA_PRIVATE	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if object is a private object; CK_FALSE if object is a public object. Default value is token-specific, and may depend on the values of other attributes of the object.
CKA_MODIFIABLE	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if object can be modified Default is CK_TRUE.
CKA_LABEL	RFC2279 string	Description of the object (default empty).
CKA_COPYABLE	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if object can be copied using C_CopyObject. Defaults to CK_TRUE. Can't be set to TRUE once it is set to FALSE.
CKA_DESTROYABLE	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if the object can be destroyed using C_DestroyObject. Default is CK_TRUE.
CKA_UNIQUE_ID[246]	RFC2279 string	The unique identifier assigned to the object.

1467 Only the **CKA_LABEL** attribute can be modified after the object is created. (The **CKA_TOKEN**,
1468 **CKA_PRIVATE**, and **CKA_MODIFIABLE** attributes can be changed in the process of copying an object,
1469 however.)

1470 The **CKA_TOKEN** attribute identifies whether the object is a token object or a session object.

1471 When the **CKA_PRIVATE** attribute is CK_TRUE, a user may not access the object until the user has
1472 been authenticated to the token.

1473 The value of the **CKA_MODIFIABLE** attribute determines whether or not an object is read-only.

1474 The **CKA_LABEL** attribute is intended to assist users in browsing.

1475 The value of the CKA_COPYABLE attribute determines whether or not an object can be copied. This
1476 attribute can be used in conjunction with CKA_MODIFIABLE to prevent changes to the permitted usages
1477 of keys and other objects.

1478 The value of the CKA_DESTROYABLE attribute determines whether the object can be destroyed using
1479 C_DestroyObject.

1480 4.4.1 The CKA_UNIQUE_ID attribute

1481 Any time a new object is created, a value for CKA_UNIQUE_ID MUST be generated by the token and
1482 stored with the object. The specific algorithm used to generate unique ID values for objects is token-
1483 specific, but values generated MUST be unique across all objects visible to any particular session, and
1484 SHOULD be unique across all objects created by the token. Reinitializing the token, such as by calling
1485 C_InitToken, MAY cause reuse of CKA_UNIQUE_ID values.

1486 Any attempt to modify the CKA_UNIQUE_ID attribute of an existing object or to specify the value of the
1487 CKA_UNIQUE_ID attribute in the template for an operation that creates one or more objects MUST fail.
1488 Operations failing for this reason return the error code CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY.

1489

4.5 Data objects

4.5.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_DATA for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

4.5.2 Overview

Data objects (object class **CKO_DATA**) hold information defined by an application. Other than providing access to it, Cryptoki does not attach any special meaning to a data object. The following table lists the attributes supported by data objects, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 18, Data Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_APPLICATION	RFC2279 string	Description of the application that manages the object (default empty)
CKA_OBJECT_ID	Byte Array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type (default empty)
CKA_VALUE	Byte array	Value of the object (default empty)

The **CKA_APPLICATION** attribute provides a means for applications to indicate ownership of the data objects they manage. Cryptoki does not provide a means of ensuring that only a particular application has access to a data object, however.

The **CKA_OBJECT_ID** attribute provides an application independent and expandable way to indicate the type of the data object value. Cryptoki does not provide a means of insuring that the data object identifier matches the data value.

The following is a sample template containing attributes for creating a data object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DATA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A data object";
CK_UTF8CHAR application[] = "An application";
CK_BYTE data[] = "Sample data";
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_APPLICATION, application, sizeof(application)-1},
  {CKA_VALUE, data, sizeof(data)}
};
```

4.6 Certificate objects

4.6.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_CERTIFICATE for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

4.6.2 Overview

Certificate objects (object class **CKO_CERTIFICATE**) hold public-key or attribute certificates. Other than providing access to certificate objects, Cryptoki does not attach any special meaning to certificates. The following table defines the common certificate object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

1528 *Table 19, Common Certificate Object Attributes*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE [1]	CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE	Type of certificate
CKA_TRUSTED[10]	CK_BBOOL	The certificate can be trusted for the application that it was created.
CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY	CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY	(default CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED)
CKA_CHECK_VALUE	Byte array	Checksum
CKA_START_DATE	CK_DATE	Start date for the certificate (default empty)
CKA_END_DATE	CK_DATE	End date for the certificate (default empty)
CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO	Byte Array	DER-encoding of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo for the public key contained in this certificate (default empty)

1529 - Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

1530 Cryptoki does not enforce the relationship of the CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO to the public key in the
1531 certificate, but does recommend that the key be extracted from the certificate to create this value.

1532 The **CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE** attribute may not be modified after an object is created. This version of
1533 Cryptoki supports the following certificate types:

1534 • X.509 public key certificate
1535 • WTLS public key certificate
1536 • X.509 attribute certificate

1537 The **CKA_TRUSTED** attribute cannot be set to CK_TRUE by an application. It MUST be set by a token
1538 initialization application or by the token's SO. Trusted certificates cannot be modified.

1539 The **CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY** attribute is used to indicate if a stored certificate is a user
1540 certificate for which the corresponding private key is available on the token ("token user"), a CA certificate
1541 ("authority"), or another end-entity certificate ("other entity"). This attribute may not be modified after an
1542 object is created.

1543 The **CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY** and **CKA_TRUSTED** attributes will together be used to map to
1544 the categorization of the certificates.

1545 **CKA_CHECK_VALUE**: The value of this attribute is derived from the certificate by taking the first three
1546 bytes of the SHA-1 hash of the certificate object's CKA_VALUE attribute.

1547 The **CKA_START_DATE** and **CKA_END_DATE** attributes are for reference only; Cryptoki does not
1548 attach any special meaning to them. When present, the application is responsible to set them to values
1549 that match the certificate's encoded "not before" and "not after" fields (if any).

1550 4.6.3 X.509 public key certificate objects

1551 X.509 certificate objects (certificate type **CKC_X_509**) hold X.509 public key certificates. The following
1552 table defines the X.509 certificate object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this
1553 object class:

1554 *Table 20, X.509 Certificate Object Attributes*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_SUBJECT[1]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the certificate subject name
CKA_ID	Byte array	Key identifier for public/private key pair (default empty)
CKA_ISSUER	Byte array	DER-encoding of the certificate issuer name (default empty)
CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER	Byte array	DER-encoding of the certificate serial number (default empty)
CKA_VALUE[2]	Byte array	BER-encoding of the certificate
CKA_URL[3]	RFC2279 string	If not empty this attribute gives the URL where the complete certificate can be obtained (default empty)
CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY[4]	Byte array	Hash of the subject public key (default empty). Hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM
CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY[4]	Byte array	Hash of the issuer public key (default empty). Hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM
CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN	CK_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN	Java MIDP security domain. (default CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_UNSPECIFIED)
CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	Defines the mechanism used to calculate CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY and CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY. If the attribute is not present then the type defaults to SHA-1.

[1]MUST be specified when the object is created.

[2]MUST be specified when the object is created. MUST be non-empty if CKA_URL is empty.

[3]MUST be non-empty if CKA_VALUE is empty.

[4]Can only be empty if CKA_URL is empty.

Only the **CKA_ID**, **CKA_ISSUER**, and **CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER** attributes may be modified after the object is created.

The **CKA_ID** attribute is intended as a means of distinguishing multiple public-key/private-key pairs held by the same subject (whether stored in the same token or not). (Since the keys are distinguished by subject name as well as identifier, it is possible that keys for different subjects may have the same **CKA_ID** value without introducing any ambiguity.)

It is intended in the interests of interoperability that the subject name and key identifier for a certificate will be the same as those for the corresponding public and private keys (though it is not required that all be stored in the same token). However, Cryptoki does not enforce this association, or even the uniqueness of the key identifier for a given subject; in particular, an application may leave the key identifier empty.

The **CKA_ISSUER** and **CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER** attributes are for compatibility with PKCS #7 and Privacy Enhanced Mail (RFC1421). Note that with the version 3 extensions to X.509 certificates, the key identifier may be carried in the certificate. It is intended that the **CKA_ID** value be identical to the key identifier in such a certificate extension, although this will not be enforced by Cryptoki.

The **CKA_URL** attribute enables the support for storage of the URL where the certificate can be found instead of the certificate itself. Storage of a URL instead of the complete certificate is often used in mobile environments.

The **CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY** and **CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY** attributes are used to store the hashes of the public keys of the subject and the issuer. They are particularly important when only the URL is available to be able to correlate a certificate with a private key and when searching for the certificate of the issuer. The hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM.

The **CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN** attribute associates a certificate with a Java MIDP security domain.

The following is a sample template for creating an X.509 certificate object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE certType = CKC_X_509;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A certificate object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE certificate[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, &certType, sizeof(certType)};
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
  {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
  {CKA_VALUE, certificate, sizeof(certificate)}
};
```

4.6.4 WTLS public key certificate objects

WTLS certificate objects (certificate type **CKC_WTLS**) hold WTLS public key certificates. The following table defines the WTLS certificate object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class.

Table 21: WTLS Certificate Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_SUBJECT[1]	Byte array	WTLS-encoding (Identifier type) of the certificate subject
CKA_ISSUER	Byte array	WTLS-encoding (Identifier type) of the certificate issuer (default empty)
CKA_VALUE[2]	Byte array	WTLS-encoding of the certificate
CKA_URL[3]	RFC2279 string	If not empty this attribute gives the URL where the complete certificate can be obtained
CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY[4]	Byte array	SHA-1 hash of the subject public key (default empty). Hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM
CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY[4]	Byte array	SHA-1 hash of the issuer public key (default empty). Hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM
CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	Defines the mechanism used to calculate CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
		_KEY and CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY. If the attribute is not present then the type defaults to SHA-1.

[1]MUST be specified when the object is created. Can only be empty if CKA_VALUE is empty.

[2]MUST be specified when the object is created. MUST be non-empty if CKA_URL is empty.

[3]MUST be non-empty if CKA_VALUE is empty.

[4]Can only be empty if CKA_URL is empty.

Only the **CKA_ISSUER** attribute may be modified after the object has been created.

The encoding for the **CKA_SUBJECT**, **CKA_ISSUER**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes can be found in [WTLS].

The **CKA_URL** attribute enables the support for storage of the URL where the certificate can be found instead of the certificate itself. Storage of a URL instead of the complete certificate is often used in mobile environments.

The **CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY** and **CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY** attributes are used to store the hashes of the public keys of the subject and the issuer. They are particularly important when only the URL is available to be able to correlate a certificate with a private key and when searching for the certificate of the issuer. The hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM.

The following is a sample template for creating a WTLS certificate object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE certType = CKC_WTLS;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A certificate object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE certificate[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] =
{
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, &certType, sizeof(certType)};
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
  {CKA_VALUE, certificate, sizeof(certificate)}
};
```

4.6.5 X.509 attribute certificate objects

X.509 attribute certificate objects (certificate type **CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT**) hold X.509 attribute certificates. The following table defines the X.509 attribute certificate object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

1641 *Table 22, X.509 Attribute Certificate Object Attributes*

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_OWNER[1]	Byte Array	DER-encoding of the attribute certificate's subject field. This is distinct from the CKA_SUBJECT attribute contained in CKC_X_509 certificates because the ASN.1 syntax and encoding are different.
CKA_AC_ISSUER	Byte Array	DER-encoding of the attribute certificate's issuer field. This is distinct from the CKA_ISSUER attribute contained in CKC_X_509 certificates because the ASN.1 syntax and encoding are different. (default empty)
CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER	Byte Array	DER-encoding of the certificate serial number. (default empty)
CKA_ATTR_TYPES	Byte Array	BER-encoding of a sequence of object identifier values corresponding to the attribute types contained in the certificate. When present, this field offers an opportunity for applications to search for a particular attribute certificate without fetching and parsing the certificate itself. (default empty)
CKA_VALUE[1]	Byte Array	BER-encoding of the certificate.

1642 [1]MUST be specified when the object is created

1643 Only the **CKA_AC_ISSUER**, **CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER** and **CKA_ATTR_TYPES** attributes may be
1644 modified after the object is created.

1645 The following is a sample template for creating an X.509 attribute certificate object:

```
1646 CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
1647 CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE certType = CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT;
1648 CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An attribute certificate object";
1649 CK_BYTE owner[] = {...};
1650 CK_BYTE certificate[] = {...};
1651 CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
1652 CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
1653   {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
1654   {CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, &certType, sizeof(certType)};
1655   {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
1656   {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
1657   {CKA_OWNER, owner, sizeof(owner)},
1658   {CKA_VALUE, certificate, sizeof(certificate)}
1659 };
```

1660 # 4.7 Key objects

1661 ## 4.7.1 Definitions

1662 There is no CKO_ definition for the base key object class, only for the key types derived from it.

1663 This section defines the object class CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY and
1664 CKO_SECRET_KEY for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

1665 ## 4.7.2 Overview

1666 Key objects hold encryption or authentication keys, which can be public keys, private keys, or secret
1667 keys. The following common footnotes apply to all the tables describing attributes of keys:

1668 The following table defines the attributes common to public key, private key and secret key classes, in
1669 addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 23, Common Key Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_KEY_TYPE[1,5]	CK_KEY_TYPE	Type of key
CKA_ID[8]	Byte array	Key identifier for key (default empty)
CKA_START_DATE[8]	CK_DATE	Start date for the key (default empty)
CKA_END_DATE[8]	CK_DATE	End date for the key (default empty)
CKA_DERIVE[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports key derivation (*i.e.*, if other keys can be derived from this one (default CK_FALSE)
CKA_LOCAL[2,4,6]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE only if key was either • generated locally (*i.e.*, on the token) with a **C_GenerateKey** or **C_GenerateKeyPair** call • created with a **C_CopyObject** call as a copy of a key which had its **CKA_LOCAL** attribute set to CK_TRUE
CKA_KEY_GEN_ MECHANISM[2,4,6]	CK_MECHANISM _TYPE	Identifier of the mechanism used to generate the key material.
CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANI SMS	CK_MECHANISM _TYPE _PTR, pointer to a CK_MECHANISM _TYPE array	A list of mechanisms allowed to be used with this key. The number of mechanisms in the array is the *ulValueLen* component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_MECHANISM_TYPE.

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_ID** field is intended to distinguish among multiple keys. In the case of public and private keys, this field assists in handling multiple keys held by the same subject; the key identifier for a public key and its corresponding private key should be the same. The key identifier should also be the same as for the corresponding certificate, if one exists. Cryptoki does not enforce these associations, however. (See Section 4.6 for further commentary.)

In the case of secret keys, the meaning of the **CKA_ID** attribute is up to the application.

Note that the **CKA_START_DATE** and **CKA_END_DATE** attributes are for reference only; Cryptoki does not attach any special meaning to them. In particular, it does not restrict usage of a key according to the dates; doing this is up to the application.

The **CKA_DERIVE** attribute has the value CK_TRUE if and only if it is possible to derive other keys from the key.

The **CKA_LOCAL** attribute has the value CK_TRUE if and only if the value of the key was originally generated on the token by a **C_GenerateKey** or **C_GenerateKeyPair** call.

The **CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM** attribute identifies the key generation mechanism used to generate the key material. It contains a valid value only if the **CKA_LOCAL** attribute has the value CK_TRUE. If **CKA_LOCAL** has the value CK_FALSE, the value of the attribute is CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION.

4.8 Public key objects

Public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY**) hold public keys. The following table defines the attributes common to all public keys, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 24, Common Public Key Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_SUBJECT[8]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the key subject name (default empty)
CKA_ENCRYPT[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports encryption[9]
CKA_VERIFY[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports verification where the signature is an appendix to the data[9]
CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports verification where the data is recovered from the signature[9]
CKA_WRAP[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports wrapping (*i.e.*, can be used to wrap other keys)[9]
CKA_TRUSTED[10]	CK_BBOOL	The key can be trusted for the application that it was created. The wrapping key can be used to wrap keys with CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED set to CK_TRUE.
CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR	For wrapping keys. The attribute template to match against any keys wrapped using this wrapping key. Keys that do not match cannot be wrapped. The number of attributes in the array is the *ulValueLen* component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE.
CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO	Byte array	DER-encoding of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo for this public key. (MAY be empty, DEFAULT derived from the underlying public key data)

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

It is intended in the interests of interoperability that the subject name and key identifier for a public key will be the same as those for the corresponding certificate and private key. However, Cryptoki does not enforce this, and it is not required that the certificate and private key also be stored on the token.

To map between ISO/IEC 9594-8 (X.509) **keyUsage** flags for public keys and the PKCS #11 attributes for public keys, use the following table.

1699 *Table 25, Mapping of X.509 key usage flags to Cryptoki attributes for public keys*

Key usage flags for public keys in X.509 public key certificates	Corresponding cryptoki attributes for public keys.
dataEncipherment	CKA_ENCRYPT
digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign	CKA_VERIFY
digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign	CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER
keyAgreement	CKA_DERIVE
keyEncipherment	CKA_WRAP
nonRepudiation	CKA_VERIFY
nonRepudiation	CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER

1700 The value of the CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO attribute is the DER encoded value of SubjectPublicKeyInfo:

1701 SubjectPublicKeyInfo **::**= SEQUENCE {

1702 algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,

1703 subjectPublicKey BIT_STRING }

1704 The encodings for the subjectPublicKey field are specified in the description of the public key types in the
1705 appropriate sections for the key types defined within this specification.

1706 4.9 Private key objects

1707 Private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY**) hold private keys. The following table defines the
1708 attributes common to all private keys, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

1709 *Table 26, Common Private Key Attributes*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_SUBJECT[8]	Byte array	DER-encoding of certificate subject name (default empty)
CKA_SENSITIVE[8,11]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key is sensitive[9]
CKA_DECRYPT[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports decryption[9]
CKA_SIGN[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports signatures where the signature is an appendix to the data[9]
CKA_SIGN_RECOVER[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports signatures where the data can be recovered from the signature[9]
CKA_UNWRAP[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports unwrapping (*i.e.*, can be used to unwrap other keys)[9]
CKA_EXTRACTABLE[8,12]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key is extractable and can be wrapped [9]
CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE[2,4,6]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key has *always* had the CKA_SENSITIVE attribute set to CK_TRUE
CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE[2,4,6]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key has *never* had the CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute set to CK_TRUE
CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED[11]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if the key can only be wrapped with a wrapping key that has CKA_TRUSTED set to CK_TRUE.

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
		Default is CK_FALSE.
CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR	For wrapping keys. The attribute template to apply to any keys unwrapped using this wrapping key. Any user supplied template is applied after this template as if the object has already been created. The number of attributes in the array is the *ulValueLen* component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE.
CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE	CK_BBOOL	If CK_TRUE, the user has to supply the PIN for each use (sign or decrypt) with the key. Default is CK_FALSE.
CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO[8]	Byte Array	DER-encoding of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo for the associated public key (MAY be empty; DEFAULT derived from the underlying private key data; MAY be manually set for specific key types; if set; MUST be consistent with the underlying private key data)
CKA_DERIVE_TEMPLATE	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR	For deriving keys. The attribute template to match against any keys derived using this derivation key. Any user supplied template is applied after this template as if the object has already been created. The number of attributes in the array is the ulValueLen component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE.

[8] Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

It is intended in the interests of interoperability that the subject name and key identifier for a private key will be the same as those for the corresponding certificate and public key. However, this is not enforced by Cryptoki, and it is not required that the certificate and public key also be stored on the token.

If the **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is CK_TRUE, or if the **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is CK_FALSE, then certain attributes of the private key cannot be revealed in plaintext outside the token. Which attributes these are is specified for each type of private key in the attribute table in the section describing that type of key.

The **CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE** attribute can be used to force re-authentication (i.e. force the user to provide a PIN) for each use of a private key. “Use” in this case means a cryptographic operation such as sign or decrypt. This attribute may only be set to CK_TRUE when **CKA_PRIVATE** is also CK_TRUE.

Re-authentication occurs by calling **C_Login** with *userType* set to **CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC** immediately after a cryptographic operation using the key has been initiated (e.g. after **C_SignInit**). In this call, the actual user type is implicitly given by the usage requirements of the active key. If **C_Login** returns CKR_OK the user was successfully authenticated and this sets the active key in an authenticated state that lasts until the cryptographic operation has successfully or unsuccessfully been completed (e.g.

by **C_Sign**, **C_SignFinal**,..). A return value CKR_PIN_INCORRECT from **C_Login** means that the user was denied permission to use the key and continuing the cryptographic operation will result in a behavior as if **C_Login** had not been called. In both of these cases the session state will remain the same, however repeated failed re-authentication attempts may cause the PIN to be locked. **C_Login** returns in this case CKR_PIN_LOCKED and this also logs the user out from the token. Failing or omitting to re-authenticate when CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE is set to CK_TRUE will result in CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN to be returned from calls using the key. **C_Login** will return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, but the active cryptographic operation will not be affected, if an attempt is made to re-authenticate when CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE is set to CK_FALSE.

The **CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO** attribute represents the public key associated with this private key. The data it represents may either be stored as part of the private key data, or regenerated as needed from the private key.

If this attribute is supplied as part of a template for **C_CreateObject, C_CopyObject** or C_**SetAttributeValue** for a private key, the token MUST verify correspondence between the private key data and the public key data as supplied in **CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO**. This can be done either by deriving a public key from the private key and comparing the values, or by doing a sign and verify operation. If there is a mismatch, the command SHALL return **CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID.** A token MAY choose not to support the **CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO** attribute for commands which create new private keys. If it does not support the attribute, the command SHALL return **CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID**.

As a general guideline, private keys of any type SHOULD store sufficient information to retrieve the public key information. In particular, the RSA private key description has been modified in PKCS #11 V2.40 to add the CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT to the list of attributes required for an RSA private key. All other private key types described in this specification contain sufficient information to recover the associated public key.

4.10 Secret key objects

Secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**) hold secret keys. The following table defines the attributes common to all secret keys, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 27, Common Secret Key Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_SENSITIVE[8,11]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if object is sensitive (default CK_FALSE)
CKA_ENCRYPT[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports encryption[9]
CKA_DECRYPT[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports decryption[9]
CKA_SIGN[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports signatures (*i.e.*, authentication codes) where the signature is an appendix to the data[9]
CKA_VERIFY[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports verification (*i.e.*, of authentication codes) where the signature is an appendix to the data[9]
CKA_WRAP[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports wrapping (*i.e.*, can be used to wrap other keys)[9]
CKA_UNWRAP[8]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key supports unwrapping (*i.e.*, can be used to unwrap other keys)[9]

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_EXTRACTABLE[8,12]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key is extractable and can be wrapped [9]
CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE[2,4,6]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key has *always* had the CKA_SENSITIVE attribute set to CK_TRUE
CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE[2,4,6]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if key has *never* had the CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute set to CK_TRUE
CKA_CHECK_VALUE	Byte array	Key checksum
CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED[11]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE if the key can only be wrapped with a wrapping key that has CKA_TRUSTED set to CK_TRUE. Default is CK_FALSE.
CKA_TRUSTED[10]	CK_BBOOL	The wrapping key can be used to wrap keys with CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED set to CK_TRUE.
CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR	For wrapping keys. The attribute template to match against any keys wrapped using this wrapping key. Keys that do not match cannot be wrapped. The number of attributes in the array is the *ulValueLen* component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE
CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR	For wrapping keys. The attribute template to apply to any keys unwrapped using this wrapping key. Any user supplied template is applied after this template as if the object has already been created. The number of attributes in the array is the *ulValueLen* component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE.
A_DERIVE_TEMPLATE	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR	For deriving keys. The attribute template to match against any keys derived using this derivation key. Any user supplied template is applied after this template as if the object has already been created. The number of attributes in the array is the ulValueLen component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE.

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

If the **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is CK_TRUE, or if the **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is CK_FALSE, then certain attributes of the secret key cannot be revealed in plaintext outside the token. Which attributes these are is specified for each type of secret key in the attribute table in the section describing that type of key.

The key check value (KCV) attribute for symmetric key objects to be called **CKA_CHECK_VALUE,** of type byte array, length 3 bytes, operates like a fingerprint, or checksum of the key. They are intended to be used to cross-check symmetric keys against other systems where the same key is shared, and as a validity check after manual key entry or restore from backup. Refer to object definitions of specific key types for KCV algorithms.

Properties:

1. For two keys that are cryptographically identical the value of this attribute should be identical.
2. CKA_CHECK_VALUE should not be usable to obtain any part of the key value.
3. Non-uniqueness. Two different keys can have the same CKA_CHECK_VALUE. This is unlikely (the probability can easily be calculated) but possible.

The attribute is optional, but if supported, regardless of how the key object is created or derived, the value of the attribute is always supplied. It SHALL be supplied even if the encryption operation for the key is forbidden (i.e. when CKA_ENCRYPT is set to CK_FALSE).

If a value is supplied in the application template (allowed but never necessary) then, if supported, it MUST match what the library calculates it to be or the library returns a CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID. If the library does not support the attribute then it should ignore it. Allowing the attribute in the template this way does no harm and allows the attribute to be treated like any other attribute for the purposes of key wrap and unwrap where the attributes are preserved also.

The generation of the KCV may be prevented by the application supplying the attribute in the template as a no-value (0 length) entry. The application can query the value at any time like any other attribute using C_GetAttributeValue. C_SetAttributeValue may be used to destroy the attribute, by supplying no-value.

Unless otherwise specified for the object definition, the value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of an encryption of a single block of null (0x00) bytes, using the default cipher and mode (e.g. ECB) associated with the key type of the secret key object.

4.11 Domain parameter objects

4.11.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

4.11.2 Overview

This object class was created to support the storage of certain algorithm's extended parameters. DSA and DH both use domain parameters in the key-pair generation step. In particular, some libraries support the generation of domain parameters (originally out of scope for PKCS11) so the object class was added.

To use a domain parameter object you MUST extract the attributes into a template and supply them (still in the template) to the corresponding key-pair generation function.

Domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS**) hold public domain parameters.

The following table defines the attributes common to domain parameter objects in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 28, Common Domain Parameter Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_KEY_TYPE[1]	CK_KEY_TYPE	Type of key the domain parameters can be used to generate.
CKA_LOCAL[2,4]	CK_BBOOL	CK_TRUE only if domain parameters were either • generated locally (*i.e.*, on the token) with a **C_GenerateKey** • created with a **C_CopyObject** call as a copy of domain parameters which had its **CKA_LOCAL** attribute set to CK_TRUE

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_LOCAL** attribute has the value CK_TRUE if and only if the values of the domain parameters were originally generated on the token by a **C_GenerateKey** call.

4.12 Mechanism objects

4.12.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_MECHANISM for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

4.12.2 Overview

Mechanism objects provide information about mechanisms supported by a device beyond that given by the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure.

When searching for objects using **C_FindObjectsInit** and **C_FindObjects**, mechanism objects are not returned unless the **CKA_CLASS** attribute in the template has the value **CKO_MECHANISM**. This protects applications written to previous versions of Cryptoki from finding objects that they do not understand.

Table 29, Common Mechanism Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	The type of mechanism object

The **CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE** attribute may not be set.

4.13 Profile objects

4.13.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_PROFILE for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

4.13.2 Overview

Profile objects (object class CKO_PROFILE) describe which PKCS #11 profiles the token implements. Profiles are defined in the OASIS PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Profiles document. A given token can contain more than one profile ID. The following table lists the attributes supported by profile objects, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 30, Profile Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PROFILE_ID	CK_PROFILE_ID	ID of the supported profile.

The **CKA_PROFILE_ID** attribute identifies a profile that the token supports.

5 Functions

Cryptoki's functions are organized into the following categories:

- general-purpose functions (4 functions)
- slot and token management functions (9 functions)
- session management functions (8 functions)
- object management functions (9 functions)
- encryption functions (4 functions)
- message-based encryption functions (5 functions)
- decryption functions (4 functions)
- message digesting functions (5 functions)
- signing and MACing functions (6 functions)
- functions for verifying signatures and MACs (6 functions)
- dual-purpose cryptographic functions (4 functions)
- key management functions (5 functions)
- random number generation functions (2 functions)
- parallel function management functions (2 functions)

In addition to these functions, Cryptoki can use application-supplied callback functions to notify an application of certain events, and can also use application-supplied functions to handle mutex objects for safe multi-threaded library access.

The Cryptoki API functions are presented in the following table:

Table 31, Summary of Cryptoki Functions

Category	Function	Description
General purpose functions	C_Initialize	initializes Cryptoki
	C_Finalize	clean up miscellaneous Cryptoki-associated resources
	C_GetInfo	obtains general information about Cryptoki
	C_GetFunctionList	obtains entry points of Cryptoki library functions
	C_GetInterfaceList	obtains list of interfaces supported by Cryptoki library
	C_GetInterface	obtains interface specific entry points to Cryptoki library functions
Slot and token management functions	C_GetSlotList	obtains a list of slots in the system
	C_GetSlotInfo	obtains information about a particular slot
	C_GetTokenInfo	obtains information about a particular token
	C_WaitForSlotEvent	waits for a slot event (token insertion, removal, etc.) to occur
	C_GetMechanismList	obtains a list of mechanisms supported by a token
	C_GetMechanismInfo	obtains information about a particular mechanism
	C_InitToken	initializes a token
	C_InitPIN	initializes the normal user’s PIN

Category	Function	Description
	C_SetPIN	modifies the PIN of the current user
Session management functions	C_OpenSession	opens a connection between an application and a particular token or sets up an application callback for token insertion
	C_CloseSession	closes a session
	C_CloseAllSessions	closes all sessions with a token
	C_GetSessionInfo	obtains information about the session
	C_SessionCancel	terminates active session based operations
	C_GetOperationState	obtains the cryptographic operations state of a session
	C_SetOperationState	sets the cryptographic operations state of a session
	C_Login	logs into a token
	C_LoginUser	logs into a token with explicit user name
	C_Logout	logs out from a token
Object management functions	C_CreateObject	creates an object
	C_CopyObject	creates a copy of an object
	C_DestroyObject	destroys an object
	C_GetObjectSize	obtains the size of an object in bytes
	C_GetAttributeValue	obtains an attribute value of an object
	C_SetAttributeValue	modifies an attribute value of an object
	C_FindObjectsInit	initializes an object search operation
	C_FindObjects	continues an object search operation
	C_FindObjectsFinal	finishes an object search operation
Encryption functions	C_EncryptInit	initializes an encryption operation
	C_Encrypt	encrypts single-part data
	C_EncryptUpdate	continues a multiple-part encryption operation
	C_EncryptFinal	finishes a multiple-part encryption operation
Message-based Encryption Functions	C_MessageEncryptInit	initializes a message-based encryption process
	C_EncryptMessage	encrypts a single-part message
	C_EncryptMessageBegin	begins a multiple-part message encryption operation
	C_EncryptMessageNext	continues or finishes a multiple-part message encryption operation
	C_MessageEncryptFinal	finishes a message-based encryption process
Decryption Functions	C_DecryptInit	initializes a decryption operation
	C_Decrypt	decrypts single-part encrypted data
	C_DecryptUpdate	continues a multiple-part decryption operation
	C_DecryptFinal	finishes a multiple-part decryption operation
Message-based Decryption Functions	C_MessageDecryptInit	initializes a message decryption operation
	C_DecryptMessage	decrypts single-part data
	C_DecryptMessageBegin	starts a multiple-part message decryption operation
	C_DecryptMessageNext	Continues and finishes a multiple-part message decryption operation

Category	Function	Description
	C_MessageDecryptFinal	finishes a message decryption operation
Message Digesting Functions	C_DigestInit	initializes a message-digesting operation
	C_Digest	digests single-part data
	C_DigestUpdate	continues a multiple-part digesting operation
	C_DigestKey	digests a key
	C_DigestFinal	finishes a multiple-part digesting operation
Signing and MACing functions	C_SignInit	initializes a signature operation
	C_Sign	signs single-part data
	C_SignUpdate	continues a multiple-part signature operation
	C_SignFinal	finishes a multiple-part signature operation
	C_SignRecoverInit	initializes a signature operation, where the data can be recovered from the signature
	C_SignRecover	signs single-part data, where the data can be recovered from the signature
Message-based Signature functions	C_MessageSignInit	initializes a message signature operation
	C_SignMessage	signs single-part data
	C_SignMessageBegin	starts a multiple-part message signature operation
	C_SignMessageNext	continues and finishes a multiple-part message signature operation
	C_MessageSignFinal	finishes a message signature operation
Functions for verifying signatures and MACs	C_VerifyInit	initializes a verification operation
	C_Verify	verifies a signature on single-part data
	C_VerifyUpdate	continues a multiple-part verification operation
	C_VerifyFinal	finishes a multiple-part verification operation
	C_VerifyRecoverInit	initializes a verification operation where the data is recovered from the signature
	C_VerifyRecover	verifies a signature on single-part data, where the data is recovered from the signature
Message-based Functions for verifying signatures and MACs	C_MessageVerifyInit	initializes a message verification operation
	C_VerifyMessage	verifies single-part data
	C_VerifyMessageBegin	starts a multiple-part message verification operation
	C_VerifyMessageNext	continues and finishes a multiple-part message verification operation
	C_MessageVerifyFinal	finishes a message verification operation
Dual-purpose cryptographic functions	C_DigestEncryptUpdate	continues simultaneous multiple-part digesting and encryption operations
	C_DecryptDigestUpdate	continues simultaneous multiple-part decryption and digesting operations
	C_SignEncryptUpdate	continues simultaneous multiple-part signature and encryption operations
	C_DecryptVerifyUpdate	continues simultaneous multiple-part decryption and verification operations
Key management	C_GenerateKey	generates a secret key
	C_GenerateKeyPair	generates a public-key/private-key pair

Category	Function	Description
functions	C_WrapKey	wraps (encrypts) a key
	C_UnwrapKey	unwraps (decrypts) a key
	C_DeriveKey	derives a key from a base key
Random number generation functions	C_SeedRandom	mixes in additional seed material to the random number generator
	C_GenerateRandom	generates random data
Parallel function management functions	C_GetFunctionStatus	legacy function which always returns CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL
	C_CancelFunction	legacy function which always returns CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL
Callback function		application-supplied function to process notifications from Cryptoki

Execution of a Cryptoki function call is in general an all-or-nothing affair, *i.e.*, a function call accomplishes either its entire goal, or nothing at all.

- If a Cryptoki function executes successfully, it returns the value CKR_OK.
- If a Cryptoki function does not execute successfully, it returns some value other than CKR_OK, and the token is in the same state as it was in prior to the function call. If the function call was supposed to modify the contents of certain memory addresses on the host computer, these memory addresses may have been modified, despite the failure of the function.
- In unusual (and extremely unpleasant!) circumstances, a function can fail with the return value CKR_GENERAL_ERROR. When this happens, the token and/or host computer may be in an inconsistent state, and the goals of the function may have been partially achieved.

There are a small number of Cryptoki functions whose return values do not behave precisely as described above; these exceptions are documented individually with the description of the functions themselves.

A Cryptoki library need not support every function in the Cryptoki API. However, even an unsupported function MUST have a “stub” in the library which simply returns the value CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED. The function’s entry in the library’s **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure (as obtained by **C_GetFunctionList**) should point to this stub function (see Section 3.6).

5.1 Function return values

The Cryptoki interface possesses a large number of functions and return values. In Section 5.1, we enumerate the various possible return values for Cryptoki functions; most of the remainder of Section 5.1 details the behavior of Cryptoki functions, including what values each of them may return.

Because of the complexity of the Cryptoki specification, it is recommended that Cryptoki applications attempt to give some leeway when interpreting Cryptoki functions’ return values. We have attempted to specify the behavior of Cryptoki functions as completely as was feasible; nevertheless, there are presumably some gaps. For example, it is possible that a particular error code which might apply to a particular Cryptoki function is unfortunately not actually listed in the description of that function as a possible error code. It is conceivable that the developer of a Cryptoki library might nevertheless permit his/her implementation of that function to return that error code. It would clearly be somewhat ungraceful if a Cryptoki application using that library were to terminate by abruptly dumping core upon receiving that error code for that function. It would be far preferable for the application to examine the function’s return value, see that it indicates some sort of error (even if the application doesn’t know precisely *what* kind of error), and behave accordingly.

See Section 5.1.8 for some specific details on how a developer might attempt to make an application that accommodates a range of behaviors from Cryptoki libraries.

5.1.1 Universal Cryptoki function return values

Any Cryptoki function can return any of the following values:

- CKR_GENERAL_ERROR: Some horrible, unrecoverable error has occurred. In the worst case, it is possible that the function only partially succeeded, and that the computer and/or token is in an inconsistent state.
- CKR_HOST_MEMORY: The computer that the Cryptoki library is running on has insufficient memory to perform the requested function.
- CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED: The requested function could not be performed, but detailed information about why not is not available in this error return. If the failed function uses a session, it is possible that the **CK_SESSION_INFO** structure that can be obtained by calling **C_GetSessionInfo** will hold useful information about what happened in its *ulDeviceError* field. In any event, although the function call failed, the situation is not necessarily totally hopeless, as it is likely to be when CKR_GENERAL_ERROR is returned. Depending on what the root cause of the error actually was, it is possible that an attempt to make the exact same function call again would succeed.
- CKR_OK: The function executed successfully. Technically, CKR_OK is not *quite* a "universal" return value; in particular, the legacy functions **C_GetFunctionStatus** and **C_CancelFunction** (see Section 5.20) cannot return CKR_OK.

The relative priorities of these errors are in the order listed above, *e.g.*, if either of CKR_GENERAL_ERROR or CKR_HOST_MEMORY would be an appropriate error return, then CKR_GENERAL_ERROR should be returned.

5.1.2 Cryptoki function return values for functions that use a session handle

Any Cryptoki function that takes a session handle as one of its arguments (i.e., any Cryptoki function except for C_Initialize, C_Finalize, C_GetInfo, C_GetFunctionList, C_GetSlotList, C_GetSlotInfo, C_GetTokenInfo, C_WaitForSlotEvent, C_GetMechanismList, C_GetMechanismInfo, C_InitToken, C_OpenSession, and C_CloseAllSessions) can return the following values:

- CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID: The specified session handle was invalid *at the time that the function was invoked*. Note that this can happen if the session's token is removed before the function invocation, since removing a token closes all sessions with it.
- CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED: The token was removed from its slot *during the execution of the function*.
- CKR_SESSION_CLOSED: The session was closed *during the execution of the function*. Note that, as stated in **[PKCS11-UG]**, the behavior of Cryptoki is *undefined* if multiple threads of an application attempt to access a common Cryptoki session simultaneously. Therefore, there is actually no guarantee that a function invocation could ever return the value CKR_SESSION_CLOSED. An example of multiple threads accessing a common session simultaneously is where one thread is using a session when another thread closes that same session.

The relative priorities of these errors are in the order listed above, *e.g.*, if either of CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID or CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED would be an appropriate error return, then CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID should be returned.

In practice, it is often not crucial (or possible) for a Cryptoki library to be able to make a distinction between a token being removed *before* a function invocation and a token being removed *during* a function execution.

5.1.3 Cryptoki function return values for functions that use a token

Any Cryptoki function that uses a particular token (*i.e.*, any Cryptoki function except for **C_Initialize**, **C_Finalize**, **C_GetInfo**, **C_GetFunctionList**, **C_GetSlotList**, **C_GetSlotInfo**, or **C_WaitForSlotEvent**) can return any of the following values:

- CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY: The token does not have sufficient memory to perform the requested function.

- CKR_DEVICE_ERROR: Some problem has occurred with the token and/or slot. This error code can be returned by more than just the functions mentioned above; in particular, it is possible for **C_GetSlotInfo** to return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR.
- CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT: The token was not present in its slot *at the time that the function was invoked*.
- CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED: The token was removed from its slot *during the execution of the function*.

The relative priorities of these errors are in the order listed above, *e.g.*, if either of CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY or CKR_DEVICE_ERROR would be an appropriate error return, then CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY should be returned.

In practice, it is often not critical (or possible) for a Cryptoki library to be able to make a distinction between a token being removed *before* a function invocation and a token being removed *during* a function execution.

5.1.4 Special return value for application-supplied callbacks

There is a special-purpose return value which is not returned by any function in the actual Cryptoki API, but which may be returned by an application-supplied callback function. It is:

- CKR_CANCEL: When a function executing in serial with an application decides to give the application a chance to do some work, it calls an application-supplied function with a CKN_SURRENDER callback (see Section 5.21). If the callback returns the value CKR_CANCEL, then the function aborts and returns CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED.

5.1.5 Special return values for mutex-handling functions

There are two other special-purpose return values which are not returned by any actual Cryptoki functions. These values may be returned by application-supplied mutex-handling functions, and they may safely be ignored by application developers who are not using their own threading model. They are:

- CKR_MUTEX_BAD: This error code can be returned by mutex-handling functions that are passed a bad mutex object as an argument. Unfortunately, it is possible for such a function not to recognize a bad mutex object. There is therefore no guarantee that such a function will successfully detect bad mutex objects and return this value.
- CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED: This error code can be returned by mutex-unlocking functions. It indicates that the mutex supplied to the mutex-unlocking function was not locked.

5.1.6 All other Cryptoki function return values

Descriptions of the other Cryptoki function return values follow. Except as mentioned in the descriptions of particular error codes, there are in general no particular priorities among the errors listed below, *i.e.*, if more than one error code might apply to an execution of a function, then the function may return any applicable error code.

- CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED: This value can only be returned by C_CopyObject, C_SetAttributeValue and C_DestroyObject. It denotes that the action may not be taken, either because of underlying policy restrictions on the token, or because the object has the relevant CKA_COPYABLE, CKA_MODIFIABLE or CKA_DESTROYABLE policy attribute set to CK_FALSE.
- CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD: This is a rather generic error code which indicates that the arguments supplied to the Cryptoki function were in some way not appropriate.
- CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY: An attempt was made to set a value for an attribute which may not be set by the application, or which may not be modified by the application. See Section 4.1 for more information.
- CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE: An attempt was made to obtain the value of an attribute of an object which cannot be satisfied because the object is either sensitive or un-extractable.

- CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID: An invalid attribute type was specified in a template. See Section 4.1 for more information.
- CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID: An invalid value was specified for a particular attribute in a template. See Section 4.1 for more information.
- CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: The output of the function is too large to fit in the supplied buffer.
- CKR_CANT_LOCK: This value can only be returned by **C_Initialize**. It means that the type of locking requested by the application for thread-safety is not available in this library, and so the application cannot make use of this library in the specified fashion.
- CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED: This value can only be returned by **C_Initialize**. It means that the Cryptoki library has already been initialized (by a previous call to **C_Initialize** which did not have a matching **C_Finalize** call).
- CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED: This value can be returned by any function other than **C_Initialize, C_GetFunctionList, C_GetInterfaceList** and **C_GetInterface**. It indicates that the function cannot be executed because the Cryptoki library has not yet been initialized by a call to **C_Initialize**.
- CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED: This curve is not supported by this token. Used with Elliptic Curve mechanisms.
- CKR_DATA_INVALID: The plaintext input data to a cryptographic operation is invalid. This return value has lower priority than CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE.
- CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE: The plaintext input data to a cryptographic operation has a bad length. Depending on the operation's mechanism, this could mean that the plaintext data is too short, too long, or is not a multiple of some particular block size. This return value has higher priority than CKR_DATA_INVALID.
- CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID: Invalid or unsupported domain parameters were supplied to the function. Which representation methods of domain parameters are supported by a given mechanism can vary from token to token.
- CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID: The encrypted input to a decryption operation has been determined to be invalid ciphertext. This return value has lower priority than CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE.
- CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE: The ciphertext input to a decryption operation has been determined to be invalid ciphertext solely on the basis of its length. Depending on the operation's mechanism, this could mean that the ciphertext is too short, too long, or is not a multiple of some particular block size. This return value has higher priority than CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID.
- CKR_EXCEEDED_MAX_ITERATIONS: An iterative algorithm (for key pair generation, domain parameter generation etc.) failed because we have exceeded the maximum number of iterations. This error code has precedence over CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED. Examples of iterative algorithms include DSA signature generation (retry if either r = 0 or s = 0) and generation of DSA primes p and q specified in FIPS 186-4.
- CKR_FIPS_SELF_TEST_FAILED: A FIPS 140-2 power-up self-test or conditional self-test failed. The token entered an error state. Future calls to cryptographic functions on the token will return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR. CKR_FIPS_SELF_TEST_FAILED has a higher precedence over CKR_GENERAL_ERROR. This error may be returned by C_Initialize, if a power-up self-test failed, by C_GenerateRandom or C_SeedRandom, if the continuous random number generator test failed, or by C_GenerateKeyPair, if the pair-wise consistency test failed.
- CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED: The function was canceled in mid-execution. This happens to a cryptographic function if the function makes a **CKN_SURRENDER** application callback which returns CKR_CANCEL (see CKR_CANCEL). It also happens to a function that performs PIN entry through a protected path. The method used to cancel a protected path PIN entry operation is device dependent.
- CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL: There is currently no function executing in parallel in the specified session. This is a legacy error code which is only returned by the legacy functions **C_GetFunctionStatus** and **C_CancelFunction**.

- CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED: The requested function is not supported by this Cryptoki library. Even unsupported functions in the Cryptoki API should have a “stub” in the library; this stub should simply return the value CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED.
- CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED: The signature request is rejected by the user.
- CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE: The information requested could not be obtained because the token considers it sensitive, and is not able or willing to reveal it.
- CKR_KEY_CHANGED: This value is only returned by **C_SetOperationState**. It indicates that one of the keys specified is not the same key that was being used in the original saved session.
- CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED: An attempt has been made to use a key for a cryptographic purpose that the key’s attributes are not set to allow it to do. For example, to use a key for performing encryption, that key MUST have its **CKA_ENCRYPT** attribute set to CK_TRUE (the fact that the key MUST have a **CKA_ENCRYPT** attribute implies that the key cannot be a private key). This return value has lower priority than CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT.
- CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: The specified key handle is not valid. It may be the case that the specified handle is a valid handle for an object which is not a key. We reiterate here that 0 is never a valid key handle.
- CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE: This error code can only be returned by **C_DigestKey**. It indicates that the value of the specified key cannot be digested for some reason (perhaps the key isn’t a secret key, or perhaps the token simply can’t digest this kind of key).
- CKR_KEY_NEEDED: This value is only returned by **C_SetOperationState**. It indicates that the session state cannot be restored because **C_SetOperationState** needs to be supplied with one or more keys that were being used in the original saved session.
- CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED: An extraneous key was supplied to **C_SetOperationState**. For example, an attempt was made to restore a session that had been performing a message digesting operation, and an encryption key was supplied.
- CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE: Although the specified private or secret key does not have its CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute set to CK_FALSE, Cryptoki (or the token) is unable to wrap the key as requested (possibly the token can only wrap a given key with certain types of keys, and the wrapping key specified is not one of these types). Compare with CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE.
- CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: Although the requested keyed cryptographic operation could in principle be carried out, this Cryptoki library (or the token) is unable to actually do it because the supplied key‘s size is outside the range of key sizes that it can handle.
- CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: The specified key is not the correct type of key to use with the specified mechanism. This return value has a higher priority than CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED.
- CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE: The specified private or secret key can’t be wrapped because its CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute is set to CK_FALSE. Compare with CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE.
- CKR_LIBRARY_LOAD_FAILED: The Cryptoki library could not load a dependent shared library.
- CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID: An invalid mechanism was specified to the cryptographic operation. This error code is an appropriate return value if an unknown mechanism was specified or if the mechanism specified cannot be used in the selected token with the selected function.
- CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID: Invalid parameters were supplied to the mechanism specified to the cryptographic operation. Which parameter values are supported by a given mechanism can vary from token to token.
- CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS: This value can only be returned by **C_Initialize**. It is returned when two conditions hold:
    1. The application called **C_Initialize** in a way which tells the Cryptoki library that application threads executing calls to the library cannot use native operating system methods to spawn new threads.

2. The library cannot function properly without being able to spawn new threads in the above fashion.

- CKR_NO_EVENT: This value can only be returned by **C_WaitForSlotEvent**. It is returned when **C_WaitForSlotEvent** is called in non-blocking mode and there are no new slot events to return.
- CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID: The specified object handle is not valid. We reiterate here that 0 is never a valid object handle.
- CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE: There is already an active operation (or combination of active operations) which prevents Cryptoki from activating the specified operation. For example, an active object-searching operation would prevent Cryptoki from activating an encryption operation with **C_EncryptInit**. Or, an active digesting operation and an active encryption operation would prevent Cryptoki from activating a signature operation. Or, on a token which doesn't support simultaneous dual cryptographic operations in a session (see the description of the **CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS** flag in the **CK_TOKEN_INFO** structure), an active signature operation would prevent Cryptoki from activating an encryption operation.
- CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED: There is no active operation of an appropriate type in the specified session. For example, an application cannot call **C_Encrypt** in a session without having called **C_EncryptInit** first to activate an encryption operation.
- CKR_PIN_EXPIRED: The specified PIN has expired, and the requested operation cannot be carried out unless C_SetPIN is called to change the PIN value. Whether or not the normal user's PIN on a token ever expires varies from token to token.
- CKR_PIN_INCORRECT: The specified PIN is incorrect, *i.e.*, does not match the PIN stored on the token. More generally-- when authentication to the token involves something other than a PIN-- the attempt to authenticate the user has failed.
- CKR_PIN_INVALID: The specified PIN has invalid characters in it. This return code only applies to functions which attempt to set a PIN.
- CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE: The specified PIN is too long or too short. This return code only applies to functions which attempt to set a PIN.
- CKR_PIN_LOCKED: The specified PIN is "locked", and cannot be used. That is, because some particular number of failed authentication attempts has been reached, the token is unwilling to permit further attempts at authentication. Depending on the token, the specified PIN may or may not remain locked indefinitely.
- CKR_PIN_TOO_WEAK: The specified PIN is too weak so that it could be easy to guess. If the PIN is too short, CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE should be returned instead. This return code only applies to functions which attempt to set a PIN.
- CKR_PUBLIC_KEY_INVALID: The public key fails a public key validation. For example, an EC public key fails the public key validation specified in Section 5.2.2 of ANSI X9.62. This error code may be returned by C_CreateObject, when the public key is created, or by C_VerifyInit or C_VerifyRecoverInit, when the public key is used. It may also be returned by C_DeriveKey, in preference to CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, if the other party's public key specified in the mechanism's parameters is invalid.
- CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG: This value can be returned by **C_SeedRandom** and **C_GenerateRandom**. It indicates that the specified token doesn't have a random number generator. This return value has higher priority than CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED.
- CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED: This value can only be returned by **C_SeedRandom**. It indicates that the token's random number generator does not accept seeding from an application. This return value has lower priority than CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG.
- CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID: This value can only be returned by **C_SetOperationState**. It indicates that the supplied saved cryptographic operations state is invalid, and so it cannot be restored to the specified session.

- CKR_SESSION_COUNT: This value can only be returned by **C_OpenSession**. It indicates that the attempt to open a session failed, either because the token has too many sessions already open, or because the token has too many read/write sessions already open.
- CKR_SESSION_EXISTS: This value can only be returned by **C_InitToken**. It indicates that a session with the token is already open, and so the token cannot be initialized.
- CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED: The specified token does not support parallel sessions. This is a legacy error code—in Cryptoki Version 2.01 and up, *no* token supports parallel sessions. CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED can only be returned by **C_OpenSession**, and it is only returned when **C_OpenSession** is called in a particular [deprecated] way.
- CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY: The specified session was unable to accomplish the desired action because it is a read-only session. This return value has lower priority than CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED.
- CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS: A read-only session already exists, and so the SO cannot be logged in.
- CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS: A read/write SO session already exists, and so a read-only session cannot be opened.
- CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE: The provided signature/MAC can be seen to be invalid solely on the basis of its length. This return value has higher priority than CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID.
- CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID: The provided signature/MAC is invalid. This return value has lower priority than CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE.
- CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID: The specified slot ID is not valid.
- CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE: The cryptographic operations state of the specified session cannot be saved for some reason (possibly the token is simply unable to save the current state). This return value has lower priority than CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED.
- CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE: The template specified for creating an object is incomplete, and lacks some necessary attributes. See Section 4.1 for more information.
- CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT: The template specified for creating an object has conflicting attributes. See Section 4.1 for more information.
- CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED: The Cryptoki library and/or slot does not recognize the token in the slot.
- CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED: The requested action could not be performed because the token is write-protected. This return value has higher priority than CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY.
- CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: This value can only be returned by **C_UnwrapKey**. It indicates that the key handle specified to be used to unwrap another key is not valid.
- CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: This value can only be returned by **C_UnwrapKey**. It indicates that although the requested unwrapping operation could in principle be carried out, this Cryptoki library (or the token) is unable to actually do it because the supplied key's size is outside the range of key sizes that it can handle.
- CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: This value can only be returned by **C_UnwrapKey**. It indicates that the type of the key specified to unwrap another key is not consistent with the mechanism specified for unwrapping.
- CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN: This value can only be returned by **C_Login**. It indicates that the specified user cannot be logged into the session, because it is already logged into the session. For example, if an application has an open SO session, and it attempts to log the SO into it, it will receive this error code.
- CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN: This value can only be returned by **C_Login**. It indicates that the specified user cannot be logged into the session, because another user is already

logged into the session. For example, if an application has an open SO session, and it attempts to log the normal user into it, it will receive this error code.

- CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN: The desired action cannot be performed because the appropriate user (or *an* appropriate user) is not logged in. One example is that a session cannot be logged out unless it is logged in. Another example is that a private object cannot be created on a token unless the session attempting to create it is logged in as the normal user. A final example is that cryptographic operations on certain tokens cannot be performed unless the normal user is logged in.
- CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED: This value can only be returned by **C_Login**. It indicates that the normal user's PIN has not yet been initialized with **C_InitPIN**.
- CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES: An attempt was made to have more distinct users simultaneously logged into the token than the token and/or library permits. For example, if some application has an open SO session, and another application attempts to log the normal user into a session, the attempt may return this error. It is not required to, however. Only if the simultaneous distinct users cannot be supported does **C_Login** have to return this value. Note that this error code generalizes to true multi-user tokens.
- CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID: An invalid value was specified as a **CK_USER_TYPE**. Valid types are **CKU_SO**, **CKU_USER**, and **CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC**.
- CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID: This value can only be returned by **C_UnwrapKey**. It indicates that the provided wrapped key is not valid. If a call is made to **C_UnwrapKey** to unwrap a particular type of key (*i.e.*, some particular key type is specified in the template provided to **C_UnwrapKey**), and the wrapped key provided to **C_UnwrapKey** is recognizably not a wrapped key of the proper type, then **C_UnwrapKey** should return CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID. This return value has lower priority than CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE.
- CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE: This value can only be returned by **C_UnwrapKey**. It indicates that the provided wrapped key can be seen to be invalid solely on the basis of its length. This return value has higher priority than CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID.
- CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: This value can only be returned by **C_WrapKey**. It indicates that the key handle specified to be used to wrap another key is not valid.
- CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: This value can only be returned by **C_WrapKey**. It indicates that although the requested wrapping operation could in principle be carried out, this Cryptoki library (or the token) is unable to actually do it because the supplied wrapping key's size is outside the range of key sizes that it can handle.
- CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: This value can only be returned by **C_WrapKey**. It indicates that the type of the key specified to wrap another key is not consistent with the mechanism specified for wrapping.
- CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED: This value can only be returned by **C_SessionCancel**. It means that one or more of the requested operations could not be cancelled for implementation or vendor-specific reasons.

5.1.7 More on relative priorities of Cryptoki errors

In general, when a Cryptoki call is made, error codes from Section 5.1.1 (other than CKR_OK) take precedence over error codes from Section 5.1.2, which take precedence over error codes from Section 5.1.3, which take precedence over error codes from Section 5.1.6. One minor implication of this is that functions that use a session handle (*i.e.*, *most* functions!) never return the error code CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT (they return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID instead). Other than these precedences, if more than one error code applies to the result of a Cryptoki call, any of the applicable error codes may be returned. Exceptions to this rule will be explicitly mentioned in the descriptions of functions.

5.1.8 Error code “gotchas”

Here is a short list of a few particular things about return values that Cryptoki developers might want to be aware of:

1. As mentioned in Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, a Cryptoki library may not be able to make a distinction between a token being removed *before* a function invocation and a token being removed *during* a function invocation.
2. As mentioned in Section 5.1.2, an application should never count on getting a CKR_SESSION_CLOSED error.
3. The difference between CKR_DATA_INVALID and CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE can be somewhat subtle. Unless an application *needs* to be able to distinguish between these return values, it is best to always treat them equivalently.
4. Similarly, the difference between CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID and CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, and between CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID and CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE, can be subtle, and it may be best to treat these return values equivalently.
5. Even with the guidance of Section 4.1, it can be difficult for a Cryptoki library developer to know which of CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, or CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT to return. When possible, it is recommended that application developers be generous in their interpretations of these error codes.

5.2 Conventions for functions returning output in a variable-length buffer

A number of the functions defined in Cryptoki return output produced by some cryptographic mechanism. The amount of output returned by these functions is returned in a variable-length application-supplied buffer. An example of a function of this sort is **C_Encrypt**, which takes some plaintext as an argument, and outputs a buffer full of ciphertext.

These functions have some common calling conventions, which we describe here. Two of the arguments to the function are a pointer to the output buffer (say *pBuf*) and a pointer to a location which will hold the length of the output produced (say *pulBufLen*). There are two ways for an application to call such a function:

1. If *pBuf* is NULL_PTR, then all that the function does is return (in **pulBufLen*) a number of bytes which would suffice to hold the cryptographic output produced from the input to the function. This number may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but should not exceed it by a large amount. CKR_OK is returned by the function.
2. If *pBuf* is not NULL_PTR, then **pulBufLen* MUST contain the size in bytes of the buffer pointed to by *pBuf*. If that buffer is large enough to hold the cryptographic output produced from the input to the function, then that cryptographic output is placed there, and CKR_OK is returned by the function and *pulBufLen is set to the exact number of bytes returned. If the buffer is not large enough, then CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL is returned and **pulBufLen* is set to at least the number of bytes needed to hold the cryptographic output produced from the input to the function.

NOTE: This is a change from previous specs. The problem is that in some decrypt cases, the token doesn’t know how big a buffer is needed until the decrypt completes. The act of doing decrypt can mess up the internal encryption state. Many tokens already implement this relaxed behavior, tokens which implement the more precise behavior are still compliant. The one corner case is applications using a token that knows exactly how big the decryption is (through some out of band means), could get CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL returned when it supplied a buffer exactly big enough to hold the decrypted value when it may previously have succeeded.

All functions which use the above convention will explicitly say so.

Cryptographic functions which return output in a variable-length buffer should always return as much output as can be computed from what has been passed in to them thus far. As an example, consider a session which is performing a multiple-part decryption operation with DES in cipher-block chaining mode

with PKCS padding. Suppose that, initially, 8 bytes of ciphertext are passed to the **C_DecryptUpdate** function. The block size of DES is 8 bytes, but the PKCS padding makes it unclear at this stage whether the ciphertext was produced from encrypting a 0-byte string, or from encrypting some string of length at least 8 bytes. Hence the call to **C_DecryptUpdate** should return 0 bytes of plaintext. If a single additional byte of ciphertext is supplied by a subsequent call to **C_DecryptUpdate**, then that call should return 8 bytes of plaintext (one full DES block).

5.3 Disclaimer concerning sample code

For the remainder of this section, we enumerate the various functions defined in Cryptoki. Most functions will be shown in use in at least one sample code snippet. For the sake of brevity, sample code will frequently be somewhat incomplete. In particular, sample code will generally ignore possible error returns from C library functions, and also will not deal with Cryptoki error returns in a realistic fashion.

5.4 General-purpose functions

Cryptoki provides the following general-purpose functions:

5.4.1 C_Initialize

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize) {
      CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs
);
```

C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. *pInitArgs* either has the value NULL_PTR or points to a **CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS** structure containing information on how the library should deal with multi-threaded access. If an application will not be accessing Cryptoki through multiple threads simultaneously, it can generally supply the value NULL_PTR to **C_Initialize** (the consequences of supplying this value will be explained below).

If *pInitArgs* is non-NULL_PTR, **C_Initialize** should cast it to a **CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR** and then dereference the resulting pointer to obtain the **CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS** fields *CreateMutex*, *DestroyMutex*, *LockMutex*, *UnlockMutex*, *flags*, and *pReserved*. For this version of Cryptoki, the value of *pReserved* thereby obtained MUST be NULL_PTR; if it's not, then **C_Initialize** should return with the value CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

If the **CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS** flag in the *flags* field is set, that indicates that application threads which are executing calls to the Cryptoki library are not permitted to use the native operation system calls to spawn off new threads. In other words, the library's code may not create its own threads. If the library is unable to function properly under this restriction, **C_Initialize** should return with the value CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS.

A call to **C_Initialize** specifies one of four different ways to support multi-threaded access via the value of the **CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK** flag in the *flags* field and the values of the *CreateMutex*, *DestroyMutex*, *LockMutex*, and *UnlockMutex* function pointer fields:

1. If the flag *isn't* set, and the function pointer fields *aren't* supplied (*i.e.*, they all have the value NULL_PTR), that means that the application *won't* be accessing the Cryptoki library from multiple threads simultaneously.
2. If the flag *is* set, and the function pointer fields *aren't* supplied (*i.e.*, they all have the value NULL_PTR), that means that the application *will* be performing multi-threaded Cryptoki access, and the library needs to use the native operating system primitives to ensure safe multi-threaded access. If the library is unable to do this, **C_Initialize** should return with the value CKR_CANT_LOCK.
3. If the flag *isn't* set, and the function pointer fields *are* supplied (*i.e.*, they all have non-NULL_PTR values), that means that the application *will* be performing multi-threaded Cryptoki access, and the library needs to use the supplied function pointers for mutex-handling to ensure safe multi-threaded access. If the library is unable to do this, **C_Initialize** should return with the value CKR_CANT_LOCK.

4. If the flag *is* set, and the function pointer fields *are* supplied (*i.e.*, they all have non-NULL_PTR values), that means that the application *will* be performing multi-threaded Cryptoki access, and the library needs to use either the native operating system primitives or the supplied function pointers for mutex-handling to ensure safe multi-threaded access. If the library is unable to do this, **C_Initialize** should return with the value CKR_CANT_LOCK.

If some, but not all, of the supplied function pointers to **C_Initialize** are non-NULL_PTR, then **C_Initialize** should return with the value CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

A call to **C_Initialize** with *pInitArgs* set to NULL_PTR is treated like a call to **C_Initialize** with *pInitArgs* pointing to a **CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS** which has the *CreateMutex*, *DestroyMutex*, *LockMutex*, *UnlockMutex*, and *pReserved* fields set to NULL_PTR, and has the *flags* field set to 0.

C_Initialize should be the first Cryptoki call made by an application, except for calls to **C_GetFunctionList**, **C_GetInterfaceList**, or **C_GetInterface**. What this function actually does is implementation-dependent; typically, it might cause Cryptoki to initialize its internal memory buffers, or any other resources it requires.

If several applications are using Cryptoki, each one should call **C_Initialize**. Every call to **C_Initialize** should (eventually) be succeeded by a single call to **C_Finalize**. See **[PKCS11-UG]** for further details.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CANT_LOCK, CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS, CKR_OK.

Example: see **C_GetInfo**.

5.4.2 C_Finalize

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Finalize)(
      CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
);
```

C_Finalize is called to indicate that an application is finished with the Cryptoki library. It should be the last Cryptoki call made by an application. The *pReserved* parameter is reserved for future versions; for this version, it should be set to NULL_PTR (if **C_Finalize** is called with a non-NULL_PTR value for *pReserved*, it should return the value CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

If several applications are using Cryptoki, each one should call **C_Finalize**. Each application's call to **C_Finalize** should be preceded by a single call to **C_Initialize**; in between the two calls, an application can make calls to other Cryptoki functions. See **[PKCS11-UG]** for further details.

*Despite the fact that the parameters supplied to **C_Initialize** can in general allow for safe multi-threaded access to a Cryptoki library, the behavior of **C_Finalize** is nevertheless undefined if it is called by an application while other threads of the application are making Cryptoki calls. The exception to this exceptional behavior of **C_Finalize** occurs when a thread calls **C_Finalize** while another of the application's threads is blocking on Cryptoki's **C_WaitForSlotEvent** function. When this happens, the blocked thread becomes unblocked and returns the value CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED. See **C_WaitForSlotEvent** for more information.*

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK.

Example: see **C_GetInfo**.

5.4.3 C_GetInfo

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetInfo)(
      CK_INFO_PTR pInfo
);
```

C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. *pInfo* points to the location that receives the information.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK.

Example:

```
CK_INFO info;
CK_RV rv;
CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS InitArgs;

InitArgs.CreateMutex = &MyCreateMutex;
InitArgs.DestroyMutex = &MyDestroyMutex;
InitArgs.LockMutex = &MyLockMutex;
InitArgs.UnlockMutex = &MyUnlockMutex;
InitArgs.flags = CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK;
InitArgs.pReserved = NULL_PTR;

rv = C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&InitArgs);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

rv = C_GetInfo(&info);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
if(info.cryptokiVersion.major == 2) {
  /* Do lots of interesting cryptographic things with the token */
  .
  .
}

rv = C_Finalize(NULL_PTR);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
```

5.4.4 C_GetFunctionList

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetFunctionList)(
      CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList
);
```

C_GetFunctionList obtains a pointer to the Cryptoki library's list of function pointers. *ppFunctionList* points to a value which will receive a pointer to the library's **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure, which in turn contains function pointers for all the Cryptoki API routines in the library. *The pointer thus obtained may point into memory which is owned by the Cryptoki library, and which may or may not be writable*. Whether or not this is the case, no attempt should be made to write to this memory.

C_GetFunctionList, **C_GetInterfaceList**, and **C_GetInterface** are the only Cryptoki functions which an application may call before calling **C_Initialize**. It is provided to make it easier and faster for applications to use shared Cryptoki libraries and to use more than one Cryptoki library simultaneously.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK.

Example:

```
CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFunctionList;
```

```
CK_C_Initialize pC_Initialize;
CK_RV rv;

/* It's OK to call C_GetFunctionList before calling C_Initialize */
rv = C_GetFunctionList(&pFunctionList);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
pC_Initialize = pFunctionList -> C_Initialize;

/* Call the C_Initialize function in the library */
rv = (*pC_Initialize)(NULL_PTR);
```

5.4.5 C_GetInterfaceList

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetInterfaceList)(
      CK_INTERFACE_PTR      pInterfaceList,
      CK_ULONG_PTR          pulCount
);
```

C_GetInterfaceList is used to obtain a list of interfaces supported by a Cryptoki library. *pulCount* points to the location that receives the number of interfaces.

There are two ways for an application to call **C_GetInterfaceList**:

1. If *pInterfaceList* is NULL_PTR, then all that **C_GetInterfaceList** does is return (in **pulCount*) the number of interfaces, without actually returning a list of interfaces. The contents of **pulCount* on entry to **C_GetInterfaceList** has no meaning in this case, and the call returns the value CKR_OK.
2. If *pIntrerfaceList* is not NULL_PTR, then **pulCount* MUST contain the size (in terms of **CK_INTERFACE** elements) of the buffer pointed to by *pInterfaceList*. If that buffer is large enough to hold the list of interfaces, then the list is returned in it, and CKR_OK is returned. If not, then the call to **C_GetInterfaceList** returns the value CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. In either case, the value **pulCount* is set to hold the number of interfaces.

Because **C_GetInterfaceList** does not allocate any space of its own, an application will often call **C_GetInterfaceList** twice. However, this behavior is by no means required.

C_GetInterfaceList obtains (in **pFunctionList* of each interface) a pointer to the Cryptoki library's list of function pointers. *The pointer thus obtained may point into memory which is owned by the Cryptoki library, and which may or may not be writable*. Whether or not this is the case, no attempt should be made to write to this memory. The same caveat applies to the interface names returned.

C_GetFunctionList, **C_GetInterfaceList**, and **C_GetInterface** are the only Cryptoki functions which an application may call before calling **C_Initialize**. It is provided to make it easier and faster for applications to use shared Cryptoki libraries and to use more than one Cryptoki library simultaneously.

Return values: CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK.

Example:

```
CK_ULONG ulCount=0;
CK_INTERFACE_PTR interfaceList=NULL;
CK_RV rv;
int I;

/* get number of interfaces */
```

```
rv = C_GetInterfaceList(NULL,&ulCount);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  /* get copy of interfaces */
  interfaceList = (CK_INTERFACE_PTR)malloc(ulCount*sizeof(CK_INTERFACE));
  rv = C_GetInterfaceList(interfaceList,&ulCount);
  for(i=0;i<ulCount;i++) {
    printf("interface %s version %d.%d funcs %p flags 0x%lu\n",
      interfaceList[i].pInterfaceName,
      ((CK_VERSION *)interfaceList[i].pFunctionList)->major,
      ((CK_VERSION *)interfaceList[i].pFunctionList)->minor,
        interfaceList[i].pFunctionList,
      interfaceList[i].flags);
  }
}
```

5.4.6 C_GetInterface

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV,C_GetInterface)(
  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR       pInterfaceName,
  CK_VERSION_PTR        pVersion,
  CK_INTERFACE_PTR_PTR  ppInterface,
  CK_FLAGS              flags
);
```

C_GetInterface is used to obtain an interface supported by a Cryptoki library. *pInterfaceName* specifies the name of the interface, *pVersion* specifies the interface version, *ppInterface* points to the location that receives the interface, *flags* specifies the required interface flags.

There are multiple ways for an application to specify a particular interface when calling **C_GetInterface**:

1. If *pInterfaceName* is not NULL_PTR, the name of the interface returned must match. If *pInterfaceName* is NULL_PTR, the cryptoki library can return a default interface of its choice
2. If *pVersion* is not NULL_PTR, the version of the interface returned must match. If *pVersion* is NULL_PTR, the cryptoki library can return an interface of any version
3. If *flags* is non-zero, the interface returned must match all of the supplied flag values (but may include additional flags not specified). If *flags* is 0, the cryptoki library can return an interface with any flags

C_GetInterface obtains (in **pFunctionList* of each interface) a pointer to the Cryptoki library's list of function pointers. *The pointer thus obtained may point into memory which is owned by the Cryptoki library, and which may or may not be writable*. Whether or not this is the case, no attempt should be made to write to this memory. The same caveat applies to the interface names returned.

C_GetFunctionList, **C_GetInterfaceList**, and **C_GetInterface** are the only Cryptoki functions which an application may call before calling **C_Initialize**. It is provided to make it easier and faster for applications to use shared Cryptoki libraries and to use more than one Cryptoki library simultaneously.

Return values: CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK.

Example:

```
CK_INTERFACE_PTR interface;
CK_RV rv;
```

```
CK_VERSION version;
CK_FLAGS flags=CKF_ INTERFACE_FORK_SAFE;

/* get default interface */
rv = C_GetInterface(NULL,NULL,&interface,flags);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  printf("interface %s version %d.%d funcs %p flags 0x%lu\n",
      interface->pInterfaceName,
      ((CK_VERSION *)interface->pFunctionList)->major,
      ((CK_VERSION *)interface->pFunctionList)->minor,
      interface->pFunctionList,
      interface->flags);
}

/* get default standard interface */
rv = C_GetInterface((CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)"PKCS 11",NULL,&interface,flags);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  printf("interface %s version %d.%d funcs %p flags 0x%lu\n",
      interface->pInterfaceName,
      ((CK_VERSION *)interface->pFunctionList)->major,
      ((CK_VERSION *)interface->pFunctionList)->minor,
      interface->pFunctionList,
      interface->flags);
}

/* get specific standard version interface */
version.major=3;
version.minor=0;
rv = C_GetInterface((CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)"PKCS 11",&version,&interface,flags);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  CK_FUNCTION_LIST_3_0_PTR pkcs11=interface->pFunctionList;

  /* ... use the new functions */
  pkcs11->C_LoginUser(hSession,userType,pPin,ulPinLen,
                                              pUsername,ulUsernameLen);
}

/* get specific vendor version interface */
version.major=1;
version.minor=0;
rv = C_GetInterface((CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)
                        "Vendor VendorName",&version,&interface,flags);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
```

```
  CK_FUNCTION_LIST_VENDOR_1_0_PTR pkcs11=interface->pFunctionList;

  /* ... use vendor specific functions */
  pkcs11->C_VendorFunction1(param1,param2,param3);
}

```

5.5 Slot and token management functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for slot and token management:

5.5.1 C_GetSlotList

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSlotList)(
      CK_BBOOL tokenPresent,
      CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList,
      CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount
);
```

C_GetSlotList is used to obtain a list of slots in the system. *tokenPresent* indicates whether the list obtained includes only those slots with a token present (CK_TRUE), or all slots (CK_FALSE); *pulCount* points to the location that receives the number of slots.

There are two ways for an application to call **C_GetSlotList**:

1. If *pSlotList* is NULL_PTR, then all that **C_GetSlotList** does is return (in **pulCount*) the number of slots, without actually returning a list of slots. The contents of the buffer pointed to by *pulCount* on entry to **C_GetSlotList** has no meaning in this case, and the call returns the value CKR_OK.
2. If *pSlotList* is not NULL_PTR, then **pulCount* MUST contain the size (in terms of **CK_SLOT_ID** elements) of the buffer pointed to by *pSlotList*. If that buffer is large enough to hold the list of slots, then the list is returned in it, and CKR_OK is returned. If not, then the call to **C_GetSlotList** returns the value CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. In either case, the value **pulCount* is set to hold the number of slots.

Because **C_GetSlotList** does not allocate any space of its own, an application will often call **C_GetSlotList** twice (or sometimes even more times—if an application is trying to get a list of all slots with a token present, then the number of such slots can (unfortunately) change between when the application asks for how many such slots there are and when the application asks for the slots themselves). However, multiple calls to **C_GetSlotList** are by no means *required*.

All slots which **C_GetSlotList** reports MUST be able to be queried as valid slots by **C_GetSlotInfo**. Furthermore, the set of slots accessible through a Cryptoki library is checked at the time that **C_GetSlotList,** for list length prediction (NULL pSlotList argument) is called. If an application calls **C_GetSlotList** with a non-NULL pSlotList, and *then* the user adds or removes a hardware device, the changed slot list will only be visible and effective if **C_GetSlotList** is called again with NULL. Even if **C_GetSlotList** is successfully called this way, it may or may not be the case that the changed slot list will be successfully recognized depending on the library implementation. On some platforms, or earlier PKCS11 compliant libraries, it may be necessary to successfully call **C_Initialize** or to restart the entire system.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK.

Example:

```
CK_ULONG ulSlotCount, ulSlotWithTokenCount;
CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, pSlotWithTokenList;
```

```
CK_RV rv;

/* Get list of all slots */
rv = C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  pSlotList =
    (CK_SLOT_ID_PTR) malloc(ulSlotCount*sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
  rv = C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
  if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    /* Now use that list of all slots */
    .
    .
  }

  free(pSlotList);
}

/* Get list of all slots with a token present */
pSlotWithTokenList = (CK_SLOT_ID_PTR) malloc(0);
ulSlotWithTokenCount = 0;
while (1) {
  rv = C_GetSlotList(
    CK_TRUE, pSlotWithTokenList, &ulSlotWithTokenCount);
  if (rv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
    break;
  pSlotWithTokenList = realloc(
    pSlotWithTokenList,
    ulSlotWithTokenList*sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
}

if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  /* Now use that list of all slots with a token present */
  .
  .
}

free(pSlotWithTokenList);
```

5.5.2 C_GetSlotInfo

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSlotInfo)(
      CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
      CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo
);
```

C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in the system. *slotID* is the ID of the slot; *pInfo* points to the location that receives the slot information.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID.

Example: see **C_GetTokenInfo.**

5.5.3 C_GetTokenInfo

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetTokenInfo)(
      CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
      CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo
);
```

C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token in the system. *slotID* is the ID of the token's slot; *pInfo* points to the location that receives the token information.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```
CK_ULONG ulCount;
CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList;
CK_SLOT_INFO slotInfo;
CK_TOKEN_INFO tokenInfo;
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulCount);
if ((rv == CKR_OK) && (ulCount > 0)) {
  pSlotList = (CK_SLOT_ID_PTR) malloc(ulCount*sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
  rv = C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulCount);
  assert(rv == CKR_OK);

  /* Get slot information for first slot */
  rv = C_GetSlotInfo(pSlotList[0], &slotInfo);
  assert(rv == CKR_OK);

  /* Get token information for first slot */
  rv = C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[0], &tokenInfo);
  if (rv == CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT) {
    .
    .
  }
  .
  .
  free(pSlotList);
```

```
}
```

5.5.4 C_WaitForSlotEvent

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_WaitForSlotEvent)(
      CK_FLAGS flags,
      CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot,
      CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
);
```

C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event, such as token insertion or token removal, to occur. *flags* determines whether or not the **C_WaitForSlotEvent** call blocks (*i.e.*, waits for a slot event to occur); *pSlot* points to a location which will receive the ID of the slot that the event occurred in. *pReserved* is reserved for future versions; for this version of Cryptoki, it should be NULL_PTR.

At present, the only flag defined for use in the *flags* argument is **CKF_DONT_BLOCK**:

Internally, each Cryptoki application has a flag for each slot which is used to track whether or not any unrecognized events involving that slot have occurred. When an application initially calls **C_Initialize**, every slot's event flag is cleared. Whenever a slot event occurs, the flag corresponding to the slot in which the event occurred is set.

If **C_WaitForSlotEvent** is called with the **CKF_DONT_BLOCK** flag set in the *flags* argument, and some slot's event flag is set, then that event flag is cleared, and the call returns with the ID of that slot in the location pointed to by *pSlot*. If more than one slot's event flag is set at the time of the call, one such slot is chosen by the library to have its event flag cleared and to have its slot ID returned.

If **C_WaitForSlotEvent** is called with the **CKF_DONT_BLOCK** flag set in the *flags* argument, and no slot's event flag is set, then the call returns with the value CKR_NO_EVENT. In this case, the contents of the location pointed to by *pSlot* when **C_WaitForSlotEvent** are undefined.

If **C_WaitForSlotEvent** is called with the **CKF_DONT_BLOCK** flag clear in the *flags* argument, then the call behaves as above, except that it will block. That is, if no slot's event flag is set at the time of the call, **C_WaitForSlotEvent** will wait until some slot's event flag becomes set. If a thread of an application has a **C_WaitForSlotEvent** call blocking when another thread of that application calls **C_Finalize**, the **C_WaitForSlotEvent** call returns with the value CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED.

*Although the parameters supplied to **C_Initialize** can in general allow for safe multi-threaded access to a Cryptoki library, **C_WaitForSlotEvent** is exceptional in that the behavior of Cryptoki is undefined if multiple threads of a single application make simultaneous calls to **C_WaitForSlotEvent**.*

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_OK.

Example:

```
CK_FLAGS flags = 0;
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_SLOT_INFO slotInfo;
CK_RV rv;
.
.
/* Block and wait for a slot event */
rv = C_WaitForSlotEvent(flags, &slotID, NULL_PTR);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* See what's up with that slot */
```

```
rv = C_GetSlotInfo(slotID, &slotInfo);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

```

5.5.5 C_GetMechanismList

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetMechanismList)(
      CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
      CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList,
      CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount
);
```

C_GetMechanismList is used to obtain a list of mechanism types supported by a token. *SlotID* is the ID of the token's slot; *pulCount* points to the location that receives the number of mechanisms.

There are two ways for an application to call **C_GetMechanismList**:

1. If *pMechanismList* is NULL_PTR, then all that **C_GetMechanismList** does is return (in **pulCount*) the number of mechanisms, without actually returning a list of mechanisms. The contents of **pulCount* on entry to **C_GetMechanismList** has no meaning in this case, and the call returns the value CKR_OK.
2. If *pMechanismList* is not NULL_PTR, then **pulCount* MUST contain the size (in terms of **CK_MECHANISM_TYPE** elements) of the buffer pointed to by *pMechanismList*. If that buffer is large enough to hold the list of mechanisms, then the list is returned in it, and CKR_OK is returned. If not, then the call to **C_GetMechanismList** returns the value CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. In either case, the value **pulCount* is set to hold the number of mechanisms.

Because **C_GetMechanismList** does not allocate any space of its own, an application will often call **C_GetMechanismList** twice. However, this behavior is by no means required.

Return values: CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_ULONG ulCount;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_GetMechanismList(slotID, NULL_PTR, &ulCount);
if ((rv == CKR_OK) && (ulCount > 0)) {
  pMechanismList =
    (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR)
    malloc(ulCount*sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
  rv = C_GetMechanismList(slotID, pMechanismList, &ulCount);
  if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
```

```
  }
  free(pMechanismList);
}
```

5.5.6 C_GetMechanismInfo

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetMechanismInfo)(
      CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
      CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
      CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo
);
```

C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular mechanism possibly supported by a token. *slotID* is the ID of the token's slot; *type* is the type of mechanism; *pInfo* points to the location that receives the mechanism information.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
/* Get information about the CKM_MD2 mechanism for this token */
rv = C_GetMechanismInfo(slotID, CKM_MD2, &info);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  if (info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) {
    .
    .
  }
}
```

5.5.7 C_InitToken

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_InitToken)(
      CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
      CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,
      CK_ULONG ulPinLen,
      CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel
);
```

C_InitToken initializes a token. *slotID* is the ID of the token's slot; *pPin* points to the SO's initial PIN (which need *not* be null-terminated); *ulPinLen* is the length in bytes of the PIN; *pLabel* points to the 32-byte label of the token (which MUST be padded with blank characters, and which MUST *not* be null-

terminated). This standard allows PIN values to contain any valid UTF8 character, but the token may impose subset restrictions.

If the token has not been initialized (i.e. new from the factory), then the *pPin* parameter becomes the initial value of the SO PIN. If the token is being reinitialized, the *pPin* parameter is checked against the existing SO PIN to authorize the initialization operation. In both cases, the SO PIN is the value *pPin* after the function completes successfully. If the SO PIN is lost, then the card MUST be reinitialized using a mechanism outside the scope of this standard. The **CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED** flag in the **CK_TOKEN_INFO** structure indicates the action that will result from calling **C_InitToken**. If set, the token will be reinitialized, and the client MUST supply the existing SO password in *pPin*.

When a token is initialized, all objects that can be destroyed are destroyed (*i.e.*, all except for "indestructible" objects such as keys built into the token). Also, access by the normal user is disabled until the SO sets the normal user's PIN. Depending on the token, some "default" objects may be created, and attributes of some objects may be set to default values.

If the token has a "protected authentication path", as indicated by the **CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH** flag in its **CK_TOKEN_INFO** being set, then that means that there is some way for a user to be authenticated to the token without having the application send a PIN through the Cryptoki library. One such possibility is that the user enters a PIN on a PINpad on the token itself, or on the slot device. To initialize a token with such a protected authentication path, the *pPin* parameter to **C_InitToken** should be NULL_PTR. During the execution of **C_InitToken**, the SO's PIN will be entered through the protected authentication path.

If the token has a protected authentication path other than a PINpad, then it is token-dependent whether or not **C_InitToken** can be used to initialize the token.

A token cannot be initialized if Cryptoki detects that *any* application has an open session with it; when a call to **C_InitToken** is made under such circumstances, the call fails with error CKR_SESSION_EXISTS. Unfortunately, it may happen when **C_InitToken** is called that some other application *does* have an open session with the token, but Cryptoki cannot detect this, because it cannot detect anything about other applications using the token. If this is the case, then the consequences of the **C_InitToken** call are undefined.

The **C_InitToken** function may not be sufficient to properly initialize complex tokens. In these situations, an initialization mechanism outside the scope of Cryptoki MUST be employed. The definition of "complex token" is product specific.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_LOCKED, CKR_SESSION_EXISTS, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_UTF8CHAR pin[] = {"MyPIN"};
CK_UTF8CHAR label[32];
CK_RV rv;

.
.
memset(label, ' ', sizeof(label));
memcpy(label, "My first token", strlen("My first token"));
rv = C_InitToken(slotID, pin, strlen(pin), label);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
```



```
  .
}
```

5.5.8 C_InitPIN

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_InitPIN)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,
  CK_ULONG ulPinLen
);
```

C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pPin* points to the normal user's PIN; *ulPinLen* is the length in bytes of the PIN. This standard allows PIN values to contain any valid UTF8 character, but the token may impose subset restrictions.

C_InitPIN can only be called in the "R/W SO Functions" state. An attempt to call it from a session in any other state fails with error CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

If the token has a "protected authentication path", as indicated by the CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH flag in its **CK_TOKEN_INFO** being set, then that means that there is some way for a user to be authenticated to the token without having to send a PIN through the Cryptoki library. One such possibility is that the user enters a PIN on a PIN pad on the token itself, or on the slot device. To initialize the normal user's PIN on a token with such a protected authentication path, the *pPin* parameter to **C_InitPIN** should be NULL_PTR. During the execution of **C_InitPIN**, the SO will enter the new PIN through the protected authentication path.

If the token has a protected authentication path other than a PIN pad, then it is token-dependent whether or not **C_InitPIN** can be used to initialize the normal user's token access.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_INVALID, CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_UTF8CHAR newPin[]= {"NewPIN"};
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_InitPIN(hSession, newPin, sizeof(newPin)-1);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
```

5.5.9 C_SetPIN

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetPIN)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin,
  CK_ULONG ulOldLen,
  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin,
  CK_ULONG ulNewLen
);
```

C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user that is currently logged in, or the CKU_USER PIN if the session is not logged in. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pOldPin* points to the old PIN; *ulOldLen* is the length in bytes of the old PIN; *pNewPin* points to the new PIN; *ulNewLen* is the length in bytes of the new PIN. This standard allows PIN values to contain any valid UTF8 character, but the token may impose subset restrictions.

C_SetPIN can only be called in the "R/W Public Session" state, "R/W SO Functions" state, or "R/W User Functions" state. An attempt to call it from a session in any other state fails with error CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY.

If the token has a "protected authentication path", as indicated by the CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH flag in its **CK_TOKEN_INFO** being set, then that means that there is some way for a user to be authenticated to the token without having to send a PIN through the Cryptoki library. One such possibility is that the user enters a PIN on a PIN pad on the token itself, or on the slot device. To modify the current user's PIN on a token with such a protected authentication path, the *pOldPin* and *pNewPin* parameters to **C_SetPIN** should be NULL_PTR. During the execution of **C_SetPIN**, the current user will enter the old PIN and the new PIN through the protected authentication path. It is not specified how the PIN pad should be used to enter *two* PINs; this varies.

If the token has a protected authentication path other than a PIN pad, then it is token-dependent whether or not **C_SetPIN** can be used to modify the current user's PIN.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_INVALID, CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE, CKR_PIN_LOCKED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_UTF8CHAR oldPin[] = {"OldPIN"};
CK_UTF8CHAR newPin[] = {"NewPIN"};
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_SetPIN(
  hSession, oldPin, sizeof(oldPin)-1, newPin, sizeof(newPin)-1);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
```

5.6 Session management functions

A typical application might perform the following series of steps to make use of a token (note that there are other reasonable sequences of events that an application might perform):

1. Select a token.
2. Make one or more calls to **C_OpenSession** to obtain one or more sessions with the token.
3. Call **C_Login** to log the user into the token. Since all sessions an application has with a token have a shared login state, **C_Login** only needs to be called for one of the sessions.
4. Perform cryptographic operations using the sessions with the token.
5. Call **C_CloseSession** once for each session that the application has with the token, or call **C_CloseAllSessions** to close all the application's sessions simultaneously.

As has been observed, an application may have concurrent sessions with more than one token. It is also possible for a token to have concurrent sessions with more than one application.

Cryptoki provides the following functions for session management:

5.6.1 C_OpenSession

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_OpenSession)(
  CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
  CK_FLAGS flags,
  CK_VOID_PTR pApplication,
  CK_NOTIFY Notify,
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession
);
```

C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a token in a particular slot. *slotID* is the slot's ID; *flags* indicates the type of session; *pApplication* is an application-defined pointer to be passed to the notification callback; *Notify* is the address of the notification callback function (see Section 5.21); *phSession* points to the location that receives the handle for the new session.

When opening a session with **C_OpenSession**, the *flags* parameter consists of the logical OR of zero or more bit flags defined in the **CK_SESSION_INFO** data type. For legacy reasons, the **CKF_SERIAL_SESSION** bit MUST always be set; if a call to **C_OpenSession** does not have this bit set, the call should return unsuccessfully with the error code CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED.

There may be a limit on the number of concurrent sessions an application may have with the token, which may depend on whether the session is "read-only" or "read/write". An attempt to open a session which does not succeed because there are too many existing sessions of some type should return CKR_SESSION_COUNT.

If the token is write-protected (as indicated in the **CK_TOKEN_INFO** structure), then only read-only sessions may be opened with it.

If the application calling **C_OpenSession** already has a R/W SO session open with the token, then any attempt to open a R/O session with the token fails with error code CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS (see **[PKCS11-UG]** for further details).

The *Notify* callback function is used by Cryptoki to notify the application of certain events. If the application does not wish to support callbacks, it should pass a value of NULL_PTR as the *Notify* parameter. See Section 5.21 for more information about application callbacks.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_COUNT, CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example: see **C_CloseSession**.

5.6.2 C_CloseSession

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CloseSession)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a token. *hSession* is the session's handle.

When a session is closed, all session objects created by the session are destroyed automatically, even if the application has other sessions "using" the objects (see **[PKCS11-UG]** for further details).

If this function is successful and it closes the last session between the application and the token, the login state of the token for the application returns to public sessions. Any new sessions to the token opened by the application will be either R/O Public or R/W Public sessions.

Depending on the token, when the last open session any application has with the token is closed, the token may be "ejected" from its reader (if this capability exists).

Despite the fact this **C_CloseSession** is supposed to close a session, the return value CKR_SESSION_CLOSED is an *error* return. It actually indicates the (probably somewhat unlikely) event that while this function call was executing, another call was made to **C_CloseSession** to close this particular session, and that call finished executing first. Such uses of sessions are a bad idea, and Cryptoki makes little promise of what will occur in general if an application indulges in this sort of behavior.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_BYTE application;
CK_NOTIFY MyNotify;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
application = 17;
MyNotify = &EncryptionSessionCallback;
rv = C_OpenSession(
  slotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION | CKF_RW_SESSION,
            (CK_VOID_PTR) &application, MyNotify,
  &hSession);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
  C_CloseSession(hSession);
}
```

5.6.3 C_CloseAllSessions

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CloseAllSessions)(
  CK_SLOT_ID slotID
);
```

C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions an application has with a token. *slotID* specifies the token's slot.

When a session is closed, all session objects created by the session are destroyed automatically.

After successful execution of this function, the login state of the token for the application returns to public sessions. Any new sessions to the token opened by the application will be either R/O Public or R/W Public sessions.

Depending on the token, when the last open session any application has with the token is closed, the token may be "ejected" from its reader (if this capability exists).

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT.

Example:

```
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_CloseAllSessions(slotID);
```

5.6.4 C_GetSessionInfo

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSessionInfo)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo
);
```

C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about a session. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pInfo* points to the location that receives the session information.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_SESSION_INFO info;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_GetSessionInfo(hSession, &info);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  if (info.state == CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS) {
    .
    .
  }
  .
  .
}
```

5.6.5 C_SessionCancel

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SessionCancel)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
  CK_FLAGS flags
);
```

C_SessionCancel terminates active session based operations. *hSession* is the session's handle; *flags* indicates the operations to cancel.

To identify which operation(s) should be terminated, the *flags* parameter should be assigned the logical bitwise OR of one or more of the bit flags defined in the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure.

If no flags are set, the session state will not be modified and CKR_OK will be returned.

If a flag is set for an operation that has not been initialized in the session, the operation flag will be ignored and **C_SessionCancel** will behave as if the operation flag was not set.

If any of the operations indicated by the *flags* parameter cannot be cancelled, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED must be returned. If multiple operation flags were set and CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED is returned, this function does not provide any information about which operation(s) could not be cancelled. If an application desires to know if any single operation could not be cancelled, the application should not call **C_SessionCancel** with multiple flags set.

If **C_SessionCancel** is called from an application callback (see Section 5.21), no action will be taken by the library and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED must be returned.

If **C_SessionCancel** is used to cancel one half of a dual-function operation, the remaining operation should still be left in an active state. However, it is expected that some Cryptoki implementations may not support this and return CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED unless flags for both operations are provided.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_EncryptInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
   .
   .
}

rv = C_SessionCancel (hSession, CKF_ENCRYPT);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
   .
   .
}

rv = C_EncryptInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
{
   .
   .
}
```


Below are modifications to existing API descriptions to allow an alternate method of cancelling individual operations. The additional text is highlighted.

5.6.6 C_GetOperationState

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetOperationState)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen
);
```

C_GetOperationState obtains a copy of the cryptographic operations state of a session, encoded as a string of bytes. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pOperationState* points to the location that receives the state; *pulOperationStateLen* points to the location that receives the length in bytes of the state.

Although the saved state output by **C_GetOperationState** is not really produced by a "cryptographic mechanism", **C_GetOperationState** nonetheless uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

Precisely what the "cryptographic operations state" this function saves is varies from token to token; however, this state is what is provided as input to **C_SetOperationState** to restore the cryptographic activities of a session.

Consider a session which is performing a message digest operation using SHA-1 (*i.e.*, the session is using the **CKM_SHA_1** mechanism). Suppose that the message digest operation was initialized properly, and that precisely 80 bytes of data have been supplied so far as input to SHA-1. The application now wants to "save the state" of this digest operation, so that it can continue it later. In this particular case, since SHA-1 processes 512 bits (64 bytes) of input at a time, the cryptographic operations state of the session most likely consists of three distinct parts: the state of SHA-1's 160-bit internal chaining variable; the 16 bytes of unprocessed input data; and some administrative data indicating that this saved state comes from a session which was performing SHA-1 hashing. Taken together, these three pieces of information suffice to continue the current hashing operation at a later time.

Consider next a session which is performing an encryption operation with DES (a block cipher with a block size of 64 bits) in CBC (cipher-block chaining) mode (*i.e.*, the session is using the **CKM_DES_CBC** mechanism). Suppose that precisely 22 bytes of data (in addition to an IV for the CBC mode) have been supplied so far as input to DES, which means that the first two 8-byte blocks of ciphertext have already been produced and output. In this case, the cryptographic operations state of the session most likely consists of three or four distinct parts: the second 8-byte block of ciphertext (this will be used for cipher-block chaining to produce the next block of ciphertext); the 6 bytes of data still awaiting encryption; some administrative data indicating that this saved state comes from a session which was performing DES encryption in CBC mode; and possibly the DES key being used for encryption (see **C_SetOperationState** for more information on whether or not the key is present in the saved state).

If a session is performing two cryptographic operations simultaneously (see Section 5.14), then the cryptographic operations state of the session will contain all the necessary information to restore both operations.

An attempt to save the cryptographic operations state of a session which does not currently have some active savable cryptographic operation(s) (encryption, decryption, digesting, signing without message recovery, verification without message recovery, or some legal combination of two of these) should fail with the error CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED.

An attempt to save the cryptographic operations state of a session which is performing an appropriate cryptographic operation (or two), but which cannot be satisfied for any of various reasons (certain necessary state information and/or key information can't leave the token, for example) should fail with the error CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE.

Return values: CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example: see **C_SetOperationState**.

5.6.7 C_SetOperationState

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetOperationState)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState,
  CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey
);
```

C_SetOperationState restores the cryptographic operations state of a session from a string of bytes obtained with **C_GetOperationState**. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pOperationState* points to the location holding the saved state; *ulOperationStateLen* holds the length of the saved state; *hEncryptionKey* holds a handle to the key which will be used for an ongoing encryption or decryption operation in the restored session (or 0 if no encryption or decryption key is needed, either because no such operation is ongoing in the stored session or because all the necessary key information is present in the saved state); *hAuthenticationKey* holds a handle to the key which will be used for an ongoing signature, MACing, or verification operation in the restored session (or 0 if no such key is needed, either because no such operation is ongoing in the stored session or because all the necessary key information is present in the saved state).

The state need not have been obtained from the same session (the "source session") as it is being restored to (the "destination session"). However, the source session and destination session should have a common session state (*e.g.*, CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS), and should be with a common token. There is also no guarantee that cryptographic operations state may be carried across logins, or across different Cryptoki implementations.

If **C_SetOperationState** is supplied with alleged saved cryptographic operations state which it can determine is not valid saved state (or is cryptographic operations state from a session with a different session state, or is cryptographic operations state from a different token), it fails with the error CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID.

Saved state obtained from calls to **C_GetOperationState** may or may not contain information about keys in use for ongoing cryptographic operations. If a saved cryptographic operations state has an ongoing encryption or decryption operation, and the key in use for the operation is not saved in the state, then it MUST be supplied to **C_SetOperationState** in the *hEncryptionKey* argument. If it is not, then **C_SetOperationState** will fail and return the error CKR_KEY_NEEDED. If the key in use for the operation *is* saved in the state, then it *can* be supplied in the *hEncryptionKey* argument, but this is not required.

Similarly, if a saved cryptographic operations state has an ongoing signature, MACing, or verification operation, and the key in use for the operation is not saved in the state, then it MUST be supplied to **C_SetOperationState** in the *hAuthenticationKey* argument. If it is not, then **C_SetOperationState** will fail with the error CKR_KEY_NEEDED. If the key in use for the operation *is* saved in the state, then it *can* be supplied in the *hAuthenticationKey* argument, but this is not required.

If an *irrelevant* key is supplied to **C_SetOperationState** call (*e.g.*, a nonzero key handle is submitted in the *hEncryptionKey* argument, but the saved cryptographic operations state supplied does not have an ongoing encryption or decryption operation, then **C_SetOperationState** fails with the error CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED.

If a key is supplied as an argument to **C_SetOperationState**, and **C_SetOperationState** can somehow detect that this key was not the key being used in the source session for the supplied cryptographic

operations state (it may be able to detect this if the key or a hash of the key is present in the saved state, for example), then **C_SetOperationState** fails with the error CKR_KEY_CHANGED.

An application can look at the **CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED** flag in the flags field of the **CK_TOKEN_INFO** field for a token to determine whether or not it needs to supply key handles to **C_SetOperationState** calls. If this flag is true, then a call to **C_SetOperationState** *never* needs a key handle to be supplied to it. If this flag is false, then at least some of the time, **C_SetOperationState** requires a key handle, and so the application should probably *always* pass in any relevant key handles when restoring cryptographic operations state to a session.

C_SetOperationState can successfully restore cryptographic operations state to a session even if that session has active cryptographic or object search operations when **C_SetOperationState** is called (the ongoing operations are abruptly cancelled).

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_OK, CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_MECHANISM digestMechanism;
CK_BYTE_PTR pState;
CK_ULONG ulStateLen;
CK_BYTE data1[] = {0x01, 0x03, 0x05, 0x07};
CK_BYTE data2[] = {0x02, 0x04, 0x08};
CK_BYTE data3[] = {0x10, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x0D, 0x0C};
CK_BYTE pDigest[20];
CK_ULONG ulDigestLen;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
/* Initialize hash operation */
rv = C_DigestInit(hSession, &digestMechanism);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Start hashing */
rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, data1, sizeof(data1));
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Find out how big the state might be */
rv = C_GetOperationState(hSession, NULL_PTR, &ulStateLen);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Allocate some memory and then get the state */
pState = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc(ulStateLen);
rv = C_GetOperationState(hSession, pState, &ulStateLen);

```



```
/* Continue hashing */
rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, data2, sizeof(data2));
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Restore state.  No key handles needed */
rv = C_SetOperationState(hSession, pState, ulStateLen, 0, 0);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Continue hashing from where we saved state */
rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, data3, sizeof(data3));
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Conclude hashing operation */
ulDigestLen = sizeof(pDigest);
rv = C_DigestFinal(hSession, pDigest, &ulDigestLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  /* pDigest[] now contains the hash of 0x01030507100F0E0D0C */
  .
  .
}
```

5.6.8 C_Login

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Login)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_USER_TYPE userType,
  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,
  CK_ULONG ulPinLen
);
```

C_Login logs a user into a token. *hSession* is a session handle; *userType* is the user type; *pPin* points to the user's PIN; *ulPinLen* is the length of the PIN. This standard allows PIN values to contain any valid UTF8 character, but the token may impose subset restrictions.

When the user type is either CKU_SO or CKU_USER, if the call succeeds, each of the application's sessions will enter either the "R/W SO Functions" state, the "R/W User Functions" state, or the "R/O User Functions" state. If the user type is CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC, the behavior of C_Login depends on the context in which it is called. Improper use of this user type will result in a return value CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED..

If the token has a "protected authentication path", as indicated by the **CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH** flag in its **CK_TOKEN_INFO** being set, then that means that there is some way for a user to be authenticated to the token without having to send a PIN through the Cryptoki library. One such possibility is that the user enters a PIN on a PIN pad on the token itself, or on the slot device. Or the user might not even use a PIN—authentication could be achieved by some fingerprint-reading device, for example. To log into a token with a protected authentication path, the *pPin* parameter to **C_Login** should be NULL_PTR. When **C_Login** returns, whatever authentication method supported by the token will have been performed; a return value of CKR_OK means that the user was successfully authenticated, and a return value of CKR_PIN_INCORRECT means that the user was denied access.

If there are any active cryptographic or object finding operations in an application's session, and then **C_Login** is successfully executed by that application, it may or may not be the case that those operations are still active. Therefore, before logging in, any active operations should be finished.

If the application calling **C_Login** has a R/O session open with the token, then it will be unable to log the SO into a session (see **[PKCS11-UG]** for further details). An attempt to do this will result in the error code CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS.

C_Login may be called repeatedly, without intervening **C_Logout** calls, if (and only if) a key with the CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE attribute set to CK_TRUE exists, and the user needs to do cryptographic operation on this key. See further Section 4.9.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_LOCKED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS, CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN, CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN, CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES, CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID.

Example: see **C_Logout**.

5.6.9 C_LoginUser

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_LoginUser)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_USER_TYPE userType,
  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,
  CK_ULONG ulPinLen,
  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pUsername,
  CK_ULONG ulUsernameLen
);
```

C_LoginUser logs a user into a token. *hSession* is a session handle; *userType* is the user type; *pPin* points to the user's PIN; *ulPinLen* is the length of the PIN, *pUsername* points to the user name, *ulUsernameLen* is the length of the user name. This standard allows PIN and user name values to contain any valid UTF8 character, but the token may impose subset restrictions.

When the user type is either CKU_SO or CKU_USER, if the call succeeds, each of the application's sessions will enter either the "R/W SO Functions" state, the "R/W User Functions" state, or the "R/O User Functions" state. If the user type is CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC, the behavior of **C_LoginUser** depends on the context in which it is called. Improper use of this user type will result in a return value CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED.

If the token has a "protected authentication path", as indicated by the CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH flag in its CK_TOKEN_INFO being set, then that means that there is some way for a user to be authenticated to the token without having to send a PIN through the Cryptoki library. One such possibility is that the user enters a PIN on a PIN pad on the token itself, or on the slot device. The user might not even use a PIN—authentication could be achieved by some fingerprint-reading device, for example. To log into a token with a protected authentication path, the *pPin* parameter to **C_LoginUser** should be NULL_PTR. When **C_LoginUser** returns, whatever authentication method supported by the token will have been performed; a return value of CKR_OK means that the user was successfully authenticated, and a return value of CKR_PIN_INCORRECT means that the user was denied access.

If there are any active cryptographic or object finding operations in an application's session, and then **C_LoginUser** is successfully executed by that application, it may or may not be the case that those operations are still active. Therefore, before logging in, any active operations should be finished.

If the application calling **C_LoginUser** has a R/O session open with the token, then it will be unable to log the SO into a session (see [PKCS11-UG] for further details). An attempt to do this will result in the error code CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS.

C_LoginUser may be called repeatedly, without intervening **C_Logout** calls, if (and only if) a key with the CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE attribute set to CK_TRUE exists, and the user needs to do cryptographic operation on this key. See further Section 4.9.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_LOCKED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS, CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN, CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN, CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES, CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_UTF8CHAR userPin[] = {"MyPIN"};
CK_UTF8CHAR userName[] = {"MyUserName"};
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_LoginUser(hSession, CKU_USER, userPin, sizeof(userPin)-1, userName,
sizeof(userName)-1);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
  rv = C_Logout(hSession);
  if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
  }
}
```

5.6.10 C_Logout

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Logout)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

C_Logout logs a user out from a token. *hSession* is the session's handle.

Depending on the current user type, if the call succeeds, each of the application's sessions will enter either the "R/W Public Session" state or the "R/O Public Session" state.

When **C_Logout** successfully executes, any of the application's handles to private objects become invalid (even if a user is later logged back into the token, those handles remain invalid). In addition, all private session objects from sessions belonging to the application are destroyed.

If there are any active cryptographic or object-finding operations in an application's session, and then **C_Logout** is successfully executed by that application, it may or may not be the case that those operations are still active. Therefore, before logging out, any active operations should be finished.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_UTF8CHAR userPin[] = {"MyPIN"};
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_Login(hSession, CKU_USER, userPin, sizeof(userPin)-1);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
  rv = C_Logout(hSession);
  if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
  }
}
```

5.7 Object management functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for managing objects. Additional functions provided specifically for managing key objects are described in Section 5.18.

5.7.1 C_CreateObject

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CreateObject)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
  CK_ULONG ulCount,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject
);
```

C_CreateObject creates a new object. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pTemplate* points to the object's template; *ulCount* is the number of attributes in the template; *phObject* points to the location that receives the new object's handle.

If a call to **C_CreateObject** cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating any object.

If **C_CreateObject** is used to create a key object, the key object will have its **CKA_LOCAL** attribute set to CK_FALSE. If that key object is a secret or private key then the new key will have the **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, and the **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE.

Only session objects can be created during a read-only session. Only public objects can be created unless the normal user is logged in.

Whenever an object is created, a value for CKA_UNIQUE_ID is generated and assigned to the new object (See Section 4.4.1).

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
  hData,
  hCertificate,
  hKey;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS
  dataClass = CKO_DATA,
  certificateClass = CKO_CERTIFICATE,
  keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR application[] = {"My Application"};
CK_BYTE dataValue[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {...};
CK_BYTE certificateValue[] = {...};
CK_BYTE modulus[] = {...};
CK_BYTE exponent[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE dataTemplate[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &dataClass, sizeof(dataClass)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_APPLICATION, application, sizeof(application)-1},
  {CKA_VALUE, dataValue, sizeof(dataValue)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE certificateTemplate[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &certificateClass, sizeof(certificateClass)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
  {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
  {CKA_VALUE, certificateValue, sizeof(certificateValue)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_WRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_MODULUS, modulus, sizeof(modulus)},
  {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, exponent, sizeof(exponent)}
};
CK_RV rv;

.
.
/* Create a data object */
```



```
rv = C_CreateObject(hSession, dataTemplate, 4, &hData);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}

/* Create a certificate object */
rv = C_CreateObject(
  hSession, certificateTemplate, 5, &hCertificate);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}

/* Create an RSA public key object */
rv = C_CreateObject(hSession, keyTemplate, 5, &hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
```

5.7.2 C_CopyObject

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CopyObject)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
  CK_ULONG ulCount,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject
);
```

C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the copy. *hSession* is the session's handle; *hObject* is the object's handle; *pTemplate* points to the template for the new object; *ulCount* is the number of attributes in the template; *phNewObject* points to the location that receives the handle for the copy of the object.

The template may specify new values for any attributes of the object that can ordinarily be modified (*e.g.*, in the course of copying a secret key, a key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute may be changed from CK_TRUE to CK_FALSE, but not the other way around. If this change is made, the new key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute will have the value CK_FALSE. Similarly, the template may specify that the new key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute be CK_TRUE; the new key will have the same value for its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute as the original key). It may also specify new values of the **CKA_TOKEN** and **CKA_PRIVATE** attributes (*e.g.*, to copy a session object to a token object). If the template specifies a value of an attribute which is incompatible with other existing attributes of the object, the call fails with the return code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT.

If a call to **C_CopyObject** cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating any object. If the object indicated by hObject has its CKA_COPYABLE attribute set to CK_FALSE, C_CopyObject will return CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED.

Whenever an object is copied, a new value for CKA_UNIQUE_ID is generated and assigned to the new object (See Section 4.4.1).

Only session objects can be created during a read-only session. Only public objects can be created unless the normal user is logged in.

Return values: , CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, hNewKey;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES;
CK_BYTE id[] = {...};
CK_BYTE keyValue[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL false = CK_FALSE;
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(false)},
  {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
  {CKA_VALUE, keyValue, sizeof(keyValue)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE copyTemplate[] = {
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_RV rv;

.
.
/* Create a DES secret key session object */
rv = C_CreateObject(hSession, keyTemplate, 5, &hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  /* Create a copy which is a token object */
  rv = C_CopyObject(hSession, hKey, copyTemplate, 1, &hNewKey);
  .
  .
}
```

5.7.3 C_DestroyObject

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DestroyObject)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
```

```
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject
);
```

C_DestroyObject destroys an object. *hSession* is the session's handle; and *hObject* is the object's handle.

Only session objects can be destroyed during a read-only session. Only public objects can be destroyed unless the normal user is logged in.

Certain objects may not be destroyed. Calling C_DestroyObject on such objects will result in the CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED error code. An application can consult the object's CKA_DESTROYABLE attribute to determine if an object may be destroyed or not.

Return values: CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED.

Example: see **C_GetObjectSize**.

5.7.4 C_GetObjectSize

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetObjectSize)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize
);
```

C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. *hSession* is the session's handle; *hObject* is the object's handle; *pulSize* points to the location that receives the size in bytes of the object.

Cryptoki does not specify what the precise meaning of an object's size is. Intuitively, it is some measure of how much token memory the object takes up. If an application deletes (say) a private object of size S, it might be reasonable to assume that the *ulFreePrivateMemory* field of the token's **CK_TOKEN_INFO** structure increases by approximately S.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS dataClass = CKO_DATA;
CK_UTF8CHAR application[] = {"My Application"};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &dataClass, sizeof(dataClass)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_APPLICATION, application, sizeof(application)-1},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
CK_ULONG ulSize;
```

```
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_CreateObject(hSession, template, 4, &hObject);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  rv = C_GetObjectSize(hSession, hObject, &ulSize);
  if (rv != CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE) {
    .
    .
  }

  rv = C_DestroyObject(hSession, hObject);
  .
  .
}
```

5.7.5 C_GetAttributeValue

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetAttributeValue)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
  CK_ULONG ulCount
);
```

C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more attributes of an object. *hSession* is the session's handle; *hObject* is the object's handle; *pTemplate* points to a template that specifies which attribute values are to be obtained, and receives the attribute values; *ulCount* is the number of attributes in the template.

For each (*type*, *pValue*, *ulValueLen*) triple in the template, **C_GetAttributeValue** performs the following algorithm:

1. If the specified attribute (i.e., the attribute specified by the type field) for the object cannot be revealed because the object is sensitive or unextractable, then the ulValueLen field in that triple is modified to hold the value CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION.
2. Otherwise, if the specified value for the object is invalid (the object does not possess such an attribute), then the ulValueLen field in that triple is modified to hold the value CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION.
3. Otherwise, if the *pValue* field has the value NULL_PTR, then the *ulValueLen* field is modified to hold the exact length of the specified attribute for the object.
4. Otherwise, if the length specified in *ulValueLen* is large enough to hold the value of the specified attribute for the object, then that attribute is copied into the buffer located at *pValue*, and the *ulValueLen* field is modified to hold the exact length of the attribute.
5. Otherwise, the ulValueLen field is modified to hold the value CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION.

If case 1 applies to any of the requested attributes, then the call should return the value CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE. If case 2 applies to any of the requested attributes, then the call should return the value CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID. If case 5 applies to any of the requested attributes, then the call should return the value CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. As usual, if more than one of these error codes is applicable, Cryptoki may return any of them. Only if none of them applies to any of the requested attributes will CKR_OK be returned.

In the special case of an attribute whose value is an array of attributes, for example CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE, where it is passed in with pValue not NULL, the length specified in ulValueLen MUST be large enough to hold all attributes in the array. If the pValue of elements within the array is NULL_PTR then the ulValueLen of elements within the array will be set to the required length. If the pValue of elements within the array is not NULL_PTR, then the ulValueLen element of attributes within the array MUST reflect the space that the corresponding pValue points to, and pValue is filled in if there is sufficient room. Therefore it is important to initialize the contents of a buffer before calling C_GetAttributeValue to get such an array value. Note that the type element of attributes within the array MUST be ignored on input and MUST be set on output. If any ulValueLen within the array isn't large enough, it will be set to CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION and the function will return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, as it does if an attribute in the pTemplate argument has ulValueLen too small. Note that any attribute whose value is an array of attributes is identifiable by virtue of the attribute type having the CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE bit set.

Note that the error codes CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, and CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL do not denote true errors for **C_GetAttributeValue**. If a call to **C_GetAttributeValue** returns any of these three values, then the call MUST nonetheless have processed *every* attribute in the template supplied to **C_GetAttributeValue**. Each attribute in the template whose value *can be* returned by the call to **C_GetAttributeValue** *will be* returned by the call to **C_GetAttributeValue**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject;
CK_BYTE_PTR pModulus, pExponent;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_MODULUS, NULL_PTR, 0},
  {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL_PTR, 0}
};
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hObject, template, 2);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  pModulus = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc(template[0].ulValueLen);
  template[0].pValue = pModulus;
  /* template[0].ulValueLen was set by C_GetAttributeValue */

  pExponent = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc(template[1].ulValueLen);
  template[1].pValue = pExponent;
  /* template[1].ulValueLen was set by C_GetAttributeValue */

  rv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hObject, template, 2);
```



```
  if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
  }
  free(pModulus);
  free(pExponent);
}
```

5.7.6 C_SetAttributeValue

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetAttributeValue)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
  CK_ULONG ulCount
);
```

C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more attributes of an object. *hSession* is the session's handle; *hObject* is the object's handle; *pTemplate* points to a template that specifies which attribute values are to be modified and their new values; *ulCount* is the number of attributes in the template.

Certain objects may not be modified. Calling C_SetAttributeValue on such objects will result in the CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED error code. An application can consult the object's CKA_MODIFIABLE attribute to determine if an object may be modified or not.

Only session objects can be modified during a read-only session.

The template may specify new values for any attributes of the object that can be modified. If the template specifies a value of an attribute which is incompatible with other existing attributes of the object, the call fails with the return code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT.

Not all attributes can be modified; see Section 4.1.2 for more details.

Return values: CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = {"New label"};
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1}
};
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_SetAttributeValue(hSession, hObject, template, 1);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
```

```
  .
  .
}
```

5.7.7 C_FindObjectsInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjectsInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
  CK_ULONG ulCount
);
```

C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session objects that match a template. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pTemplate* points to a search template that specifies the attribute values to match; *ulCount* is the number of attributes in the search template. The matching criterion is an exact byte-for-byte match with all attributes in the template. To find all objects, set *ulCount* to 0.

After calling **C_FindObjectsInit**, the application may call **C_FindObjects** one or more times to obtain handles for objects matching the template, and then eventually call **C_FindObjectsFinal** to finish the active search operation. At most one search operation may be active at a given time in a given session.

The object search operation will only find objects that the session can view. For example, an object search in an "R/W Public Session" will not find any private objects (even if one of the attributes in the search template specifies that the search is for private objects).

If a search operation is active, and objects are created or destroyed which fit the search template for the active search operation, then those objects may or may not be found by the search operation. Note that this means that, under these circumstances, the search operation may return invalid object handles.

Even though **C_FindObjectsInit** can return the values CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID and CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, it is not required to. For example, if it is given a search template with nonexistent attributes in it, it can return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, or it can initialize a search operation which will match no objects and return CKR_OK.

If the CKA_UNIQUE_ID attribute is present in the search template, either zero or one objects will be found, since at most one object can have any particular CKA_UNIQUE_ID value.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see **C_FindObjectsFinal**.

5.7.8 C_FindObjects

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjects)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject,
  CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount
);
```

C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session objects that match a template, obtaining additional object handles. *hSession* is the session's handle; *phObject* points to the location that receives the list (array) of additional object handles; *ulMaxObjectCount* is the maximum number of object handles to be returned; *pulObjectCount* points to the location that receives the actual number of object handles returned.

If there are no more objects matching the template, then the location that *pulObjectCount* points to receives the value 0.

The search MUST have been initialized with **C_FindObjectsInit**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see **C_FindObjectsFinal**.

5.7.9 C_FindObjectsFinal

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjectsFinal)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

C_FindObjectsFinal terminates a search for token and session objects. *hSession* is the session's handle.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject;
CK_ULONG ulObjectCount;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_FindObjectsInit(hSession, NULL_PTR, 0);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
while (1) {
  rv = C_FindObjects(hSession, &hObject, 1, &ulObjectCount);
  if (rv != CKR_OK || ulObjectCount == 0)
    break;
  .
  .
}

rv = C_FindObjectsFinal(hSession);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
```

5.8 Encryption functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for encrypting data:

5.8.1 C_EncryptInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
```

```
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the encryption mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the encryption key.

The **CKA_ENCRYPT** attribute of the encryption key, which indicates whether the key supports encryption, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_EncryptInit**, the application can either call **C_Encrypt** to encrypt data in a single part; or call **C_EncryptUpdate** zero or more times, followed by **C_EncryptFinal**, to encrypt data in multiple parts. The encryption operation is active until the application uses a call to **C_Encrypt** or **C_EncryptFinal** *to actually obtain* the final piece of ciphertext. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_EncryptInit** again.

C_EncryptInit can be called with *pMechanism* set to NULL_PTR to terminate an active encryption operation. If an active operation operations cannot be cancelled, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED must be returned.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED.

Example: see **C_EncryptFinal**.

5.8.2 C_Encrypt

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Encrypt)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
  CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen
);
```

C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pData* points to the data; *ulDataLen* is the length in bytes of the data; *pEncryptedData* points to the location that receives the encrypted data; *pulEncryptedDataLen* points to the location that holds the length in bytes of the encrypted data.

C_Encrypt uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The encryption operation MUST have been initialized with **C_EncryptInit**. A call to **C_Encrypt** always terminates the active encryption operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (*i.e.*, one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the ciphertext.

C_Encrypt cannot be used to terminate a multi-part operation, and MUST be called after **C_EncryptInit** without intervening **C_EncryptUpdate** calls.

For some encryption mechanisms, the input plaintext data has certain length constraints (either because the mechanism can only encrypt relatively short pieces of plaintext, or because the mechanism's input data MUST consist of an integral number of blocks). If these constraints are not satisfied, then **C_Encrypt** will fail with return code CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE.

The plaintext and ciphertext can be in the same place, *i.e.*, it is OK if *pData* and *pEncryptedData* point to the same location.

For most mechanisms, **C_Encrypt** is equivalent to a sequence of **C_EncryptUpdate** operations followed by **C_EncryptFinal**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see **C_EncryptFinal** for an example of similar functions.

5.8.3 C_EncryptUpdate

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptUpdate)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
  CK_ULONG ulPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen
);
```

C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation, processing another data part. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pPart* points to the data part; *ulPartLen* is the length of the data part; *pEncryptedPart* points to the location that receives the encrypted data part; *pulEncryptedPartLen* points to the location that holds the length in bytes of the encrypted data part.

C_EncryptUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The encryption operation MUST have been initialized with **C_EncryptInit**. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to **C_EncryptUpdate** which results in an error other than CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL terminates the current encryption operation.

The plaintext and ciphertext can be in the same place, *i.e.*, it is OK if *pPart* and *pEncryptedPart* point to the same location.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see **C_EncryptFinal.**

5.8.4 C_EncryptFinal

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptFinal)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen
);
```

C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pLastEncryptedPart* points to the location that receives the last encrypted data part, if any; *pulLastEncryptedPartLen* points to the location that holds the length of the last encrypted data part.

C_EncryptFinal uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The encryption operation MUST have been initialized with **C_EncryptInit**. A call to **C_EncryptFinal** always terminates the active encryption operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (*i.e.*, one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the ciphertext.

For some multi-part encryption mechanisms, the input plaintext data has certain length constraints, because the mechanism's input data MUST consist of an integral number of blocks. If these constraints are not satisfied, then **C_EncryptFinal** will fail with return code CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```
#define PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ 200
#define CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ 256

CK_ULONG firstPieceLen, secondPieceLen;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_DES_CBC_PAD, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_BYTE data[PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_BYTE encryptedData[CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedData1Len;
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedData2Len;
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedData3Len;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
firstPieceLen = 90;
secondPieceLen = PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ-firstPieceLen;
rv = C_EncryptInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  /* Encrypt first piece */
  ulEncryptedData1Len = sizeof(encryptedData);
  rv = C_EncryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &data[0], firstPieceLen,
    &encryptedData[0], &ulEncryptedData1Len);
  if (rv != CKR_OK) {
     .
     .
  }

  /* Encrypt second piece */
  ulEncryptedData2Len = sizeof(encryptedData)-ulEncryptedData1Len;
  rv = C_EncryptUpdate(
    hSession,
```



```
    &data[firstPieceLen], secondPieceLen,
    &encryptedData[ulEncryptedData1Len], &ulEncryptedData2Len);
  if (rv != CKR_OK) {
     .
     .
  }

  /* Get last little encrypted bit */
  ulEncryptedData3Len =
    sizeof(encryptedData)-ulEncryptedData1Len-ulEncryptedData2Len;
  rv = C_EncryptFinal(
    hSession,
    &encryptedData[ulEncryptedData1Len+ulEncryptedData2Len],
    &ulEncryptedData3Len);
  if (rv != CKR_OK) {
     .
     .
  }
}
```

5.9 Message-based encryption functions

Message-based encryption refers to the process of encrypting multiple messages using the same encryption mechanism and encryption key. The encryption mechanism can be either an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithm or a pure encryption algorithm.

Cryptoki provides the following functions for message-based encryption:

5.9.1 C_MessageEncryptInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_MessageEncryptInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_MessageEncryptInit prepares a session for one or more encryption operations that use the same encryption mechanism and encryption key. hSession is the session's handle; pMechanism points to the encryption mechanism; hKey is the handle of the encryption key.

The CKA_ENCRYPT attribute of the encryption key, which indicates whether the key supports encryption, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_MessageEncryptInit**, the application can either call **C_EncryptMessage** to encrypt a message in a single part, or call **C_EncryptMessageBegin**, followed by **C_EncryptMessageNext** one or more times, to encrypt a message in multiple parts. This may be repeated several times. The message-based encryption process is active until the application calls **C_MessageEncryptFinal** to finish the message-based encryption process.

C_MessageEncryptInit can be called with *pMechanism* set to NULL_PTR to terminate a message-based encryption process. If a multi-part message encryption operation is active, it will also be terminated. If an active operation has been initialized and it cannot be cancelled, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED must be returned.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED.

5.9.2 C_EncryptMessage

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptMessage)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pAssociatedData,
  CK_ULONG ulAssociatedDataLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPlaintext,
  CK_ULONG ulPlaintextLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pCiphertext,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulCiphertextLen
);
```

C_EncryptMessage encrypts a message in a single part. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message encryption operation; *pAssociatedData* and *ulAssociatedDataLen* specify the associated data for an AEAD mechanism; *pPlaintext* points to the plaintext data; *ulPlaintextLen* is the length in bytes of the plaintext data; *pCiphertext* points to the location that receives the encrypted data; *pulCiphertextLen* points to the location that holds the length in bytes of the encrypted data.

Typically, *pParameter* is an initialization vector (IV) or nonce. Depending on the mechanism parameter passed to **C_MessageEncryptInit**, *pParameter* may be either an input or an output parameter. For example, if the mechanism parameter specifies an IV generator mechanism, the IV generated by the IV generator will be output to the *pParameter* buffer.

If the encryption mechanism is not AEAD, *pAssociatedData* and *ulAssociatedDataLen* are not used and should be set to (NULL, 0).

C_EncryptMessage uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The message-based encryption process MUST have been initialized with **C_MessageEncryptInit**. A call to **C_EncryptMessage** begins and terminates a message encryption operation.

C_EncryptMessage cannot be called in the middle of a multi-part message encryption operation.

For some encryption mechanisms, the input plaintext data has certain length constraints (either because the mechanism can only encrypt relatively short pieces of plaintext, or because the mechanism's input data MUST consist of an integral number of blocks). If these constraints are not satisfied, then **C_EncryptMessage** will fail with return code CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE. The plaintext and ciphertext can be in the same place, i.e., it is OK if *pPlaintext* and *pCiphertext* point to the same location.

For most mechanisms, **C_EncryptMessage** is equivalent to **C_EncryptMessageBegin** followed by a sequence of **C_EncryptMessageNext** operations.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

5.9.3 C_EncryptMessageBegin

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptMessageBegin)(
```

```
   CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
   CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
   CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,
   CK_BYTE_PTR pAssociatedData,
   CK_ULONG ulAssociatedDataLen
);
```

C_EncryptMessageBegin begins a multiple-part message encryption operation. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message encryption operation*; pAssociatedData* and *ulAssociatedDataLen* specify the associated data for an AEAD mechanism.

Typically, *pParameter* is an initialization vector (IV) or nonce. Depending on the mechanism parameter passed to **C_MessageEncryptInit**, *pParameter* may be either an input or an output parameter. For example, if the mechanism parameter specifies an IV generator mechanism, the IV generated by the IV generator will be output to the *pParameter* buffer.

If the mechanism is not AEAD, *pAssociatedData* and *ulAssociatedDataLen* are not used and should be set to (NULL, 0).

After calling **C_EncryptMessageBegin**, the application should call **C_EncryptMessageNext** one or more times to encrypt the message in multiple parts. The message encryption operation is active until the application uses a call to **C_EncryptMessageNext** with flags=CKF_END_OF_MESSAGE to actually obtain the final piece of ciphertext. To process additional messages (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_EncryptMessage** or **C_EncryptMessageBegin** again.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

5.9.4 C_EncryptMessageNext

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptMessageNext)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPlaintextPart,
  CK_ULONG ulPlaintextPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pCiphertextPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulCiphertextPartLen,
  CK_FLAGS flags
);
```

C_EncryptMessageNext continues a multiple-part message encryption operation, processing another message part. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message encryption operation; *pPlaintextPart* points to the plaintext message part; *ulPlaintextPartLen* is the length of the plaintext message part; *pCiphertextPart* points to the location that receives the encrypted message part; *pulCiphertextPartLen* points to the location that holds the length in bytes of the encrypted message part; flags is set to 0 if there is more plaintext data to follow, or set to CKF_END_OF_MESSAGE if this is the last plaintext part.

Typically, *pParameter* is an initialization vector (IV) or nonce. Depending on the mechanism parameter passed to **C_EncryptMessageNext**, *pParameter* may be either an input or an output parameter. For example, if the mechanism parameter specifies an IV generator mechanism, the IV generated by the IV generator will be output to the *pParameter* buffer.

C_EncryptMessageNext uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The message encryption operation MUST have been started with **C_EncryptMessageBegin**. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to C_EncryptMessageNext with flags=0 which results in an error other than CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL terminates the current message

encryption operation. A call to **C_EncryptMessageNext** with flags=CKF_END_OF_MESSAGE always terminates the active message encryption operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns **CKR_OK**) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the ciphertext.

Although the last **C_EncryptMessageNext** call ends the encryption of a message, it does not finish the message-based encryption process. Additional **C_EncryptMessage** or **C_EncryptMessageBegin** and **C_EncryptMessageNext** calls may be made on the session.

The plaintext and ciphertext can be in the same place, i.e., it is OK if *pPlaintextPart* and *pCiphertextPart* point to the same location.

For some multi-part encryption mechanisms, the input plaintext data has certain length constraints, because the mechanism's input data MUST consist of an integral number of blocks. If these constraints are not satisfied when the final message part is supplied (i.e., with flags=CKF_END_OF_MESSAGE), then **C_EncryptMessageNext** will fail with return code CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

5.9.5 C_MessageEncryptFinal

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_MessageEncryptFinal)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

C_MessageEncryptFinal finishes a message-based encryption process. hSession is the session's handle.

The message-based encryption process MUST have been initialized with **C_MessageEncryptInit**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```
#define PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ 200
#define AUTH_BUF_SZ 100
#define CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ 256

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_BYTE iv[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 };
CK_BYTE tag[16];
CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS gcmParams = {
  iv,
  sizeof(iv) * 8,
  0,
  CKG_NO_GENERATE,
  tag,
  sizeof(tag) * 8
```

```
};
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_AES_GCM, &gcmParams, sizeof(gcmParams)
};
CK_BYTE data[2][PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_BYTE auth[2][AUTH_BUF_SZ];
CK_BYTE encryptedData[2][CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, ulFirstEncryptedDataLen;
CK_ULONG firstPieceLen = PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ / 2;

/* error handling is omitted for better readability */
.
.
C_MessageEncryptInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
/* encrypt message en bloc with given IV */
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData[0]);
C_EncryptMessage(hSession,
  &gcmParams, sizeof(gcmParams),
  &auth[0][0], sizeof(auth[0]),
  &data[0][0], sizeof(data[0]),
  &encryptedData[0][0], &ulEncryptedDataLen);
/* iv and tag are set now for message */

/* encrypt message in two steps with generated IV */
gcmParams.ivGenerator = CKG_GENERATE;
C_EncryptMessageBegin(hSession,
  &gcmParams, sizeof(gcmParams),
  &auth[1][0], sizeof(auth[1])
);
/* encrypt first piece */
ulFirstEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData[1]);
C_EncryptMessageNext(hSession,
  &gcmParams, sizeof(gcmParams),
  &data[1][0], firstPieceLen,
  &encryptedData[1][0], &ulFirstEncryptedDataLen,
  0
);
/* encrypt second piece */
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData[1]) - ulFirstEncryptedDataLen;
C_EncryptMessageNext(hSession,
  &gcmParams, sizeof(gcmParams),
  &data[1][firstPieceLen], sizeof(data[1])-firstPieceLen,
  &encryptedData[1][ulFirstEncryptedDataLen], &ulEncryptedDataLen,
```



```
  CKF_END_OF_MESSAGE
);
/* tag is set now for message */

/* finalize */
C_MessageEncryptFinal(hSession);
```

5.10 Decryption functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for decrypting data:

5.10.1 C_DecryptInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the decryption mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the decryption key.

The **CKA_DECRYPT** attribute of the decryption key, which indicates whether the key supports decryption, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_DecryptInit**, the application can either call **C_Decrypt** to decrypt data in a single part; or call **C_DecryptUpdate** zero or more times, followed by **C_DecryptFinal**, to decrypt data in multiple parts. The decryption operation is active until the application uses a call to **C_Decrypt** or **C_DecryptFinal** *to actually obtain* the final piece of plaintext. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_DecryptInit** again.

C_DecryptInit can be called with *pMechanism* set to NULL_PTR to terminate an active decryption operation. If an active operation cannot be cancelled, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED must be returned.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED.

Example: see **C_DecryptFinal**.

5.10.2 C_Decrypt

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Decrypt)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
  CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen
);
```

C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pEncryptedData* points to the encrypted data; *ulEncryptedDataLen* is the length of the encrypted data; *pData* points to the

location that receives the recovered data; *pulDataLen* points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data.

C_Decrypt uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The decryption operation MUST have been initialized with **C_DecryptInit**. A call to **C_Decrypt** always terminates the active decryption operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (*i.e.*, one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the plaintext.

C_Decrypt cannot be used to terminate a multi-part operation, and MUST be called after **C_DecryptInit** without intervening **C_DecryptUpdate** calls.

The ciphertext and plaintext can be in the same place, *i.e.*, it is OK if *pEncryptedData* and *pData* point to the same location.

If the input ciphertext data cannot be decrypted because it has an inappropriate length, then either CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID or CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE may be returned.

For most mechanisms, **C_Decrypt** is equivalent to a sequence of **C_DecryptUpdate** operations followed by **C_DecryptFinal**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see **C_DecryptFinal** for an example of similar functions.

5.10.3 C_DecryptUpdate

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptUpdate)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
  CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen
);
```

C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation, processing another encrypted data part. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pEncryptedPart* points to the encrypted data part; *ulEncryptedPartLen* is the length of the encrypted data part; *pPart* points to the location that receives the recovered data part; *pulPartLen* points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data part.

C_DecryptUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The decryption operation MUST have been initialized with **C_DecryptInit**. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to **C_DecryptUpdate** which results in an error other than CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL terminates the current decryption operation.

The ciphertext and plaintext can be in the same place, *i.e.*, it is OK if *pEncryptedPart* and *pPart* point to the same location.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: See **C_DecryptFinal**.

5.10.4 C_DecryptFinal

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptFinal)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen
);
```

C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pLastPart* points to the location that receives the last recovered data part, if any; *pulLastPartLen* points to the location that holds the length of the last recovered data part.

C_DecryptFinal uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The decryption operation MUST have been initialized with **C_DecryptInit**. A call to **C_DecryptFinal** always terminates the active decryption operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (*i.e.*, one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the plaintext.

If the input ciphertext data cannot be decrypted because it has an inappropriate length, then either CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID or CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE may be returned.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```
#define CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ 256
#define PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ 256

CK_ULONG firstEncryptedPieceLen, secondEncryptedPieceLen;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_DES_CBC_PAD, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_BYTE data[PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_BYTE encryptedData[CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONG ulData1Len, ulData2Len, ulData3Len;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
firstEncryptedPieceLen = 90;
secondEncryptedPieceLen = CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ-firstEncryptedPieceLen;
rv = C_DecryptInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  /* Decrypt first piece */
  ulData1Len = sizeof(data);
```

```
  rv = C_DecryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &encryptedData[0], firstEncryptedPieceLen,
    &data[0], &ulData1Len);
  if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
  }

  /* Decrypt second piece */
  ulData2Len = sizeof(data)-ulData1Len;
  rv = C_DecryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &encryptedData[firstEncryptedPieceLen],
    secondEncryptedPieceLen,
    &data[ulData1Len], &ulData2Len);
  if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
  }

  /* Get last little decrypted bit */
  ulData3Len = sizeof(data)-ulData1Len-ulData2Len;
  rv = C_DecryptFinal(
    hSession,
    &data[ulData1Len+ulData2Len], &ulData3Len);
  if (rv != CKR_OK) {
     .
     .
  }
}
```

5.11 Message-based decryption functions

Message-based decryption refers to the process of decrypting multiple encrypted messages using the same decryption mechanism and decryption key. The decryption mechanism can be either an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithm or a pure encryption algorithm.

Cryptoki provides the following functions for message-based decryption.

5.11.1 C_MessageDecryptInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_MessageDecryptInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_MessageDecryptInit initializes a message-based decryption process, preparing a session for one or more decryption operations that use the same decryption mechanism and decryption key. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the decryption mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the decryption key.

The CKA_DECRYPT attribute of the decryption key, which indicates whether the key supports decryption, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_MessageDecryptInit**, the application can either call **C_DecryptMessage** to decrypt an encrypted message in a single part; or call **C_DecryptMessageBegin**, followed by **C_DecryptMessageNext** one or more times, to decrypt an encrypted message in multiple parts. This may be repeated several times. The message-based decryption process is active until the application uses a call to **C_MessageDecryptFinal** to finish the message-based decryption process.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED.

5.11.2 C_DecryptMessage

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptMessage)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pAssociatedData,
  CK_ULONG ulAssociatedDataLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pCiphertext,
  CK_ULONG ulCiphertextLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPlaintext,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulPlaintextLen
);
```

C_DecryptMessage decrypts an encrypted message in a single part. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message decryption operation; *pAssociatedData* and *ulAssociatedDataLen* specify the associated data for an AEAD mechanism; *pCiphertext* points to the encrypted message; *ulCiphertextLen* is the length of the encrypted message; *pPlaintext* points to the location that receives the recovered message; *pulPlaintextLen* points to the location that holds the length of the recovered message.

Typically, *pParameter* is an initialization vector (IV) or nonce. Unlike the *pParameter* parameter of **C_EncryptMessage**, *pParameter* is always an input parameter.

If the decryption mechanism is not AEAD, *pAssociatedData* and *ulAssociatedDataLen* are not used and should be set to (NULL, 0).

C_DecryptMessage uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The message-based decryption process MUST have been initialized with **C_MessageDecryptInit**. A call to **C_DecryptMessage** begins and terminates a message decryption operation.

C_DecryptMessage cannot be called in the middle of a multi-part message decryption operation.

The ciphertext and plaintext can be in the same place, i.e., it is OK if *pCiphertext* and *pPlaintext* point to the same location.

If the input ciphertext data cannot be decrypted because it has an inappropriate length, then either CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID or CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE may be returned.

If the decryption mechanism is an AEAD algorithm and the authenticity of the associated data or ciphertext cannot be verified, then CKR_AEAD_DECRYPT_FAILED is returned.

For most mechanisms, **C_DecryptMessage** is equivalent to **C_DecryptMessageBegin** followed by a sequence of **C_DecryptMessageNext** operations.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_AEAD_DECRYPT_FAILED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED.

5.11.3 C_DecryptMessageBegin

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptMessageBegin)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pAssociatedData,
  CK_ULONG ulAssociatedDataLen
);
```

C_DecryptMessageBegin begins a multiple-part message decryption operation. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message decryption operation; *pAssociatedData* and *ulAssociatedDataLen* specify the associated data for an AEAD mechanism.

Typically, *pParameter* is an initialization vector (IV) or nonce. Unlike the *pParameter* parameter of **C_EncryptMessageBegin**, *pParameter* is always an input parameter.

If the decryption mechanism is not AEAD, *pAssociatedData* and *ulAssociatedDataLen* are not used and should be set to (NULL, 0).

After calling **C_DecryptMessageBegin**, the application should call **C_DecryptMessageNext** one or more times to decrypt the encrypted message in multiple parts. The message decryption operation is active until the application uses a call to **C_DecryptMessageNext** with flags=CKF_END_OF_MESSAGE to actually obtain the final piece of plaintext. To process additional encrypted messages (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_DecryptMessage** or **C_DecryptMessageBegin** again.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

5.11.4 C_DecryptMessageNext

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptMessageNext)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pCiphertextPart,
  CK_ULONG ulCiphertextPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPlaintextPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulPlaintextPartLen,
  CK_FLAGS flags
);
```

C_DecryptMessageNext continues a multiple-part message decryption operation, processing another encrypted message part. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message decryption operation; *pCiphertextPart* points to the

encrypted message part; *ulCiphertextPartLen* is the length of the encrypted message part; *pPlaintextPart* points to the location that receives the recovered message part; *pulPlaintextPartLen* points to the location that holds the length of the recovered message part; flags is set to 0 if there is more ciphertext data to follow, or set to CKF_END_OF_MESSAGE if this is the last ciphertext part.

Typically, *pParameter* is an initialization vector (IV) or nonce. Unlike the *pParameter* parameter of **C_EncryptMessageNext**, *pParameter* is always an input parameter.

C_DecryptMessageNext uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The message decryption operation MUST have been started with **C_DecryptMessageBegin.** This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to **C_DecryptMessageNext** with flags=0 which results in an error other than CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL terminates the current message decryption operation. A call to **C_DecryptMessageNext** with flags=CKF_END_OF_MESSAGE always terminates the active message decryption operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the plaintext.

The ciphertext and plaintext can be in the same place, i.e., it is OK if *pCiphertextPart* and *pPlaintextPart* point to the same location.

Although the last **C_DecryptMessageNext** call ends the decryption of a message, it does not finish the message-based decryption process. Additional **C_DecryptMessage** or **C_DecryptMessageBegin** and **C_DecryptMessageNext c**alls may be made on the session.

If the input ciphertext data cannot be decrypted because it has an inappropriate length, then either CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID or CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE may be returned by the last **C_DecryptMessageNext** call.

If the decryption mechanism is an AEAD algorithm and the authenticity of the associated data or ciphertext cannot be verified, then CKR_AEAD_DECRYPT_FAILED is returned by the last **C_DecryptMessageNext** call.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_AEAD_DECRYPT_FAILED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

5.11.5 C_MessageDecryptFinal

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_MessageDecryptFinal)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

C_MessageDecryptFinal finishes a message-based decryption process. *hSession* is the session's handle.

The message-based decryption process MUST have been initialized with **C_MessageDecryptInit.**

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

5.12 Message digesting functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for digesting data:

5.12.1 C_DigestInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism
);
```

C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the digesting mechanism.

After calling **C_DigestInit**, the application can either call **C_Digest** to digest data in a single part; or call **C_DigestUpdate** zero or more times, followed by **C_DigestFinal**, to digest data in multiple parts. The message-digesting operation is active until the application uses a call to **C_Digest** or **C_DigestFinal** *to actually obtain* the message digest. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_DigestInit** again.

C_DigestInit can be called with *pMechanism* set to NULL_PTR to terminate an active message-digesting operation. If an operation has been initialized and it cannot be cancelled, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED must be returned.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED.

Example: see **C_DigestFinal**.

5.12.2 C_Digest

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Digest)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
  CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen
);
```

C_Digest digests data in a single part. *hSession* is the session's handle, *pData* points to the data; *ulDataLen* is the length of the data; *pDigest* points to the location that receives the message digest; *pulDigestLen* points to the location that holds the length of the message digest.

C_Digest uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The digest operation MUST have been initialized with **C_DigestInit**. A call to **C_Digest** always terminates the active digest operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (*i.e.*, one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the message digest.

C_Digest cannot be used to terminate a multi-part operation, and MUST be called after **C_DigestInit** without intervening **C_DigestUpdate** calls.

The input data and digest output can be in the same place, *i.e.*, it is OK if *pData* and *pDigest* point to the same location.

C_Digest is equivalent to a sequence of **C_DigestUpdate** operations followed by **C_DigestFinal**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see **C_DigestFinal** for an example of similar functions.

5.12.3 C_DigestUpdate

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestUpdate)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
  CK_ULONG ulPartLen
);
```

C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation, processing another data part. *hSession* is the session's handle, *pPart* points to the data part; *ulPartLen* is the length of the data part.

The message-digesting operation MUST have been initialized with **C_DigestInit**. Calls to this function and **C_DigestKey** may be interspersed any number of times in any order. A call to **C_DigestUpdate** which results in an error terminates the current digest operation.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see **C_DigestFinal**.

5.12.4 C_DigestKey

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestKey)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_DigestKey continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation by digesting the value of a secret key. *hSession* is the session's handle; *hKey* is the handle of the secret key to be digested.

The message-digesting operation MUST have been initialized with **C_DigestInit**. Calls to this function and **C_DigestUpdate** may be interspersed any number of times in any order.

If the value of the supplied key cannot be digested purely for some reason related to its length, **C_DigestKey** should return the error code CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see **C_DigestFinal**.

5.12.5 C_DigestFinal

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestFinal)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen
);
```

C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation, returning the message digest. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pDigest* points to the location that receives the message digest; *pulDigestLen* points to the location that holds the length of the message digest.

C_DigestFinal uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The digest operation MUST have been initialized with **C_DigestInit**. A call to **C_DigestFinal** always terminates the active digest operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful

call (*i.e.*, one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the message digest.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_MD5, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE data[] = {...};
CK_BYTE digest[16];
CK_ULONG ulDigestLen;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_DigestInit(hSession, &mechanism);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}

rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, data, sizeof(data));
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}

rv = C_DigestKey(hSession, hKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}

ulDigestLen = sizeof(digest);
rv = C_DigestFinal(hSession, digest, &ulDigestLen);
.
.
```

5.13 Signing and MACing functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for signing data (for the purposes of Cryptoki, these operations also encompass message authentication codes).

5.13.1 C_SignInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_SignInit initializes a signature operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the signature mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the signature key.

The **CKA_SIGN** attribute of the signature key, which indicates whether the key supports signatures with appendix, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_SignInit**, the application can either call **C_Sign** to sign in a single part; or call **C_SignUpdate** one or more times, followed by **C_SignFinal,** to sign data in multiple parts. The signature operation is active until the application uses a call to **C_Sign** or **C_SignFinal** *to actually obtain* the signature. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_SignInit** again.

C_SignInit can be called with *pMechanism* set to NULL_PTR to terminate an active signature operation. If an operation has been initialized and it cannot be cancelled, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED must be returned.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED,CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED.

Example: see **C_SignFinal**.

5.13.2 C_Sign

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Sign)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
  CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen
);
```

C_Sign signs data in a single part, where the signature is an appendix to the data. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pData* points to the data; *ulDataLen* is the length of the data; *pSignature* points to the location that receives the signature; *pulSignatureLen* points to the location that holds the length of the signature.

C_Sign uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The signing operation MUST have been initialized with **C_SignInit**. A call to **C_Sign** always terminates the active signing operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (*i.e.*, one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the signature.

C_Sign cannot be used to terminate a multi-part operation, and MUST be called after **C_SignInit** without intervening **C_SignUpdate** calls.

For most mechanisms, **C_Sign** is equivalent to a sequence of **C_SignUpdate** operations followed by **C_SignFinal**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

Example: see **C_SignFinal** for an example of similar functions.

5.13.3 C_SignUpdate

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignUpdate)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
  CK_ULONG ulPartLen
);
```

C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, processing another data part. *hSession* is the session's handle, *pPart* points to the data part; *ulPartLen* is the length of the data part.

The signature operation MUST have been initialized with **C_SignInit**. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to **C_SignUpdate** which results in an error terminates the current signature operation.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

Example: see **C_SignFinal**.

5.13.4 C_SignFinal

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignFinal)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen
);
```

C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, returning the signature. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pSignature* points to the location that receives the signature; *pulSignatureLen* points to the location that holds the length of the signature.

C_SignFinal uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The signing operation MUST have been initialized with **C_SignInit**. A call to **C_SignFinal** always terminates the active signing operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (*i.e.*, one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the signature.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID,

CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_DES_MAC, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE data[] = {...};
CK_BYTE mac[4];
CK_ULONG ulMacLen;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_SignInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  rv = C_SignUpdate(hSession, data, sizeof(data));
  .
  .
  ulMacLen = sizeof(mac);
  rv = C_SignFinal(hSession, mac, &ulMacLen);
  .
  .
}
```

5.13.5 C_SignRecoverInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignRecoverInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where the data can be recovered from the signature. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the structure that specifies the signature mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the signature key.

The **CKA_SIGN_RECOVER** attribute of the signature key, which indicates whether the key supports signatures where the data can be recovered from the signature, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_SignRecoverInit**, the application may call **C_SignRecover** to sign in a single part. The signature operation is active until the application uses a call to **C_SignRecover** *to actually obtain* the signature. To process additional data in a single part, the application MUST call **C_SignRecoverInit** again.

C_SignRecoverInit can be called with *pMechanism* set to NULL_PTR to terminate an active signature with data recovery operation. If an active operation has been initialized and it cannot be cancelled, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED must be returned.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED,

CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED.

Example: see **C_SignRecover**.

5.13.6 C_SignRecover

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignRecover)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
  CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen
);
```

C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the data can be recovered from the signature. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pData* points to the data; *uLDataLen* is the length of the data; *pSignature* points to the location that receives the signature; *pulSignatureLen* points to the location that holds the length of the signature.

C_SignRecover uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The signing operation MUST have been initialized with **C_SignRecoverInit**. A call to **C_SignRecover** always terminates the active signing operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (*i.e.*, one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the signature.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_RSA_9796, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE data[] = {...};
CK_BYTE signature[128];
CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_SignRecoverInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  ulSignatureLen = sizeof(signature);
```

```
  rv = C_SignRecover(
    hSession, data, sizeof(data), signature, &ulSignatureLen);
  if (rv == CKR_OK) {
     .
     .
  }
}
```

5.14 Message-based signing and MACing functions

Message-based signature refers to the process of signing multiple messages using the same signature mechanism and signature key.

Cryptoki provides the following functions for for signing messages (for the purposes of Cryptoki, these operations also encompass message authentication codes).

5.14.1 C_MessageSignInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_MessageSignInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_MessageSignInit initializes a message-based signature process, preparing a session for one or more signature operations (where the signature is an appendix to the data) that use the same signature mechanism and signature key. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the signature mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the signature key.

The **CKA_SIGN** attribute of the signature key, which indicates whether the key supports signatures with appendix, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_MessageSignInit**, the application can either call **C_SignMessage** to sign a message in a single part; or call **C_SignMessageBegin**, followed by **C_SignMessageNext** one or more times, to sign a message in multiple parts. This may be repeated several times. The message-based signature process is active until the application calls **C_MessageSignFinal** to finish the message-based signature process.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED,CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

5.14.2 C_SignMessage

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignMessage)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
  CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
```

```
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen
);
```

C_SignMessage signs a message in a single part, where the signature is an appendix to the message. **C_MessageSignInit** must previously been called on the session. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message signature operation; *pData* points to the data; *ulDataLen* is the length of the data; *pSignature* points to the location that receives the signature; *pulSignatureLen* points to the location that holds the length of the signature.

Depending on the mechanism parameter passed to **C_MessageSignInit**, *pParameter* may be either an input or an output parameter.

C_SignMessage uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The message-based signing process MUST have been initialized with **C_MessageSignInit**. A call to **C_SignMessage** begins and terminates a message signing operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the signature, or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK).

C_SignMessage cannot be called in the middle of a multi-part message signing operation.

C_SignMessage does not finish the message-based signing process. Additional **C_SignMessage** or **C_SignMessageBegin** and **C_SignMessageNext** calls may be made on the session.

For most mechanisms, **C_SignMessage** is equivalent to **C_SignMessageBegin** followed by a sequence of **C_SignMessageNext** operations.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

5.14.3 C_SignMessageBegin

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignMessageBegin)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen
);
```

C_SignMessageBegin begins a multiple-part message signature operation, where the signature is an appendix to the message. **C_MessageSignInit** must previously been called on the session. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message signature operation.

Depending on the mechanism parameter passed to **C_MessageSignInit**, *pParameter* may be either an input or an output parameter.

After calling **C_SignMessageBegin**, the application should call **C_SignMessageNext** one or more times to sign the message in multiple parts. The message signature operation is active until the application uses a call to **C_SignMessageNext** with a non-NULL *pulSignatureLen* to actually obtain the signature. To process additional messages (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_SignMessage** or **C_SignMessageBegin** again.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED,

CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

5.14.4 C_SignMessageNext

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignMessageNext)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pDataPart,
  CK_ULONG ulDataPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen
);
```

C_SignMessageNext continues a multiple-part message signature operation, processing another data part, or finishes a multiple-part message signature operation, returning the signature. *hSession* is the session's handle, *pDataPart* points to the data part; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message signature operation; *ulDataPartLen* is the length of the data part; *pSignature* points to the location that receives the signature; *pulSignatureLen* points to the location that holds the length of the signature.

The *pulSignatureLen* argument is set to NULL if there is more data part to follow, or set to a non-NULL value (to receive the signature length) if this is the last data part.

C_SignMessageNext uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The message signing operation MUST have been started with **C_SignMessageBegin**. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to **C_SignMessageNext** with a NULL *pulSignatureLen* which results in an error terminates the current message signature operation. A call to **C_SignMessageNext** with a non-NULL *pulSignatureLen* always terminates the active message signing operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the signature, or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK).

Although the last **C_SignMessageNext** call ends the signing of a message, it does not finish the message-based signing process. Additional **C_SignMessage** or **C_SignMessageBegin** and **C_SignMessageNext** calls may be made on the session.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

5.14.5 C_MessageSignFinal

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_MessageSignFinal)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

C_MessageSignFinal finishes a message-based signing process. *hSession* is the session's handle.

The message-based signing process MUST have been initialized with **C_MessageSignInit**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR,

CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

5.15 Functions for verifying signatures and MACs

Cryptoki provides the following functions for verifying signatures on data (for the purposes of Cryptoki, these operations also encompass message authentication codes):

5.15.1 C_VerifyInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the structure that specifies the verification mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the verification key.

The **CKA_VERIFY** attribute of the verification key, which indicates whether the key supports verification where the signature is an appendix to the data, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_VerifyInit**, the application can either call **C_Verify** to verify a signature on data in a single part; or call **C_VerifyUpdate** one or more times, followed by **C_VerifyFinal,** to verify a signature on data in multiple parts. The verification operation is active until the application calls **C_Verify** or **C_VerifyFinal**. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_VerifyInit** again.

C_VerifyInit can be called with *pMechanism* set to NULL_PTR to terminate an active verification operation. If an active operation has been initialized and it cannot be cancelled, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED must be returned.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED.

Example: see **C_VerifyFinal**.

5.15.2 C_Verify

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Verify)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
  CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
  CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen
);
```

C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pData* points to the data; *ulDataLen* is the length of the data; *pSignature* points to the signature; *ulSignatureLen* is the length of the signature.

The verification operation MUST have been initialized with **C_VerifyInit**. A call to **C_Verify** always terminates the active verification operation.

A successful call to **C_Verify** should return either the value CKR_OK (indicating that the supplied signature is valid) or CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (indicating that the supplied signature is invalid). If the

signature can be seen to be invalid purely on the basis of its length, then CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE should be returned. In any of these cases, the active signing operation is terminated.

C_Verify cannot be used to terminate a multi-part operation, and MUST be called after **C_VerifyInit** without intervening **C_VerifyUpdate** calls.

For most mechanisms, **C_Verify** is equivalent to a sequence of **C_VerifyUpdate** operations followed by **C_VerifyFinal**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

Example: see **C_VerifyFinal** for an example of similar functions.

5.15.3 C_VerifyUpdate

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyUpdate)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
  CK_ULONG ulPartLen
);
```

C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation, processing another data part. *hSession* is the session's handle, *pPart* points to the data part; *ulPartLen* is the length of the data part.

The verification operation MUST have been initialized with **C_VerifyInit**. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to **C_VerifyUpdate** which results in an error terminates the current verification operation.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

Example: see **C_VerifyFinal**.

5.15.4 C_VerifyFinal

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyFinal)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
  CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen
);
```

C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation, checking the signature. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pSignature* points to the signature; *ulSignatureLen* is the length of the signature.

The verification operation MUST have been initialized with **C_VerifyInit**. A call to **C_VerifyFinal** always terminates the active verification operation.

A successful call to **C_VerifyFinal** should return either the value CKR_OK (indicating that the supplied signature is valid) or CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (indicating that the supplied signature is invalid). If the signature can be seen to be invalid purely on the basis of its length, then CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE should be returned. In any of these cases, the active verifying operation is terminated.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY,

CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_DES_MAC, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE data[] = {...};
CK_BYTE mac[4];
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_VerifyInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  rv = C_VerifyUpdate(hSession, data, sizeof(data));
  .
  .
  rv = C_VerifyFinal(hSession, mac, sizeof(mac));
  .
  .
}
```

5.15.5 C_VerifyRecoverInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyRecoverInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the structure that specifies the verification mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the verification key.

The **CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER** attribute of the verification key, which indicates whether the key supports verification where the data is recovered from the signature, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_VerifyRecoverInit**, the application may call **C_VerifyRecover** to verify a signature on data in a single part. The verification operation is active until the application uses a call to **C_VerifyRecover** *to actually obtain* the recovered message.

C_VerifyRecoverInit can be called with *pMechanism* set to NULL_PTR to terminate an active verification with data recovery operation. If an active operations has been initialized and it cannot be cancelled, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED must be returned.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID,

CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED.

Example: see **C_VerifyRecover**.

5.15.6 C_VerifyRecover

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyRecover)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
  CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen
);
```

C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pSignature* points to the signature; *ulSignatureLen* is the length of the signature; *pData* points to the location that receives the recovered data; and *pulDataLen* points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data.

C_VerifyRecover uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The verification operation MUST have been initialized with **C_VerifyRecoverInit**. A call to **C_VerifyRecover** always terminates the active verification operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (*i.e.*, one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the recovered data.

A successful call to **C_VerifyRecover** should return either the value CKR_OK (indicating that the supplied signature is valid) or CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (indicating that the supplied signature is invalid). If the signature can be seen to be invalid purely on the basis of its length, then CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE should be returned. The return codes CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID and CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE have a higher priority than the return code CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, *i.e.*, if **C_VerifyRecover** is supplied with an invalid signature, it will never return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE, CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_RSA_9796, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE data[] = {...};
CK_ULONG ulDataLen;
CK_BYTE signature[128];
CK_RV rv;


.
```

```
.
rv = C_VerifyRecoverInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  ulDataLen = sizeof(data);
  rv = C_VerifyRecover(
    hSession, signature, sizeof(signature), data, &ulDataLen);
  .
  .
}
```

5.16 Message-based functions for verifying signatures and MACs

Message-based verification refers to the process of verifying signatures on multiple messages using the same verification mechanism and verification key.

Cryptoki provides the following functions for verifying signatures on messages (for the purposes of Cryptoki, these operations also encompass message authentication codes).

5.16.1 C_MessageVerifyInit

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_MessageVerifyInit)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_MessageVerifyInit initializes a message-based verification process, preparing a session for one or more verification operations (where the signature is an appendix to the data) that use the same verification mechanism and verification key. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the structure that specifies the verification mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the verification key.

The **CKA_VERIFY** attribute of the verification key, which indicates whether the key supports verification where the signature is an appendix to the data, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_MessageVerifyInit**, the application can either call **C_VerifyMessage** to verify a signature on a message in a single part; or call **C_VerifyMessageBegin**, followed by **C_VerifyMessageNext** one or more times, to verify a signature on a message in multiple parts. This may be repeated several times. The message-based verification process is active until the application calls **C_MessageVerifyFinal** to finish the message-based verification process.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

5.16.2 C_VerifyMessage

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyMessage)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
```

```
  CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
  CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen
);
```

C_VerifyMessage verifies a signature on a message in a single part operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data. **C_MessageVerifyInit** must previously been called on the session. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message verification operation; *pData* points to the data; *ulDataLen* is the length of the data; *pSignature* points to the signature; *ulSignatureLen* is the length of the signature.

Unlike the *pParameter* parameter of **C_SignMessage**, *pParameter* is always an input parameter.

The message-based verification process MUST have been initialized with **C_MessageVerifyInit**. A call to **C_VerifyMessage** starts and terminates a message verification operation.

A successful call to **C_VerifyMessage** should return either the value CKR_OK (indicating that the supplied signature is valid) or CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (indicating that the supplied signature is invalid). If the signature can be seen to be invalid purely on the basis of its length, then CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE should be returned.

C_VerifyMessage does not finish the message-based verification process. Additional **C_VerifyMessage** or **C_VerifyMessageBegin** and **C_VerifyMessageNext** calls may be made on the session.

For most mechanisms, **C_VerifyMessage** is equivalent to **C_VerifyMessageBegin** followed by a sequence of **C_VerifyMessageNext** operations.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

5.16.3 C_VerifyMessageBegin

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyMessageBegin)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen
);
```

C_VerifyMessageBegin begins a multiple-part message verification operation, where the signature is an appendix to the message. **C_MessageVerifyInit** must previously been called on the session. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message verification operation.

Unlike the *pParameter* parameter of **C_SignMessageBegin**, *pParameter* is always an input parameter.

After calling **C_VerifyMessageBegin**, the application should call **C_VerifyMessageNext** one or more times to verify a signature on a message in multiple parts. The message verification operation is active until the application calls **C_VerifyMessageNext** with a non-NULL *pSignature*. To process additional messages (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_VerifyMessage** or **C_VerifyMessageBegin** again.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

5.16.4 C_VerifyMessageNext

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyMessageNext)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,
  CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pDataPart,
  CK_ULONG ulDataPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
  CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen
);
```

C_VerifyMessageNext continues a multiple-part message verification operation, processing another data part, or finishes a multiple-part message verification operation, checking the signature. *hSession* is the session's handle, *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message verification operation, *pPart* points to the data part; *ulPartLen* is the length of the data part; *pSignature* points to the signature; *ulSignatureLen* is the length of the signature.

The *pSignature* argument is set to NULL if there is more data part to follow, or set to a non-NULL value (pointing to the signature to verify) if this is the last data part.

The message verification operation MUST have been started with **C_VerifyMessageBegin**. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to **C_VerifyMessageNext** with a NULL *pSignature* which results in an error terminates the current message verification operation. A call to **C_VerifyMessageNext** with a non-NULL *pSignature* always terminates the active message verification operation.

A successful call to **C_VerifyMessageNext** with a non-NULL *pSignature* should return either the value CKR_OK (indicating that the supplied signature is valid) or CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (indicating that the supplied signature is invalid). If the signature can be seen to be invalid purely on the basis of its length, then CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE should be returned. In any of these cases, the active message verifying operation is terminated.

Although the last **C_VerifyMessageNext** call ends the verification of a message, it does not finish the message-based verification process. Additional **C_VerifyMessage** or **C_VerifyMessageBegin** and **C_VerifyMessageNext** calls may be made on the session.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE, CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

5.16.5 C_MessageVerifyFinal

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV,C_MessageVerifyFinal)(
 CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

C_MessageVerifyFinal finishes a message-based verification process. *hSession* is the session's handle.

The message-based verification process MUST have been initialized with **C_MessageVerifyInit**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED,

CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID,
CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

5.17 Dual-function cryptographic functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions to perform two cryptographic operations “simultaneously” within a session. These functions are provided so as to avoid unnecessarily passing data back and forth to and from a token.

5.17.1 C_DigestEncryptUpdate

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestEncryptUpdate)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
  CK_ULONG ulPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen
);
```

C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues multiple-part digest and encryption operations, processing another data part. *hSession* is the session’s handle; *pPart* points to the data part; *ulPartLen* is the length of the data part; *pEncryptedPart* points to the location that receives the digested and encrypted data part; *pulEncryptedPartLen* points to the location that holds the length of the encrypted data part.

C_DigestEncryptUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output. If a **C_DigestEncryptUpdate** call does not produce encrypted output (because an error occurs, or because *pEncryptedPart* has the value NULL_PTR, or because *pulEncryptedPartLen* is too small to hold the entire encrypted part output), then no plaintext is passed to the active digest operation.

Digest and encryption operations MUST both be active (they MUST have been initialized with **C_DigestInit** and **C_EncryptInit,** respectively). This function may be called any number of times in succession, and may be interspersed with **C_DigestUpdate**, **C_DigestKey**, and **C_EncryptUpdate** calls (it would be somewhat unusual to intersperse calls to **C_DigestEncryptUpdate** with calls to **C_DigestKey**, however).

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```
#define BUF_SZ 512

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM digestMechanism = {
  CKM_MD5, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_MECHANISM encryptionMechanism = {
  CKM_DES_ECB, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_BYTE encryptedData[BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen;
```

```
CK_BYTE digest[16];
CK_ULONG ulDigestLen;
CK_BYTE data[(2*BUF_SZ)+8];
CK_RV rv;
int i;

.
.
memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
memset(data, 'A', ((2*BUF_SZ)+5));
rv = C_EncryptInit(hSession, &encryptionMechanism, hKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
rv = C_DigestInit(hSession, &digestMechanism);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}

ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_DigestEncryptUpdate(
  hSession,
  &data[0], BUF_SZ,
  encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
.
.
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_DigestEncryptUpdate(
  hSession,
  &data[BUF_SZ], BUF_SZ,
  encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
.
.

/*
 * The last portion of the buffer needs to be
 * handled with separate calls to deal with
 * padding issues in ECB mode
 */

/* First, complete the digest on the buffer */
```



```
rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, &data[BUF_SZ*2], 5);
.
.
ulDigestLen = sizeof(digest);
rv = C_DigestFinal(hSession, digest, &ulDigestLen);
.
.

/* Then, pad last part with 3 0x00 bytes, and complete encryption */
for(i=0;i<3;i++)
  data[((BUF_SZ*2)+5)+i] = 0x00;

/* Now, get second-to-last piece of ciphertext */
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_EncryptUpdate(
  hSession,
  &data[BUF_SZ*2], 8,
  encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
.
.

/* Get last piece of ciphertext (should have length 0, here) */
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_EncryptFinal(hSession, encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
.
.
```

5.17.2 C_DecryptDigestUpdate

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptDigestUpdate)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
  CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen
);
```

C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part combined decryption and digest operation, processing another data part. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pEncryptedPart* points to the encrypted data part; *ulEncryptedPartLen* is the length of the encrypted data part; *pPart* points to the location that receives the recovered data part; *pulPartLen* points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data part.

C_DecryptDigestUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output. If a **C_DecryptDigestUpdate** call does not produce decrypted output (because an error occurs, or because *pPart* has the value NULL_PTR, or because *pulPartLen* is too small to hold the entire decrypted part output), then no plaintext is passed to the active digest operation.

Decryption and digesting operations MUST both be active (they MUST have been initialized with **C_DecryptInit** and **C_DigestInit,** respectively). This function may be called any number of times in

succession, and may be interspersed with **C_DecryptUpdate**, **C_DigestUpdate**, and **C_DigestKey** calls (it would be somewhat unusual to intersperse calls to **C_DigestEncryptUpdate** with calls to **C_DigestKey**, however).

Use of **C_DecryptDigestUpdate** involves a pipelining issue that does not arise when using **C_DigestEncryptUpdate**, the "inverse function" of **C_DecryptDigestUpdate**. This is because when **C_DigestEncryptUpdate** is called, precisely the same input is passed to both the active digesting operation and the active encryption operation; however, when **C_DecryptDigestUpdate** is called, the input passed to the active digesting operation is the *output of* the active decryption operation. This issue comes up only when the mechanism used for decryption performs padding.

In particular, envision a 24-byte ciphertext which was obtained by encrypting an 18-byte plaintext with DES in CBC mode with PKCS padding. Consider an application which will simultaneously decrypt this ciphertext and digest the original plaintext thereby obtained.

After initializing decryption and digesting operations, the application passes the 24-byte ciphertext (3 DES blocks) into **C_DecryptDigestUpdate**. **C_DecryptDigestUpdate** returns exactly 16 bytes of plaintext, since at this point, Cryptoki doesn't know if there's more ciphertext coming, or if the last block of ciphertext held any padding. These 16 bytes of plaintext are passed into the active digesting operation.

Since there is no more ciphertext, the application calls **C_DecryptFinal**. This tells Cryptoki that there's no more ciphertext coming, and the call returns the last 2 bytes of plaintext. However, since the active decryption and digesting operations are linked *only* through the **C_DecryptDigestUpdate** call, these 2 bytes of plaintext are *not* passed on to be digested.

A call to **C_DigestFinal**, therefore, would compute the message digest of *the first 16 bytes of the plaintext*, not the message digest of the entire plaintext. It is crucial that, before **C_DigestFinal** is called, the last 2 bytes of plaintext get passed into the active digesting operation via a **C_DigestUpdate** call.

Because of this, it is critical that when an application uses a padded decryption mechanism with **C_DecryptDigestUpdate**, it knows exactly how much plaintext has been passed into the active digesting operation. *Extreme caution is warranted when using a padded decryption mechanism with **C_DecryptDigestUpdate**.*

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```
#define BUF_SZ 512

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM decryptionMechanism = {
  CKM_DES_ECB, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_MECHANISM digestMechanism = {
  CKM_MD5, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE encryptedData[(2*BUF_SZ)+8];
CK_BYTE digest[16];
CK_ULONG ulDigestLen;
CK_BYTE data[BUF_SZ];
```



```
CK_ULONG ulDataLen, ulLastUpdateSize;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
memset(encryptedData, 'A', ((2*BUF_SZ)+8));
rv = C_DecryptInit(hSession, &decryptionMechanism, hKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
rv = C_DigestInit(hSession, &digestMechanism);
if (rv != CKR_OK){
  .
  .
}

ulDataLen = sizeof(data);
rv = C_DecryptDigestUpdate(
  hSession,
  &encryptedData[0], BUF_SZ,
  data, &ulDataLen);
.
.
ulDataLen = sizeof(data);
rv = C_DecryptDigestUpdate(
  hSession,
  &encryptedData[BUF_SZ], BUF_SZ,
  data, &ulDataLen);
.
.

/*
 * The last portion of the buffer needs to be handled with
 * separate calls to deal with padding issues in ECB mode
 */

/* First, complete the decryption of the buffer */
ulLastUpdateSize = sizeof(data);
rv = C_DecryptUpdate(
  hSession,
  &encryptedData[BUF_SZ*2], 8,
```

```
  data, &ulLastUpdateSize);
.
.
/* Get last piece of plaintext (should have length 0, here) */
ulDataLen = sizeof(data)-ulLastUpdateSize;
rv = C_DecryptFinal(hSession, &data[ulLastUpdateSize], &ulDataLen);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}

/* Digest last bit of plaintext */
rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, data, 5);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
ulDigestLen = sizeof(digest);
rv = C_DigestFinal(hSession, digest, &ulDigestLen);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
```

5.17.3 C_SignEncryptUpdate

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignEncryptUpdate)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
  CK_ULONG ulPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen
);
```

C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part combined signature and encryption operation, processing another data part. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pPart* points to the data part; *ulPartLen* is the length of the data part; *pEncryptedPart* points to the location that receives the digested and encrypted data part; and *pulEncryptedPartLen* points to the location that holds the length of the encrypted data part.

C_SignEncryptUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output. If a **C_SignEncryptUpdate** call does not produce encrypted output (because an error occurs, or because *pEncryptedPart* has the value NULL_PTR, or because *pulEncryptedPartLen* is too small to hold the entire encrypted part output), then no plaintext is passed to the active signing operation.

Signature and encryption operations MUST both be active (they MUST have been initialized with **C_SignInit** and **C_EncryptInit,** respectively). This function may be called any number of times in succession, and may be interspersed with **C_SignUpdate** and **C_EncryptUpdate** calls.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK,

CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```
#define BUF_SZ 512

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, hMacKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM signMechanism = {
  CKM_DES_MAC, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_MECHANISM encryptionMechanism = {
  CKM_DES_ECB, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_BYTE encryptedData[BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen;
CK_BYTE MAC[4];
CK_ULONG ulMacLen;
CK_BYTE data[(2*BUF_SZ)+8];
CK_RV rv;
int i;

.
.
memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
memset(data, 'A', ((2*BUF_SZ)+5));
rv = C_EncryptInit(hSession, &encryptionMechanism, hEncryptionKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
rv = C_SignInit(hSession, &signMechanism, hMacKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}

ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_SignEncryptUpdate(
  hSession,
  &data[0], BUF_SZ,
  encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
.
```

```
.
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_SignEncryptUpdate(
  hSession,
  &data[BUF_SZ], BUF_SZ,
  encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
.
.

/*
 * The last portion of the buffer needs to be handled with
 * separate calls to deal with padding issues in ECB mode
 */

/* First, complete the signature on the buffer */
rv = C_SignUpdate(hSession, &data[BUF_SZ*2], 5);
.
.
ulMacLen = sizeof(MAC);
rv = C_SignFinal(hSession, MAC, &ulMacLen);
.
.

/* Then pad last part with 3 0x00 bytes, and complete encryption */
for(i=0;i<3;i++)
  data[((BUF_SZ*2)+5)+i] = 0x00;

/* Now, get second-to-last piece of ciphertext */
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_EncryptUpdate(
  hSession,
  &data[BUF_SZ*2], 8,
  encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
.
.

/* Get last piece of ciphertext (should have length 0, here) */
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_EncryptFinal(hSession, encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
.
.
```

5.17.4 C_DecryptVerifyUpdate

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
  CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen
);
```

C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part combined decryption and verification operation, processing another data part. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pEncryptedPart* points to the encrypted data; *ulEncryptedPartLen* is the length of the encrypted data; *pPart* points to the location that receives the recovered data; and *pulPartLen* points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data.

C_DecryptVerifyUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output. If a **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** call does not produce decrypted output (because an error occurs, or because *pPart* has the value NULL_PTR, or because *pulPartLen* is too small to hold the entire encrypted part output), then no plaintext is passed to the active verification operation.

Decryption and signature operations MUST both be active (they MUST have been initialized with **C_DecryptInit** and **C_VerifyInit,** respectively). This function may be called any number of times in succession, and may be interspersed with **C_DecryptUpdate** and **C_VerifyUpdate** calls.

Use of **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** involves a pipelining issue that does not arise when using **C_SignEncryptUpdate**, the "inverse function" of **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate**. This is because when **C_SignEncryptUpdate** is called, precisely the same input is passed to both the active signing operation and the active encryption operation; however, when **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** is called, the input passed to the active verifying operation is the *output of* the active decryption operation. This issue comes up only when the mechanism used for decryption performs padding.

In particular, envision a 24-byte ciphertext which was obtained by encrypting an 18-byte plaintext with DES in CBC mode with PKCS padding. Consider an application which will simultaneously decrypt this ciphertext and verify a signature on the original plaintext thereby obtained.

After initializing decryption and verification operations, the application passes the 24-byte ciphertext (3 DES blocks) into **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate**. **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** returns exactly 16 bytes of plaintext, since at this point, Cryptoki doesn't know if there's more ciphertext coming, or if the last block of ciphertext held any padding. These 16 bytes of plaintext are passed into the active verification operation.

Since there is no more ciphertext, the application calls **C_DecryptFinal**. This tells Cryptoki that there's no more ciphertext coming, and the call returns the last 2 bytes of plaintext. However, since the active decryption and verification operations are linked *only* through the **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** call, these 2 bytes of plaintext are *not* passed on to the verification mechanism.

A call to **C_VerifyFinal**, therefore, would verify whether or not the signature supplied is a valid signature on *the first 16 bytes of the plaintext*, not on the entire plaintext. It is crucial that, before **C_VerifyFinal** is called, the last 2 bytes of plaintext get passed into the active verification operation via a **C_VerifyUpdate** call.

Because of this, it is critical that when an application uses a padded decryption mechanism with **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate**, it knows exactly how much plaintext has been passed into the active verification operation. *Extreme caution is warranted when using a padded decryption mechanism with **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate**.*

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```
#define BUF_SZ 512
```

```
5775
5776  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
5777  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hDecryptionKey, hMacKey;
5778  CK_BYTE iv[8];
5779  CK_MECHANISM decryptionMechanism = {
5780    CKM_DES_ECB, iv, sizeof(iv)
5781  };
5782  CK_MECHANISM verifyMechanism = {
5783    CKM_DES_MAC, NULL_PTR, 0
5784  };
5785  CK_BYTE encryptedData[(2*BUF_SZ)+8];
5786  CK_BYTE MAC[4];
5787  CK_ULONG ulMacLen;
5788  CK_BYTE data[BUF_SZ];
5789  CK_ULONG ulDataLen, ulLastUpdateSize;
5790  CK_RV rv;
5791
5792  .
5793  .
5794  memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
5795  memset(encryptedData, 'A', ((2*BUF_SZ)+8));
5796  rv = C_DecryptInit(hSession, &decryptionMechanism, hDecryptionKey);
5797  if (rv != CKR_OK) {
5798    .
5799    .
5800  }
5801  rv = C_VerifyInit(hSession, &verifyMechanism, hMacKey);
5802  if (rv != CKR_OK){
5803    .
5804    .
5805  }
5806
5807  ulDataLen = sizeof(data);
5808  rv = C_DecryptVerifyUpdate(
5809    hSession,
5810    &encryptedData[0], BUF_SZ,
5811    data, &ulDataLen);
5812  .
5813  .
5814  ulDataLen = sizeof(data);
5815  rv = C_DecryptVerifyUpdate(
5816    hSession,
5817    &encryptedData[BUF_SZ], BUF_SZ,
```



```
  data, &ulDataLen);
.
.

/*
 * The last portion of the buffer needs to be handled with
 * separate calls to deal with padding issues in ECB mode
 */

/* First, complete the decryption of the buffer */
ulLastUpdateSize = sizeof(data);
rv = C_DecryptUpdate(
  hSession,
  &encryptedData[BUF_SZ*2], 8,
  data, &ulLastUpdateSize);
.
.
/* Get last little piece of plaintext.  Should have length 0 */
ulDataLen = sizeof(data)-ulLastUpdateSize;
rv = C_DecryptFinal(hSession, &data[ulLastUpdateSize], &ulDataLen);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}

/* Send last bit of plaintext to verification operation */
rv = C_VerifyUpdate(hSession, data, 5);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
rv = C_VerifyFinal(hSession, MAC, ulMacLen);
if (rv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID) {
  .
  .
}
```

5.18 Key management functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for key management:

5.18.1 C_GenerateKey

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateKey)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
```

```
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
  CK_ULONG ulCount,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey
);
```

C_GenerateKey generates a secret key or set of domain parameters, creating a new object. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the generation mechanism; *pTemplate* points to the template for the new key or set of domain parameters; *ulCount* is the number of attributes in the template; *phKey* points to the location that receives the handle of the new key or set of domain parameters.

If the generation mechanism is for domain parameter generation, the **CKA_CLASS** attribute will have the value CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS; otherwise, it will have the value CKO_SECRET_KEY.

Since the type of key or domain parameters to be generated is implicit in the generation mechanism, the template does not need to supply a key type. If it does supply a key type which is inconsistent with the generation mechanism, **C_GenerateKey** fails and returns the error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT. The CKA_CLASS attribute is treated similarly.

If a call to **C_GenerateKey** cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating an object.

The object created by a successful call to **C_GenerateKey** will have its **CKA_LOCAL** attribute set to CK_TRUE. In addition, the object created will have a value for CKA_UNIQUE_ID generated and assigned (See Section 4.4.1).

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_DES_KEY_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_GenerateKey(hSession, &mechanism, NULL_PTR, 0, &hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
```


5.18.2 C_GenerateKeyPair

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateKeyPair)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate,
  CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount,
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate,
  CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey
);
```

C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public/private key pair, creating new key objects. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the key generation mechanism; *pPublicKeyTemplate* points to the template for the public key; *ulPublicKeyAttributeCount* is the number of attributes in the public-key template; *pPrivateKeyTemplate* points to the template for the private key; *ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount* is the number of attributes in the private-key template; *phPublicKey* points to the location that receives the handle of the new public key; *phPrivateKey* points to the location that receives the handle of the new private key.

Since the types of keys to be generated are implicit in the key pair generation mechanism, the templates do not need to supply key types. If one of the templates does supply a key type which is inconsistent with the key generation mechanism, **C_GenerateKeyPair** fails and returns the error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT. The CKA_CLASS attribute is treated similarly.

If a call to **C_GenerateKeyPair** cannot support the precise templates supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating any key objects.

A call to **C_GenerateKeyPair** will never create just one key and return. A call can fail, and create no keys; or it can succeed, and create a matching public/private key pair.

The key objects created by a successful call to **C_GenerateKeyPair** will have their **CKA_LOCAL** attributes set to CK_TRUE. In addition, the key objects created will both have values for CKA_UNIQUE_ID generated and assigned (See Section 4.4.1).

*Note carefully the order of the arguments to **C_GenerateKeyPair**. The last two arguments do not have the same order as they did in the original Cryptoki Version 1.0 document. The order of these two arguments has caused some unfortunate confusion.*

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, hPrivateKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_ULONG modulusBits = 3072;
CK_BYTE publicExponent[] = { 3 };
```

```
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE publicKeyTemplate[] = {
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_WRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &modulusBits, sizeof(modulusBits)},
  {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, publicExponent, sizeof (publicExponent)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE privateKeyTemplate[] = {
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_PRIVATE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
  {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
  {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_UNWRAP, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_GenerateKeyPair(
  hSession, &mechanism,
  publicKeyTemplate, 5,
  privateKeyTemplate, 8,
  &hPublicKey, &hPrivateKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
```

5.18.3 C_WrapKey

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_WrapKey)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen
);
```

C_WrapKey wraps (*i.e.*, encrypts) a private or secret key. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the wrapping mechanism; *hWrappingKey* is the handle of the wrapping key; *hKey* is the handle of the key to be wrapped; *pWrappedKey* points to the location that receives the wrapped key; and *pulWrappedKeyLen* points to the location that receives the length of the wrapped key.

C_WrapKey uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The **CKA_WRAP** attribute of the wrapping key, which indicates whether the key supports wrapping, MUST be CK_TRUE. The **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute of the key to be wrapped MUST also be CK_TRUE.

If the key to be wrapped cannot be wrapped for some token-specific reason, despite its having its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then **C_WrapKey** fails with error code CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE. If it cannot be wrapped with the specified wrapping key and mechanism solely because of its length, then **C_WrapKey** fails with error code CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE.

C_WrapKey can be used in the following situations:

- To wrap any secret key with a public key that supports encryption and decryption.
- To wrap any secret key with any other secret key. Consideration MUST be given to key size and mechanism strength or the token may not allow the operation.
- To wrap a private key with any secret key.

Of course, tokens vary in which types of keys can actually be wrapped with which mechanisms.

To partition the wrapping keys so they can only wrap a subset of extractable keys the attribute CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE can be used on the wrapping key to specify an attribute set that will be compared against the attributes of the key to be wrapped. If all attributes match according to the C_FindObject rules of attribute matching then the wrap will proceed. The value of this attribute is an attribute template and the size is the number of items in the template times the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE. If this attribute is not supplied then any template is acceptable. If an attribute is not present, it will not be checked. If any attribute mismatch occurs on an attempt to wrap a key then the function SHALL return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID.

Return Values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_DES3_ECB, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE wrappedKey[8];
CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen;
CK_RV rv;

.
.
ulWrappedKeyLen = sizeof(wrappedKey);
rv = C_WrapKey(
  hSession, &mechanism,
  hWrappingKey, hKey,
```



```
  wrappedKey, &ulWrappedKeyLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
```

5.18.4 C_UnwrapKey

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_UnwrapKey)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
  CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen,
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
  CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey
);
```

C_UnwrapKey unwraps (*i.e.* decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new private key or secret key object. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the unwrapping mechanism; *hUnwrappingKey* is the handle of the unwrapping key; *pWrappedKey* points to the wrapped key; *ulWrappedKeyLen* is the length of the wrapped key; *pTemplate* points to the template for the new key; *ulAttributeCount* is the number of attributes in the template; *phKey* points to the location that receives the handle of the recovered key.

The **CKA_UNWRAP** attribute of the unwrapping key, which indicates whether the key supports unwrapping, MUST be CK_TRUE.

The new key will have the **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, and the **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE. The **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is by default set to CK_TRUE.

Some mechanisms may modify, or attempt to modify. the contents of the pMechanism structure at the same time that the key is unwrapped.

If a call to **C_UnwrapKey** cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating any key object.

The key object created by a successful call to **C_UnwrapKey** will have its **CKA_LOCAL** attribute set to CK_FALSE. In addition, the object created will have a value for CKA_UNIQUE_ID generated and assigned (See Section 4.4.1).

To partition the unwrapping keys so they can only unwrap a subset of keys the attribute CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE can be used on the unwrapping key to specify an attribute set that will be added to attributes of the key to be unwrapped. If the attributes do not conflict with the user supplied attribute template, in 'pTemplate', then the unwrap will proceed. The value of this attribute is an attribute template and the size is the number of items in the template times the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE. If this attribute is not present on the unwrapping key then no additional attributes will be added. If any attribute conflict occurs on an attempt to unwrap a key then the function SHALL return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE,

CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID, CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_DES3_ECB, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE wrappedKey[8] = {...};
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES;
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_UnwrapKey(
  hSession, &mechanism, hUnwrappingKey,
  wrappedKey, sizeof(wrappedKey), template, 4, &hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
```

5.18.5 C_DeriveKey

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DeriveKey)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey,
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
  CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey
);
```

C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to a structure that specifies the key derivation mechanism; *hBaseKey* is the handle of the base key; *pTemplate* points to the template for the new key; *ulAttributeCount* is the number of attributes in the template; and *phKey* points to the location that receives the handle of the derived key.

The values of the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes for the base key affect the values that these attributes can hold for the newly-derived key. See the description of each particular key-derivation mechanism in Section 5.21.2 for any constraints of this type.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating any key object.

The key object created by a successful call to **C_DeriveKey** will have its **CKA_LOCAL** attribute set to CK_FALSE. In addition, the object created will have a value for CKA_UNIQUE_ID generated and assigned (See Section 4.4.1).

To partition the derivation keys so they can only derive a subset of keys the attribute CKA_DERIVE_TEMPLATE can be used on the derivation keys to specify an attribute set that will be added to attributes of the key to be derived. If the attributes do not conflict with the user supplied attribute template, in 'pTemplate', then the derivation will proceed. The value of this attribute is an attribute template and the size is the number of items in the template times the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE. If this attribute is not present on the base derivation keys then no additional attributes will be added. If any attribute conflict occurs on an attempt to derive a key then the function SHALL return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, hPrivateKey, hKey;
CK_MECHANISM keyPairMechanism = {
  CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE publicValue[128];
CK_BYTE otherPublicValue[128];
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
  CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, otherPublicValue, sizeof(otherPublicValue)
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_VALUE, &publicValue, sizeof(publicValue)}
};
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES;
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE publicKeyTemplate[] = {
```



```
  {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
  {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE privateKeyTemplate[] = {
  {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE derivedKeyTemplate[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_GenerateKeyPair(
  hSession, &keyPairMechanism,
  publicKeyTemplate, 2,
  privateKeyTemplate, 1,
  &hPublicKey, &hPrivateKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  rv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hPublicKey, template, 1);
  if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    /* Put other guy's public value in otherPublicValue */
    .
    .
    rv = C_DeriveKey(
      hSession, &mechanism,
      hPrivateKey, derivedKeyTemplate, 4, &hKey);
    if (rv == CKR_OK) {
      .
      .
    }
  }
}
```

5.19 Random number generation functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for generating random numbers:

5.19.1 C_SeedRandom

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SeedRandom)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
```

```
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed,
  CK_ULONG ulSeedLen
);
```

C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number generator. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pSeed* points to the seed material; and *ulSeedLen* is the length in bytes of the seed material.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see **C_GenerateRandom**.

5.19.2 C_GenerateRandom

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateRandom)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData,
  CK_ULONG ulRandomLen
);
```

C_GenerateRandom generates random or pseudo-random data. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pRandomData* points to the location that receives the random data; and *ulRandomLen* is the length in bytes of the random or pseudo-random data to be generated.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_BYTE seed[] = {...};
CK_BYTE randomData[] = {...};
CK_RV rv;

.
.
rv = C_SeedRandom(hSession, seed, sizeof(seed));
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
rv = C_GenerateRandom(hSession, randomData, sizeof(randomData));
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
```

5.20 Parallel function management functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for managing parallel execution of cryptographic functions. These functions exist only for backwards compatibility.

5.20.1 C_GetFunctionStatus

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetFunctionStatus)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

In previous versions of Cryptoki, **C_GetFunctionStatus** obtained the status of a function running in parallel with an application. Now, however, **C_GetFunctionStatus** is a legacy function which should simply return the value CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED.

5.20.2 C_CancelFunction

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CancelFunction)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

In previous versions of Cryptoki, **C_CancelFunction** cancelled a function running in parallel with an application. Now, however, **C_CancelFunction** is a legacy function which should simply return the value CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED.

5.21 Callback functions

Cryptoki sessions can use function pointers of type **CK_NOTIFY** to notify the application of certain events.

5.21.1 Surrender callbacks

Cryptographic functions (*i.e.*, any functions falling under one of these categories: encryption functions; decryption functions; message digesting functions; signing and MACing functions; functions for verifying signatures and MACs; dual-purpose cryptographic functions; key management functions; random number generation functions) executing in Cryptoki sessions can periodically surrender control to the application who called them if the session they are executing in had a notification callback function associated with it when it was opened. They do this by calling the session's callback with the arguments (hSession, CKN_SURRENDER, pApplication), where hSession is the session's handle and pApplication was supplied to **C_OpenSession** when the session was opened. Surrender callbacks should return either the value CKR_OK (to indicate that Cryptoki should continue executing the function) or the value CKR_CANCEL (to indicate that Cryptoki should abort execution of the function). Of course, before returning one of these values, the callback function can perform some computation, if desired.

A typical use of a surrender callback might be to give an application user feedback during a lengthy key pair generation operation. Each time the application receives a callback, it could display an additional "." to the user. It might also examine the keyboard's activity since the last surrender callback, and abort the key pair generation operation (probably by returning the value CKR_CANCEL) if the user hit <ESCAPE>.

A Cryptoki library is not *required* to make *any* surrender callbacks.

5.21.2 Vendor-defined callbacks

Library vendors can also define additional types of callbacks. Because of this extension capability, application-supplied notification callback routines should examine each callback they receive, and if they are unfamiliar with the type of that callback, they should immediately give control back to the library by returning with the value CKR_OK.

6 Mechanisms

6.1 RSA

Table 32, Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_RSA_PKCS	✓[2]	✓[2]	✓			✓	
CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP	✓[2]					✓	
CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓[2]					
CKM_RSA_9796		✓[2]	✓				
CKM_RSA_X_509	✓[2]	✓[2]	✓			✓	
CKM_RSA_X9_31		✓[2]					
CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31		✓					
CKM_RSA_PKCS_TPM_1_1	✓[2]					✓	
CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_TPM_1_1	✓[2]					✓	
CKM_SHA3_224_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA3_256_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA3_384_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA3_512_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA3_224_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA3_256_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA3_384_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA3_512_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					

6.1.1 Definitions

This section defines the RSA key type “CKK_RSA” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of RSA key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN

CKM_RSA_PKCS

CKM_RSA_9796

CKM_RSA_X_509
CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS
CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS
CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS
CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS
CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS
CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS
CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS
CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS
CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS
CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP
CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN
CKM_RSA_X9_31
CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31
CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS
CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS
CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS
CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS
CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS
CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS
CKM_RSA_PKCS_TPM_1_1
CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_TPM_1_1
CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP
CKM_SHA3_224_RSA_PKCS
CKM_SHA3_256_RSA_PKCS
CKM_SHA3_384_RSA_PKCS
CKM_SHA3_512_RSA_PKCS
CKM_SHA3_224_RSA_PKCS_PSS
CKM_SHA3_256_RSA_PKCS_PSS
CKM_SHA3_384_RSA_PKCS_PSS
CKM_SHA3_512_RSA_PKCS_PSS

6.1.2 RSA public key objects

RSA public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,** key type **CKK_RSA**) hold RSA public keys. The following table defines the RSA public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 33, RSA Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_MODULUS[1,4]	Big integer	Modulus *n*
CKA_MODULUS_BITS[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length in bits of modulus *n*
CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT[1]	Big integer	Public exponent *e*

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of key components. See PKCS #1 for more information on RSA keys.

The following is a sample template for creating an RSA public key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An RSA public key object";
CK_BYTE modulus[] = {...};
CK_BYTE exponent[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_WRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_MODULUS, modulus, sizeof(modulus)},
  {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, exponent, sizeof(exponent)}
};
```

6.1.3 RSA private key objects

RSA private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,** key type **CKK_RSA**) hold RSA private keys. The following table defines the RSA private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 34, RSA Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_MODULUS[1,4,6]	Big integer	Modulus *n*
CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT[1,4,6]	Big integer	Public exponent *e*
CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT[1,4,6,7]	Big integer	Private exponent *d*
CKA_PRIME_1[4,6,7]	Big integer	Prime *p*
CKA_PRIME_2[4,6,7]	Big integer	Prime *q*
CKA_EXPONENT_1[4,6,7]	Big integer	Private exponent *d* modulo *p*-1
CKA_EXPONENT_2[4,6,7]	Big integer	Private exponent *d* modulo *q*-1
CKA_COEFFICIENT[4,6,7]	Big integer	CRT coefficient q^{-1} mod *p*

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See PKCS #1 for more information on RSA keys.

Tokens vary in what they actually store for RSA private keys. Some tokens store all of the above attributes, which can assist in performing rapid RSA computations. Other tokens might store only the **CKA_MODULUS** and **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT** values. Effective with version 2.40, tokens MUST also store **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT**. This permits the retrieval of sufficient data to reconstitute the associated public key.

Because of this, Cryptoki is flexible in dealing with RSA private key objects. When a token generates an RSA private key, it stores whichever of the fields in Table 34 it keeps track of. Later, if an application asks for the values of the key's various attributes, Cryptoki supplies values only for attributes whose values it can obtain (*i.e.*, if Cryptoki is asked for the value of an attribute it cannot obtain, the request fails). Note that a Cryptoki implementation may or may not be able and/or willing to supply various attributes of RSA private keys which are not actually stored on the token. *E.g.*, if a particular token stores

values only for the **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIME_1**, and **CKA_PRIME_2** attributes, then Cryptoki is certainly *able* to report values for all the attributes above (since they can all be computed efficiently from these three values). However, a Cryptoki implementation may or may not actually do this extra computation. The only attributes from Table 34 for which a Cryptoki implementation is *required* to be able to return values are **CKA_MODULUS, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** and **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT**. A token SHOULD also be able to return **CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO** for an RSA private key.

If an RSA private key object is created on a token, and more attributes from Table 34 are supplied to the object creation call than are supported by the token, the extra attributes are likely to be thrown away. If an attempt is made to create an RSA private key object on a token with insufficient attributes for that particular token, then the object creation call fails and returns CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE.

Note that when generating an RSA private key, there is no **CKA_MODULUS_BITS** attribute specified. This is because RSA private keys are only generated as part of an RSA key *pair*, and the **CKA_MODULUS_BITS** attribute for the pair is specified in the template for the RSA public key.

The following is a sample template for creating an RSA private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An RSA private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE modulus[] = {...};
CK_BYTE publicExponent[] = {...};
CK_BYTE privateExponent[] = {...};
CK_BYTE prime1[] = {...};
CK_BYTE prime2[] = {...};
CK_BYTE exponent1[] = {...};
CK_BYTE exponent2[] = {...};
CK_BYTE coefficient[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
  {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
  {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_MODULUS, modulus, sizeof(modulus)},
  {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, publicExponent,
       sizeof(publicExponent)},
  {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, privateExponent,
       sizeof(privateExponent)},
  {CKA_PRIME_1, prime1, sizeof(prime1)},
  {CKA_PRIME_2, prime2, sizeof(prime2)},
  {CKA_EXPONENT_1, exponent1, sizeof(exponent1)},
  {CKA_EXPONENT_2, exponent2, sizeof(exponent2)},
  {CKA_COEFFICIENT, coefficient, sizeof(coefficient)}
```



```
};
```

6.1.4 PKCS #1 RSA key pair generation

The PKCS #1 RSA key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem, as defined in PKCS #1.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates RSA public/private key pairs with a particular modulus length in bits and public exponent, as specified in the **CKA_MODULUS_BITS** and **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** attributes of the template for the public key. The **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** may be omitted in which case the mechanism shall supply the public exponent attribute using the default value of 0x10001 (65537). Specific implementations may use a random value or an alternative default if 0x10001 cannot be used by the token.

Note: Implementations strictly compliant with version 2.11 or prior versions may generate an error if this attribute is omitted from the template. Experience has shown that many implementations of 2.11 and prior did allow the **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** attribute to be omitted from the template, and behaved as described above. The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_MODULUS**, and **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** attributes to the new public key. **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** will be copied from the template if supplied. **CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT** shall be returned if the implementation cannot use the supplied exponent value. It contributes the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attributes to the new private key; it may also contribute some of the following attributes to the new private key: **CKA_MODULUS**, **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIME_1**, **CKA_PRIME_2**, **CKA_EXPONENT_1**, **CKA_EXPONENT_2**, **CKA_COEFFICIENT**. Other attributes supported by the RSA public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) may also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.5 X9.31 RSA key pair generation

The X9.31 RSA key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem, as defined in X9.31.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates RSA public/private key pairs with a particular modulus length in bits and public exponent, as specified in the **CKA_MODULUS_BITS** and **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** attributes of the template for the public key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_MODULUS**, and **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** attributes to the new public key. It contributes the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attributes to the new private key; it may also contribute some of the following attributes to the new private key: **CKA_MODULUS**, **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIME_1**, **CKA_PRIME_2**, **CKA_EXPONENT_1**, **CKA_EXPONENT_2**, **CKA_COEFFICIENT**. Other attributes supported by the RSA public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) may also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values. Unlike the **CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN** mechanism, this mechanism is guaranteed to generate *p* and *q* values, **CKA_PRIME_1** and **CKA_PRIME_2** respectively, that meet the strong primes requirement of X9.31.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.6 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA

The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS**, is a multi-purpose mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the block formats initially defined in PKCS #1 v1.5. It supports

single-part encryption and decryption; single-part signatures and verification with and without message recovery; key wrapping; and key unwrapping. This mechanism corresponds only to the part of PKCS #1 v1.5 that involves RSA; it does not compute a message digest or a DigestInfo encoding as specified for the md2withRSAEncryption and md5withRSAEncryption algorithms in PKCS #1 v1.5 .

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key of appropriate length. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every appropriate-length secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the "input" to the encryption operation is the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped; similarly for unwrapping. The mechanism does not wrap the key type or any other information about the key, except the key length; the application must convey these separately. In particular, the mechanism contributes only the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_VALUE** (and **CKA_VALUE_LEN**, if the key has it) attributes to the recovered key during unwrapping; other attributes must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. For encryption, decryption, signatures and signature verification, the input and output data may begin at the same location in memory. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 35, PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt[1]	RSA public key	≤ *k*-11	*k*	block type 02
C_Decrypt[1]	RSA private key	*k*	≤ *k*-11	block type 02
C_Sign[1]	RSA private key	≤ *k*-11	*k*	block type 01
C_SignRecover	RSA private key	≤ *k*-11	*k*	block type 01
C_Verify[1]	RSA public key	≤ *k*-11, *k*[2]	N/A	block type 01
C_VerifyRecover	RSA public key	*k*	≤ *k*-11	block type 01
C_WrapKey	RSA public key	≤ *k*-11	*k*	block type 02
C_UnwrapKey	RSA private key	*k*	≤ *k*-11	block type 02

1 Single-part operations only.

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.7 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism parameters

♦ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR

CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Mask Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme or the PKCS #1 PSS signature scheme. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE;
```

The following MGFs are defined in PKCS #1. The following table lists the defined functions.

Table 36, PKCS #1 Mask Generation Functions

Source Identifier	Value
CKG_MGF1_SHA1	0x00000001UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA224	0x00000005UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA256	0x00000002UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA384	0x00000003UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA512	0x00000004UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA3_224	0x00000006UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA3_256	0x00000007UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA3_384	0x00000008UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA3_512	0x00000009UL

CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE**.

♦ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR

CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE;
```

The following encoding parameter sources are defined in PKCS #1. The following table lists the defined sources along with the corresponding data type for the *pSourceData* field in the **CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS** structure defined below.

Table 37, PKCS #1 RSA OAEP: Encoding parameter sources

Source Identifier	Value	Data Type
CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED	0x00000001UL	Array of CK_BYTE containing the value of the encoding parameter. If the parameter is empty, *pSourceData* must be NULL and *ulSourceDataLen* must be zero.

CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE**.

♦ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR

CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP** mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS {
   CK_MECHANISM_TYPE            hashAlg;
   CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE         mgf;
   CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source;
   CK_VOID_PTR                  pSourceData;
   CK_ULONG                     ulSourceDataLen;
}  CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

hashAlg	mechanism ID of the message digest algorithm used to calculate the digest of the encoding parameter
mgf	mask generation function to use on the encoded block

source	source of the encoding parameter
pSourceData	data used as the input for the encoding parameter source
ulSourceDataLen	length of the encoding parameter source input

CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS**.

6.1.8 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP

The PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP**, is a multi-purpose mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the OAEP block format defined in PKCS #1. It supports single-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key of appropriate length. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every appropriate-length secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the "input" to the encryption operation is the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped; similarly for unwrapping. The mechanism does not wrap the key type or any other information about the key, except the key length; the application must convey these separately. In particular, the mechanism contributes only the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_VALUE** (and **CKA_VALUE_LEN**, if the key has it) attributes to the recovered key during unwrapping; other attributes must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. For encryption and decryption, the input and output data may begin at the same location in memory. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus, and *hLen* is the output length of the message digest algorithm specified by the *hashAlg* field of the **CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS** structure.

Table 38, PKCS #1 RSA OAEP: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt[1]	RSA public key	≤ *k*-2-2*hLen*	*k*
C_Decrypt[1]	RSA private key	*k*	≤ *k*-2-2*hLen*
C_WrapKey	RSA public key	≤ *k*-2-2*hLen*	*k*
C_UnwrapKey	RSA private key	*k*	≤ *k*-2-2*hLen*

1 Single-part operations only.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.9 PKCS #1 RSA PSS mechanism parameters

♦ CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR

CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS** mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS {
   CK_MECHANISM_TYPE    hashAlg;
   CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
   CK_ULONG             sLen;
}  CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

	hashAlg	hash algorithm used in the PSS encoding; if the signature mechanism does not include message hashing, then this value must be the mechanism used by the application to generate the message hash; if the signature mechanism includes hashing, then this value must match the hash algorithm indicated by the signature mechanism
	mgf	mask generation function to use on the encoded block
	sLen	length, in bytes, of the salt value used in the PSS encoding; typical values are the length of the message hash and zero

CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS**.

6.1.10 PKCS #1 RSA PSS

The PKCS #1 RSA PSS mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, is a mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the PSS block format defined in PKCS #1. It supports single-part signature generation and verification without message recovery. This mechanism corresponds only to the part of PKCS #1 that involves block formatting and RSA, given a hash value; it does not compute a hash value on the message to be signed.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS** structure. The *sLen* field must be less than or equal to *k**-2-*hLen* and *hLen* is the length of the input to the C_Sign or C_Verify function. *k** is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus, except if the length in bits of the RSA modulus is one more than a multiple of 8, in which case *k** is one less than the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA.

Table 39, PKCS #1 RSA PSS: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign[1]	RSA private key	*hLen*	*k*
C_Verify[1]	RSA public key	*hLen*, *k*	N/A

1 Single-part operations only.

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.11 ISO/IEC 9796 RSA

The ISO/IEC 9796 RSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_9796**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification with and without message recovery based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the block formats defined in ISO/IEC 9796 and its annex A.

This mechanism processes only byte strings, whereas ISO/IEC 9796 operates on bit strings. Accordingly, the following transformations are performed:

- Data is converted between byte and bit string formats by interpreting the most-significant bit of the leading byte of the byte string as the leftmost bit of the bit string, and the least-significant bit of the trailing byte of the byte string as the rightmost bit of the bit string (this assumes the length in bits of the data is a multiple of 8).
- A signature is converted from a bit string to a byte string by padding the bit string on the left with 0 to 7 zero bits so that the resulting length in bits is a multiple of 8, and converting the resulting bit string as above; it is converted from a byte string to a bit string by converting the byte string as above, and removing bits from the left so that the resulting length in bits is the same as that of the RSA modulus.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 40, ISO/IEC 9796 RSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign[1]	RSA private key	≤ ⌊*k*/2⌋	*k*
C_SignRecover	RSA private key	≤ ⌊*k*/2⌋	*k*
C_Verify[1]	RSA public key	≤ ⌊*k*/2⌋, *k*[2]	N/A
C_VerifyRecover	RSA public key	*k*	≤ ⌊*k*/2⌋

1 Single-part operations only.

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.12 X.509 (raw) RSA

The X.509 (raw) RSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_X_509**, is a multi-purpose mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem. It supports single-part encryption and decryption; single-part signatures and verification with and without message recovery; key wrapping; and key unwrapping. All these operations are based on so-called "raw" RSA, as assumed in X.509.

"Raw" RSA as defined here encrypts a byte string by converting it to an integer, most-significant byte first, applying "raw" RSA exponentiation, and converting the result to a byte string, most-significant byte first. The input string, considered as an integer, must be less than the modulus; the output string is also less than the modulus.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key of appropriate length. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every appropriate-length secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the "input" to the encryption operation is the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped; similarly for unwrapping. The mechanism does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately, and supply them when unwrapping the key.

Unfortunately, X.509 does not specify how to perform padding for RSA encryption. For this mechanism, padding should be performed by prepending plaintext data with 0-valued bytes. In effect, to encrypt the sequence of plaintext bytes $b_1\ b_2\ \ldots\ b_n$ ($n \le k$), Cryptoki forms $P=2^{n-1}b_1+2^{n-2}b_2+\ldots+b_n$. This number must be less than the RSA modulus. The *k*-byte ciphertext (*k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus) is produced by raising P to the RSA public exponent modulo the RSA modulus. Decryption of a *k*-byte ciphertext C is accomplished by raising C to the RSA private exponent modulo the RSA modulus, and returning the resulting value as a sequence of exactly *k* bytes. If the resulting plaintext is to be used to produce an unwrapped key, then however many bytes are specified in the template for the length of the key are taken *from the end* of this sequence of bytes.

Technically, the above procedures may differ very slightly from certain details of what is specified in X.509.

Executing cryptographic operations using this mechanism can result in the error returns CKR_DATA_INVALID (if plaintext is supplied which has the same length as the RSA modulus and is numerically at least as large as the modulus) and CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID (if ciphertext is supplied which has the same length as the RSA modulus and is numerically at least as large as the modulus).

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 41, X.509 (Raw) RSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt[1]	RSA public key	≤ *k*	*k*
C_Decrypt[1]	RSA private key	*k*	*k*
C_Sign[1]	RSA private key	≤ *k*	*k*
C_SignRecover	RSA private key	≤ *k*	*k*
C_Verify[1]	RSA public key	≤ *k*, *k*[2]	N/A
C_VerifyRecover	RSA public key	*k*	*k*
C_WrapKey	RSA public key	≤ *k*	*k*
C_UnwrapKey	RSA private key	*k*	≤ *k* (specified in template)

1 Single-part operations only.

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

This mechanism is intended for compatibility with applications that do not follow the PKCS #1 or ISO/IEC 9796 block formats.

6.1.13 ANSI X9.31 RSA

The ANSI X9.31 RSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_X9_31**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification without message recovery based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the block formats defined in ANSI X9.31.

This mechanism applies the header and padding fields of the hash encapsulation. The trailer field must be applied by the application.

This mechanism processes only byte strings, whereas ANSI X9.31 operates on bit strings. Accordingly, the following transformations are performed:

- Data is converted between byte and bit string formats by interpreting the most-significant bit of the leading byte of the byte string as the leftmost bit of the bit string, and the least-significant bit of the trailing byte of the byte string as the rightmost bit of the bit string (this assumes the length in bits of the data is a multiple of 8).
- A signature is converted from a bit string to a byte string by padding the bit string on the left with 0 to 7 zero bits so that the resulting length in bits is a multiple of 8, and converting the resulting bit string as above; it is converted from a byte string to a bit string by converting the byte string as above, and removing bits from the left so that the resulting length in bits is the same as that of the RSA modulus.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus. For all operations, the *k* value must be at least 128 and a multiple of 32 as specified in ANSI X9.31.

Table 42, ANSI X9.31 RSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign[1]	RSA private key	≤ *k*-2	*k*
C_Verify[1]	RSA public key	≤ *k*-2, *k*[2]	N/A

1 Single-part operations only.

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.14 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, RIPE-MD 128 or RIPE-MD 160

The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD2 mechanism, denoted **CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS**, performs single- and multiple-part digital signatures and verification operations without message recovery. The operations performed are as described initially in PKCS #1 v1.5 with the object identifier md2WithRSAEncryption, and as in the scheme RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 in the current version of PKCS #1, where the underlying hash function is MD2.

Similarly, the PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD5 mechanism, denoted **CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS**, performs the same operations described in PKCS #1 with the object identifier md5WithRSAEncryption. The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS**, performs the same operations, except that it uses the hash function SHA-1 with object identifier sha1WithRSAEncryption.

Likewise, the PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 mechanisms, denoted **CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS**, **CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS**, and **CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS** respectively, perform the same operations using the SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 hash functions with the object identifiers sha256WithRSAEncryption, sha384WithRSAEncryption and sha512WithRSAEncryption respectively.

The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with RIPEMD-128 or RIPEMD-160, denoted **CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS** and **CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS** respectively, perform the same operations using the RIPE-MD 128 and RIPE-MD 160 hash functions.

None of these mechanisms has a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data for these mechanisms are summarized in the following table. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus. For the PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD2 and PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD5 mechanisms, *k* must be at least 27; for the PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-1 mechanism, *k* must be at least 31, and so on for other underlying hash functions, where the minimum is always 11 bytes more than the length of the hash value.

Table 43, PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA Signatures with Various Hash Functions: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Sign	RSA private key	any	*k*	block type 01
C_Verify	RSA public key	any, k^2	N/A	block type 01

2 Data length, signature length.

For these mechanisms, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.15 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-224

The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS,** performs similarly as the other **CKM_SHA*X*_RSA_PKCS** mechanisms but uses the SHA-224 hash function.

6.1.16 PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-224

The PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, performs similarly as the other **CKM_SHA*X*_RSA_ PKCS_PSS** mechanisms but uses the SHA-224 hash function.

6.1.17 PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512

The PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, performs single- and multiple-part digital signatures and verification operations without message

recovery. The operations performed are as described in PKCS #1 with the object identifier id-RSASSA-PSS, i.e., as in the scheme RSASSA-PSS in PKCS #1 where the underlying hash function is SHA-1.

The PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 mechanisms, denoted **CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, **CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, and **CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS** respectively, perform the same operations using the SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 hash functions.

The mechanisms have a parameter, a **CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS** structure. The *sLen* field must be less than or equal to *k**-2-*hLen* where *hLen* is the length in bytes of the hash value. *k** is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus, except if the length in bits of the RSA modulus is one more than a multiple of 8, in which case *k** is one less than the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 44, PKCS #1 RSA PSS Signatures with Various Hash Functions: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	RSA private key	any	*k*
C_Verify	RSA public key	any, k^2	N/A

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.18 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA3

The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 mechanisms, denoted **CKM_SHA3_224_RSA_PKCS**, **CKM_SHA3_256_RSA_PKCS**, **CKM_SHA3_384_RSA_PKCS**, and **CKM_SHA3_512_RSA_PKCS** respectively, performs similarly as the other **CKM_SHA*X*_RSA_PKCS** mechanisms but uses the corresponding SHA3 hash functions.

6.1.19 PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA3

The PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 mechanisms, denoted **CKM_SHA3_224_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, **CKM_SHA3_256_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, **CKM_SHA3_384_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, and **CKM_SHA3_512_RSA_PKCS_PSS** respectively, performs similarly as the other **CKM_SHA*X*_RSA_PKCS_PSS** mechanisms but uses the corresponding SHA-3 hash functions.

6.1.20 ANSI X9.31 RSA signature with SHA-1

The ANSI X9.31 RSA signature with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31**, performs single- and multiple-part digital signatures and verification operations without message recovery. The operations performed are as described in ANSI X9.31.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data for these mechanisms are summarized in the following table. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus. For all operations, the *k* value must be at least 128 and a multiple of 32 as specified in ANSI X9.31.

Table 45, ANSI X9.31 RSA Signatures with SHA-1: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	RSA private key	any	*k*
C_Verify	RSA public key	any, k^2	N/A

2 Data length, signature length.

For these mechanisms, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.21 TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA

The TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS_TPM_1_1**, is a multi-use mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the block formats initially defined in PKCS #1 v1.5, with additional formatting rules defined in TCPA TPM Specification Version 1.1b. Additional formatting rules remained the same in TCG TPM Specification 1.2 The mechanism supports single-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

This mechanism does not have a parameter. It differs from the standard PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA encryption mechanism in that the plaintext is wrapped in a TCPA_BOUND_DATA (TPM_BOUND_DATA for TPM 1.2) structure before being submitted to the PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption process. On encryption, the version field of the TCPA_BOUND_DATA (TPM_BOUND_DATA for TPM 1.2) structure must contain 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00. On decryption, any structure of the form 0x01, 0x01, 0xXX, 0xYY may be accepted.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key of appropriate length. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every appropriate-length secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the "input" to the encryption operation is the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped; similarly for unwrapping. The mechanism does not wrap the key type or any other information about the key, except the key length; the application must convey these separately. In particular, the mechanism contributes only the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_VALUE** (and **CKA_VALUE_LEN**, if the key has it) attributes to the recovered key during unwrapping; other attributes must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. For encryption and decryption, the input and output data may begin at the same location in memory. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 46, TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt[1]	RSA public key	≤ *k*-11-5	*k*
C_Decrypt[1]	RSA private key	*k*	≤ *k*-11-5
C_WrapKey	RSA public key	≤ *k*-11-5	*k*
C_UnwrapKey	RSA private key	*k*	≤ *k*-11-5

1 Single-part operations only.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.22 TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP

The TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_TPM_1_1**, is a multi-purpose mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the OAEP block format defined in PKCS #1, with additional formatting defined in TCPA TPM Specification Version 1.1b. Additional formatting rules remained the same in TCG TPM Specification 1.2. The mechanism supports single-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

This mechanism does not have a parameter. It differs from the standard PKCS#1 OAEP RSA encryption mechanism in that the plaintext is wrapped in a TCPA_BOUND_DATA (TPM_BOUND_DATA for TPM 1.2) structure before being submitted to the encryption process and that all of the values of the parameters that are passed to a standard CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP operation are fixed. On encryption, the version field of the TCPA_BOUND_DATA (TPM_BOUND_DATA for TPM 1.2) structure must contain 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00. On decryption, any structure of the form 0x01, 0x01, 0xXX, 0xYY may be accepted.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key of appropriate length. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every appropriate-length secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the "input" to the encryption operation is the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped; similarly for unwrapping. The mechanism does not wrap the key type or any other information about the key, except the key length; the application must convey these separately. In particular, the mechanism contributes only the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_VALUE** (and **CKA_VALUE_LEN**, if the key has it) attributes to the recovered key during unwrapping; other attributes must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. For encryption and decryption, the input and output data may begin at the same location in memory. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 47, TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt[1]	RSA public key	≤ *k*-2-40-5	*k*
C_Decrypt[1]	RSA private key	*k*	≤ *k*-2-40-5
C_WrapKey	RSA public key	≤ *k*-2-40-5	*k*
C_UnwrapKey	RSA private key	*k*	≤ *k*-2-40-5

1 Single-part operations only.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

6.1.23 RSA AES KEY WRAP

The RSA AES key wrap mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP**, is a mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the AES key wrap mechanism. It supports single-part key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS** structure.

The mechanism can wrap and unwrap a target asymmetric key of any length and type using an RSA key.

- A temporary AES key is used for wrapping the target key using CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP mechanism.
- The temporary AES key is wrapped with the wrapping RSA key using CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism.

For wrapping, the mechanism -

- Generates a temporary random AES key of *ulAESKeyBits* length. This key is not accessible to the user - no handle is returned.
- Wraps the AES key with the wrapping RSA key using **CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP** with parameters of *OAEPParams*.
- Wraps the target key with the temporary AES key using **CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP**.
- Zeroizes the temporary AES key
- Concatenates two wrapped keys and outputs the concatenated blob. The first is the wrapped AES key, and the second is the wrapped target key.

The private target key will be encoded as defined in section 6.7.

The use of Attributes in the PrivateKeyInfo structure is OPTIONAL. In case of conflicts between the object attribute template, and Attributes in the PrivateKeyInfo structure, an error should be thrown

For unwrapping, the mechanism -

- Splits the input into two parts. The first is the wrapped AES key, and the second is the wrapped target key. The length of the first part is equal to the length of the unwrapping RSA key.
- Un-wraps the temporary AES key from the first part with the private RSA key using **CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP** with parameters of *OAEPParams*.
- Un-wraps the target key from the second part with the temporary AES key using **CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP**.
- Zeroizes the temporary AES key.
- Returns the handle to the newly unwrapped target key.

Table 48, CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP Mechanisms vs. Functions

	Functions						
Mechanism	**Encrypt & Decrypt**	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP						✓	
[1] SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover							

6.1.24 RSA AES KEY WRAP mechanism parameters

♦ **CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS; CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS {
   CK_ULONG                      ulAESKeyBits;
   CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR   pOAEPParams;
}  CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

ulAESKeyBits	length of the temporary AES key in bits. Can be only 128, 192 or 256.
pOAEPParams	pointer to the parameters of the temporary AES key wrapping. See also the description of PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism parameters.

CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS**.

6.1.25 FIPS 186-4

When CKM_RSA_PKCS is operated in FIPS mode, the length of the modulus SHALL only be 1024, 2048, or 3072 bits.

6.2 DSA

Table 49, DSA Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN					✓		
CKM_DSA_PROBABILISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN					✓		
CKM_DSA_SHAWE_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN					✓		
CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN					✓		
CKM_DSA		✓[2]					
CKM_DSA_SHA1		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA224		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA256		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA384		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA512		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA3_224		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA3_256		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA3_384		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA3_512		✓					

6.2.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_DSA” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of DSA key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN
- CKM_DSA
- CKM_DSA_SHA1
- CKM_DSA_SHA224
- CKM_DSA_SHA256
- CKM_DSA_SHA384
- CKM_DSA_SHA512
- CKM_DSA_SHA3_224
- CKM_DSA_SHA3_256
- CKM_DSA_SHA3_384
- CKM_DSA_SHA3_512
- CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN
- CKM_DSA_PROBABILISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN
- CKM_DSA_SHAWE_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN
- CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN

♦ CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM

CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM is a structure which provides and returns parameters for the NIST FIPS 186-4 parameter generating algorithms.

CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM_PTR is a pointer to a CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM.

```
typedef struct CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM {
   CK_MECHANISM_TYPE   hash;
   CK_BYTE_PTR         pSeed;
   CK_ULONG            ulSeedLen;
   CK_ULONG            ulIndex;
}  CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

hash	Mechanism value for the base hash used in PQG generation, Valid values are CKM_SHA_1, CKM_SHA224, CKM_SHA256, CKM_SHA384, CKM_SHA512.
pSeed	Seed value used to generate PQ and G. This value is returned by CKM_DSA_PROBABILISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN, CKM_DSA_SHAWE_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN, and passed into CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN.
ulSeedLen	Length of seed value.
ulIndex	Index value for generating G. Input for CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN. Ignored by CKM_DSA_PROBABILISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN and CKM_DSA_SHAWE_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN.

6.2.2 DSA public key objects

DSA public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,** key type **CKK_DSA**) hold DSA public keys. The following table defines the DSA public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 50, DSA Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME[1,3]	Big integer	Prime *p* (512 to 3072 bits, in steps of 64 bits)
CKA_SUBPRIME[1,3]	Big integer	Subprime *q* (160, 224 bits, or 256 bits)
CKA_BASE[1,3]	Big integer	Base *g*
CKA_VALUE[1,4]	Big integer	Public value *y*

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the “DSA domain parameters”. See FIPS PUB 186-4 for more information on DSA keys.

The following is a sample template for creating a DSA public key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = “A DSA public key object”;
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
```

```
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
  {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
  {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.2.3 DSA Key Restrictions

FIPS PUB 186-4 specifies permitted combinations of prime and sub-prime lengths. They are:

- Prime: 1024 bits, Subprime: 160
- Prime: 2048 bits, Subprime: 224
- Prime: 2048 bits, Subprime: 256
- Prime: 3072 bits, Subprime: 256

Earlier versions of FIPS 186 permitted smaller prime lengths, and those are included here for backwards compatibility. An implementation that is compliant to FIPS 186-4 does not permit the use of primes of any length less than 1024 bits.

6.2.4 DSA private key objects

DSA private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,** key type **CKK_DSA**) hold DSA private keys. The following table defines the DSA private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 51, DSA Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME[1,4,6]	Big integer	Prime *p* (512 to 1024 bits, in steps of 64 bits)
CKA_SUBPRIME[1,4,6]	Big integer	Subprime *q* (160 bits, 224 bits, or 256 bits)
CKA_BASE[1,4,6]	Big integer	Base *g*
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Big integer	Private value *x*

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the “DSA domain parameters”. See FIPS PUB 186-4 for more information on DSA keys.

Note that when generating a DSA private key, the DSA domain parameters are *not* specified in the key’s template. This is because DSA private keys are only generated as part of a DSA key *pair*, and the DSA domain parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the DSA public key.

The following is a sample template for creating a DSA private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = “A DSA private key object”;
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
```

```
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
  {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
  {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
  {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
  {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.2.5 DSA domain parameter objects

DSA domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS,** key type **CKK_DSA**) hold DSA domain parameters. The following table defines the DSA domain parameter object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 52, DSA Domain Parameter Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME[1,4]	Big integer	Prime *p* (512 to 1024 bits, in steps of 64 bits)
CKA_SUBPRIME[1,4]	Big integer	Subprime *q* (160 bits, 224 bits, or 256 bits)
CKA_BASE[1,4]	Big integer	Base *g*
CKA_PRIME_BITS[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length of the prime value.

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the “DSA domain parameters”. See FIPS PUB 186-4 for more information on DSA domain parameters.

To ensure backwards compatibility, if **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** is not specified for a call to **C_GenerateKey**, it takes on a default based on the value of **CKA_PRIME_BITS** as follows:

- If **CKA_PRIME_BITS** is less than or equal to 1024 then CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS shall be 160 bits
- If **CKA_PRIME_BITS** equals 2048 then CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS shall be 224 bits
- If **CKA_PRIME_BITS** equals 3072 then CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS shall be 256 bits

The following is a sample template for creating a DSA domain parameter object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A DSA domain parameter object";
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
```

```
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
  {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
  {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
};
```

6.2.6 DSA key pair generation

The DSA key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-2.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates DSA public/private key pairs with a particular prime, subprime and base, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, and **CKA_BASE** attributes of the template for the public key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_BASE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new private key. Other attributes supported by the DSA public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) may also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

6.2.7 DSA domain parameter generation

The DSA domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN**, is a domain parameter generation mechanism based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-2.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates DSA domain parameters with a particular prime length in bits, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attribute of the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_BASE** and **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attributes to the new object. Other attributes supported by the DSA domain parameter types may also be specified in the template, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

6.2.8 DSA probabilistic domain parameter generation

The DSA probabilistic domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_PROBABILISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN**, is a domain parameter generation mechanism based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, section Appendix A.1.1 Generation and Validation of Probable Primes..

This mechanism takes a **CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM** which supplies the base hash and returns the seed (pSeed) and the length (ulSeedLen).

The mechanism generates DSA the prime and subprime domain parameters with a particular prime length in bits, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attribute of the template and the subprime length as specified in the **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attribute of the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_PRIME_BITS, and CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attributes to the new object. **CKA_BASE** is not set by this call. Other attributes supported by the DSA domain parameter types may also be specified in the template, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

6.2.9 DSA Shawe-Taylor domain parameter generation

The DSA Shawe-Taylor domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHAWE_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN**, is a domain parameter generation mechanism based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, section Appendix A.1.2 Construction and Validation of Provable Primes p and q.

This mechanism takes a **CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM** which supplies the base hash and returns the seed (pSeed) and the length (ulSeedLen).

The mechanism generates DSA the prime and subprime domain parameters with a particular prime length in bits, as specified in the CKA_PRIME_BITS attribute of the template and the subprime length as specified in the **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attribute of the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_PRIME_BITS, and CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attributes to the new object. **CKA_BASE** is not set by this call. Other attributes supported by the DSA domain parameter types may also be specified in the template, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

6.2.10 DSA base domain parameter generation

The DSA base domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN**, is a base parameter generation mechanism based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, section Appendix A.2 Generation of Generator G.

This mechanism takes a **CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM** which supplies the base hash the seed (pSeed) and the length (ulSeedLen) and the index value.

The mechanism generates the DSA base with the domain parameter specified in the **CKA_PRIME** and **CKA_SUBPRIME** attributes of the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_BASE** attributes to the new object. Other attributes supported by the DSA domain parameter types may also be specified in the template, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

6.2.11 DSA without hashing

The DSA without hashing mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-2. (This mechanism corresponds only to the part of DSA that processes the 20-byte hash value; it does not compute the hash value.)

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a 40-byte string, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 53, DSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign[1]	DSA private key	20, 28, 32, 48, or 64 bytes	2*length of subprime
C_Verify[1]	DSA public key	(20, 28, 32, 48, or 64 bytes), (2*length of subprime)[2]	N/A

1 Single-part operations only.

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

6.2.12 DSA with SHA-1

The DSA with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA1**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-2. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-1.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a 40-byte string, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 54, DSA with SHA-1: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length[2]	N/A

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

6.2.13 FIPS 186-4

When CKM_DSA is operated in FIPS mode, only the following bit lengths of p and q, represented by L and N, SHALL be used:

L = 1024, N = 160

L = 2048, N = 224

L = 2048, N = 256

L = 3072, N = 256

6.2.14 DSA with SHA-224

The DSA with SHA-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA224**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-224.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 55, DSA with SHA-244: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length[2]	N/A

[2] Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

6.2.15 DSA with SHA-256

The DSA with SHA-256 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA256**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-256.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 56, DSA with SHA-256: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length[2]	N/A

[2] Data length, signature length.

6.2.16 DSA with SHA-384

The DSA with SHA-384 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA384**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-384.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 57, DSA with SHA-384: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length[2]	N/A

[2] Data length, signature length.

6.2.17 DSA with SHA-512

The DSA with SHA-512 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA512**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-512.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 58, DSA with SHA-512: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length[2]	N/A

[2] Data length, signature length.

6.2.18 DSA with SHA3-224

The DSA with SHA3-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA3_224**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA3-224.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 59, DSA with SHA3-224: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length[2]	N/A

[2] Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

6.2.19 DSA with SHA3-256

The DSA with SHA3-256 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA3_256**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA3-256.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 60, DSA with SHA3-256: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length[2]	N/A

[2] Data length, signature length.

6.2.20 DSA with SHA3-384

The DSA with SHA3-384 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA3_384**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA3-384.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 61, DSA with SHA3-384: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length[2]	N/A

[2] Data length, signature length.

6.2.21 DSA with SHA3-512

The DSA with SHA3-512 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA3_512**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SH3A-512.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 62, DSA with SHA3-512: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length[2]	N/A

[2] Data length, signature length.

6.3 Elliptic Curve

The Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptosystem in this document was originally based on the one described in the ANSI X9.62 and X9.63 standards developed by the ANSI X9F1 working group.

The EC cryptosystem developed by the ANSI X9F1 working group was created at a time when EC curves were always represented in their Weierstrass form. Since that time, new curves represented in Edwards form (RFC 8032) and Montgomery form (RFC 7748) have become more common. To support these new curves, the EC cryptosystem in this document has been extended from the original. Additional key generation mechanisms have been added as well as an additional signature generation mechanism.

Table 63, Elliptic Curve Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN_W_EXTRA_BITS					✓		
CKM_EC_EDWARDS_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_EC_MONTGOMERY_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_ECDSA		✓[2]					
CKM_ECDSA_SHA1		✓					
CKM_ECDSA_SHA224		✓					
CKM_ECDSA_SHA256		✓					
CKM_ECDSA_SHA384		✓					
CKM_ECDSA_SHA512		✓					
CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_224		✓					
CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_256		✓					
CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_384		✓					
CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_512		✓					
CKM_EDDSA		✓					
CKM_XEDDSA		✓					
CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE							✓
CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE							✓
CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE							✓

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP						✓	

7255

7256

7257 *Table 64, Mechanism Information Flags*

CKF_EC_F_P	0x00100000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with EC domain parameters over F_p
CKF_EC_F_2M	0x00200000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with EC domain parameters over F_{2^m}
CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS	0x00400000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with EC domain parameters of the choice **ecParameters**
CKF_EC_OID	0x00800000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with EC domain parameters of the choice **oId**
CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS	0x01000000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with Elliptic Curve point uncompressed
CKF_EC_COMPRESS	0x02000000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with Elliptic Curve point compressed
CKF_EC_CURVENAME	0x04000000UL	True of the mechanism can be used with EC domain parameters of the choice **curveName**

7258 Note: CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE is deprecated with PKCS#11 3.00. It is replaced by CKF_EC_OID.

7259 In these standards, there are two different varieties of EC defined:

7260 1. EC using a field with an odd prime number of elements (i.e. the finite field F_p).

7261 2. EC using a field of characteristic two (i.e. the finite field F_{2^m}).

7262 An EC key in Cryptoki contains information about which variety of EC it is suited for. It is preferable that a
7263 Cryptoki library, which can perform EC mechanisms, be capable of performing operations with the two
7264 varieties of EC, however this is not required. The **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure **CKF_EC_F_P** flag
7265 identifies a Cryptoki library supporting EC keys over F_p whereas the **CKF_EC_F_2M** flag identifies a
7266 Cryptoki library supporting EC keys over F_{2^m}. A Cryptoki library that can perform EC mechanisms must
7267 set either or both of these flags for each EC mechanism.

7268 In these specifications there are also four representation methods to define the domain parameters for an
7269 EC key. Only the **ecParameters,** the **oId** and the **curveName** choices are supported in Cryptoki. The
7270 **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure **CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS** flag identifies a Cryptoki library
7271 supporting the **ecParameters** choice whereas the **CKF_EC_OID** flag identifies a Cryptoki library
7272 supporting the **oId** choice, and the **CKF_EC_CURVENAME** flag identifies a Cryptoki library supporting
7273 the **curveName** choice. A Cryptoki library that can perform EC mechanisms must set the appropriate
7274 flag(s) for each EC mechanism.

7275 In these specifications, an EC public key (i.e. EC point *Q*) or the base point *G* when the **ecParameters**
7276 choice is used can be represented as an octet string of the uncompressed form or the compressed form.
7277 The **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure **CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS** flag identifies a Cryptoki library
7278 supporting the uncompressed form whereas the **CKF_EC_COMPRESS** flag identifies a Cryptoki library

supporting the compressed form. A Cryptoki library that can perform EC mechanisms must set either or both of these flags for each EC mechanism.

Note that an implementation of a Cryptoki library supporting EC with only one variety, one representation of domain parameters or one form may encounter difficulties achieving interoperability with other implementations.

If an attempt to create, generate, derive or unwrap an EC key of an unsupported curve is made, the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED. If an attempt to create, generate, derive, or unwrap an EC key with invalid or of an unsupported representation of domain parameters is made, that attempt should fail with the error code CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID. If an attempt to create, generate, derive, or unwrap an EC key of an unsupported form is made, that attempt should fail with the error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT.

6.3.1 EC Signatures

For the purposes of these mechanisms, an ECDSA signature is an octet string of even length which is at most two times *nLen* octets, where *nLen* is the length in octets of the base point order *n*. The signature octets correspond to the concatenation of the ECDSA values *r* and *s*, both represented as an octet string of equal length of at most *nLen* with the most significant byte first. If *r* and *s* have different octet length, the shorter of both must be padded with leading zero octets such that both have the same octet length. Loosely spoken, the first half of the signature is *r* and the second half is *s*. For signatures created by a token, the resulting signature is always of length 2*nLen*. For signatures passed to a token for verification, the signature may have a shorter length but must be composed as specified before.

If the length of the hash value is larger than the bit length of *n*, only the leftmost bits of the hash up to the length of *n* will be used. Any truncation is done by the token.

Note: For applications, it is recommended to encode the signature as an octet string of length two times *nLen* if possible. This ensures that the application works with PKCS#11 modules which have been implemented based on an older version of this document. Older versions required all signatures to have length two times *nLen*. It may be impossible to encode the signature with the maximum length of two times *nLen* if the application just gets the integer values of *r* and *s* (i.e. without leading zeros), but does not know the base point order *n*, because *r* and *s* can have any value between zero and the base point order *n*.

An EdDSA signature is an octet string of even length which is two times nLen octets, where nLen is calculated as EdDSA parameter b divided by 8. The signature octets correspond to the concatenation of the EdDSA values R and S as defined in [RFC 8032], both represented as an octet string of equal length of nLen bytes in little endian order.

6.3.2 Definitions

This section defines the key types “CKK_EC”, “CKK_EC_EDWARDS” and “CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Note: CKK_ECDSA is deprecated. It is replaced by CKK_EC.

Mechanisms:

CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN
CKM_EC_EDWARDS_KEY_PAIR_GEN
CKM_EC_MONTGOMERY_KEY_PAIR_GEN
CKM_ECDSA
CKM_ECDSA_SHA1
CKM_ECDSA_SHA224
CKM_ECDSA_SHA256
CKM_ECDSA_SHA384

CKM_ECDSA_SHA512
CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_224
CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_256
CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_384
CKM_ECDSA_SHA3_512
CKM_EDDSA
CKM_XEDDSA
CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE
CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE
CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE
CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP

CKD_NULL
CKD_SHA1_KDF
CKD_SHA224_KDF
CKD_SHA256_KDF
CKD_SHA384_KDF
CKD_SHA512_KDF
CKD_SHA3_224_KDF
CKD_SHA3_256_KDF
CKD_SHA3_384_KDF
CKD_SHA3_512_KDF
CKD_SHA1_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA224_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA256_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA384_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA512_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA3_224_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA3_256_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA3_384_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA3_512_KDF_SP800
CKD_BLAKE2B_160_KDF
CKD_BLAKE2B_256_KDF
CKD_BLAKE2B_384_KDF
CKD_BLAKE2B_512_KDF

6.3.3 Short Weierstrass Elliptic Curve public key objects

Short Weierstrass EC public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,** key type **CKK_EC**) hold EC public keys. The following table defines the EC public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 65, Elliptic Curve Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_EC_PARAMS[1,3]	Byte array	DER-encoding of an ANSI X9.62 Parameters value
CKA_EC_POINT[1,4]	Byte array	DER-encoding of ANSI X9.62 ECPoint value *Q*

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

Note: CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated. It is replaced by CKA_EC_PARAMS.

The **CKA_EC_PARAMS** attribute value is known as the "EC domain parameters" and is defined in ANSI X9.62 as a choice of three parameter representation methods with the following syntax:

```
Parameters ::= CHOICE {
  ecParameters   ECParameters,
  oId            CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
  implicitlyCA   NULL,
  curveName      PrintableString
}
```

This allows detailed specification of all required values using choice **ecParameters**, the use of **oId** as an object identifier substitute for a particular set of Elliptic Curve domain parameters, or **implicitlyCA** to indicate that the domain parameters are explicitly defined elsewhere, or **curveName** to specify a curve name as e.g. define in [ANSI X9.62], [BRAINPOOL], [SEC 2], [LEGIFRANCE]. The use of **oId** or **curveName** is recommended over the choice **ecParameters**. The choice **implicitlyCA** must not be used in Cryptoki.

The following is a sample template for creating an short Weierstrass EC public key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_EC;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An EC public key object";
CK_BYTE ecParams[] = {...};
CK_BYTE ecPoint[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecParams, sizeof(ecParams)},
  {CKA_EC_POINT, ecPoint, sizeof(ecPoint)}
};
```

6.3.4 Short Weierstrass Elliptic Curve private key objects

Short Weierstrass EC private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,** key type **CKK_EC**) hold EC private keys. See Section 6.3 for more information about EC. The following table defines the EC private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 66, Elliptic Curve Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_EC_PARAMS[1,4,6]	Byte array	DER-encoding of an ANSI X9.62 Parameters value
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Big integer	ANSI X9.62 private value *d*

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_EC_PARAMS** attribute value is known as the "EC domain parameters" and is defined in ANSI X9.62 as a choice of three parameter representation methods with the following syntax:

```
Parameters ::= CHOICE {
  ecParameters   ECParameters,
  oId            CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
  implicitlyCA   NULL,
  curveName      PrintableString
}
```

This allows detailed specification of all required values using choice **ecParameters**, the use of **oId** as an object identifier substitute for a particular set of Elliptic Curve domain parameters, or **implicitlyCA** to indicate that the domain parameters are explicitly defined elsewhere, or **curveName** to specify a curve name as e.g. define in [ANSI X9.62], [BRAINPOOL], [SEC 2], [LEGIFRANCE]. The use of **oId** or **curveName** is recommended over the choice **ecParameters**. The choice **implicitlyCA** must not be used in Cryptoki.Note that when generating an EC private key, the EC domain parameters are *not* specified in the key's template. This is because EC private keys are only generated as part of an EC key *pair*, and the EC domain parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the EC public key.

The following is a sample template for creating an short Weierstrass EC private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_EC;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An EC private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE ecParams[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
  {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
  {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecParams, sizeof(ecParams)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.3.5 Edwards Elliptic Curve public key objects

Edwards EC public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,** key type **CKK_EC_EDWARDS**) hold Edwards EC public keys. The following table defines the Edwards EC public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 67, Edwards Elliptic Curve Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_EC_PARAMS[1,3]	Byte array	DER-encoding of a Parameters value as defined above
CKA_EC_POINT[1,4]	Byte array	Public key bytes in little endian order as defined in RFC 8032

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_EC_PARAMS** attribute value is known as the "EC domain parameters" and is defined in ANSI X9.62 as a choice of three parameter representation methods. A 4th choice is added to support Edwards and Montgomery Elliptic Curves. The CKA_EC_PARAMS attribute has the following syntax:

```
Parameters ::= CHOICE {
  ecParameters   ECParameters,
  oId            CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
  implicitlyCA   NULL,
  curveName      PrintableString
}
```

Edwards EC public keys only support the use of the **curveName** selection to specify a curve name as defined in [RFC 8032] and the use of the **oID** selection to specify a curve through an EdDSA algorithm as defined in [RFC 8410]. Note that keys defined by RFC 8032 and RFC 8410 are incompatible.

The following is a sample template for creating an Edwards EC public key object with Edwards25519 being specified as curveName:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_EC_EDWARDS;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An Edwards EC public key object";
CK_BYTE ecParams[] = {0x13, 0x0c, 0x65, 0x64, 0x77, 0x61,
        0x72, 0x64, 0x73, 0x32, 0x35, 0x35, 0x31, 0x39};
CK_BYTE ecPoint[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecParams, sizeof(ecParams)},
  {CKA_EC_POINT, ecPoint, sizeof(ecPoint)}
};
```

6.3.6 Edwards Elliptic Curve private key objects

Edwards EC private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,** key type **CKK_EC_EDWARDS**) hold Edwards EC private keys. See Section 6.3 for more information about EC. The following table defines the Edwards EC private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 68, Edwards Elliptic Curve Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_EC_PARAMS[1,4,6]	Byte array	DER-encoding of a Parameters value as defined above
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Big integer	Private key bytes in little endian order as defined in RFC 8032

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_EC_PARAMS** attribute value is known as the "EC domain parameters" and is defined in ANSI X9.62 as a choice of three parameter representation methods. A 4th choice is added to support Edwards and Montgomery Elliptic Curves. The CKA_EC_PARAMS attribute has the following syntax:

```
Parameters ::= CHOICE {
  ecParameters   ECParameters,
  oId            CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
  implicitlyCA   NULL,
  curveName      PrintableString
}
```

Edwards EC private keys only support the use of the **curveName** selection to specify a curve name as defined in [RFC 8032] and the use of the **oID** selection to specify a curve through an EdDSA algorithm as defined in [RFC 8410]. Note that keys defined by RFC 8032 and RFC 8410 are incompatible.

Note that when generating an Edwards EC private key, the EC domain parameters are *not* specified in the key's template. This is because Edwards EC private keys are only generated as part of an Edwards EC key *pair*, and the EC domain parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the Edwards EC public key.

The following is a sample template for creating an Edwards EC private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_EC_EDWARDS;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An Edwards EC private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE ecParams[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
  {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
  {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.3.7 Montgomery Elliptic Curve public key objects

Montgomery EC public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,** key type **CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY**) hold Montgomery EC public keys. The following table defines the Montgomery EC public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 69, Montgomery Elliptic Curve Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_EC_PARAMS[1,3]	Byte array	DER-encoding of a Parameters value as defined above
CKA_EC_POINT[1,4]	Byte array	Public key bytes in little endian order as defined in RFC 7748

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_EC_PARAMS** attribute value is known as the "EC domain parameters" and is defined in ANSI X9.62 as a choice of three parameter representation methods. A 4th choice is added to support Edwards and Montgomery Elliptic Curves. The CKA_EC_PARAMS attribute has the following syntax:

```
Parameters ::= CHOICE {
  ecParameters   ECParameters,
  oId            CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
  implicitlyCA   NULL,
  curveName      PrintableString
}
```

Montgomery EC public keys only support the use of the **curveName** selection to specify a curve name as defined in [RFC7748] and the use of the **oID** selection to specify a curve through an ECDH algorithm as defined in [RFC 8410]. Note that keys defined by RFC 7748 and RFC 8410 are incompatible.

The following is a sample template for creating a Montgomery EC public key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A Montgomery EC public key object";
CK_BYTE ecParams[] = {...};
CK_BYTE ecPoint[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecParams, sizeof(ecParams)},
  {CKA_EC_POINT, ecPoint, sizeof(ecPoint)}
};
```

6.3.8 Montgomery Elliptic Curve private key objects

Montgomery EC private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,** key type **CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY**) hold Montgomery EC private keys. See Section 6.3 for more information about EC. The following table defines the Montgomery EC private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 70, Montgomery Elliptic Curve Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_EC_PARAMS[1,4,6]	Byte array	DER-encoding of a Parameters value as defined above
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Big integer	Private key bytes in little endian order as defined in RFC 7748

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_EC_PARAMS** attribute value is known as the “EC domain parameters” and is defined in ANSI X9.62 as a choice of three parameter representation methods. A 4th choice is added to support Edwards and Montgomery Elliptic Curves. The CKA_EC_PARAMS attribute has the following syntax:

```
Parameters ::= CHOICE {
  ecParameters   ECParameters,
  oId            CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
  implicitlyCA   NULL,
  curveName      PrintableString
}
```

Montgomery EC private keys only support the use of the **curveName** selection to specify a curve name as defined in [RFC7748] and the use of the **oID** selection to specify a curve through an ECDH algorithm as defined in [RFC 8410]. Note that keys defined by RFC 7748 and RFC 8410 are incompatible.

Note that when generating a Montgomery EC private key, the EC domain parameters are *not* specified in the key’s template. This is because Montgomery EC private keys are only generated as part of a Montgomery EC key *pair*, and the EC domain parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the Montgomery EC public key.

The following is a sample template for creating a Montgomery EC private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = “A Montgomery EC private key object”;
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE ecParams[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
  {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
  {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.3.9 Elliptic Curve key pair generation

The short Weierstrass ECkey pair generation mechanism, denoted CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, is a key pair generation mechanism that uses the method defined by the ANSI X9.62 and X9.63 standards.

The short Weierstrass EC key pair generation mechanism, denoted CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN_W_EXTRA_BITS, is a key pair generation mechanism that uses the method defined by FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.4.1.

These mechanisms do not have a parameter.

These mechanisms generate EC public/private key pairs with particular EC domain parameters, as specified in the **CKA_EC_PARAMS** attribute of the template for the public key. Note that this version of Cryptoki does not include a mechanism for generating these EC domain parameters.

These mechanism contribute the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_EC_POINT** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_EC_PARAMS** and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new private key. Other attributes supported by the EC public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) may also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only ECDSA using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements, then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

6.3.10 Edwards Elliptic Curve key pair generation

The Edwards EC key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_EC_EDWARDS_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism for EC keys over curves represented in Edwards form.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism can only generate EC public/private key pairs over the curves edwards25519 and edwards448 as defined in RFC 8032 or the curves id-Ed25519 and id-Ed448 as defined in RFC 8410. These curves can only be specified in the **CKA_EC_PARAMS** attribute of the template for the public key using the **curveName** or the oID methods. Attempts to generate keys over these curves using any other EC key pair generation mechanism will fail with CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_EC_POINT** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_EC_PARAMS** and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new private key. Other attributes supported by the Edwards EC public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) may also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For this mechanism, the only allowed values are 255 and 448 as RFC 8032 only defines curves of these two sizes. A Cryptoki implementation may support one or both of these curves and should set the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields accordingly.

6.3.11 Montgomery Elliptic Curve key pair generation

The Montgomery EC key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_EC_MONTGOMERY_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism for EC keys over curves represented in Montgomery form.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism can only generate Montgomery EC public/private key pairs over the curves curve25519 and curve448 as defined in RFC 7748 or the curves id-X25519 and id-X448 as defined in RFC 8410. These curves can only be specified in the **CKA_EC_PARAMS** attribute of the template for the public key using the **curveName** or oId methods. Attempts to generate keys over these curves using any other EC key pair generation mechanism will fail with CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_EC_POINT** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_EC_PARAMS** and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new private key. Other attributes supported by the EC public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) may also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For this mechanism, the only allowed values are 255 and 448 as RFC 7748 only defines curves of these two sizes. A Cryptoki implementation may support one or both of these curves and should set the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields accordingly.

6.3.12 ECDSA without hashing

Refer section 6.3.1 for signature encoding.

The ECDSA without hashing mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECDSA**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification for ECDSA. (This mechanism corresponds only to the part of ECDSA that processes the hash value, which should not be longer than 1024 bits; it does not compute the hash value.)

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 71, ECDSA without hashing: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign[1]	CKK_EC private key	any[3]	2*nLen*
C_Verify[1]	CKK_EC public key	any[3], ≤2*nLen* [2]	N/A

1 Single-part operations only.

2 Data length, signature length.

3 Input the entire raw digest. Internally, this will be truncated to the appropriate number of bits.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only ECDSA using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements (inclusive), then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

6.3.13 ECDSA with hashing

Refer to section 6.3.1 for signature encoding.

The ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECDSA_[SHA1|SHA224|SHA256|SHA384|SHA512|SHA3_224|SHA3_256|SHA3_384|SHA3_512]** respectively, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification for ECDSA. This mechanism computes the entire ECDSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 respectively.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 72, ECDSA with hashing: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	CKK_EC private key	any	2*nLen*
C_Verify	CKK_EC public key	any, ≤2*nLen* [2]	N/A

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only ECDSA using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements, then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

6.3.14 EdDSA

The EdDSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_EDDSA**, is a mechanism for single-part and multipart signatures and verification for EdDSA. This mechanism implements the five EdDSA signature schemes defined in RFC 8032 and RFC 8410.

For curves according to RFC 8032, this mechanism has an optional parameter, a **CK_EDDSA_PARAMS** structure. The absence or presence of the parameter as well as its content is used to identify which signature scheme is to be used. The following table enumerates the five signature schemes defined in RFC 8032 and all supported permutations of the mechanism parameter and its content.

Table 73, Mapping to RFC 8032 Signature Schemes

Signature Scheme	Mechanism Param	phFlag	Context Data
Ed25519	Not Required	N/A	N/A
Ed25519ctx	Required	False	Optional
Ed25519ph	Required	True	Optional
Ed448	Required	False	Optional
Ed448ph	Required	True	Optional

For curves according to RFC 8410, the mechanism is implicitly given by the curve, which is EdDSA in pure mode.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 74, EdDSA: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	CKK_EC_EDWARDS private key	any	2b*Len*
C_Verify	CKK_EC_EDWARDS public key	any, ≤2b*Len* [2]	N/A

2 Data length, signature length.

Note that for EdDSA in pure mode, Ed25519 and Ed448 the data must be processed twice. Therefore, a token might need to cache all the data, especially when used with C_SignUpdate/C_VerifyUpdate. If tokens are unable to do so they can return CKR_TOKEN_RESOURCE_EXCEEDED.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For this mechanism, the only allowed values are 255 and 448 as RFC 8032and RFC 8410 only define curves of these two sizes. A Cryptoki implementation may support one or both of these curves and should set the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields accordingly.

6.3.15 XEdDSA

The XEdDSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_XEDDSA**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification for XEdDSA. This mechanism implements the XEdDSA signature scheme defined in **[XEDDSA]**. CKM_XEDDSA operates on CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY type EC keys, which allows these keys to be used both for signing/verification and for Diffie-Hellman style key-exchanges. This double use is necessary for the Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman where the long-term identity key is used to sign short-term keys and also contributes to the DH key-exchange.

This mechanism has a parameter, a **CK_XEDDSA_PARAMS** structure.

Table 75, XEdDSA: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign[1]	CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY private key	any[3]	2b
C_Verify[1]	CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY public key	any[3], ≤2b [2]	N/A

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For this mechanism, the only allowed values are 255 and 448 as **[XEDDSA]** only defines curves of these two sizes. A Cryptoki implementation may support one or both of these curves and should set the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields accordingly.

6.3.16 EC mechanism parameters

- **CK_EDDSA_PARAMS, CK_EDDSA_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_EDDSA_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters for the **CKM_EDDSA** signature mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_EDDSA_PARAMS {
   CK_BBOOL     phFlag;
   CK_ULONG     ulContextDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR  pContextData;
}  CK_EDDSA_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

phFlag a Boolean value which indicates if Prehashed variant of EdDSA should used

ulContextDataLen the length in bytes of the context data where 0 ≤ ulContextDataLen ≤ 255.

pContextData context data shared between the signer and verifier

CK_EDDSA_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_EDDSA_PARAMS**.

- **CK_XEDDSA_PARAMS, CK_XEDDSA_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_XEDDSA_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters for the **CKM_XEDDSA** signature mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_XEDDSA_PARAMS {
   CK_XEDDSA_HASH_TYPE  hash;
}  CK_XEDDSA_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

hash a Hash mechanism to be used by the mechanism.

CK_XEDDSA_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_XEDDSA_PARAMS**.

- **CK_XEDDSA_HASH_TYPE, CK_XEDDSA_HASH_TYPE_PTR**

CK_XEDDSA_HASH_TYPE is used to indicate the hash function used in XEDDSA. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_XEDDSA_HASH_TYPE;
```

7762 The following table lists the defined functions.

7763 *Table 76, EC: Key Derivation Functions*

Source Identifier
CKM_BLAKE2B_256
CKM_BLAKE2B_512
CKM_SHA3_256
CKM_SHA3_512
CKM_SHA256
CKM_SHA512

7764

7765 **CK_XEDDSA_HASH_TYPE_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_XEDDSA_HASH_TYPE**.

7766

7767 ♦ **CK_EC_KDF_TYPE, CK_EC_KDF_TYPE_PTR**

7768 **CK_EC_KDF_TYPE** is used to indicate the Key Derivation Function (KDF) applied to derive keying data
7769 from a shared secret. The key derivation function will be used by the EC key agreement schemes. It is
7770 defined as follows:

7771
```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE;
```

7772

7773 The following table lists the defined functions.

7774 *Table 77, EC: Key Derivation Functions*

Source Identifier
CKD_NULL
CKD_SHA1_KDF
CKD_SHA224_KDF
CKD_SHA256_KDF
CKD_SHA384_KDF
CKD_SHA512_KDF
CKD_SHA3_224_KDF
CKD_SHA3_256_KDF
CKD_SHA3_384_KDF
CKD_SHA3_512_KDF
CKD_SHA1_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA224_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA256_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA384_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA512_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA3_224_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA3_256_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA3_384_KDF_SP800
CKD_SHA3_512_KDF_SP800
CKD_BLAKE2B_160_KDF

CKD_BLAKE2B_256_KDF
CKD_BLAKE2B_384_KDF
CKD_BLAKE2B_512_KDF

The key derivation function **CKD_NULL** produces a raw shared secret value without applying any key derivation function.

The key derivation functions **CKD_[SHA1|SHA224|SHA384|SHA512|SHA3_224|SHA3_256|SHA3_384|SHA3_512]_KDF**, which are based on SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 respectively, derive keying data from the shared secret value as defined in [ANSI X9.63].

The key derivation functions **CKD_[SHA1|SHA224|SHA384|SHA512|SHA3_224|SHA3_256|SHA3_384|SHA3_512]_KDF_SP800**, which are based on SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 respectively, derive keying data from the shared secret value as defined in [FIPS SP800-56A] section 5.8.1.1.

The key derivation functions **CKD_BLAKE2B_[160|256|384|512]_KDF**, which are based on the Blake2b family of hashes, derive keying data from the shared secret value as defined in [FIPS SP800-56A] section 5.8.1.1. **CK_EC_KDF_TYPE_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_EC_KDF_TYPE**.

- **CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters for the **CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE** and **CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE** key derivation mechanisms, where each party contributes one key pair. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
   CK_EC_KDF_TYPE  kdf;
   CK_ULONG        ulSharedDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR     pSharedData;
   CK_ULONG        ulPublicDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR     pPublicData;
} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

kdf	key derivation function used on the shared secret value
ulSharedDataLen	the length in bytes of the shared info
pSharedData	some data shared between the two parties
ulPublicDataLen	the length in bytes of the other party's EC public key

pPublicData[1]	pointer to other party's EC public key value. For short Weierstrass EC keys: a token MUST be able to accept this value encoded as a raw octet string (as per section A.5.2 of [ANSI X9.62]). A token MAY, in addition, support accepting this value as a DER-encoded ECPoint (as per section E.6 of [ANSI X9.62]) i.e. the same as a CKA_EC_POINT encoding. The calling application is responsible for converting the offered public key to the compressed or uncompressed forms of these encodings if the token does not support the offered form. For Montgomery keys: the public key is provided as bytes in little endian order as defined in RFC 7748.

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pSharedData* must be NULL and *ulSharedDataLen* must be zero. With the key derivation functions **CKD_[SHA1|SHA224|SHA384|SHA512|SHA3_224|SHA3_256|SHA3_384|SHA3_512]_KDF, CKD_[SHA1|SHA224|SHA384|SHA512|SHA3_224|SHA3_256|SHA3_384|SHA3_512]_KDF_SP800**, an optional *pSharedData* may be supplied, which consists of some data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pSharedData* must be NULL and *ulSharedDataLen* must be zero.

CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

- **CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE** key derivation mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
   CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
   CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
   CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
   CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
   CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
   CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

kdf	key derivation function used on the shared secret value
ulSharedDataLen	the length in bytes of the shared info
pSharedData	some data shared between the two parties
ulPublicDataLen	the length in bytes of the other party's first EC public key
pPublicData	pointer to other party's first EC public key value. Encoding rules are as per pPublicData of CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS
ulPrivateDataLen	the length in bytes of the second EC private key

1 The encoding in V2.20 was not specified and resulted in different implementations choosing different encodings. Applications relying only on a V2.20 encoding (e.g. the DER variant) other than the one specified now (raw) may not work with all V2.30 compliant tokens.

hPrivateData	key handle for second EC private key value
ulPublicDataLen2	the length in bytes of the other party's second EC public key
pPublicData2	pointer to other party's second EC public key value. Encoding rules are as per pPublicData of CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pSharedData* must be NULL and *ulSharedDataLen* must be zero. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF**, an optional *pSharedData* may be supplied, which consists of some data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pSharedData* must be NULL and *ulSharedDataLen* must be zero.

CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

- **CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE** key derivation mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
   CK_EC_KDF_TYPE    kdf;
   CK_ULONG          ulSharedDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR       pSharedData;
   CK_ULONG          ulPublicDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR       pPublicData;
   CK_ULONG          ulPrivateDataLen;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hPrivateData;
   CK_ULONG          ulPublicDataLen2;
   CK_BYTE_PTR       pPublicData2;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  publicKey;
} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

kdf	key derivation function used on the shared secret value
ulSharedDataLen	the length in bytes of the shared info
pSharedData	some data shared between the two parties
ulPublicDataLen	the length in bytes of the other party's first EC public key
pPublicData	pointer to other party's first EC public key value. Encoding rules are as per pPublicData of CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS
ulPrivateDataLen	the length in bytes of the second EC private key
hPrivateData	key handle for second EC private key value
ulPublicDataLen2	the length in bytes of the other party's second EC public key
pPublicData2	pointer to other party's second EC public key value. Encoding rules are as per pPublicData of CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS
publicKey	Handle to the first party's ephemeral public key

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pSharedData* must be NULL and *ulSharedDataLen* must be zero. With the key derivation functions **CKD_[SHA1|SHA224|SHA384|SHA512|SHA3_224|SHA3_256|SHA3_384|SHA3_512]_KDF, CKD_[SHA1|SHA224|SHA384|SHA512|SHA3_224|SHA3_256|SHA3_384|SHA3_512]_KDF_SP800**, an

optional *pSharedData* may be supplied, which consists of some data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pSharedData* must be NULL and *ulSharedDataLen* must be zero.

CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

6.3.17 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key derivation

The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on the Diffie-Hellman version of the Elliptic Curve key agreement scheme, as defined in ANSI X9.63 for short Weierstrass EC keys and RFC 7748 for Montgomery keys, where each party contributes one key pair all using the same EC domain parameters.

It has a parameter, a **CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only EC using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements, then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

Constraints on key types are summarized in the following table:

Table 78: ECDH: Allowed Key Types

Function	Key type
C_Derive	CKK_EC or CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY

6.3.18 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with cofactor key derivation

The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) with cofactor key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on the cofactor Diffie-Hellman version of the Elliptic Curve key agreement scheme, as defined in ANSI X9.63, where each party contributes one key pair all using the same EC domain parameters. Cofactor multiplication is computationally efficient and helps to prevent security problems like small group attacks.

It has a parameter, a **CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only EC using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements, then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

Constraints on key types are summarized in the following table:

Table 79: ECDH with cofactor: Allowed Key Types

Function	Key type
C_Derive	CKK_EC

6.3.19 Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone key derivation

The Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based the MQV version of the Elliptic Curve key agreement scheme, as defined in ANSI X9.63, where each party contributes two key pairs all using the same EC domain parameters.

It has a parameter, a **CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only EC using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements, then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation,

the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

Constraints on key types are summarized in the following table:

Table 80: ECDH MQV: Allowed Key Types

Function	Key type
C_Derive	CKK_EC

6.3.20 ECDH AES KEY WRAP

The ECDH AES KEY WRAP mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP**, is a mechanism based on Elliptic Curve public-key crypto-system and the AES key wrap mechanism. It supports single-part key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

It has a parameter, a **CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS** structure.

The mechanism can wrap and unwrap an asymmetric target key of any length and type using an EC key.

- A temporary AES key is derived from a temporary EC key and the wrapping EC key using the **CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE** mechanism.
- The derived AES key is used for wrapping the target key using the **CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP** mechanism.

For wrapping, the mechanism -

- Generates a temporary random EC key (transport key) having the same parameters as the wrapping EC key (and domain parameters). Saves the transport key public key material.
- Performs ECDH operation using **CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE** with parameters of kdf, ulSharedDataLen and pSharedData using the private key of the transport EC key and the public key of wrapping EC key and gets the first ulAESKeyBits bits of the derived key to be the temporary AES key.
- Wraps the target key with the temporary AES key using **CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP**.
- Zeroizes the temporary AES key and EC transport private key.
- Concatenates public key material of the transport key and output the concatenated blob. The first part is the public key material of the transport key and the second part is the wrapped target key.

The private target key will be encoded as defined in section 6.7.

The use of Attributes in the PrivateKeyInfo structure is OPTIONAL. In case of conflicts between the object attribute template, and Attributes in the PrivateKeyInfo structure, an error should be thrown.

For unwrapping, the mechanism -

- Splits the input into two parts. The first part is the public key material of the transport key and the second part is the wrapped target key. The length of the first part is equal to the length of the public key material of the unwrapping EC key.

  Note: since the transport key and the wrapping EC key share the same domain, the length of the public key material of the transport key is the same length of the public key material of the unwrapping EC key.

- Performs ECDH operation using **CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE** with parameters of kdf, ulSharedDataLen and pSharedData using the private part of unwrapping EC key and the public part of the transport EC key and gets first ulAESKeyBits bits of the derived key to be the temporary AES key.

- Un-wraps the target key from the second part with the temporary AES key using **CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP**.
- Zeroizes the temporary AES key.

Table 81, CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP Mechanisms vs. Functions

	Functions						
Mechanism	**Encrypt & Decrypt**	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP						✓	
[1] SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover							

Constraints on key types are summarized in the following table:

Table 82: ECDH AES Key Wrap: Allowed Key Types

Function	Key type
C_Wrap / C_Unwrap	CKK_EC or CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY

6.3.21 ECDH AES KEY WRAP mechanism parameters

♦ **CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS; CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS {
   CK_ULONG        ulAESKeyBits;
   CK_EC_KDF_TYPE  kdf;
   CK_ULONG        ulSharedDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR     pSharedData;
}  CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

ulAESKeyBits	length of the temporary AES key in bits. Can be only 128, 192 or 256.
kdf	key derivation function used on the shared secret value to generate AES key.
ulSharedDataLen	the length in bytes of the shared info
pSharedData	Some data shared between the two parties

CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS**.

6.3.22 FIPS 186-4

When CKM_ECDSA is operated in FIPS mode, the curves SHALL either be NIST recommended curves (with a fixed set of domain parameters) or curves with domain parameters generated as specified by ANSI X9.64. The NIST recommended curves are:

P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521

K-163, B-163, K-233, B-233

K-283, B-283, K-409, B-409

K-571, B-571

6.4 Diffie-Hellman

Table 83, Diffie-Hellman Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN					✓		
CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE							✓
CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN					✓		
CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE							✓
CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE							✓
CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE							✓

6.4.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_DH” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of [DH] key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN

CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN

CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE

CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN

CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN

CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE

CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE

CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE

6.4.2 Diffie-Hellman public key objects

Diffie-Hellman public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,** key type **CKK_DH**) hold Diffie-Hellman public keys. The following table defines the Diffie-Hellman public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 84, Diffie-Hellman Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME[1,3]	Big integer	Prime *p*
CKA_BASE[1,3]	Big integer	Base *g*
CKA_VALUE[1,4]	Big integer	Public value *y*

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the "Diffie-Hellman domain parameters". Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See [PKCS #3] for more information on Diffie-Hellman keys.

The following is a sample template for creating a Diffie-Hellman public key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A Diffie-Hellman public key object";
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
  {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.4.3 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key objects

X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,** key type **CKK_X9_42_DH**) hold X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public keys. The following table defines the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 85, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME[1,3]	Big integer	Prime *p* (≥ 1024 bits, in steps of 256 bits)
CKA_BASE[1,3]	Big integer	Base *g*
CKA_SUBPRIME[1,3]	Big integer	Subprime *q* (≥ 160 bits)
CKA_VALUE[1,4]	Big integer	Public value *y*

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME, CKA_BASE** and **CKA_SUBPRIME** attribute values are collectively the "X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters". See the ANSI X9.42 standard for more information on X9.42 Diffie-Hellman keys.

The following is a sample template for creating a X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_X9_42_DH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key
        object";
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
  {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
  {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.4.4 Diffie-Hellman private key objects

Diffie-Hellman private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,** key type **CKK_DH**) hold Diffie-Hellman private keys. The following table defines the Diffie-Hellman private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 86, Diffie-Hellman Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME[1,4,6]	Big integer	Prime *p*
CKA_BASE[1,4,6]	Big integer	Base *g*
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Big integer	Private value *x*
CKA_VALUE_BITS[2,6]	CK_ULONG	Length in bits of private value *x*

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the "Diffie-Hellman domain parameters". Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See [PKCS #3] for more information on Diffie-Hellman keys.

Note that when generating a Diffie-Hellman private key, the Diffie-Hellman parameters are *not* specified in the key's template. This is because Diffie-Hellman private keys are only generated as part of a Diffie-Hellman key *pair*, and the Diffie-Hellman parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the Diffie-Hellman public key.

The following is a sample template for creating a Diffie-Hellman private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A Diffie-Hellman private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
```

```
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
  {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
  {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
  {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.4.5 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key objects

X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,** key type **CKK_X9_42_DH**) hold X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private keys. The following table defines the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 87, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME[1,4,6]	Big integer	Prime *p* (≥ 1024 bits, in steps of 256 bits)
CKA_BASE[1,4,6]	Big integer	Base *g*
CKA_SUBPRIME[1,4,6]	Big integer	Subprime *q* (≥ 160 bits)
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Big integer	Private value *x*

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME, CKA_BASE** and **CKA_SUBPRIME** attribute values are collectively the "X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters". Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See the ANSI X9.42 standard for more information on X9.42 Diffie-Hellman keys.

Note that when generating a X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key, the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters are *not* specified in the key's template. This is because X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private keys are only generated as part of a X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key *pair*, and the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key.

The following is a sample template for creating a X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_X9_42_DH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
```

```
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
    {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
  };
```

6.4.6 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter objects

Diffie-Hellman domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS,** key type **CKK_DH**) hold Diffie-Hellman domain parameters. The following table defines the Diffie-Hellman domain parameter object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 88, Diffie-Hellman Domain Parameter Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME[1,4]	Big integer	Prime *p*
CKA_BASE[1,4]	Big integer	Base *g*
CKA_PRIME_BITS[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length of the prime value.

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the "Diffie-Hellman domain parameters". Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See [PKCS #3] for more information on Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.

The following is a sample template for creating a Diffie-Hellman domain parameter object:

```
  CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
  CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DH;
  CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A Diffie-Hellman domain parameters
        object";
  CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
  CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
  CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
  CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
  };
```

6.4.7 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters objects

X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS,** key type **CKK_X9_42_DH**) hold X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters. The following table defines the X9.42

Diffie-Hellman domain parameters object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 89, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Domain Parameters Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME[1,4]	Big integer	Prime *p* (≥ 1024 bits, in steps of 256 bits)
CKA_BASE[1,4]	Big integer	Base *g*
CKA_SUBPRIME[1,4]	Big integer	Subprime *q* (≥ 160 bits)
CKA_PRIME_BITS[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length of the prime value.
CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length of the subprime value.

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE** and **CKA_SUBPRIME** attribute values are collectively the "X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters". Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the domain parameters components. See the ANSI X9.42 standard for more information on X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.

The following is a sample template for creating a X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_X9_42_DH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain
        parameters object";
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
  {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
  {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
};
```

6.4.8 PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman key pair generation

The PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, as defined in [PKCS #3]. This is what PKCS #3 calls "phase I". It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Diffie-Hellman public/private key pairs with a particular prime and base, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attributes of the template for the public key. If the **CKA_VALUE_BITS** attribute of the private key is specified, the mechanism limits the length in bits of the private value, as described in [PKCS #3].

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE**, and **CKA_VALUE** (and the **CKA_VALUE_BITS** attribute, if it is not already provided in the template) attributes to the new private key; other attributes required by the Diffie-Hellman public and private key types must be specified in the templates.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits.

6.4.9 PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter generation

The PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN**, is a domain parameter generation mechanism based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, as defined in [PKCS #3].

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Diffie-Hellman domain parameters with a particular prime length in bits, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attribute of the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE,** and **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attributes to the new object. Other attributes supported by the Diffie-Hellman domain parameter types may also be specified in the template, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits.

6.4.10 PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman key derivation

The PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, as defined in [PKCS #3]. This is what PKCS #3 calls “phase II”.

It has a parameter, which is the public value of the other party in the key agreement protocol, represented as a Cryptoki “Big integer” (*i.e.*, a sequence of bytes, most-significant byte first).

This mechanism derives a secret key from a Diffie-Hellman private key and the public value of the other party. It computes a Diffie-Hellman secret value from the public value and private key according to [PKCS #3], and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability[2]:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits.

2 Note that the rules regarding the CKA_SENSITIVE, CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, and CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE attributes have changed in version 2.11 to match the policy used by other key derivation mechanisms such as CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE.

6.4.11 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman mechanism parameters

♦ **CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE, CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR**

CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE is used to indicate the Key Derivation Function (KDF) applied to derive keying data from a shared secret. The key derivation function will be used by the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE;
```

The following table lists the defined functions.

Table 90, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Key Derivation Functions

Source Identifier
CKD_NULL
CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1
CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE

The key derivation function **CKD_NULL** produces a raw shared secret value without applying any key derivation function whereas the key derivation functions **CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1** and **CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE**, which are both based on SHA-1, derive keying data from the shared secret value as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard.

CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE**.

♦ **CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE** key derivation mechanism, where each party contributes one key pair. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
   CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE  kdf;
   CK_ULONG              ulOtherInfoLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR           pOtherInfo;
   CK_ULONG              ulPublicDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR           pPublicData;
}  CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

kdf	key derivation function used on the shared secret value
ulOtherInfoLen	the length in bytes of the other info
pOtherInfo	some data shared between the two parties
ulPublicDataLen	the length in bytes of the other party's X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key
pPublicData	pointer to other party's X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key value

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1**, *pOtherInfo* must be supplied, which contains an octet string, specified in ASN.1 DER encoding, consisting of mandatory and optional data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE**, an optional *pOtherInfo* may be supplied, which consists of some

data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero.

CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

- ## CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE** and **CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE** key derivation mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
   CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE    kdf;
   CK_ULONG          ulOtherInfoLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR       pOtherInfo;
   CK_ULONG          ulPublicDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR       pPublicData;
   CK_ULONG          ulPrivateDataLen;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hPrivateData;
   CK_ULONG          ulPublicDataLen2;
   CK_BYTE_PTR       pPublicData2;
} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

kdf	key derivation function used on the shared secret value
ulOtherInfoLen	the length in bytes of the other info
pOtherInfo	some data shared between the two parties
ulPublicDataLen	the length in bytes of the other party's first X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key
pPublicData	pointer to other party's first X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key value
ulPrivateDataLen	the length in bytes of the second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key
hPrivateData	key handle for second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key value
ulPublicDataLen2	the length in bytes of the other party's second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key
pPublicData2	pointer to other party's second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key value

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1**, *pOtherInfo* must be supplied, which contains an octet string, specified in ASN.1 DER encoding, consisting of mandatory and optional data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE**, an optional *pOtherInfo* may be supplied, which consists of some data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero.

CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

- **CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE** key derivation mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
   CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE  kdf;
   CK_ULONG              ulOtherInfoLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR           pOtherInfo;
   CK_ULONG              ulPublicDataLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR           pPublicData;
   CK_ULONG              ulPrivateDataLen;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE      hPrivateData;
   CK_ULONG              ulPublicDataLen2;
   CK_BYTE_PTR           pPublicData2;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE      publicKey;
} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

kdf	key derivation function used on the shared secret value
ulOtherInfoLen	the length in bytes of the other info
pOtherInfo	some data shared between the two parties
ulPublicDataLen	the length in bytes of the other party's first X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key
pPublicData	pointer to other party's first X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key value
ulPrivateDataLen	the length in bytes of the second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key
hPrivateData	key handle for second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key value
ulPublicDataLen2	the length in bytes of the other party's second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key
pPublicData2	pointer to other party's second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key value
publicKey	Handle to the first party's ephemeral public key

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1**, *pOtherInfo* must be supplied, which contains an octet string, specified in ASN.1 DER encoding, consisting of mandatory and optional data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE**, an optional *pOtherInfo* may be supplied, which consists of some data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero.

CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

6.4.12 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key pair generation

The X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public/private key pairs with a particular prime, base and subprime, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE** and **CKA_SUBPRIME** attributes of the template for the public key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new private key; other attributes required by the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public and private key types must be specified in the templates.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of X9.42 Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits, for the **CKA_PRIME** attribute.

6.4.13 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter generation

The X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN**, is a domain parameters generation mechanism based on X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key agreement, as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters with particular prime and subprime length in bits, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME_BITS** and **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attributes of the template for the domain parameters.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE,** **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_PRIME_BITS** and **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attributes to the new object. Other attributes supported by the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter types may also be specified in the template for the domain parameters, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of X9.42 Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits.

6.4.14 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key derivation

The X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme, as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard, where each party contributes one key pair, all using the same X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.

It has a parameter, a **CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template. Note that in order to validate this mechanism it may be required to use the **CKA_VALUE** attribute as the key of a general-length MAC mechanism (e.g. **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL**) over some test data.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of X9.42 Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits, for the **CKA_PRIME** attribute.

6.4.15 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman hybrid key derivation

The X9.42 Diffie-Hellman hybrid key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on the Diffie-Hellman hybrid key agreement scheme, as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard, where each party contributes two key pair, all using the same X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.

It has a parameter, a **CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template. Note that in order to validate this mechanism it may be required to use the **CKA_VALUE** attribute as the key of a general-length MAC mechanism (e.g. **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL**) over some test data.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of X9.42 Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits, for the **CKA_PRIME** attribute.

6.4.16 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Menezes-Qu-Vanstone key derivation

The X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV) key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based the MQV scheme, as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard, where each party contributes two key pairs, all using the same X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.

It has a parameter, a **CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template. Note that in order to validate this mechanism it may be required to use the **CKA_VALUE** attribute as the key of a general-length MAC mechanism (e.g. **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL**) over some test data.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the

derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.

- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of X9.42 Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits, for the **CKA_PRIME** attribute.

6.5 Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman (x3dh)

The Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman mechanism described here is the one described in [SIGNAL].

Table 91, Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_X3DH_INITIALIZE							✓
CKM_X3DH_RESPOND							✓

6.5.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_X3DH_INITIALIZE

CKM_X3DH_RESPOND

6.5.2 Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman key objects

Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman uses Elliptic Curve keys in Montgomery representation (**CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY**). Three different kinds of keys are used, they differ in their lifespan:

- identity keys are long-term keys, which identify the peer,
- prekeys are short-term keys, which should be rotated often (weekly to hourly)
- onetime prekeys are keys, which should be used only once.

Any peer intending to be contacted using X3DH must publish their so-called prekey-bundle, consisting of their:

- public Identity key,
- current prekey, signed using XEDDSA with their identity key
- optionally a batch of One-time public keys.

6.5.3 Initiating an Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Initiating an Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange starts by retrieving the following required public keys (the so-called prekey-bundle) of the other peer: the Identity key, the signed public Prekey, and optionally one One-time public key.

When the necessary key material is available, the initiating party calls CKM_X3DH_INITIALIZE, also providing the following additional parameters:

- the initiators identity key

- the initiators ephemeral key (a fresh, one-time **CKK_EC_MONTGOMERY** type key)

CK_X3DH_INITIATE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_X3DH_INITIALIZE** key exchange mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_X3DH_INITIATE_PARAMS {
   CK_X3DH_KDF_TYPE   kdf;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE   pPeer_identity;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE   pPeer_prekey;
   CK_BYTE_PTR        pPrekey_signature;
   CK_BYTE_PTR        pOnetime_key;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE   pOwn_identity;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE   pOwn_ephemeral;
}  CK_X3DH_INITIATE_PARAMS;
```

Table 92, Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman Initiate Message parameters:

Parameter	Data type	Meaning
kdf	CK_X3DH_KDF_TYPE	*Key derivation function*
pPeer_identity	Key handle	*Peers public Identity key (from the prekey-bundle)*
pPeer_prekey	Key Handle	Peers public prekey (from the prekey-bundle)
pPrekey_signature	Byte array	*XEDDSA signature of PEER_PREKEY (from prekey-bundle)*
pOnetime_key	Byte array	Optional one-time public prekey of peer (from the prekey-bundle)
pOwn_identity	Key Handle	Initiators Identity key
pOwn_ephemeral	Key Handle	Initiators ephemeral key

6.5.4 Responding to an Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Responding an Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange is done by executing a CKM_X3DH_RESPOND mechanism. **CK_X3DH_RESPOND_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_X3DH_RESPOND** key exchange mechanism. All these parameter should be supplied by the Initiator in a message to the responder. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_X3DH_RESPOND_PARAMS {
   CK_X3DH_KDF_TYPE   kdf;
   CK_BYTE_PTR        pIdentity_id;
   CK_BYTE_PTR        pPrekey_id;
   CK_BYTE_PTR        pOnetime_id;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE   pInitiator_identity;
   CK_BYTE_PTR        pInitiator_ephemeral;
}  CK_X3DH_RESPOND_PARAMS;
```

Table 93, Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman 1st Message parameters:

Parameter	Data type	Meaning
kdf	CK_X3DH_KDF_TYPE	*Key derivation function*
pIdentity_id	Byte array	*Peers public Identity key identifier (from the prekey-bundle)*
pPrekey_id	Byte array	Peers public prekey identifier (from the prekey-bundle)
pOnetime_id	Byte array	Optional one-time public prekey of peer (from the prekey-bundle)
pInitiator_identity	Key handle	Initiators Identity key
pInitiator_ephemeral	Byte array	Initiators ephemeral key

Where the *_id fields are identifiers marking which key has been used from the prekey-bundle, these identifiers could be the keys themselves.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability[3]:

1 The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
2 If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
3 Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

6.5.5 Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman parameters

- **CK_X3DH_KDF_TYPE, CK_X3DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR**

CK_X3DH_KDF_TYPE is used to indicate the Key Derivation Function (KDF) applied to derive keying data from a shared secret. The key derivation function will be used by the X3DH key agreement schemes. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_X3DH_KDF_TYPE;
```

The following table lists the defined functions.

Table 94, X3DH: Key Derivation Functions

Source Identifier
CKD_NULL
CKD_BLAKE2B_256_KDF
CKD_BLAKE2B_512_KDF
CKD_SHA3_256_KDF

3 Note that the rules regarding the CKA_SENSITIVE, CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, and CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE attributes have changed in version 2.11 to match the policy used by other key derivation mechanisms such as CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE.

CKD_SHA256_KDF
CKD_SHA3_512_KDF
CKD_SHA512_KDF

6.6 Double Ratchet

The Double Ratchet is a key management algorithm managing the ongoing renewal and maintenance of short-lived session keys providing forward secrecy and break-in recovery for encrypt/decrypt operations. The algorithm is described in **[DoubleRatchet]**. The Signal protocol uses X3DH to exchange a shared secret in the first step, which is then used to derive a Double Ratchet secret key.

Table 95, Double Ratchet Mechanisms vs. Functions

	Functions						
Mechanism	**Encrypt & Decrypt**	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR** [1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_X2RATCHET_INITIALIZE							✓
CKM_X2RATCHET_RESPOND							✓
CKM_X2RATCHET_ENCRYPT	✓					✓	
CKM_X2RATCHET_DECRYPT	✓					✓	

6.6.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_X2RATCHET” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_X2RATCHET_INITIALIZE

CKM_X2RATCHET_RESPOND

CKM_X2RATCHET_ENCRYPT

CKM_X2RATCHET_DECRYPT

6.6.2 Double Ratchet secret key objects

Double Ratchet secret key objects (object class CKO_SECRET_KEY, key type CKK_X2RATCHET) hold Double Ratchet keys. Double Ratchet secret keys can only be derived from shared secret keys using the mechanism CKM_X2RATCHET_INITIALIZE or CKM_X2RATCHET_RESPOND. In the Signal protocol these are seeded with the shared secret derived from an Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman [X3DH] key-exchange. The following table defines the Double Ratchet secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 96, Double Ratchet Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_X2RATCHET_RK	Byte array	Root key
CKA_X2RATCHET_HKS	Byte array	Sender Header key
CKA_X2RATCHET_HKR	Byte array	Receiver Header key
CKA_X2RATCHET_NHKS	Byte array	Next Sender Header Key
CKA_X2RATCHET_NHKR	Byte array	Next Receiver Header Key
CKA_X2RATCHET_CKS	Byte array	Sender Chain key

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_X2RATCHET_CKR	Byte array	Receiver Chain key
CKA_X2RATCHET_DHS	Byte array	Sender DH secret key
CKA_X2RATCHET_DHP	Byte array	Sender DH public key
CKA_X2RATCHET_DHR	Byte array	Receiver DH public key
CKA_X2RATCHET_NS	ULONG	Message number send
CKA_X2RATCHET_NR	ULONG	Message number receive
CKA_X2RATCHET_PNS	ULONG	Previous message number send
CKA_X2RATCHET_BOBS1STMSG	BOOL	Is this bob and has he ever sent a message?
CKA_X2RATCHET_ISALICE	BOOL	Is this Alice?
CKA_X2RATCHET_BAGSIZE	ULONG	How many out-of-order keys do we store
CKA_X2RATCHET_BAG	Byte array	Out-of-order keys

6.6.3 Double Ratchet key derivation

The Double Ratchet key derivation mechanisms depend on who is the initiating party, and who the receiving, denoted **CKM_X2RATCHET_INITIALIZE** and **CKM_X2RATCHET_RESPOND**, are the key derivation mechanisms for the Double Ratchet. Usually the keys are derived from a shared secret by executing a X3DH key exchange.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Additionally the attribute flags indicating which functions the key supports are also contributed by the mechanism.

For this mechanism, the only allowed values are 255 and 448 as RFC 8032 only defines curves of these two sizes. A Cryptoki implementation may support one or both of these curves and should set the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields accordingly.

- **CK_X2RATCHET_INITIALIZE_PARAMS; CK_X2RATCHET_INITIALIZE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_X2RATCHET_INITIALIZE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the **CKM_X2RATCHET_INITIALIZE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_X2RATCHET_INITIALIZE_PARAMS {
   CK_BYTE_PTR             sk;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE        peer_public_prekey;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE        peer_public_identity;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE        own_public_identity;
   CK_BBOOL                bEncryptedHeader;
   CK_ULONG                eCurve;
   CK_MECHANISM_TYPE       aeadMechanism;
   CK_X2RATCHET_KDF_TYPE   kdfMechanism;
} CK_X2RATCHET_INITIALIZE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

sk	*the shared secret with peer (derived using X3DH)*
peers_public_prekey	*Peers public prekey which the Initiator used in the X3DH*
peers_public_identity	*Peers public identity which the Initiator used in the X3DH*

own_public_identity	*Initiators public identity as used in the X3DH*
bEncryptedHeader	*whether the headers are encrypted*
eCurve	*255 for curve 25519 or 448 for curve 448*
aeadMechanism	*a mechanism supporting AEAD encryption*
kdfMechanism	*a Key Derivation Mechanism, such as CKD_BLAKE2B_512_KDF*

- **CK_X2RATCHET_RESPOND_PARAMS; CK_X2RATCHET_RESPOND_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_X2RATCHET_RESPOND_PARAMS provides the parameters to the **CKM_X2RATCHET_RESPOND** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_X2RATCHET_RESPOND_PARAMS {
   CK_BYTE_PTR             sk;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE        own_prekey;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE        initiator_identity;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE        own_public_identity;
   CK_BBOOL                bEncryptedHeader;
   CK_ULONG                eCurve;
   CK_MECHANISM_TYPE       aeadMechanism;
   CK_X2RATCHET_KDF_TYPE   kdfMechanism;
}  CK_X2RATCHET_RESPOND_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

sk	*shared secret with the Initiator*
own_prekey	*Own Prekey pair that the Initiator used*
initiator_identity	*Initiators public identity key used*
own_public_identity	*as used in the prekey bundle by the initiator in the X3DH*
bEncryptedHeader	*whether the headers are encrypted*
eCurve	*255 for curve 25519 or 448 for curve 448*
aeadMechanism	*a mechanism supporting AEAD encryption*
kdfMechanism	*a Key Derivation Mechanism, such as CKD_BLAKE2B_512_KDF*

6.6.4 Double Ratchet Encryption mechanism

The Double Ratchet encryption mechanism, denoted **CKM_X2RATCHET_ENCRYPT** and **CKM_X2RATCHET_DECRYPT**, are a mechanisms for single part encryption and decryption based on the Double Ratchet and its underlying AEAD cipher.

6.6.5 Double Ratchet parameters

- **CK_X2RATCHET_KDF_TYPE, CK_X2RATCHET_KDF_TYPE_PTR**

CK_X2RATCHET_KDF_TYPE is used to indicate the Key Derivation Function (KDF) applied to derive keying data from a shared secret. The key derivation function will be used by the X key derivation scheme. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_X2RATCHET_KDF_TYPE;
```

The following table lists the defined functions.

Table 97, X2RATCHET: Key Derivation Functions

Source Identifier
CKD_NULL
CKD_BLAKE2B_256_KDF
CKD_BLAKE2B_512_KDF
CKD_SHA3_256_KDF
CKD_SHA256_KDF
CKD_SHA3_512_KDF
CKD_SHA512_KDF

6.7 Wrapping/unwrapping private keys

Cryptoki Versions 2.01 and up allow the use of secret keys for wrapping and unwrapping RSA private keys, Diffie-Hellman private keys, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private keys, short Weierstrass EC private keys and DSA private keys. For wrapping, a private key is BER-encoded according to [PKCS #8] PrivateKeyInfo ASN.1 type. PKCS #8 requires an algorithm identifier for the type of the private key. The object identifiers for the required algorithm identifiers are as follows:

```
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }

dhKeyAgreement OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-3 1 }

dhpublicnumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
        us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 }

id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
        us(840) ansi-x9-62(10045) publicKeyType(2) 1 }

id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
  iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 }

where
pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
  iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }

pkcs-3 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
  iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 3 }
```

```
    These parameters for the algorithm identifiers have the
            following types, respectively:
    NULL

    DHParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
      prime               INTEGER,  -- p
      base                INTEGER,  -- g
      privateValueLength  INTEGER OPTIONAL
    }

    DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
      prime               INTEGER,  -- p
      base                INTEGER,  -- g
      subprime            INTEGER,  -- q
      cofactor            INTEGER OPTIONAL,  -- j
      validationParms     ValidationParms OPTIONAL
    }

    ValidationParms ::= SEQUENCE {
      Seed           BIT STRING, -- seed
      PGenCounter    INTEGER     -- parameter verification
    }

    Parameters ::= CHOICE {
      ecParameters   ECParameters,
      namedCurve     CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
      implicitlyCA   NULL
    }

    Dss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE {
      p INTEGER,
      q INTEGER,
      g INTEGER
    }
```

For the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters, the **cofactor** and the **validationParms** optional fields should not be used when wrapping or unwrapping X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private keys since their values are not stored within the token.

For the EC domain parameters, the use of **namedCurve** is recommended over the choice **ecParameters**. The choice **implicitlyCA** must not be used in Cryptoki.

Within the PrivateKeyInfo type:

- RSA private keys are BER-encoded according to PKCS #1's RSAPrivateKey ASN.1 type. This type requires values to be present for *all* the attributes specific to Cryptoki's RSA private key objects. In other words, if a Cryptoki library does not have values for an RSA private key's **CKA_MODULUS**, **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIME_1**, **CKA_PRIME_2**, **CKA_EXPONENT_1**, **CKA_EXPONENT_2**, and **CKA_COEFFICIENT** values, it must not create an RSAPrivateKey BER-encoding of the key, and so it must not prepare it for wrapping.
- Diffie-Hellman private keys are represented as BER-encoded ASN.1 type INTEGER.

- X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private keys are represented as BER-encoded ASN.1 type INTEGER.
- Short Weierstrass EC private keys are BER-encoded according to SECG SEC 1 ECPrivateKey ASN.1 type:

```
ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
   Version       INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) }
         (ecPrivkeyVer1),
   privateKey    OCTET STRING,
   parameters    [0] Parameters OPTIONAL,
   publicKey     [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL
}
```

  Since the EC domain parameters are placed in the PKCS #8's privateKeyAlgorithm field, the optional **parameters** field in an ECPrivateKey must be omitted. A Cryptoki application must be able to unwrap an ECPrivateKey that contains the optional **publicKey** field; however, what is done with this **publicKey** field is outside the scope of Cryptoki.

- DSA private keys are represented as BER-encoded ASN.1 type INTEGER.

Once a private key has been BER-encoded as a PrivateKeyInfo type, the resulting string of bytes is encrypted with the secret key. This encryption is defined in the section for the respective key wrapping mechanism.

Unwrapping a wrapped private key undoes the above procedure. The ciphertext is decrypted as defined for the respective key unwrapping mechanism. The data thereby obtained are parsed as a PrivateKeyInfo type. An error will result if the original wrapped key does not decrypt properly, or if the decrypted data does not parse properly, or its type does not match the key type specified in the template for the new key. The unwrapping mechanism contributes only those attributes specified in the PrivateKeyInfo type to the newly-unwrapped key; other attributes must be specified in the template, or will take their default values.

Earlier drafts of PKCS #11 Version 2.0 and Version 2.01 used the object identifier

```
DSA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { algorithm 12 }
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
  iso(1) identifier-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
        algorithm(2) }
```

with associated parameters

```
DSAParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
  prime1 INTEGER,  -- modulus p
  prime2 INTEGER,  -- modulus q
  base INTEGER  -- base g
}
```

for wrapping DSA private keys. Note that although the two structures for holding DSA domain parameters appear identical when instances of them are encoded, the two corresponding object identifiers are different.

6.8 Generic secret key

Table 98, Generic Secret Key Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.8.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_GENERIC_SECRET” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN

6.8.2 Generic secret key objects

Generic secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY,** key type **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**) hold generic secret keys. These keys do not support encryption or decryption; however, other keys can be derived from them and they can be used in HMAC operations. The following table defines the generic secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

These key types are used in several of the mechanisms described in this section.

Table 99, Generic Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key value (arbitrary length)
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating a generic secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A generic secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of the SHA-1 hash of the generic secret key object’s CKA_VALUE attribute.

6.8.3 Generic secret key generation

The generic secret key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN**, is used to generate generic secret keys. The generated keys take on any attributes provided in the template passed to the **C_GenerateKey** call, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute specifies the length of the key to be generated.

It does not have a parameter.

The template supplied must specify a value for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute. If the template specifies an object type and a class, they must have the following values:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
```

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes, in bits.

6.9 HMAC mechanisms

Refer to **RFC2104** and **FIPS 198** for HMAC algorithm description. The HMAC secret key shall correspond to the PKCS11 generic secret key type or the mechanism specific key types (see mechanism definition). Such keys, for use with HMAC operations can be created using C_CreateObject or C_GenerateKey.

The RFC also specifies test vectors for the various hash function based HMAC mechanisms described in the respective hash mechanism descriptions. The RFC should be consulted to obtain these test vectors.

6.9.1 General block cipher mechanism parameters

- **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to the general-length MACing mechanisms of the DES, DES3 (triple-DES), AES, Camellia, SEED, and ARIA ciphers. It also provides the parameters to the general-length HMACing mechanisms (i.e.,SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, and SHA-512/T family) and the two SSL 3.0 MACing mechanisms, (i.e., MD5 and SHA-1). It holds the length of the MAC that these mechanisms produce. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
```

CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**.

6.10 AES

For the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) see [FIPS PUB 197].

Table 100, AES Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_AES_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL		✓					

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_MAC		✓					
CKM_AES_OFB	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CFB64	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CFB8	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CFB128	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CFB1	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC		✓					
CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96		✓					

6.10.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_AES” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_KEY_GEN
CKM_AES_ECB
CKM_AES_CBC
CKM_AES_MAC
CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL
CKM_AES_CBC_PAD
CKM_AES_OFB
CKM_AES_CFB64
CKM_AES_CFB8
CKM_AES_CFB128
CKM_AES_CFB1
CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC
CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96

6.10.2 AES secret key objects

AES secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY,** key type **CKK_AES**) hold AES keys. The following table defines the AES secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 101, AES Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key value (16, 24, or 32 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2,3,6]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an AES secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_AES;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An AES secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of the ECB encryption of a single block of null (0x00) bytes, using the default cipher associated with the key type of the secret key object.

6.10.3 AES key generation

The AES key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_AES_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates AES keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the AES key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.10.4 AES-ECB

AES-ECB, denoted **CKM_AES_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on NIST Advanced Encryption Standard and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 102, AES-ECB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	AES	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	AES	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	AES	any	input length rounded up to multiple of block size	
C_UnwrapKey	AES	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.10.5 AES-CBC

AES-CBC, denoted **CKM_AES_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard and cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 103, AES-CBC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	AES	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	AES	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	AES	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size	
C_UnwrapKey	AES	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.10.6 AES-CBC with PKCS padding

AES-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_AES_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on NIST's Advanced

Encryption Standard; cipher-block chaining mode; and the block cipher padding method detailed in [PKCS #7].

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap and unwrap secret keys, this mechanism can wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, short Weierstrass EC and DSA private keys (see Section 6.7 for details). The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 104, AES-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	AES	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	AES	multiple of block size	between 1 and block size bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	AES	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	AES	multiple of block size	between 1 and block length bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.10.7 AES-OFB

AES-OFB, denoted CKM_AES_OFB. It is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption with AES. AES-OFB mode is described in [NIST sp800-38a].

It has a parameter, an initialization vector for this mode. The initialization vector has the same length as the block size.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 105, AES-OFB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	AES	any	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	AES	any	same as input length	no final part

For this mechanism the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure is as specified for CBC mode.

6.10.8 AES-CFB

Cipher AES has a cipher feedback mode, AES-CFB, denoted CKM_AES_CFB8, CKM_AES_CFB64, and CKM_AES_CFB128. It is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption with AES. AES-OFB mode is described [NIST sp800-38a].

It has a parameter, an initialization vector for this mode. The initialization vector has the same length as the block size.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 106, AES-CFB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	AES	any	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	AES	any	same as input length	no final part

For this mechanism the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure is as specified for CBC mode.

6.10.9 General-length AES-MAC

General-length AES-MAC, denoted **CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on NIST Advanced Encryption Standard as defined in FIPS PUB 197 and data authentication as defined in FIPS PUB 113.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final AES cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 107, General-length AES-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	AES	any	1-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	AES	any	1-block size, as specified in parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.10.10 AES-MAC

AES-MAC, denoted by **CKM_AES_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length AES-MAC mechanism. AES-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are half the block size in length.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 108, AES-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	AES	Any	½ block size (8 bytes)
C_Verify	AES	Any	½ block size (8 bytes)

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.10.11 AES-XCBC-MAC

AES-XCBC-MAC, denoted **CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC**, is a mechanism for single and multiple part signatures and verification; based on NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard and [RFC 3566].

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 109, AES-XCBC-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	AES	Any	16 bytes
C_Verify	AES	Any	16 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.10.12 AES-XCBC-MAC-96

AES-XCBC-MAC-96, denoted **CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96**, is a mechanism for single and multiple part signatures and verification; based on NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard and [RFC 3566].

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 110, AES-XCBC-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	AES	Any	12 bytes
C_Verify	AES	Any	12 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.11 AES with Counter

Table 111, AES with Counter Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_CTR	✓					✓	

6.11.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_CTR

6.11.2 AES with Counter mechanism parameters

♦ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR

CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_AES_CTR** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
   CK_ULONG  ulCounterBits;
   CK_BYTE   cb[16];
} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS;
```

ulCounterBits specifies the number of bits in the counter block (cb) that shall be incremented. This number shall be such that 0 < *ulCounterBits* ≤ 128. For any values outside this range the mechanism shall return **CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID**.

It's up to the caller to initialize all of the bits in the counter block including the counter bits. The counter bits are the least significant bits of the counter block (cb). They are a big-endian value usually starting with 1. The rest of 'cb' is for the nonce, and maybe an optional IV.

E.g. as defined in [RFC 3686]:



This construction permits each packet to consist of up to 2^{32}-1 blocks = 4,294,967,295 blocks = 68,719,476,720 octets.

CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS**.

6.11.3 AES with Counter Encryption / Decryption

Generic AES counter mode is described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A and in RFC 3686. These describe encryption using a counter block which may include a nonce to guarantee uniqueness of the counter block. Since the nonce is not incremented, the mechanism parameter must specify the number of counter bits in the counter block.

The block counter is incremented by 1 after each block of plaintext is processed. There is no support for any other increment functions in this mechanism.

If an attempt to encrypt/decrypt is made which will cause an overflow of the counter block's counter bits, then the mechanism shall return **CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE**. Note that the mechanism should allow the final post increment of the counter to overflow (if it implements it this way) but not allow any further processing after this point. E.g. if ulCounterBits = 2 and the counter bits start as 1 then only 3 blocks of data can be processed.

6.12 AES CBC with Cipher Text Stealing CTS

Ref [NIST AES CTS]

This mode allows unpadded data that has length that is not a multiple of the block size to be encrypted to the same length of cipher text.

Table 112, AES CBC with Cipher Text Stealing CTS Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_AES_CTS	✓					✓	

6.12.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_CTS

6.12.2 AES CTS mechanism parameters

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

Table 113, AES-CTS: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	AES	Any, ≥ block size (16 bytes)	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	AES	any, ≥ block size (16 bytes)	same as input length	no final part

6.13 Additional AES Mechanisms

Table 114, Additional AES Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_GCM	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CCM	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_GMAC		✓					

6.13.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_GCM
CKM_AES_CCM
CKM_AES_GMAC

Generator Functions:

CKG_NO_GENERATE
CKG_GENERATE
CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER
CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM
CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR

6.13.2 AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption / Decryption

Generic GCM mode is described in [GCM]. To set up for AES-GCM use the following process, where *K* (key) and *AAD* (additional authenticated data) are as described in [GCM]. AES-GCM uses CK_GCM_PARAMS for Encrypt, Decrypt and CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS for MessageEncrypt and MessageDecrypt.

Encrypt:

- Set the IV length *ulIvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIv* in the parameter block.

- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD m*ay be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Call C_EncryptInit() for **CKM_AES_GCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C_Encrypt(), or C_EncryptUpdate()*[4] C_EncryptFinal(), for the plaintext obtaining ciphertext and authentication tag output.

Decrypt:

- Set the IV length *ulIvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIv* in the parameter block.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD m*ay be NULL if ulAADLen is 0.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Call C_DecryptInit() for **CKM_AES_GCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C_Decrypt(), or C_DecryptUpdate()*[1] C_DecryptFinal(), for the ciphertext, including the appended tag, obtaining plaintext output. Note: since **CKM_AES_GCM** is an AEAD cipher, no data should be returned until C_Decrypt() or C_DecryptFinal().

MessageEncrypt:

- Set the IV length *ulIvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set *pIv* to hold the IV data returned from C_EncryptMessage() and C_EncryptMessageBegin(). If *ulIvFixedBits* is not zero, then the most significant bits of *pIV* contain the fixed IV. If *ivGenerator* is set to CKG_NO_GENERATE, *pIv* is an input parameter with the full IV.
- Set the *ulIvFixedBits* and *ivGenerator* fields in the parameter block.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Set *pTag* to hold the tag data returned from C_EncryptMessage() or the final C_EncryptMessageNext().
- Call C_MessageEncryptInit() for **CKM_AES_GCM** mechanism key *K*.
- Call C_EncryptMessage(), or C_EncryptMessageBegin() followed by C_EncryptMessageNext()*[5]. The mechanism parameter is passed to all three of these functions.
- Call C_MessageEncryptFinal() to close the message decryption.

MessageDecrypt:

- Set the IV length *ulIvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIv* in the parameter block.
- The *ulIvFixedBits* and *ivGenerator* fields are ignored.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Set the tag data *pTag* in the parameter block before C_DecryptMessage() or the final C_DecryptMessageNext().

4 "*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

5 "*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

- Call C_MessageDecryptInit() for **CKM_AES_GCM** mechanism key *K*.
- Call C_DecryptMessage(), or C_DecryptMessageBegin followed by C_DecryptMessageNext()*[6]. The mechanism parameter is passed to all three of these functions.
- Call C_MessageDecryptFinal() to close the message decryption.

In *pIv* the least significant bit of the initialization vector is the rightmost bit. *ulIvLen* is the length of the initialization vector in bytes.

On MessageEncrypt, the meaning of *ivGenerator* is as follows: CKG_NO_GENERATE means the IV is passed in on MessageEncrypt and no internal IV generation is done. CKG_GENERATE means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is generated by the module internally. The generation method is not defined.

CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is generated by the module internally by use of an incrementing counter, the initial IV counter is zero.

CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is xored with a counter. The value of the non-fixed portion passed must not vary from call to call. Like CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER, the counter starts at zero.

CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is generated by the module internally using a PRNG. In any case the entire IV, including the fixed portion, is returned in *pIV*.

Modules must implement CKG_GENERATE. Modules may also reject *ulIvFixedBits* values which are too large. Zero is always an acceptable value for *ulIvFixedBits*.

In Encrypt and Decrypt the tag is appended to the cipher text and the least significant bit of the tag is the rightmost bit and the tag bits are the rightmost *ulTagBits* bits. In MessageEncrypt the tag is returned in the *pTag* field of CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS. In MesssageDecrypt the tag is provided by the *pTag* field of CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS.

The key type for *K* must be compatible with **CKM_AES_ECB** and the C_EncryptInit()/C_DecryptInit()/C_MessageEncryptInit()/C_MessageDecryptInit() calls shall behave, with respect to *K*, as if they were called directly with **CKM_AES_ECB**, *K* and NULL parameters.

6.13.3 AES-CCM authenticated Encryption / Decryption

For IPsec (RFC 4309) and also for use in ZFS encryption. Generic CCM mode is described in [RFC 3610].

To set up for AES-CCM use the following process, where *K* (key), nonce and additional authenticated data are as described in [RFC 3610]. AES-CCM uses CK_CCM_PARAMS for Encrypt and Decrypt, and CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS for MessageEncrypt and MessageDecrypt.

Encrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Call C_EncryptInit() for **CKM_AES_CCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C_Encrypt(), C_EncryptUpdate(), or C_EncryptFinal(), for the plaintext obtaining the final ciphertext output and the MAC. The total length of data processed must be *ulDataLen*. The output length will be *ulDataLen* + *ulMACLen.*

Decrypt:

6 "*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block. This length must not include the length of the MAC that is appended to the cipher text.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD m*ay be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Call C_DecryptInit() for **CKM_AES_CCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C_Decrypt(), C_DecryptUpdate(), or C_DecryptFinal(), for the ciphertext, including the appended MAC, obtaining plaintext output. The total length of data processed must be *ulDataLen* + *ulMACLen*. Note: since **CKM_AES_CCM** is an AEAD cipher, no data should be returned until C_Decrypt() or C_DecryptFinal().

MessageEncrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen*.
- Set *pNonce* to hold the nonce data returned from C_EncryptMessage() and C_EncryptMessageBegin(). If *ulNonceFixedBits* is not zero, then the most significant bits of *pNonce* contain the fixed nonce. If *nonceGenerator* is set to CKG_NO_GENERATE, *pNonce* is an input parameter with the full nonce.
- Set the *ulNonceFixedBits* and *nonceGenerator* fields in the parameter block.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Set *pMAC* to hold the MAC data returned from C_EncryptMessage() or the final C_EncryptMessageNext().
- Call C_MessageEncryptInit() for **CKM_AES_CCM** mechanism key *K*.
- Call C_EncryptMessage(), or C_EncryptMessageBegin() followed by C_EncryptMessageNext()*[7]. The mechanism parameter is passed to all three functions.
- Call C_MessageEncryptFinal() to close the message encryption.
- The MAC is returned in *pMac* of the CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS structure.

MessageDecrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block
- The *ulNonceFixedBits* and *nonceGenerator* fields in the parameter block are ignored.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the MAC data *pMAC* in the parameter block before C_DecryptMessage() or the final C_DecryptMessageNext().
- Call C_MessageDecryptInit() for **CKM_AES_CCM** mechanism key *K*.
- Call C_DecryptMessage(), or C_DecryptMessageBegin() followed by C_DecryptMessageNext()*[8]. The mechanism parameter is passed to all three functions.

---

7 "*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

8 "*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

- Call C_MessageDecryptFinal() to close the message decryption.

In *pNonce* the least significant bit of the nonce is the rightmost bit. *ulNonceLen* is the length of the nonce in bytes.

On MessageEncrypt, the meaning of *nonceGenerator* is as follows: CKG_NO_GENERATE means the nonce is passed in on MessageEncrypt and no internal MAC generation is done. CKG_GENERATE means that the non-fixed portion of the nonce is generated by the module internally. The generation method is not defined.

CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER means that the non-fixed portion of the nonce is generated by the module internally by use of an incrementing counter, the initial IV counter is zero.

CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is xored with a counter. The value of the non-fixed portion passed must not vary from call to call. Like CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER, the counter starts at zero.

CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM means that the non-fixed portion of the nonce is generated by the module internally using a PRNG. In any case the entire nonce, including the fixed portion, is returned in *pNonce*.

Modules must implement CKG_GENERATE. Modules may also reject *ulNonceFixedBits* values which are too large. Zero is always an acceptable value for *ulNonceFixedBits*.

In Encrypt and Decrypt the MAC is appended to the cipher text and the least significant byte of the MAC is the rightmost byte and the MAC bytes are the rightmost *ulMACLen* bytes. In MessageEncrypt the MAC is returned in the *pMAC* field of CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS. In MesssageDecrypt the MAC is provided by the *pMAC* field of CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS.

The key type for K must be compatible with **CKM_AES_ECB** and the C_EncryptInit()/C_DecryptInit()/C_MessageEncryptInit()/C_MessageDecryptInit() calls shall behave, with respect to K, as if they were called directly with **CKM_AES_ECB**, K and NULL parameters.

6.13.4 AES-GMAC

AES-GMAC, denoted **CKM_AES_GMAC**, is a mechanism for single and multiple-part signatures and verification. It is described in NIST Special Publication 800-38D [GMAC]. GMAC is a special case of GCM that authenticates only the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) part of the GCM mechanism parameters. When GMAC is used with C_Sign or C_Verify, pData points to the AAD. GMAC does not use plaintext or ciphertext.

The signature produced by GMAC, also referred to as a Tag, the tag's length is determined by the CK_GCM_PARAMS field *ulTagBits*.

The IV length is determined by the CK_GCM_PARAMS field *ulIvLen*.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 115, AES-GMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_AES	< 2^64	Depends on param's ulTagBits
C_Verify	CKK_AES	< 2^64	Depends on param's ulTagBits

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.13.5 AES GCM and CCM Mechanism parameters

♦ CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION

Functions to generate unique IVs and nonces.

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION;
```

♦ CK_GCM_PARAMS; CK_GCM_PARAMS_PTR

CK_GCM_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the CKM_AES_GCM mechanism when used for Encrypt or Decrypt. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_GCM_PARAMS {
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pIv;
   CK_ULONG      ulIvLen;
   CK_ULONG      ulIvBits;
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pAAD;
   CK_ULONG      ulAADLen;
   CK_ULONG      ulTagBits;
}  CK_GCM_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pIv	pointer to initialization vector
ulIvLen	length of initialization vector in bytes. The length of the initialization vector can be any number between 1 and (2^32) - 1. 96-bit (12 byte) IV values can be processed more efficiently, so that length is recommended for situations in which efficiency is critical.
ulIvBits	length of initialization vector in bits. Do no use ulIvBits to specify the length of the initialization vector, but ulIvLen instead.
pAAD	pointer to additional authentication data. This data is authenticated but not encrypted.
ulAADLen	length of pAAD in bytes. The length of the AAD can be any number between 0 and (2^32) – 1.
ulTagBits	length of authentication tag (output following cipher text) in bits. Can be any value between 0 and 128.

CK_GCM_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_GCM_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS; CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the CKM_AES_GCM mechanism when used for MessageEncrypt or MessageDecrypt. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS {
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pIv;
   CK_ULONG      ulIvLen;
   CK_ULONG      ulIvFixedBits;
   CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION   ivGenerator;
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pTag;
   CK_ULONG      ulTagBits;
}  CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pIv	pointer to initialization vector

ulIvLen	length of initialization vector in bytes. The length of the initialization vector can be any number between 1 and (2^32) - 1. 96-bit (12 byte) IV values can be processed more efficiently, so that length is recommended for situations in which efficiency is critical.
ulIvFixedBits	number of bits of the original IV to preserve when generating an new IV. These bits are counted from the Most significant bits (to the right).
ivGenerator	Function used to generate a new IV. Each IV must be unique for a given session.
pTag	location of the authentication tag which is returned on MessageEncrypt, and provided on MessageDecrypt.
ulTagBits	length of authentication tag in bits. Can be any value between 0 and 128.

CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_CCM_PARAMS; CK_CCM_PARAMS_PTR

CK_CCM_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_AES_CCM** mechanism when used for Encrypt or Decrypt. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_CCM_PARAMS {
   CK_ULONG     ulDataLen; /*plaintext or ciphertext*/
   CK_BYTE_PTR  pNonce;
   CK_ULONG     ulNonceLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR  pAAD;
   CK_ULONG     ulAADLen;
   CK_ULONG     ulMACLen;
}  CK_CCM_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings, where L is the size in bytes of the data length's length ($2 \le L \le 8$):

ulDataLen	length of the data where $0 \le$ ulDataLen $< 2^{(8L)}$.
pNonce	the nonce.
ulNonceLen	length of pNonce in bytes where $7 \le$ ulNonceLen ≤ 13.
pAAD	Additional authentication data. This data is authenticated but not encrypted.
ulAADLen	length of pAAD in bytes where $0 \le$ ulAADLen $\le (2^{32}) - 1$.
ulMACLen	length of the MAC (output following cipher text) in bytes. Valid values are 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16.

CK_CCM_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_CCM_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS; CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_AES_CCM** mechanism when used for MessageEncrypt or MessageDecrypt. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS {
   CK_ULONG     ulDataLen; /*plaintext or ciphertext*/
   CK_BYTE_PTR  pNonce;
```



```
        CK_ULONG     ulNonceLen;
        CK_ULONG     ulNonceFixedBits;
        CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION   nonceGenerator;
        CK_BYTE_PTR  pMAC;
        CK_ULONG     ulMACLen;
    }   CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings, where L is the size in bytes of the data length's length ($2 \le L \le 8$):

ulDataLen	length of the data where $0 \le$ ulDataLen $< 2^{(8L)}$.
pNonce	the nonce.
ulNonceLen	length of pNonce in bytes where $7 \le$ ulNonceLen ≤ 13.
ulNonceFixedBits	number of bits of the original nonce to preserve when generating a new nonce. These bits are counted from the Most significant bits (to the right).
nonceGenerator	Function used to generate a new nonce. Each nonce must be unique for a given session.
pMAC	location of the CCM MAC returned on MessageEncrypt, provided on MessageDecrypt
ulMACLen	length of the MAC (output following cipher text) in bytes. Valid values are 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16.

CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS**.

6.14 AES CMAC

Table 116, Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_AES_CMAC		✓					

1 SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover.

6.14.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL

CKM_AES_CMAC

6.14.2 Mechanism parameters

CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL uses the existing **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure.
CKM_AES_CMAC does not use a mechanism parameter.

6.14.3 General-length AES-CMAC

General-length AES-CMAC, denoted **CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on **[**NIST SP800-38B**]** and **[**RFC 4493**]**.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final AES cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 117, General-length AES-CMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_AES	any	1-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	CKK_AES	any	1-block size, as specified in parameters

References [NIST SP800-38B] and [RFC 4493] recommend that the output MAC is not truncated to less than 64 bits. The MAC length must be specified before the communication starts, and must not be changed during the lifetime of the key. It is the caller's responsibility to follow these rules.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.14.4 AES-CMAC

AES-CMAC, denoted **CKM_AES_CMAC**, is a special case of the general-length AES-CMAC mechanism. AES-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are a full block size in length, the default output length specified by [RFC 4493].

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 118, AES-CMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_AES	any	Block size (16 bytes)
C_Verify	CKK_AES	any	Block size (16 bytes)

References [NIST SP800-38B] and [RFC 4493] recommend that the output MAC is not truncated to less than 64 bits. The MAC length must be specified before the communication starts, and must not be changed during the lifetime of the key. It is the caller's responsibility to follow these rules.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

6.15 AES XTS

Table 119, Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_XTS	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_XTS_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.15.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_AES_XTS” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_XTS

CKM_AES_XTS_KEY_GEN

6.15.2 AES-XTS secret key objects

Table 120, AES-XTS Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key value (32 or 64 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2,3,6]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

6.15.3 AES-XTS key generation

The double-length AES-XTS key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_AES_XTS_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for double-length AES-XTS keys.

The mechanism generates AES-XTS keys with a particular length in bytes as specified in the CKA_VALUE_LEN attributes of the template for the key.

This mechanism contributes the CKA_CLASS, CKA_KEY_TYPE, and CKA_VALUE attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the double-length AES-XTS key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure specify the supported range of AES-XTS key sizes, in bytes.

6.15.4 AES-XTS

AES-XTS (XEX-based Tweaked CodeBook mode with CipherText Stealing), denoted **CKM_AES_XTS**, isa mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption. It is specified in NIST SP800-38E.

Its single parameter is a Data Unit Sequence Number 16 bytes long. Supported key lengths are 32 and 64 bytes. Keys are internally split into half-length sub-keys of 16 and 32 bytes respectively. Constraintson key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 121, AES-XTS: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_AES_XTS	Any, ≥ block size (16 bytes)	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_AES_XTS	Any, ≥ block size (16 bytes)	Same as input length	No final part

6.16 AES Key Wrap

Table 122, AES Key Wrap Mechanisms vs. Functions

	Functions						
Mechanism	**Encrypt & Decrypt**	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PKCS7	✓					✓	
[1]SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover							

6.16.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP

CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD

CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP

CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PKCS7

6.16.2 AES Key Wrap Mechanism parameters

The mechanisms will accept an optional mechanism parameter as the Initialization vector which, if present, must be a fixed size array of 8 bytes for CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP and CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PKCS7, resp. 4 bytes for CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP; and, if NULL, will use the default initial value defined in Section 4.3 resp. 6.2 / 6.3 of [AES KEYWRAP].

The type of this parameter is CK_BYTE_PTR and the pointer points to the array of bytes to be used as the initial value. The length shall be either 0 and the pointer NULL; or 8 for CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP and CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PKCS7, resp. 4 for CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, and the pointer non-NULL.

6.16.3 AES Key Wrap

The mechanisms support only single-part operations, i.e. single part wrapping and unwrapping, and single-part encryption and decryption.

♦ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP

The CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP mechanism can wrap a key of any length. A secret key whose length is not a multiple of the AES Key Wrap semiblock size (8 bytes) will be zero padded to fit. Semiblock size is defined in Section 5.2 of [AES KEYWRAP]. A private key will be encoded as defined in section 6.7; the encoded private key will be zero padded to fit if necessary.

The CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP mechanism can only encrypt a block of data whose size is an exact multiple of the AES Key Wrap algorithm semiblock size.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key. In case of a secret key, it truncates the result according to the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute of the template. The length specified in the template must not be less than n-7 bytes, where n is the length of the wrapped key. In case of a private key, the mechanism parses the encoding as defined in section 6.7 and ignores trailing zero bytes.

♦ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD

The CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD mechanism is deprecated. CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP resp. CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PKCS7 shall be used instead.

♦ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP

The CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP mechanism can wrap a key or encrypt block of data of any length. The input is zero-padded and wrapped / encrypted as defined in Section 6.3 of [AES KEYWRAP], which produces same results as RFC 5649.

♦ CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PKCS7

The CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PKCS7 mechanism can wrap a key or encrypt a block of data of any length. It does the padding detailed in [PKCS #7] of inputs (keys or data blocks) up to a semiblock size to make it an exact multiple of AES Key Wrap algorithum semiblock size (8bytes), always producing wrapped output that is larger than the input key/data to be wrapped. This padding is done by the token before being passed to the AES key wrap algorithm, which then wraps / encrypts the padded block of data as defined in Section 6.2 of [AES KEYWRAP].

6.17 Key derivation by data encryption – DES & AES

These mechanisms allow derivation of keys using the result of an encryption operation as the key value. They are for use with the C_DeriveKey function.

Table 123, Key derivation by data encryption Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

6.17.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA
CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA
CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA
CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA
CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA
CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA

```
typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
   CK_BYTE       iv[8];
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pData;
   CK_ULONG      length;
}  CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;

typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
        CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;

typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
   CK_BYTE       iv[16];
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pData;
   CK_ULONG      length;
}  CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;

typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
```

6.17.2 Mechanism Parameters

Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA as defined in section 6.43.2

Table 124, Mechanism Parameters

CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 8 bytes long.
CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 16 long.
CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS. Parameter is an 8 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 8 bytes long.
CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS. Parameter is an 16 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.

6.17.3 Mechanism Description

The mechanisms will function by performing the encryption over the data provided using the base key. The resulting cipher text shall be used to create the key value of the resulting key. If not all the cipher text is used then the part discarded will be from the trailing end (least significant bytes) of the cipher text data. The derived key shall be defined by the attribute template supplied but constrained by the length of cipher text available for the key value and other normal PKCS11 derivation constraints.

Attribute template handling, attribute defaulting and key value preparation will operate as per the SHA-1 Key Derivation mechanism in section 6.20.5.

If the data is too short to make the requested key then the mechanism returns CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE.

6.18 Double and Triple-length DES

Table 125, Double and Triple-Length DES Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_DES3_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_DES3_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_DES3_MAC		✓					

6.18.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_DES2” and “CKK_DES3” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN

CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN

CKM_DES3_ECB

CKM_DES3_CBC

CKM_DES3_MAC

CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL

CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD

6.18.2 DES2 secret key objects

DES2 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY,** key type **CKK_DES2**) hold double-length DES keys. The following table defines the DES2 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 126, DES2 Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key value (always 16 bytes long)

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

DES2 keys must always have their parity bits properly set as described in FIPS PUB 46-3 (*i.e.*, each of the DES keys comprising a DES2 key must have its parity bits properly set). Attempting to create or unwrap a DES2 key with incorrect parity will return an error.

The following is a sample template for creating a double-length DES secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
```

```
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES2;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A DES2 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[16] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of the ECB encryption of a single block of null (0x00) bytes, using the default cipher associated with the key type of the secret key object.

6.18.3 DES3 secret key objects

DES3 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY,** key type **CKK_DES3**) hold triple-length DES keys. The following table defines the DES3 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 127, DES3 Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key value (always 24 bytes long)

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

DES3 keys must always have their parity bits properly set as described in FIPS PUB 46-3 (*i.e.*, each of the DES keys comprising a DES3 key must have its parity bits properly set). Attempting to create or unwrap a DES3 key with incorrect parity will return an error.

The following is a sample template for creating a triple-length DES secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES3;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A DES3 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[24] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of the ECB encryption of a single block of null (0x00) bytes, using the default cipher associated with the key type of the secret key object.

6.18.4 Double-length DES key generation

The double-length DES key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for double-length DES keys. The DES keys making up a double-length DES key both have their parity bits set properly, as specified in FIPS PUB 46-3.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the double-length DES key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

Double-length DES keys can be used with all the same mechanisms as triple-DES keys: **CKM_DES3_ECB**, **CKM_DES3_CBC**, **CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD**, **CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL**, and **CKM_DES3_MAC**. Triple-DES encryption with a double-length DES key is equivalent to encryption with a triple-length DES key with K1=K3 as specified in FIPS PUB 46-3.

When double-length DES keys are generated, it is token-dependent whether or not it is possible for either of the component DES keys to be “weak” or “semi-weak” keys.

6.18.5 Triple-length DES Order of Operations

Triple-length DES encryptions are carried out as specified in FIPS PUB 46-3: encrypt, decrypt, encrypt. Decryptions are carried out with the opposite three steps: decrypt, encrypt, decrypt. The mathematical representations of the encrypt and decrypt operations are as follows:

```
DES3-E({K1,K2,K3}, P) = E(K3, D(K2, E(K1, P)))
DES3-D({K1,K2,K3}, C) = D(K1, E(K2, D(K3, P)))
```

6.18.6 Triple-length DES in CBC Mode

Triple-length DES operations in CBC mode, with double or triple-length keys, are performed using outer CBC as defined in X9.52. X9.52 describes this mode as TCBC. The mathematical representations of the CBC encrypt and decrypt operations are as follows:

```
DES3-CBC-E({K1,K2,K3}, P) = E(K3, D(K2, E(K1, P + I)))
DES3-CBC-D({K1,K2,K3}, C) = D(K1, E(K2, D(K3, P))) + I
```

The value *I* is either an 8-byte initialization vector or the previous block of cipher text that is added to the current input block. The addition operation is used is addition modulo-2 (XOR).

6.18.7 DES and Triple length DES in OFB Mode

Table 128, DES and Triple Length DES in OFB Mode Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_DES_OFB64	✓						
CKM_DES_OFB8	✓						
CKM_DES_CFB64	✓						
CKM_DES_CFB8	✓						

Cipher DES has a output feedback mode, DES-OFB, denoted **CKM_DES_OFB8** and **CKM_DES_OFB64**. It is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption with DES.

It has a parameter, an initialization vector for this mode. The initialization vector has the same length as the block size.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 129, OFB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_DES, CKK_DES2, CKK_DES3	any	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_DES, CKK_DES2, CKK_DES3	any	same as input length	no final part

For this mechanism the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure is as specified for CBC mode.

6.18.8 DES and Triple length DES in CFB Mode

Cipher DES has a cipher feedback mode, DES-CFB, denoted **CKM_DES_CFB8** and **CKM_DES_CFB64**. It is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption with DES.

It has a parameter, an initialization vector for this mode. The initialization vector has the same length as the block size.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 130, CFB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_DES, CKK_DES2, CKK_DES3	any	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_DES, CKK_DES2, CKK_DES3	any	same as input length	no final part

For this mechanism the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure is as specified for CBC mode.

6.19 Double and Triple-length DES CMAC

Table 131, Double and Triple-length DES CMAC Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_DES3_CMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_DES3_CMAC		✓					

1 SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover.

6.19.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_DES3_CMAC_GENERAL

CKM_DES3_CMAC

6.19.2 Mechanism parameters

CKM_DES3_CMAC_GENERAL uses the existing **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure.
CKM_DES3_CMAC does not use a mechanism parameter.

6.19.3 General-length DES3-MAC

General-length DES3-CMAC, denoted **CKM_DES3_CMAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification with DES3 or DES2 keys, based on [NIST sp800-38b].

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final DES3 cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 132, General-length DES3-CMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_DES3 CKK_DES2	any	1-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	CKK_DES3 CKK_DES2	any	1-block size, as specified in parameters

Reference [NIST sp800-38b] recommends that the output MAC is not truncated to less than 64 bits (which means using the entire block for DES). The MAC length must be specified before the communication starts, and must not be changed during the lifetime of the key. It is the caller's responsibility to follow these rules.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used

6.19.4 DES3-CMAC

DES3-CMAC, denoted **CKM_DES3_CMAC**, is a special case of the general-length DES3-CMAC mechanism. DES3-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are a full block size in length, since the DES3 block length is the minimum output length recommended by [NIST sp800-38b].

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 133, DES3-CMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_DES3 CKK_DES2	any	Block size (8 bytes)
C_Verify	CKK_DES3 CKK_DES2	any	Block size (8 bytes)

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

6.20 SHA-1

Table 134, SHA-1 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA_1				✓			
CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA_1_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHA_1_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.20.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type "CKK_SHA_1_HMAC" for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_SHA_1
CKM_SHA_1_HMAC
CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL
CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION
CKM_SHA_1_KEY_GEN

6.20.2 SHA-1 digest

The SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA_1**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 160-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 135, SHA-1: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	20

6.20.3 General-length SHA-1-HMAC

The general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for signatures and verification. It uses the HMAC construction, based on the SHA-1 hash function. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA_1_HMAC.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-20 (the output size of SHA-1 is 20 bytes). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 20-byte HMAC output.

Table 136, General-length SHA-1-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret CKK_SHA_1_HMAC	any	1-20, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret CKK_SHA_1_HMAC	any	1-20, depending on parameters

6.20.4 SHA-1-HMAC

The SHA-1-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.20.3.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 20.

6.20.5 SHA-1 key derivation

SHA-1 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION**, is a mechanism which provides the capability of deriving a secret key by digesting the value of another secret key with SHA-1.

The value of the base key is digested once, and the result is used to make the value of derived secret key.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key. Its length will be 20 bytes (the output size of SHA-1).
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length was provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more than 20 bytes, such as DES3, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

6.20.6 SHA-1 HMAC key generation

The SHA-1-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA_1_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's SHA-1-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SHA-1-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SHA-1-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.21 SHA-224

Table 137, SHA-224 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_SHA224				✓			
CKM_SHA224_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHA224_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.21.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_SHA224_HMAC” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_SHA224

CKM_SHA224_HMAC

CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION

CKM_SHA224_KEY_GEN

6.21.2 SHA-224 digest

The SHA-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 224-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 180-4.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 138, SHA-224: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	28

6.21.3 General-length SHA-224-HMAC

The general-length SHA-224-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism except that it uses the HMAC construction based

on the SHA-224 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-28. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA224_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 14 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA-224 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-28 (the output size of SHA-224 is 28 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 14 (half the maximum length). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 28-byte HMAC output.

Table 139, General-length SHA-224-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret CKK_SHA224_HMAC	Any	1-28, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret CKK_SHA224_HMAC	Any	1-28, depending on parameters

6.21.4 SHA-224-HMAC

The SHA-224-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-224-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 28.

6.21.5 SHA-224 key derivation

SHA-224 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5 except that it uses the SHA-224 hash function and the relevant length is 28 bytes.

6.21.6 SHA-224 HMAC key generation

The SHA-224-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's SHA224-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SHA224-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SHA224-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA224_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.22 SHA-256

Table 140, SHA-256 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA256				✓			
CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA256_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHA256_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.22.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_SHA256_HMAC” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_SHA256
CKM_SHA256_HMAC
CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL
CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION
CKM_SHA256_KEY_GEN

6.22.2 SHA-256 digest

The SHA-256 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA256**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 256-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 141, SHA-256: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	32

6.22.3 General-length SHA-256-HMAC

The general-length SHA-256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.20.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-256 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-32. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA256_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 16 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA-256 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-32 (the output size of SHA-256 is 32 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 16 (half the maximum length). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 32-byte HMAC output.

Table 142, General-length SHA-256-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret, CKK_SHA256_HMAC	Any	1-32, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret, CKK_SHA256_HMAC	Any	1-32, depending on parameters

6.22.4 SHA-256-HMAC

The SHA-256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA256_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-256-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.22.3.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 32.

6.22.5 SHA-256 key derivation

SHA-256 key derivation, denoted CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5, except that it uses the SHA-256 hash function and the relevant length is 32 bytes.

6.22.6 SHA-256 HMAC key generation

The SHA-256-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA256_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's SHA256-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SHA256-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SHA256-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA256_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.23 SHA-384

Table 143, SHA-384 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA384				✓			
CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA384_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHA384_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.23.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type "CKK_SHA384_HMAC" for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

CKM_SHA384

CKM_SHA384_HMAC

CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION

CKM_SHA384_KEY_GEN

6.23.2 SHA-384 digest

The SHA-384 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA384**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 384-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 144, SHA-384: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	48

6.23.3 General-length SHA-384-HMAC

The general-length SHA-384-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.20.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-384 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-48.

The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA384_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 24 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA-384 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 0-48 (the output size of SHA-384 is 48 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 24 (half the maximum length). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 48-byte HMAC output.

Table 145, General-length SHA-384-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret, CKK_SHA384_HMAC	Any	1-48, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret, CKK_SHA384_HMAC	Any	1-48, depending on parameters

6.23.4 SHA-384-HMAC

The SHA-384-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA384_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-384-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 48.

6.23.5 SHA-384 key derivation

SHA-384 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5, except that it uses the SHA-384 hash function and the relevant length is 48 bytes.

6.23.6 SHA-384 HMAC key generation

The SHA-384-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA384_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's SHA384-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SHA384-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SHA384-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA384_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.24 SHA-512

Table 146, SHA-512 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_SHA512				✓			
CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA512_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHA512_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.24.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type "CKK_SHA512_HMAC" for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_SHA512
- CKM_SHA512_HMAC
- CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL
- CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION
- CKM_SHA512_KEY_GEN

6.24.2 SHA-512 digest

The SHA-512 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 512-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 147, SHA-512: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	64

6.24.3 General-length SHA-512-HMAC

The general-length SHA-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.20.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-512 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-64.

The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA512_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 32 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA-512 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 0-64 (the output size of SHA-512 is 64 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 32 (half the maximum length). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 64-byte HMAC output.

Table 148, General-length SHA-384-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret, CKK_SHA512_HMAC	Any	1-64, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret, CKK_SHA512_HMAC	Any	1-64, depending on parameters

6.24.4 SHA-512-HMAC

The SHA-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-512-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 64.

6.24.5 SHA-512 key derivation

SHA-512 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5, except that it uses the SHA-512 hash function and the relevant length is 64 bytes.

6.24.6 SHA-512 HMAC key generation

The SHA-512-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's SHA512-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SHA512-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SHA512-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA512_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.25 SHA-512/224

Table 149, SHA-512/224 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512_224				✓			
CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.25.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_SHA512_224_HMAC” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_SHA512_224

CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC

CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_DERIVATION

CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_GEN

6.25.2 SHA-512/224 digest

The SHA-512/224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_224**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 180-4, section 5.3.6. It is based on a 512-bit message digest with a distinct initial hash value and truncated to 224 bits. **CKM_SHA512_224** is the same as **CKM_SHA512_T** with a parameter value of 224.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 150, SHA-512/224: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	28

6.25.3 General-length SHA-512/224-HMAC

The general-length SHA-512/224-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.20.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-512/224 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-28. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA512_224_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 14 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA-512/224 hash output.

10019 It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired
10020 output. This length should be in the range 0-28 (the output size of SHA-512/224 is 28 bytes). FIPS-198
10021 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 14 (half the maximum length).
10022 Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 28-byte HMAC
10023 output.

10024 *Table 151, General-length SHA-384-HMAC: Key And Data Length*

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret, CKK_SHA512_224_HMAC	Any	1-28, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret, CKK_SHA512_224_HMAC	Any	1-28, depending on parameters

10025

10026 6.25.4 SHA-512/224-HMAC

10027 The SHA-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-
10028 length SHA-512/224-HMAC mechanism.

10029 It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 28.

10030 6.25.5 SHA-512/224 key derivation

10031 The SHA-512/224 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the
10032 SHA-512 key derivation mechanism in section 6.24.5, except that it uses the SHA-512/224 hash function
10033 and the relevant length is 28 bytes.

10034 6.25.6 SHA-512/224 HMAC key generation

10035 The SHA-512/224-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_GEN**, is a key
10036 generation mechanism for NIST's SHA512/224-HMAC.

10037 It does not have a parameter.

10038 The mechanism generates SHA512/224-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the
10039 **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

10040 The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new
10041 key. Other attributes supported by the SHA512/224-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating
10042 which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned
10043 default initial values.

10044 For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure
10045 specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

10046 6.26 SHA-512/256

10047 *Table 152, SHA-512/256 Mechanisms vs. Functions*

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512_256				✓			

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.26.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_SHA512_256_HMAC” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_SHA512_256

CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC

CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_DERIVATION

CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_GEN

6.26.2 SHA-512/256 digest

The SHA-512/256 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_256**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 180-4, section 5.3.6. It is based on a 512-bit message digest with a distinct initial hash value and truncated to 256 bits. **CKM_SHA512_256** is the same as **CKM_SHA512_T** with a parameter value of 256.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 153, SHA-512/256: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	32

6.26.3 General-length SHA-512/256-HMAC

The general-length SHA-512/256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.20.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-512/256 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-32. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA512_256_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 16 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA-512/256 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-32 (the output size of SHA-512/256 is 32 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 16 (half the maximum length). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 32-byte HMAC output.

10078 *Table 154, General-length SHA-384-HMAC: Key And Data Length*

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret, CKK_SHA512_256_HMAC	Any	1-32, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret, CKK_SHA512_256_HMAC	Any	1-32, depending on parameters

10079

10080 ### 6.26.4 SHA-512/256-HMAC

10081 The SHA-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-
10082 length SHA-512/256-HMAC mechanism.

10083 It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 32.

10084 ### 6.26.5 SHA-512/256 key derivation

10085 The SHA-512/256 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the
10086 SHA-512 key derivation mechanism in section 6.24.5, except that it uses the SHA-512/256 hash function
10087 and the relevant length is 32 bytes.

10088 ### 6.26.6 SHA-512/256 HMAC key generation

10089 The SHA-512/256-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_GEN**, is a key
10090 generation mechanism for NIST's SHA512/256-HMAC.

10091 It does not have a parameter.

10092 The mechanism generates SHA512/256-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the
10093 **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

10094 The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new
10095 key. Other attributes supported by the SHA512/256-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating
10096 which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned
10097 default initial values.

10098 For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure
10099 specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

10100 ## 6.27 SHA-512/t

10101 *Table 155, SHA-512 / t Mechanisms vs. Functions*

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512_T				✓			
CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA512_T_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512_T_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.27.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type "CKK_SHA512_T_HMAC" for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_SHA512_T
CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC
CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC_GENERAL
CKM_SHA512_T_KEY_DERIVATION
CKM_SHA512_T_KEY_GEN

6.27.2 SHA-512/t digest

The SHA-512/t mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_T**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 180-4, section 5.3.6. It is based on a 512-bit message digest with a distinct initial hash value and truncated to t bits.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the value of t in bits. The length in bytes of the desired output should be in the range of 0-⌈t/8⌉, where 0 < t < 512, and t <> 384.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 156, SHA-512/256: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	⌈t/8⌉, where 0 < t < 512, and t <> 384

6.27.3 General-length SHA-512/t-HMAC

The general-length SHA-512/t-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.20.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-512/t hash function and length of the output should be in the range 0 – ⌈t/8⌉, where 0 < t < 512, and t <> 384.

6.27.4 SHA-512/t-HMAC

The SHA-512/t-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-512/t-HMAC mechanism.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the value of t in bits. The length in bytes of the desired output should be in the range of 0-⌈t/8⌉, where 0 < t < 512, and t <> 384.

6.27.5 SHA-512/t key derivation

The SHA-512/t key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA512_T_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-512 key derivation mechanism in section 6.24.5, except that it uses the SHA-512/t hash function and the relevant length is ⌈t/8⌉ bytes, where 0 < t < 512, and t <> 384.

6.27.6 SHA-512/t HMAC key generation

The SHA-512/t-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_T_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's SHA512/t-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SHA512/t-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SHA512/t-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.28 SHA3-224

Table 157, SHA3-224 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA3_224				✓			
CKM_SHA3_224_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA3_224_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA3_224_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHA3_224_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.28.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_SHA3_224
CKM_SHA3_224_HMAC
CKM_SHA3_224_HMAC_GENERAL
CKM_SHA3_224_KEY_DERIVATION
CKM_SHA3_224_KEY_GEN

CKK_SHA3_224_HMAC

6.28.2 SHA3-224 digest

The SHA3-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_224**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash 3 Algorithm with a 224-bit message digest defined in FIPS Pub 202.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 158, SHA3-224: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	28

6.28.3 General-length SHA3-224-HMAC

The general-length SHA3-224-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_224_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in section 6.20.4 except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA3-224 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-28. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA3_224_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 14 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA3-224 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-28 (the output size of SHA3-224 is 28 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 14 (half the maximum length). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism shall be taken from the start of the full 28-byte HMAC output.

Table 159, General-length SHA3-224-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret or CKK_SHA3_224_HMAC	Any	1-28, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret or CKK_SHA3_224_HMAC	Any	1-28, depending on parameters

6.28.4 SHA3-224-HMAC

The SHA3-224-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_224_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA3-224-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 28.

6.28.5 SHA3-224 key derivation

SHA-224 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA3_224_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5 except that it uses the SHA3-224 hash function and the relevant length is 28 bytes.

6.28.6 SHA3-224 HMAC key generation

The SHA3-224-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_224_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's SHA3-224-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SHA3-224-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SHA3-224-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which

functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA3_224_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.29 SHA3-256

Table 160, SHA3-256 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA3_256				✓			
CKM_SHA3_256_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA3_256_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA3_256_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHA3_256_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.29.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_SHA3_256
CKM_SHA3_256_HMAC
CKM_SHA3_256_HMAC_GENERAL
CKM_SHA3_256_KEY_DERIVATION
CKM_SHA3_256_KEY_GEN

CKK_SHA3_256_HMAC

6.29.2 SHA3-256 digest

The SHA3-256 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_256**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash 3 Algorithm with a 256-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 202.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 161, SHA3-256: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	32

6.29.3 General-length SHA3-256-HMAC

The general-length SHA3-256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_256_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.20.4, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA3-256 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-32. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA3_256_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 16 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA3-256 hash output.

10221 It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired
10222 output. This length should be in the range 1-32 (the output size of SHA3-256 is 32 bytes). FIPS-198
10223 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 16 (half the maximum length).
10224 Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism shall be taken from the start of the full 32-byte HMAC
10225 output.

10226 *Table 162, General-length SHA3-256-HMAC: Key And Data Length*

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret or CKK_SHA3_256_HMAC	Any	1-32, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret or CKK_SHA3_256_HMAC	Any	1-32, depending on parameters

10227 ### 6.29.4 SHA3-256-HMAC

10228 The SHA-256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_256_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-
10229 length SHA-256-HMAC mechanism.

10230 It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 32.

10231 ### 6.29.5 SHA3-256 key derivation

10232 SHA-256 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA3_256_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key
10233 derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5, except that it uses the SHA3-256 hash function and the relevant
10234 length is 32 bytes.

10235 ### 6.29.6 SHA3-256 HMAC key generation

10236 The SHA3-256-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_256_KEY_GEN**, is a key
10237 generation mechanism for NIST's SHA3-256-HMAC.

10238 It does not have a parameter.

10239 The mechanism generates SHA3-256-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the
10240 **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

10241 The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new
10242 key. Other attributes supported by the SHA3-256-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which
10243 functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default
10244 initial values.

10245 For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure
10246 specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA3_256_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

10247

10248 ## 6.30 SHA3-384

10249 *Table 163, SHA3-384 Mechanisms vs. Functions*

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA3_384				✓			
CKM_SHA3_384_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA3_384_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA3_384_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA3_384_KEY_GEN				✓			

6.30.1 Definitions

CKM_SHA3_384

CKM_SHA3_384_HMAC

CKM_SHA3_384_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_SHA3_384_KEY_DERIVATION

CKM_SHA3_384_KEY_GEN

CKK_SHA3_384_HMAC

6.30.2 SHA3-384 digest

The SHA3-384 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_384**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash 3 Algorithm with a 384-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 202.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 164, SHA3-384: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	48

6.30.3 General-length SHA3-384-HMAC

The general-length SHA3-384-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_384_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.20.4, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-384 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-48.The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA3_384_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 24 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA3-384 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-48 (the output size of SHA3-384 is 48 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 24 (half the maximum length). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism shall be taken from the start of the full 48-byte HMAC output.

Table 165, General-length SHA3-384-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret or CKK_SHA3_384_HMAC	Any	1-48, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret or CKK_SHA3_384_HMAC	Any	1-48, depending on parameters

6.30.4 SHA3-384-HMAC

The SHA3-384-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_384_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA3-384-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 48.

6.30.5 SHA3-384 key derivation

SHA3-384 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA3_384_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5, except that it uses the SHA-384 hash function and the relevant length is 48 bytes.

6.30.6 SHA3-384 HMAC key generation

The SHA3-384-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_384_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's SHA3-384-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SHA3-384-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SHA3-384-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA3_384_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.31 SHA3-512

Table 166, SHA-512 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA3_512				✓			
CKM_SHA3_512_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA3_512_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA3_512_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHA3_512_KEY_GEN				✓			

6.31.1 Definitions

CKM_SHA3_512
CKM_SHA3_512_HMAC
CKM_SHA3_512_HMAC_GENERAL
CKM_SHA3_512_KEY_DERIVATION
CKM_SHA3_512_KEY_GEN

CKK_SHA3_512_HMAC

6.31.2 SHA3-512 digest

The SHA3-512 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_512**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash 3 Algorithm with a 512-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 202.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 167, SHA3-512: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	64

6.31.3 General-length SHA3-512-HMAC

The general-length SHA3-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_512_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 6.20.4, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA3-512 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-64.The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA3_512_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 32 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA3-512 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-64 (the output size of SHA3-512 is 64 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 32 (half the maximum length). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism shall be taken from the start of the full 64-byte HMAC output.

Table 168, General-length SHA3-512-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret or CKK_SHA3_512_HMAC	Any	1-64, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret or CKK_SHA3_512_HMAC	Any	1-64, depending on parameters

6.31.4 SHA3-512-HMAC

The SHA3-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_512_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA3-512-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 64.

6.31.5 SHA3-512 key derivation

SHA3-512 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA3_512_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5, except that it uses the SHA-512 hash function and the relevant length is 64 bytes.

6.31.6 SHA3-512 HMAC key generation

The SHA3-512-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA3_512_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's SHA3-512-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SHA3-512-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SHA3-512-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_SHA3_512_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.32 SHAKE

Table 169, SHA-512 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHAKE_128_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_SHAKE_256_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

6.32.1 Definitions

CKM_SHAKE_128_KEY_DERIVATION

CKM_SHAKE_256_KEY_DERIVATION

6.32.2 SHAKE Key Derivation

SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHAKE_128_KEY_DERIVATION** and **CKM_SHAKE_256_KEY_DERIVATION**, implements the SHAKE expansion function defined in FIPS 202 on the input key.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template a **CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE** error is generated.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism shall be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length was provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism shall be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error shall be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism shall be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key shall be set properly.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key shall as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key shall, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

6.33 BLAKE2B-160

Table 170, BLAKE2B-160 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_BLAKE2B_160				✓			
CKM_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC		✓					
CKM_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_BLAKE2B_160_KEY_DERIVE							✓
CKM_BLAKE2B_160_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.33.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_BLAKE2B_160

CKM_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC

CKM_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_BLAKE2B_160_KEY_DERIVE

CKM_BLAKE2B_160_KEY_GEN

CKK_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC

6.33.2 BLAKE2B-160 digest

The BLAKE2B-160 mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_160**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Blake2b Algorithm with a 160-bit message digest without a key as defined in RFC 7693.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 171, BLAKE2B-160: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	20

6.33.3 General-length BLAKE2B-160-HMAC

The general-length BLAKE2B-160-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the keyed variant of BLAKE2b-160 and length of the output should be in the range 1-20. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-20 (the output size of BLAKE2B-160 is 20 bytes). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism shall be taken from the start of the full 20-byte HMAC output.

Table 172, General-length BLAKE2B-160-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret or CKK_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC	Any	1-20, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret or CKK_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC	Any	1-20, depending on parameters

6.33.4 BLAKE2B-160-HMAC

The BLAKE2B-160-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length BLAKE2B-160-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 20.

6.33.5 BLAKE2B-160 key derivation

BLAKE2B-160 key derivation, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_160_KEY_DERIVE**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5 except that it uses the BLAKE2B-160 hash function and the relevant length is 20 bytes.

6.33.6 BLAKE2B-160 HMAC key generation

The BLAKE2B-160-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_160_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for BLAKE2B-160-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates BLAKE2B-160-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the BLAKE2B-160-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_BLAKE2B_160_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.34 BLAKE2B-256

Table 173, BLAKE2B-256 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_BLAKE2B_256				✓			
CKM_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC		✓					
CKM_BLAKE2B_256_KEY_DERIVE							✓
CKM_BLAKE2B_256_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.34.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_BLAKE2B_256

CKM_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC

CKM_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_BLAKE2B_256_KEY_DERIVE

CKM_BLAKE2B_256_KEY_GEN

CKK_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC

6.34.2 BLAKE2B-256 digest

The BLAKE2B-256 mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_256**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Blake2b Algorithm with a 256-bit message digest without a key as defined in RFC 7693.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 174, BLAKE2B-256: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	32

6.34.3 General-length BLAKE2B-256-HMAC

The general-length BLAKE2B-256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the keyed variant of Blake2b-256 and length of the output should be in the range 1-32. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-32 (the output size of BLAKE2B-256 is 32 bytes). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism shall be taken from the start of the full 32-byte HMAC output.

Table 175, General-length BLAKE2B-256-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret or CKK_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC	Any	1-32, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret or CKK_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC	Any	1-32, depending on parameters

6.34.4 BLAKE2B-256-HMAC

The BLAKE2B-256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length BLAKE2B-256-HMAC mechanism in Section6.34.3.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 32.

6.34.5 BLAKE2B-256 key derivation

BLAKE2B-256 key derivation, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_256_KEY_DERIVE**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5, except that it uses the BLAKE2B-256 hash function and the relevant length is 32 bytes.

6.34.6 BLAKE2B-256 HMAC key generation

The BLAKE2B-256-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_256_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for BLAKE2B-256-HMAC.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates BLAKE2B-256-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the BLAKE2B-256-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of **CKM_BLAKE2B_256_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

6.35 BLAKE2B-384

Table 176, BLAKE2B-384 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_BLAKE2B_384				✓			
CKM_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC		✓					
CKM_BLAKE2B_384_KEY_DERIVE							✓
CKM_BLAKE2B_384_KEY_GEN				✓			

6.35.1 Definitions

CKM_BLAKE2B_384

CKM_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC

CKM_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_BLAKE2B_384_KEY_DERIVE

CKM_BLAKE2B_384_KEY_GEN

CKK_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC

6.35.2 BLAKE2B-384 digest

The BLAKE2B-384 mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_384**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Blake2b Algorithm with a 384-bit message digest without a key as defined in RFC 7693.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 177, BLAKE2B-384: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	48

6.35.3 General-length BLAKE2B-384-HMAC

The general-length BLAKE2B-384-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the keyed variant of the BLAKE2B-384 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-48.The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC.

It has a parameter, a `CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS`, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-48 (the output size of BLAKE2B-384 is 48 bytes). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism shall be taken from the start of the full 48-byte HMAC output.

Table 178, General-length BLAKE2B-384-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret or CKK_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC	Any	1-48, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret or CKK_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC	Any	1-48, depending on parameters

10498

10499 6.35.4 BLAKE2B-384-HMAC

10500 The BLAKE2B-384-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC**, is a special case of the
10501 general-length BLAKE2B-384-HMAC mechanism.

10502 It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 48.

10503 6.35.5 BLAKE2B-384 key derivation

10504 BLAKE2B-384 key derivation, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_384_KEY_DERIVE**, is the same as the SHA-1
10505 key derivation mechanism in Section 6.20.5, except that it uses the BLAKE2B-384 hash function and the
10506 relevant length is 48 bytes.

10507 6.35.6 BLAKE2B-384 HMAC key generation

10508 The BLAKE2B-384-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_384_KEY_GEN**, is a
10509 key generation mechanism for NIST's BLAKE2B-384-HMAC.

10510 It does not have a parameter.

10511 The mechanism generates BLAKE2B-384-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the
10512 **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

10513 The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new
10514 key. Other attributes supported by the BLAKE2B-384-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating
10515 which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned
10516 default initial values.

10517 For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure
10518 specify the supported range of **CKM_BLAKE2B_384_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

10519 6.36 BLAKE2B-512

10520 *Table 179, SHA-512 Mechanisms vs. Functions*

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_BLAKE2B_512				✓			
CKM_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC		✓					
CKM_BLAKE2B_512_KEY_DERIVE							✓
CKM_BLAKE2B_512_KEY_GEN				✓			

6.36.1 Definitions

CKM_BLAKE2B_512

CKM_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC

CKM_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_BLAKE2B_512_KEY_DERIVE

CKM_BLAKE2B_512_KEY_GEN

CKK_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC

6.36.2 BLAKE2B-512 digest

The BLAKE2B-512 mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_512**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Blake2b Algorithm with a 512-bit message digest defined in RFC 7693.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 180, BLAKE2B-512: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	64

6.36.3 General-length BLAKE2B-512-HMAC

The general-length BLAKE2B-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the keyed variant of the BLAKE2B-512 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 1-64.The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 1-64 (the output size of BLAKE2B-512 is 64 bytes). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism shall be taken from the start of the full 64-byte HMAC output.

Table 181, General-length BLAKE2B-512-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret or CKK_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC	Any	1-64, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret or CKK_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC	Any	1-64, depending on parameters

10545

10546 6.36.4 BLAKE2B-512-HMAC

10547 The BLAKE2B-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC**, is a special case of the
10548 general-length BLAKE2B-512-HMAC mechanism.

10549 It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 64.

10550 6.36.5 BLAKE2B-512 key derivation

10551 BLAKE2B-512 key derivation, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_512_KEY_DERIVE**, is the same as the SHA-1
10552 key derivation mechanism in Section6.20.5, except that it uses the BLAKE2B-512 hash function and the
10553 relevant length is 64 bytes.

10554 6.36.6 BLAKE2B-512 HMAC key generation

10555 The BLAKE2B-512-HMAC key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLAKE2B_512_KEY_GEN**, is a
10556 key generation mechanism for NIST's BLAKE2B-512-HMAC.

10557 It does not have a parameter.

10558 The mechanism generates BLAKE2B-512-HMAC keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the
10559 **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

10560 The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new
10561 key. Other attributes supported by the BLAKE2B-512-HMAC key type (specifically, the flags indicating
10562 which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned
10563 default initial values.

10564 For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure
10565 specify the supported range of **CKM_BLAKE2B_512_HMAC** key sizes, in bytes.

10566

10567 6.37 PKCS #5 and PKCS #5-style password-based encryption (PBE)

10568 The mechanisms in this section are for generating keys and IVs for performing password-based
10569 encryption. The method used to generate keys and IVs is specified in [PKCS #5].

10570 *Table 182, PKCS 5 Mechanisms vs. Functions*

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC					✓		
CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC					✓		
CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC					✓		

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2					✓		

6.37.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC
CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC
CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2
CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC

6.37.2 Password-based encryption/authentication mechanism parameters

♦ CK_PBE_PARAMS; CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_PBE_PARAMS is a structure which provides all of the necessary information required by the CKM_PBE mechanisms (see [PKCS #5] and [PKCS #12] for information on the PBE generation mechanisms) and the CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {
   CK_BYTE_PTR      pInitVector;
   CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR  pPassword;
   CK_ULONG         ulPasswordLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR      pSalt;
   CK_ULONG         ulSaltLen;
   CK_ULONG         ulIteration;
} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pInitVector	pointer to the location that receives the 8-byte initialization vector (IV), if an IV is required;
pPassword	points to the password to be used in the PBE key generation;
ulPasswordLen	length in bytes of the password information;
pSalt	points to the salt to be used in the PBE key generation;
ulSaltLen	length in bytes of the salt information;
ulIteration	number of iterations required for the generation.

CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_PBE_PARAMS**.

6.37.3 PKCS #5 PBKDF2 key generation mechanism parameters

- **CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR**

CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE;
```

The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.1. The following table lists the defined functions.

Table 183, PKCS #5 PBKDF2 Key Generation: Pseudo-random functions

PRF Identifier	Value	Parameter Type
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1	0x00000001UL	No Parameter. *pPrfData* must be NULL and *ulPrfDataLen* must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_GOSTR3411	0x00000002UL	This PRF uses GOST R34.11-94 hash to produce secret key value. *pPrfData* should point to DER-encoded OID, indicating GOSTR34.11-94 parameters. *ulPrfDataLen* holds encoded OID length in bytes. If *pPrfData* is set to NULL_PTR, then *id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet* parameters will be used (RFC 4357, 11.2), and *ulPrfDataLen* must be 0.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA224	0x00000003UL	No Parameter. *pPrfData* must be NULL and *ulPrfDataLen* must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA256	0x00000004UL	No Parameter. *pPrfData* must be NULL and *ulPrfDataLen* must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA384	0x00000005UL	No Parameter. *pPrfData* must be NULL and *ulPrfDataLen* must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512	0x00000006UL	No Parameter. *pPrfData* must be NULL and *ulPrfDataLen* must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512_224	0x00000007UL	No Parameter. *pPrfData* must be NULL and *ulPrfDataLen* must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512_256	0x00000008UL	No Parameter. *pPrfData* must be NULL and *ulPrfDataLen* must be zero.

CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE**.

♦ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE; CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR

CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
```

The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.1. The following table lists the defined sources along with the corresponding data type for the *pSaltSourceData* field in the **CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS2** structure defined below.

Table 184, PKCS #5 PBKDF2 Key Generation: Salt sources

Source Identifier	Value	Data Type
CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED	0x00000001	Array of CK_BYTE containing the value of the salt value.

CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE**.

♦ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS2; CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS2_PTR

CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS2 is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2** mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS2 {
   CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE    saltSource;
   CK_VOID_PTR                         pSaltSourceData;
   CK_ULONG                            ulSaltSourceDataLen;
   CK_ULONG                            iterations;
   CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE  prf;
   CK_VOID_PTR                         pPrfData;
   CK_ULONG                            ulPrfDataLen;
   CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR                     pPassword;
   CK_ULONG                            ulPasswordLen;
} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS2;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

saltSource	source of the salt value
pSaltSourceData	data used as the input for the salt source
ulSaltSourceDataLen	length of the salt source input
iterations	number of iterations to perform when generating each block of random data
prf	pseudo-random function used to generate the key
pPrfData	data used as the input for PRF in addition to the salt value
ulPrfDataLen	length of the input data for the PRF
pPassword	points to the password to be used in the PBE key generation
ulPasswordLen	length in bytes of the password information

CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS2_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS2**.

6.37.4 PKCS #5 PBKD2 key generation

PKCS #5 PBKDF2 key generation, denoted **CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2**, is a mechanism used for generating a secret key from a password and a salt value. This functionality is defined in PKCS#5 as PBKDF2.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS2** structure. The parameter specifies the salt value source, pseudo-random function, and iteration count used to generate the new key.

Since this mechanism can be used to generate any type of secret key, new key templates must contain the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** and **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attributes. If the key type has a fixed length the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute may be omitted.

6.38 PKCS #12 password-based encryption/authentication mechanisms

The mechanisms in this section are for generating keys and IVs for performing password-based encryption or authentication. The method used to generate keys and IVs is based on a method that was specified in [PKCS #12].

We specify here a general method for producing various types of pseudo-random bits from a password, *p*; a string of salt bits, *s*; and an iteration count, *c*. The "type" of pseudo-random bits to be produced is identified by an identification byte, *ID*, the meaning of which will be discussed later.

Let H be a hash function built around a compression function $f: \mathbf{Z}_2^u \times \mathbf{Z}_2^v \rightarrow \mathbf{Z}_2^u$ (that is, H has a chaining variable and output of length *u* bits, and the message input to the compression function of H is *v* bits). For MD2 and MD5, u=128 and v=512; for SHA-1, u=160 and v=512.

We assume here that *u* and *v* are both multiples of 8, as are the lengths in bits of the password and salt strings and the number *n* of pseudo-random bits required. In addition, *u* and *v* are of course nonzero.

1. Construct a string, *D* (the "diversifier"), by concatenating $v/8$ copies of *ID*.
2. Concatenate copies of the salt together to create a string *S* of length $v \cdot \lceil s/v \rceil$ bits (the final copy of the salt may be truncated to create *S*). Note that if the salt is the empty string, then so is *S*.
3. Concatenate copies of the password together to create a string *P* of length $v \cdot \lceil p/v \rceil$ bits (the final copy of the password may be truncated to create *P*). Note that if the password is the empty string, then so is *P*.
4. Set $I=S||P$ to be the concatenation of *S* and *P*.
5. Set $j=\lceil n/u \rceil$.
6. For i=1, 2, …, *j*, do the following:
    a. Set $A_i=H^c(D||I)$, the c^{th} hash of $D||I$. That is, compute the hash of $D||I$; compute the hash of that hash; etc.; continue in this fashion until a total of *c* hashes have been computed, each on the result of the previous hash.
    b. Concatenate copies of A_i to create a string *B* of length *v* bits (the final copy of A_i may be truncated to create *B*).
    c. Treating *I* as a concatenation $I_0, I_1, \ldots, I_{k-1}$ of *v*-bit blocks, where $k=\lceil s/v \rceil+\lceil p/v \rceil$, modify *I* by setting $I_j=(I_j+B+1) \bmod 2^v$ for each *j*. To perform this addition, treat each *v*-bit block as a binary number represented most-significant bit first.
7. Concatenate $A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_j$ together to form a pseudo-random bit string, *A*.
8. Use the first *n* bits of *A* as the output of this entire process.

When the password-based encryption mechanisms presented in this section are used to generate a key and IV (if needed) from a password, salt, and an iteration count, the above algorithm is used. To generate a key, the identifier byte *ID* is set to the value 1; to generate an IV, the identifier byte *ID* is set to the value 2.

When the password based authentication mechanism presented in this section is used to generate a key from a password, salt, and an iteration count, the above algorithm is used. The identifier byte *ID* is set to the value 3.

6.38.1 SHA-1-PBE for 3-key triple-DES-CBC

SHA-1-PBE for 3-key triple-DES-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a 3-key triple-DES secret key and IV from a password and a salt value by using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. The method used to generate the key and IV is described above. Each byte of the key produced will have its low-order bit adjusted, if necessary, so that a valid 3-key triple-DES key with proper parity bits is obtained.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of the application-supplied buffer which will receive the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism.

The key and IV produced by this mechanism will typically be used for performing password-based encryption.

6.38.2 SHA-1-PBE for 2-key triple-DES-CBC

SHA-1-PBE for 2-key triple-DES-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a 2-key triple-DES secret key and IV from a password and a salt value by using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. The method used to generate the key and IV is described above. Each byte of the key produced will have its low-order bit adjusted, if necessary, so that a valid 2-key triple-DES key with proper parity bits is obtained.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of the application-supplied buffer which will receive the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism.

The key and IV produced by this mechanism will typically be used for performing password-based encryption.

6.38.3 SHA-1-PBA for SHA-1-HMAC

SHA-1-PBA for SHA-1-HMAC, denoted **CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC**, is a mechanism used for generating a 160-bit generic secret key from a password and a salt value by using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. The method used to generate the key is described above.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process. The parameter also has a field to hold the location of an application-supplied buffer which will receive an IV; for this mechanism, the contents of this field are ignored, since authentication with SHA-1-HMAC does not require an IV.

The key generated by this mechanism will typically be used for computing a SHA-1 HMAC to perform password-based authentication (not *password-based encryption*). At the time of this writing, this is primarily done to ensure the integrity of a PKCS #12 PDU.

6.39 SSL

Table 185,SSL Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR** [1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key / Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN					✓		

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key / Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE							✓
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH							✓
CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE							✓
CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC		✓					
CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC		✓					

6.39.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN
CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC
CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC

6.39.2 SSL mechanism parameters

- **CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA**

CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA is a structure which provides information about the random data of a client and a server in an SSL context. This structure is used by both the **CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE** and the **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanisms. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA {
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pClientRandom;
   CK_ULONG      ulClientRandomLen;
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pServerRandom;
   CK_ULONG      ulServerRandomLen;
}  CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pClientRandom	pointer to the client's random data
ulClientRandomLen	length in bytes of the client's random data
pServerRandom	pointer to the server's random data
ulServerRandomLen	length in bytes of the server's random data

♦ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
   CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA   RandomInfo;
   CK_VERSION_PTR        pVersion;
} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

RandomInfo	client's and server's random data information.
pVersion	pointer to a **CK_VERSION** structure which receives the SSL protocol version information

CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR

CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT is a structure that contains the resulting key handles and initialization vectors after performing a C_DeriveKey function with the **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT {
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hClientMacSecret;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hServerMacSecret;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hClientKey;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hServerKey;
   CK_BYTE_PTR       pIVClient;
   CK_BYTE_PTR       pIVServer;
} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

hClientMacSecret	key handle for the resulting Client MAC Secret key
hServerMacSecret	key handle for the resulting Server MAC Secret key
hClientKey	key handle for the resulting Client Secret key
hServerKey	key handle for the resulting Server Secret key
pIVClient	pointer to a location which receives the initialization vector (IV) created for the client (if any)
pIVServer	pointer to a location which receives the initialization vector (IV) created for the server (if any)

CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT**.

♦ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR

CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:


```
typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
   CK_ULONG                  ulMacSizeInBits;
   CK_ULONG                  ulKeySizeInBits;
   CK_ULONG                  ulIVSizeInBits;
   CK_BBOOL                  bIsExport;
   CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA       RandomInfo;
   CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR   pReturnedKeyMaterial;
} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

ulMacSizeInBits	the length (in bits) of the MACing keys agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase
ulKeySizeInBits	the length (in bits) of the secret keys agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase
ulIVSizeInBits	the length (in bits) of the IV agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase. If no IV is required, the length should be set to 0
bIsExport	a Boolean value which indicates whether the keys have to be derived for an export version of the protocol
RandomInfo	client's and server's random data information.
pReturnedKeyMaterial	points to a CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT structures which receives the handles for the keys generated and the IVs

CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS**.

6.39.3 Pre-master key generation

Pre-master key generation in SSL 3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN**, is a mechanism which generates a 48-byte generic secret key. It is used to produce the "pre_master" key used in SSL version 3.0 for RSA-like cipher suites.

It has one parameter, a **CK_VERSION** structure, which provides the client's SSL version number.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_GenerateKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 48. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 48 bytes.

CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN has identical functionality as **CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN.** It exists only for historical reasons, please use **CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN** instead.

6.39.4 Master key derivation

Master key derivation in SSL 3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive one 48-byte generic secret key from another 48-byte generic secret key. It is used to produce the "master_secret" key used in the SSL protocol from the "pre_master" key. This mechanism returns the value of the client version, which is built into the "pre_master" key as well as a handle to the derived "master_secret" key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data to the token as well as the returning of the protocol version number which is part of the pre-master key. This structure is defined in Section 6.39.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template; otherwise they are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 48. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 48 bytes.

Note that the **CK_VERSION** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure's *pVersion* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, when the call returns, this structure will hold the SSL version associated with the supplied pre_master key.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for cipher suites that use a 48-byte "pre_master" secret with an embedded version number. This includes the RSA cipher suites, but excludes the Diffie-Hellman cipher suites.

6.39.5 Master key derivation for Diffie-Hellman

Master key derivation for Diffie-Hellman in SSL 3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH**, is a mechanism used to derive one 48-byte generic secret key from another arbitrary length generic secret key. It is used to produce the "master_secret" key used in the SSL protocol from the "pre_master" key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data to the token. This structure is defined in Section 6.39. The *pVersion* field of the structure must be set to NULL_PTR since the version number is not embedded in the "pre_master" key as it is for RSA-like cipher suites.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 48. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.

- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 48 bytes.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for cipher suites that do not use a fixed length 48-byte "pre_master" secret with an embedded version number. This includes the Diffie-Hellman cipher suites, but excludes the RSA cipher suites.

6.39.6 Key and MAC derivation

Key, MAC and IV derivation in SSL 3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive the appropriate cryptographic keying material used by a "CipherSuite" from the "master_secret" key and random data. This mechanism returns the key handles for the keys generated in the process, as well as the IVs created.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data as well as the characteristic of the cryptographic material for the given CipherSuite and a pointer to a structure which receives the handles and IVs which were generated. This structure is defined in Section 6.39.

This mechanism contributes to the creation of four distinct keys on the token and returns two IVs (if IVs are requested by the caller) back to the caller. The keys are all given an object class of **CKO_SECRET_KEY**.

The two MACing keys ("client_write_MAC_secret" and "server_write_MAC_secret") are always given a type of **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. They are flagged as valid for signing, verification, and derivation operations.

The other two keys ("client_write_key" and "server_write_key") are typed according to information found in the template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** function call. By default, they are flagged as valid for encryption, decryption, and derivation operations.

IVs will be generated and returned if the *ulIVSizeInBits* field of the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** field has a nonzero value. If they are generated, their length in bits will agree with the value in the *ulIVSizeInBits* field.

All four keys inherit the values of the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes from the base key. The template provided to **C_DeriveKey** may not specify values for any of these attributes which differ from those held by the base key.

Note that the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure's *pReturnedKeyMaterial* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, the four key handle fields in the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure will be modified to hold handles to the newly-created keys; in addition, the buffers pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure's *pIVClient* and *pIVServer* fields will have IVs returned in them (if IVs are requested by the caller). Therefore, these two fields must point to buffers with sufficient space to hold any IVs that will be returned.

This mechanism departs from the other key derivation mechanisms in Cryptoki in its returned information. For most key-derivation mechanisms, **C_DeriveKey** returns a single key handle as a result of a successful completion. However, since the **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism returns all of its key handles in the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure specified as the mechanism parameter, the parameter *phKey* passed to **C_DeriveKey** is unnecessary, and should be a NULL_PTR.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** with this mechanism fails, then *none* of the four keys will be created on the token.

6.39.7 MD5 MACing in SSL 3.0

MD5 MACing in SSL3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures (data authentication) and verification using MD5, based on the SSL 3.0 protocol. This technique is very similar to the HMAC technique.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which specifies the length in bytes of the signatures produced by this mechanism.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

Table 186, MD5 MACing in SSL 3.0: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret	any	4-8, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret	any	4-8, depending on parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of generic secret key sizes, in bits.

6.39.8 SHA-1 MACing in SSL 3.0

SHA-1 MACing in SSL3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures (data authentication) and verification using SHA-1, based on the SSL 3.0 protocol. This technique is very similar to the HMAC technique.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which specifies the length in bytes of the signatures produced by this mechanism.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

Table 187, SHA-1 MACing in SSL 3.0: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret	any	4-8, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret	any	4-8, depending on parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of generic secret key sizes, in bits.

6.40 TLS 1.2 Mechanisms

Details for TLS 1.2 and its key derivation and MAC mechanisms can be found in [TLS12]. TLS 1.2 mechanisms differ from TLS 1.0 and 1.1 mechanisms in that the base hash used in the underlying TLS PRF (pseudo-random function) can be negotiated. Therefore each mechanism parameter for the TLS 1.2 mechanisms contains a new value in the parameters structure to specify the hash function.

This section also specifies CKM_TLS12_MAC which should be used in place of **CKM_TLS_PRF** to calculate the verify_data in the TLS "finished" message.

This section also specifies **CKM_TLS_KDF** that can be used in place of **CKM_TLS_PRF** to implement key material exporters.

Table 188, TLS 1.2 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE							✓
CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH							✓
CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE							✓
CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE							✓
CKM_TLS_KDF							✓
CKM_TLS12_MAC		✓					
CKM_TLS12_KDF							✓

6.40.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE
CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE
CKM_TLS_KDF
CKM_TLS12_MAC
CKM_TLS12_KDF

6.40.2 TLS 1.2 mechanism parameters

- **CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
  CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
  CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism;
} CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

RandomInfo	client's and server's random data information.
pVersion	pointer to a **CK_VERSION** structure which receives the SSL protocol version information
prfHashMechanism	base hash used in the underlying TLS1.2 PRF operation used to derive the master key.

CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR

CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
  CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
  CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
  CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
  CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
  CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
  CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism;
} CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

ulMacSizeInBits	the length (in bits) of the MACing keys agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase. If no MAC key is required, the length should be set to 0.
ulKeySizeInBits	the length (in bits) of the secret keys agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase
ulIVSizeInBits	the length (in bits) of the IV agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase. If no IV is required, the length should be set to 0
bIsExport	must be set to CK_FALSE because export cipher suites must not be used in TLS 1.1 and later.
RandomInfo	client's and server's random data information.
pReturnedKeyMaterial	points to a CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT structures which receives the handles for the keys generated and the IVs
prfHashMechanism	base hash used in the underlying TLS1.2 PRF operation used to derive the master key.

CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS; CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS_PTR

CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the CKM_TLS_KDF mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS {
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfMechanism;
  CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
  CK_ULONG ulLabelLength;
  CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
  CK_BYTE_PTR pContextData;
  CK_ULONG ulContextDataLength;
} CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

prfMechanism	the hash mechanism used in the TLS1.2 PRF construct or CKM_TLS_PRF to use with the TLS1.0 and 1.1 PRF construct.

pLabel	a pointer to the label for this key derivation
ulLabelLength	length of the label in bytes
RandomInfo	the random data for the key derivation
pContextData	a pointer to the context data for this key derivation. NULL_PTR if not present
ulContextDataLength	length of the context data in bytes. 0 if not present.

CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS; CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS_PTR

CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_TLS_MAC** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS {
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism;
  CK_ULONG ulMacLength;
  CK_ULONG ulServerOrClient;
} CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

prfHashMechanism	the hash mechanism used in the TLS12 PRF construct or CKM_TLS_PRF to use with the TLS1.0 and 1.1 PRF construct.
ulMacLength	the length of the MAC tag required or offered. Always 12 octets in TLS 1.0 and 1.1. Generally 12 octets, but may be negotiated to a longer value in TLS1.2.
ulServerOrClient	1 to use the label "server finished", 2 to use the label "client finished". All other values are invalid.

CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS; CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR

CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is a structure, which provides the parameters to the **CKM_TLS_PRF** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS {
  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed;
  CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen;
  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLabel;
  CK_ULONG          ulLabelLen;
  CK_BYTE_PTR       pOutput;
  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulOutputLen;
} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pSeed	*pointer to the input seed*
ulSeedLen	*length in bytes of the input seed*
pLabel	*pointer to the identifying label*

ulLabelLen	*length in bytes of the identifying label*
pOutput	*pointer receiving the output of the operation*
pulOutputLen	*pointer to the length in bytes that the output to be created shall have, has to hold the desired length as input and will receive the calculated length as output*

CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS.

6.40.3 TLS MAC

The TLS MAC mechanism is used to generate integrity tags for the TLS "finished" message. It replaces the use of the **CKM_TLS_PRF** function for TLS1.0 and 1.1 and that mechanism is deprecated.

CKM_TLS_MAC takes a parameter of CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS. To use this mechanism with TLS1.0 and TLS1.1, use **CKM_TLS_PRF** as the value for *prfMechanism* in place of a hash mechanism. Note: Although **CKM_TLS_PRF** is deprecated as a mechanism for C_DeriveKey, the manifest value is retained for use with this mechanism to indicate the use of the TLS1.0/1.1 pseudo-random function.

In TLS1.0 and 1.1 the "finished" message verify_data (i.e. the output signature from the MAC mechanism) is always 12 bytes. In TLS1.2 the "finished" message verify_data is a minimum of 12 bytes, defaults to 12 bytes, but may be negotiated to longer length.

Table 189, General-length TLS MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret	any	≥ 12 bytes
C_Verify	generic secret	any	≥ 12 bytes

6.40.4 Master key derivation

Master key derivation in TLS 1.0, denoted **CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive one 48-byte generic secret key from another 48-byte generic secret key. It is used to produce the "master_secret" key used in the TLS protocol from the "pre_master" key. This mechanism returns the value of the client version, which is built into the "pre_master" key as well as a handle to the derived "master_secret" key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data to the token as well as the returning of the protocol version number which is part of the pre-master key. This structure is defined in Section 6.39.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The mechanism also contributes the CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS attribute consisting only of **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE, CKM_TLS12_KDF** and **CKM_TLS12_MAC**.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 48. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the

derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.

- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 48 bytes.

Note that the **CK_VERSION** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure's *pVersion* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, when the call returns, this structure will hold the SSL version associated with the supplied pre_master key.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for cipher suites that use a 48-byte "pre_master" secret with an embedded version number. This includes the RSA cipher suites, but excludes the Diffie-Hellman cipher suites.

6.40.5 Master key derivation for Diffie-Hellman

Master key derivation for Diffie-Hellman in TLS 1.0, denoted **CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH**, is a mechanism used to derive one 48-byte generic secret key from another arbitrary length generic secret key. It is used to produce the "master_secret" key used in the TLS protocol from the "pre_master" key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data to the token. This structure is defined in Section 6.39. The *pVersion* field of the structure must be set to NULL_PTR since the version number is not embedded in the "pre_master" key as it is for RSA-like cipher suites.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The mechanism also contributes the CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS attribute consisting only of **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE, CKM_TLS12_KDF** and **CKM_TLS12_MAC**.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 48. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 48 bytes.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for cipher suites that do not use a fixed length 48-byte "pre_master" secret with an embedded version number. This includes the Diffie-Hellman cipher suites, but excludes the RSA cipher suites.

6.40.6 Key and MAC derivation

Key, MAC and IV derivation in TLS 1.0, denoted **CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive the appropriate cryptographic keying material used by a "CipherSuite" from the "master_secret" key and random data. This mechanism returns the key handles for the keys generated in the process, as well as the IVs created.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data as well as the characteristic of the cryptographic material for the given CipherSuite and a pointer to a structure which receives the handles and IVs which were generated. This structure is defined in Section 6.39.

This mechanism contributes to the creation of four distinct keys on the token and returns two IVs (if IVs are requested by the caller) back to the caller. The keys are all given an object class of **CKO_SECRET_KEY**.

The two MACing keys ("client_write_MAC_secret" and "server_write_MAC_secret") (if present) are always given a type of **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. They are flagged as valid for signing and verification.

The other two keys ("client_write_key" and "server_write_key") are typed according to information found in the template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** function call. By default, they are flagged as valid for encryption, decryption, and derivation operations.

For **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, IVs will be generated and returned if the *ulIVSizeInBits* field of the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** field has a nonzero value. If they are generated, their length in bits will agree with the value in the *ulIVSizeInBits* field.

> Note Well: CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE produces both private (key) and public (IV) data. It is possible to "leak" private data by the simple expedient of decreasing the length of private data requested. E.g. Setting ulMacSizeInBits and ulKeySizeInBits to 0 (or other lengths less than the key size) will result in the private key data being placed in the destination designated for the IV's. Repeated calls with the same master key and same RandomInfo but with differing lengths for the private key material will result in different data being leaked.<

All four keys inherit the values of the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes from the base key. The template provided to **C_DeriveKey** may not specify values for any of these attributes which differ from those held by the base key.

Note that the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure's *pReturnedKeyMaterial* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, the four key handle fields in the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure will be modified to hold handles to the newly-created keys; in addition, the buffers pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure's *pIVClient* and *pIVServer* fields will have IVs returned in them (if IVs are requested by the caller). Therefore, these two fields must point to buffers with sufficient space to hold any IVs that will be returned.

This mechanism departs from the other key derivation mechanisms in Cryptoki in its returned information. For most key-derivation mechanisms, **C_DeriveKey** returns a single key handle as a result of a successful completion. However, since the **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism returns all of its key handles in the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure specified as the mechanism parameter, the parameter *phKey* passed to **C_DeriveKey** is unnecessary, and should be a NULL_PTR.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** with this mechanism fails, then *none* of the four keys will be created on the token.

6.40.7 CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE

CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE is identical to **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** except that it shall never produce IV data, and the ulIvSizeInBits field of **CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** is ignored

and treated as 0. All of the other conditions and behavior described for CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, with the exception of the black box warning, apply to this mechanism.

CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE is provided as a separate mechanism to allow a client to control the export of IV material (and possible leaking of key material) through the use of the CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS key attribute.

6.40.8 Generic Key Derivation using the TLS PRF

CKM_TLS_KDF is the mechanism defined in [RFC 5705]. It uses the TLS key material and TLS PRF function to produce additional key material for protocols that want to leverage the TLS key negotiation mechanism. **CKM_TLS_KDF** has a parameter of **CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS**. If the protocol using this mechanism does not use context information, the *pContextData* field shall be set to NULL_PTR and the *ulContextDataLength* field shall be set to 0.

To use this mechanism with TLS1.0 and TLS1.1, use **CKM_TLS_PRF** as the value for *prfMechanism* in place of a hash mechanism. Note: Although **CKM_TLS_PRF** is deprecated as a mechanism for C_DeriveKey, the manifest value is retained for use with this mechanism to indicate the use of the TLS1.0/1.1 Pseudo-random function.

This mechanism can be used to derive multiple keys (e.g. similar to **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**) by first deriving the key stream as a **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET** of the necessary length and doing subsequent derives against that derived key using the **CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY** mechanism to split the key stream into the actual operational keys.

The mechanism should not be used with the labels defined for use with TLS, but the token does not enforce this behavior.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the original key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from the original key.

- Similarly, if the original key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from the original key.

- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the original key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the original key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

6.40.9 Generic Key Derivation using the TLS12 PRF

CKM_TLS12_KDF is the mechanism defined in [RFC 5705]. It uses the TLS key material and TLS PRF function to produce additional key material for protocols that want to leverage the TLS key negotiation mechanism. **CKM_TLS12_KDF** has a parameter of **CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS**. If the protocol using this mechanism does not use context information, the *pContextData* field shall be set to NULL_PTR and the *ulContextDataLength* field shall be set to 0.

To use this mechanism with TLS1.0 and TLS1.1, use **CKM_TLS_PRF** as the value for *prfMechanism* in place of a hash mechanism. Note: Although **CKM_TLS_PRF** is deprecated as a mechanism for C_DeriveKey, the manifest value is retained for use with this mechanism to indicate the use of the TLS1.0/1.1 Pseudo-random function.

This mechanism can be used to derive multiple keys (e.g. similar to **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**) by first deriving the key stream as a **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET** of the necessary length and doing subsequent derives against that derived key stream using the **CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY** mechanism to split the key stream into the actual operational keys.

The mechanism should not be used with the labels defined for use with TLS, but the token does not enforce this behavior.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the original key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from the original key.
- Similarly, if the original key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from the original key.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the original key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the original key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

6.41 WTLS

Details can be found in [WTLS].

When comparing the existing TLS mechanisms with these extensions to support WTLS one could argue that there would be no need to have distinct handling of the client and server side of the handshake. However, since in WTLS the server and client use different sequence numbers, there could be instances (e.g. when WTLS is used to protect asynchronous protocols) where sequence numbers on the client and server side differ, and hence this motivates the introduced split.

Table 190, WTLS Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR** [1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key / Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE							✓
CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC							✓
CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE							✓
CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE							✓
CKM_WTLS_PRF							✓

6.41.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN

CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE

CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC

CKM_WTLS_PRF

CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE

CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE

6.41.2 WTLS mechanism parameters

♦ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR

CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA is a structure, which provides information about the random data of a client and a server in a WTLS context. This structure is used by the **CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA {
  CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
  CK_ULONG    ulClientRandomLen;
  CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
  CK_ULONG    ulServerRandomLen;
} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pClientRandom	pointer to the client's random data
pClientRandomLen	length in bytes of the client's random data
pServerRaondom	pointer to the server's random data
ulServerRandomLen	length in bytes of the server's random data

CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA**.

♦ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS _PTR

CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure, which provides the parameters to the **CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE   DigestMechanism;
  CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
  CK_BYTE_PTR         pVersion;
} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

DigestMechanism	the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used (possible types can be found in [WTLS])
RandomInfo	Client's and server's random data information
pVersion	pointer to a **CK_BYTE** which receives the WTLS protocol version information

CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR

CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS is a structure, which provides the parameters to the **CKM_WTLS_PRF** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS {
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed;
  CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen;
  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLabel;
  CK_ULONG          ulLabelLen;
  CK_BYTE_PTR       pOutput;
  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulOutputLen;
} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

Digest Mechanism	the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used (possible types can be found in [WTLS])
pSeed	pointer to the input seed
ulSeedLen	length in bytes of the input seed
pLabel	pointer to the identifying label
ulLabelLen	length in bytes of the identifying label
pOutput	pointer receiving the output of the operation
pulOutputLen	pointer to the length in bytes that the output to be created shall have, has to hold the desired length as input and will receive the calculated length as output

CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR

CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT is a structure that contains the resulting key handles and initialization vectors after performing a C_DeriveKey function with the **CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** or with the **CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT {
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret;
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
  CK_BYTE_PTR      pIV;
} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

hMacSecret	Key handle for the resulting MAC secret key
hKey	Key handle for the resulting secret key
pIV	Pointer to a location which receives the initialization vector (IV) created (if any)

CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT _PTR is a pointer to a **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT**.

♦ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR

CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** and the **CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanisms. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE       DigestMechanism;
  CK_ULONG                ulMacSizeInBits;
  CK_ULONG                ulKeySizeInBits;
  CK_ULONG                ulIVSizeInBits;
  CK_ULONG                ulSequenceNumber;
  CK_BBOOL                bIsExport;
  CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA     RandomInfo;
  CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

Digest Mechanism	the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used (possible types can be found in [WTLS])
ulMaxSizeInBits	the length (in bits) of the MACing key agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase
ulKeySizeInBits	the length (in bits) of the secret key agreed upon during the handshake phase
ulIVSizeInBits	the length (in bits) of the IV agreed upon during the handshake phase. If no IV is required, the length should be set to 0.
ulSequenceNumber	the current sequence number used for records sent by the client and server respectively
bIsExport	a boolean value which indicates whether the keys have to be derives for an export version of the protocol. If this value is true (i.e., the keys are exportable) then ulKeySizeInBits is the length of the key in bits before expansion. The length of the key after expansion is determined by the information found in the template sent along with this mechanism during a C_DeriveKey function call (either the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** or the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute).
RandomInfo	client's and server's random data information
pReturnedKeyMaterial	points to a **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure which receives the handles for the keys generated and the IV

CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS**.

6.41.3 Pre master secret key generation for RSA key exchange suite

Pre master secret key generation for the RSA key exchange suite in WTLS denoted **CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN**, is a mechanism, which generates a variable length secret key. It is used to produce the pre master secret key for RSA key exchange suite used in WTLS. This mechanism returns a handle to the pre master secret key.

It has one parameter, a **CK_BYTE**, which provides the client's WTLS version.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE** and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_GenerateKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute indicates the length of the pre master secret key.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize field of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure shall indicate 20 bytes.

6.41.4 Master secret key derivation

Master secret derivation in WTLS, denoted **CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive a 20 byte generic secret key from variable length secret key. It is used to produce the master secret key used in WTLS from the pre master secret key. This mechanism returns the value of the client version, which is built into the pre master secret key as well as a handle to the derived master secret key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for passing the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used as well as the passing of random data to the token as well as the returning of the protocol version number which is part of the pre master secret key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 20. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.

If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.

Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 20 bytes.

Note that the **CK_BYTE** pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure's *pVersion* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, when the call returns, this byte will hold the WTLS version associated with the supplied pre master secret key.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for key exchange suites that use a 20-byte pre master secret key with an embedded version number. This includes the RSA key exchange suites, but excludes the Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography key exchange suites.

6.41.5 Master secret key derivation for Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Master secret derivation for Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography in WTLS, denoted **CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC**, is a mechanism used to derive a 20 byte generic secret key from variable length secret key. It is used to produce the master secret key used in WTLS from the pre master secret key. This mechanism returns a handle to the derived master secret key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used as well as random data to the token. The *pVersion* field of the structure must be set to NULL_PTR since the version number is not embedded in the pre master secret key as it is for RSA-like key exchange suites.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 20. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.

If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.

Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 20 bytes.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for key exchange suites that do not use a fixed length 20-byte pre master secret key with an embedded version number. This includes the Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography key exchange suites, but excludes the RSA key exchange suites.

6.41.6 WTLS PRF (pseudorandom function)

PRF (pseudo random function) in WTLS, denoted **CKM_WTLS_PRF**, is a mechanism used to produce a securely generated pseudo-random output of arbitrary length. The keys it uses are generic secret keys.

It has a parameter, a **CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS** structure, which allows for passing the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used, the passing of the input seed and its length, the passing of an identifying label and its length and the passing of the length of the output to the token and for receiving the output.

This mechanism produces securely generated pseudo-random output of the length specified in the parameter.

This mechanism departs from the other key derivation mechanisms in Cryptoki in not using the template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** function call, which means the template shall be a NULL_PTR. For most key-derivation mechanisms, **C_DeriveKey** returns a single key handle as a result of a successful completion. However, since the **CKM_WTLS_PRF** mechanism returns the requested number of output bytes in the **CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS** structure specified as the mechanism parameter, the parameter *phKey* passed to **C_DeriveKey** is unnecessary, and should be a NULL_PTR.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** with this mechanism fails, then no output will be generated.

6.41.7 Server Key and MAC derivation

Server key, MAC and IV derivation in WTLS, denoted **CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive the appropriate cryptographic keying material used by a cipher suite from the master secret key and random data. This mechanism returns the key handles for the keys generated in the process, as well as the IV created.

It has a parameter, a **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used, random data, the characteristic of the cryptographic material for the given cipher suite, and a pointer to a structure which receives the handles and IV which were generated.

This mechanism contributes to the creation of two distinct keys and returns one IV (if an IV is requested by the caller) back to the caller. The keys are all given an object class of **CKO_SECRET_KEY**.

The MACing key (server write MAC secret) is always given a type of **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. It is flagged as valid for signing, verification and derivation operations.

The other key (server write key) is typed according to information found in the template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** function call. By default, it is flagged as valid for encryption, decryption, and derivation operations.

An IV (server write IV) will be generated and returned if the *ulIVSizeInBits* field of the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** field has a nonzero value. If it is generated, its length in bits will agree with the value in the *ulIVSizeInBits* field

Both keys inherit the values of the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes from the base key. The template provided to **C_DeriveKey** may not specify values for any of these attributes that differ from those held by the base key.

Note that the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure's *pReturnedKeyMaterial* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, the two key handle fields in the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure will be modified to hold handles to the newly-created keys; in addition, the buffer pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure's *pIV* field will have the IV returned in them (if an IV is requested by the caller). Therefore, this field must point to a buffer with sufficient space to hold any IV that will be returned.

This mechanism departs from the other key derivation mechanisms in Cryptoki in its returned information. For most key-derivation mechanisms, **C_DeriveKey** returns a single key handle as a result of a successful completion. However, since the **CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism returns all of its key handles in the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure specified as the mechanism parameter, the parameter *phKey* passed to **C_DeriveKey** is unnecessary, and should be a NULL_PTR.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** with this mechanism fails, then *none* of the two keys will be created.

6.41.8 Client key and MAC derivation

Client key, MAC and IV derivation in WTLS, denoted **CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive the appropriate cryptographic keying material used by a cipher suite from the master secret key and random data. This mechanism returns the key handles for the keys generated in the process, as well as the IV created.

It has a parameter, a **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used, random data, the characteristic of the cryptographic material for the given cipher suite, and a pointer to a structure which receives the handles and IV which were generated.

This mechanism contributes to the creation of two distinct keys and returns one IV (if an IV is requested by the caller) back to the caller. The keys are all given an object class of **CKO_SECRET_KEY**.

The MACing key (client write MAC secret) is always given a type of **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. It is flagged as valid for signing, verification and derivation operations.

The other key (client write key) is typed according to information found in the template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** function call. By default, it is flagged as valid for encryption, decryption, and derivation operations.

An IV (client write IV) will be generated and returned if the *ulIVSizeInBits* field of the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** field has a nonzero value. If it is generated, its length in bits will agree with the value in the *ulIVSizeInBits* field

Both keys inherit the values of the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes from the base key. The template provided to **C_DeriveKey** may not specify values for any of these attributes that differ from those held by the base key.

Note that the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure's *pReturnedKeyMaterial* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, the two key handle fields in the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure will be modified to hold handles to the newly-created keys; in addition, the buffer pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure's *pIV* field will have the IV returned in them (if an IV is requested by the caller). Therefore, this field must point to a buffer with sufficient space to hold any IV that will be returned.

This mechanism departs from the other key derivation mechanisms in Cryptoki in its returned information. For most key-derivation mechanisms, **C_DeriveKey** returns a single key handle as a result of a successful completion. However, since the **CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism returns all of its key handles in the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure specified as the mechanism parameter, the parameter *phKey* passed to **C_DeriveKey** is unnecessary, and should be a NULL_PTR.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** with this mechanism fails, then *none* of the two keys will be created.

6.42 SP 800-108 Key Derivation

NIST SP800-108 defines three types of key derivation functions (KDF); a Counter Mode KDF, a Feedback Mode KDF and a Double Pipeline Mode KDF.

This section defines a unique mechanism for each type of KDF. These mechanisms can be used to derive one or more symmetric keys from a single base symmetric key.

The KDFs defined in SP800-108 are all built upon pseudo random functions (PRF). In general terms, the PRFs accepts two pieces of input; a base key and some input data. The base key is taken from the *hBaseKey* parameter to **C_Derive**. The input data is constructed from an iteration variable (internally defined by the KDF/PRF) and the data provided in the CK_ PRF_DATA_PARAM array that is part of the mechanism parameter.

Table 191, SP800-108 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF							✓
CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF							✓
CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF							✓

For these mechanisms, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported base key size in bits. Note, these mechanisms support multiple PRF types and key types; as such the values reported by ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize specify the minimum and maximum supported base key size when all PRF and keys types are considered. For example, a Cryptoki implementation may support CKK_GENERIC_SECRET keys that can be as small as 8-bits in length and therefore ulMinKeySize could report 8-bits. However, for an AES-CMAC PRF the base key must be of type CKK_AES and must be either 16-bytes, 24-bytes or 32-bytes in lengths and therefore the value reported by ulMinKeySize could be misleading. Depending on the PRF type selected, additional key size restrictions may apply.

6.42.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF

CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF

CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF

Data Field Types:

CK_SP800_108_ITERATION_VARIABLE

CK_SP800_108_COUNTER

CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH

CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY

DKM Length Methods:

CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_SUM_OF_KEYS

CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_SUM_OF_SEGMENTS

6.42.2 Mechanism Parameters

♦ CK_SP800_108_PRF_TYPE

The **CK_SP800_108_PRF_TYPE** field of the mechanism parameter is used to specify the type of PRF that is to be used. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_SP800_108_PRF_TYPE;
```

The **CK_SP800_108_PRF_TYPE** field reuses the existing mechanisms definitions. The following table lists the supported PRF types:

Table 192, SP800-108 Pseudo Random Functions

Pseudo Random Function Identifiers
CKM_SHA_1_HMAC
CKM_SHA224_HMAC
CKM_SHA256_HMAC
CKM_SHA384_HMAC
CKM_SHA512_HMAC
CKM_SHA3_224_HMAC
CKM_SHA3_256_HMAC
CKM_SHA3_384_HMAC
CKM_SHA3_512_HMAC
CKM_DES3_CMAC
CKM_AES_CMAC

♦ CK_PRF_DATA_TYPE

Each mechanism parameter contains an array of **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** structures. The **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** structure contains **CK_PRF_DATA_TYPE** field. The **CK_PRF_DATA_TYPE** field is used to identify the type of data identified by each **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** element in the array. Depending on the type of KDF used, some data field types are mandatory, some data field types are optional and some data field types are not allowed. These requirements are defined on a per-mechanism basis in the sections below. The **CK_PRF_DATA_TYPE** is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_PRF_DATA_TYPE;
```

The following table lists all of the supported data field types:

Table 193, SP800-108 PRF Data Field Types

Data Field Identifier	Description
CK_SP800_108_ITERATION_VARIABLE	Identifies the iteration variable defined internally by the KDF.
CK_SP800_108_COUNTER	Identifies an optional counter value represented as a binary string. Exact formatting of the counter value is defined by the CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT structure. The value of the counter is defined by the KDF's internal loop counter.
CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH	Identifies the length in bits of the derived keying material (DKM) represented as a binary string. Exact formatting of the length value is defined by the CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT structure.
CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY	Identifies a generic byte array of data. This data type can be used to provide "context", "label", "separator bytes" as well as any other type of encoding information required by the higher level protocol.

♦ CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM

CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM is used to define a segment of input for the PRF. Each mechanism parameter supports an array of **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** structures. The **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM
{
  CK_PRF_DATA_TYPE    type;
  CK_VOID_PTR         pValue;
  CK_ULONG            ulValueLen;
} CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM;

typedef CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM CK_PTR CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM_PTR
```

The fields of the **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** structure have the following meaning:

type	defines the type of data pointed to by pValue
pValue	pointer to the data defined by type
ulValueLen	size of the data pointed to by pValue

If the *type* field of the **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** structure is set to CK_SP800_108_ITERATION_VARIABLE, then *pValue* must be set the appropriate value for the KDF's iteration variable type. For the Counter Mode KDF, *pValue* must be assigned a valid CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT_PTR and *ulValueLen* must be set to sizeof(CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT). For all other KDF types, *pValue must be set* to NULL_PTR and *ulValueLen* must be set to 0.

If the *type* field of the **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** structure is set to CK_SP800_108_COUNTER, then *pValue* must be assigned a valid CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT_PTR and *ulValueLen* must be set to sizeof(CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT).

If the *type* field of the **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** structure is set to CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH then *pValue* must be assigned a valid CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT_PTR and *ulValueLen* must be set to sizeof(CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT).

If the *type* field of the **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** structure is set to CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, then *pValue* must be assigned a valid CK_BYTE_PTR value and *ulValueLen* must be set to a non-zero length.

♦ CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT

CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT is used to define the encoding format for a counter value. The **CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT** is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT
{
   CK_BBOOL    bLittleEndian;
   CK_ULONG    ulWidthInBits;
} CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT;

typedef CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT CK_PTR
CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT_PTR
```

The fields of the CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT structure have the following meaning:

bLittleEndian	defines if the counter should be represented in Big Endian or Little Endian format
ulWidthInBits	defines the number of bits used to represent the counter value

♦ CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_METHOD

CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_METHOD is used to define how the DKM length value is calculated. The **CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_METHOD** type is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_METHOD;
```

The following table lists all of the supported DKM Length Methods:

Table 194, SP800-108 DKM Length Methods

DKM Length Method Identifier	Description
CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_SUM_OF_KEYS	Specifies that the DKM length should be set to the sum of the length of all keys derived by this invocation of the KDF.
CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_SUM_OF_SEGMENTS	Specifies that the DKM length should be set to the sum of the length of all segments of output produced by the PRF by this invocation of the KDF.

♦ CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT

CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT is used to define the encoding format for the DKM length value. The **CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT** is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT
```



```
{
  CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_METHOD  dkmLengthMethod;
  CK_BBOOL                        bLittleEndian;
  CK_ULONG                        ulWidthInBits;
} CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT;

typedef CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT CK_PTR
CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT_PTR
```

The fields of the CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT structure have the following meaning:

dkmLengthMethod	defines the method used to calculate the DKM length value
bLittleEndian	defines if the DKM length value should be represented in Big Endian or Little Endian format
ulWidthInBits	defines the number of bits used to represent the DKM length value

♦ CK_DERIVED_KEY

CK_DERIVED_KEY is used to define an additional key to be derived as well as provide a CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR to receive the handle for the derived keys. The **CK_DERIVED_KEY** is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_DERIVED_KEY
{
  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate;
  CK_ULONG             ulAttributeCount;
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey;
} CK_DERIVED_KEY;

typedef CK_DERIVED_KEY CK_PTR CK_DERIVED_KEY_PTR
```

The fields of the CK_DERIVED_KEY structure have the following meaning:

pTemplate	pointer to a template that defines a key to derive
ulAttributeCount	number of attributes in the template pointed to by pTemplate
phKey	pointer to receive the handle for a derived key

♦ CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS_PTR

CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters for the **CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF** and **CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF** mechanisms.

```
typedef struct CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS
{
  CK_SP800_108_PRF_TYPE  prfType;
  CK_ULONG               ulNumberOfDataParams;
  CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM_PTR  pDataParams;
  CK_ULONG               ulAdditionalDerivedKeys;
  CK_DERIVED_KEY_PTR     pAdditionalDerivedKeys;
} CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS;
```



```
typedef CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS CK_PTR
CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS_PTR;
```

The fields of the **CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS** structure have the following meaning:

prfType	type of PRF
ulNumberOfDataParams	number of elements in the array pointed to by pDataParams
pDataParams	an array of CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM structures. The array defines input parameters that are used to construct the “data” input to the PRF.
ulAdditionalDerivedKeys	number of additional keys that will be derived and the number of elements in the array pointed to by pAdditionalDerivedKeys. If pAdditionalDerivedKeys is set to NULL_PTR, this parameter must be set to 0.
pAdditionalDerivedKeys	an array of CK_DERIVED_KEY structures. If ulAdditionalDerivedKeys is set to 0, this parameter must be set to NULL_PTR

♦ CK_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_PARAMS, CK_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_PARAMS_PTR

The **CK_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_PARAMS** structure provides the parameters for the CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_PARAMS
{
  CK_SP800_108_PRF_TYPE  prfType;
  CK_ULONG               ulNumberOfDataParams;
  CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM_PTR  pDataParams;
  CK_ULONG               ulIVLen;
  CK_BYTE_PTR            pIV;
  CK_ULONG               ulAdditionalDerivedKeys;
  CK_DERIVED_KEY_PTR     pAdditionalDerivedKeys;
} CK_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_PARAMS;

typedef CK_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_PARAMS CK_PTR
CK_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_PARAMS_PTR;
```

The fields of the **CK_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_PARAMS** structure have the following meaning:

prfType	type of PRF
ulNumberOfDataParams	number of elements in the array pointed to by pDataParams
pDataParams	an array of CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM structures. The array defines input parameters that are used to construct the “data” input to the PRF.
ulIVLen	the length in bytes of the IV. If pIV is set to NULL_PTR, this parameter must be set to 0.
pIV	an array of bytes to be used as the IV for the feedback mode KDF. This parameter is optional and can be set to NULL_PTR. If ulIVLen is set to 0, this parameter must be set to NULL_PTR.

ulAdditionalDerivedKeys	number of additional keys that will be derived and the number of elements in the array pointed to by pAdditionalDerivedKeys. If pAdditionalDerivedKeys is set to NULL_PTR, this parameter must be set to 0.
pAdditionalDerivedKeys	an array of CK_DERIVED_KEY structures. If ulAdditionalDerivedKeys is set to 0, this parameter must be set to NULL_PTR.

6.42.3 Counter Mode KDF

The SP800-108 Counter Mode KDF mechanism, denoted **CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF**, represents the KDF defined SP800-108 section 5.1. **CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF** is a mechanism for deriving one or more symmetric keys from a symmetric base key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS** structure.

The following table lists the data field types that are supported for this KDF type and their meaning:

Table 195, Counter Mode data field requirements

Data Field Identifier	Description
CK_SP800_108_ITERATION_VARIABLE	This data field type is mandatory. This data field type identifies the location of the iteration variable in the constructed PRF input data. The iteration variable for this KDF type is a counter. Exact formatting of the counter value is defined by the CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT structure.
CK_SP800_108_COUNTER	This data field type is invalid for this KDF type.
CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH	This data field type is optional. This data field type identifies the location of the DKM length in the constructed PRF input data. Exact formatting of the DKM length is defined by the CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT structure. If specified, only one instance of this type may be specified.
CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY	This data field type is optional. This data field type identifies the location and value of a byte array of data in the constructed PRF input data. This standard does not restrict the number of instances of this data type.

SP800-108 limits the amount of derived keying material that can be produced by a Counter Mode KDF by limiting the internal loop counter to (2^r-1), where “r” is the number of bits used to represent the counter. Therefore the maximum number of bits that can be produced is $(2^r-1)h$, where “h” is the length in bits of the output of the selected PRF.

6.42.4 Feedback Mode KDF

The SP800-108 Feedback Mode KDF mechanism, denoted **CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF**, represents the KDF defined SP800-108 section 5.2. **CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF** is a mechanism for deriving one or more symmetric keys from a symmetric base key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_PARAMS** structure.

The following table lists the data field types that are supported for this KDF type and their meaning:

Table 196, Feedback Mode data field requirements

Data Field Identifier	Description
CK_SP800_108_ITERATION_VARIABLE	This data field type is mandatory. This data field type identifies the location of the iteration variable in the constructed PRF input data. The iteration variable is defined as K(i-1) in section 5.2 of SP800-108. The size, format and value of this data input is defined by the internal KDF structure and PRF output. Exact formatting of the counter value is defined by the CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT structure.
CK_SP800_108_COUNTER	This data field type is optional. This data field type identifies the location of the counter in the constructed PRF input data. Exact formatting of the counter value is defined by the CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT structure. If specified, only one instance of this type may be specified.
CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH	This data field type is optional. This data field type identifies the location of the DKM length in the constructed PRF input data. Exact formatting of the DKM length is defined by the CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT structure. If specified, only one instance of this type may be specified.
CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY	This data field type is optional. This data field type identifies the location and value of a byte array of data in the constructed PRF input data. This standard does not restrict the number of instances of this data type.

SP800-108 limits the amount of derived keying material that can be produced by a Feedback Mode KDF by limiting the internal loop counter to (2^{32}–1). Therefore the maximum number of bits that can be produced is (2^{32}–1)h, where “h” is the length in bits of the output of the selected PRF.

6.42.5 Double Pipeline Mode KDF

The SP800-108 Double Pipeline Mode KDF mechanism, denoted **CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF**, represents the KDF defined SP800-108 section 5.3. **CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF** is a mechanism for deriving one or more symmetric keys from a symmetric base key.

It has a parameter, a CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS structure.

The following table lists the data field types that are supported for this KDF type and their meaning:

Table 197, Double Pipeline Mode data field requirements

Data Field Identifier	Description
CK_SP800_108_ITERATION_VARIABLE	This data field type is mandatory. This data field type identifies the location of the iteration variable in the constructed PRF input data. The iteration variable is defined as A(i) in section 5.3 of SP800-108.

	The size, format and value of this data input is defined by the internal KDF structure and PRF output. Exact formatting of the counter value is defined by the CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT structure.
CK_SP800_108_COUNTER	This data field type is optional. This data field type identifies the location of the counter in the constructed PRF input data. Exact formatting of the counter value is defined by the CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT structure. If specified, only one instance of this type may be specified.
CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH	This data field type is optional. This data field type identifies the location of the DKM length in the constructed PRF input data. Exact formatting of the DKM length is defined by the CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT structure. If specified, only one instance of this type may be specified.
CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY	This data field type is optional. This data field type identifies the location and value of a byte array of data in the constructed PRF input data. This standard does not restrict the number of instances of this data type.

SP800-108 limits the amount of derived keying material that can be produced by a Double-Pipeline Mode KDF by limiting the internal loop counter to $(2^{32}-1)$. Therefore the maximum number of bits that can be produced is $(2^{32}-1)h$, where "h" is the length in bits of the output of the selected PRF.

The Double Pipeline KDF requires an internal IV value. The IV is constructed using the same method used to construct the PRF input data; the data/values identified by the array of **CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM** structures are concatenated in to a byte array that is used as the IV. As shown in SP800-108 section 5.3, the CK_SP800_108_ITERATION_VARIABLE and CK_SP800_108_COUNTER data field types are not included in IV construction process. All other data field types are included in the construction process.

6.42.6 Deriving Additional Keys

The KDFs defined in this section can be used to derive more than one symmetric key from the base key. The **C_Derive** function accepts one CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR to define a single derived key and one CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR to receive the handle for the derived key.

To derive additional keys, the mechanism parameter structure can be filled in with one or more CK_DERIVED_KEY structures. Each structure contains a CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR to define a derived key and a CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR to receive the handle for the additional derived keys. The key defined by the **C_Derive** function parameters is always derived before the keys defined by the CK_DERIVED_KEY array that is part of the mechanism parameter. The additional keys that are defined by the CK_DERIVED_KEY array are derived in the order they are defined in the array. That is to say that the derived keying material produced by the KDF is processed from left to right, and bytes are assigned first to the key defined by the **C_Derive** function parameters, and then bytes are assigned to the keys that are defined by the CK_DERIVED_KEY array in the order they are defined in the array.

Each internal iteration of a KDF produces a unique segment of PRF output. Sometimes, a single iteration will produce enough keying material for the key being derived. Other times, additional internal iterations are performed to produce multiple segments which are concatenated together to produce enough keying material for the derived key(s).

When deriving multiple keys, no key can be created using part of a segment that was used for another key. All keys must be created from disjoint segments. For example, if the parameters are defined such

that a 48-byte key (defined by the **C_Derive** function parameters) and a 16-byte key (defined by the content of CK_DERIVED_KEY) are to be derived using **CKM_SHA256_HMAC** as a PRF, three internal iterations of the KDF will be performed and three segments of PRF output will be produced. The first segment and half of the second segment will be used to create the 48-byte key and the third segment will be used to create the 16-byte key.



In the above example, if the CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH data field type is specified with method CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_SUM_OF_KEYS, then the DKM length value will be 512 bits. If the CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH data field type is specified with method CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_SUM_OF_SEGMENTS, then the DKM length value will be 768 bits.

When deriving multiple keys, if any of the keys cannot be derived for any reason, none of the keys shall be derived. If the failure was caused by the content of a specific key's template (ie the template defined by the content of *pTemplate*), the corresponding *phKey* value will be set to CK_INVALID_HANDLE to identify the offending template.

6.42.7 Key Derivation Attribute Rules

The **CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF**, **CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF** and **CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF** mechanisms have the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key(s) can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

6.42.8 Constructing PRF Input Data

SP800-108 defines the PRF input data for each KDF at a high level using terms like "label", "context", "separator", "counter"…etc. The value, formatting and order of the input data is not strictly defined by SP800-108, instead it is described as being defined by the "encoding scheme".

To support any encoding scheme, these mechanisms construct the PRF input data from from the array of CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM structures in the mechanism parameter. All of the values defined by the CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM array are concatenated in the order they are defined and passed in to the PRF as the data parameter.

6.42.8.1 Sample Counter Mode KDF

SP800-108 section 5.1 outlines a sample Counter Mode KDF which defines the following PRF input:

$$\text{PRF}\ (K_I, [i]_2 \,||\, Label \,||\, 0x00 \,||\, Context \,||\, [L]_2)$$

Section 5.1 does not define the number of bits used to represent the counter (the "r" value) or the DKM length (the "L" value), so 16-bits is assumed for both cases. The following sample code shows how to define this PRF input data using an array of CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM structures.

```
#define DIM(a) (sizeof((a))/sizeof((a)[0]))

CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hDerivedKey;
CK_ATTRIBUTE derivedKeyTemplate = { … };

CK_BYTE baLabel[] = {0xde, 0xad, 0xbe , 0xef};
CK_ULONG ulLabelLen = sizeof(baLabel);
CK_BYTE baContext[] = {0xfe, 0xed, 0xbe , 0xef};
CK_ULONG ulContextLen = sizeof(baContext);

CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT counterFormat = {0, 16};
CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT dkmFormat
   = {CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_SUM_OF_KEYS, 0, 16};

CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM dataParams[] =
{
   { CK_SP800_108_ITERATION_VARIABLE,
     &counterFormat, sizeof(counterFormat) },
   { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, baLabel, ulLabelLen },
   { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, {0x00}, 1 },
   { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, baContext, ulContextLen },
   { CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH, dkmFormat, sizeof(dkmFormat) }
};

CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS kdfParams =
{
   CKM_AES_CMAC,
   DIM(dataParams),
   &dataParams,
   0,     /* no addition derived keys */
   NULL   /* no addition derived keys */
};

CK_MECHANISM = mechanism
{
   CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF,
   &kdfParams,
   sizeof(kdfParams)
};

hBaseKey = GetBaseKeyHandle(.....);

rv = C_DeriveKey(
   hSession,
   &mechanism,
   hBaseKey,
   &derivedKeyTemplate,
   DIM(derivedKeyTemplate),
   &hDerivedKey);
```

6.42.8.2 Sample SCP03 Counter Mode KDF

The SCP03 standard defines a variation of a counter mode KDF which defines the following PRF input:

PRF (K_I, *Label* || *0x00* || $[L]_2$ || $[i]_2$ || *Context*)

SCP03 defines the number of bits used to represent the counter (the “r” value) and number of bits used to represent the DKM length (the “L” value) as 16-bits. The following sample code shows how to define this PRF input data using an array of CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM structures.

```
#define DIM(a) (sizeof((a))/sizeof((a)[0]))

CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hDerivedKey;
CK_ATTRIBUTE derivedKeyTemplate = { … };

CK_BYTE baLabel[] = {0xde, 0xad, 0xbe , 0xef};
CK_ULONG ulLabelLen = sizeof(baLabel);
CK_BYTE baContext[] = {0xfe, 0xed, 0xbe , 0xef};
CK_ULONG ulContextLen = sizeof(baContext);

CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT counterFormat = {0, 16};
CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT dkmFormat
   = {CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_SUM_OF_KEYS, 0, 16};

CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM dataParams[] =
{
   { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, baLabel, ulLabelLen },
   { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, {0x00}, 1 },
   { CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH, dkmFormat, sizeof(dkmFormat) },
   { CK_SP800_108_ITERATION_VARIABLE,
     &counterFormat, sizeof(counterFormat) },
   { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, baContext, ulContextLen }
};

CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS kdfParams =
{
   CKM_AES_CMAC,
   DIM(dataParams),
   &dataParams,
   0,     /* no addition derived keys */
   NULL   /* no addition derived keys */
};

CK_MECHANISM = mechanism
{
   CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF,
   &kdfParams,
   sizeof(kdfParams)
};

hBaseKey = GetBaseKeyHandle(.....);

rv = C_DeriveKey(
   hSession,
   &mechanism,
   hBaseKey,
   &derivedKeyTemplate,
   DIM(derivedKeyTemplate),
   &hDerivedKey);
```

6.42.8.3 Sample Feedback Mode KDF

SP800-108 section 5.2 outlines a sample Feedback Mode KDF which defines the following PRF input:

12018 PRF (K_I, $K(i-1)$ {|| $[i]_2$ }|| *Label* || *0x00* || *Context* || $[L]_2$)

12019 Section 5.2 does not define the number of bits used to represent the counter (the “r” value) or the DKM
12020 length (the “L” value), so 16-bits is assumed for both cases. The counter is defined as being optional and
12021 is included in this example. The following sample code shows how to define this PRF input data using an
12022 array of CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM structures.

```
12023    #define DIM(a) (sizeof((a))/sizeof((a)[0]))
12024
12025    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey;
12026    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hDerivedKey;
12027    CK_ATTRIBUTE derivedKeyTemplate = { … };
12028
12029    CK_BYTE baFeedbackIV[] = {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04};
12030    CK_ULONG ulFeedbackIVLen = sizeof(baFeedbackIV);
12031    CK_BYTE baLabel[] = {0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef};
12032    CK_ULONG ulLabelLen = sizeof(baLabel);
12033    CK_BYTE baContext[] = {0xfe, 0xed, 0xbe, 0xef};
12034    CK_ULONG ulContextLen = sizeof(baContext);
12035
12036    CK_SP800_108_COUNTER_FORMAT counterFormat = {0, 16};
12037    CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT dkmFormat
12038       = {CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_SUM_OF_KEYS, 0, 16};
12039
12040    CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM dataParams[] =
12041    {
12042       { CK_SP800_108_ITERATION_VARIABLE,
12043         &counterFormat, sizeof(counterFormat) },
12044       { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, baLabel, ulLabelLen },
12045       { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, {0x00}, 1 },
12046       { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, baContext, ulContextLen },
12047       { CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH, dkmFormat, sizeof(dkmFormat) }
12048    };
12049
12050    CK_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_PARAMS kdfParams =
12051    {
12052       CKM_AES_CMAC,
12053       DIM(dataParams),
12054       &dataParams,
12055       ulFeedbackIVLen,
12056       baFeedbackIV,
12057       0,     /* no addition derived keys */
12058       NULL   /* no addition derived keys */
12059    };
12060
12061    CK_MECHANISM = mechanism
12062    {
12063       CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF,
12064       &kdfParams,
12065       sizeof(kdfParams)
12066    };
12067
12068    hBaseKey = GetBaseKeyHandle(.....);
12069
12070    rv = C_DeriveKey(
12071       hSession,
12072       &mechanism,
12073       hBaseKey,
```



```
        &derivedKeyTemplate,
        DIM(derivedKeyTemplate),
        &hDerivedKey);
```

6.42.8.4 Sample Double-Pipeline Mode KDF

SP800-108 section 5.3 outlines a sample Double-Pipeline Mode KDF which defines the two following PRF inputs:

PRF (*KI, A*(*i*-1))

PRF (*KI,* `K(i-1)` {|| [*i*]2 }|| *Label* || *0x00* || *Context* || [*L*]2)

Section 5.3 does not define the number of bits used to represent the counter (the “r” value) or the DKM length (the “L” value), so 16-bits is assumed for both cases. The counter is defined as being optional so it is left out in this example. The following sample code shows how to define this PRF input data using an array of CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM structures.

```
#define DIM(a) (sizeof((a))/sizeof((a)[0]))

CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hDerivedKey;
CK_ATTRIBUTE derivedKeyTemplate = { … };

CK_BYTE baLabel[] = {0xde, 0xad, 0xbe , 0xef};
CK_ULONG ulLabelLen = sizeof(baLabel);
CK_BYTE baContext[] = {0xfe, 0xed, 0xbe , 0xef};
CK_ULONG ulContextLen = sizeof(baContext);

CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_FORMAT dkmFormat
   = {CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH_SUM_OF_KEYS, 0, 16};

CK_PRF_DATA_PARAM dataParams[] =
{
   { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, baLabel, ulLabelLen },
   { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, {0x00}, 1 },
   { CK_SP800_108_BYTE_ARRAY, baContext, ulContextLen },
   { CK_SP800_108_DKM_LENGTH, dkmFormat, sizeof(dkmFormat) }
};

CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS kdfParams =
{
   CKM_AES_CMAC,
   DIM(dataParams),
   &dataParams,
   0,     /* no addition derived keys */
   NULL   /* no addition derived keys */
};

CK_MECHANISM = mechanism
{
   CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF,
   &kdfParams,
   sizeof(kdfParams)
};

hBaseKey = GetBaseKeyHandle(.....);

rv = C_DeriveKey(
   hSession,
```

```
        &mechanism,
        hBaseKey,
        &derivedKeyTemplate,
        DIM(derivedKeyTemplate),
        &hDerivedKey);
```

6.43 Miscellaneous simple key derivation mechanisms

Table 198, Miscellaneous simple key derivation Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY							✓
CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA							✓
CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE							✓
CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA							✓
CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY							✓

6.43.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA

CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE

CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA

CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY

CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY

6.43.2 Parameters for miscellaneous simple key derivation mechanisms

- **CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;**
  CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR

CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA provides the parameters for the CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA, CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE, and CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA mechanisms. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA {
  CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
  CK_ULONG ulLen;
} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pData	pointer to the byte string
ulLen	length of the byte string

CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA**.

♦ CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR

CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS provides the parameter to the **CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY** mechanism. It specifies which bit of the base key should be used as the first bit of the derived key. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS;
```

CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS**.

6.43.3 Concatenation of a base key and another key

This mechanism, denoted **CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY**, derives a secret key from the concatenation of two existing secret keys. The two keys are specified by handles; the values of the keys specified are concatenated together in a buffer.

This mechanism takes a parameter, a **CK_OBJECT_HANDLE**. This handle produces the key value information which is appended to the end of the base key's value information (the base key is the key whose handle is supplied as an argument to **C_DeriveKey**).

For example, if the value of the base key is 0x01234567, and the value of the other key is 0x89ABCDEF, then the value of the derived key will be taken from a buffer containing the string 0x0123456789ABCDEF.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key. Its length will be equal to the sum of the lengths of the values of the two original keys.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length is provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, DES3, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more bytes than are available by concatenating the two original keys' values, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If either of the two original keys has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- Similarly, if either of the two original keys has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if both of the original keys have their **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attributes set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if both of the original keys have their **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes set to CK_TRUE.

6.43.4 Concatenation of a base key and data

This mechanism, denoted **CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA**, derives a secret key by concatenating data onto the end of a specified secret key.

This mechanism takes a parameter, a **CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA** structure, which specifies the length and value of the data which will be appended to the base key to derive another key.

For example, if the value of the base key is 0x01234567, and the value of the data is 0x89ABCDEF, then the value of the derived key will be taken from a buffer containing the string 0x0123456789ABCDEF.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key. Its length will be equal to the sum of the lengths of the value of the original key and the data.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length is provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, DES3, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more bytes than are available by concatenating the original key's value and the data, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the base key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

6.43.5 Concatenation of data and a base key

This mechanism, denoted **CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE**, derives a secret key by prepending data to the start of a specified secret key.

This mechanism takes a parameter, a **CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA** structure, which specifies the length and value of the data which will be prepended to the base key to derive another key.

For example, if the value of the base key is 0x01234567, and the value of the data is 0x89ABCDEF, then the value of the derived key will be taken from a buffer containing the string 0x89ABCDEF01234567.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key. Its length will be equal to the sum of the lengths of the data and the value of the original key.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length is provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, DES3, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more bytes than are available by concatenating the data and the original key's value, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the base key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

6.43.6 XORing of a key and data

XORing key derivation, denoted **CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA**, is a mechanism which provides the capability of deriving a secret key by performing a bit XORing of a key pointed to by a base key handle and some data.

This mechanism takes a parameter, a **CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA** structure, which specifies the data with which to XOR the original key's value.

For example, if the value of the base key is 0x01234567, and the value of the data is 0x89ABCDEF, then the value of the derived key will be taken from a buffer containing the string 0x88888888.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key. Its length will be equal to the minimum of the lengths of the data and the value of the original key.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length is provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, DES3, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more bytes than are available by taking the shorter of the data and the original key's value, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the base key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

6.43.7 Extraction of one key from another key

Extraction of one key from another key, denoted **CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY**, is a mechanism which provides the capability of creating one secret key from the bits of another secret key.

This mechanism has a parameter, a CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS, which specifies which bit of the original key should be used as the first bit of the newly-derived key.

We give an example of how this mechanism works. Suppose a token has a secret key with the 4-byte value 0x329F84A9. We will derive a 2-byte secret key from this key, starting at bit position 21 (i.e., the value of the parameter to the CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism is 21).

1. We write the key's value in binary: 0011 0010 1001 1111 1000 0100 1010 1001. We regard this binary string as holding the 32 bits of the key, labeled as b0, b1, …, b31.
2. We then extract 16 consecutive bits (i.e., 2 bytes) from this binary string, starting at bit b21. We obtain the binary string 1001 0101 0010 0110.
3. The value of the new key is thus 0x9526.

Note that when constructing the value of the derived key, it is permissible to wrap around the end of the binary string representing the original key's value.

If the original key used in this process is sensitive, then the derived key must also be sensitive for the derivation to succeed.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then an error will be returned.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length is provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, DES3, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more bytes than the original key has, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the base key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

6.44 CMS

Table 199, CMS Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_CMS_SIG		✓	✓				

12337 ## 6.44.1 Definitions

12338 Mechanisms:

12339 CKM_CMS_SIG

12340 ## 6.44.2 CMS Signature Mechanism Objects

12341 These objects provide information relating to the CKM_CMS_SIG mechanism. CKM_CMS_SIG
12342 mechanism object attributes represent information about supported CMS signature attributes in the token.
12343 They are only present on tokens supporting the **CKM_CMS_SIG** mechanism, but must be present on
12344 those tokens.

12345 *Table 200, CMS Signature Mechanism Object Attributes*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES	Byte array	Attributes the token always will include in the set of CMS signed attributes
CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES	Byte array	Attributes the token will include in the set of CMS signed attributes in the absence of any attributes specified by the application
CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES	Byte array	Attributes the token may include in the set of CMS signed attributes upon request by the application

12346 The contents of each byte array will be a DER-encoded list of CMS **Attributes** with optional accompanying
12347 values. Any attributes in the list shall be identified with its object identifier, and any values shall be DER-
12348 encoded. The list of attributes is defined in ASN.1 as:

```
12349       Attributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
12350       Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
12351       attrType    OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
12352       attrValues SET OF ANY DEFINED BY OBJECT IDENTIFIER
12353            OPTIONAL
12354       }
```

12355 The client may not set any of the attributes.

12356 ## 6.44.3 CMS mechanism parameters

12357 - **CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS, CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR**

12358 **CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_CMS_SIG** mechanism.
12359 It is defined as follows:

```
12360    typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS {
12361    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE      certificateHandle;
12362    CK_MECHANISM_PTR      pSigningMechanism;
12363    CK_MECHANISM_PTR      pDigestMechanism;
```

```
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR       pContentType;
    CK_BYTE_PTR           pRequestedAttributes;
    CK_ULONG              ulRequestedAttributesLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR           pRequiredAttributes;
    CK_ULONG              ulRequiredAttributesLen;
    } CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

certificateHandle	Object handle for a certificate associated with the signing key. The token may use information from this certificate to identify the signer in the **SignerInfo** result value. CertificateHandle may be NULL_PTR if the certificate is not available as a PKCS #11 object or if the calling application leaves the choice of certificate completely to the token.
pSigningMechanism	Mechanism to use when signing a constructed CMS **SignedAttributes** value. E.g. **CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS**.
pDigestMechanism	Mechanism to use when digesting the data. Value shall be NULL_PTR when the digest mechanism to use follows from the pSigningMechanism parameter.
pContentType	NULL-terminated string indicating complete MIME Content-type of message to be signed; or the value NULL_PTR if the message is a MIME object (which the token can parse to determine its MIME Content-type if required). Use the value “application/octet-stream“ if the MIME type for the message is unknown or undefined. Note that the pContentType string shall conform to the syntax specified in RFC 2045, i.e. any parameters needed for correct presentation of the content by the token (such as, for example, a non-default “charset”) must be present. The token must follow rules and procedures defined in RFC 2045 when presenting the content.
pRequestedAttributes	Pointer to DER-encoded list of CMS **Attributes** the caller requests to be included in the signed attributes. Token may freely ignore this list or modify any supplied values.
ulRequestedAttributesLen	Length in bytes of the value pointed to by pRequestedAttributes
pRequiredAttributes	Pointer to DER-encoded list of CMS **Attributes** (with accompanying values) required to be included in the resulting signed attributes. Token must not modify any supplied values. If the token does not support one or more of the attributes, or does not accept provided values, the signature operation will fail. The token will use its own default attributes when signing if both the pRequestedAttributes and pRequiredAttributes field are set to NULL_PTR.
ulRequiredAttributesLen	Length in bytes, of the value pointed to by pRequiredAttributes.

6.44.4 CMS signatures

The CMS mechanism, denoted **CKM_CMS_SIG**, is a multi-purpose mechanism based on the structures defined in [PKCS #7] and RFC 2630. It supports single- or multiple-part signatures with and without message recovery. The mechanism is intended for use with, e.g., PTDs (see MeT-PTD) or other capable tokens. The token will construct a CMS **SignedAttributes** value and compute a signature on this value. The content of the **SignedAttributes** value is decided by the token, however the caller can suggest some attributes in the parameter *pRequestedAttributes*. The caller can also require some attributes to be

present through the parameters *pRequiredAttributes*. The signature is computed in accordance with the parameter *pSigningMechanism*.

When this mechanism is used in successful calls to **C_Sign** or **C_SignFinal**, the *pSignature* return value will point to a DER-encoded value of type **SignerInfo**. **SignerInfo** is defined in ASN.1 as follows (for a complete definition of all fields and types, see RFC 2630):

```
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        version CMSVersion,
        sid SignerIdentifier,
        digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
        signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
        signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
        signature SignatureValue,
        unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes
        OPTIONAL }
```

The *certificateHandle* parameter, when set, helps the token populate the **sid** field of the **SignerInfo** value. If *certificateHandle* is NULL_PTR the choice of a suitable certificate reference in the **SignerInfo** result value is left to the token (the token could, e.g., interact with the user).

This mechanism shall not be used in calls to **C_Verify** or **C_VerifyFinal** (use the *pSigningMechanism* mechanism instead).

For the *pRequiredAttributes* field, the token may have to interact with the user to find out whether to accept a proposed value or not. The token should never accept any proposed attribute values without some kind of confirmation from its owner (but this could be through, e.g., configuration or policy settings and not direct interaction). If a user rejects proposed values, or the signature request as such, the value CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED shall be returned.

When possible, applications should use the **CKM_CMS_SIG** mechanism when generating CMS-compatible signatures rather than lower-level mechanisms such as **CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS**. This is especially true when the signatures are to be made on content that the token is able to present to a user. Exceptions may include those cases where the token does not support a particular signing attribute. Note however that the token may refuse usage of a particular signature key unless the content to be signed is known (i.e. the **CKM_CMS_SIG** mechanism is used).

When a token does not have presentation capabilities, the PKCS #11-aware application may avoid sending the whole message to the token by electing to use a suitable signature mechanism (e.g. **CKM_RSA_PKCS**) as the *pSigningMechanism* value in the **CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS** structure, and digesting the message itself before passing it to the token.

PKCS #11-aware applications making use of tokens with presentation capabilities, should attempt to provide messages to be signed by the token in a format possible for the token to present to the user. Tokens that receive multipart MIME-messages for which only certain parts are possible to present may fail the signature operation with a return value of **CKR_DATA_INVALID**, but may also choose to add a signing attribute indicating which parts of the message were possible to present.

6.45 Blowfish

Blowfish, a secret-key block cipher. It is a Feistel network, iterating a simple encryption function 16 times. The block size is 64 bits, and the key can be any length up to 448 bits. Although there is a complex initialization phase required before any encryption can take place, the actual encryption of data is very efficient on large microprocessors. See [BLOWFISH] for details.

Table 201, Blowfish Mechanisms vs. Functions

	Functions						
Mechanism	**Encrypt & Decrypt**	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	

6.45.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_BLOWFISH” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN

CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC

CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC_PAD

6.45.2 BLOWFISH secret key objects

Blowfish secret key objects (object class CKO_SECRET_KEY, key type CKK_BLOWFISH) hold Blowfish keys. The following table defines the Blowfish secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 202, BLOWFISH Secret Key Object

Attribute	**Data type**	**Meaning**
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key value the key can be any length up to 448 bits. Bit length restricted to a byte array.
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an Blowfish secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_BLOWFISH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = “A blowfish secret key object”;
CK_BYTE value[16] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.45.3 Blowfish key generation

The Blowfish key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism Blowfish.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Blowfish keys with a particular length, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes in bytes.

6.45.4 Blowfish-CBC

Blowfish-CBC, denoted **CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

It has a parameter, a 8-byte initialization vector.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 203, BLOWFISH-CBC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input Length	Output Length
C_Encrypt	BLOWFISH	Multiple of block size	Same as input length
C_Decrypt	BLOWFISH	Multiple of block size	Same as input length
C_WrapKey	BLOWFISH	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	BLOWFISH	Multiple of block size	Determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of BLOWFISH key sizes, in bytes.

6.45.5 Blowfish-CBC with PKCS padding

Blowfish-CBC-PAD, denoted CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC_PAD, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption, key wrapping and key unwrapping, cipher-block chaining mode and the block cipher padding method detailed in [PKCS #7].

It has a parameter, a 8-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

12523 Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

12524

12525 *Table 204, BLOWFISH-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key and Data Length*

Function	Key type	Input Length	Output Length
C_Encrypt	BLOWFISH	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	BLOWFISH	Multiple of block size	Between 1 and block length block size bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	BLOWFISH	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	BLOWFISH	Multiple of block size	Between 1 and block length block size bytes shorter than input length

12526 ## 6.46 Twofish

12527 Twofish is a secret key block cipher. See [TWOFISH] for details.

12528 ### 6.46.1 Definitions

12529 This section defines the key type “CKK_TWOFISH” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the
12530 CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

12531 Mechanisms:

12532 CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN
12533 CKM_TWOFISH_CBC
12534 CKM_TWOFISH_CBC_PAD

12535

12536 ### 6.46.2 Twofish secret key objects

12537 Twofish secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY,** key type **CKK_TWOFISH**) hold Twofish
12538 keys. The following table defines the Twofish secret key object attributes, in addition to the common
12539 attributes defined for this object class:

12540 *Table 205, Twofish Secret Key Object*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key value 128-, 192-, or 256-bit key
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

12541 - Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

12542 The following is a sample template for creating an TWOFISH secret key object:

```
12543    CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
12544    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_TWOFISH;
12545    CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A twofish secret key object";
12546    CK_BYTE value[16] = {...};
12547    CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
12548    CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
12549      {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
```

```
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.46.3 Twofish key generation

The Twofish key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism Twofish.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Blowfish keys with a particular length, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes, in bytes.

6.46.4 Twofish -CBC

Twofish-CBC, denoted **CKM_TWOFISH_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

6.46.5 Twofish-CBC with PKCS padding

Twofish-CBC-PAD, denoted CKM_TWOFISH_CBC_PAD, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption, key wrapping and key unwrapping, cipher-block chaining mode and the block cipher padding method detailed in [PKCS #7].

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

6.47 CAMELLIA

Camellia is a block cipher with 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys, similar to AES. Camellia is described e.g. in IETF RFC 3713.

Table 206, Camellia Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR** [1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key / Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB	✓					✓	

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR [1]	Digest	Gen. Key / Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC		✓					
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

6.47.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_CAMELLIA” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC
CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC
CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD

6.47.2 Camellia secret key objects

Camellia secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY,** key type **CKK_CAMELLIA**) hold Camellia keys. The following table defines the Camellia secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 207, Camellia Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key value (16, 24, or 32 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2,3,6]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating a Camellia secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_CAMELLIA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = “A Camellia secret key object”;
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
```

```
      {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
      {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
      {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
      {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
      {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
      {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
    };
```

6.47.3 Camellia key generation

The Camellia key generation mechanism, denoted CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN, is a key generation mechanism for Camellia.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Camellia keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the Camellia key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

6.47.4 Camellia-ECB

Camellia-ECB, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Camellia and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 208, Camellia-ECB: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

6.47.5 Camellia-CBC

Camellia-CBC, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Camellia and cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 209, Camellia-CBC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

6.47.6 Camellia-CBC with PKCS padding

Camellia-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Camellia; cipher-block chaining mode; and the block cipher padding method detailed in [PKCS #7].

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap and unwrap secret keys, this mechanism can wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, short Weierstrass EC and DSA private keys (see Section 6.7 for details). The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 210, Camellia-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block size bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block length bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

6.47.7 CAMELLIA with Counter mechanism parameters

♦ CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR

CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS {
        CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
        CK_BYTE cb[16];
} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS;
```

ulCounterBits specifies the number of bits in the counter block (cb) that shall be incremented. This number shall be such that 0 < *ulCounterBits* ≤ 128. For any values outside this range the mechanism shall return **CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID**.

It's up to the caller to initialize all of the bits in the counter block including the counter bits. The counter bits are the least significant bits of the counter block (cb). They are a big-endian value usually starting with 1. The rest of 'cb' is for the nonce, and maybe an optional IV.

E.g. as defined in [RFC 3686]:



This construction permits each packet to consist of up to 2^{32}-1 blocks = 4,294,967,295 blocks = 68,719,476,720 octets.

CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS**.

6.47.8 General-length Camellia-MAC

General-length Camellia -MAC, denoted CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on Camellia and data authentication as defined in.[CAMELLIA]

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final Camellia cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 211, General-length Camellia-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	1-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	1-block size, as specified in parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

6.47.9 Camellia-MAC

Camellia-MAC, denoted by **CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length Camellia-MAC mechanism. Camellia-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are half the block size in length.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 212, Camellia-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)
C_Verify	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

6.48 Key derivation by data encryption - Camellia

These mechanisms allow derivation of keys using the result of an encryption operation as the key value. They are for use with the C_DeriveKey function.

6.48.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA

CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA

```
typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
  CK_BYTE      iv[16];
  CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
  CK_ULONG     length;
} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;

typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
        CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
```

6.48.2 Mechanism Parameters

Uses CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS, and CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA.

Table 213, Mechanism Parameters for Camellia-based key derivation

CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 16 long.
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS. Parameter is an 16 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.

6.49 ARIA

ARIA is a block cipher with 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys, similar to AES. ARIA is described in NSRI “Specification of ARIA”.

Table 214, ARIA Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_ARIA_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_ARIA_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_ARIA_MAC		✓					
CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

12753 ## 6.49.1 Definitions

12754 This section defines the key type “CKK_ARIA” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE
12755 attribute of key objects.

12756 Mechanisms:

12757 CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN
12758 CKM_ARIA_ECB
12759 CKM_ARIA_CBC
12760 CKM_ARIA_MAC
12761 CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL
12762 CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD

12763 ## 6.49.2 Aria secret key objects

12764 ARIA secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY,** key type **CKK_ARIA**) hold ARIA keys. The
12765 following table defines the ARIA secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined
12766 for this object class:

12767 *Table 215, ARIA Secret Key Object Attributes*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key value (16, 24, or 32 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2,3,6]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

12768 - Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

12769 The following is a sample template for creating an ARIA secret key object:

```
12770    CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
12771    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_ARIA;
12772    CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An ARIA secret key object";
12773    CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
12774    CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
12775    CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
12776      {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
12777      {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
12778      {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
12779      {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
12780      {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
```

```
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
  };
```

6.49.3 ARIA key generation

The ARIA key generation mechanism, denoted CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN, is a key generation mechanism for Aria.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates ARIA keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the ARIA key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

6.49.4 ARIA-ECB

ARIA-ECB, denoted **CKM_ARIA_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Aria and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 216, ARIA-ECB: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

6.49.5 ARIA-CBC

ARIA-CBC, denoted **CKM_ARIA_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on ARIA and cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 217, ARIA-CBC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure specify the supported range of Aria key sizes, in bytes.

6.49.6 ARIA-CBC with PKCS padding

ARIA-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on ARIA; cipher-block chaining mode; and the block cipher padding method detailed in [PKCS #7].

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap and unwrap secret keys, this mechanism can wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, short Weierstrass EC and DSA private keys (see Section 6.7 for details). The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 218, ARIA-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block size bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block length bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

6.49.7 General-length ARIA-MAC

General-length ARIA -MAC, denoted **CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on ARIA and data authentication as defined in [FIPS 113].

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final ARIA cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 219, General-length ARIA-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_ARIA	any	1-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	CKK_ARIA	any	1-block size, as specified in parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

6.49.8 ARIA-MAC

ARIA-MAC, denoted by **CKM_ARIA_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length ARIA-MAC mechanism. ARIA-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are half the block size in length.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 220, ARIA-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_ARIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)
C_Verify	CKK_ARIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

6.50 Key derivation by data encryption - ARIA

These mechanisms allow derivation of keys using the result of an encryption operation as the key value. They are for use with the C_DeriveKey function.

6.50.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA

CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA

```
typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
 CK_BYTE      iv[16];
  CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
  CK_ULONG     length;
} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;

typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
        CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
```

6.50.2 Mechanism Parameters

Uses CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS, and CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA.

Table 221, Mechanism Parameters for Aria-based key derivation

CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 16 long.
CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS. Parameter is an 16 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.

6.51 SEED

SEED is a symmetric block cipher developed by the South Korean Information Security Agency (KISA). It has a 128-bit key size and a 128-bit block size.

Its specification has been published as Internet [RFC 4269].

RFCs have been published defining the use of SEED in

TLS ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc4162.txt

IPsec ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc4196.txt

CMS ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc4010.txt

TLS cipher suites that use SEED include:

```
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00,
  0x96};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA   = { 0x00,
  0x97};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA   = { 0x00,
  0x98};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  = { 0x00,
  0x99};
```

```
        CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  = { 0x00,
          0x9A};
        CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  = { 0x00,
          0x9B};
```

As with any block cipher, it can be used in the ECB, CBC, OFB and CFB modes of operation, as well as in a MAC algorithm such as HMAC.

OIDs have been published for all these uses. A list may be seen at
http://www.alvestrand.no/objectid/1.2.410.200004.1.html

Table 222, SEED Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR** [1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_SEED_ECB			✓				
CKM_SEED_CBC			✓				
CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL			✓				
CKM_SEED_MAC				✓			
CKM_SEED_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

6.51.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_SEED” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN
CKM_SEED_ECB
CKM_SEED_CBC
CKM_SEED_MAC
CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL
CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD

For all of these mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** are always 16.

6.51.2 SEED secret key objects

SEED secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY,** key type **CKK_SEED**) hold SEED keys. The following table defines the secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 223, SEED Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key value (always 16 bytes long)

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating a SEED secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_SEED;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A SEED secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.51.3 SEED key generation

The SEED key generation mechanism, denoted CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN, is a key generation mechanism for SEED.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SEED keys.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SEED key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

6.51.4 SEED-ECB

SEED-ECB, denoted **CKM_SEED_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on SEED and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

6.51.5 SEED-CBC

SEED-CBC, denoted **CKM_SEED_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on SEED and cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

6.51.6 SEED-CBC with PKCS padding

SEED-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on SEED; cipher-block chaining mode; and the block cipher padding method detailed in [PKCS #7].

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

6.51.7 General-length SEED-MAC

General-length SEED-MAC, denoted **CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on SEED and data authentication.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final cipher block produced in the MACing process.

6.51.8 SEED-MAC

SEED-MAC, denoted by **CKM_SEED_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length SEED-MAC mechanism. SEED-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are half the block size in length.

It does not have a parameter.

6.52 Key derivation by data encryption - SEED

These mechanisms allow derivation of keys using the result of an encryption operation as the key value. They are for use with the C_DeriveKey function.

6.52.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_SEED_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA

CKM_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA

```
typedef struct CK_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
  CK_BYTE       iv[16];
  CK_BYTE_PTR   pData;
  CK_ULONG      length;
} CK_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;

typedef CK_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
        CK_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
```

6.52.2 Mechanism Parameters

Table 224, Mechanism Parameters for SEED-based key derivation

CKM_SEED_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 16 long.
CKM_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS. Parameter is an 16 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.

6.53 OTP

6.53.1 Usage overview

OTP tokens represented as PKCS #11 mechanisms may be used in a variety of ways. The usage cases can be categorized according to the type of sought functionality.

6.53.2 Case 1: Generation of OTP values



Figure 2: Retrieving OTP values through C_Sign

Figure 2 shows an integration of PKCS #11 into an application that needs to authenticate users holding OTP tokens. In this particular example, a connected hardware token is used, but a software token is equally possible. The application invokes **C_Sign** to retrieve the OTP value from the token. In the example, the application then passes the retrieved OTP value to a client API that sends it via the network to an authentication server. The client API may implement a standard authentication protocol such as RADIUS [RFC 2865] or EAP [RFC 3748], or a proprietary protocol such as that used by RSA Security's ACE/Agent® software.

6.53.3 Case 2: Verification of provided OTP values



Figure 3: Server-side verification of OTP values

Figure 3 illustrates the server-side equivalent of the scenario depicted in Figure 2. In this case, a server application invokes **C_Verify** with the received OTP value as the signature value to be verified.

6.53.4 Case 3: Generation of OTP keys



13019 *Figure 4: Generation of an OTP key*

13020 Figure 4 shows an integration of PKCS #11 into an application that generates OTP keys. The application
13021 invokes **C_GenerateKey** to generate an OTP key of a particular type on the token. The key may
13022 subsequently be used as a basis to generate OTP values.

13023 ## 6.53.5 OTP objects

13024 ### 6.53.5.1 Key objects

13025 OTP key objects (object class **CKO_OTP_KEY**) hold secret keys used by OTP tokens. The following
13026 table defines the attributes common to all OTP keys, in addition to the attributes defined for secret keys,
13027 all of which are inherited by this class:

13028 *Table 225: Common OTP key attributes*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_OTP_FORMAT	CK_ULONG	Format of OTP values produced with this key: CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL = Decimal (default) (UTF8-encoded) CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL = Hexadecimal (UTF8-encoded) CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC = Alphanumeric (UTF8-encoded) CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY = Only binary values.
CKA_OTP_LENGTH[9]	CK_ULONG	Default length of OTP values (in the CKA_OTP_FORMAT) produced with this key.
CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE[9]	CK_BBOOL	Set to CK_TRUE when the token is capable of returning OTPs suitable for human consumption. See the description of CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP below.
CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT[9]	CK_ULONG	Parameter requirements when generating or verifying OTP values with this key: CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY = A challenge must be supplied. CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL = A challenge may be supplied but need not be. CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED = A challenge, if supplied, will be ignored.
CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT[9]	CK_ULONG	Parameter requirements when generating or verifying OTP values with this key: CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY = A time value must be supplied. CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL = A time value may be supplied but need not be. CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED = A time value, if supplied, will be ignored.

CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT[9]	CK_ULONG	Parameter requirements when generating or verifying OTP values with this key: CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY = A counter value must be supplied. CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL = A counter value may be supplied but need not be. CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED = A counter value, if supplied, will be ignored.
CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT[9]	CK_ULONG	Parameter requirements when generating or verifying OTP values with this key: CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY = A PIN value must be supplied. CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL = A PIN value may be supplied but need not be (if not supplied, then library will be responsible for collecting it) CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED = A PIN value, if supplied, will be ignored.
CKA_OTP_COUNTER	Byte array	Value of the associated internal counter. Default value is empty (i.e. *ulValueLen* = 0).
CKA_OTP_TIME	RFC 2279 string	Value of the associated internal UTC time in the form YYYYMMDDhhmmss. Default value is empty (i.e. *ulValueLen*= 0).
CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER	RFC 2279 string	Text string that identifies a user associated with the OTP key (may be used to enhance the user experience). Default value is empty (i.e. *ulValueLen* = 0).
CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER	RFC 2279 string	Text string that identifies a service that may validate OTPs generated by this key. Default value is empty (i.e. *ulValueLen* = 0).
CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO	Byte array	Logotype image that identifies a service that may validate OTPs generated by this key. Default value is empty (i.e. *ulValueLen* = 0).
CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE	RFC 2279 string	MIME type of the CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO attribute value. Default value is empty (i.e. *ulValueLen* = 0).
CKA_VALUE[1, 4, 6, 7]	Byte array	Value of the key.
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2, 3]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value.

13029 - Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

Note: A Cryptoki library may support PIN-code caching in order to reduce user interactions. An OTP-PKCS #11 application should therefore always consult the state of the CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT attribute before each call to **C_SignInit**, as the value of this attribute may change dynamically.

For OTP tokens with multiple keys, the keys may be enumerated using **C_FindObjects**. The **CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER** and/or the **CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO** attribute may be used to distinguish between keys. The actual choice of key for a particular operation is however application-specific and beyond the scope of this document.

For all OTP keys, the CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS attribute should be set as required.

6.53.6 OTP-related notifications

This document extends the set of defined notifications as follows:

CKN_OTP_CHANGED	Cryptoki is informing the application that the OTP for a key on a connected token just changed. This notification is particularly useful when applications wish to display the current OTP value for time-based mechanisms.

6.53.7 OTP mechanisms

The following table shows, for the OTP mechanisms defined in this document, their support by different cryptographic operations. For any particular token, of course, a particular operation may well support only a subset of the mechanisms listed. There is also no guarantee that a token that supports one mechanism for some operation supports any other mechanism for any other operation (or even supports that same mechanism for any other operation).

Table 226: OTP mechanisms vs. applicable functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_SECURID		✓					
CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_HOTP		✓					
CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_ACTI		✓					

The remainder of this section will present in detail the OTP mechanisms and the parameters that are supplied to them.

6.53.7.1 OTP mechanism parameters

- **CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE**

CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE is a value that identifies an OTP parameter type. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE;
```

The following **CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE** types are defined:

Table 227, OTP parameter types

Parameter	Data type	Meaning
CK_OTP_PIN	RFC 2279 string	A UTF8 string containing a PIN for use when computing or verifying PIN-based OTP values.
CK_OTP_CHALLENGE	Byte array	Challenge to use when computing or verifying challenge-based OTP values.
CK_OTP_TIME	RFC 2279 string	UTC time value in the form YYYYMMDDhhmmss to use when computing or verifying time-based OTP values.
CK_OTP_COUNTER	Byte array	Counter value to use when computing or verifying counter-based OTP values.
CK_OTP_FLAGS	CK_FLAGS	Bit flags indicating the characteristics of the sought OTP as defined below.
CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH	CK_ULONG	Desired output length (overrides any default value). A Cryptoki library will return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if a provided length value is not supported.
CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT	CK_ULONG	Returned OTP format (allowed values are the same as for CKA_OTP_FORMAT). This parameter is only intended for **C_Sign** output, see paragraphs below. When not present, the returned OTP format will be the same as the value of the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute for the key in question.
CK_OTP_VALUE	Byte array	An actual OTP value. This parameter type is intended for **C_Sign** output, see paragraphs below.

13059

13060 The following table defines the possible values for the CK_OTP_FLAGS type:

13061 *Table 228: OTP Mechanism Flags*

Bit flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_NEXT_OTP	0x00000001	True (i.e. set) if the OTP computation shall be for the next OTP, rather than the current one (current being interpreted in the context of the algorithm, e.g. for the current counter value or current time window). A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if the CKF_NEXT_OTP flag is set and the OTP mechanism in question does not support the concept of “next” OTP or the library is not capable of generating the next OTP[9].

9 Applications that may need to retrieve the next OTP should be prepared to handle this situation. For example, an application could store the OTP value returned by C_Sign so that, if a next OTP is required, it can compare it to the OTP value returned by subsequent calls to C_Sign should it turn out that the library does not support the CKF_NEXT_OTP flag.

Bit flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME	0x00000002	True (i.e. set) if the OTP computation must not include a time value. Will have an effect only on mechanisms that do include a time value in the OTP computation and then only if the mechanism (and token) allows exclusion of this value. A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if exclusion of the value is not allowed.
CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER	0x00000004	True (i.e. set) if the OTP computation must not include a counter value. Will have an effect only on mechanisms that do include a counter value in the OTP computation and then only if the mechanism (and token) allows exclusion of this value. A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if exclusion of the value is not allowed.
CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE	0x00000008	True (i.e. set) if the OTP computation must not include a challenge. Will have an effect only on mechanisms that do include a challenge in the OTP computation and then only if the mechanism (and token) allows exclusion of this value. A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if exclusion of the value is not allowed.
CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN	0x00000010	True (i.e. set) if the OTP computation must not include a PIN value. Will have an effect only on mechanisms that do include a PIN in the OTP computation and then only if the mechanism (and token) allows exclusion of this value. A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if exclusion of the value is not allowed.
CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP	0x00000020	True (i.e. set) if the OTP returned shall be in a form suitable for human consumption. If this flag is set, and the call is successful, then the returned CK_OTP_VALUE shall be a UTF8-encoded printable string. A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if this flag is set when CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE for the key in question is CK_FALSE.

Note: Even if CKA_OTP_FORMAT is not set to CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY, then there may still be value in setting the CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP flag (assuming CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE is CK_TRUE, of course) if the intent is for a human to read the generated OTP value, since it may become shorter or otherwise better suited for a user. Applications that do not intend to provide a returned OTP value to a user should not set the CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP flag.

♦ CK_OTP_PARAM; CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR

CK_OTP_PARAM is a structure that includes the type, value, and length of an OTP parameter. It is defined as follows:


```
typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM {
   CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type;
   CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
   CK_ULONG ulValueLen;
} CK_OTP_PARAM;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

type	the parameter type
pValue	pointer to the value of the parameter
ulValueLen	length in bytes of the value

If a parameter has no value, then *ulValueLen* = 0, and the value of *pValue* is irrelevant. Note that *pValue* is a "void" pointer, facilitating the passing of arbitrary values. Both the application and the Cryptoki library must ensure that the pointer can be safely cast to the expected type (*i.e.*, without word-alignment errors).

CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_OTP_PARAM**.

♦ CK_OTP_PARAMS; CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR

CK_OTP_PARAMS is a structure that is used to provide parameters for OTP mechanisms in a generic fashion. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS {
   CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
   CK_ULONG ulCount;
} CK_OTP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pParams	pointer to an array of OTP parameters
ulCount	the number of parameters in the array

CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_OTP_PARAMS**.

When calling C_SignInit or C_VerifyInit with a mechanism that takes a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure as a parameter, the **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure shall be populated in accordance with the **CKA_OTP_*X*_REQUIREMENT** key attributes for the identified key, where *X* is PIN, CHALLENGE, TIME, or COUNTER.

For example, if CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT = CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY, then the CK_OTP_TIME parameter shall be present. If CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT = CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL, then a CK_OTP_TIME parameter may be present. If it is not present, then the library may collect it (during the C_Sign call). If CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT = CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED, then a provided CK_OTP_TIME parameter will always be ignored. Additionally, a provided CK_OTP_TIME parameter will always be ignored if CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME is set in a CK_OTP_FLAGS parameter. Similarly, if this flag is set, a library will not attempt to collect the value itself, and it will also instruct the token not to make use of any internal value, subject to token policies. It is an error (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID) to set the CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME flag when the CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT attribute is CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY.

The above discussion holds for all CKA_OTP_*X*_REQUIREMENT attributes (*i.e.*, CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT, CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT, CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT, CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT). A library may set a particular CKA_OTP_*X*_REQUIREMENT attribute to CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL even if it is required by the mechanism as long as the token (or the library itself) has the capability of providing the value to the computation. One example of this is a token with an on-board clock.

In addition, applications may use the CK_OTP_FLAGS, the CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT and the CKA_OTP_LENGTH parameters to set additional parameters.

♦ CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO, CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR

CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO is a structure that is returned by all OTP mechanisms in successful calls to **C_Sign** (**C_SignFinal**). The structure informs applications of actual parameter values used in particular OTP computations in addition to the OTP value itself. It is used by all mechanisms for which the key belongs to the class CKO_OTP_KEY and is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO {
   CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
   CK_ULONG ulCount;
} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pParams	pointer to an array of OTP parameter values
ulCount	the number of parameters in the array

After successful calls to **C_Sign** or **C_SignFinal** with an OTP mechanism, the *pSignature* parameter will be set to point to a **CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO** structure. One of the parameters in this structure will be the OTP value itself, identified with the **CK_OTP_VALUE** tag. Other parameters may be present for informational purposes, e.g. the actual time used in the OTP calculation. In order to simplify OTP validations, authentication protocols may permit authenticating parties to send some or all of these parameters in addition to OTP values themselves. Applications should therefore check for their presence in returned **CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO** values whenever such circumstances apply.

Since **C_Sign** and **C_SignFinal** follows the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output, a call to **C_Sign** (or **C_SignFinal**) with *pSignature* set to NULL_PTR will return (in the *pulSignatureLen* parameter) the required number of bytes to hold the **CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO** structure as well as all the data in all its **CK_OTP_PARAM** components. If an application allocates a memory block based on this information, it shall therefore not subsequently de-allocate components of such a received value but rather de-allocate the complete **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure itself. A Cryptoki library that is called with a non-NULL *pSignature* pointer will assume that it points to a *contiguous* memory block of the size indicated by the *pulSignatureLen* parameter.

When verifying an OTP value using an OTP mechanism, *pSignature* shall be set to the OTP value itself, e.g. the value of the **CK_OTP_VALUE** component of a **CK_OTP_PARAM** structure returned by a call to **C_Sign**. The **CK_OTP_PARAM** value supplied in the **C_VerifyInit** call sets the values to use in the verification operation.

CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR points to a **CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO.**

6.53.8 RSA SecurID

6.53.8.1 RSA SecurID secret key objects

RSA SecurID secret key objects (object class **CKO_OTP_KEY,** key type **CKK_SECURID**) hold RSA SecurID secret keys. The following table defines the RSA SecurID secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 229, RSA SecurID secret key object attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL[1]	CK_ULONG	Interval between OTP values produced with this key, in seconds. Default is 60.

[1] Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an RSA SecurID secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_OTP_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_SECURID;
CK_DATE endDate = {...};
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "RSA SecurID secret key object";
CK_BYTE keyId[]= {...};
CK_ULONG outputFormat = CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL;
CK_ULONG outputLength = 6;
CK_ULONG needPIN = CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY;
CK_ULONG timeInterval = 60;
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
   CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
   {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
   {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
   {CKA_END_DATE, &endDate, sizeof(endDate)},
   {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
   {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_ID, keyId, sizeof(keyId)},
   {CKA_OTP_FORMAT, &outputFormat, sizeof(outputFormat)},
   {CKA_OTP_LENGTH, &outputLength, sizeof(outputLength)},
   {CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT, &needPIN, sizeof(needPIN)},
   {CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL, &timeInterval,
        sizeof(timeInterval)},
   {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.53.8.2 RSA SecurID key generation

The RSA SecurID key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for the RSA SecurID algorithm.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates RSA SecurID keys with a particular set of attributes as specified in the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes at least the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_VALUE_LEN**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the RSA SecurID key type may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of SecurID key sizes, in bytes.

6.53.8.3 SecurID OTP generation and validation

CKM_SECURID is the mechanism for the retrieval and verification of RSA SecurID OTP values.

The mechanism takes a pointer to a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure as a parameter.

When signing or verifying using the **CKM_SECURID** mechanism, *pData* shall be set to NULL_PTR and *ulDataLen* shall be set to 0.

6.53.8.4 Return values

Support for the CKM_SECURID mechanism extends the set of return values for C_Verify with the following values:

- CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE: The supplied OTP was not accepted and the library requests a new OTP computed using a new PIN. The new PIN is set through means out of scope for this document.
- CKR_NEXT_OTP: The supplied OTP was correct but indicated a larger than normal drift in the token's internal state (e.g. clock, counter). To ensure this was not due to a temporary problem, the application should provide the next one-time password to the library for verification.

6.53.9 OATH HOTP

6.53.9.1 OATH HOTP secret key objects

HOTP secret key objects (object class **CKO_OTP_KEY,** key type **CKK_HOTP**) hold generic secret keys and associated counter values.

The **CKA_OTP_COUNTER** value may be set at key generation; however, some tokens may set it to a fixed initial value. Depending on the token's security policy, this value may not be modified and/or may not be revealed if the object has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE or its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE.

For HOTP keys, the **CKA_OTP_COUNTER** value shall be an 8 bytes unsigned integer in big endian (i.e. network byte order) form. The same holds true for a **CK_OTP_COUNTER** value in a **CK_OTP_PARAM** structure.

The following is a sample template for creating a HOTP secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_OTP_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_HOTP;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "HOTP secret key object";
CK_BYTE keyId[]= {...};
CK_ULONG outputFormat = CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL;
CK_ULONG outputLength = 6;
CK_DATE endDate = {...};
CK_BYTE counterValue[8] = {0};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
   CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
   {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
   {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
   {CKA_END_DATE, &endDate, sizeof(endDate)},
   {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
   {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_ID, keyId, sizeof(keyId)},
   {CKA_OTP_FORMAT, &outputFormat, sizeof(outputFormat)},
   {CKA_OTP_LENGTH, &outputLength, sizeof(outputLength)},
   {CKA_OTP_COUNTER, counterValue, sizeof(counterValue)},
   {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.53.9.2 HOTP key generation

The HOTP key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for the HOTP algorithm.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates HOTP keys with a particular set of attributes as specified in the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes at least the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_OTP_COUNTER**, **CKA_VALUE** and **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the HOTP key type may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of HOTP key sizes, in bytes.

6.53.9.3 HOTP OTP generation and validation

CKM_HOTP is the mechanism for the retrieval and verification of HOTP OTP values based on the current internal counter, or a provided counter.

The mechanism takes a pointer to a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure as a parameter.

As for the **CKM_SECURID** mechanism, when signing or verifying using the **CKM_HOTP** mechanism, *pData* shall be set to NULL_PTR and *ulDataLen* shall be set to 0.

For verify operations, the counter value **CK_OTP_COUNTER** must be provided as a **CK_OTP_PARAM** parameter to **C_VerifyInit**. When verifying an OTP value using the **CKM_HOTP** mechanism, *pSignature* shall be set to the OTP value itself, e.g. the value of the **CK_OTP_VALUE** component of a **CK_OTP_PARAM** structure in the case of an earlier call to **C_Sign**.

6.53.10 ActivIdentity ACTI

6.53.10.1 ACTI secret key objects

ACTI secret key objects (object class **CKO_OTP_KEY,** key type **CKK_ACTI**) hold ActivIdentity ACTI secret keys.

For ACTI keys, the **CKA_OTP_COUNTER** value shall be an 8 bytes unsigned integer in big endian (i.e. network byte order) form. The same holds true for the **CK_OTP_COUNTER** value in the **CK_OTP_PARAM** structure.

The **CKA_OTP_COUNTER** value may be set at key generation; however, some tokens may set it to a fixed initial value. Depending on the token's security policy, this value may not be modified and/or may not be revealed if the object has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE or its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE.

The **CKA_OTP_TIME** value may be set at key generation; however, some tokens may set it to a fixed initial value. Depending on the token's security policy, this value may not be modified and/or may not be revealed if the object has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE or its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE.

The following is a sample template for creating an ACTI secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_OTP_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_ACTI;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "ACTI secret key object";
CK_BYTE keyId[]= {...};
CK_ULONG outputFormat = CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL;
CK_ULONG outputLength = 6;
CK_DATE endDate = {...};
CK_BYTE counterValue[8] = {0};
```

```
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
   {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
   {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
   {CKA_END_DATE, &endDate, sizeof(endDate)},
   {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
   {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)},
   {CKA_ID, keyId, sizeof(keyId)},
   {CKA_OTP_FORMAT, &outputFormat,
   sizeof(outputFormat)},
   {CKA_OTP_LENGTH, &outputLength,
   sizeof(outputLength)},
   {CKA_OTP_COUNTER, counterValue,
   sizeof(counterValue)},
   {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.53.10.2 ACTI key generation

The ACTI key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for the ACTI algorithm.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates ACTI keys with a particular set of attributes as specified in the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes at least the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_VALUE** and **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the ACTI key type may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ACTI key sizes, in bytes.

6.53.10.3 ACTI OTP generation and validation

CKM_ACTI is the mechanism for the retrieval and verification of ACTI OTP values.

The mechanism takes a pointer to a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure as a parameter.

When signing or verifying using the **CKM_ACTI** mechanism, *pData* shall be set to NULL_PTR and *ulDataLen* shall be set to 0.

When verifying an OTP value using the **CKM_ACTI** mechanism, *pSignature* shall be set to the OTP value itself, e.g. the value of the **CK_OTP_VALUE** component of a **CK_OTP_PARAM** structure in the case of an earlier call to **C_Sign**.

6.54 CT-KIP

6.54.1 Principles of Operation



Figure 5: PKCS #11 and CT-KIP integration

Figure 5 shows an integration of PKCS #11 into an application that generates cryptographic keys through the use of CT-KIP. The application invokes **C_DeriveKey** to derive a key of a particular type on the token. The key may subsequently be used as a basis to e.g., generate one-time password values. The application communicates with a CT-KIP server that participates in the key derivation and stores a copy of the key in its database. The key is transferred to the server in wrapped form, after a call to **C_WrapKey**. The server authenticates itself to the client and the client verifies the authentication by calls to **C_Verify**.

6.54.2 Mechanisms

The following table shows, for the mechanisms defined in this document, their support by different cryptographic operations. For any particular token, of course, a particular operation may well support only a subset of the mechanisms listed. There is also no guarantee that a token that supports one mechanism for some operation supports any other mechanism for any other operation (or even supports that same mechanism for any other operation).

Table 230: CT-KIP Mechanisms vs. applicable functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_KIP_DERIVE							✓
CKM_KIP_WRAP						✓	
CKM_KIP_MAC		✓					

The remainder of this section will present in detail the mechanisms and the parameters that are supplied to them.

6.54.3 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_KIP_DERIVE

CKM_KIP_WRAP

CKM_KIP_MAC

6.54.4 CT-KIP Mechanism parameters

♦ CK_KIP_PARAMS; CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR

CK_KIP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to all the CT-KIP related mechanisms: The **CKM_KIP_DERIVE** key derivation mechanism, the **CKM_KIP_WRAP** key wrap and key unwrap mechanism, and the **CKM_KIP_MAC** signature mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS {
   CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism;
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey;
   CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed;
   CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen;
} CK_KIP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pMechanism	pointer to the underlying cryptographic mechanism (e.g. AES, SHA-256)
hKey	handle to a key that will contribute to the entropy of the derived key (CKM_KIP_DERIVE) or will be used in the MAC operation (CKM_KIP_MAC)
pSeed	pointer to an input seed
ulSeedLen	length in bytes of the input seed

CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_KIP_PARAMS** structure.

6.54.5 CT-KIP key derivation

The CT-KIP key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_KIP_DERIVE**, is a key derivation mechanism that is capable of generating secret keys of potentially any type, subject to token limitations.

It takes a parameter of type **CK_KIP_PARAMS** which allows for the passing of the desired underlying cryptographic mechanism as well as some other data. In particular, when the *hKey* parameter is a handle

to an existing key, that key will be used in the key derivation in addition to the *hBaseKey* of **C_DeriveKey**. The *pSeed* parameter may be used to seed the key derivation operation.

The mechanism derives a secret key with a particular set of attributes as specified in the attributes of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the key type may be specified in the template for the key, or else will be assigned default initial values. Since the mechanism is generic, the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute should be set in the template, if the key is to be used with a particular mechanism.

6.54.6 CT-KIP key wrap and key unwrap

The CT-KIP key wrap and unwrap mechanism, denoted **CKM_KIP_WRAP**, is a key wrap mechanism that is capable of wrapping and unwrapping generic secret keys.

It takes a parameter of type **CK_KIP_PARAMS**, which allows for the passing of the desired underlying cryptographic mechanism as well as some other data. It does not make use of the *hKey* parameter of **CK_KIP_PARAMS**.

6.54.7 CT-KIP signature generation

The CT-KIP signature (MAC) mechanism, denoted **CKM_KIP_MAC**, is a mechanism used to produce a message authentication code of arbitrary length. The keys it uses are secret keys.

It takes a parameter of type **CK_KIP_PARAMS**, which allows for the passing of the desired underlying cryptographic mechanism as well as some other data. The mechanism does not make use of the *pSeed* and the *ulSeedLen* parameters of **CT_KIP_PARAMS**.

This mechanism produces a MAC of the length specified by *pulSignatureLen* parameter in calls to **C_Sign**.

If a call to **C_Sign** with this mechanism fails, then no output will be generated.

6.55 GOST 28147-89

GOST 28147-89 is a block cipher with 64-bit block size and 256-bit keys.

Table 231, GOST 28147-89 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_GOST28147_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_GOST28147_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_GOST28147	✓					✓	
CKM_GOST28147_MAC		✓					
CKM_GOST28147_KEY_WRAP						✓	

6.55.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_GOST28147” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects and domain parameter objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_GOST28147_KEY_GEN

CKM_GOST28147_ECB

CKM_GOST28147

CKM_GOST28147_MAC

CKM_GOST28147_KEY_WRAP

6.55.2 GOST 28147-89 secret key objects

GOST 28147-89 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY,** key type **CKK_GOST28147**) hold GOST 28147-89 keys. The following table defines the GOST 28147-89 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 232, GOST 28147-89 Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	32 bytes in little endian order
CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS[1,3,5]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST 28147-89. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOST28147 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating a GOST 28147-89 secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOST28147;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST 28147-89 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[32] = {...};
CK_BYTE params_oid[] = {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02,
        0x02, 0x1f, 0x00};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS, params_oid, sizeof(params_oid)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.55.3 GOST 28147-89 domain parameter objects

GOST 28147-89 domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS,** key type **CKK_GOST28147**) hold GOST 28147-89 domain parameters.

The following table defines the GOST 28147-89 domain parameter object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

13447 *Table 233, GOST 28147-89 Domain Parameter Object Attributes*

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the domain parameters as it was introduced in [4] section 8.1 (type *Gost28147-89-ParamSetParameters*)
CKA_OBJECT_ID[1]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the domain parameters

13448 - Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

13449 For any particular token, there is no guarantee that a token supports domain parameters loading up
13450 and/or fetching out. Furthermore, applications, that make direct use of domain parameters objects, should
13451 take in account that **CKA_VALUE** attribute may be inaccessible.

13452 The following is a sample template for creating a GOST 28147-89 domain parameter object:

```
13453    CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
13454    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOST28147;
13455    CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST 28147-89 cryptographic
13456            parameters object";
13457    CK_BYTE oid[] = {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02,
13458            0x1f, 0x00};
13459    CK_BYTE value[] = {
13460      0x30,0x62,0x04,0x40,0x4c,0xde,0x38,0x9c,0x29,0x89,0xef,0xb6,
13461      0xff,0xeb,0x56,0xc5,0x5e,0xc2,0x9b,0x02,0x98,0x75,0x61,0x3b,
13462      0x11,0x3f,0x89,0x60,0x03,0x97,0x0c,0x79,0x8a,0xa1,0xd5,0x5d,
13463      0xe2,0x10,0xad,0x43,0x37,0x5d,0xb3,0x8e,0xb4,0x2c,0x77,0xe7,
13464      0xcd,0x46,0xca,0xfa,0xd6,0x6a,0x20,0x1f,0x70,0xf4,0x1e,0xa4,
13465      0xab,0x03,0xf2,0x21,0x65,0xb8,0x44,0xd8,0x02,0x01,0x00,0x02,
13466      0x01,0x40,0x30,0x0b,0x06,0x07,0x2a,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x0e,
13467      0x00,0x05,0x00
13468    };
13469    CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
13470    CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
13471        {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
13472        {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
13473        {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
13474        {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
13475        {CKA_OBJECT_ID, oid, sizeof(oid)},
13476        {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
13477    };
```

13478 6.55.4 GOST 28147-89 key generation

13479 The GOST 28147-89 key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_GOST28147_KEY_GEN**, is a key
13480 generation mechanism for GOST 28147-89.

13481 It does not have a parameter.

13482 The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new
13483 key. Other attributes supported by the GOST 28147-89 key type may be specified for objects of object
13484 class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**.

13485 For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** are not
13486 used.

6.55.5 GOST 28147-89-ECB

GOST 28147-89-ECB, denoted **CKM_GOST28147_ECB**, is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on GOST 28147-89 and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports.

For wrapping (**C_WrapKey**), the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size.

For unwrapping (**C_UnwrapKey**), the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 234, GOST 28147-89-ECB: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_GOST28147	Multiple of block size	Same as input length
C_Decrypt	CKK_GOST28147	Multiple of block size	Same as input length
C_WrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of block size
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	Multiple of block size	Determined by type of key being unwrapped

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

6.55.6 GOST 28147-89 encryption mode except ECB

GOST 28147-89 encryption mode except ECB, denoted **CKM_GOST28147**, is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on [GOST 28147-89] and CFB, counter mode, and additional CBC mode defined in [RFC 4357] section 2. Encryption's parameters are specified in object identifier of attribute **CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS**.

It has a parameter, which is an 8-byte initialization vector. This parameter may be omitted then a zero initialization vector is used.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports.

For wrapping (**C_WrapKey**), the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped.

For unwrapping (**C_UnwrapKey**), the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 235, GOST 28147-89 encryption modes except ECB: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_GOST28147	Any	For counter mode and CFB is the same as input length. For CBC is the same as input length padded on the trailing end with up to block size so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	CKK_GOST28147	Any	
C_WrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	Any	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	Any	

13521

13522 For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure
13523 are not used.

13524 ## 6.55.7 GOST 28147-89-MAC

13525 GOST 28147-89-MAC, denoted **CKM_GOST28147_MAC**, is a mechanism for data integrity and
13526 authentication based on GOST 28147-89 and key meshing algorithms [RFC 4357] section 2.3.

13527 MACing parameters are specified in object identifier of attribute **CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS**.

13528 The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final GOST 28147-89 cipher block
13529 produced in the MACing process.

13530 It has a parameter, which is an 8-byte MAC initialization vector. This parameter may be omitted then a
13531 zero initialization vector is used.

13532 Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

13533 *Table 236, GOST28147-89-MAC: Key and Data Length*

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_GOST28147	Any	4 bytes
C_Verify	CKK_GOST28147	Any	4 bytes

13534

13535 For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure
13536 are not used.
13537

13538 ## 6.55.8 GOST 28147-89 keys wrapping/unwrapping with GOST 28147-89

13539 GOST 28147-89 keys as a KEK (key encryption keys) for encryption GOST 28147-89 keys, denoted by
13540 **CKM_GOST28147_KEY_WRAP**, is a mechanism for key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on
13541 GOST 28147-89. Its purpose is to encrypt and decrypt keys have been generated by key generation
13542 mechanism for GOST 28147-89.

13543 For wrapping (**C_WrapKey**), the mechanism first computes MAC from the value of the **CKA_VALUE**
13544 attribute of the key that is wrapped and then encrypts in ECB mode the value of the **CKA_VALUE**
13545 attribute of the key that is wrapped. The result is 32 bytes of the key that is wrapped and 4 bytes of MAC.

13546 For unwrapping (**C_UnwrapKey**), the mechanism first decrypts in ECB mode the 32 bytes of the key that
13547 was wrapped and then computes MAC from the unwrapped key. Then compared together 4 bytes MAC
13548 has computed and 4 bytes MAC of the input. If these two MACs do not match the wrapped key is
13549 disallowed. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the unwrapped key.

13550 It has a parameter, which is an 8-byte MAC initialization vector. This parameter may be omitted then a
13551 zero initialization vector is used.

13552 Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 237, GOST 28147-89 keys as KEK: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_WrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	32 bytes	36 bytes
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	32 bytes	36 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

6.56 GOST R 34.11-94

GOST R 34.11-94 is a mechanism for message digesting, following the hash algorithm with 256-bit message digest defined in [GOST R 34.11-94].

Table 238, GOST R 34.11-94 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_GOSTR3411				✓			
CKM_GOSTR3411_HMAC		✓					

6.56.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_GOSTR3411” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of domain parameter objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_GOSTR3411

CKM_GOSTR3411_HMAC

6.56.2 GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameter objects

GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS,** key type **CKK_GOSTR3411**) hold GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameters.

The following table defines the GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameter object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 239, GOST R 34.11-94 Domain Parameter Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the domain parameters as it was introduced in [4] section 8.2 (type *GostR3411-94-ParamSetParameters*)
CKA_OBJECT_ID[1]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the domain parameters

[1] Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

For any particular token, there is no guarantee that a token supports domain parameters loading up and/or fetching out. Furthermore, applications, that make direct use of domain parameters objects, should take in account that **CKA_VALUE** attribute may be inaccessible.

The following is a sample template for creating a GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameter object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOSTR3411;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST R34.11-94 cryptographic
        parameters object";
CK_BYTE oid[] = {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02,
        0x1e, 0x00};
CK_BYTE value[] = {
  0x30,0x64,0x04,0x40,0x4e,0x57,0x64,0xd1,0xab,0x8d,0xcb,0xbf,
  0x94,0x1a,0x7a,0x4d,0x2c,0xd1,0x10,0x10,0xd6,0xa0,0x57,0x35,
  0x8d,0x38,0xf2,0xf7,0x0f,0x49,0xd1,0x5a,0xea,0x2f,0x8d,0x94,
  0x62,0xee,0x43,0x09,0xb3,0xf4,0xa6,0xa2,0x18,0xc6,0x98,0xe3,
  0xc1,0x7c,0xe5,0x7e,0x70,0x6b,0x09,0x66,0xf7,0x02,0x3c,0x8b,
  0x55,0x95,0xbf,0x28,0x39,0xb3,0x2e,0xcc,0x04,0x20,0x00,0x00,
  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00
};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_OBJECT_ID, oid, sizeof(oid)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.56.3 GOST R 34.11-94 digest

GOST R 34.11-94 digest, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3411,** is a mechanism for message digesting based on GOST R 34.11-94 hash algorithm [GOST R 34.11-94].

As a parameter this mechanism utilizes a DER-encoding of the object identifier. A mechanism parameter may be missed then parameters of the object identifier *id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet* [RFC 4357] (section 11.2) must be used.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 240, GOST R 34.11-94: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	Any	32 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

6.56.4 GOST R 34.11-94 HMAC

GOST R 34.11-94 HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3411_HMAC**, is a mechanism for signatures and verification. It uses the HMAC construction, based on the GOST R 34.11-94 hash function [GOST R 34.11-94] and core HMAC algorithm [RFC 2104]. The keys it uses are of generic key type **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET** or **CKK_GOST28147**.

To be conformed to GOST R 34.11-94 hash algorithm [GOST R 34.11-94] the block length of core HMAC algorithm is 32 bytes long (see [RFC 2104] section 2, and [RFC 4357] section 3).

As a parameter this mechanism utilizes a DER-encoding of the object identifier. A mechanism parameter may be missed then parameters of the object identifier *id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet* [RFC 4357] (section 11.2) must be used.

Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism are of 32 bytes long.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

Table 241, GOST R 34.11-94 HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_GENERIC_SECRET or CKK_GOST28147	Any	32 byte
C_Verify	CKK_GENERIC_SECRET or CKK_GOST28147	Any	32 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

6.57 GOST R 34.10-2001

GOST R 34.10-2001 is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, following the digital signature algorithm defined in [GOST R 34.10-2001].

Table 242, GOST R34.10-2001 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_GOSTR3410		✓[1]					
CKM_GOSTR3410_WITH_GOSTR3411		✓					
CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP						✓	
CKM_GOSTR3410_DERIVE							✓

1 Single-part operations only

6.57.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_GOSTR3410” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects and domain parameter objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_PAIR_GEN
CKM_GOSTR3410
CKM_GOSTR3410_WITH_GOSTR3411
CKM_GOSTR3410
CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP
CKM_GOSTR3410_DERIVE

6.57.2 GOST R 34.10-2001 public key objects

GOST R 34.10-2001 public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,** key type **CKK_GOSTR3410**) hold GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys.

The following table defines the GOST R 34.10-2001 public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 243, GOST R 34.10-2001 Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4]	Byte array	64 bytes for public key; 32 bytes for each coordinates X and Y of Elliptic Curve point P(X, Y) in little endian order
CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS[1,3]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST R 34.10-2001. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOSTR3410 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID
CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS[1,3,8]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST R 34.11-94. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOSTR3411 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID
CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS[8]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST 28147-89. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOST28147 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID. The attribute value may be omitted

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an GOST R 34.10-2001 public key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOSTR3410;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST R34.10-2001 public key object";
CK_BYTE gostR3410params_oid[] =
   {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x23, 0x00};
CK_BYTE gostR3411params_oid[] =
```

```
      {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x00};
CK_BYTE gost28147params_oid[] =
      {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x1f, 0x00};
CK_BYTE value[64] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS, gostR3410params_oid,
        sizeof(gostR3410params_oid)},
    {CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS, gostR3411params_oid,
        sizeof(gostR3411params_oid)},
    {CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS, gost28147params_oid,
        sizeof(gost28147params_oid)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.57.3 GOST R 34.10-2001 private key objects

GOST R 34.10-2001 private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,** key type **CKK_GOSTR3410**) hold GOST R 34.10-2001 private keys.

The following table defines the GOST R 34.10-2001 private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 244, GOST R 34.10-2001 Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	32 bytes for private key in little endian order
CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS[1,4,6]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST R 34.10-2001. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOSTR3410 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID
CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS[1,4,6,8]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST R 34.11-94. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOSTR3411 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID
CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS[4,6,8]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST 28147-89.

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
		When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOST28147 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID. The attribute value may be omitted

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

Note that when generating an GOST R 34.10-2001 private key, the GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameters are *not* specified in the key's template. This is because GOST R 34.10-2001 private keys are only generated as part of an GOST R 34.10-2001 key *pair*, and the GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the GOST R 34.10-2001 public key.

The following is a sample template for creating an GOST R 34.10-2001 private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOSTR3410;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST R34.10-2001 private key
        object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE gostR3410params_oid[] =
   {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x23, 0x00};
CK_BYTE gostR3411params_oid[] =
   {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x00};
CK_BYTE gost28147params_oid[] =
   {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x1f, 0x00};
CK_BYTE value[32] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS, gostR3410params_oid,
        sizeof(gostR3410params_oid)},
    {CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS, gostR3411params_oid,
        sizeof(gostR3411params_oid)},
    {CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS, gost28147params_oid,
        sizeof(gost28147params_oid)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```


6.57.4 GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameter objects

GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS,** key type **CKK_GOSTR3410**) hold GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameters.

The following table defines the GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameter object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 245, GOST R 34.10-2001 Domain Parameter Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the domain parameters as it was introduced in [4] section 8.4 (type *GostR3410-2001-ParamSetParameters*)
CKA_OBJECT_ID[1]	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the domain parameters

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

For any particular token, there is no guarantee that a token supports domain parameters loading up and/or fetching out. Furthermore, applications, that make direct use of domain parameters objects, should take in account that **CKA_VALUE** attribute may be inaccessible.

The following is a sample template for creating a GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameter object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOSTR3410;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST R34.10-2001 cryptographic
        parameters object";
CK_BYTE oid[] =
  {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x23, 0x00};
CK_BYTE value[] = {
  0x30,0x81,0x90,0x02,0x01,0x07,0x02,0x20,0x5f,0xbf,0xf4,0x98,
  0xaa,0x93,0x8c,0xe7,0x39,0xb8,0xe0,0x22,0xfb,0xaf,0xef,0x40,
  0x56,0x3f,0x6e,0x6a,0x34,0x72,0xfc,0x2a,0x51,0x4c,0x0c,0xe9,
  0xda,0xe2,0x3b,0x7e,0x02,0x21,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
  0x00,0x04,0x31,0x02,0x21,0x00,0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x50,0xfe,
  0x8a,0x18,0x92,0x97,0x61,0x54,0xc5,0x9c,0xfc,0x19,0x3a,0xcc,
  0xf5,0xb3,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x08,0xe2,0xa8,0xa0,0xe6,
  0x51,0x47,0xd4,0xbd,0x63,0x16,0x03,0x0e,0x16,0xd1,0x9c,0x85,
  0xc9,0x7f,0x0a,0x9c,0xa2,0x67,0x12,0x2b,0x96,0xab,0xbc,0xea,
  0x7e,0x8f,0xc8
};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_OBJECT_ID, oid, sizeof(oid)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.57.5 GOST R 34.10-2001 mechanism parameters

♦ CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS

CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS {
        CK_BYTE_PTR      pWrapOID;
        CK_ULONG         ulWrapOIDLen;
        CK_BYTE_PTR      pUKM;
        CK_ULONG         ulUKMLen;
        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
} CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pWrapOID	pointer to a data with DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST 28147-89. If pointer takes NULL_PTR value in C_WrapKey operation then parameters are specified in object identifier of attribute CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS must be used. For C_UnwrapKey operation the pointer is not used and must take NULL_PTR value anytime
ulWrapOIDLen	length of data with DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST 28147-89
pUKM	pointer to a data with UKM. If pointer takes NULL_PTR value in C_WrapKey operation then random value of UKM will be used. If pointer takes non-NULL_PTR value in C_UnwrapKey operation then the pointer value will be compared with UKM value of wrapped key. If these two values do not match the wrapped key will be rejected
ulUKMLen	length of UKM data. If *pUKM*-pointer is different from NULL_PTR then equal to 8
hKey	key handle. Key handle of a sender for C_WrapKey operation. Key handle of a receiver for C_UnwrapKey operation. When key handle takes CK_INVALID_HANDLE value then an ephemeral (one time) key pair of a sender will be used

CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS.

♦ CK_GOSTR3410_DERIVE_PARAMS

CK_GOSTR3410_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_GOSTR3410_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_GOSTR3410_DERIVE_PARAMS {
  CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
  CK_BYTE_PTR    pPublicData;
  CK_ULONG       ulPublicDataLen;
```

```
  CK_BYTE_PTR    pUKM;
  CK_ULONG       ulUKMLen;
} CK_GOSTR3410_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

kdf	additional key diversification algorithm identifier. Possible values are CKD_NULL and CKD_CPDIVERSIFY_KDF. In case of CKD_NULL, result of the key derivation function described in [RFC 4357], section 5.2 is used directly; In case of CKD_CPDIVERSIFY_KDF, the resulting key value is additionally processed with algorithm from [RFC 4357], section 6.5.
pPublicData[1]	pointer to data with public key of a receiver
ulPublicDataLen	length of data with public key of a receiver (must be 64)
pUKM	pointer to a UKM data
ulUKMLen	length of UKM data in bytes (must be 8)

1 Public key of a receiver is an octet string of 64 bytes long. The public key octets correspond to the concatenation of X and Y coordinates of a point. Any one of them is 32 bytes long and represented in little endian order.

CK_GOSTR3410_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_GOSTR3410_DERIVE_PARAMS.

6.57.6 GOST R 34.10-2001 key pair generation

The GOST R 34.10-2001 key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism for GOST R 34.10-2001.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates GOST R 34.10-2001 public/private key pairs with particular GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameters, as specified in the **CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS**, **CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS**, and **CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS** attributes of the template for the public key. Note that **CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS** attribute may not be present in the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_VALUE**, and **CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS**, **CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS**, **CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS** attributes to the new private key.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

6.57.7 GOST R 34.10-2001 without hashing

The GOST R 34.10-2001 without hashing mechanism, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3410**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification for GOST R 34.10-2001. (This mechanism corresponds only to the part of GOST R 34.10-2001 that processes the 32-bytes hash value; it does not compute the hash value.)

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

For the purposes of these mechanisms, a GOST R 34.10-2001 signature is an octet string of 64 bytes long. The signature octets correspond to the concatenation of the GOST R 34.10-2001 values *s* and *r'*, both represented as a 32 bytes octet string in big endian order with the most significant byte first [RFC 4490] section 3.2, and [RFC 4491] section 2.2.2.

The input for the mechanism is an octet string of 32 bytes long with digest has computed by means of GOST R 34.11-94 hash algorithm in the context of signed or should be signed message.

Table 246, GOST R 34.10-2001 without hashing: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign[1]	CKK_GOSTR3410	32 bytes	64 bytes
C_Verify[1]	CKK_GOSTR3410	32 bytes	64 bytes

1 Single-part operations only.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

6.57.8 GOST R 34.10-2001 with GOST R 34.11-94

The GOST R 34.10-2001 with GOST R 34.11-94, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3410_WITH_GOSTR3411**, is a mechanism for signatures and verification for GOST R 34.10-2001. This mechanism computes the entire GOST R 34.10-2001 specification, including the hashing with GOST R 34.11-94 hash algorithm.

As a parameter this mechanism utilizes a DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating GOST R 34.11-94 data object type. A mechanism parameter may be missed then parameters are specified in object identifier of attribute **CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS** must be used.

For the purposes of these mechanisms, a GOST R 34.10-2001 signature is an octet string of 64 bytes long. The signature octets correspond to the concatenation of the GOST R 34.10-2001 values *s* and *r'*, both represented as a 32 bytes octet string in big endian order with the most significant byte first [RFC 4490] section 3.2, and [RFC 4491] section 2.2.2.

The input for the mechanism is signed or should be signed message of any length. Single- and multiple-part signature operations are available.

Table 247, GOST R 34.10-2001 with GOST R 34.11-94: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	CKK_GOSTR3410	Any	64 bytes
C_Verify	CKK_GOSTR3410	Any	64 bytes

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure are not used.

6.57.9 GOST 28147-89 keys wrapping/unwrapping with GOST R 34.10-2001

GOST R 34.10-2001 keys as a KEK (key encryption keys) for encryption GOST 28147 keys, denoted by **CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP**, is a mechanism for key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on GOST R 34.10-2001. Its purpose is to encrypt and decrypt keys have been generated by key generation mechanism for GOST 28147-89. An encryption algorithm from [RFC 4490] (section 5.2) must be used. Encrypted key is a DER-encoded structure of ASN.1 *GostR3410-KeyTransport* type [RFC 4490] section 4.2.

It has a parameter, a **CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS** structure defined in section 6.57.5.

For unwrapping (**C_UnwrapKey**), the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

6.57.10 Common key derivation with assistance of GOST R 34.10-2001 keys

Common key derivation, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3410_DERIVE,** is a mechanism for key derivation with assistance of GOST R 34.10-2001 private and public keys. The key of the mechanism must be of object

class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS** and key type **CKK_GOSTR3410**. An algorithm for key derivation from [RFC 4357] (section 5.2) must be used.

The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new private key. All other attributes must be specified in a template for creating private key object.

6.58 ChaCha20

ChaCha20 is a secret-key stream cipher described in **[CHACHA].**

Table 248, ChaCha20 Mechanisms vs. Functions

	Functions						
Mechanism	**Encrypt & Decrypt**	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR** [1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_CHACHA20	✓					✓	

6.58.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_CHACHA20” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN

CKM_CHACHA20

6.58.2 ChaCha20 secret key objects

ChaCha20 secret key objects (object class CKO_SECRET_KEY, key type CKK_CHACHA20) hold ChaCha20 keys. The following table defines the ChaCha20 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 249, ChaCha20 Secret Key Object

Attribute	**Data type**	**Meaning**
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key length is fixed at 256 bits. Bit length restricted to a byte array.
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

The following is a sample template for creating a ChaCha20 secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_CHACHA20;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = “A ChaCha20 secret key object”;
CK_BYTE value[32] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
```

```
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of the SHA-1 hash of the ChaCha20 secret key object's CKA_VALUE attribute.

6.58.3 ChaCha20 mechanism parameters

♦ CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS; CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS_PTR

CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS provides the parameters to the **CKM_CHACHA20** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS {
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pBlockCounter;
   CK_ULONG      blockCounterBits;
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pNonce;
   CK_ULONG      ulNonceBits;
} CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pBlockCounter	*pointer to block counter*
ulblockCounterBits	*length of block counter in bits (can be either 32 or 64)*
pNonce	*nonce (This should be never re-used with the same key.)*
ulNonceBits	*length of nonce in bits (is 64 for original, 96 for IETF and 192 for xchacha20 variant)*

The block counter is used to address 512 bit blocks in the stream. In certain settings (e.g. disk encryption) it is necessary to address these blocks in random order, thus this counter is exposed here.

CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to **CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS.**

6.58.4 ChaCha20 key generation

The ChaCha20 key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for ChaCha20.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates ChaCha20 keys of 256 bits.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes in bytes. As a practical matter, the key size for ChaCha20 is fixed at 256 bits.

6.58.5 ChaCha20 mechanism

ChaCha20, denoted **CKM_CHACHA20**, is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption based on the ChaCha20 stream cipher. It comes in 3 variants, which only differ in the size and handling of their nonces, affecting the safety of using random nonces and the maximum size that can be encrypted safely.

13930 Chacha20 has a parameter, **CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS**, which indicates the nonce and initial block
13931 counter value.

13932 Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

13933 *Table 250, ChaCha20: Key and Data Length*

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	ChaCha20	Any / only up to 256 GB in case of IETF variant	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	ChaCha20	Any / only up to 256 GB in case of IETF variant	Same as input length	No final part

13934 For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure
13935 specify the supported range of ChaCha20 key sizes, in bits.

13936 *Table 251, ChaCha20: Nonce and block counter lengths*

Variant	Nonce	Block counter	Maximum message	Nonce generation
original	64 bit	64 bit	Virtually unlimited	1st msg: $nonce_0$=random nth msg: $nonce_{n-1}$++
IETF	96 bit	32 bit	Max ~256 GB	1st msg: $nonce_0$=random nth msg: $nonce_{n-1}$++
XChaCha20	192 bit	64 bit	Virtually unlimited	Each nonce can be randomly generated.

13937 Nonces must not ever be reused with the same key. However due to the birthday paradox the first two
13938 variants cannot guarantee that randomly generated nonces are never repeating. Thus the recommended
13939 way to handle this is to generate the first nonce randomly, then increase this for follow-up messages.
13940 Only the last (XChaCha20) has large enough nonces so that it is virtually impossible to trigger with
13941 randomly generated nonces the birthday paradox.

13942 6.59 Salsa20

13943 Salsa20 is a secret-key stream cipher described in **[SALSA].**

13944 *Table 252, Salsa20 Mechanisms vs. Functions*

	Functions						
Mechanism	**Encrypt & Decrypt**	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR** [1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_SALSA20_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_SALSA20	✓					✓	

6.59.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_SALSA20” and “CKK_SALSA20” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_SALSA20_KEY_GEN

CKM_SALSA20

6.59.2 Salsa20 secret key objects

Salsa20 secret key objects (object class CKO_SECRET_KEY, key type CKK_SALSA20) hold Salsa20 keys. The following table defines the Salsa20 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 253, ChaCha20 Secret Key Object

Attribute	**Data type**	**Meaning**
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key length is fixed at 256 bits. Bit length restricted to a byte array.
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

The following is a sample template for creating a Salsa20 secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_SALSA20;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = “A Salsa20 secret key object”;
CK_BYTE value[32] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of the SHA-1 hash of the ChaCha20 secret key object’s CKA_VALUE attribute.

6.59.3 Salsa20 mechanism parameters

♦ CK_SALSA20_PARAMS; CK_SALSA20_PARAMS_PTR

CK_SALSA20_PARAMS provides the parameters to the **CKM_SALSA20** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SALSA20_PARAMS {
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pBlockCounter;
   CK_BYTE_PTR   pNonce;
   CK_ULONG      ulNonceBits;
} CK_SALSA20_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pBlockCounter	*pointer to block counter (64 bits)*
pNonce	*nonce*
ulNonceBits	*size of the nonce in bits (64 for classic and 192 for XSalsa20)*

The block counter is used to address 512 bit blocks in the stream. In certain settings (e.g. disk encryption) it is necessary to address these blocks in random order, thus this counter is exposed here.

CK_SALSA20_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to **CK_SALSA20_PARAMS.**

6.59.4 Salsa20 key generation

The Salsa20 key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SALSA20_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for Salsa20.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Salsa20 keys of 256 bits.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes in bytes. As a practical matter, the key size for Salsa20 is fixed at 256 bits.

6.59.5 Salsa20 mechanism

Salsa20, denoted **CKM_SALSA20**, is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption based on the Salsa20 stream cipher. Salsa20 comes in two variants which only differ in the size and handling of their nonces, affecting the safety of using random nonces.

Salsa20 has a parameter, **CK_SALSA20_PARAMS**, which indicates the nonce and initial block counter value.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

Table 254, Salsa20: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	Salsa20	Any	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	Salsa20	Any	Same as input length	No final part

14009 For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure
14010 specify the supported range of ChaCha20 key sizes, in bits.

14011 *Table 255, Salsa20: Nonce sizes*

Variant	Nonce	Maximum message	Nonce generation
original	64 bit	Virtually unlimited	1st msg: $nonce_0$=random nth msg: $nonce_{n-1}$++
XSalsa20	192 bit	Virtually unlimited	Each nonce can be randomly generated.

14012 Nonces must not ever be reused with the same key. However due to the birthday paradox the original
14013 variant cannot guarantee that randomly generated nonces are never repeating. Thus the recommended
14014 way to handle this is to generate the first nonce randomly, then increase this for follow-up messages.
14015 Only the XSalsa20 has large enough nonces so that it is virtually impossible to trigger with randomly
14016 generated nonces the birthday paradox.

14017 6.60 Poly1305

14018 Poly1305 is a message authentication code designed by D.J Bernsterin **[POLY1305].** Poly1305 takes a
14019 256 bit key and a message and produces a 128 bit tag that is used to verify the message.

14020 *Table 256, Poly1305 Mechanisms vs. Functions*

	Functions						
Mechanism	**Encrypt & Decrypt**	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR** [1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_POLY1305_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_POLY1305		✓					

14021 6.60.1 Definitions

14022 This section defines the key type “CKK_POLY1305” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the
14023 CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

14024 Mechanisms:

14025 CKM_POLY1305_KEY_GEN

14026 CKM_POLY1305

14027 6.60.2 Poly1305 secret key objects

14028 Poly1305 secret key objects (object class CKO_SECRET_KEY, key type CKK_POLY1305) hold
14029 Poly1305 keys. The following table defines the Poly1305 secret key object attributes, in addition to the
14030 common attributes defined for this object class:

14031 *Table 257, Poly1305 Secret Key Object*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Key length is fixed at 256 bits. Bit length restricted to a byte array.
CKA_VALUE_LEN[2,3]	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

The following is a sample template for creating a Poly1305 secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_POLY1305;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A Poly1305 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[32] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
  {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
  {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
  {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
  {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
  {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

6.60.3 Poly1305 mechanism

Poly1305, denoted **CKM_POLY1305**, is a mechanism for producing an output tag based on a 256 bit key and arbitrary length input.

It has no parameters.

Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be fixed at 128 bits in size.

Table 258, Poly1305: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature Length
C_Sign	Poly1305	Any	128 bits
C_Verify	Poly1305	Any	128 bits

6.61 Chacha20/Poly1305 and Salsa20/Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption / Decryption

The stream ciphers Salsa20 and ChaCha20 are normally used in conjunction with the Poly1305 authenticator, in such a construction they also provide Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). This section defines the combined mechanisms and their usage in an AEAD setting.

Table 259, Poly1305 Mechanisms vs. Functions

	Functions						
Mechanism	**Encrypt & Decrypt**	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR** [1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305	✓						
CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305	✓						

6.61.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305

CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305

6.61.2 Usage

Generic ChaCha20, Salsa20, Poly1305 modes are described in [CHACHA], [SALSA] and [POLY1305]. To set up for ChaCha20/Poly1305 or Salsa20/Poly1305 use the following process. ChaCha20/Poly1305 and Salsa20/Poly1305 both use CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS for Encrypt, Decrypt and CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS for MessageEncrypt, and MessageDecrypt.

Encrypt:

- Set the Nonce length *ulNonceLen* in the parameter block. (this affects which variant of Chacha20 will be used: 64 bits → original, 96 bits → IETF, 192 bits → XChaCha20)
- Set the Nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD m*ay be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Call C_EncryptInit() for **CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305** or **CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C_Encrypt(), or C_EncryptUpdate()*[10] C_EncryptFinal(), for the plaintext obtaining ciphertext and authentication tag output.

Decrypt:

- Set the Nonce length *ulNonceLen* in the parameter block. (this affects which variant of Chacha20 will be used: 64 bits → original, 96 bits → IETF, 192 bits → XChaCha20)
- Set the Nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD m*ay be NULL if ulAADLen is 0.
- Call C_DecryptInit() for **CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305** or **CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C_Decrypt(), or C_DecryptUpdate()*[1] C_DecryptFinal(), for the ciphertext, including the appended tag, obtaining plaintext output. Note: since **CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305** and **CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305** are AEAD ciphers, no data should be returned until C_Decrypt() or C_DecryptFinal().

10 "*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

MessageEncrypt::

- Set the Nonce length *ulNonceLen* in the parameter block. (this affects which variant of Chacha20 will be used: 64 bits → original, 96 bits → IETF, 192 bits → XChaCha20)
- Set the Nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block.
- Set pTag to hold the tag data returned from C_EncryptMessage() or the final C_EncryptMessageNext().
- Call C_MessageEncryptInit() for **CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305** or **CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305** mechanism with key *K*.
- Call C_EncryptMessage(), or C_EncryptMessageBegin followed by C_EncryptMessageNext()*[11]. The mechanism parameter is passed to all three of these functions.
- Call C_MessageEncryptFinal() to close the message decryption.

MessageDecrypt:

- Set the Nonce length *ulNonceLen* in the parameter block. (this affects which variant of Chacha20 will be used: 64 bits → original, 96 bits → IETF, 192 bits → XChaCha20)
- Set the Nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block.
- Set the tag data pTag in the parameter block before C_DecryptMessage or the final C_DecryptMessageNext()
- Call C_MessageDecryptInit() for **CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305** or **CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305** mechanism with key *K*.
- Call C_DecryptMessage(), or C_DecryptMessageBegin followed by C_DecryptMessageNext()*[12]. The mechanism parameter is passed to all three of these functions.
- Call C_MessageDecryptFinal() to close the message decryption

ulNonceLen is the length of the nonce in bits.

In Encrypt and Decrypt the tag is appended to the cipher text. In MessageEncrypt the tag is returned in the pTag filed of CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS. In MesssageDecrypt the tag is provided by the pTag field of CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS. The application must provide 16 bytes of space for the tag.

The key type for *K* must be compatible with **CKM_CHACHA20** or **CKM_SALSA20** respectively and the C_EncryptInit/C_DecryptInit calls shall behave, with respect to *K*, as if they were called directly with **CKM_CHACHA20** or **CKM_SALSA20**, *K* and NULL parameters.

Unlike the atomic Salsa20/ChaCha20 mechanism the AEAD mechanism based on them does not expose the block counter, as the AEAD construction is based on a message metaphor in which random access is not needed.

11 "*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

12 "*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

6.61.3 ChaCha20/Poly1305 and Salsa20/Poly1305 Mechanism parameters

- **CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS; CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305** and **CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305** mechanisms. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS {
  CK_BYTE_PTR  pNonce;
  CK_ULONG     ulNonceLen;
  CK_BYTE_PTR  pAAD;
  CK_ULONG     ulAADLen;
} CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pNonce	*nonce (This should be never re-used with the same key.)*
ulNonceLen	*length of nonce in bits (is 64 for original, 96 for IETF (only for chacha20) and 192 for xchacha20/xsalsa20 variant)*
pAAD	*pointer to additional authentication data. This data is authenticated but not encrypted.*
ulAADLen	*length of pAAD in bytes.*

CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS**.

- **CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS; CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_CHACHA20POLY1305_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the CKM_ CHACHA20_POLY1305 mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS {
  CK_BYTE_PTR    pNonce;
  CK_ULONG       ulNonceLen;
  CK_BYTE_PTR    pTag;
} CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pNonce	*pointer to nonce*
ulNonceLen	*length of nonce in bits. The length of the influences which variant of the ChaCha20 will be used (64 original, 96 IETF(only for ChaCha20), 192 XChaCha20/XSalsa20)*
pTag	*location of the authentication tag which is returned on MessageEncrypt, and provided on MessageDecrypt.*

CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS**.

6.62 HKDF Mechanisms

Details for HKDF key derivation mechanisms can be found in [RFC 5869].

Table 260, HKDF Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_HKDF_DERIVE							✓
CKM_HKDF_DATA							✓
CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN					✓		

6.62.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_HKDF_DERIVE
CKM_HKDF_DATA
CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN

Key Types:

CKK_HKDF

6.62.2 HKDF mechanism parameters

♦ CK_HKDF_PARAMS; CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR

CK_HKDF_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_HKDF_DERIVE** and **CKM_HKDF_DATA** mechanisms. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_HKDF_PARAMS {
  CK_BBOOL bExtract;
  CK_BBOOL bExpand;
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism;
  CK_ULONG ulSaltType;
  CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;
  CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hSaltKey;
  CK_BYTE_PTR pInfo;
  CK_ULONG ulInfoLen;
} CK_HKDF_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

bExtract	execute the extract portion of HKDF.
bExpand	execute the expand portion of HKDF.
prfHashMechanism	base hash used for the HMAC in the underlying HKDF operation.
ulSaltType	specifies how the salt for the extract portion of the KDF is supplied.

		CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL no salt is supplied.
		CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA salt is supplied as a data in pSalt with length ulSaltLen.
		CKF_HKDF_SALT_KEY salt is supplied as a key in hSaltKey.
	pSalt	pointer to the salt.
	ulSaltLen	length of the salt pointed to in pSalt.
	hSaltKey	object handle to the salt key.
	pInfo	info string for the expand stage.
	ulInfoLen	length of the info string for the expand stage.

CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_HKDF_PARAMS**.

6.62.3 HKDF derive

HKDF derivation implements the HKDF as specified in [RFC 5869]. The two booleans bExtract and bExpand control whether the extract section of the HKDF or the expand section of the HKDF is in use.

It has a parameter, a **CK_HKDF_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of the salt and or the expansion info. The structure contains the bools *bExtract* and *bExpand* which control whether the extract or expand portions of the HKDF is to be used. This structure is defined in Section 6.62.2.

The input key must be of type **CKK_HKDF** or **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET** and the length must be the size of the underlying hash function specified in *prfHashMechanism*. The exception is a data object which has the same size as the underlying hash function, and which may be supplied as an input key. In this case bExtract should be true and non-null salt should be supplied.

Either *bExtract* or *bExpand* must be set to true. If they are both set to true, input key is first extracted then expanded. The salt is used in the extraction stage. If bExtract is set to true and no salt is given, a 'zero' salt (salt whose length is the same as the underlying hash and values all set to zero) is used as specified by the RFC. If bExpand is set to true, **CKA_VALUE_LEN** should be set to the desired key length. If it is false CKA_VALUE_LEN may be set to the length of the hash, but that is not necessary as the mechanism will supply this value. The salt should be ignored if *bExtract* is false. The *pInfo* should be ignored if *bExpand* is set to false.

The mechanism also contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

6.62.4 HKDF Data

HKDF Data derive mechanism, denoted **CKM_HKDF_DATA**, is identical to HKDF Derive except the output is a **CKO_DATA** object whose value is the result to the derive operation. Some tokens may restrict what data may be successfully derived based on the pInfo portion of the CK_HKDF_PARAMS. Tokens may reject requests based on the *pInfo* values. Allowed *pInfo* values are specified in the profile document and applications could then query the appropriate profile before depending on the mechanism.

6.62.5 HKDF Key gen

HKDF key gen, denoted CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN generates a new random HKDF key. CKA_VALUE_LEN must be set in the template.

6.63 NULL Mechanism

CKM_NULL is a mechanism used to implement the trivial pass-through function.

Table 261, CKM_NULL Mechanisms vs. Functions

	Functions						
Mechanism	**Encrypt & Decrypt**	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**[1]	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_NULL	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
[1] SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover							

6.63.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_NULL

6.63.2 CKM_NULL mechanism parameters

CKM_NULL does not have a parameter.

When used for encrypting / decrypting data, the input data is copied unchanged to the output data.

When used for signing, the input data is copied to the signature. When used for signature verification, it compares the input data and the signature, and returns CKR_OK (indicating that both are identical) or CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID.

When used for digesting data, the input data is copied to the message digest.

When used for wrapping a private or secret key object, the wrapped key will be identical to the key to be wrapped. When used for unwrapping, a new object with the same value as the wrapped key will be created.

When used for deriving a key, the derived key has the same value as the base key.

6.64 IKE Mechanisms

Table 262, IKE Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR[1]	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE							✓
CKM_IKE_PRF_DERIVE							✓
CKM_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE							✓
CKM_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE							✓

6.64.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE
CKM_IKE_PRF_DERIVE
CKM_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE
CKM_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE

6.64.2 IKE mechanism parameters

- **CK_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS; CK_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS {
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE  prfMechanism;
  CK_BBOOL  bHasSeedKey;
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hSeedKey;
  CK_BYTE_PTR  pSeedData;
  CK_ULONG  ulSeedDataLen;
} CK_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

prfMechanism	underlying MAC mechanism used to generate the prf
bHasSeedKey	hSeed key is present
hSeedKey	optional seed from key
pSeedData	optional seed from data
ulSeedDataLen	length of optional seed data. If no seed data is present this value is 0

CK_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS.**

♦ CK_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS; CK_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_IKE_PRF_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS {
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE  prfMechanism;
  CK_BBOOL  bDataAsKey;
  CK_BBOOL  bRekey;
  CK_BYTE_PTR  pNi;
  CK_ULONG  ulNiLen;
  CK_BYTE_PTR  pNr;
  CK_ULONG  ulNrLen;
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hNewKey;
 } CK_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

prfMechanism	underlying MAC mechanism used to generate the prf
bDataAsKey	Ni||Nr is used as the key for the prf rather than baseKey
bRekey	rekey operation. hNewKey must be present
pNi	Ni value
ulNiLen	length of Ni
pNr	Nr value
ulNrLen	length of Nr
hNewKey	New key value to drive the rekey.

CK_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

♦ CK_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS; CK_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS {
  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE  prfMechanism;
  CK_BBOOL  bHasPrevKey;
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKeygxy;
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hPrevKey;
  CK_BYTE_PTR  pCKYi;
  CK_ULONG  ulCKYiLen;
  CK_BYTE_PTR  pCKYr;
  CK_ULONG  ulCKYrLen;
  CK_BYTE  keyNumber;
 } CK_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

prfMechanism	underlying MAC mechanism used to generate the prf

bHasPrevkey	hPrevKey is present
hKeygxy	handle to the exchanged g^xy key
hPrevKey	handle to the previously derived key
pCKYi	CKYi value
ulCKYiLen	length of CKYi
pCKYr	CKYr value
ulCKYrLen	length of CKYr
keyNumber	unique number for this key derivation

CK_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

- **CK_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE_PARAMS; CK_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE_PARAMS {
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE  prfMechanism;
    CK_BBOOL  bHasKeygxy;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKeygxy;
    CK_BYTE_PTR  pExtraData;
    CK_ULONG  ulExtraDataLen;
} CK_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

prfMechanism	underlying MAC mechanism used to generate the prf
bHasKeygxy	hKeygxy key is present
hKeygxy	optional key g^xy
pExtraData	optional extra data
ulExtraDataLen	length of optional extra data. If no extra data is present this value is 0

CK_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

6.64.3 IKE PRF DERIVE

The IKE PRF Derive mechanism denoted **CKM_IKE_PRF_DERIVE** is used in IPSEC both IKEv1 and IKEv2 to generate an initial key that is used to generate additional keys. It takes a **CK_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS** as a mechanism parameter. *baseKey* is the base key passed into **C_DeriveKey**. *baseKey* must be of type **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET** if *bDataAsKey* is TRUE and the key type of the underlying prf if *bDataAsKey* is FALSE. *hNewKey* must be of type **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. Depending on the parameter settings, it generates keys with a **CKA_VALUE** of:

1. prf(pNi|pNr, baseKey); (bDataAsKey=TRUE, bRekey=FALSE)

2. prf(baseKey, pNi|pNr); (bDataAsKkey=FALSE, bRekey=FALSE)

3. prf(baseKey, ValueOf(hNewKey)| pNi | pNr); (bDataAsKey=FALSE, bRekey=TRUE)

The resulting output key is always the length of the underlying prf. The combination of *bDataAsKey*=TRUE and *bRekey*=TRUE is not allowed. If both are set, **CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD** is returned.

Case 1 is used in

a. ikev2 (RFC 5996) *baseKey* is called g^ir, the output is called SKEYSEED

b. ikev1 (RFC 2409) *baseKey* is called g^ir, the output is called SKEYID

Case 2 is used in ikev1 (RFC 2409) inkey is called pre-shared-key, output is called SKEYID

Case 3 is used in ikev2 (RFC 5996) rekey case, *baseKey* is SK_d, hNewKey is g^ir (new), the output is called SKEYSEED. The derived key will have a length of the length of the underlying prf. If **CKA_VALUE_LEN** is specified, it must equal the underlying prf or **CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE** is returned. If **CKA_KEY_TYPE** is not specified in the template, it will be the underlying key type of the prf.

6.64.4 IKEv1 PRF DERIVE

The IKEv1 PRF Derive mechanism denoted **CKM_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE** is used in IPSEC IKEv1 to generate various additional keys from the initial SKEYID. It takes a **CK_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS** as a mechanism parameter. SKEYID is the base key passed into **C_DeriveKey**.

This mechanism derives a key with **CKA_VALUE** set to either:

prf(baseKey, ValueOf(hKeygxy) || pCKYi || pCKYr || key_number)

or

prf(baseKey, ValueOf(hPrevKey) || ValueOf(hKeygxy) || pCKYi || pCKYr || key_number)

depending on the state of *bHasPrevKey*.

The key type of *baseKey* must be the key type of the prf, and the key type of *hKeygxy* must be **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. The key type of *hPrevKey* can be any key type.

This is defined in RFC 2409. For each of the following keys.

baseKey is SKEYID, *hKeygxy* is g^xy

for outKey = SKEYID_d, *bHasPrevKey* = false, key_number = 0

for outKey = SKEYID_a, *hPrevKey*= SKEYID_d, key_number = 1

for outKey = SKEYID_e, *hPrevKey*= SKEYID_a, key_number = 2

If **CKA_VALUE_LEN** is not specified, the resulting key will be the length of the prf. If **CKA_VALUE_LEN** is greater then the prf, **CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE** is returned. If it is less the key is truncated taking the left most bytes. The value **CKA_KEY_TYPE** must be specified in the template or **CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE** is returned.

6.64.5 IKEv2 PRF PLUS DERIVE

The IKEv2 PRF PLUS Derive mechanism denoted **CKM_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE** is used in IPSEC IKEv2 to derive various additional keys from the initial SKEYSEED. It takes a **CK_IKE2_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS** as a mechanism parameter. SKEYSEED is the base key passed into **C_DeriveKey**. The key type of *baseKey* must be the key type of the underlying prf. This mechanism uses the base key and a feedback version of the prf to generate a single key with sufficient bytes to cover all additional keys. The application will then use **CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY** several times to pull out the various keys. **CKA_VALUE_LEN** must be set in the template and its value

must not be bigger than 255 times the size of the prf function output or **CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE** will be returned. If **CKA_KEY_TYPE** is not specified, the output key type will be **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**.

This mechanism derives a key with a **CKA_VALUE** of (from RFC 5996):

prfplus = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 |... Tn
where:
T1 = prf(K, S | 0x01)
T2 = prf(K, T1 | S | 0x02)
T3 = prf(K, T3 | S | 0x03)
T4 = prf(K, T4 | S | 0x04)
.
Tn = prf(K, T(n-1) | n)
K = *baseKey*, S = valueOf(*hSeedKey*) | *pSeedData*

6.64.6 IKEv1 Extended Derive

The IKE Extended Derive mechanism denoted **CKM_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE** is used in IPSEC IKEv1 to derive longer keys than **CKM_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE** can from the initial SKEYID. It is used to support RFC 2409 appendix B and RFC 2409 section 5.5 (Quick Mode). It takes a **CK_IKE1_EXTENDED_DERIVE_PARAMS** as a mechanism parameter. SKEYID is the base key passed into **C_DeriveKey**. **CKA_VALUE_LEN** must be set in the template and its value must not be bigger than 255 times the size of the prf function output or **CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE** will be returned. If **CKA_KEY_TYPE** is not specified, the output key type will be **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. The key type of SKEYID must be the key type of the prf, and the key type of *hKeygxy* (if present) must be **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**.

This mechanism derives a key with **CKA_VALUE** (from RFC 2409 appendix B and section 5.5):

Ka = K1 | K2 | K3 | K4 |... Kn
where:
K1 = prf(K, valueOf(*hKeygxy*)|*pExtraData*) or prf(K,0x00) if *bHashKeygxy* is FALSE and *ulExtraData* is 0
K2 = prf(K, K1|valueOf(*hKeygxy*)|*pExtraData*)
K3 = prf(K, K2|valueOf(*hKeygxy*)|*pExtraData*)
K4 = prf(K, K3|valueOf(*hKeygxy*)|*pExtraData*)
.
Kn = prf(K, K(n-1)|valueOf(*hKeygxy*)|*pExtraData*)
K = *baseKey*

If **CKA_VALUE_LEN** is less then or equal to the prf length and bHasKeygxy is CK_FALSE, then the new key is simply the base key truncated to **CKA_VALUE_LEN** (specified in RFC 2409 appendix B). Otherwise the prf is executed and the derived keys value is **CKA_VALUE_LEN** bytes of the resulting prf.

6.65 HSS

HSS is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification, following the digital signature algorithm defined in [RFC 8554] and [NIST 802-208].

Table 263, HSS Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	**Sign & Verify**	**SR & VR**	**Digest**	**Gen. Key/ Key Pair**	**Wrap & Unwrap**	**Derive**
CKM_HSS_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_HSS		✓[1]					

1 Single-part operations only

6.65.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type **CKK_HSS** for type **CK_KEY_TYPE** as used in the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of key objects and domain parameter objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_HSS_KEY_PAIR_GEN

CKM_HSS

6.65.2 HSS public key objects

HSS public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,** key type **CKK_HSS**) hold HSS public keys.

The following table defines the HSS public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 264, *HSS Public Key Object Attributes*

Attribute	**Data Type**	**Meaning**
CKA_HSS_LEVELS[2,4]	CK_ULONG	The number of levels in the HSS scheme.
CKA_HSS_LMS_TYPE[2,4]	CK_ULONG	The encoding for the Merkle tree heights of the top level LMS tree in the hierarchy.
CKA_HSS_LMOTS_TYPE[2,4]	CK_ULONG	The encoding for the Winternitz parameter of the one-time-signature scheme of the top level LMS tree.
CKA_VALUE[1,4]	Byte array	XDR-encoded public key as defined in [RFC8554].

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an HSS public key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_HSS;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An HSS public key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
```

```
    CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
    CK_BBOOL false = CK_FALSE;

    CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
        {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
        {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
        {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(false)},
        {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
        {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)},
        {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)}
    };
```

6.65.3 HSS private key objects

HSS private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,** key type **CKK_HSS**) hold HSS private keys.

The following table defines the HSS private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 265, HSS Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_HSS_LEVELS[1,3]	CK_ULONG	The number of levels in the HSS scheme.
CKA_HSS_LMS_TYPES[1,3]	CK_ULONG_PTR	A list of encodings for the Merkle tree heights of the LMS trees in the hierarchy from top to bottom. The number of encodings in the array is the ulValueLen component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ULONG. This number must match the CKA_HSS_LEVELS attribute value.
CKA_HSS_LMOTS_TYPES[1,3]	CK_ULONG_PTR	A list of encodings for the Winternitz parameter of the one-time-signature scheme of the LMS trees in the hierarchy from top to bottom. The number of encodings in the array is the ulValueLen component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ULONG. This number must match the CKA_HSS_LEVELS attribute value.
CKA_VALUE[1,4,6,7]	Byte array	Vendor defined, must include state information. Note that exporting this value is dangerous as it would allow key reuse.
CKA_HSS_KEYS_REMAINING[2,4]	CK_ULONG	The minimum of the following two values: 1) The number of one-time private keys remaining; 2) 2^32-1

- Refer to Table 11 for footnotes

The encodings for CKA_HSS_LMOTS_TYPES and CKA_HSS_LMS_TYPES are defined in [RFC 8554] and [NIST 802-208].

The following is a sample template for creating an LMS private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_HSS;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An HSS private key object";
CK_ULONG hssLevels = 123;
CK_ULONG lmsTypes[] = {123,...};
CK_ULONG lmotsTypes[] = {123,...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_BBOOL false = CK_FALSE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
```

```
        {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
        {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
        {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
        {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &false, sizeof(true)},
        {CKA_HSS_LEVELS, &hssLevels, sizeof(hssLevels)},
        {CKA_HSS_LMS_TYPES, lmsTypes, sizeof(lmsTypes)},
        {CKA_HSS_LMOTS_TYPES, lmotsTypes, sizeof(lmotsTypes)},
        {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)},
        {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)}
    };
```

CKA_SENSITIVE MUST be true, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** MUST be false, and **CKA_COPYABLE** MUST be false for this key.

6.65.4 HSS key pair generation

The HSS key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_HSS_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism for HSS.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates HSS public/private key pairs for the scheme specified by the **CKA_HSS_LEVELS**, **CKA_HSS_LMS_TYPES**, and **CKA_HSS_LMOTS_TYPES** attributes of the template for the private key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_HSS_LEVELS,** **CKA_HSS_LMS_TYPE**, **CKA_HSS_LMOTS_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_VALUE**, and **CKA_HSS_KEYS_REMAINING** attributes to the new private key.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used and must be set to 0.

6.65.5 HSS without hashing

The HSS without hashing mechanism, denoted **CKM_HSS**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification for HSS. (This mechanism corresponds only to the part of LMS that processes the hash value, which may be of any length; it does not compute the hash value.)

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

For the purposes of these mechanisms, an HSS signature is a byte string with length depending on **CKA_HSS_LEVELS, CKA_HSS_LMS_TYPES**, **CKA_HSS_LMOTS_TYPES** as described in the following table.

Table 266, *HSS without hashing: Key and Data Length*

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign[1]	HSS Private Key	any	1296-74988[2]
C_Verify[1]	HSS Public Key	any, 1296-74988[2]	N/A

1 Single-part operations only.

2 4+(*levels*-1)*56+*levels**(8+(36+32**p*)+*h**32) where *p* has values (265, 133, 67, 34) for lmots type (W1, W2, W4, W8) and *h* is the number of levels in the LMS Merkle trees.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used and must be set to 0.

If the number of signatures is exhausted, CKR_KEY_EXHAUSTED will be returned.

7 PKCS #11 Implementation Conformance

7.1 PKCS#11 Consumer Implementation Conformance

An implementation is a conforming PKCS#11 Consumer if the implementation meets the conditions specified in one or more consumer profiles specified in **[PKCS11-Prof]**.

A PKCS#11 consumer implementation SHALL be a conforming PKCS#11 Consumer.

If a PKCS#11 consumer implementation claims support for a particular consumer profile, then the implementation SHALL conform to all normative statements within the clauses specified for that profile and for any subclauses to each of those clauses.

7.2 PKCS#11 Provider Implementation Conformance

An implementation is a conforming PKCS#11 Provider if the implementation meets the conditions specified in one or more provider profiles specified in **[PKCS11-Prof]**.

A PKCS#11 provider implementation SHALL be a conforming PKCS#11 Provider.

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

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Appendix B. Manifest constants

The definitions for manifest constants specified in this document can be found in the Additional artifacts section.

Appendix C. Revision History

Revision	Date	Editor	Changes Made
CSD02 WD01	12 May 2022	Dieter Bong	Changes made compared to Committee Specification CSD01, as working draft of Committee Specification CSD02 - Editorial changes resolving comments by Paul Knight, OASIS, https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/pkcs11-comment/202203/msg00001.html - Reference [PKCS11-curr] replaced by reference within document - Correction of typos

Appendix D. Notices

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