



Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

Root DNSSEC KSK Ceremony 14

Wednesday August 7, 2013

ICANN KSK Facility@Equinix LA3
1920 East Maple Avenue, El Segundo, CA 90245

This ceremony is executed under the
DNSSEC Practices Statement for the Root Zone KSK Operator Version A Revision 1358

AbbreviationsDraft

TEB = Tamper Evident Bag (AMPAC, item #GCS1013 small or #GCS1216 large or MMF Industries, item #2362010N20 small or #2362011N20 large)
 SO= Security Officer OP= Operator
 HSM = Hardware Security Module FD = Flash Drive CA = Ceremony Administrator
 IW = Internal Witness CO= Crypto Officer SA = System Administrator
 SSC = Safe Security Controller MC = Master of Ceremony IKOS = ICANN KSK Operations Security
 KSR= Key Signing Request SKR= Signed Key Response RZM= Root Zone Maintainer

Participants

Instructions: At the end of the ceremony, participants sign on IW1's copy. IW1 records time upon completion.

	Title	Printed Name/Citizenship	Signature	Date	Time
	CA	Mehmet Akcin			
IW2	IW1/IKOS	Tomofumi Okubo			
	SA1	Alexander Kulik			
	SSC1	Selina Harrington			
	SSC2	Leo Vegoda			
	CO2	Dmitry Burkov / RU			
	CO5	Edward Lewis / US			
	CO6	Andy Linton / NZ			
	CO7	Subramanian Moonesamy / MU			
	EW1	Alejandro Bolivar / Verisign			
	EW2	Duane Wessels / Verisign			
	EW3	James Kouyoumdjian / PricewaterhouseCoopers		7 August 2013	22:57
	EW4	Martin Levy / Hurricane Electric			
	EW5	Edward Beek			
	EW6	Connor Barthold			
	EW7	Dalini Khemlani			
	EW8	Rod Treweek			
	CA2	Richard Lamb			
IW1	IW2	Kim Davies			
	SA2	Math Childs			
	EW9	Greg Dibrise			

Note: Dual Occupancy enforced. CA leads ceremony. Only CAs, IWs, or SAs can enter ceremony room and/or escort other participants. Only CA+IW can enter safe room and/or escort other participants. CAs, SAs or IWs may let individuals out of the ceremony room but only when CA+IW remain in the ceremony room. No one may leave when CA+IW are in safe room. Participants must sign in and out of ceremony room and leave any credentials assigned to them (keys, cards) in the ceremony room if leaving before completion of the ceremony. The SA starts filming before the participants enter the room.

Some steps during the ceremony require the participants to tell and/or confirm identifiers composed of numbers and letters. When spelling identifiers, the phonetic alphabet shown below will be used:

A	Alfa	AL-FAH
B	Bravo	BRAH-VOH
C	Charlie	CHAR-LEE
D	Delta	DELL-TAH
E	Echo	ECK-OH
F	Foxtrot	FOKS-TROT
G	Golf	GOLF
H	Hotel	HOH-TEL
I	India	IN-DEE-AH
J	Juliet	JEW-LEE-ETT
K	Kilo	KEY-LOH
L	Lima	LEE-MAH
M	Mike	MIKE
N	November	NO-VEM-BER
O	Oscar	OSS-CAH
P	Papa	PAH-PAH
Q	Quebec	KEH-BECK
R	Romeo	ROW-ME-OH
S	Sierra	SEE-AIR-RAH
T	Tango	TANG-GO
U	Uniform	YOU-NEE-FORM
V	Victor	VIK-TAH
W	Whiskey	WISS-KEY
X	Xray	ECKS-RAY
Y	Yankee	YANG-KEY
Z	Zulu	ZOO-LOO
1	One	WUN
2	Two	TOO
3	Three	TREE
4	Four	FOW-ER
5	Five	FIFE
6	Six	SIX
7	Seven	SEV-EN
8	Eight	AIT
9	Nine	NIN-ER
0	Zero	ZEE-RO

Act 1. Initiate Ceremony and Retrieve Equipments

Participants Arrive and Sign into Key Ceremony Room

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1.	SA confirms that the videos are recorded and online streaming is live. IW confirms that all participants are signed into the Ceremony Room.	KJD	20:34

Verify Time and Date

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
2.	IW1 enters UTC date (day/month/year) and time using a reasonably accurate wall clock visible to all in the Ceremony Room: Date and time: <u>7 August 2013, 20:35</u> All entries into this script or any logs should follow this common source of time.	KJD	20:35

Open Credential Safe #2

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
3.	CA and IW1 escorts SSC2, COs into the safe room together. CA brings a flashlight when entering the safe room.	KJD	20:36
4.	SSC2, while shielding combination from camera, opens Safe #2.	KJD	20:38
5.	SSC2 takes out safe log and prints name, date, time, signature, and reason (i.e. "open safe") in safe log. IW1 initials this entry. Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.	KJD	20:39

COs Extract Credentials From the Safe Deposit Boxes

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
6.	<p>One by one, the selected COs retrieves required OP cards and SO cards following the steps shown below.</p> <p>a) With the assistance of CA (and his/her common key), opens her/his safe deposit box. # Common Key is bottom lock and CO Key is top lock</p> <p>b) Verifies integrity of contents by reading out box number and TEB # for OP and SO cards which should match below.</p> <p>c) Retains OP TEB and SO TEB and locks box.</p> <p>d) Makes an entry in safe log indicating OP TEB and SO TEB removal with box #, printed name, date, time and signature.</p> <p>Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.</p> <p>Repeat these steps until all required cards are removed. IW1 initials this entry when all CO have finished.</p> <p>CO 2: Dmitry Burkov Box # 1793 OP TEB # BB21820459 ✓ SO TEB # A13004336 ✓✓</p> <p>CO 5: Edward Lewis Box # 1790 OP TEB # BB21820461 ✓ SO TEB # A13004326 ✓✓</p> <p>CO 6: Andy Linton Box # 1072 OP TEB # BB21369032 ✓ SO TEB # A16608558 ✓✓</p> <p>CO 7: Subramanian Moonesamy Box # 1792 OP TEB # BB21369033 ✓ SO TEB # A16608556 ✓✓</p>	KJD	20:46

Close Credential Safe #2

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
7.	<p>Once all safe deposit boxes are closed and locked, SSC2 makes an entry that includes printed name, date, time and signature into the safe log indicating closing of the safe. IW1 initials this entry.</p> <p>Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.</p>	KJD	20:46
8.	SSC2 puts log back in safe and locks Safe #2 (spin dial at least two full		

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
	revolutions each way, counter clock wise then clock wise). CA and IW1 verify that the safe is locked and card reader indicator is green.	KJD	20:47
9.	IW1, CA, SSC2, and COs leave safe room, with OP cards in TEBs, closing the door behind them.	KJD	20:47

Open Equipment Safe #1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
10.	After a one (1) minute delay, CA, IW1 and SSC1 enter the safe room with an empty equipment cart.	KJD	20:50
11.	SSC1, while shielding combination from camera, opens Safe #1.	KJD	20:51
12.	SSC1 takes out safe log and prints name, date, time, signature and reason (i.e., "opened safe") in safe log. IW1 initials this entry. Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.	KJD	20:53

Remove Equipment from Safe #1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
13.	CA CAREFULLY removes HSM2 (in TEB) from the safe and completes the entry in the safe log indicating HSM Removal, TEB # and serial number, printed name, date, time, and signature. CA places the item on the equipment cart. IW1 initials this entry. Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign. HSM2: BB24049957 ✓ serial # K6002018 ✓ Verify the integrity of the other HSM that will not be in used this time. HSM1: TEB# BB24706821 ✓ serial # K6002020 (last used) ✓	KJD	20:54
14.	CA takes out the items listed below from the safe and completes the entry in the safe log indicating each item, TEB#, serial number if available. Printed name, date, time and signature. CA places the item on the equipment cart. IW1 initials this entry. Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign. Laptop1 (Dell ATG6400): TEB# BB24706822 ✓ serial# 37240147333 ✓ O/S DVD (Rev600) + HSMFD: TEB# BB21820463 ✓ Verify the integrity of the other Laptop that will not be used this time. Laptop2: TEB# A2734916 ✓ serial # 7292928457	KJD	21:02

exception
1



Close Equipment Safe #1 and exit safe room

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
15.	SSC1 makes an entry including printed name, date, time and signature into the safe log indicating, "Close safe". IW1 initials this entry. Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.	KJD	21:04

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
16.	SSC1 puts log back in safe and locks Safe #1 (spin dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter clock wise then clock wise). CA and IW1 verify that the safe is locked and door indicator light is green.	KJD	21:04
17.	CA, SSC1 and IW1 leave the safe room with the equipment cart, closing the door to the safe room securely behind them.	KJD	21:04

Act 2. Confirm and Sign the Key Signing Request

Set Up Laptop

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1.	CA inspects the laptop TEB for tamper evidence; reads out TEB # and serial # while IW1 observes and matches it to the prior entry in most recent key ceremony or acceptance script for this site. IW1 confirms the TEB # and serial # below. Laptop1 (Dell ATG6400): TEB# BB24706822 ✓ / serial# 37240147333 ✓	KJD	21:11
2.	CA inspects the O/S DVD + HSMFD TEB for tamper evidence; reads out TEB # while IW1 observes and matches it to the prior entry in most recent key ceremony script for this site. IW1 confirms the TEB # below. O/S DVD (Rev600) + HSMFD: TEB# BB21820463 ✓	KJD	21:12
3.	CA takes the laptop, HSMFD and O/S DVD out of TEB placing it on key ceremony table; discards TEBs; connects laptop power, external display, printer and boots laptop from O/S DVD.	KJD	21:13
4.	CA presses "CTRL+ALT+F2" to get a console prompt and logs in as root.	KJD	21:17
5.	CA enters the commands <code>system-config-display --noui</code> and <code>killall Xorg</code> CA ensures that external display works.	KJD	21:17
6.	CA logs in as root.	KJD	21:18
7.	CA configures printer as default and prints test page by going to System > Administration > Printing.	KJD	21:21
8.	CA opens a terminal window and maximizes its size for visibility by going to Applications > Accessories > Terminal.	KJD	21:21
9.	CA checks and fixes date and time on laptop based on wall clock ensuring UTC time zone has been chosen by going to System > Administration > Date and Time.	KJD	21:23
10.	CA inserts USB port expander into laptop.	KJD	21:25

Format and label blank FD

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
11.	CA plugs a new FD into the laptop, then waits for it to be recognized by the O/S, closes the file system popup window and formats the drive by executing <code>dmesg grep -A 5 usb-storage</code> to confirm the drive letter that is assigned to the blank USB drive (e.g. sda, sdb, sdc), <code>umount /dev/sda1</code> to unmounts the drive (change drive letter if necessary), <code>mkfs.vfat -n HSMFD -I /dev/sda</code> to execute a FAT32 format and label it as HSMFD.	KJD	21:27
12.	CA repeats step 11 for the 2 nd blank FD	KJD	21:28
13.	CA repeats step 11 for the 3 rd blank FD	KJD	21:28
14.	CA repeats step 11 for the 4 th blank FD	KJD	21:29
15.	CA repeats step 11 for the 5 th blank FD	KJD	21:29

Connect HSMFD

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
16.	CA plugs HSMFD into free USB slot on the laptop -NOT EXPANDER- and waits for O/S to recognize the FD. CA lets participants view file names in the HSMFD then closes the file system window.	KJD	21:31
17.	Calculate the md5hash of the contents on the copied HSMFD. <code>find -P /media/HSMFD -type f -print0 sort -z xargs -0 cat md5sum</code> IW confirms that the result matches the md5hash of the HSMFD that is on the annotated script from the Ceremony 12.	KJD	21:32

Start Logging Terminal Session

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
18.	CA changes the default directory to the HSMFD by executing <code>cd /media/HSMFD</code>	KJD	21:32
19.	CA executes <code>script script-20130807.log</code> to start a capture of terminal output.	KJD	21:33

Start Logging HSM Output

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
20.	CA connects a serial to USB null modem cable to laptop.	KJD	21:33
21.	CA opens a second terminal screen and executes <code>cd /media/HSMFD</code> and executes <code>ttyaudit /dev/ttyUSB0</code> to start logging HSM serial port outputs. Note: DO NOT unplug USB serial port from laptop as this causes logging to stop.	KJD	21:34

Power Up HSM

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
22.	CA inspects the HSM TEB for tamper evidence; reads out TEB # and serial # while IW1 observes and matches it to the prior script entry. IW1 confirms TEB # and serial # below. HSM2: BB24049957✓serial # K6002018✓	KJD	21:34
23.	CA removes HSM from TEB; discards TEB and plugs ttyUSB0 null modem serial cable to the back.	KJD	21:35
24.	CA switches to the ttyaudit terminal window and connects power to HSM. Status information should appear on the serial logging screen. IW1 matches displayed HSM serial number with above. (Time and date in the HSM may not match the time used for the ceremony logs, but there is no need to change it since the scripts that does the logging to the laptop adds a timestamp.)	KJD	21:36

Enable/Activate HSM

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
25.	CA calls a CO, CO inspects the TEB for tamper evidence, opens the TEB and hands the OP card to the CA who places card in cardholder visible to all.	KJD	21:39
26.	Repeat the step above until all OP cards are placed on the cardholder.	KJD	21:39
27.	CA inserts 3 cards into HSM to activate the unit (via "Set Online" menu item). Type in the default PIN "11223344" when prompted. IW1 records the used cards below. Each card is returned to cardholder after use. 1st OP card <u>6</u> of 7 2nd OP card <u>5</u> of 7 3rd OP card <u>7</u> of 7	KJD	21:41

Check Network between Laptop and HSM

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
28.	CA connects HSM to laptop using Ethernet cable.	KJD	21:42
29.	CA tests network connectivity between laptop and HSM by entering <code>ping 192.168.0.2</code> on the laptop terminal window and looking for responses. Ctrl-C to exit program.	KJD	21:42

Insert Copy of KSR to be signed

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
30.	The KSR is downloaded to the KSRFD and transferred to the facility by the IKOS. CA plugs FD labeled "KSR" with KSR to be signed into the laptop and waits for the O/S to recognize the FD. CA points out the KSR file to be signed then closes the file system window.	KJD	21:43

Execute KSR signer

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
31.	CA identifies the KSR to be signed and runs, in the terminal window <code>ksrsigner Kjqmt7v /media/KSR/ksr-root-2013-q4-0.xml</code>	KJD	21:43
32.	The KSR signer will ask whether the HSM is activated or not as below. Activate HSM prior to accepting in the affirmative!! (y/N) : CA confirms that the HSM is online and then enters "y" to proceed to verification. Note: DO NOT enter "y" for the "Is this correct y/n?" yet.	KJD	21:43

Final Verification of the Hash (validity) of the KSR

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
33.	When the program requests verification of the KSR hash, CA asks the Root Zone Maintainer (RZM) representative to identify him/herself, present identification document for IW1 to retain and read out the SHA256 hash in PGP wordlist format for the KSR previously sent to ICANN. IW1 enters RZM representative's name here: <u>ALEJANDRO BOLIVAR</u>	KJD	21:45
34.	Participants match the hash read out with that displayed on the terminal. CA asks, "are there are any objections?"	KJD	21:45
35.	CA then enters "y" in response to "Is this correct y/n?" to complete KSR signing operation. Sample output should look like Figure 1. The signed KSR (SKR) will be found in <code>/media/KSR/skr-root-2013-q4-0.xml</code>	KJD	21:45



VERISIGN™

7 August 2013

12061 Bluemont Way,
Reston, VA 20190
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f: 701-987-6543

The SHA256 hash of the 2013 Q4 KSR file is:

7d9e415d4e074dc6ef02f120e55083b66914b0995cd5ac67e318da93c9dcae36

VerisignInc.com

The PGP wordlist for the hash above is:

klaxon onlooker cranky filament drifter amusement
dreadful responsive uncut aftermath unwind butterfat
topmost embezzle Mohawk potato gazelle belowground
ruffled nebula escape specialist ribcage graduate tissue
borderline surmount molasses spearhead sympathy robust
congregate

Attested on behalf of VeriSign by:

Alejandro Bolivar
Senior Engineer, Cryptographic Business Operations
VeriSign, Inc.



VERISIGN

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Reston, Va. 20190
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August 2nd, 2013

To Whom It May Concern:

This is a letter of Verification of Employment for Alejandro A. Bolivar. Verisign, Inc. has employed Alejandro A. Bolivar full-time since September 8th, 1997 as a Sr. Engineer-CBO in our Naming Product Operations department.

Verisign is the trusted provider of Internet infrastructure services for the networked world. Billions of times each day our Identity protection and registry services allow companies and consumers all over the world to engage in trusted communications and commerce.

For over 10 years, Verisign Internet infrastructure has been at the very heart of the Internet, enabling key transactions and protecting valuable data. Verisign facilitates as many as 31 billion authoritative Domain Name System (DNS) queries a day, and has been providing this service since 1998 with 100% availability. Over the years the Verisign Internet infrastructure has scaled quickly and dramatically, and has the capacity to scale just as dramatically in the coming years, as the world moves to Internet-based transactions. Verisign's Network Intelligence and Availability team helps protect against distributed denial of service or DDoS attacks through an in-the-cloud monitoring and mitigation services. Verisign's iDefense Security Intelligence Services help identify and track vulnerabilities, malicious code, threats, and helps provide comprehensive intelligence to enable customers to proactively manage risk.

Should you have further questions, please contact me at the number below.

Sincerely,

David Carney
HR Services Consultant | Verisign, Inc. | 703-948-4143 | dcarney@verisign.com

ICANN Root DNSSEC KSK Ceremony 14

```

$ ksrsigner Kjqmt7v ksr-root-2010-q4-1.xml

Starting: ksrsigner Kjqmt7v /media/KSR/ksr-root-2010-q4-1.xml (at Mon Jul 12 22:44:26 2010 UTC)
Use HSM /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig?
Activate HSM prior to accepting in the affirmative!! (y/N): y

HSM /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig activated.
[debug] setenv KEYPER_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/dnssec
[debug] setenv PKCS11_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07
Found 1 slots on HSM /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07
HSM slot 0 included
Loaded /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07 Slot=0
HSM Information:
  Label:          ICANNKSK
  ManufacturerID: AEP Networks
  Model:         Keyper Pro 0405
  Serial:        K6002E18

Validating last SKR with HSM...
# Inception      Expiration      ZSK Tags      KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1 2010-07-01T00:00:00 2010-07-15T23:59:59 55138,41248 19036
2 2010-07-11T00:00:00 2010-07-25T23:59:59 41248      19036
3 2010-07-21T00:00:00 2010-08-04T23:59:59 41248      19036
4 2010-07-31T00:00:00 2010-08-14T23:59:59 41248      19036
5 2010-08-10T00:00:00 2010-08-24T23:59:59 41248      19036
6 2010-08-20T00:00:00 2010-09-03T23:59:59 41248      19036
7 2010-08-30T00:00:00 2010-09-13T23:59:59 41248      19036
8 2010-09-09T00:00:00 2010-09-24T00:00:00 41248      19036
9 2010-09-20T00:00:00 2010-10-05T23:59:59 40288,41248 19036
...VALIDATED.

Validate and Process KSR /media/KSR/ksr-root-2010-q4-1.xml...
# Inception      Expiration      ZSK Tags      KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1 2010-10-01T00:00:00 2010-10-15T23:59:59 40288,41248
2 2010-10-11T00:00:00 2010-10-25T23:59:59 40288
3 2010-10-21T00:00:00 2010-11-04T23:59:59 40288
4 2010-10-31T00:00:00 2010-11-14T23:59:59 40288
5 2010-11-10T00:00:00 2010-11-24T23:59:59 40288
6 2010-11-20T00:00:00 2010-12-04T23:59:59 40288
7 2010-11-30T00:00:00 2010-12-14T23:59:59 40288
8 2010-12-10T00:00:00 2010-12-25T00:00:00 40288
9 2010-12-21T00:00:00 2011-01-05T23:59:59 21639,40288
...PASSED.

SHA256 hash of KSR:
A17E539793B261112C4F591A06AF4FBC2221DDDD71794BC72D5AEE910C72543
>> ratchet insurgent dwelling mosquito playhouse pioneer fallout Babylon atlas reproduce vapor miracle
ragtime hamburger upshot Wichita snapshot candidate Belfast tambourine stopwatch bookseller Pluto
pyramid highchair specialist robust ultimate assume retraction bombast decimal <<
Is this correct (y/N)? y

Generated new SKR in /media/KSR/ksr-root-2010-q4-1.xml
# Inception      Expiration      ZSK Tags      KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1 2010-10-01T00:00:00 2010-10-15T23:59:59 40288,41248 19036
2 2010-10-11T00:00:00 2010-10-25T23:59:59 40288      19036
3 2010-10-21T00:00:00 2010-11-04T23:59:59 40288      19036
4 2010-10-31T00:00:00 2010-11-14T23:59:59 40288      19036
5 2010-11-10T00:00:00 2010-11-24T23:59:59 40288      19036
6 2010-11-20T00:00:00 2010-12-04T23:59:59 40288      19036
7 2010-11-30T00:00:00 2010-12-14T23:59:59 40288      19036
8 2010-12-10T00:00:00 2010-12-25T00:00:00 40288      19036
9 2010-12-21T00:00:00 2011-01-05T23:59:59 40288,21639 19036

SHA256 hash of SKR:
00CC341B7B3BAEE2E62B1AA6A58DEF07F02E4950E959E6A6ACBD7CEFF2741257
>> aardvark revolver choking bravado kickoff councilman robust tomorrow tracker Cherokee beehive
paragon reindeer microscope uncut amusement unearth coherence deckhand embezzle treadmill examine
tracker paragon ribcage quantity kiwi unravel uproot hydraulic atlas Eskimo <<
Unloaded /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07 Slot=0

***** Log output in ./ksrsigner-20100712-224426.log *****

```

Figure 1

Starting: ksr signer Kjqmt7v /media/KSR/ksr-root-2013-q4-0.xml (at Wed Aug 7 21:43:13 2013 UTC)

Use HSM /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig?

HSM /opt/dnssec/aep.hsmconfig activated.

setenv KEYPER_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/dnssec

setenv PKCS11_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07

Found 1 slots on HSM /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07

HSM slot 0 included

Loaded /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07 Slot=0

HSM Information:

Label: ICANNKSK
ManufacturerID: AEP Networks
Model: Keyper Pro 0405
Serial: K6002018

Validating last SKR with HSM...

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1	2013-07-01T00:00:00	2013-07-15T23:59:59	20580,49656	19036
2	2013-07-11T00:00:00	2013-07-25T23:59:59	49656	19036
3	2013-07-21T00:00:00	2013-08-04T23:59:59	49656	19036
4	2013-07-31T00:00:00	2013-08-14T23:59:59	49656	19036
5	2013-08-10T00:00:00	2013-08-24T23:59:59	49656	19036
6	2013-08-20T00:00:00	2013-09-03T23:59:59	49656	19036
7	2013-08-30T00:00:00	2013-09-13T23:59:59	49656	19036
8	2013-09-09T00:00:00	2013-09-24T00:00:00	49656	19036
9	2013-09-20T00:00:00	2013-10-05T23:59:59	49656,59085	19036

...VALIDATED.

Validate and Process KSR /media/KSR/ksr-root-2013-q4-0.xml...

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1	2013-10-01T00:00:00	2013-10-15T23:59:59	59085,49656	
2	2013-10-11T00:00:00	2013-10-25T23:59:59	59085	
3	2013-10-21T00:00:00	2013-11-04T23:59:59	59085	
4	2013-10-31T00:00:00	2013-11-14T23:59:59	59085	
5	2013-11-10T00:00:00	2013-11-24T23:59:59	59085	
6	2013-11-20T00:00:00	2013-12-04T23:59:59	59085	
7	2013-11-30T00:00:00	2013-12-14T23:59:59	59085	
8	2013-12-10T00:00:00	2013-12-25T00:00:00	59085	
9	2013-12-21T00:00:00	2014-01-05T23:59:59	33655,59085	

...PASSED.

SHA256 hash of KSR:

7D9E415D4E074DC6EF02F120E55083B66914B0995CD5AC67E318DA93C9DCAE36

>> klaxon onlooker cranky filament drifter amusement dreadful responsive uncut aftermat
h unwind butterfat topmost embezzle Mohawk potato gazelle belowground ruffled nebula es
cape specialist ribcage graduate tissue borderline surmount molasses spearhead sympathy
robust congregate <<

Generated new SKR in /media/KSR/ksr-root-2013-q4-0.xml

#	Inception	Expiration	ZSK Tags	KSK Tag(CKA_LABEL)
1	2013-10-01T00:00:00	2013-10-15T23:59:59	49656,59085	19036

2	2013-10-11T00:00:00	2013-10-25T23:59:59	59085	19036
3	2013-10-21T00:00:00	2013-11-04T23:59:59	59085	19036
4	2013-10-31T00:00:00	2013-11-14T23:59:59	59085	19036
5	2013-11-10T00:00:00	2013-11-24T23:59:59	59085	19036
6	2013-11-20T00:00:00	2013-12-04T23:59:59	59085	19036
7	2013-11-30T00:00:00	2013-12-14T23:59:59	59085	19036
8	2013-12-10T00:00:00	2013-12-25T00:00:00	59085	19036
9	2013-12-21T00:00:00	2014-01-05T23:59:59	33655,59085	19036

SHA256 hash of SKR:

87228D59A093641A4A15D18AC2FB1D9518A59392B2D9F882A305B56C8DF15845

>> Neptune candidate optic examine ragtime molasses flytrap Bradbury dogsled bifocals s
tairway maverick snapshot Wichita Belfast Montana beaming paperweight playhouse misnome
r sawdust supportive Vulcan Istanbul reform almighty scorecard handiwork optic vacancy
endorse detector <<

Unloaded /opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider/pkcs11.GCC4.0.2.so.4.07 Slot=0

Print Copies of the Operation for Participants

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
36.	CA prints out a sufficient number of copies for participants using <code>printlog krsigner-20130807-*.log N</code> where <code>krsigner-20130807-*.log</code> is replaced by log output file displayed by program. (this example generates N copies) and hands copies to participants.	KJD	21:48
37.	IW1 attaches a copy to his/her script.	KJD	21:48

Backup Newly Created SKR

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
38.	CA copies the contents of the KSR FD by running <code>cp -p /media/KSR/* .</code> for posting back to RZM. Confirm overwrite by entering "y" when prompted.	KJD	21:49
39.	CA lists contents of KSR FD which should now have an SKR by running <code>ls -ltr /media/KSR</code> and then unmounts the KSR FD using <code>umount /media/KSR</code>	KJD	21:49
40.	CA removes KSR FD containing SKR and gives it to the RZM representative.	KJD	21:49

Disable/Deactivate HSM

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
41.	CA inserts 3 cards into HSM to deactivate the unit (via "Set Offline" menu item). Type in the default PIN "11223344" when prompted. IW1 records the used cards below. Each card is returned to cardholder after use. CA makes sure the card(s) NOT used to activate are used to deactivate the HSM. 1st OP card <u>2</u> of 7 2nd OP card <u>6</u> of 7 3rd OP card <u>7</u> of 7 Confirm the ready light turns off.	KJD	21:51

Act. 3 Secure Hardware and Close the Ceremony

Return HSM to a TEB

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1.	CA disconnects HSM from power and laptop (serial and Ethernet) if connected, placing HSM into a new TEB and seals.	KJD	21:51
2.	CA reads out TEB # and HSM serial #, shows item to participants and IW1 confirms TEB # and HSM serial # below. HSM2: TEB# BB24646585Y serial # K6002018 ✓ IW1 initials the TEB and keep the sealing strips for later inventory. CA places item on equipment cart.	KJD	21:54

Stop Recording Serial Port Activity and Logging Terminal Output

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
3.	Closing ttyaudit terminal window CA terminates the HSM serial output capture by disconnecting the USB serial adaptor from laptop. CA then exits out of ttyaudit terminal window by typing "exit".	KJD	21:54
4.	Terminating the logging script CA stops logging terminal output by entering "exit" in the other terminal window. This only stops the script logging and will NOT close window.	KJD	21:54

Backup HSMFD Contents

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
5.	Set dotglob by executing <code>shopt -s dotglob</code> This allows copying everything in the original HSMFD.	KJD	21:56
6.	Calculate the sha256hash of the contents on the original HSMFD. <code>find -P /media/HSMFD -type f -print0 sort -z xargs -0 cat sha256sum</code>	KJD	21:56
7.	Copy and paste the sha256hash and paste it on Text Editor by going to Applications > Accessories > Text Editor Print two copies. One for the audit bundle and the other for the HSMFD package.	KJD	22:02
8.	CA displays contents of HSMFD by executing <code>ls -ltr</code>	KJD	22:02
9.	CA plugs a blank FD labeled HSMFD into the laptop, then waits for it to be recognized by the O/S (as HSMFD_); and copies the contents of the HSMFD to the blank drive for backup by executing <code>cp -Rp * /media/HSMFD_</code>	KJD	22:02

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
10.	CA displays contents of HSMFD_ by executing <code>ls -ltr /media/HSMFD_</code>	KJD	22:03
11.	Calculate the sha256hash of the contents on the copied HSMFD. <code>find -P /media/HSMFD_ -type f -print0 sort -z xargs -0 cat sha256sum</code> Confirm that it matches the sha256hash of the original HSMFD	KJD	22:03
12.	CA unmounts new FD using <code>umount /media/HSMFD_</code>	KJD	22:04
13.	CA removes HSMFD_ and places on table.	KJD	22:04
14.	CA repeats step 9 to 13 for the 2 nd copy	KJD	22:05
15.	CA repeats step 9 to 13 for the 3 rd copy	KJD	22:05
16.	CA repeats step 9 to 13 for the 4 th copy	KJD	22:06
17.	CA repeats step 9 to 13 for the 5 th copy	KJD	22:07

Print Logging Information

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
18.	CA prints out hard copies of logging information by executing <code>enscript -2Gr -# 2 script-20130807.log</code> <code>enscript -Gr -# 2 --font="Courier8" ttyaudit-ttyUSB*-20130807-*.log</code> for attachment to IW1 and CA scripts. Note: Ignore the error regarding non-printable characters if prompted.	KJD	22:09

Returning HSMFD and O/S DVD to a TEB

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
19.	CA unmounts HSMFD by executing <code>cd /tmp</code> then <code>umount /media/HSMFD</code> CA removes HSMFD.	KJD	22:09
20.	After all print jobs are complete, CA a) Turns off the laptop by pressing the power switch b) Turns on the laptop by pressing the power switch c) Remove the O/S DVD from the drive d) Turns off the laptop again by pressing the power switch	KJD	22:09
21.	CA places TWO HSMFDs and OS/DVD in TEB; writes date, time and "HSMFD" in amount field; and seals; reads out TEB #; shows item to participants and IW1 confirms TEB # below. O/S DVD (Rev600) + HSMFD: TEB# BB21907269 IW1 initials the TEB. CA places TEB on equipment cart.	KJD	22:13

2013-08-07 KJD

File: /tmp/hash

Page 1 of 1

7f0cf7a27e93db38b239c26d6fc805104291386730a45c70aeb82a65569f96bf -

08/07/13
11:49:47

ttyaudit-ttyUSB0-20130807-213355.log

```
2013-08-07T21:43:18+0000 ttyUSB0
2013-08-07T21:43:18+0000 ttyUSB0 20:27:36 on 07-08-2013
2013-08-07T21:43:18+0000 ttyUSB0
2013-08-07T21:43:18+0000 ttyUSB0
2013-08-07T21:43:18+0000 ttyUSB0
2013-08-07T21:43:18+0000 ttyUSB0
2013-08-07T21:44:37+0000 ttyUSB0
2013-08-07T21:44:37+0000 ttyUSB0
2013-08-07T21:44:37+0000 ttyUSB0 Closing connection on address 139.72.192.168.0.1.
2013-08-07T21:44:37+0000 ttyUSB0
2013-08-07T21:49:47+0000 ttyUSB0
2013-08-07T21:49:47+0000 ttyUSB0 7/8/2013 at 20:34:05
2013-08-07T21:49:47+0000 ttyUSB0
2013-08-07T21:49:47+0000 ttyUSB0
```

Distribute HSMFDs

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
22.	Remaining HSMFDs are distributed to IW1 (2 for audit bundles, 1 for himself), IKOS(1) to post SKR to RZM, and to review, analyze and improve on procedures.	KJD	22:14

Returning Laptop to a TEB

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
23.	CA disconnects printer, display, power, and any other connections from laptop and puts laptop in prepared TEB and seals; reads out TEB #, serial # laptop # and shows item to participants and IW1 confirms TEB #, serial # laptop # below. Laptop1 (Dell ATG6400): TEB# BB24646586 / serial# 37240147333 IW1 initials the TEB and keep the sealing strips for later inventory. CA places TEB on equipment cart.	KJD	22:15

Returning OP Smartcards to TEBs

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
24.	CA calls each CO to the front of the room one at a time and repeats the steps below. a) CA takes a TEB prepared for the CO and reads out the number and description while showing the bag to IW1 and CO. Figure 2 below for an example. b) CO places the OP card into the labeled plastic case c) CA places the plastic case into the TEB, seals in front of IW1 and CO then initials bag and strip. d) IW1 inspects the TEB, confirms description in table below and initials TEB and strip. IW1 keeps sealing strips for later inventory. e) CA hands the TEB containing the OP card to the CO. CO inspects and verifies TEB #s and contents then initials his/her bag. f) CO enters completion time and signs for each TEB in the table below in IW1's script. IW1 initials table entry. g) CO returns to his/her seat with the TEB, being careful not to poke or puncture TEB.	KJD	22:22

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
25.	<p>Once the OP cards are packed, CA calls each CO to the front of the room one at a time and repeats the steps below.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) CO opens the SO card TEB and confirms the contents b) CO places the SO card into the labeled plastic case c) CA places the plastic case into the TEB, seals in front of IW1 and CO then initials bag and strip. d) IW1 inspects the TEB, confirms description in table below and initials TEB and strip. IW1 keeps sealing strips for later inventory. e) CA hands the TEB containing the SO card to the CO. CO inspects and verifies TEB #s and contents then initials his/her bag. f) CO enters completion time and signs for each TEB in the table below in IW1's script. IW1 initials table entry. g) CO returns to his/her seat with the TEB, being careful not to poke or puncture TEB. 	KJD	22:32



ICANN

ICANN Root DNSSEC KSK Ceremony 14

CO#	Card Type	TEB #	Printed Name	Signature	Date	Time	IW1
CO 2	OP 2 of 7 SO 2 of 7	BB21907261 ✓ BB21907262 ✓	Dmitry Burkov		7 August 2013	22:31	KJD
CO 5	OP 5 of 7 SO 5 of 7	BB21907263 ✓ BB21907264 ✓	Edward Lewis		7 August 2013	22:29	KJD
CO 6	OP 6 of 7 SO 6 of 7	BB21907265 ✓ BB21907266 ✓	Andy Linton		7 August 2013	22:28	KJD
CO 7	OP 7 of 7 SO 7 of 7	BB21907267 ✓ BB21907268 ✓	Subramanian Moonesamy		7 August 2013	22:25	KJD

BB21368993

DATE: 2 May 2013
TO: Olaf Kalkman

DO NOT OPEN AND NOTIFY BINDER IMMEDIATELY IF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS APPEAR ON THIS BAG: THE FOLLOWING INDICATORS MAY SIGNIFY TAMPERING:
1. STITCHES APPEARING IN TAPE CLOSURE MAY INDICATE TAMPERING.
2. CHANGE IN COLOR APPEARING IN WHITE STRIP.
3. DISCOLORATION, DISTORTION, OR SMEARING OF GREEN KEEPSAFE TEXT.



04-11

SEALING INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Use ball point pen to complete all information BEFORE loading bag.
2. Remove tear-off receipt and keep with copy of deposit documentation.
3. Remove trapped air; peel off release liner over sealing strip.
4. Press down firmly from center to edges.

DATE: 2 May 2013

SAID TO CONTAIN: \$ OP 3 of 7

1. \$ 4. \$

2. \$ 5. \$

3. \$ 6. \$

FROM: Root DNSSEC KSK Ceremony 13

TO: Olaf Kalkman

DO NOT CUT HERE TO OPEN - KEEPSAFE - DO NOT CUT HERE TO OPEN - KEEPSAFE

DO NOT CUT HERE TO OPEN - KEEPSAFE - DO NOT CUT HERE TO OPEN - KEEPSAFE



BB21368993



BB21368993



STOCK # GCS1013
PATENT NO. 6,471,058 & 6,270,256



TO REMOVE CONTENTS - CUT ALONG THIS DOTTED LINE



KEEPSAFE gold KEEPSAFE gold KEEPSAFE gold KEEPSAFE gold

Figure 2

Returning Equipment to Safe #1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
26.	CA, IW1, SSC1 open safe room and enter with equipment cart.	KJD	22:33
27.	SSC1 opens Safe #1 shielding combination from camera.	KJD	22:33
28.	SSC1 removes the safe log and fills the next entry with printed name, date, time, and signature indicating the opening of the safe. IW1 initials the entry. Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.	KJD	22:34
29.	CA records return of HSM in next entry field of safe log with TEB # and HSM serial #, printed name, date, time, and signature. CA CAREFULLY places the HSM into Safe #1 and IW1 initials the entry. HSM2: TEB# BB24646585 ✓ serial # K6002018 ✓	KJD	22:36
30.	CA records return of laptop in next entry field of safe log with TEB #, serial #, laptop #, printed name, date, time, and signature; places the laptop into Safe #1 and IW1 initials the entry. Laptop1 (Dell ATG6400): BB24646586 ✓ serial# 37240147333 ✓	KJD	22:37
31.	CA records return of O/S DVD + HSMFD in next entry field of safe log with TEB #, printed name, date, time, and signature; places the O/S DVD + HSMFD into Safe #1 and IW1 initials the entry. O/S DVD (Rev600) + HSMFD: TEB# BB21907269 ✓	KJD	22:38

Exception
1
return to
safe

→ Laptop 2 BB 24646591 ✓

KJD 22:39

Close Equipment Safe #1

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
32.	SSC1 makes an entry including printed name, date, time, signature and notes "closing safe" in the safe log. IW1 initials the entry. Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.	KJD	22:40
33.	SSC1 places log back in safe and locks Safe #1 (spin dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter clock wise then clock wise). IW1 and CA verify safe is locked and door indicator light is green.	KJD	22:41
34.	IW1, CA, and SSC1 return to ceremony room with equipment cart closing the door behind them.	KJD	22:42

Open Credential Safe #2

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
35.	After a one (1) minute delay, CA, IW1, SSC2, and COs enter the safe room. CA brings a flashlight and the CO brings their OP card TEB with them.	KJD	22:44
36.	SSC2 opens Safe #2 while shielding combination from camera.	KJD	22:45
37.	SSC2 removes the safe log and fills in the next entry with printed name, date, time, and signature indicating the opening of the safe. IW1 initials the entry. Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.	KJD	22:46



Close Credential Safe #2

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
39.	Once all safe deposit boxes are closed, SSC2 makes an entry including printed name, date, time, and signature and notes "Close safe" into the safe log. IW1 initials the entry. <i>Note: If log entry is pre-printed, verify the entry, record time of completion and sign.</i>	KJD	22:51
40.	SSC2 puts log back in safe and locks Safe #2 (spin dial at least two full revolutions each way, counter clock wise then clock wise). IW1 and CA verify safe is locked and door indicator light is green.	KJD	22:52
41.	CA, IW1, SSC2, and COs leave safe room closing the door behind them making sure it is locked.	KJD	22:52

Participant Signing of IW1's Script

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
42.	All participants enter printed name, date, time, and signature on IW1's script coversheet. IW records the completion time. <i>Note: If entry is pre-printed, verify the entry and sign.</i>	KJD	22:57
43.	CA reviews IW1's script and signs it.	KJD	22:59

Signing Out of Ceremony Room

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
44.	IW2 ensures that all participants sign out of Ceremony Room log and are escorted out of the Ceremony Room. SA, IW1 and CA remain in the Ceremony Room.	KJD	23:05

Filming Stops

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
45.	SA stops filming and makes 2 copies of film, one for on-site and one for off-site storage along with IW1 script copies made below.	KJD	00:37 +1

Copying and Storing the Script

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
46.	IW1 makes at least 4 copies of his/her script: one for off-site audit bundle, one for IW1, one for IKOS and copies for other participants, as requested. Audit bundles each contain 1) Output of signer system – HSMFD 2) Copy of IW1's key ceremony script 3) Audio-visual recording 4) Logs from the Physical Access Control and Intrusion Detection System (Range is 07/20/2012 - 08/07/2013) 5) The IW attestation (A.1 below) 6) SA attestation (A.2, A.3 below) All in a TEB labeled "Key Ceremony 14", dated and signed by IW1 and CA. Off-site audit bundle is delivered to off-site storage. The CA holds the ultimate responsibility for finalizing the audit bundle.	KJD	01:17

2/12/2013
Last Ceremony

+1

All remaining participants sign out of ceremony room log and leave.

Audit Bundle Checklist:

1. Output of Signer System (CA)

One electronic copy (physical flash drive) of the HSMFD in each audit bundle, each placed within a tamper-evident bag, labeled, dated and signed by the CA and the IW1

2. Key Ceremony Scripts (IW1)

Hard copies of the IW1's key ceremony scripts, including the IW's notes and the IW's attestation. See Appendix A.1.

3. Audio-visual recordings from the key ceremony (SA)

One set for the original audit bundle and the other for duplicate.

4. Logs from the Physical Access Control and Intrusion Detection System (SA)

One electronic copy (physical flash drive) of the firewall configuration, the screenshots from the PAC-IDS configuration review, the list of the enrolled users, the event log file and the configuration audit log file in each audit bundle, each placed in a tamper-evident bag, labeled, dated and signed by the SA and the IW.

IW confirms the contents of the logs before placing the logs in the audit bundle.

5. Configuration review of the Physical Access Control and Intrusion Detection System (SA)

SA's attestation and hard copies of the screen shots and configuration audit log from the review process. See Appendix A.2.

6. Configuration review of the Firewall System (SA)

SA's attestation and hard copies of the firewall configuration from the review process. See Appendix A.3. Make sure the scrambled passwords are eliminated from the configuration before publishing it.


7. Other items

If applicable.

A.1 Key Ceremony Script (by IW)

I hereby attest that the Key Ceremony was conducted in accordance with this script and any exceptions that may have occurred were accurately and properly documented.

~~Tomofumi Okubo~~ Kim Davies



Date: 7 August 2013



A.2 Access Control System Configuration Review (by SA)

I have reviewed the access control system configuration, the configuration audit log and the assigned authorizations from the other KMF and not found any discrepancies or anything else out of the ordinary.

Enclosed are the configuration audit log, the list of assigned authorizations and the screenshots of the roles configurations.

Enclosed is also an electronic copy of the event log from the access control system ranging from the last log extraction on [date, time UTC] ~~7-15~~ to now.

Alexander Kulik

~~At~~ Feb. 12, 2013 - Aug. 8, 2013


Date: 7 August 2013
8

A.3 Firewall Configuration Review (by SA)

I have reviewed the firewall configuration from the other KMF and not found any discrepancies or anything else out of the ordinary.

Enclosed is the configuration extract from the firewall unit.

Alexander Kulik



Date: 7 August 2013



ICANN DNSSEC Script Exception

Abbreviations

- TEB = Tamper Evident Bag
- HSM = Hardware Security Module
- FD = Flash Drive
- CA = Ceremony Administrator
- IW = Internal Witness
- SA = System Administrator
- SSC = Safe Security Controller

Instructions: Initial each step that has been completed below, e.g., *BTB*. Note time.

①

Note Exception Time

Step	Activity	Initial	Time
1	IW notes date and time of key ceremony exception and signs here:	KJD	21:09
2	IW Describes exception and action below		

TCRS requested TEB for Laptop #2
 be replaced with new TEB. It was
 removed from safe at step 14

Removed TEB A2734916

Added TEB BB24646591

Serial 7292928457

- End of DNSSEC Script Exception -

```

akulik@srx> show configuration | no-more
## Last commit: 2012-02-03 09:41:48 UTC by root
version 10.1R1.8;
system {
    host-name srx;
    domain-name ksk.lax.dns.icann.org;
    location {
        country-code US;
        postal-code 90245;
        building Equinix-LA3;
        floor 1;
        rack 1;
    }
    ports {
        console {
            log-out-on-disconnect;
            type vt100;
        }
    }
    root-authentication {
        encrypted-password "#####"; ##
SECRET-DATA
    }
    name-server {
        199.4.28.18;
        199.4.28.28;
    }
    login {
        user akulik {
            full-name "Alex Kulik";
            uid 2002;
            class super-user;
            authentication {
                encrypted-password
"#####"; ## SECRET-DATA
            }
        }
        user reed {
            full-name "Reed Quinn";
            uid 2003;
            class super-user;
            authentication {
                encrypted-password
"#####"; ## SECRET-DATA
            }
        }
    }
}
services;
syslog {
    archive size 100k files 3;
}

```

```

    user * {
        any emergency;
    }
    host 199.4.28.21 {
        any any;
        match RT_FLOW_SESSION;
        log-prefix SRX-KSK-LAX;
    }
    file messages {
        any critical;
        authorization info;
    }
    file interactive-commands {
        interactive-commands error;
    }
    source-address 199.4.28.145;
}
max-configurations-on-flash 5;
max-configuration-rollback 20;
archival {
    configuration {
        transfer-on-commit;
        archive-sites {
            "scp://srxkskcjr@199.4.28.21:/home/srxkskcjr" password
"#####"; ## SECRET-DATA
        }
    }
}
license {
    autoupdate {
        url https://ae1.juniper.net/junos/key_retrieval;
    }
}
ntp {
    server 199.4.28.17;
    server 199.4.28.27;
    source-address 10.4.28.1;
}
}
interfaces {
    interface-range interfaces-trust {
        member ge-0/0/1;
        member fe-0/0/2;
        member fe-0/0/3;
        member fe-0/0/4;
        member fe-0/0/5;
        member fe-0/0/6;
        member fe-0/0/7;
        unit 0 {
            family ethernet-switching {

```

```

        vlan {
            members vlan-trust;
        }
    }
}
ge-0/0/0 {
    unit 0 {
        family inet {
            address 199.4.28.145/26;
        }
    }
}
vlan {
    unit 0 {
        family inet {
            address 10.4.28.1/24;
        }
    }
}
}
snmp {
    community dnss3c {
        clients {
            10.4.28.253/32;
        }
    }
    trap-options {
        source-address 199.4.28.145;
        agent-address outgoing-interface;
    }
    trap-group kskwest {
        categories {
            authentication;
            link;
            routing;
            startup;
            configuration;
            services;
        }
        targets {
            199.4.28.21;
        }
    }
}
routing-options {
    static {
        route 0.0.0.0/0 next-hop 199.4.28.129;
    }
}
}

```



```

security {
  ssh-known-hosts {
    host 199.4.28.21 {
      rsa-key #####;
    }
  }
  nat {
    source {
      rule-set trust-to-untrust {
        from zone trust;
        to zone untrust;
        rule source-nat-rule {
          match {
            source-address 0.0.0.0/0;
          }
          then {
            source-nat {
              interface;
            }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
zones {
  security-zone trust {
    address-book {
      address localnet 10.4.28.0/24;
    }
    host-inbound-traffic {
      system-services {
        all;
      }
      protocols {
        all;
      }
    }
    interfaces {
      vlan.0;
    }
  }
  security-zone untrust {
    address-book {
      address icann dns 199.4.28.0/22;
    }
    interfaces {
      ge-0/0/0.0 {
        host-inbound-traffic {
          system-services {
            ping;
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

```

