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Protect Children

# Actionable Recommendations for the Tech Industry

Annex to the research report:  
Tech Platforms Used by Online Child Sexual Abuse Offenders

Suojellaan Lapsia, Protect Children ry.  
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AI-generated image

#ReDirection



# Protect Children

Protect Children is a non-governmental, non-profit organisation based in Helsinki, Finland, working globally to end all forms of sexual violence against children. We adopt a holistic, research-based approach to address the issue from multiple angles, advocating for victims, survivors, and families; equipping children and young people with essential skills and knowledge to stay safe online and offline; developing offender-focused prevention measures; and conducting innovative research.

Learn more about Protect Children: [www.suojellaanlapsia.fi/en](http://www.suojellaanlapsia.fi/en)



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Safe Online is the only global investment vehicle dedicated to keeping children safe in the digital world. Through investing in innovation and bringing key actors together, Safe Online helps shape a digital world that is safe and empowering for all children and young people, everywhere. The Tech Coalition Safe Online Research Fund is a groundbreaking collaboration fuelling actionable research and uniting the tech industry with academia in a bold alliance to end online child sexual exploitation and abuse.

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# Key Findings

1. CSAM is easily accessible on the surface web, particularly on pornography sites and social media
  - Most respondents have encountered CSAM on the surface web
  - The surface web provides information on how to access CSAM on the dark web
2. Offenders view and share CSAM on popular social media and encrypted messaging apps
  - Social media platforms are used to search for, view & share CSAM
  - End-to-end encrypted messaging apps are used to search for, view & share CSAM
3. Perpetrators seek contact with children on social media, encrypted messaging apps, and online games
  - Many respondents have sought contact with children on social media
  - Offenders use online gaming platforms to seek contact with children
  - Encrypted messaging apps are used by perpetrators to contact children







# Actionable Recommendations

The findings presented in this report highlight key issues that require urgent action by the tech industry, among other actors. On the basis of the findings of this research, alongside insights from our work, we have developed five actionable recommendations for the tech industry.

The recommendations should be considered holistically, as one approach alone is not adequate to tackle the enormous scale of the problem of online child sexual exploitation and abuse. All actors have a responsibility to address sexual violence against children and keep children safe in all environments.

1. Build and develop platforms with a children's rights-by-design approach
2. Ensure availability and accessibility of online safety resources and information for children
3. Effectively detect, report, and remove CSAM and combat OCSEA
4. Implement deterrence and perpetration prevention measures
5. Ensure robust and proportionate age assurance measures



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# Build and develop platforms with a children's rights-by-design approach

We urge service providers to place children's safety and rights at the forefront of technological development and ensure that digital environments are designed to prioritise children's rights.

We recommend tech companies to design platforms with a children's rights-by-design approach.<sup>1</sup> Child safety must be prioritised in the development of services that are available to children and can influence their safety or well-being. Technology companies should enrich safety-by-design by incorporating children's voices and providing accessible, child-friendly, and effective reporting tools with a meaningful response system.

**End-to-end encryption should not be implemented without appropriate safeguards.** Encrypted platforms are quickly becoming a safe haven for child sexual abuse offenders. The rollout of end-to-end encryption on tech platforms, without appropriate safeguards, directly undermines a children's rights-by-design approach, as it hinders law enforcement efforts to identify and rescue victims, prevents identification of grooming, and prevents tech companies' ability to detect child sexual abuse material. This puts children at increased risk of abuse and exploitation and continues the cycle of revictimisation of survivors. As such, we urge tech companies not to implement end-to-end encryption on their services unless they put in place further safeguards to ensure access to evidence by law enforcement and maintain the ability to detect and report child sexual abuse material.

**Avoid misuse of functionality provided by the platform.** Technology companies must subject all updates to thorough trials to engineer out the possibility to abuse its tools to harm children, always with guidance from children's perspectives. One of the ways to address misuse of the platform's functions is to limit opportunities for contact and interaction between adult and child users, i.e., by making accounts of child users invisible for adult users.

**Monitor and address emerging threats.** Technology companies must take a proactive approach in maintaining child safety by design by continuously monitoring and eliminating emerging risks. This includes constant improvement of existing filtering algorithms, age verification systems, and any other safeguarding mechanisms in place.

**Follow good practices when using AI technologies.** Online service providers must invest in good practices when using AI technologies and elaborate clear guidelines for privacy, personal data protection and information, and user safety. In addition, service providers must implement robust measures to reduce or eliminate the risk of AI being misused or abused, for example to generate CSAM. At the same time, we encourage tech companies to invest resources in AI technologies that contribute to preventing harm, and to train AI algorithms with a focus on child protection and a human rights-based and intersectional perspective, to avoid discrimination and bias.

Any platform that can be accessed by children or influence their safety and well-being must be built with a children's rights-by-design approach. Children must be provided with an opportunity to meaningfully participate in the product development and share their experiences through an effective reporting system. Children's inherent vulnerabilities must not be exploited for profit.

## Ensure availability and accessibility of online safety resources and information for children

We call on online platforms to ensure that online safety resources and information are provided in a comprehensive and accessible manner for all children, families, victims, and survivors.

As evidenced by the research report, social media, instant messengers, and online games are all being used to commit crimes of sexual violence against children. As such, internet service providers have the responsibility to ensure that the rights of the child are respected on their platforms. Moreover, internet service providers must ensure sure that children understand the rights they are entitled to online, understand how their rights are protected, and be well-informed about the safeguarding mechanisms at their disposal.

**Inform children about their rights online.** Tech companies must take effective measures to guarantee children's right to information on their platforms. All information and resources must be comprehensive, available, and accessible to all children and young people. The right to information expands to children and young people's families, as well as to victims and survivors. Internet service providers should offer age-appropriate information in all languages and the information should be culturally adapted to ensure equal access.

**Offer comprehensive information about safeguarding mechanisms.** Over three quarters of respondents to our survey reported that they have encountered CSAM on the surface web, highlighting that CSAM is widely accessible and available on common online platforms and websites. As a result, involuntary exposure to harmful material among children and young people is prevalent. Internet service providers must provide clear and age-appropriate information about what constitutes illegal behaviour or content with relevant examples. Internet service providers must ensure that support and safeguarding mechanisms are easily accessible and well explained, so if a child or young person is concerned about their safety, they know how to access appropriate support. This contributes to prevent discrimination and re-victimisation in case of child victims.

We encourage internet service providers to offer relevant, country-specific, and accessible information for children on where to seek support in cases when a child feels that the platform negatively influences their well-being, when exposed to harmful or illegal content, or when subject to online sexual violence. Internet service providers should inform children what cases must be reported to the police and explain the procedure of reporting. We encourage internet service providers to offer information about available support after a child user blocks another user or flags inappropriate content.

**Adopt an intersectional approach.** Children belonging or identifying themselves with minority groups are at greater risk of being exposed to online child sexual abuse and exploitation, according to WeProtect Global Alliance.<sup>2</sup> As such, internet service providers must take measures to effectively combat sexual violence against children from all angles. Adopting an intersectional approach means recognising the differences between children and understanding the co-existence of multiple forms of discrimination among them, based on gender, race, ethnicity, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, class, and other grounds of discrimination. Through an intersectional approach, internet service providers can ensure that their platforms are adapted and accessible for all children. Ultimately, this would help to ensure that children can stay safe in the digital environment.

# Effectively detect, report, and remove CSAM and combat sexual violence against children online

We urge all internet service providers to take active steps to detect, report, and remove child sexual abuse material from their platforms, and to eliminate all forms of sexual violence against children.

Our research results find that child sexual abuse material is widely accessible and available on the surface web, especially on pornography sites and social media platforms. The circulation of child sexual abuse material online leads to the continuous revictimisation of survivors of sexual violence. In addition, the accessibility of the material increases the risk of exposure to harmful material to children and young people, which has been found to be associated with an increased risk of harmful sexual behaviour.<sup>3</sup>

**Proactively detect child sexual abuse material.** Reactive detection of child sexual abuse material based on user reports is an important measure to ensure the removal of abusive material from online platforms. However, this alone is inadequate to address the proliferation of CSAM online, and efficient proactive detection measures must be adopted. In 2022, electronic service providers sent more than 31.8 million reports of suspected child sexual exploitation to NCMEC's CyberTipline.<sup>4</sup> These reports are essential for helping law enforcement prioritise the most urgent cases, for identifying and rescuing victims,<sup>5</sup> for preventing the further victimisation of children, for empowering survivors, and for discovering trends that can assist in preventing these crimes.<sup>6</sup> We recognise the significant efforts of companies who currently proactively detect and report CSAM and encourage them to continue their efforts to combat child sexual abuse and exploitation.

However, only 236 electronic service providers submitted CyberTipline reports in 2022 and just five companies (Facebook, Instagram, Google, WhatsApp, and Omegle) accounted for more than 90% of the reports.<sup>7</sup> Most tech companies around the world still choose not to proactively detect and report child sexual abuse and exploitation on their platforms.<sup>8</sup> Thus, we urge all companies that host user-generated content, particularly social media platforms, messaging platforms, and file-sharing platforms, to begin proactive detection and reporting of CSAM with urgency. By both proactively and reactively detecting child sexual abuse material, tech companies have an important role in contributing to the removal of the material, thus ending the cycle of revictimisation for victims and survivors.

**Cooperate with law enforcement and report information.** Internet service providers must forge efficient collaboration with national and international law enforcement agencies and report any form of sexual violence against children. Law enforcement agencies must be allowed to conduct searches on the platform to ensure removal of reported, detected, or suspected child sexual abuse material. Furthermore, to facilitate ongoing investigation, it is advisable to provide relevant law enforcement agencies with access to visual and written content exchanged between the perpetrator and the victim that facilitated or constituted sexual violence against children, as well as to any other content or data collected and processed by the service provider about the victim and the perpetrator. Additionally, reporting is key to ensure the effective protection of children from abuse or exploitation and to avoid revictimisation. We urge internet service providers to report to national law enforcement agencies and national reporting hotlines any form of sexual violence against children immediately when brought to their attention.

## RECOMMENDATION 4

# Implement deterrence and perpetration prevention measures

We urge all internet service providers to implement effective deterrence and prevention measures for persons who are at risk of committing crimes of sexual violence against children on their platforms.

It is vital to implement effective deterrence and prevention measures for potential and actual perpetrators of crimes of sexual violence against children, to prevent offending before it occurs. As demonstrated by our research results, child sexual abuse material is widely accessible and available on the surface web, where it is not only viewed, disseminated, and procured by persons actively seeking to engage with the material, but children themselves are also being exposed to the material involuntarily. A majority of current CSAM offenders were first exposed to the material as children themselves. Finally, 40% of CSAM offenders report having sought contact with a child after viewing the material. A clear escalation within the offending pathway is visible, which underlines the importance of effective deterrence and prevention measures for people who search for and view child sexual abuse and exploitation material.

We encourage online service providers and tech companies to make available resources for individuals who are worried about their thoughts and who fear they might commit or recommit harmful acts against children. All tech companies should promote a space of respect for the rights of the child, and of safety and good practices focused on child protection. In addition, online service providers and tech companies should encourage users to report any suspicious, abusive, or harmful content involving children. The reporting processes should be simple and accessible.

All platforms that allow for image or video sharing, in particular pornography websites, must prohibit all search terms that refer to any form of child sexual abuse and exploitation and include deterrence messages to appear when searches are conducted using such terms. Deterrence messages should educate individuals about the repercussions of searching for CSAM, by clearly informing about the real-life consequences on the child victim, as well as the legal consequences of searching for and viewing CSAM or committing any other form of sexual violence against children. Deterrence messages should additionally refer individuals to relevant perpetration prevention resources for individuals at risk of committing or recommitting offences against children. These deterrence messages should appear on all platforms whenever a user searches for CSAM, attempts to contact a child, or carries out any other harmful activity online.

To keep all children safe from sexual violence comprehensively and effectively, prevention efforts must include potential offender-focused prevention and intervention measures at a low threshold.



## RECOMMENDATION 5

# Ensure robust and proportionate age assurance measures

We call on service providers to assure the age of all users meaningfully and consistently, using robust and proportionate measures to create a safer online experience for children and young people.

The adoption of robust age assurance measures is essential to limit opportunities for grooming, and prevent children from accessing harmful content, by regulating access of users to specific content, services, and communication with other users. Service providers should introduce robust and mandatory age assurance mechanisms for all users.

Age assurance must constitute a recurring process rather than a one-time verification to limit opportunities to circumvent the system. Based on the results of age assurance, the users should receive access to age-appropriate content and services offered by the service provider. The users should be clearly informed how and why their age influences access to particular services provided by the platform. If the platform hosts adult content, age assurance must additionally concern every person depicted in the content.

“

In my case, sexual violence has mostly happened online. I used to have free access to the internet because my parents are not very familiar with technology. It started with kid-oriented platforms, where grown men pretended to be kids and got me to give them my phone number and send them pictures of myself.

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**Survivor of childhood sexual violence responding to the global #OurVoice survivor survey**

Technology companies must regularly monitor and eliminate opportunities to abuse the age assurance systems. They should clearly inform the users about the consequences of circumventing the age assurance system and the risks that it can cause to their safety. We also advise platforms to develop effective sanctions for circumventing age assurance system that can affect the user's access to the platform. Users who violate the age assurance system should be identified and removed from the platform.

The age assurance measures must respect the right to personal data and privacy of communications. As implementing an effective international age assurance system that does not compromise users' personal information constitutes a challenge, we strongly recommend supporting the research and development of new-age verification systems.

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