Risks from nuclear power and weapons are on the rise

The risks posed by both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy are increasing. Nowhere is immune from these risks, and the methods used to assess them are imperfect. This is the message from theoretical physicist and arms control specialist Sidney Drell in an article published in Science today. In the article, "A Safer Nuclear Enterprise," Drell and his co-authors (including former Secretary of State George P. Shultz) address these issues through a series of recommendations to improve nuclear safety, with the "clear goal" of global disarmament of nuclear weapons among them.

Contextualized both by Fukushima, which the article claims "demonstrates the fragility of the civil nuclear enterprise," and by growing apprehension surrounding nuclear terrorism, the authors set out three "guiding principles" for leaders in nuclear enterprises, though these might more accurately be described as warnings against complacency.

Increasing risk, imperfectly assessed

The first is that the calculations used to assess risks posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear power are "fallible." There is no implicit criticism of the analysis methods used; rather, the article warns against over-confidence in what are inevitably imprecise methods, and urges governments, nuclear industries, and concerned citizens to "reexamine the assumptions" upon which nuclear energy production, safety, security, and emergency procedures are founded.

Secondly, the article warns that the risks posed by nuclear accidents, regional war, and nuclear terrorism are increasing. The article attributes this increasing risk, at least in part, to emerging nuclear powers that may have insufficient measures in place to keep nuclear weapons or civil nuclear reactors safe, secure, or properly regulated.

Finally, as if preempting the conclusion that established nuclear powers are beyond such concerns, the article warns that "no nation is immune from risks involving nuclear weapons and nuclear power." By way of illustration, Drell points to more than 30 "serious accidents" involving US nuclear weapons, with a footnote citing a DoD report (PDF) listing incidents that occurred between 1950 and 1980. In the context of the report, the DoD defines an accident as any event involving nuclear weapons in which they were accidentally launched, detonated (though not necessarily implying nuclear explosion), lost or stolen, or caused a radioactive contamination or other public hazard. (c.f. the Wikipedia list of military nuclear accidents, which partly overlaps the DoD list.)

The authors also highlight the need for nations with well-established nuclear energy programs to increase safety. Though acknowledging the "admirable" record of the US since Three Mile Island, the article states that Fukushima has highlighted that urgent action is required to address the problem of existing reactors that require the rapid restoration of power in the event of an accident. The safety of such reactors, including boiling water reactors employing aging Mark I containment, has been a point of contention in the US since the Fukushima accident.

Safety, independence, and disarmament

To address theses concerns, the group makes four recommendations. The first is an almost ideological plea to nuclear enterprises and organizations, both military and civilian, to "embrace" safety and security. Though this may sound obvious, the article points out that improving safety brings with it greater regulation and cost, the implication being that such concerns might conceivably suffer if left to those with a financial interest.

This leads to the article's second recommendation: that nuclear regulation be independent. Again using the example of the United States, Drell warns that, although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) has a reputation for high standards, attention should be paid to "regulatory capture" by vested interests, which the report claims fund "a high proportion of the NRC budget." The NRC's precursor, the Atomic Energy Commission, was abolished in 1974 due to such a conflict of interest.

Along similar lines, the third measure proffered is that "all aspects" of nuclear enterprise be subject to peer review, although the piece is a bit vague on exactly what that should entail. The authors suggest that the example set in the US by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (which provides on-site peer reviews to evaluate nuclear power plants) be adopted internationally by the World Association of Nuclear Operators to shore up safety in the global nuclear power industry. Drell et. al. also recommend peer review in the weapons industry by independent experts to "rigorously challenge weapons and safety systems."

The article's fourth and final recommendation is that measures to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons be "organized around a clear goal." The authors call for global efforts to reduce nuclear proliferation, and to see that they are not obtained by "potentially dangerous hands." Ultimately the authors claim that catastrophe can be avoided by building international trust—trust that could be fostered by "progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons."

The report concludes by calling for a better-informed public—a prerequisite, it argues, for a proper response to future nuclear incidents, and essential in increasing public confidence in the nuclear industry.

In addition to Sidney Drell, Professor Emeritus at Stanford University's SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, the report was coauthored by economist and former US Secretary of State George P. Shultz, and nuclear proliferation specialist and former Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the White House National Security Council Steven P. Andreasen.

Science, 2012. DOI:10.1126/science.1221842 (About DOIs).