1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION		
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5	THE SCO GROUP, INC.		
6	Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant,)		
7))		
8	vs.) Case No.) 2:03-CV-294 DAK		
9	INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES) CORPORATION,)		
10))		
11	Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff.		
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14			
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DALE A. KIMBALL		
16	DATE: OCTOBER 24, 2006		
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCTIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
18	MOTION HEARING		
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25	Reporter: REBECCA JANKE, CSR, RMR		
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1 OCTOBER 24, 2006 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 2 PROCEEDINGS 3 4 THE COURT: We're here this morning in the matter of the SCO Group, Inc., vs. International Business 5 Machines Corporation, 2:03-29 -- 2:03-CV-294. For 6 plaintiff, Mr. Mark James. There you are. MR. JAMES: Yes, Your Honor. Good morning. 8 9 THE COURT: Good morning. 10 Mr. Stuart Singer. 11 MR. SINGER: Good morning, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: And Ms. Sashi Boruchow, correct? 13 MS. BORUCHOW: Yes. Good morning. 14 THE COURT: For defendant, Mr. David Marriott Mr. Todd Shaughnessy, Mr. Michael Burke and Mr. Wing 15 16 Chiu. Correct? 17 MR. MARRIOTT: Good morning. 18 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Good morning. 19 MR. BURKE: Good morning. 20 MR. CHIU: Good morning 21 THE COURT: All right. This is plaintiff's objection to the order of Magistrate Wells. Who is going 22 23 to argue? Mr. Singer? 24 MR. SINGER: I will, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: And, Mr. Marriott?

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              MR. MARRIOTT:
                              I will, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: How long do you need?
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              MR. SINGER: Your Honor, if I could have up to
    40 minutes for the initial argument, I would appreciate
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    it. I probably could get by in 30 minutes.
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              THE COURT: The initial argument?
                                                That means
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   how much are you going to need later?
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              MR. SINGER: I would like to reserve 15 minutes
   if I could.
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              THE COURT:
                          Fifty-five minutes?
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              MR. SINGER: Yes. There are a lot of issues in
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    this motion, but I think if I had 30 and 15.
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              THE COURT: I'll give you 35 and 15.
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              How much do you need?
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              MR. MARRIOTT:
                              Forty minutes should be fine,
   Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Singer.
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              MR. SINGER: Thank you. Your Honor, we've
   prepared a book with certain exhibits, if I could present
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    it to the Court.
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              THE COURT: Have you given defendants their
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    copy?
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              MR. SINGER: Yes, I have. May it please the
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   Court, we have looked forward to this argument on these
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   objections for some time. First of all, the issue before
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the Court is significant. The Magistrate's order that's under review and the issues here relate to a significant number of the technology claims which have been dismissed without a day in court. And we think that's wrong for the reasons which I will spend my argument on.

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But, beyond that, the order is predicated on the view that the SCO group and its attorneys have been derelict in following orders of this Court and have been sandbagging, laying in wait with certain information that we have not turned over, to spring it on IBM at some time, presumably at trial, and that could not be further from the truth.

We have sought, in responding to this Court's order of July, 2005, and the interrogatories and other discovery, to be as forthcoming and complete as possible. And there is record evidence of that which supports it.

The nature of these items is that every last coordinate of source code is simply not known to SCO for each of the items, and we submit that is not a basis on which those items are to be tossed out of Court without a hearing.

There are a number of bases for this -- these objections. They include the fact that the order did not have particularized findings for virtually all of the technology items that have been struck; did not, as

required by Tenth Circuit law, consider alternatives to 2 striking those actions; did not result from an 3 evidentiary hearing, although it was based on factual 4 issues; did not require IBM to prove specialized, particularized prejudice; did not, as a matter of law, we 5 believe, follow from the earlier orders that this Court 7 and the Magistrate Judge had entered; and, finally, does 8 not rest on any factual basis that shows that SCO has willfully, intentionally flouted any orders of this 9 10 Court.

But, before turning to those and the standard of review with respect to those issues, I'd like to address how these disclosure items were prepared. As reflected on tab 1 and tab 2 of the book which we've presented to you and IBM's counsel, we took the obligations of this Court's orders in July 2005 very seriously.

Before that time, as the Court is aware, there was a lot of jockeying between the parties as to who had to provide what discovery, what level of specificity was needed, a lot of orders on both sides on motions to compel.

23 THE COURT: That occasionally happens, doesn't

24 it?

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MR. SINGER: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

THE COURT: That occasionally happens?

MR. SINGER: It happens in other cases, and it happens, as the Court is aware, a great deal in this case. And the Magistrate Judge and the Court gave us a substantial amount of discovery that we received in the early part of 2005. We had experts working with that discovery, and over principally 2005, we have had, working with our experts, prepared a comprehensive list of 294 items that we called the December submission because they were submitted in December pursuant to the Court's order, and various interrogatories were updated at that time pursuant to the Court's orders that have thousands of pages of supporting exhibits, and almost in all cases the actual disclosure that is in controversy.

It doesn't just talk about, well, IBM somewhere disclosed something but reproduces as an e-mail in the exhibits what we're talking about. This is the disclosure in question.

The principal -- other than the lawyers, the principal individual who was involved in that preparation was a gentleman named Marc Rochkind. He is an expert in UNIX programming. He is an expert on it, and he offered, in connection with these issues, a declaration where he makes clear that, in almost all cases, the actual written communication constituting the disclosure was provided.

And then, as we reproduce at tab 2, he stated, for each of the 294 items, "I did everything I could to ensure that everything we had was disclosed and that it was organized in the most accessible possible manner."

Counsel to SCO made it very clear that this was what they wanted me to do. I made sure that every tab contained a publicly -- containing a publicly available e-mail had the complete URL address where it could be found on the internet. He states that he made sure that versions, lines and files would be cited where available.

There has been no hearing, no evidentiary hearing in this case, no basis upon which Mr. Rochkind's sworn testimony, buttressed by the representations of counsel in open court, that we have provided everything we have; we are not holding back anything; that the information that was available on these was provided.

Now, I think it's useful to consider the information that's being requested that is at the heart of this order along with IBM's terminology of nine coordinates of code, even though that never appears in any Court order that has been rendered in this case, but it's a useful way to think about the issue.

At tab 3, the breakdown of what IBM talks about is the nine coordinates of code that they are claiming are missing, and they are really for each of three areas:

Versions of file systems, operating systems, files within those operating systems, and lines of code. And the first one of those three areas is the disclosure itself. And where there is an item in controversy that involved source code — and there's a lot of items that aren't subject to today's motion that involve source code where we were able to provide chapter and verse; the version, line and file. They are not the subject of IBM's motion.

not been provided by SCO.

THE COURT: Or of Judge Well's order, right?

MR. SINGER: Or of Judge Well's order. That
order concerns 198 of the 294 items, so there's a lot of
items there where the source code was provided, and where
there isn't a source code disclosure, when the engineer
at IBM who's telling someone in the Linux community how
to do something that we think is protected and doesn't
give them source code, we can't create that source code.
You can't cite the coordinates that don't exist, and
there is no evidence in this record that there are any
such coordinates in the disclosures themselves that have

The next item is where much of the debate really centers on. It's origin information; the issue being that SCO has not, for many of these 198 items, provided a location of source code either in UNIX or Dynix or AIX, the systems that we maintain are subject to

our contractual protections.

Now, it's important to note that on almost all of those technology items, there is a written admission in the text of the items that it comes from Dynix or AIX. There is what we would consider an admission of liability if our contract theories are legally correct. It is an admission that that particular method or concept comes out of Dynix. But the technologist did not say that it comes out of Dynix at this file location and at this line of code. And our position is: You cannot expect SCO, and you certainly shouldn't sanction SCO for not being able to tell IBM what lines of code an IBM engineer had in his or her mind when making such a method or concept disclosure.

It's information which, if there is a particular location, it is uniquely within the mind of the IBM technologist who's writing an e-mail to the Linux community saying, "I want to tell you about how we did this in Dynix," but he doesn't tell them where that's found in Dynix. If anyone has that information, it's that IBM technologist, and there is no evidence in this record that IBM has ever asked its own employees for that origin information, no position in any expert reports that they have tried to get it from their engineers.

If those engineers told them, "We don't know

what it is," how can SCO be expected to supply that? And if those engineers know what it is, then the information is already in the possession of IBM.

The third category is destination information, where these disclosures wound up having an impact on Linux. For virtually every one of the items that has been struck under this order, we have provided the file locations where SCO contends that information has impacted Linux. There has been no indication that we have been derelict by failing to provide more specific line identifications in all the lines in that file or that IBM is prejudiced because they are told where the file is but there is some question as to which lines in that file were impacted by that method or concept, and there is no finding by the Magistrate Judge with respect to that.

Now, I'd like, if I might -- from tab 4, we have reproduced an exhibit that Marc Rochkind prepared that relates to each of the challenged items by IBM. A checkmark in the respective column shows that for the item on that row, what information was provided. Column A indicates that the actual disclosure of code or method and concept was actually provided. Column B indicates where is the source code reference on those. And those were always provided. Column C, a checkmark indicates

that somewhere in that item there is an express statement by IBM that that in fact came from Dynix or another one of the protected systems.

There is an admission, we contend, of liability if our contract theories are correct.

And the final column is: "X" indicates that there have been file locations in Linux identified in our December submission.

Now, I'd like, Your Honor, to take a few minutes to talk about just a handful of examples. I think the examples illustrate the thoroughness, the specificity of the disclosures provided. Each of these examples has expressly been raised in briefs below and in arguments. None of these examples were expressly addressed in the June 28 order, but yet all the claims we have relating to these technology items have been precluded by that order.

At tab 6 we have an item called differential profiles. It's item number 146. This was a method and concept where we had the entire e-mail chain in which the code submission to Linux is proposed. We had a reference in there to where you had scripts -- that is the source code -- from Dynix and where those could be found in Linux. And as Mr. Rochkind explained in his declaration, he couldn't go behind IBM's apparent protection on the

internet to get at that source code because it's on an internal IBM server where that source code is located and so the most we could do is identify the reference to where it could be found.

IBM has access to it. SCO does not. But yet this item, without any discussion in the order, is one of the items struck for lack of specificity. And I might note this is an unusual item for another reason. This is the one example that IBM pointed to in a declaration filed with its opposition papers of where we were lacking. So we're taking IBM's own example here and showing on that example there's specific -- there's sufficient specificity.

At tab 7, talking about a method and concept involving locking, and there's source code patches identified that consist of hundreds of lines of source code with version, file and line in there. There is an admission by the IBM developer of that, Mr. Lindsley, who said this his experience with this came out of things he did at Sequent, which we believe are subject to our contractual protections.

So, you have specificity here, you have an admission, but yet this was struck. You don't have anything in the record that IBM ever went to Mr. Lindsley and asked him, "Where in Dynix exactly in the source

code -- where were you thinking of when you came up with
this method and concept?"

But if there is such a location, Mr. Lindsley, who works for IBM, would be the person who knew that.

At tab 8, there's another method called semaphores, number 53. It's used in the locking mechanism. Again, the IBM developer, a man named Tim Wright, says that under -- these are not currently used in Linux and that the classic coding style in Dynix/ptx is the following. And we provide the exact source code that he revealed to the Linux community relating to that method and concept. He then testified under oath that that particular code and method came from source files of Dynix source code.

And we identified specific Linux files that related to that method and concept and the Linux developer, a man named Phillips, to whom the disclosure was made. IBM has, in the briefing on this and the argument on this said not one word about item 53. There is no finding about item 53 in the Magistrate's order, but it has been struck from our case.

Item 38 at tab 9 is another example of checking for updates in memory. Item 46 at tab 10 on bug fixes is the same thing. And, in addition to these five examples, Your Honor, we have cited upwards of a dozen other

examples in the objections we filed together with an appendix. And we think that it leads to the first fatal defect in the order below, which is the failure of that order to make particularized findings required by Tenth Circuit law if you're going to throw out and sanction a party in the way which has been done here.

We cite at tab 11 Tenth Circuit case law that that requires particularized findings for a sanction order of this type, the Proctor & Gamble case, the Gripe vs. City of Enid case. You need detailed and specific findings, and you don't have those here. For virtually all of the disclosures where we've been dismissed to present claims to a jury involving that technology, there is no particularized finding or discussion at all. All there is, is a Magistrate's statement that all the 198 items were reviewed but are not legally sufficient.

We are not questioning whether or not the Magistrate reviewed those. That's not the issue. The point is: We cannot meaningfully address, and the Court cannot meaningfully review, as the Tenth Circuit said, a determination that just says, "I've looked at everything, and these 198 items just aren't sufficient in my view." That does not meet the requirements of law established in this Circuit and elsewhere that you have to have detailed and specific findings.

We think that stems from a second related failure, Your Honor, and that, as we point out at tab 12, is the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing. Now, SCO expressly requested an evidentiary hearing at the argument in this case. IBM has said, well, we didn't request it in writing earlier. Well, the first time that they submitted any evidence — their initial motion was a ten-page motion. No declarations. And it really just talked about the July 2005 order, not about other discovery requests. We responded to that fully.

In the reply below is when IBM submitted its first declaration from Mr. Davis, one of their experts. Therefore, it was appropriate at oral argument -- and we submitted then or got leave to submit a responding declaration from Mr. Rochkind, but at that point you have an evidentiary conflict, and at that point we asked for an evidentiary hearing so that these issues could be decided not just based on declarations or arguments of counsel but on the facts.

Let's hear Mr. Wright and Mr. Lindsley say, even though they are the developers from IBM who disclosed this method and concept, that they don't know where in Dynix it's found, but yet we should be thrown out of court on those items because we can't tell IBM.

Some of the issues that an evidentiary hearing

would have been required for: The disputes between the respective experts; Davis on their side, Rochkind on our side over whether sufficient specificity was provided; whether we in fact have but are simply not disclosing more specific code locations, the idea that somehow we're sandbagging IBM. And it should be noted that Courts in many cases have recognize that if there is a concern with sandbagging, the remedy is -- you don't throw out the evidence and the detail that's provided. What you do is you stop that party later at trial from introducing evidence or disclosing an item that should have been mentioned earlier.

And IBM has full rights to object if that were ever to occur later in this case; at the trial of this case or otherwise, if we say, "Forget the 294 items. We have item number 295." And they, of course, know how to object to that. There has not been sandbagging going on, and this is not an appropriate remedy for it. An evidentiary hearing could have looked at the prejudice to IBM on an item-by-item basis rather than a generalized discussion.

And it could also have dealt with an item which is the subject of a separate motion before the Court, which is the effect of IBM's own actions in this case after this lawsuit was filed, and directing people in

their Linux technology center to do what's been called cleaning their sandboxes. Their sandboxes are actually work spaces where they are working on this. The Linux technology center is the heart of this lawsuit. That's where this work is being done.

After this lawsuit was filed, directions went out, confirmed by Dan Frye, the head of the center, for those developers to take off their system, to clean their sandboxes of the AIX and the Dynix code. We think that is wrong, and we have a motion dealing with that pending before the Court. But that is also a factual matter that relates to our ability to come up now with all those code locations relating to those developers' work.

In addition, as pointed out in the cases on tab 13, the Court did not make any express findings about alternative remedies. That's required under the Ehrenhaus case, a Tenth Circuit case, which says that a lesser sanction needs to be considered before you throw out claims. There is nothing in this order that supports it. As I mentioned, there are clear alternatives that should have been considered. If there is a concern that SCO is sandbagging someone, that is addressed at the time of trial by excluding improperly withheld evidence.

Moreover, we argued and still argue that the specificity and the prejudice involved here should have

been considered in light of expert reports. This order was entered before the expert process. We have tendered seven expert reports, IBM eleven, but for a case in which IBM has throughout the case said our claims are totally without merit, Your Honor, they have seen the need to retain no fewer than eleven experts to submit reports in this case.

These are very highly technical issues, and if one is to make judgments about requisite specificity and prejudice, that should be done after the expert discovery process, which has now been done. All the reports have been tendered, and all those experts have been deposed. To the extent there is an issue about getting additional time for discovery of their experts to respond, that is an additional lesser remedy, again not considered on the record.

Now I'd like to say a few words, if I might, about the scope of review. It is our position that this ruling is dispositive. It is, on its face, a motion -- an order that grants IBM's motion -- they call it this -- to limit SCO's claims. Now, they have tried to backtrack some in their briefs on that, but, as filed, it was a motion to limit SCO's claims. And when it is granted, it does exactly that. It limits our claims.

THE COURT: So your argument is that this is

subject to de novo review?

MR. SINGER: Precisely, Your Honor. And we are supported in that by a lot of case law. We have cited that in our briefs, and we have some at tab 15 in this book, that when the decision has the effect of a dispositive ruling, de novo review is required. The Ocelot case from the Tenth Circuit says that -- that was dealing with a discovery sanction saying it's equivalent to an involuntary dismissal of a claim. It requires de novo review. And the Tenth Circuit has indicated you don't have to look at the label, although in this case the label on IBM's motion supports our point, but even if IBM had labeled their motion differently, the effect of the order is dispositive.

There are 188 claims of technology disclosures which we contend each and every one of which is a breach of contract which will, if this order is left in place, never see a jury, will never have their day in court.

Even less drastic orders -- and we provide examples of some of those at tab 16 -- have been given de novo review. And as we point out in tab 17, with Wright and Miller's reference to the Tenth Circuit's approach, requires the Court to consider the impact of the action taken on the case.

Your Honor, one of the cases we've cited in

connection with this is a patent case out of New York where in fact one claim out of a lot of patent claims was dismissed because it wasn't appropriately -- it wasn't timely filed. Not 188, but one. And the Court there said, "That dismisses a claim on which liability could be found," just like these technology claims dismiss a basis on which liability could be found, and de novo review is required.

Now, I'd like to briefly note that even deferential review is not non-review. IBM has talked about that the review here should be something like abuse of discretion or even a dead fish standard. It has to smell like dead fish. And that's not found anywhere in the Tenth Circuit case law.

THE COURT: An interesting standard, though.

MR. SINGER: It is an interesting standard.

And I can see why a party who is defending a ruling would like to invoke it from time to time, but it's not the law. And, in addition, regardless of the general scope of review, Your Honor, as the Court knows, issues of law are always reviewed de novo. The interpretation of this Court's orders, that's a de novo issue. Whether or not you should have an evidentiary hearing on particularized findings, those are matters of law applying Tenth Circuit precedent. Those are clearly issues that, regardless of

standard of review for the factual findings, have to be reviewed de novo by this Court.

But as we point out at tab 21, even mixed questions of fact and law, where it's predominantly applying the legal principles, calls for de novo review, even if there's a more limited scope of review generally.

Now, I'd like to discuss next the issue that we have violated a Court order because we contend that, in addition to providing tremendous specificity, that we have not violated any Court orders in connection with this matter.

At tab 22, we reproduce what IBM had proposed this Court include in its July order. It's July 2005 order said that the parties should disclose misuse of materials with specificity. It didn't say anything about line coordinates of code. IBM has proposed Language which talks about providing, for each misused item, version, file and line of code and origin information. The Court did not include that in its order. We believe it was reasonable for the Court not to include it in its order because the type of specificity required and available is going to differ depending on what the source material has. We are being sanctioned as though this was in the order, when in fact it isn't.

Now, with respect to the nine coordinates of

code -- and I point this out at tab 23 -- there has never been an express order on the subject. This whole position -- and I am not going to go into detail on all these because I think that the briefs set these forward. What's clear is there is no express orders on the subject of nine coordinates of source code. That is something which IBM seeks to glean from these discovery requests.

Until this whole proceeding on the motion to strike our claims, there has been no consideration or argument on the level of specificity that should be provided for method and concept disclosures where source code is not a part of the disclosure, and there has been no order, following the December submissions, that tells us that you need to provide X, Y and Z or you will have your claims struck. Instead, the order just goes directly to striking those claims.

Now, I'd like to point out a few things about the discovery that is now being cited in addition to the July 2005 order which was the basis for the original motion. Piggybacked on top of that has been discovery requests. At tab 25 — this is IBM's request — their interrogatory, principal interrogatory that is at issue here, does ask for identification of product, file and line of code. But it qualifies it with the words "where appropriate," which is an important qualification because

if you don't have a source code disclosure, you can't create coordinates.

Now, I'd like to turn, if I might, Your Honor, to tab 29 and address what the Court found, what the Magistrate Judge found to be the most important factor in entering her order. And that was that at the beginning of the case SCO defined -- identified in one of its discovery requests, in a way which the Magistrate believed would require providing these type of coordinates for source code. And, first of all, this issue was never briefed or argued below.

This came in on an expert witness declaration that IBM sought leave to submit post-argument to respond to our expert, was granted that leave, and then put into that expert witness declaration our discovery request that the Magistrate Judge then relied upon. Without argument our motion to strike that declaration or to have an opportunity to respond to that declaration was denied.

So the points here are ones that would have come out, that those discovery requests qualified "identify" to where that was appropriate, just like IBM did in its interrogatory number 1. The order from the Magistrate says that she assumes that if IBM hadn't given us source code coordinates on all of this, there would have been a motion to compel and that IBM must have done

that. And that, in fact, is not the case. IBM didn't do that, but on these grounds no motion to compel was brought.

This simply is not an appropriate basis, SCO's discovery request at the beginning of the case and how it defines "identify" on which any sanction order, let alone a sanction order dismissing our claims, should be evaluated. It shows that there is no clear order saying nine coordinates of source information must be provided on each technology item or it will be struck from the case. And such an order would be inappropriate because there is no finding that in order to make our case, in order to prove our claims, you have to have that level of detail.

There is an additional basis for why this order should be reversed. And that is: There is no evidence of willful noncompliance. At tab 30, repeat the case law which includes U.S. Supreme Court cases, the Tenth Circuit case involving Westinghouse, which says if you are going impose a sanction like this, you have to have willfulness, you have to have an intentional noncompliance.

Now, IBM says that, well, we voluntarily assembled these reports, so it must have been intentional. That would make the standard meaningless.

Our position is: You have to show that we have information within our ability to provide that we have withheld and that then it becomes a willful action, and there is no such evidence. There is simply no evidence of that.

If one turns to tab 33, the June 28 order cites no explicit evidence of willfulness. What the Magistrate's order says is that there is no evidence before the Court to indicate that SCO lacked the ability to comply, and given our public statements, it would appear that SCO had more than enough evidence to comply. We submit that that point is wrong. First of all, there is evidence that we have provided everything we have. That's Mr. Rochkind's declaration that says that expressly. And I quote certain parts of that declaration at that exhibit number.

And, in addition, SCO's prior public statements do not indicate and cannot be read to indicate that SCO has source code coordinates for disputed items. It is true SCO said, back when it --

THE COURT: What would be the best way to read those public statements in your view?

MR. SINGER: I think that those were statements saying we have a lot to offer in this case, a lot has occurred. I think it involved statements which you

might -- the Court may have observed have not been made in recent years because we believe that these statements should be reserved in court. Those were statements in reaction to a lot of public inquiry and a lot of attention to this case, which said that we have a lot of source code, we have a lot of technology items to talk about.

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We have defended each of those statements in an appendix to the briefs in front of the Magistrate, and I believe it's also in the briefing in front of this Court. Those statements are true. Those statements were related to source code contributions. Most of the items here are method and concept contributions that were not unearthed by our experts until 2005 when Mr. Rochkind and some of our other experts, like Professor Ivey started working with the discovery and starting drilling down on this.

And there certainly is no statement in any of the public statements made by SCO in 2003 which says that we have source code for these items, but, you know, we're not going to tell you about them. Those items weren't even identified until 2005. And, you know, we -- whether or not those statements should have been made when they had been made or whether or not the Court -- the case should have been tried only in this courtroom, the fact is that those statements do not support the finding here

of willfulness or the exclusion of 188 items of technology disclosures that we have identified in this case to IBM.

Now, I'd like to note that IBM's showing of prejudice is also inadequate. They have -- it's basically an analogy in the Magistrate's order to a shoplifter from Neiman Marcus being caught outside the store but not being told what he has taken. And that clearly isn't the case here. We have provided tremendous detail, in thousands of pages of exhibits and the types of examples we have shown. It's more akin to that shoplifter being told what he has taken but not being able to, perhaps, cite the catalog number where it appears in the Neiman Marcus catalog. That would be a more are apt analogy, we contend.

Honor, is discussed at tab 35 in this report is that this ruling can be vacated without undue delay to the trial schedule. We much want this case to go to trial on the schedule that's set, February of 2007. SCO's expert reports are complete on these issues. Our experts have addressed all these items. We can limit the 188 items going forward certainly to just those set forth in the Rochkind and Ivey reports, which are not all of those.

We submit that IBM's experts should be able to

quickly respond to these expert reports because their reports were due only three weeks after this order came down. And one presumes that they would have been working on those. They couldn't count on a judge striking these items from our case. They should get at least those three weeks. They should even get more time than three weeks, within reason, and that should go forward along with the summary judgment consideration that the Court is engaged in now.

And, if there are any issues which then, at the time of trial, relate to whether or not a specific technology item has been identified sufficiently, those can be raised either in connection with the Daubert process of experts or at a pretrial conference at that time, where you have a chance for an evidentiary hearing and where it can be appropriately handled on a full record. And we submit that that process would lead to no delay or, at most, a very short delay in the trial as currently scheduled and that that would be a fair and appropriate way of dealing with these issues.

Thank you very much.

THE COURT: That you, Mr. Singer.

Mr. Marriott.

MR. MARRIOTT: Thank you, Your Honor. SCO is, Your Honor, nothing, if not liberal in its accusations of

error. By my count SCO accuses Magistrate Judge Wells of somewhere on the order of 20 separate errors, and despite the number of those objections, Your Honor, there are in fact three simple points that dispose of SCO's objections, and it is on those points, with Your Honor's permission, that I would like to focus.

2.1

Magistrate Judge Wells, in her order, focused on two provisions of Rule 37. Rule 37(b)(2) and Rule 37(b)(3), and if Your Honor looks at the book, which has been provided, at tabs 1, 2 and 3, you will see the language from those orders -- from those rules, rather. Under Rule 37(c), Your Honor, a party that fails to disclose information required in discovery by a Court is automatically precluded from using that evidence at trial or at a hearing unless the party failing to make the disclosure can show either a substantial justification for its failure to provide the ordered information or harmlessness.

And the three points I'd like to make, Your Honor, flow from those -- from those rules. The first point is that SCO failed to provide version, file and line information as order by the Court and as required by Rule 26(e). The second point I'd like to make is that SCO failed to show substantial justification for its failure to provide version, file and line information.

And finally, Your Honor, I'd like to demonstrate that SCO failed to show that its failure to provide that information was harmless.

Now, before I come to the first of those points, Your Honor, if I may, I'd like to emphasize three facts that are undisputed and say a word about the standard of review. The first undisputed fact, Your Honor, is that the crux of SCO's case is that IBM has misused, in some respect, the elements of three separate sets of operating systems, which we depicted, if I can ask my colleague to hold the chart -- which we depict on that chart which appears also in Your Honor's book.

IBM is alleged to have misused the elements of UNIX System V on the one hand, AIX or Dynix on the other, and Linux as a third set of operating systems. It is undisputed, Judge, that those operating systems are comprised of hundreds of versions, millions of files and billions of lines of source codes, methods and concepts.

Second undisputed fact, Judge, is that because of the size of the universe of potentially implicated codes, methods and concepts, IBM propounded a series of discovery requests which are illustrated at tab 5 of the book in which, contrary to what Mr. Singer just argued, IBM asked in very specific terms for. And I will walk Your Honor through this, with the Court's permission,

momentarily; version, file and line information with respect to every one of the allegedly misused operating system elements.

Undisputed fact number 3, Judge. In response to IBM's discovery requests, in SCO's final disclosures of allegedly misused information, SCO failed, as to 187 of its 294 items, to identify even the most basic identifying information, version, file and line information.

And if Your Honor will look at tab 6 of the book which we've provided, you will see there an illustration of SCO's failings in this respect. As to not a single one, Judge, of the 187 items did SCO provide line information relating to System V. Not a single line of System V code is identified with respect to any of those 187 items. As to AIX and Dynix, which are alternative categories, if you look at the middle two columns, not a single line of AIX or Dynix code is provided with respect to those two sets of operating systems.

And finally, now, with respect to Linux, SCO provided line information with respect to three of the 187 items of allegedly misused information. And, as to those three, Judge, they failed to provide even version information for the supposed improper disclosures. There

are, by rough estimation, a hundred -- 500 plus versions of Linux.

Those are the three undisputed facts I would submit are of great consequence to this motion.

Now, as to the standard of review. SCO argues that Magistrate Judge Wells' decision is entitled to no deference, and that is wrong for at least two reasons. The first reason, Your Honor, is that Magistrate Judge Wells' decision was, contrary to Mr. Singer's contention, a non-dispositive order. Non-dispositive orders are reviewed, as Your Honor knows, pursuant to the clearly erroneous or clear error standard. A firm and definite conviction of error is required.

As the Seventh Circuit puts it: The decision must have the stench of a five-week-old dead, unrefrigerated fish. Whether or not the Tenth Circuit has adopted the same language, Your Honor, the fact of the matter remains: The decision must stink under that standard in order to be reversed.

Even if, Your Honor -- even if the standard of review here were de novo, as I propose now to show, Judge Wells' decision which, frankly, is proper, I would submit, under any standard of review, should be affirmed.

Let me take you now to the question of whether the order here was dispositive. An order is dispositive

under the rules and under the governing cases if it disposes of a claim or a defense in an action. Claim, for this purpose, is defined, Your Honor, as cause of action. In SCO's operative Complaint, it asserts nine cause of action. In its operative Answer to IBM's Counterclaim, it asserts 14 affirmative defenses. Magistrate Judge Wells' order does not dismiss, strike or remove from the case any one of SCO's nine claims for relief. Nor does it dismiss, remove or strike from the case any one of SCO's affirmative defenses. Magistrate Judge Wells entered her order not

Magistrate Judge Wells entered her order not prusuant to Rule 12 or Rule 56, she entered her order pursuant to Rule 37 and Rule 26. Every one of SCO's claims is, as SCO publicly acknowledged following the entry of Magistrate Judge Wells' order, in the case. Now SCO offers several arguments, Judge, as to why that isn't true.

First. Mr. Singer said this morning that IBM styled its motion as a motion to limit the scope of SCO's claims. As Mr. Singer himself pointed out, Judge, the cases are perfectly clear that it is not the relief requested, but it is the order entered that determines whether an issue is dispositive and, in any event, if Mr. Singer had read the continued title of IBM's motion, it is about limiting the scope of SCO's claims to the

items properly disclosed in SCO's final disclosures.

Second. Mr. Singer and SCO in their papers contend that the order was dispositive because it was, quote, plainly intended to be dispositive. And I refer Your Honor to page 13 of SCO's reply for that argument. That is simply not true. The motion IBM brought was brought under Rules 1, 26, 30 and 37. The order was decided under Rule 37 and Rule 26. Magistrate Judge Wells issued an order. She did not issue a report and recommendation, as one would expect of a Judge who believed she was issuing a dispositive order.

Moreover, Your Honor's order of reference, which you will find at page 11 of the book before you, is quite clear that Magistrate Judge Wells was to proceed only with respect to non-dispositive matters. And I would respectfully submit that if SCO had believed, when it received IBM's motion requesting the relief that it requested and when SCO argued that motion before Magistrate Judge Wells, if it had believed Magistrate Judge Wells could not properly hear that motion, as SCO now contends is the case, it would have, should have and could have then objected. It didn't because the relief suggested is not dispositive.

Next, Your Honor, SCO contends that the order is dispositive because it affects what Mr. Singer calls

claims or causes of action in SCO's final disclosures.

That, Your Honor, is an interesting effort at relabeling.

SCO's final disclosures contain 294, by SCO's own words,

items. Those items represent collections of evidence to

support SCO's claims. Now, in its papers here, they are

renamed claims with the argument that any effort to touch

7 upon a claim causes it to represent a cause of action.
8 That is simply not what Magistrate Judge Wells

was doing, and I would refer you, Your Honor, to page 12 of the book before you where, in her order, Magistrate

Judge Wells, at page 2, made perfectly clear what she was

12 doing.

Sorry, Judge. This is tab 12 of the book.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MARRIOTT: She says in her quote at the outset that all evidence needs to be on the table, and, after it's on the table, there will be a decision. Then she says: "The current motion focuses on the interpretation of the Court's prior orders and exactly what evidence should have been provided. The sanction IBM seeks --" and she describes it -- " precluding SCO from using certain alleged misappropriated items."

And I would respectfully submit, Your Honor, that any reasonable reading of SCO's final disclosures, under any reasonable reading of SCO's disclosures, they

are collections of items of evidence. They are not
causes of action. If they were causes of action, Your
Honor, SCO would have been required under Rule 15 to make
an amendment to amend its Complaint to assert these new
causes of action. The deadline to make amendments to
pleadings had passed. SCO had sought leave of Court to
make an amendment to the pleading, and it wasn't
permitted.

Finally, Your Honor, SCO suggests that the cases are supportive of SCO's view that the order here at issue was a dispositive one, and I would respectfully submit that that is not the case. If you look at Mr. Singer's exhibit, Your Honor, where he lays out three cases which he says support the idea that the review here is dispositive, he cites Ocelot, Smith and Lister.

Ocelot, Your Honor, struck a cause of action. Smith remanded a case and effectively, in doing so, dismissed it. And the Lister decision denied IFP status and effectively, in so doing, dismissed the action.

None of these cases stand for the proposition that an order limiting the scope of claims, like limiting the scope of evidence permitted to be submitted in support of SCO's claims is dispositive.

Now, finally, one additional point on the standard of review. Magistrate Judge Wells' order, Your

1 Honor, did essentially, as I read it, four things. It found that SCO violated the Court's orders in Rule 26(e). Two. It found that SCO acted willfully. 3 It found prejudice. And, four. It entered a sanction. 5 It said SCO would not be allowed to proceed as to those -- as to those items not properly disclosed. 6 7 If you think about it, Your Honor, each of the three predicates to the actual relief order, none of them 8 9 could possibly be considered dispositive in form. 10 Magistrate Judge Wells construed her own orders and an 11 order of this Court. Magistrate Judge Wells found that SCO acted willfully, and Magistrate Judge Wells found 12 that IBM would have been prejudiced. The sanction could 13 14 well have been, Judge, that SCO was to pay a hundred thousand dollars penalty for having done that. 15 16 alone, the penalty, would be what, under SCO's reading, 17 would convert the order into something that is 18 dispositive. 19 But under Rule 37(c), Judge, where you have a 20 failure to provide, supported by Magistrate Judge Wells' other findings, the sanction of being unable to use 21 22 evidence in support of your case at trial is automatic. 23 Magistrate Judge Wells could have said nothing further 24 other than: Violation of order. Acted willfully.

Prejudice to IBM. And the sanction which now SCO claims

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converts her order into a dispositive order would have been automatic under the rules.

2.2

That brings me, Judge, if I may, to the first of the points I'd like to make, which is that SCO failed to provide version, file and line information as ordered by the Court. And for this purpose, I'd like to point you to tab 16 of the book before Your Honor. You will see there, Judge, a fold out of an exhibit illustrating the orders of the Court. There are three orders at issue here, and there's Rule 26(e).

Mr. Singer said that the orders did not require and that IBM effectively has made up this idea that SCO is required to provide version, file and line information, and I would like, with your permission, Your Honor, to walk you through these orders and to show you how it is that these orders, each of them, expressly, unequivocally required SCO to provide version, file and line information with respect to each of the supposedly misused operating system elements.

In her first order of December of '03,

Magistrate Judge Wells required SCO to identify and state
with specificity the source codes underlying its case.

Then she went on, Judge, as reflected in the second
bullet, to require SCO to respond fully and in detail to
IBM's interrogatories; first as to 1 through 9, and then

second, if you look at the third bullet, to 12 and 13.

And I emphasize, SCO was ordered to respond as stated in

IBM's interrogatories.

"identify," to begin, Judge, and that definition is included here in the book, and I won't walk Your Honor through it except to emphasize that it makes perfectly clear that what is required is a detailed -- and I uncerscore the word "complete" description of the allegedly misused information. It simply cannot be that one can provide a detailed and complete description of allegedly misused information without providing version, file and line information. And the definition goes on to be -- to specifically mention the provision of line information and file information, in any event.

But put aside, if you would, Your Honor, the definition altogether. Forget the definition exists in IBM's discovery requests and look, if you would, simply at the requests themselves. Let me read you, Your Honor -- not to read all of these to you, but take you, if I may, Your Honor, to interrogatory number 12. And this can be done with respect to each of these interrogatories. In the interest of time, I will do it only with respect to number 12.

SCO is required, Judge, to identify with

specificity, by file and line of code: A. All source code and other material in Linux.

Let me pause there. If you look at the chart, Your Honor, by file and line of code, all source code and other material that would include methods and concepts in Linux. A file and line information is expressly called out, despite what Mr. Singer said, in the order.

Now, Your Honor, it is true that the order doesn't mention version information, but it is impossible to provide file information and line information without providing version information because it's as if you had a street address. You can't give somebody -- you can't say to somebody, "I live at number 20." You need to tell them 20 of what street, and you need to tell them where the street is located. Version information is indisputably required.

Magistrate Judge Wells expressly found version information is required. That, you can contend, is at least fairly implied. There is, looking at interrogatory number 12 alone, therefore, an express requirement that version, file and line information be provided with respect to Linux. Now, to continue on in the same single interrogatory. Now, again: Please identify with specificity, by file and line of code, how the code and

other material derives from UNIX. This, for that purpose, Your Honor, is UNIX. SCO contends that AIX and Dynix are derivatives of UNIX System V, versions of 4 those, and that IBM has, in one respect or another, 5 misused these

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So interrogatory 12 expressly calls for, again, files and lines as to these operating systems. And, in any given item, SCO would be required to provide file and line for either AIX or Dynix. both in any given instance. So, again, file and line with, I respectfully submit, version, being an absolute minimum fairly implied. A single interrogatory, Your Honor, incorporated as written, without any regard to IBM's definition of identify, expressly required the provision of version, file and line information.

And, again, I won't take the time to do it. Ιt can be done with respect to every one of these interrogatories.

Now, if you would, Your Honor, take a look at the second of the orders on this list, Magistrate Judge Wells' 3/3/04 order, March 3,'04 order. Magistrate Judge Wells begins by requiring SCO to fully comply with her prior order within 45 days because, as IBM pointed out to her, SCO then had not complied. The requirements of interrogatory 12, as incorporated into the first order,

are expressly, then, repeated and included into the 3/3/04 order.

But forget that, Judge. Forget entirely the incorporation of the prior reference and look at the highlighted text. These are express quotes from Magistrate Judge Wells' order of March. Let's start with the red text. "SCO is to provide and identify all specific lines of code from UNIX System V from which IBM's contributions --" again, contribution is not just code. It could be method or concept "-- from AIX or Dynix are alleged to be derived." So, again specific lines are required.

So, if this is the March order, if this is the '03 order, Judge, now we have the '04 order. Lines are expressly required as to System V. And, again, I would argue you can't provide line information without providing file and version information. It is simply meaningless without that. Look at the next text, AIX and Dynix. "As previously ordered, SCO is to provide and identify all specific lines of code that IBM is alleged to have contributed to Linux from either AIX or Dynix."

All specific lines. Again, lines required

All specific lines. Again, lines required expressly. Version and file fairly reasonably implied.

And finally, as to Linux: "SCO is to provide and identify with specificity all lines of code in Linux

that it claims rights to." Again, lines, not just files, as SCO suggests is sufficient, are expressly, unequivocally required.

Now, two provisions there required it. Seven provisions from the earlier order required it. Now this Court's -- this Court's 7/1/05 order in which Your Honor requires SCO simply, in effect, to provide specific disclosures of the allegedly misused material and to update its interrogatories accordingly. Again, I would argue there is no reasonable reading of Your Honor's order except to say that it requires disclosures at least along the same lines of specificity as were required by the prior orders.

Now, entirely independent of the Court's orders, under Rule 26(e), SCO had an obligation to update its interrogatories seasonably, which updating obligation would have required the same information. So you have three orders and Rule 26(e). The orders have multiple provisions which, on their terms, without even looking at the definition of identify, make perfectly clear that version, file and line information was to be provided.

Now, what does SCO argue, Your Honor, with respect to these orders? With respect to the early order, the December 12, '03 order, in fact SCO says nothing in its opening papers of consequence, if anything

at all, about interrogatories 3 and 6. And I would submit that any complaint about those is therefore waived. With respect to interrogatories 12 and 13 -- and we talked about 12 -- nothing of any consequence is said, Your Honor, about interrogatories 12 and 13. And I would invite you to go back and look at SCO's opening papers about interrogatory 12 and 13.

2.5

Magistrate Judge Wells issued the '03 order and the '04 order in '03 and '04. Any complaint or objection, any uncertainty that SCO had with respect to the meaning of those orders is a complaint that should have been raised within ten days of the entry of those orders, and an effort now to end run that by arguing that SCO was surprised to learn or apparently even today still doesn't believe it is required to provide version, file and line information, when it is expressly called for in the Courts' orders.

Now, SCO argues, Judge, that the provisions simply don't apply to methods and concepts. Mr. Singer said that this morning, and that has been repeated in SCO's papers. Two points in that regard: First. Contrary to SCO's suggestion, many, many of these items are expressly about source code, and I will come back to that, eventually, in my second point.

In any case, IBM's requests and the Courts'

1 orders are plain on their face that they are not limited 2 to requesting information about code, they apply to all 3 material in these operating systems, whether you want to 4 call it code, method or concept. The definition of 5 identify is clear in that regard as are the requests. Interrogatory number 1 calls for specificity as to 6 7 confidential or proprietary information. Interrogatory 3 talks about information. Interrogatory 4 talks code or 8 9 methods. Interrogatory 6, code or methods. 10. Interrogatory 12, code and other material, and so on. 11 The arguments raised, Your Honor, in objection 12 to the proposition that this order is somehow unclear are 13 simply untenable. And Mr. Singer finally says, with 14

simply untenable. And Mr. Singer finally says, with respect to this Court's '05 order, that that couldn't possibly require specificity along the lines that I've just argued because IBM proposed in a proposed order to the Court the inclusion of version, file and line information. Therefore, he says, the fact the Court didn't include it is the best indication that the Court did not intend to require it.

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I would submit, Your Honor, that that reads far too much into the submission of a proposed wording for an order and is, in any event, irrelevant. The fact of the matter is that this Court entered its order in July, which is only one of three pronged orders that underlie

Judge Wells' decision here at a time when the landscape and requirements of the Court were clear.

Moreover, I don't believe the argument that the footnote was somehow left out had some significance was ever raised in front of Magistrate Judge Wells, and for that reason, independently, it is not properly raised here.

The second point, Judge, which I'd like to make is that SCO's failure to -- that SCO failed to substantially justify its failure to provide version, file and line information. In this regard, SCO provides three arguments. And let me walk through these quickly. First of all, Your Honor, as a predicate to this, contrary to SCO's suggestion, it is SCO, under Rule 37(c) that bears the burden to show substantial justification. It is not, as he seems to suggest, IBM.

The justifications at issue here supposedly are the following: SCO says the order is ambiguous.

Plainly, Judge, that is not true, and any contention that it is has been waived. I won't repeat what I just said.

The second argument SCO makes is that version, file and line information is simply not available. It cannot be provided, they say, with respect to methods and concepts. Well, again, as I said I would come to, not all of the items at issue here are methods and concepts.

A substantial number of them are, by SCO's own words,

Judge, code. And I would refer Your Honor to tab 18 of
the book before you.

A full list is set out in Exhibit C to the reply declaration of Randy Davis in support of IBM's proclusion motion. Here are the words, SCO's words, describing items that are at issue on this motion. Item 17. Quote, port of discontinuous memory code from ptx to Linux, close quote. Item 22. Port of PTX NUMA code to Linux, close quote. And so on. The list of these, Your Honor, is fuller. It's professor Davis' declaration, and it demonstrates with, I think, no equivocation that many, many of the items at issue with Magistrate Judge Wells' order concern, by their own terms, by SCO's terms, code and not methods and concepts.

In any event, it makes no difference, Judge, because there is absolutely no reason why SCO could not have provided version, file and line information with respect to methods and concepts. Professor Davis, in his declaration, makes perfectly clear, common sense dictates: Methods and concepts do not exist in the ether. They exist in an operating system, insofar as they are embodied in source code.

And I refer Your Honor to tab 19 of the book.

As Professor Davis says: "There must be lines of source

code in the program that implement the method or concept.

Methods and concepts employed in an operating system or
any computer program are in the source codes. It could
not be otherwise."

sco's own technology officer, Your Honor, in testifying in this case said -- Gupta, G-u-p-t-a, had indicated in his deposition that the provision of source code is important to understanding version and file. It is important to understanding methods and concepts.

Mr. Rochkind, of whom Mr. Singer speaks, Sco's expert, has written on the subject of operating systems and used in his writing on operating systems source code to describe methods and concepts. Whether or not it is available in every circumstance, it is beyond debate that methods and concepts can be and must be, if to be understood precisely, understood in terms of the source code that embodies them.

Now, finally, Mr. Singer says in this connection that the problem with Magistrate Judge Wells' order, Judge, is that it requires SCO to read IBM's mind, that SCO has no means to figure out what it is that IBM supposedly did wrong because IBM hasn't told them. That, Your Honor, is, I respectfully submit, a frolick and a detour into the irrelevant.

And that is simply because what IBM's discovery

requests ask for is SCO's allegations. What is it, after all the billions of lines of code that have been produced, the millions of pages of paper that have been produced and all the depositions taken, what is it precisely that IBM is supposed to have done, so that IBM can prepare a defense with respect to that. That's what was asked for. That's what was required, and that's what the evidence, I would submit, unequivocally demonstrates could be provided if SCO would disclose what its allegations are.

That is what has been withheld, its allegations about what IBM has supposedly done. In any event, Your Honor, SCO raised this argument that it shouldn't be -- it couldn't possibly be required to tell IBM the particularity of its claims in advance of IBM telling SCO what IBM had supposedly done in 2003 and 2004.

Magistrate Judge Wells rejected the argument then. SCO didn't appeal from the order, and it is not an argument that can be timely raised now.

And, finally, with respect to willfulness, SCO suggests, in an effort to justify its failure to comply, it acted in good faith and that it didn't act willfully. Again, here, if anyone bears the burden to demonstrate the justification for SCO's failure, it's SCO. And the record evidence here, I would respectfully submit, is

overwhelming that SCO acted willfully. Indeed, Your Honor, I believe that evidence fairly can be read to create inference of that faith.

TBM repeatedly requested the disclosure of version, file and line information over the course of years. IBM made motions to dismiss. This is not an item buried somewhere in a footnote. This is not an item that came up by surprise. From the beginning of this litigation, we have been seeking version, file and line information. Two motions to compel were made. Three orders of the Court were entered. IBM, during this period of time, communicated with SCO and indicated to SCO that we believed SCO was not in compliance; that we would bring this motion if SCO did not bring itself into compliance.

Magistrate Judge Wells made perfectly clear, warning SCO in chambers at the beginning of the case and on the record later in the case, that the evidence must be put on the table, that evidence not put on the table would not be allowed to be used.

SCO asked nothing less of IBM in its discovery requests where, with respect to methods and concepts, it defined the term "identify" to include version, file and line information. Without the information requested, Your Honor, it simply is not possible for IBM to be in a

position to defend itself. The mere fact, which I submit 1 2 is not supported by the record, that SCO believes that it it subjectively thought it was in compliance is not 3 enough to justify SCO's failure here to comply. 4 5 There is not evidence of subjective compliance, 6 and, in any event, the mere subjective belief that a 7 person is compliant with a Court order is not, by itself, sufficient to justify its failure to comply. It simply 8 9 cannot be that they can not comply with three orders of 10 the Court and then shift, on the strength of an argument 11 that, gee, we thought we could, the burden to IBM, the impossible burden to IBM of having to figure out for 12 13 itself what it is SCO's case is about. 14 SCO asks, in effect, Judge, to be rewarded for 15 its failure to comply and have IBM punished by an 16 inability to figure out what SCO's case is about. 17 Last point, Judge. I'm getting close. 18 THE COURT REPORTER: But you don't have to 19 hurry. 20 Okay. Last point. MR. MARRIOTT: THE COURT: She says. 21 22 MR. MARRIOTT: I will hurry, but I will hurry 23 slowly. 24 THE COURT REPORTER: Thank you. 25 MR. MARRIOTT: Point 3. SCO failed to

demonstrate that its error here was harmless. Here, again, the burden is on SCO, and even if it weren't, Judge, the record here amply demonstrates prejudice following SCO's disclosures. The argument seems to be that IBM can figure out for itself what it did because, again, it did it, so nobody knows better than IBM.

"And, by the way," SCO says, "we've given them a whole bunch of stuff, and it's enough stuff for them to generally figure out what we're talking about, and if they haven't figured it out, they can go and get their developers to sit down in a room and talk to them about it, and they will tell IBM what they actually did."

Your Honor, let me refer you to tab 92 of the book. Mr. Singer talked about -- I'm sorry. It's not tab 92, it's item 92, which appears at tab 26, item 92 of SCO's final disclosures.

In the spirit of giving Your Honor a flavor for SCO's allegations, this is item 92. It says that IBM contributed Dynix/ptx code to Linux from Michael, who appears to be a former Sequent employee. So the allegation -- what we're told in this final set of final disclosures, which SCO argues has all the specificity required by Magistrate Judge Wells, all the specificity that could reasonably be required, all that IBM needs to defend itself, we're told what we were told in the

1 | Complaint. IBM took code from Dynix and it put it into 2 | Linux.

Now look, if you would, Your Honor, at the next page. Much of SCO's argument is: Judge, we have given them the actual disclosures. What do they want from us? They have been handed the documents.

This is one of the documents we have been handed, not unique among the particularity provided: An anonymous posting somewhere on the internet by a person purported to be called Michael, purported to have been a former employee of IBM saying that Sequent didn't get into the business of contributing Dynix/ptx code to Linux, IBM did. That's it.

Now, contrast that, Your Honor, with the scope -- look at tab 24, if you would, of the book.

Again, to end where I began. The scope of code implicated by SCO's claims is substantial. Millions of files. Billions of lines of code. And IBM is told:

Your guys did it. Figure it out for yourself. SCO declined to provide version, file and line information.

That is undisputed. And the table laid out in this book, I think, makes that clear.

It is simply not possible, contrary to Mr. Singer's suggestion, for IBM to simply figure out for itself what is at issue. The haystack is enormous, and

while we could in theory search the haystack of this code for the allegedly misused information, the real problem here, Your Honor, is that the needles that we have been sent to find are undefined needles, as defined in item 92 of SCO's final disclosures.

There are numerous additional reasons why the complaints made here lack merit. They are set out in our papers, Your Honor. Magistrate Judge Wells' order did all that it could properly have done with respect to the 187 items at issue here. It granted IBM's motion. It afforded relief that was, in any event, automatic under Rule 37(c). Your Honor should, respectfully, overrule SCO's objections. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Singer?

MR. SINGER: Your Honor, I'd like to start by talking about one of the points which Mr. Marriott mentions in quoting from the Magistrate in trying to argue the order concerned evidence, not claims, refers to the Magistrate saying, "I don't want either side to use information that has been withheld. I want all the evidence to be on the table for the other party to analyze and take a look at."

But the order here does not do that. The order takes the evidence we have put on the table, takes the

items that relate to that evidence and says we cannot take those to trial. It takes the items we have disclosed and excludes them from the case, and the evidence relating to those items, none of which could be used to support it and takes them out of the case.

It doesn't say: The things which you haven't disclosed, you can't use. And, similarly, Rule 37(c), which, first of all, a sanction like this is not automatic. There is no case law or anything indicating there is anything automatic about precluding claims, but Rule 37(c), which Mr. Marriott points to, says that when a party without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26 or to amend a response to discovery then, unless its harmless, it shall not be permitted to use as evidence at trial any witness or information not so disclosed.

It doesn't say anything about putting an order saying that your claims aren't in the case, that you can limit and exclude all this evidence on all these claims that are on the table, which goes directly to the point we have made. We are not sandbagging anyone, but the remedy for a party that sandbags in litigation is at the time when the evidence comes out of the bag and in open court it's excluded. It's not an order which takes all the evidence we have presented, all the items we have

presented and says those are out of the case.

The second point we'd like to make is that, as indicated by IBM's own chart, it is IBM that uniquely would have origin information. And most of the dispute here is really about origin information on methods and concepts because IBM has never shown, and Mr. Marriott doesn't suggest that on the methods and concepts that have been disclosed — there is origin information that we simply haven't provided because we have quoted the whole disclosure. If it's too general, if it's too imprecise to be actionable, they can make a motion for summary judgment on it. They can move later that it be excluded as too general.

Perhaps the example, tab 92, which is raised by Mr. Marriott the first time here -- it hasn't been raised below. It hasn't been raised in briefing. This is the first time that example comes up -- if that one is too general, it should be excluded, but you don't throw out all these parts of our case.

Dynix and AIX are operating systems that IBM or Sequent, which IBM bought, developed. They developed them under licenses that said they cannot disclose information that comes from derivative systems. That is our contract argument. The individuals who worked on making these disclosures from Dynix and AIX into Linux

are people at IBM. They are the ones who, if you can say what line of code I was thinking about in Dynix when I was making that method and concept disclosure, it is an IBM engineer.

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Now, on that point, what does Mr. Marriott say near the end of his presentation? He says, "Well, SCO is the one who has to specify its allegations." We have done that.

We have said, "It is the disclosure of this method and concept that is wrong, and here is the whole disclosure."

But we can't tell IBM what Mr. Hysega, who works for IBM, had in his mind when he said, "This came from Dynix, and I'm disclosing it." if he didn't put that in writing in his disclosure. Either no one knows that because it didn't come from a specific place in code or, if it is known, it's known uniquely to Mr. Hysega. The same is true for Mr. Wright and all the other developers for IBM.

Mr. Marriott said nothing about what we have said throughout this case -- or throughout this motion. They have not addressed the fact that they even asked their developers, "Where in Dynix or AIX did you get that method or concept?" Where is the record saying that those people don't know? And if they don't know, how

does SCO know that origin information?

Now, the destination information is different. We admit that interrogatory 12 calls for destination information in Linux. We have provided file information. With respect to versions, they weren't expressly called for by the order. Mr. Rochkind, in his declaration, said that the disclosures apply to all versions of Linux after that disclosure has been made. And there is no showing anywhere that that is somehow unworkable for IBM to deal with. And as to lines, we have identified the files. That refers to all the lines in those files.

There is no showing that we had more specific information within a given file of Linux and we didn't disclose it. There is no showing that IBM or its experts can't work with the file information that has been provided and that that is a basis for throwing out these claims relating to those disclosures.

Now, one of the points which has been made is that de novo review, they suggest, is not required here because we are not dealing with evidence -- we are not dealing with claims, we are just dealing with evidence. The fact of the matter is, is the Courts that we have cited at tab 16, when you throw out all the evidence relating to a claim, you have disposed of that claim. These are claims that, if we prove they have breached 188

methods and concepts or even some subset of those that have been excluded, that can support our contract breach, independent of the claims that haven't been excluded, just like the case we cite which threw out -- which said you had to use a dispositive, de novo scope of review when just one patent claim, of a number of patent claims, was resolved. The cases cited at tab 16 involve sanctions and deal with de novo review.

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I'm not going to belabor the standard of review point. I think that it's clear that there is no legal support in this Circuit for what one Court characterizes as a dead fish standard, but the standard is de novo review if it has this effect. It is not denied that it's de novo with respect to legal issues. And what is the significance of that? Mr. Marriott does not address the fact that you need particularized findings. It's simply not enough to say that all of these are grouped together and then to talk about an example here, one example out of 188.

Did Mr. Marriott address any of the five examples that we addressed here, which have been addressed earlier, including example 146, where the only source code known is hiding behind an IBM fire wall that we can't get at, but that's been struck from our case? Has it addressed any of the other examples that are in

our papers or the appendix, dozens of examples? It
hasn't. You have to decide an issue like this on an
item-by-item basis, and that is the type of
particularized finding that the Tenth Circuit has
required.

There should be an evidentiary hearing if you are going to go down this path before striking these. That also is not responded to. There needs to be a consideration of alternatives, the Tenth Circuit says, to the sanction of striking a claim. Here, the very authorities that Mr. Marriott points to, Rule 37 and the colloquy with the Magistrate, as well as Rule 26, talk about a lesser sanction that is perfectly appropriate for the concern they have.

If we seek to use information that hasn't been disclosed, they can object and say that should have been disclosed earlier. It is not, however, a basis for preventing arguments for what has been put on the table and the information that we have.

Now, in addition, I'd like to turn to the issue of whether or not this order required disclosure of the nine coordinates. First of all, I think it's clear that the nine coordinates is something which IBM has derived from the various interrogatory requests that was not required. This Court's order in July talks about

specificity. IBM suggests it's irrelevant that the Court didn't adopt its language. I ask: If that's so, why did they propose it? If it was irrelevant, why did they ask the Court to enter into it?

2.3

We think that -- and the briefs pars through all of the orders and interrogatories if you look at them closely. Our position is: While we have provided everything, they certainly never had a requirement that for a method and concept disclosure that SCO identifies what was disclosed, we had to go back and say where that is found by line in AIX or Dynix or face dismissal of our case on those items. That never happened.

What happens is you have interrogatory 1 that expressly used the language, "modify where appropriate." We have interrogatories 3 and 4 which, at tab 27, we address. They refer back to the information in interrogatory 1, and they don't seek identification of product file and line information. And that's true of interrogatory 6 as well. That identifies the products in which the code is included, and we have admissions here, admissions we contend of liability, saying this comes from Dynix, that is both sufficient to answer interrogatory 6 and is as complete information as SCO has.

On interrogatory 12 and 13, we address that at

tab 28 as well as in our briefs. Tab 12 addresses Linux files, where we have provided all the information in Linux that we have as to where that is located, and there is no denial as to the file-specific level of information. In interrogatory 13, which says, "Describe how IBM is alleged to have infringed plaintiff's rights," that interrogatory made no mention of version, file and line information.

If you look at their own exhibit, tab 16, and the AIX and Dynix part in blue, what is asked for? SCO is ordered to provide and identify all specific lines of code that IBM is alleged to have contributed to Linux from either AIX or Dynix. And we have done that. Where there is an allegation that code has been contributed, that has been specific. For example, disclosures of JFS, a whole file system, are done specifically. It's not subject to this motion. The issue here is not where IBM is alleged to have contributed code from AIX or Dynix, but to have used methods and concepts, through knowledge of those systems, to disclose confidential information, to talk about a method and concept, like those five examples illustrated. And that can be done without code, as Mr. Rochkind indicated in his declaration.

There is an issue raised that we have waived this because we didn't object to these discovery requests

in 2004 or 2003. Our objection is not to the discovery requests, as such. It is the interpretation that is being placed on them here and is part of the motion to throw these claims out of Court, that if we don't have this information, that it's our obligation with respect to methods and concepts, that IBM shouldn't be expected to ask its own employees, who made those disclosures: Where did they come from?

Those items have only come up since the December disclosures have been made, and they have come up in this motion. There has never been any earlier orders to deal with that. And certainly, with respect to the issue of whether or not the sanction is appropriate, whether or not this order is appropriate, we are on direct review of that, and none of those issues are waived.

Mr. Marriott says that SCO has not justified its failure because he points to one example of an item which he says is too generally provided, too abstractly provided, never going through item-by-item either the examples we give, and what he has actually proven, we submit, Your Honor, is the need, if you're going to go down this road, for some type of item-by-item process to look at those. And the way in which we submit it is appropriate to do that, if you're going down that road,

is after the expert reports are considered and after expert discovery addresses that, which is where we are at now.

2.0

And then, if they want to make a motion before trial saying that item number 92 still remains too general for us to properly form a defense, then you deal with that item and, if they're right, that item doesn't come in. But it doesn't mean that all the items which are specific and where we have provided all the information we have, that those items are out of the case.

He refers to Mr. Gupta. How did Mr. Gupta's testimony come in? It came in not in the Magistrate's hearing or in papers filed by IBM. It comes in in the Davis declaration submitted post-argument, appended to it. And it's clear that Mr. Gupta, throughout his deposition says and identifies a lot of methods and concepts without using source code to do so. And he says, which is true, that you can do so more accurately when you have the source code.

It doesn't mean that there are methods and concepts which you can't talk about and identify without source code or that SCO has or should be expected to know everything in IBM's mind about the source code they were thinking about when making a method and concept

disclosure that didn't involve source code specifically.

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In any event, how is it appropriate for, in a non-evidentiary setting, in a non-adversarial setting, since we weren't even allowed to respond to Mr. Davis' declaration, which submitted parts of Mr. Gupta's testimony, for now that can become the basis for supporting a sanction order? How is it appropriate -- and Mr. Marriott doesn't even address the issue -- for the Court to look at a discovery request SCO made in June of 2003, which talked about identify, and which the Magistrate Judge said was the most important factor in her decision, when that comes in after argument in Davis' declaration? And when you look at all the circumstances, it's clear it didn't support that decision because it also was modified by the terms "where appropriate" in providing sources.

With respect to willfulness, there is not one example on this record, Your Honor, of where any information has been proven to exist with SCO which has not been turned over. The Rochkind declaration is the only evidence on this record that addresses that. And that says, "I was instructed by SCO's counsel to provide everything we had, and we provided everything we had."

Faced with that, how is there support for finding that we were willfully withholding information? The two sources

of support that the Magistrate refers to don't support that.

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There is the reference to the public statements, which don't relate to that, and there is the reference to the fact that you have certain source code disclosures and for source code disclosures, you make There is no proof of anything we are withholding, and we don't know what more we can do, other than an evidentiary hearing, put our witnesses on to say that. There is no case which we're aware of, and there is no example IBM has provided where a sanction striking claims has been ordered where a party has provided the type of information we have provided, saying what our allegations are, identifying these are the method and concept disclosures that we are talking about, none others, but where the party, because it hasn't been able to go back and relate those to a particular underlying program with the specificity that one would in an ideal world perhaps have, where that results in those claims being struck. There is no precedent for a Draconian sanction like that. So, procedurally, there is no basis for it.

Substantively, there isn't a record to support that, and the decision would be without precedent. Your Honor, these claims should be resolved on their merits at trial. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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Mr. Marriott, let me ask you about a couple of Mr. Singer's complaints. He complains that Judge Wells did not make particularized findings. I'd like you to briefly talk to me about that. He complains that SCO requested an evidentiary hearing and didn't get one. Could you talk to me briefly about that. And, also, it's clear from his argument that he believes that claims have been stricken, and it's clear from yours that you don't believe claims have been. Talk to me briefly about that. MR. MARRIOTT: Sure, Your Honor. Thank you for the opportunity. First, with respect to particularized findings. Particularized findings are not required, and I would refer Your Honor to the Penn decision from the Tenth Circuit, 528 F.2d 1181, 1975. Magistrate Judge Wells issued -- and additional cases, Your Honor, I believe are in our papers. Magistrate Judge Wells issued a 39-page opinion which makes abundantly clear that she looked at the items in question. The only findings that matter as to particularity are whether or not SCO provided that which was required and which was put at issue in IBM's motion. What was that? We asked for version, file and line information. It's undisputed they didn't provide

precisely what we asked for, Your Honor.

There is not

1 any debate about that. If you look at Exhibit 6 to the book, is there a single line of System V code provided 2 for any of the 187 items? No. Undisputed. Magistrate 3 Judge Wells acknowledged that. What more particularized 4 finding could there be? With respect to AIX and Dynix, 5 6 were there any lines of AIX and Dynix code provided? 7 Zero. Nil. Not a single one was provided. 8 more particular finding could one enter? 9 With respect to Linux, as to the 187 items, 10 Your Honor, three of the items identified lines of code. 11 Three. And as to those three items, there were no 12 versions provided. So there was no need, Your Honor, 13 for a particularized set of findings here. It is not 14 required in the cases, only that level of findings 15 necessary to permit this Court to undertake review. But, in any event, Magistrate Judge Wells did do precisely the 1.6 17 type of particularized finding that one could do. could have done no more. She found there was no version, 18 19 file and line information. 20 THE COURT: What about the request for an 21 evidentiary hearing? 22 MR. MARRIOTT: Yes, Your Honor. As to the 23 request for an evidentiary hearing; again, to begin, there was no request for an evidentiary hearing made 24

until SCO's reply papers. Having failed to request an

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evidentiary hearing until then, Your Honor, the request
was waived. There is no need here for an evidentiary
hearing anymore than there is for particularized findings
different from what Magistrate Judge Wells did because
those findings are not in dispute. And I would refer
Your Honor, for cases for the proposition that a hearing
is not required, to page 55 of IBM's opposition brief.
An evidentiary hearing was not required.

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Now, finally, Your Honor, you asked about claims. Mr. Singer cited again, in his rebuttal remarks, the Mopex case from the Southern District of New York.

And he says that what's so dramatically different here is that Judge Wells has taken SCO's claims, ripped them from the final disclosures and thrown them from the case, and they will never be seen again. That's absolutely not what happened. The claims are in the Complaint. The theories of liability exist in the Complaint. In its Complaint, SCO says IBM breached the agreement, this agreement or that agreement, by violating Version 7.06 of the IBM and Sequent agreements with AT&T, by violating Section 2.01 and so on. Specific provisions are identified as having been breached by IBM.

Magistrate Judge Wells didn't touch any of those provisions. SCO can proceed with its case with respect to any theory of liability that it has that is

laid out in the Complaint, notwithstanding what Magistrate Judge Wells did in her order.

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Now, the Mopex case, this case from the Southern District of New York, Judge Shindler, the Mopex case supports IBM's view, not SCO's, as to whether the relief here is dispositive. Why is that the case? was a patent case. It involved at least 34 independent claims of a patent. The Magistrate Judge in the case found that one of the claims should not be permitted and, pursuant to Report and Recommendation, said the plaintiff in the case shouldn't be allowed to proceed as to that claim. But the patent claim, Judge, is comparable, if anything, to the provision of the IBM agreements that IBM is said to have breached. Did we breach Section 7.06? Did we breach Section 2.01? Magistrate Judge Wells didn't touch those. Those remain in the case, and the other remaining items that SCO has in support of its case can be used to the extent they apply to support those theories of recovery.

SCO has not lost any claims, however many times it wants to call its evidence claims, Judge. The Complaint is intact. The claims are intact. The theories of liability are intact. And Mopex does not support that view. In fact, if anything, Your Honor, if you look carefully at Mopex, you will see that under

circumstances far less severe than these, where the violations were far less significant than those of SCO, the Magistrate Judge in that case found the preclusion should be entered on a far lesser showing, where the Court more readily than ever would be required here, found a basis for the relief and request.

2.3

Now, if I may make just two additional points while I'm here, Your Honor. It was suggested that I failed to describe in detail all of the items laid out by Mr. Singer. As you well know, time doesn't permit that, but one of them deserves at least some mention because it has now been mentioned twice. SCO contends IBM -- it couldn't provide any additional information because, again, it's in the minds of the IBM developers. "Who knows better than IBM," says Mr. Singer, "about the coordinates within AIX and Dynix?"

Your Honor may remember something called CMVC, the many billions of lines of code which it was insistent that IBM produce to put SCO in the position to tell IBM exactly where it is the code is found. The argument to get that code at that expense and that effort was so SCO could be in a position to tell IBM what IBM had been requesting. We gave the information, Your Honor, as the court ordered us to do. We, nevertheless, don't have a single line of code from either AIX or Dynix.

As to the minds of these developers, that's what depositions are for. The one example Mr. Singer mentioned, Mr. Hysega, is the only developer I believe SCO deposed. It was as free as IBM to ask Mr. Hysega whatever it wanted about what it relied upon or didn't rely upon. At the end of the day, SCO has to stand up for any claims that survive the Court's order and be able to explain and put IBM in a position to respond to what it is that IBM supposedly did to injure SCO. To simply say that you took code from here and you put it there tells us nothing about what that code's value might be, what impact it could potentially have and so on.

Moreover, Judge, the supposed fire wall, the document that can't be found? IBM produced the document to SCO at SCO -- at Bates range 1910678798 through 1910678885, and so far as we have any idea what they are talking about, this appears to be the document. There is no reason they couldn't have discovered what's been asked for in discovery, and notably, at no point, never, despite IBM's repeated requests about what was required, did SCO come to Magistrate Judge Wells and say, "We can't do this. You have ordered version, file and line information, but it can't be done. It's not possible, Judge."

That never happened, Your Honor,

notwithstanding IBM's assertions that SCO was in 1 2 violation and that it would bring this motion. 3 Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. 5 Mr. Singer, you get the last word. This is 6 your motion. 7 MR. SINGER: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd like to address the particular issues that the Court asked 8 Mr. Marriott about. Particularized findings. 10 Mr. Marriott said, "Well, what is it that the Court could 11 be expected to say?". 12 Well, first of all, the Court could be expected 13 to address the other items in the way in which it 14 addressed a handful of items near the end of her order and actually left a number of those in the case. 15 16 Court could be expected to address the prejudice to IBM, 17 whether or not on a specific item it has enough specificity or not to go forward and defend that item. 18 19 The Court could be expected to address whether there's 20 any evidence in the record that we had the ability to 21 provide more specific information on that item. There is no holding by this Court or anywhere else that in order 22 23 to prove our case we have to have the file, line and version relating to these items. And if it's in the CMV 24 25 system regarding AIX and Dynix, IBM has it already.

Our -- a factual finding would deal with why it is that we should be expected to know, on a given item, what's in Mr. Hysega's mind on that if he works for IBM. But IBM doesn't know it? There has never been a ruling saying that a party's claims are thrown out of Court because they didn't ask in deposition questions, something of the other side's witness which the other side already knows. There is no basis for that. So, there's plenty of factual issues that particularized findings would be appropriate for her.

The evidentiary hearing. Mr. Marriott is suggesting that we requested it too late in our reply brief. Well, first of all, it didn't come in a reply brief. We never got a reply brief. He was the moving party on the motion. He got a reply brief. It came in the argument where in their reply brief, for the first time, some evidentiary matters were introduced into the motion. IBM filed a ten-page motion without any supporting materials. That's what set this process in place. We responded.

In IBM's reply, they offered Mr. Davis' declaration, which was evidence. At that point, we moved for leave to supply the Court with Mr. Rochkind's counter declaration. And then, at our first opportunity, which was the argument before the Magistrate, we expressly

to before all of these type of factual findings that we have information, that we haven't disclosed it, and the like, are being made.

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The third question that's being asked: claims being stricken or just evidence being precluded? Well, you have a motion here which says, "Limit SCO's claims." You have a ruling here that grants that motion. You have the effect of the ruling that on 188 items, any one of which would show a disclosure that a jury could find, if we're right, breached a contract and could support certain findings. We can't bring those to the jury now. We are left with the others. Those are, we think, exactly analogous to the Mopex case, when the Court is dealing with claims, many claims in a patent, and a new claim comes along, number 34, that the Court finds is untimely or the Magistrate found is untimely and says, "That one you can't proceed on. You have other claims of breach of infringement of the patent," just like we have other claims for breach of copyright. fall within the same cause of action. But because this would have independently supported liability of patent infringement, just like these 188 items could individually or collectively support findings of breach of contract, a ruling that excludes those is a

dispositive ruling.

This is not a ruling saying certain categories of evidence in support of those items can't be used. It is not a ruling saying things you haven't told us about in support of these items can't be used. It's saying those claims are out of the case. That is a dispositive ruling which this Court is required to review de novo.

I'd like to briefly address the last two items that Mr. Marriott addressed at the end of the questions.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. SINGER: He said that the CMVC system was produced. And we have used that, and our experts, as they have testified, including Mr. Rochkind in his declaration, used that a great deal to identify code disclosures. IBM has not pointed to anything in CMVC or anywhere else that would allow us to say that when these method or concept disclosures have been made from Dynix to Linux, we know what their developers had in their mind as the origins in Dynix.

And they are not being asked to just search for needles in a haystack. They have the disclosure of the actual disclosures of the method and concept to the Linux world. If it was complete and detailed enough to be valuable, they have the entire disclosure to work with; to argue it wasn't valuable, to argue the information was

available from other sources. They have as much there as the Linux world relied on and which we argue was sufficient to create liability.

The last point which was suggested is that there is an example of item 146, where we could find that at some page. All I can say, Your Honor, is that we have been arguing about Exhibit 146 back since they first raised it in the Davis declaration. And this is the first time now, in what everyone calls that, a sur-rebuttal reply, that that has been referenced. And, if anything, it shows that if you're going make decisions on these types of issues, they have to be made on an item-by-item basis on an evidentiary record.

Thank you very much.

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THE COURT: Thank you. Well, I'll take this happy matter under advisement.

Let me ask you briefly about a couple of other things. We currently have a trial beginning February 26. Originally, in the July 1, 2005 scheduling order, I set a dispositive motion deadline for July 28 of 2006 and, with that deadline, all the motions would have been briefed by September 29. They would already be briefed, which was five months before trial. Now, through several stipulated extensions, which were taken from you folks, although I suppose I approved them, so I suppose I'm

partly at fault here, the dispositive motion deadline is the 25th of September -- was the 25th of September. And the motions won't be briefed until December 8.

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Now, there are ten motions at this point, which will be briefed by December 8, I assume, but first they have to be heard and then they have to be decided.

That's not a lot of time to get them heard and decided before we're all in full scale trial prep.

Any quick thoughts about that? So now, instead of five months, we have, what, two-and-a-half months between fully-briefed dispositive motions and a trial date? And we have ten motions. It's not like it's one simple motion.

MR. SINGER: Your Honor, we would not minimize the burden that's on the Court. We've filed four of those motions. They are each supported by memos of -- I don't know an exact length, but 20 -- I think 30 pages. One might be longer, but in that range. IBM has filed six motions which have over 400 pages of briefing and over 40,000 pages of exhibits supporting. Faced with that, we asked for one additional week beyond with what we had previously agreed to deal with that.

And the reason we only asked for a week is because we understand the Court needs as much time as possible to review that before trial, and it is important

1 to SCO -- we want to get to trial as quickly as possible.

I don't have a specific solution in mind on that, other than preceding to have an argument, and perhaps if there are particular issues that come out of the argument after that, the parties could be directed to file very short, two to three-page summary briefs that extract from this larger material what would be relevant to those particular issues that might help focus the Court then on being able to extract from this mountain of paper those items that may be relevant in deciding whether, in a case of this dimension, there really are no disputed material facts. We would hate very much to lose that February trial date.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Marriott.

MR. MARRIOTT: With respect, Your Honor, I think the last thing we need is more briefs. I, like Mr. Singer, am eager to have this matter resolved. That said, candidly, I don't know how realistic it is, in view of the filing of those ten motions and the current schedule, to expect that the Court would have time to hold the hearing and to resolve it and that the parties would then have the time to deal with that.

THE COURT: In that connection, how long do you think it would -- how long would it take to hear argument

on ten dispositive motions? 1 2 Well, I suppose that depends on MR. MARRIOTT: 3 how much time Your Honor alots per argument. THE COURT: How much would you folks want, if 5 you had your wishes granted? 6 MR. MARRIOTT: Well, that's an excellent 7 question, one that I, candidly, haven't spent a lot of time thinking about. Off the top of my head, Your Honor, what I would say is that it would vary quite a bit. My motion -- some of these motions are much more involved 10 11 than others. I think, at the end of the day, there will 12 be truly very few facts that are in dispute as to these motions, and I would like to believe that the issues the 13 14 Court would actually hear are relatively straightforward. 15 I would think any one of these motions, Your Honor, could 16 be and should be argued in no more than an hour and a 17 half. 18 THE COURT: Total? 19 MR. MARRIOTT: Correct. Both sides. 20 THE COURT: What do you say to that? 21 MR. SINGER: Your Honor, my estimate would not 22 be much different than that. I think if the Court would set aside a day for arguing SCO's motions for summary 23 24 judgment, equally divided time between the parties that

would be available, I think that would be a reasonable

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amount of time. It might be a little bit less than an 1 hour per motion, but some of these motions don't require 2 an hour. Some of them probably do. 3 THE COURT: So we might be talking about, basically, two full days to argue the motions, right? 5 6 MR. SINGER: I was suggesting one full day, 7 Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Ten motions. I thought you said 9 one day for SCO's motions. 10 MR. SINGER: I was thinking one day for both 11 sets of motions. 12 13

THE COURT: Well, if Mr. Marriott is right with his estimate, that would be 15 hours of argument, and people might want to eat and go to the bathroom.

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MR. SINGER: We have been known to want to do that occasionally. I agree with Mr. Marriott that on some of these motions, like there is a contract motion and others, an hour, hour and a half of argument divided between the parties makes sense. I think on some of these, I'm not sure that much time is required, given it is a much more focused motion.

THE COURT: And one could -- the most brilliant jurist on earth, I would think, could hardly be expected to say, on December 9 and 10, when all the briefing is done by the 8th -- did you say you were asking for

1 | another week?

MR. SINGER: That's already accounted for in the 8th.

THE COURT: In the 8th. All right. -- could be properly prepared to hear the arguments. There's got to be some reasonable period of time between the 8th and the arguments, doesn't there?

MR. MARRIOTT: As eager as I am to have it resolved, Your Honor, I don't, candidly, think it's realistic to expect that the trial date can hold, and I really think it's not feasible, if there is to be any meaningful opportunity for the Court to prepare, for the parties to argue, and for the Court to have some time to consider the motions.

THE COURT: And decide them.

MR. MARRIOTT: And then decide them. And then whatever is decided is decided, and there may be well be actions the parties need to take as a result of those. So, if your bottom-line question is, Judge: Should the trial date slip?

I think the answer is: Yes, it should.

And, as to the scheduling of oral argument, we are available to do it at the Court's leisure. It may well be that counsel can collaborate and coordinate as to what we believe by way of proposal each side would

require by way of arguments on each motion and propose that to Your Honor for your consideration.

THE COURT: Why don't you do that. Apparently you're still talking with each other. This is good. Why don't you talk to each other before you get away from town here and send me a proposal about how long you think it would take to argue these ten motions, and that will help me find the time necessary to do it, and a reasonable period of time that I can get ready after the 8th of December.

MR. SINGER: Your Honor, in connection with that, would your office be able to tell us if there -- what your trial schedule looks like? I mean, we hate to lose February 26.

THE COURT: But it sounds to me like -- I think you're going -- I think we're going to lose it. I don't think we have any choice about that if we want to give any intelligent consideration to these motions, and we do. But I'm not prepared to -- I need to think about how far out it needs to go, and you maybe should suggest that also in whatever you give to me.

MR. SINGER: I think that the parties, if we knew for example that there would be -- three months out on the Court's schedule, there would be time for a five-week jury trial, we could work back from that.

THE COURT: There's always a whole bunch of trials set, and who knows what's going to go and what isn't. We'll just have to figure out the time we're going to have to do this and plunk it down in there and work around it. All right.

MR. MARRIOTT: If it makes you feel any better, Your Honor, we have at least committed with one another that there will be no extensions of the opposition dates for responding to the motions.

THE COURT: So December 8?

MR. MARRIOTT: The 8th is fixed, so those dates are not moving, so that at least is one fixed mark in this whole affair.

THE COURT: I wonder if I could get ready to hear these motions on December 23 and 24? No. I'm kidding.

I've asked Judge Wells to hear IBM's motion to strike the allegations in excess of the final disclosures.

Here's another thing I want to get your quick reaction to. Novell isn't here, but you both know there's another case. Is there an argument that that case ought to be tried first, at least from you two folks? I'm not asking Novell that. They are not here -- or it is not here. Do you have a reaction to that

1 question? 2 MR. SINGER: My immediate reaction would be 3 that the IBM case should come first, that the contract claims shouldn't be affected by the issues there. 5 copyright claim on which IBM is seeking a declaratory judgment, and we simply have a similar copyright claim, 6 7 that is affected by the question of whether or not those copyrights were transferred from Novell to SCO. issue is one which is -- if that was decided adversely to 10 us would moot out that aspect of this case. 11 THE COURT: Do you have a comment? 12 MR. MARRIOTT: I do, Your Honor. There is, I think, an excellent argument that the trial of that 13 14 matter should come first because there are issues, as Your Honor well knows, there that would dispose entirely 15 16 of causes of action and claims in the IBM case. Just by 17 way of example: The ownership of the copyrights is an 18 If it's found in that case that issue in those cases. 19 Novell, not SCO, owns the copyrights, that cleans up -- a lot of IBM's motion for declaration of non-infringement 20 of Linux, for example disappears. 21 22 THE COURT: "Cleans up" is your phrase, not 23 Mr. Singer's? 24 MR. MARRIOTT: I suspect that's right, Judge.

MR. SINGER: Absolutely.

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MR. MARRIOTT: A second issue is that in IBM's
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   motion for summary judgment on its contract claims, we
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   have argued and believe that Novell has, by way of the
 3
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    rights it has under its asset purchase agreement with
    Santa Cruse, the predecessor of the Park Corporation of
 5
    SCO, has the right to waive the alleged violations of the
 6
 7.
    contract, and that issue is another issue raised in the
   Novell matter and, if decided in favor of Novell, would
 8
    preclude relief sought here.
10
              MR. SINGER: Well, that's an issue that we
    think is relevant to the IBM matter but not really to the
11
12
   Novell matter. That is being litigatged -- it concerns
13
    Novell, but it is being litigated in the IBM case because
14
    the claims Novell has purported to exercise the right to
    waive are claims against IBM that are relevant here.
15
16
    They are not relevant to the claims between SCO and
17
   Novell.
18
                              I agree it's an issue here.
              MR. MARRIOTT:
19
    think it's also an issue there.
20
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you both.
21
    Thank you all. We'll be in recess on this matter.
22
              MR. SINGER:
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
23
              THE COURT:
                          I'll hear from the two of you in a
24
    few days.
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              MR. SINGER: Your Honor, may I, before we
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   leave, just hold out one item Mr. Marriott raised.
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   worked -- we asked for only one week to December 1
   because we were trying our best to hold the trial
3
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   schedule for February 26. There are over 400 pages of
 5
    IBM motions. There are 40,000 pages of exhibits, over a
 6
   hundred declarations. If, as part of this
7
   consultation -- and we're looking at a schedule that
   pushes this out further, as it looks like now is going to
 9
   happen, we would like to ask the Court for at least the
10
    opportunity, if we think we need it, to ask for an
11
    additional week in responding to these motions if this
    whole schedule is going to require this additional time.
12
13
              MR. MARRIOTT:
                              Well, if it's an additional
14
    week, Your Honor, I think I could live with that.
    wouldn't want it to be much more than that because, of
15
16
    course, then it runs into the holidays on our reply, but
17
    an additional week is fine by me.
18
                           Thank you.
              MR. SINGER:
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              THE COURT: All right. The 15th?
                                                 But that
20
   means we are going to get replies when?
21
                              We could endeavor to do our
              MR. MARRIOTT:
22
    replies a week earlier than the schedule and so we could
23
    make the proposal to the Court.
24
              THE COURT: All right.
25
              MR. MARRIOTT: I don't know what I'm getting,
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which is the challenge in committing to the time schedule
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    for the replies, but I think so long as we can work
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    together to have them briefed by the holidays, that would
 3
    probably be fine. That would hopefully meet everyone's
 5
    needs.
 6
              THE COURT: All right. Fine. Thank you.
 7
    We'll be in recess.
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              MR. SINGER: Thank you.
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           (Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
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1 2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 3 STATE OF UTAH 4) ss. 5 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 6 I, REBECCA JANKE, do hereby certify that I am a 7 Certified Court Reporter for the State of Utah; 8 9 That as such Reporter I attended the hearing of the foregoing matter on October 24, 2006, and thereat 10 reported in Stenotype all of the testimony and 11 proceedings had, and caused said notes to be transcribed 12 13 into typewriting, and the foregoing pages numbered 1through 89; constitute a full, true and correct record of 14 15 the proceedings transcribed. 16 That I am not of kin to any of the parties and have no interets in the outcome of the matter; 17 18 And hereby set my hand and seal this 30th day of October, 2006. 19 2.0 21 22 23 24 25 REBECCA JANKE, CRR, RPR, RMR