EXHIBIT 15

In The Matter Of:

CERTAIN PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES, INCLUDING WIRELESS COMMUNICATION DEVICES

DAVID J. TEECE, Ph.D. - Vol. 1
April 19, 2012

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY

MERRILL CORPORATION

LegaLink, Inc.

179 Lincoln Street Suite 401 Boston, MA 02110 Phone: 617.542.0039 Fax: 617.542.2119

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	Page 137		Page 139
14:30:25 1	MR. BURLING: Q. And having seen today,	14:39:15 1	as I see them.
14:30:28 2	and apparently having had it shown to you before by	14:39:18 2	MR. BURLING: Q. Were you involved in any
14:30:33 3	your staff, Exhibit 10, showing Samsung's position	14:39:23 3	way in the prior litigation between Samsung and
14:30:38 4	of non-entitlement to injunctive relief taken	14:39:28 4	Ericsson
14:30:41 5	previously, that doesn't affect any of the opinions	14:39:29 5	A. No.
14:30:46 6	that you are offering either in the ITC or the	14:39:30 6	Q with respect to declared-essential
14:30:49 7	Northern District of California; is that correct?	14:39:35 7	royalty rates?
14:30:51 8	A. That is correct.	14:39:36 8	A. I don't think so. I don't recall being
14:30:52 9	MR. BURLING: Okay. Let's take a tape	14:39:38 9	involved.
14:30:54 10	break.	14:39:43 10	Q. Did you did you follow that case at the
14:30:54 11	I don't know can you do that in a	14:39:46 11	time of the litigation for any reason?
14:30:54 12	minute, or do we need to	14:39:48 12	A. No.
14:30:54 13	Do you want to	14:39:52 13	Q. Were any of your colleagues involved in
14:30:59 14	MR. WALL: I want to take a break. We've	14:39:55 14	that case?
14:31:01 15	been going well over an hour now. So if we could	14:39:56 15	A. Not to my knowledge. They could have
14:31:04 16	take a break, I think it's a good opportunity.	14:39:58 16	been. I just don't I just don't know.
14:31:05 17	MR. BURLING: We can take a break.	14:40:05 17	Q. Okay. So look at Exhibit 1, please, and
14:31:07 18	MR. WALL: That's all I'm saying. I	14:41:42 18	I think it's page 27. A couple of pages earlier,
14:31:07 19	didn't know if you wanted to keep going.	14:42:08 19	24. Do you have that in front of you?
14:31:08 20	MR. BURLING: I'm not aware of any	14:42:15 20	A. Yes.
14:31:09 21	one-hour rule, but I'm happy to take a break.	14:42:16 21	Q. And there you list this is a section
14:31:11 22	MR. WALL: Oh.	14:42:19 22	where you talk about a number of studies from which.
14:31:12 23	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This is the end of	14:42:30 23	as I understand it, you draw information points to
14:31:13 24	Volume 1	14:42:35 24	use as what I think you called this morning
14:31:13 25	MR. WALL: That's how I usually do it.	14:42:38 25	benchmarks for developing a damages reasonable
	Page 138		Page 140
14:31:13 1	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Videotape No. 2, in	14:42:43 1	royalty rate. Is that correct?
14:31:14 2	the deposition of Dr. David Teece. We're going off	14:42:47 2	A. Yes. This is one part of the canvas, if
14:31:17 3	the record. The time is 2:31.	14:42:56 3	you will, that I review for purposes of determining
14:37:44 4	(Recess taken.)	14:43:05 4	reasonable royalties.
14:37:58 5	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're back on the	14:43:08 5	Q. And this section starting on page 24 up to
14:37:59 6	record. This is the beginning of Volume 1,	14:43:20 6	page 33 is similar to a section that's in your ITC
14:38:01 7	Videotape No. 3, in the deposition of Dr. David	14:43:33 7	report. Is that a fair statement?
14:38:04 8	Teece. The time is 2:38.	14:43:37 8	A. Yes, there's some overlap.
14:38:10 9	MR. BURLING: Q. So, Professor Teece, am	14:43:46 9	Q. And so let's start first looking at one of
14:38:13 10	I fair in assuming that if I showed you other	14:43:48 10	the information points, which is the Stasik report
14:38:21 11	examples of where Samsung previously had taken the	14:44:04 11	that's shown on page 25, or at least a table from it
14:38:25 12	position that "injunctive relief was not available	14:44:07 12	is shown.
14:38:31 13	to FRAND declarants" to ETSI, that that would not	14:44:08 13	A. That's correct.
14:38:38 14	affect your opinions either?	14:44:09 14	Q. And this is a report
14:38:40 15	MR. WALL: Objection; facts not in	14:44:12 15	Let me just mark it for us. This is
14:38:42 16	evidence, lacks foundation.	14:44:14 16	Exhibit 11.
14:38:45 17	THE WITNESS: Well, particularly in view	14:44:44 17	(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit 11 was
14:38:46 18			marked for identification.)
	of the fact, as I said I think twice before, I mean,	14:44:44 18	
14:38:50 19	ETSI's now looked at this issue and they've not come	14:44:44 19	MR. BURLING: Q. Is Exhibit 11 the Stasik
14:38:53 20	ETSI's now looked at this issue and they've not come to the view in fact, I think it was very	14:44:44 19 14:44:47 20	MR. BURLING: Q. Is Exhibit 11 the Stasik article from which the information shown on page 25
14:38:53 20 14:38:57 21	ETSI's now looked at this issue and they've not come to the view in fact, I think it was very recently they've not come to the view that FRAND	14:44:44 19 14:44:47 20 14:44:49 21	MR. BURLING: Q. Is Exhibit 11 the Stasik article from which the information shown on page 25 is drawn?
14:38:53 20 14:38:57 21 14:39:00 22	ETSI's now looked at this issue and they've not come to the view in fact, I think it was very recently they've not come to the view that FRAND waives injunctive relief.	14:44:44 19 14:44:47 20 14:44:49 21 14:44:51 22	MR. BURLING: Q. Is Exhibit 11 the Stasik article from which the information shown on page 25 is drawn? A. It is.
14:38:53 20 14:38:57 21 14:39:00 22 14:39:03 23	ETSI's now looked at this issue and they've not come to the view in fact, I think it was very recently they've not come to the view that FRAND waives injunctive relief. The fact that Samsung may have taken a	14:44:44 19 14:44:47 20 14:44:49 21 14:44:51 22 14:44:52 23	MR. BURLING: Q. Is Exhibit 11 the Stasik article from which the information shown on page 25 is drawn? A. It is. Q. And the table on page 116 of Exhibit 11
14:38:53 20 14:38:57 21 14:39:00 22	ETSI's now looked at this issue and they've not come to the view in fact, I think it was very recently they've not come to the view that FRAND waives injunctive relief.	14:44:44 19 14:44:47 20 14:44:49 21 14:44:51 22	MR. BURLING: Q. Is Exhibit 11 the Stasik article from which the information shown on page 25 is drawn? A. It is.

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14:45:09 1	Q. Mr. Stasik is also a testifying expert for	14:49:06 1	A. That is correct.
14:45:17 2	Samsung in this litigation with Apple?	14:49:10 2	Q. And do you understand that products
14:45:23 3	A. That's my understanding, yes.	14:49:14 3	compliant handsets compliant with LTE or able to
14:45:26 4	Q. And this article lists what he says are	14:49:19 4	function on LTE will, for the foreseeable future,
14:45:38 5	published handset royalty rates for LTE; right?	14:49:24 5	also be required to function on UMTS?
14:45:46 6	A. Correct.	14:49:28 6	MR. WALL: Objection to form.
14:45:48 7	Q. LTE is a different standard from UMTS?	14:49:36 7	THE WITNESS: Are you talking about in the
14:45:54 8	A. Yes.	14:49:38 8	United States or in every jurisdiction or where?
14:45:56 9	Q. It is a so-called fourth-generation	14:49:42 9	MR. BURLING: Q. I don't think it
14:45:57 10	standard versus third generation, which is UMTS?	14:49:42 10	matters. Let me make it expansive. I don't think
14:46:05 11	A. That is correct.	14:49:46 11	it matters.
14:46:10 12	Q. And do you know whether any or all of the	14:49:47 12	A. Mm-hmm. I know there's an effort to
14:46:15 13	patents declared essential to UMTS are also declared	14:49:50 13	secure backward compatibility. I haven't studied
14:46:22 14	essential to LTE?	14:49:54 14	that in any detail.
14:46:25 15	MR. WALL: Objection to form.	14:49:55 15	Q. It's more than an effort. Isn't that the
14:46:32 16	THE WITNESS: Do I know whether any of	14:49:57 16	plan, to have backward compatibility to UMTS?
14:46:33 17	them are?	14:50:01 17	A. I think so, yes.
14:46:34 18	MR. BURLING: Q. Yes.	14:50:02 18	Q. So that if you have a fourth-generation
14:46:34 19	A. I believe that some of them are. I just	14:50:05 19	LTE phone and you go to the next town, which may no
14:46:36 20	don't know which ones and how many.	14:50:10 20	have access to an LTE tower but to a UMTS tower,
14:46:41 21	Q. Do you know roughly what proportion?	14:50:15 21	your phone will revert to UMTS and function on that
14:46:58 22	A. As I sit here right now, I don't recall.	14:50:18 22	standard; right?
14:47:01 23	I think I've seen reference to it somewhere.	14:50:20 23	A. That's my understanding.
14:47:08 24	Q. So you don't know?	14:50:21 24	Q. Just as today UMTS phones are capable of
14:47:11 25	A. As I sit here right now, I don't recall.	14:50:26 25	reverting back to PVDS or whatever it is; is that
	Page 142		Page 144
14:47:19 1	Q. Do you know if the seven patents at issue	14:50:33 1	right?
	in the Northern District of California suit have	14:50:34 2	A. I believe so.
	been declared essential to LTE?	14:50:34 3	Q. The prior standard.
14:47:32 4	A. I don't know for sure, but I don't believe	14:50:36 4	So my question is: When you see these
14:47:33 5	so, but I don't know for sure.	14:50:38 5	rates from Mr. Stasik for LTE, do you know if those
14:47:36 6	Q. Do you know whether any of the Samsung	14:50:45 6	are announced rates that include patents the
14:47:42 7	portfolio of UMTS declared-essential patents has	14:50:50 7	patent portfolios just for LTE or for LTE and UMTS
	been declared essential to LTE?	14:50:56 8	and prior generations?
14:47:57 9	A. As I sit here right now, I don't know.	14:51:21 9	A. It's not my understanding that infringed
14:47:59 10	Q. Do you know whether the published handset	14:51:26 10	products would pay both, but I'd have to go back and
14:48:05 11	royalty rates for LTE listed on page 25 of your	14:51:30 11	check the the announced royalty rates. There may
14:48:11 12	Northern District of California report are in	14:51:38 12	be some specification with respect to that that's in
	addition to any royalty rates for UMTS or inclusive	14:51:42 13	those disclosures.
	of royalty rates for UMTS?	14:51:44 14	Q. But you didn't know or you don't know at
14:48:32 15	A. Let me see if I understand what you mean.	14:51:48 15	the time you were using these LTE-announced rates as
14:48:33 16	Are you asking me whether someone seeking a license	14:51:52 16	a reference point whether those rates include both
	for LTE would get a credit if they got a contract	14:51:56 17	LTE and UMTS and prior generations or not; is that
	under a different standard?	14:52:00 18	correct?
14:48:51 19	Q. Fair question. Let me back up a second.	14:52:05 19	A. I don't know the details of that.
14:48:54 20	Do you understand LTE to be in some sense	14:52:08 20	Q. You don't know one way or the other?
14:48:56 21	a successor to UMTS?	14:52:12 21	A. I would have to check further. I'm
14:48:58 22	A. Yes.	14:52:17 22	implicitly assuming that you only pay once and that
14:48:59 23	Q. A fourth-generation product hoped to	14:52:21 23	there's not stacking across the standards, but I
14:49:02 24	supersede and improve a third-generation standard	14:52:24 24	have to check that.
		14:52:26 25	Q. So you're assuming that for

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14:52:27 1	Alcatel-Lucent, just to be specific, that for a	14:55:07 1	MR. WALL: Hold on.
14:52:30 2	2 percent royalty, you get Alcatel-Lucent's	14:55:07 2	Objection to form; vague.
14:52:34 3	portfolio of declared-essential patents for UMTS and	14:55:13 3	THE WITNESS: I understand this to be the
14:52:37 4	for LTE to the extent that differs?	14:55:13 4	announced royalty rates which would be in the form
14:52:40 5	MR. WALL: Objection to form; lacks	14:55:19 5	of offer rates. But I'm just making clear that the
14:52:42 6	foundation, misconstrues testimony.	14:55:23 6	industry practice is one where almost nobody ever
14:52:44 7	THE WITNESS: I mean, there may be some	14:55:27 7	pays these rates because
14:52:47 8	ambiguity in this, but I think that certainly in a	14:55:28 8	MR. BURLING: Q. Okay.
14:52:58 9	cross-license arrangement, it's likely that you	14:55:30 9	A they engage in cross-licensing
14:53:02 10	could get coverage from you could get a contract	14:55:32 10	arrangements of one kind or another.
14:53:09 11	that would include them both.	14:55:35 11	Q. All right. And because opening offers
14:53:11 12	MR. BURLING: Q. Well, this isn't a	14:55:37 12	often go down; correct?
14:53:12 13	cross-license, is it? This is a published handset	14:55:38 13	A. Well
14:53:15 14	royalty rate for a one-way license from each of	14:55:39 14	MR. WALL: Objection.
14:53:17 15	these companies to their portfolios. Isn't that	14:55:39 15	Hold on.
14:53:21 16	what you understand the report to be?	14:55:40 16	Objection to form.
14:53:24 17	A. Correct. This is an offer. But as I said	14:55:47 17	THE WITNESS: My testimony this morning is
14:53:27 18	before, in this industry, almost nobody just takes a	14:55:48 18	maybe in the early stages of an industry, but once
14:53:29 19	one-way license; there's a cross-license. So	14:55:50 19	there is some experience amongst the parties, they
14:53:31 20	negotiations will almost inevitably end up with	14:55:54 20	typically don't go down.
14:53:37 21	end-to-end discussions about existing contracts and	14:55:56 21	What happens is they'll go down in terms
14:53:40 22	the kinds of issues you're raising right now.	14:56:03 22	of the price, is that something will be traded off;
14:53:43 23	Q. Negotiations would result in lower rates	14:56:05 23	namely, you take back some intellectual property or
14:53:46 24	than those specified on page 25?	14:56:08 24	some intellectual property rights of one kind or
14:53:50 25	MR. WALL: Objection to form.	14:56:12 25	another.

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14:53:53 1	_	14:56:15 1	
14:53:53 1 14:53:57 2	THE WITNESS: As I've said before, in	14:56:15 1 14:56:17 2	MR. BURLING: Q. All right. Let's try to
	THE WITNESS: As I've said before, in cross-licensing, you know, typically one does come		MR. BURLING: Q. All right. Let's try to focus, though. I just I want to focus on one
14:53:57 2 14:54:02 3	THE WITNESS: As I've said before, in cross-licensing, you know, typically one does come down from this rate.	14:56:17 2	MR. BURLING: Q. All right. Let's try to focus, though. I just I want to focus on one aspect of this, which is as following:
14:53:57 2	THE WITNESS: As I've said before, in cross-licensing, you know, typically one does come down from this rate. MR. BURLING: Q. I want every time	14:56:17 2 14:56:19 3	MR. BURLING: Q. All right. Let's try to focus, though. I just I want to focus on one aspect of this, which is as following: If these published handset royalty rates
14:53:57 2 14:54:02 3 14:54:04 4	THE WITNESS: As I've said before, in cross-licensing, you know, typically one does come down from this rate. MR. BURLING: Q. I want every time I ask about licensing, you go to cross-licensing. I	14:56:17 2 14:56:19 3 14:56:21 4	MR. BURLING: Q. All right. Let's try to focus, though. I just I want to focus on one aspect of this, which is as following: If these published handset royalty rates are for both LTE and UMTS, then doesn't it stand to
14:53:57 2 14:54:02 3 14:54:04 4 14:54:05 5	THE WITNESS: As I've said before, in cross-licensing, you know, typically one does come down from this rate. MR. BURLING: Q. I want every time I ask about licensing, you go to cross-licensing. I want I want you I want not to ask about	14:56:17 2 14:56:19 3 14:56:21 4 14:56:23 5	MR. BURLING: Q. All right. Let's try to focus, though. I just I want to focus on one aspect of this, which is as following: If these published handset royalty rates are for both LTE and UMTS, then doesn't it stand to reason that if someone wanted to license only UMTS
14:53:57 2 14:54:02 3 14:54:04 4 14:54:05 5 14:54:07 6	THE WITNESS: As I've said before, in cross-licensing, you know, typically one does come down from this rate. MR. BURLING: Q. I want every time I ask about licensing, you go to cross-licensing. I want I want you I want not to ask about cross-licensing now. Okay?	14:56:17 2 14:56:19 3 14:56:21 4 14:56:23 5 14:56:30 6	MR. BURLING: Q. All right. Let's try to focus, though. I just I want to focus on one aspect of this, which is as following: If these published handset royalty rates are for both LTE and UMTS, then doesn't it stand to reason that if someone wanted to license only UMTS and not any different patents for LTE, the royalty
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14:53:57 2 14:54:02 3 14:54:04 4 14:54:05 5 14:54:07 6 14:54:10 7 14:54:11 8 14:54:14 9	THE WITNESS: As I've said before, in cross-licensing, you know, typically one does come down from this rate. MR. BURLING: Q. I want every time I ask about licensing, you go to cross-licensing. I want I want you I want not to ask about cross-licensing now. Okay? I want not to ask about that because you understand on page 25, these royalty rates are the opening positions, as you understand it, for a	14:56:17 2 14:56:19 3 14:56:21 4 14:56:23 5 14:56:30 6 14:56:37 7 14:56:41 8 14:56:42 9 14:56:43 10	MR. BURLING: Q. All right. Let's try to focus, though. I just I want to focus on one aspect of this, which is as following: If these published handset royalty rates are for both LTE and UMTS, then doesn't it stand to reason that if someone wanted to license only UMTS and not any different patents for LTE, the royalty rate should be less? MR. WALL: Objection to form; assumes
14:53:57 2 14:54:02 3 14:54:04 4 14:54:05 5 14:54:07 6 14:54:10 7 14:54:11 8 14:54:14 9 14:54:19 10	THE WITNESS: As I've said before, in cross-licensing, you know, typically one does come down from this rate. MR. BURLING: Q. I want every time I ask about licensing, you go to cross-licensing. I want I want you I want not to ask about cross-licensing now. Okay? I want not to ask about that because you understand on page 25, these royalty rates are the opening positions, as you understand it, for a one-way license of the portfolio of that company for	14:56:17 2 14:56:19 3 14:56:21 4 14:56:23 5 14:56:30 6 14:56:37 7 14:56:41 8 14:56:42 9 14:56:43 10	MR. BURLING: Q. All right. Let's try to focus, though. I just I want to focus on one aspect of this, which is as following: If these published handset royalty rates are for both LTE and UMTS, then doesn't it stand to reason that if someone wanted to license only UMTS and not any different patents for LTE, the royalty rate should be less? MR. WALL: Objection to form; assumes facts not in evidence.
14:53:57 2 14:54:02 3 14:54:04 4 14:54:05 5 14:54:07 6 14:54:10 7 14:54:11 8 14:54:14 9 14:54:19 10 14:54:22 11	THE WITNESS: As I've said before, in cross-licensing, you know, typically one does come down from this rate. MR. BURLING: Q. I want every time I ask about licensing, you go to cross-licensing. I want I want you I want not to ask about cross-licensing now. Okay? I want not to ask about that because you understand on page 25, these royalty rates are the opening positions, as you understand it, for a	14:56:17 2 14:56:19 3 14:56:21 4 14:56:23 5 14:56:30 6 14:56:37 7 14:56:41 8 14:56:42 9 14:56:43 10 14:56:52 11	MR. BURLING: Q. All right. Let's try to focus, though. I just I want to focus on one aspect of this, which is as following: If these published handset royalty rates are for both LTE and UMTS, then doesn't it stand to reason that if someone wanted to license only UMTS and not any different patents for LTE, the royalty rate should be less? MR. WALL: Objection to form; assumes facts not in evidence. THE WITNESS: You know, when you have
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14:57:38 1 14:57:41 2	Page 149		Page 151
14.57.41 0	about what the base is for this chart for Mr. Stasik	15:00:24 1	THE WITNESS: I do know that there is some
14.5/.41 2	that you incorporate in your report, is there?	15:00:28 2	use of the LTE standard. There are some sales of
14:57:48 3	A. You'd have to go back and look one at a	15:00:31 3	LTE phones. I suspect but don't know for sure
14:58:08 4	time, but it is, I believe, at the handset level.	15:00:37 4	that there's some licenses that are accruing.
14:58:11 5	Q. And whatever the base is for any one of	15:00:41 5	I don't know whether they're being paid or not.
14:58:15 6	these, isn't it logical that a rate that applied to	15:00:43 6	MR. BURLING: Q. Okay. So you don't know
14:58:23 7	both UMTS and LTE would be higher than a rate that	15:00:45 7	if the rates specified in the third column have ever
14:58:27 8	applied only to UMTS?	15:00:48 8	been paid by anyone; correct?
14:58:33 9	A. No, it is not necessarily.	15:00:50 9	MR. WALL: Objection to form.
14:58:34 10	Q. Assuming that the base always stayed the	15:00:53 10	THE WITNESS: I have not seen specific
14:58:36 11	same?	15:00:55 11	evidence that confirms that people are paying. And
14:58:36 12	A. Well, okay. You slipped something in at	15:01:00 12	as I said before, I would expect that over time,
14:58:39 13	the end.	15:01:03 13	following the pattern of other standards, that there
14:58:40 14	Q. I'm not slipping anything in, Professor	15:01:08 14	will be payments made.
14:58:41 15	Teece. Apple/Lucent announces a rate, 2.2 percent.	15:01:10 15	But the primary currency for payment in
14:58:46 16	Okay? They obviously have a base in mind. All	15:01:13 16	this industry is cross-license. It's not money
14:58:50 17	right? I don't know what it is, but they have one	15:01:16 17	it's not money.
14:58:52 18	in mind. That's fixed.	15:01:17 18	MR. BURLING: Q. All right. And motions
14:58:54 19	And my question is: If for 2 percent,	15:01:22 19	to strike and all that, I reserve. But I just
14:58:55 20	applied to whatever base they specify, you get both	15:01:25 20	I think when you net through all of that, your
14:59:00 21	LTE and UMTS, then by logic if you only want UMTS	15:01:27 21	answer is no, I have no evidence that anyone has
14:59:04 22	and not LTE, you don't want those extra patents that	15:01:31 22	actually paid the rates specified in the third
14:59:07 23	may be peculiar to LTE, the rate should be less. Do	15:01:34 23	column of the chart on page 25?
14:59:11 24	you agree with that or not?	15:01:37 24	MR. WALL: Objection; form.
14:59:13 25	A. No, I don't necessarily agree with it.	15:01:41 25	MR. BURLING: Q. If you have any
	Page 150		Page 152
14:59:17 1	You'll note that one of the features of	15:01:42 1	evidence, tell me what it is now.
14:59:19 2	cross-licensing is, you know, if you want to piece	15:01:45 2	A. The only evidence I can refer to is use of
14:59:25 3	part a portfolio, it doesn't necessarily give you a	15:01:48 3	the LTE standard. There is now use taking place, so
14:59:27 4	discount. That's a well-recognized aspect of	15:01:53 4	
			I would expect that some folks are paying.
14:59:31 5	industry practice.	15:02:01 5	Q. From the fact that people are licensing
14:59:31 5 14:59:34 6	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are
	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge?	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form.	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No.
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25?
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced.	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on.	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 14	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form.	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 14 14:59:49 15	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I haven't seen any licenses	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14 15:02:25 15	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates but in kind, through giving back a grant-back of
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 14 14:59:49 15 14:59:53 16	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I haven't seen any licenses with these rates. I wouldn't expect necessarily to	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14 15:02:25 15 15:02:28 16	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates but in kind, through giving back a grant-back of other intellectual property rights.
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 14 14:59:49 15 14:59:53 16 15:00:00 17	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I haven't seen any licenses with these rates. I wouldn't expect necessarily to see them publicly for two reasons. One, it would be	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14 15:02:25 15 15:02:28 16 15:02:30 17	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates but in kind, through giving back a grant-back of other intellectual property rights. Q. Are these the equivalent of what you would
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 15 14:59:53 16 15:00:00 17 15:00:03 18	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I haven't seen any licenses with these rates. I wouldn't expect necessarily to see them publicly for two reasons. One, it would be highly confidential; and (b) there's likely to be a	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14 15:02:25 15 15:02:28 16 15:02:33 18	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates but in kind, through giving back a grant-back of other intellectual property rights. Q. Are these the equivalent of what you would refer to as opening offers in the same meaning as
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 14 14:59:49 15 14:59:53 16 15:00:00 17 15:00:03 18 15:00:07 19	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I haven't seen any licenses with these rates. I wouldn't expect necessarily to see them publicly for two reasons. One, it would be highly confidential; and (b) there's likely to be a cross-license back on the other side.	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14 15:02:25 15 15:02:28 16 15:02:33 17 15:02:33 18 15:02:35 19	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates but in kind, through giving back a grant-back of other intellectual property rights. Q. Are these the equivalent of what you would refer to as opening offers in the same meaning as you use in your ITC report?
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 14 14:59:49 15 14:59:53 16 15:00:00 17 15:00:03 18 15:00:07 19 15:00:09 20	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I haven't seen any licenses with these rates. I wouldn't expect necessarily to see them publicly for two reasons. One, it would be highly confidential; and (b) there's likely to be a cross-license back on the other side. MR. BURLING: Q. So you don't have any	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14 15:02:25 15 15:02:28 16 15:02:33 17 15:02:33 18 15:02:35 19 15:02:42 20	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates but in kind, through giving back a grant-back of other intellectual property rights. Q. Are these the equivalent of what you would refer to as opening offers in the same meaning as you use in your ITC report? A. Yes and no. I mean, they're announced
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 14 14:59:49 15 14:59:53 16 15:00:00 17 15:00:03 18 15:00:07 19 15:00:09 20 15:00:10 21	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I haven't seen any licenses with these rates. I wouldn't expect necessarily to see them publicly for two reasons. One, it would be highly confidential; and (b) there's likely to be a cross-license back on the other side. MR. BURLING: Q. So you don't have any information to suggest that anyone has ever paid the	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14 15:02:25 15 15:02:28 16 15:02:30 17 15:02:33 18 15:02:35 19 15:02:42 20 15:02:45 21	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates but in kind, through giving back a grant-back of other intellectual property rights. Q. Are these the equivalent of what you would refer to as opening offers in the same meaning as you use in your ITC report? A. Yes and no. I mean, they're announced rates; but, you know, let's look at Motorola, which
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 14 14:59:49 15 14:59:53 16 15:00:00 17 15:00:03 18 15:00:07 19 15:00:09 20 15:00:10 21 15:00:14 22	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I haven't seen any licenses with these rates. I wouldn't expect necessarily to see them publicly for two reasons. One, it would be highly confidential; and (b) there's likely to be a cross-license back on the other side. MR. BURLING: Q. So you don't have any information to suggest that anyone has ever paid the rates set out here in the third column of the chart	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14 15:02:25 15 15:02:28 16 15:02:30 17 15:02:33 18 15:02:35 19 15:02:42 20 15:02:45 21 15:02:49 22	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates but in kind, through giving back a grant-back of other intellectual property rights. Q. Are these the equivalent of what you would refer to as opening offers in the same meaning as you use in your ITC report? A. Yes and no. I mean, they're announced rates; but, you know, let's look at Motorola, which is in there, 2.25. This is Motorola's rate that
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 14 14:59:49 15 14:59:53 16 15:00:00 17 15:00:03 18 15:00:07 19 15:00:09 20 15:00:10 21 15:00:14 22 15:00:17 23	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I haven't seen any licenses with these rates. I wouldn't expect necessarily to see them publicly for two reasons. One, it would be highly confidential; and (b) there's likely to be a cross-license back on the other side. MR. BURLING: Q. So you don't have any information to suggest that anyone has ever paid the rates set out here in the third column of the chart on page 25; is that correct?	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14 15:02:25 15 15:02:28 16 15:02:30 17 15:02:33 18 15:02:35 19 15:02:42 20 15:02:45 21 15:02:49 22 15:02:52 23	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates but in kind, through giving back a grant-back of other intellectual property rights. Q. Are these the equivalent of what you would refer to as opening offers in the same meaning as you use in your ITC report? A. Yes and no. I mean, they're announced rates; but, you know, let's look at Motorola, which is in there, 2.25. This is Motorola's rate that it's held on to in multiple contexts over multiple
14:59:34 6 14:59:36 7 14:59:41 8 14:59:42 9 14:59:42 10 14:59:46 11 14:59:47 12 14:59:48 13 14:59:49 14 14:59:49 15 14:59:53 16 15:00:00 17 15:00:03 18 15:00:07 19 15:00:09 20 15:00:10 21 15:00:14 22	Q. Have these rates ever shown up in any licenses, to your knowledge? MR. WALL: Objection to form. MR. BURLING: Q. Any of these rates on I'm sticking on page 25, the table there that you reproduced. A. I have MR. WALL: Hold on. Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I haven't seen any licenses with these rates. I wouldn't expect necessarily to see them publicly for two reasons. One, it would be highly confidential; and (b) there's likely to be a cross-license back on the other side. MR. BURLING: Q. So you don't have any information to suggest that anyone has ever paid the rates set out here in the third column of the chart	15:02:01 5 15:02:02 6 15:02:06 7 15:02:09 8 15:02:11 9 15:02:12 10 15:02:13 11 15:02:15 12 15:02:18 13 15:02:21 14 15:02:25 15 15:02:28 16 15:02:30 17 15:02:33 18 15:02:35 19 15:02:42 20 15:02:45 21 15:02:49 22	Q. From the fact that people are licensing LTE, you draw the conclusion that those people are paying the rates set out in the third column of Exhibit A. No. Q of page 25? A. To be clear, I told you I didn't necessarily expect that with cross-licensing, that anyone would actually pay these rates as such. They would in normal dollars. They pay these rates but in kind, through giving back a grant-back of other intellectual property rights. Q. Are these the equivalent of what you would refer to as opening offers in the same meaning as you use in your ITC report? A. Yes and no. I mean, they're announced rates; but, you know, let's look at Motorola, which is in there, 2.25. This is Motorola's rate that

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Merrill Corporation - Boston

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15:03:02 1	Page 153		Page 155
13.03.02 1	Motorola what is known publicly is that Motorola	15:10:20 1	licensee [sic] ultimately expects to get"?
15:03:06 2	doesn't actually discount their rate. It it	15:10:23 2	A. That's correct.
15:03:14 3	looks for cross-licenses or access to other folks'	15:10:25 3	Q. And didn't you say in the same paragraph
15:03:19 4	intellectual property as a way to get satisfaction.	15:10:27 4	that "An [sic] opening offer by a licensor even
15:03:22 5	Q. So haven't you explicitly said that for	15:10:31 5	one that is relatively high is no more
15:03:26 6	Motorola, that 2.25 is their normal, what you	15:10:34 6	'unreasonable' than a low-ball counteroffer by the
15:03:29 7	called, opening rate?	15:10:37 7	prospective licensee"?
15:03:32 8	A. Yes.	15:10:40 8	A. Yes, I did.
15:03:32 9	Q. And haven't you explicitly said in your	15:10:40 9	Q. And isn't it no more unreasonable because
15:03:35 10	reports that opening rates are just that and they	15:10:47 10	the opening offer by the licensor will come down and
15:03:39 11	typically are negotiated down in the give-and-take	15:10:50 11	the, quote, low-ball offer by the licensee will come
15:03:41 12	of subsequent negotiations?	15:10:54 12	up during the course of negotiation?
15:03:45 13	A. Negotiated away from, rather than down. I	15:10:56 13	MR. WALL: Objection to form; vague,
15:03:46 14	mean, those rates don't necessarily come down. What	15:10:58 14	incomplete hypothetical.
15:03:49 15	you get is exchange of consideration in the form of	15:11:02 15	THE WITNESS: You know, your questions
15:03:56 16	intellectual property.	15:11:04 16	come as if there's only a negotiation over price.
15:08:21 17	Q. So is it your testimony, Professor Teece,	15:11:07 17	And what I'm trying to say, without much
15:08:23 18	that the opening offers made by patent holders do	15:11:10 18	success, trying to get across is that really the
15:08:35 19	not move down in the course of subsequent	15:11:13 19	negotiation is not about, you know, the royalty rate
15:08:40 20	negotiations?	15:11:18 20	per se. It's almost always around what is the
15:08:43 21	MR. WALL: Objection to form; lacks	15:11:23 21	cross-consideration; and secondly, what is the base
15:08:45 22	foundation, vague.	15:11:29 22	associated with the royalty rate if one is, in fact,
15:08:48 23	THE WITNESS: If I could draw your	15:11:34 23	specified. And that may lead to a balancing
15:08:49 24	attention to Exhibit 4, paragraph 33, where I talk	15:11:37 24	payment; it may not.
15:08:55 25	about initial offers versus final terms, in	15:11:38 25	MR. BURLING: Q. In your report on that
	Page 154		Page 156
15:09:05 1	paragraph 33 I say:	15:11:46 1	page 25 we were looking at, with the Stasik chart
15:09:05 1 15:09:12 2	paragraph 33 I say: "A prospective licensor	15:11:46 1 15:11:50 2	page 25 we were looking at, with the Stasik chart A. Yeah.
15:09:12 2	"A prospective licensor	15:11:50 2	A. Yeah.
15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3	A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to
15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3 15:09:15 4	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer at the high end of what it	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3 15:11:55 4	A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to be the announced rates for a one-way license or not?
15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3 15:09:15 4 15:09:17 5	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer at the high end of what it believes to be a plausible bargaining range." And then:	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3 15:11:55 4 15:12:00 5	 A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to be the announced rates for a one-way license or not? A. Yes, I did.
15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3 15:09:15 4 15:09:17 5 15:09:19 6	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer at the high end of what it believes to be a plausible bargaining range." And then: "The prospective licensee	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3 15:11:55 4 15:12:00 5 15:12:01 6 15:12:09 7 15:12:12 8	 A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to be the announced rates for a one-way license or not? A. Yes, I did. Q. Okay. And you understood those were subject to negotiation? A. Yes, but not just negotiation around
15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3 15:09:15 4 15:09:17 5 15:09:19 6 15:09:19 7	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer at the high end of what it believes to be a plausible bargaining range." And then: "The prospective licensee responds with a counteroffer.	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3 15:11:55 4 15:12:00 5 15:12:01 6 15:12:09 7	 A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to be the announced rates for a one-way license or not? A. Yes, I did. Q. Okay. And you understood those were subject to negotiation? A. Yes, but not just negotiation around rates. It's as I've said, you know, this is
15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3 15:09:15 4 15:09:17 5 15:09:19 6 15:09:19 7 15:09:20 8 15:09:21 9 15:09:22 10	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer at the high end of what it believes to be a plausible bargaining range." And then: "The prospective licensee responds with a counteroffer. The parties engage in	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3 15:11:55 4 15:12:00 5 15:12:01 6 15:12:09 7 15:12:12 8 15:12:14 9 15:12:17 10	 A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to be the announced rates for a one-way license or not? A. Yes, I did. Q. Okay. And you understood those were subject to negotiation? A. Yes, but not just negotiation around rates. It's as I've said, you know, this is that's just the starting point. There's the
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15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3 15:09:15 4 15:09:17 5 15:09:19 6 15:09:19 7 15:09:20 8 15:09:21 9 15:09:22 10 15:09:24 11 15:09:26 12 15:09:28 14 15:09:30 15 15:09:36 16 15:09:41 17 15:09:51 18 15:09:56 19 15:09:58 20	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer at the high end of what it believes to be a plausible bargaining range." And then: "The prospective licensee responds with a counteroffer. The parties engage in back-and-forth negotiations whereby the parties' offers move closer together." That does not imply, nor do I say that, quote, the rate comes down as such. It's it's more that the consideration coming back is negotiated over and and maybe aspects of the royalty base are also negotiated. So it's much more complicated in the context of a cross-license because, really, the	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3 15:11:55 4 15:12:00 5 15:12:01 6 15:12:09 7 15:12:12 8 15:12:14 9 15:12:17 10 15:12:20 11 15:12:24 12 15:12:29 13 15:12:30 14 15:12:34 15 15:12:37 16 15:12:47 18 15:12:51 19 15:12:53 20	A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to be the announced rates for a one-way license or not? A. Yes, I did. Q. Okay. And you understood those were subject to negotiation? A. Yes, but not just negotiation around rates. It's as I've said, you know, this is that's just the starting point. There's the competitive canvas here is we have players that are not just holders of IP rights; they're also participants in the industry. So I'm trying to point out that they wear multiple hats. It's a complex negotiation that involves other consideration besides pure money payments. And, you know, behind it all is an effort, in the case of many parties, to get design freedom and operating freedom. Q. Are you is it your testimony, Professor
15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3 15:09:15 4 15:09:17 5 15:09:19 6 15:09:19 7 15:09:20 8 15:09:21 9 15:09:24 11 15:09:26 12 15:09:28 13 15:09:28 14 15:09:30 15 15:09:31 16 15:09:41 17 15:09:51 18 15:09:56 19 15:09:58 20 15:10:01 21	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer at the high end of what it believes to be a plausible bargaining range." And then: "The prospective licensee responds with a counteroffer. The parties engage in back-and-forth negotiations whereby the parties' offers move closer together." That does not imply, nor do I say that, quote, the rate comes down as such. It's it's more that the consideration coming back is negotiated over and and maybe aspects of the royalty base are also negotiated. So it's much more complicated in the context of a cross-license because, really, the whole purpose is to not collect money damages, but	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3 15:11:55 4 15:12:00 5 15:12:01 6 15:12:09 7 15:12:12 8 15:12:14 9 15:12:17 10 15:12:20 11 15:12:24 12 15:12:29 13 15:12:30 14 15:12:37 16 15:12:37 16 15:12:42 17 15:12:47 18 15:12:51 19 15:12:53 20 15:12:55 21	A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to be the announced rates for a one-way license or not? A. Yes, I did. Q. Okay. And you understood those were subject to negotiation? A. Yes, but not just negotiation around rates. It's as I've said, you know, this is that's just the starting point. There's the competitive canvas here is we have players that are not just holders of IP rights; they're also participants in the industry. So I'm trying to point out that they wear multiple hats. It's a complex negotiation that involves other consideration besides pure money payments. And, you know, behind it all is an effort, in the case of many parties, to get design freedom and operating freedom. Q. Are you is it your testimony, Professor Teece, that in this industry, those opening royalty
15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3 15:09:15 4 15:09:17 5 15:09:19 6 15:09:19 7 15:09:20 8 15:09:21 9 15:09:22 10 15:09:24 11 15:09:26 12 15:09:28 13 15:09:28 14 15:09:30 15 15:09:31 18 15:09:51 18 15:09:56 19 15:09:58 20 15:10:01 21 15:10:06 22	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer at the high end of what it believes to be a plausible bargaining range." And then: "The prospective licensee responds with a counteroffer. The parties engage in back-and-forth negotiations whereby the parties' offers move closer together." That does not imply, nor do I say that, quote, the rate comes down as such. It's it's more that the consideration coming back is negotiated over and and maybe aspects of the royalty base are also negotiated. So it's much more complicated in the context of a cross-license because, really, the whole purpose is to not collect money damages, but to get design freedom and operating freedom.	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3 15:11:55 4 15:12:00 5 15:12:01 6 15:12:09 7 15:12:12 8 15:12:14 9 15:12:17 10 15:12:20 11 15:12:24 12 15:12:29 13 15:12:30 14 15:12:34 15 15:12:37 16 15:12:47 18 15:12:47 18 15:12:51 19 15:12:55 21 15:12:55 21	A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to be the announced rates for a one-way license or not? A. Yes, I did. Q. Okay. And you understood those were subject to negotiation? A. Yes, but not just negotiation around rates. It's as I've said, you know, this is that's just the starting point. There's the competitive canvas here is we have players that are not just holders of IP rights; they're also participants in the industry. So I'm trying to point out that they wear multiple hats. It's a complex negotiation that involves other consideration besides pure money payments. And, you know, behind it all is an effort, in the case of many parties, to get design freedom and operating freedom. Q. Are you is it your testimony, Professor Teece, that in this industry, those opening royalty rates such as announced by those companies in that
15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3 15:09:15 4 15:09:17 5 15:09:19 6 15:09:19 7 15:09:20 8 15:09:21 9 15:09:22 10 15:09:24 11 15:09:26 12 15:09:28 13 15:09:28 14 15:09:30 15 15:09:31 18 15:09:51 18 15:09:56 19 15:09:58 20 15:10:01 21 15:10:06 22 15:10:12 23	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer at the high end of what it believes to be a plausible bargaining range." And then: "The prospective licensee responds with a counteroffer. The parties engage in back-and-forth negotiations whereby the parties' offers move closer together." That does not imply, nor do I say that, quote, the rate comes down as such. It's it's more that the consideration coming back is negotiated over and and maybe aspects of the royalty base are also negotiated. So it's much more complicated in the context of a cross-license because, really, the whole purpose is to not collect money damages, but to get design freedom and operating freedom. MR. BURLING: Q. Didn't you say in	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3 15:11:55 4 15:12:00 5 15:12:01 6 15:12:09 7 15:12:12 8 15:12:14 9 15:12:17 10 15:12:20 11 15:12:24 12 15:12:29 13 15:12:30 14 15:12:34 15 15:12:37 16 15:12:42 17 15:12:42 17 15:12:47 18 15:12:51 19 15:12:53 20 15:12:55 21 15:13:00 22 15:13:02 23	A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to be the announced rates for a one-way license or not? A. Yes, I did. Q. Okay. And you understood those were subject to negotiation? A. Yes, but not just negotiation around rates. It's as I've said, you know, this is that's just the starting point. There's the competitive canvas here is we have players that are not just holders of IP rights; they're also participants in the industry. So I'm trying to point out that they wear multiple hats. It's a complex negotiation that involves other consideration besides pure money payments. And, you know, behind it all is an effort, in the case of many parties, to get design freedom and operating freedom. Q. Are you is it your testimony, Professor Teece, that in this industry, those opening royalty rates such as announced by those companies in that chart that you have taken from Mr. Stasik never are
15:09:12 2 15:09:13 3 15:09:15 4 15:09:17 5 15:09:19 6 15:09:19 7 15:09:20 8 15:09:21 9 15:09:22 10 15:09:24 11 15:09:26 12 15:09:28 13 15:09:28 14 15:09:30 15 15:09:31 18 15:09:51 18 15:09:56 19 15:09:58 20 15:10:01 21 15:10:06 22	"A prospective licensor starts out with an initial offer at the high end of what it believes to be a plausible bargaining range." And then: "The prospective licensee responds with a counteroffer. The parties engage in back-and-forth negotiations whereby the parties' offers move closer together." That does not imply, nor do I say that, quote, the rate comes down as such. It's it's more that the consideration coming back is negotiated over and and maybe aspects of the royalty base are also negotiated. So it's much more complicated in the context of a cross-license because, really, the whole purpose is to not collect money damages, but to get design freedom and operating freedom.	15:11:50 2 15:11:51 3 15:11:55 4 15:12:00 5 15:12:01 6 15:12:09 7 15:12:12 8 15:12:14 9 15:12:17 10 15:12:20 11 15:12:24 12 15:12:29 13 15:12:30 14 15:12:34 15 15:12:37 16 15:12:47 18 15:12:47 18 15:12:51 19 15:12:55 21 15:13:00 22	A. Yeah. Q did you understand that third column to be the announced rates for a one-way license or not? A. Yes, I did. Q. Okay. And you understood those were subject to negotiation? A. Yes, but not just negotiation around rates. It's as I've said, you know, this is that's just the starting point. There's the competitive canvas here is we have players that are not just holders of IP rights; they're also participants in the industry. So I'm trying to point out that they wear multiple hats. It's a complex negotiation that involves other consideration besides pure money payments. And, you know, behind it all is an effort, in the case of many parties, to get design freedom and operating freedom. Q. Are you is it your testimony, Professor Teece, that in this industry, those opening royalty rates such as announced by those companies in that

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