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8	UNITED STATES I	DISTRI	CT COURT	
9	WESTERN DISTRICT AT SEA		ASHINGTON	
10	INTERVAL LICENSING LLC,			
11	Plaintiff,	Case	e No. 2:10-cv-013	85-MJP
12		CUU		
13	V.		PLEMENTAL . PORT	JOINT STATUS
14	AOL, INC.; APPLE, INC.; eBAY, INC.; FACEBOOK, INC.; GOOGLE INC.;			
15	NETFLIX, INC.; OFFICE DEPOT, INC.; OFFICEMAX INC.; STAPLES, INC.;			
16	YAHOO! INC.; AND YOUTUBE, LLC,			
17	Defendants.			
18 19	Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedu		Local Rule CR	16 and this Court's
20	December 14, 2010 Order (Dkt. Nos. 148, 149), t			
20	supplemental Joint Status Report:	n para		
22	1. Nature and Complexity of Case:	: Interva	ll Licensing LLC	("Interval" or
23	"Plaintiff") has asserted four patents – United Sta	ates Pate	ent Nos. 6,263,50 [°]	7; 6,034,652;
24	6,788,314; and 6,757,682 – against 11 defendants	s. Two	of the patents (the	e '652 and '314
25	Patents) share the same specification, but have di	stinct cl	laims. Each defer	idant is alleged to have
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27	SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT - 1 (10-cv-01385-MJP)	1 -	121 S.W. Salmo Portland	SPARKMAN, LLP on Street, Suite 1600 J, OR 97204 0; Fax: (503) 595-5301

infringed at least two of the patents. Set forth below is a list of defendants, and the claims asserted against each. Claim numbers in **bold-face** are asserted against all defendants:

	PATENTS IN SUIT			
DEFENDANT	'314	'652	'682	'507
AOL, INC.	8 Claims Asserted:	6 Claims Asserted:	14 Claims Asserted:	26 Claims Asserted:
	1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13,	4, 5, 8, 11, 17, 18	1-9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17,	20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37,
	15		20	39, 40, 43, 63-67, 70, 71,
				74, 77, 80, 82, 83, 86
APPLE, INC.	8 Claims Asserted:	7 Claims Asserted:	14 Claims Asserted:	20 Claims Asserted:
	1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13,	4, 5, 8, 11, 15, 16, 18	1-9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17,	20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37,
	15		20	63-67, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80
eBAY, INC.			14 Claims Asserted:	20 Claims Asserted:
			1-9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17,	20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37,
EL GER O OTT	/ /	/ /	20	63-67, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80
FACEBOOK,			14 Claims Asserted:	20 Claims Asserted:
INC.			1-9 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 16 , 17 ,	20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37,
	8 Claims Asserted:	10 Claims Asserted:	20 15 Claims Asserted:	63-67, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80 <i>28 Claims Asserted:</i>
GOOGLE		4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16,	1.9 , 10, 11, 12, 13, 16 ,	28 Claims Asserted: 20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37 ,
INC.	1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15	4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18	1-9 , 10, 11 , 12 , 13 , 16 , 17 , 20	20-24 , 27 , 28 , 31 , 34 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40, 43, 63-67 , 70 ,
	15	17, 10	17,20	71, 74, 77, 80 , 81, 82, 83
				86
NETFLIX,			14 Claims Asserted:	20 Claims Asserted:
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			1-9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17,	20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37,
INC.			20	63-67, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80
OFFICE			14 Claims Asserted:	20 Claims Asserted:
DEPOT, INC.			1-9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17,	20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37,
DEI UI, INC.			20	63-67, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80
OFFICEMAX			14 Claims Asserted:	20 Claims Asserted:
INC.			1-9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17,	20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37,
			20	63-67, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80
STAPLES,			14 Claims Asserted:	20 Claims Asserted:
INC.			1-9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17,	20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37,
			20	63-67, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80
YAHOO!	13 Claims Asserted:	9 Claims Asserted:	15 Claims Asserted:	26 Claims Asserted:
INC.	1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10,	4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 15, 16,	1-9 , 10, 11 , 12 , 13 , 16 , 17 , 20	20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37 , 30, 40, 43, 63, 67, 70, 71
	11, 12, 13, 14, 15	17, 18	17, 20	39, 40, 43, 63-67, 70, 71 , 74, 77, 80, 82, 83, 86
VOUTUDE			14 Claims Asserted:	74, 77, 80, 82, 83, 86 20 Claims Asserted:
YOUTUBE,			1-9 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 16 , 17 ,	20 Claims Asserted. 20-24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 37 ,
LLC			1-9, 11, 12, 13, 10, 17, 20	63-67, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80
			20	05-07, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80

Plaintiff's Contention:

Defendants exaggerate the complexity of the case by overlooking several key facts. First, the same claims for each patent are generally asserted against the defendants, which gives rise to substantial overlap and efficiencies. For example, with respect to the '507 patent, 20 of the 28 asserted claims are asserted against each of the defendants. For the '682 patent, 14 of the 15 asserted claims are asserted against each of the defendants. In addition, the majority of the

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asserted claims are dependent claims – Interval is asserting a total of 16 independent claims. Second, the '314 and '652 patents are related and share the same specification. Third, while there is a large number of accused instrumentalities and websites, the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") makes clear that the vast majority of those accused instrumentalities and websites infringe the asserted claims based on the same general theories. For example, paragraph 21 of the FAC alleges that AOL infringes the '507 patent and identifies 69 examples of AOL websites that infringe. But the fact that AOL has at least 69 websites that employ the same infringing functionality will add little complexity to the case. The same is true for paragraph 34 of the FAC, which alleges that Yahoo infringes the '507 patent and identifies 43 examples of Yahoo websites that infringe using the same infringing functionality. Finally, although there are eleven defendants, the FAC alleges that many of the defendants infringe the asserted claims under the same basic theory. For example, paragraph 22 of the FAC alleges that AOL Spam Filter infringes claims 39, 40, 43, 82, 83, and 86 of the '507 patent because "[w]hen a new email is received by AOL Mail, the hardware and software associated with the AOL Spam Filter categorize the new email as either 'spam' or 'not spam.' The categorization is based at least in part on a comparison between the new email and other emails that have been received by AOL Mail." Similarly, paragraph 28 of the FAC alleges that Google infringed the same claims of the '507 patent by operating the Gmail Spam Filter. And paragraph 36 of the FAC alleges that Yahoo infringed the same claims of the '507 patent by operating Yahoo SpamGuard.

As discussed below, rather than adopting defendants' proposed bifurcation of the case and conducting discovery on validity first, the greatest efficiency would be gained by dividing the case into two groups of patents: the '314 and '652 patents in one group and the '507 and '682 patents in the other group. The '314 and '652 patents are related, are asserted against the same defendants, and Interval's theories of infringement for each of the two patents are similar. With respect to the second group, the '507 and '682 patents are asserted against the same **SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT** -3-KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP 121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 1600

defendants, and while the infringement theories are not identical, there is overlap. Specifically, for AOL, eBay, Netflix, Office Depot, OfficeMax, Staples, and YouTube, the accused functionality with respect to the '507 and '682 patents (generally speaking, product and content recommendations functionality) is either the same or very closely related. Similar functionality is accused of infringing the '507 and '682 patents for Apple, Google, and Yahoo as well, although these defendants also operate a number of more unique systems that also infringe Interval's patents. The allegations against Facebook are similar to those asserted against all of the other defendants for the '507 patent and similar to the theories asserted Apple, Google, and Yahoo with respect to the '682 patent. Such grouping of the patents would capitalize on the similarities of Interval's infringement theories on a single patent asserted against multiple defendants, shorten the time to trial and the duration of the trial, and minimize the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.

Defendants contend that the Court should bifurcate the issues of validity and enforceability and proceed on those issues before infringement because such an approach would "resolve the case or greatly simplify it before the parties expend resources on discovery regarding infringement (and damages) issues, which is often expensive, invasive and burdensome." But defendants' arguments would apply equally to <u>all</u> patent cases, yet neither the Local Patent Rules nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt such an approach.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." FRCP 1 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Local Patent Rules "are designed to <u>streamline</u> the pre-trial and claim construction process, and <u>generally to reduce the cost of patent litigation</u>." LPR 101 (emphasis added). Defendants' proposed bifurcation defeats the fundamental goals of the Federal Rules and this District's Local Patent Rules by injecting substantial and needless delay into the schedule. For example, the Local Patent Rules provide that a Markman hearing will be held 180 days from the date of the scheduling conference. Yet defendants' proposed schedule

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sets a Markman hearing almost 300 days after the scheduling conference and over a year after this case was filed. Defendants' proposed schedule runs through March 30, 2012, at which time only a single issue (validity) would have been addressed, and even that issue would not have been tried despite the fact that this case will have been on the Court's docket for over 18 months. Indeed, under defendants' proposed schedule, this case will likely be on the Court's docket for at least 3-4 years before a trial commences, which would do little to minimize discovery expenses and would put an unfair strain on the Court's resources. Such a lax schedule does not streamline the pre-trial and claim construction processes nor does it minimize discovery expenses.

In addition, discovery on all issues promotes early settlement and would likely permit Interval to narrow the number of asserted claims. For example, if Interval learns through damages discovery that a certain accused website generates no revenues, then that would be an important component in the cost/benefit analysis to determine whether to proceed against that accused website. In addition, discovery on infringement issues permits Interval to identify early in the case those accused functionalities/websites with the strongest infringement reads, and to focus its efforts on those specific accused functionalities/websites.

At the December 2010 scheduling conference, this Court's instructions regarding the proposed schedules were clear:

Don't be coming back to me with a schedule that basically puts me in my dotage. I don't want this on my senior status schedule. I am looking for a rigorous schedule. If I let you stretch it out, that is one of the things I am telling you, you will simply fill up the time and spend more money. That doesn't necessarily mean you will get a better piece of litigation. So I am much more interested up front in having you spend time about what you are going to leave on the cutting room floor, and which issues are really worth pursuing, so that you can stay inside the schedule.

12/13/2010 Scheduling Conference Transcript at 24:23-25:7. The Court correctly noted that an aggressive and rigorous schedule would minimize costs and would not compromise the quality

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of the parties' presentations or the Court's rulings. This Court also pointed out that this District can get cases ready for trial quickly and efficiently:

In this district we can try your cases pretty fast. Usually I can try them faster than you want to go. We usually operate on a 12- to 14-month schedule. Now, we have already burned through four or five months of that.

Id. at 24:18-22.

Defendants' proposed schedule fails to heed the Court's instructions. Under their schedule, the Court would not even hold a case management conference to set the schedule on discovery relating to infringement and damages until *over eighteen months after the case was filed*. That is the antithesis of an aggressive and rigorous schedule, and would do nothing to minimize costs.

This case no doubt raises important issues, some of which might prove challenging to resolve. And a substantial amount of money is at stake. But neither of these factors warrants a trial date 3-4 years in the future. Defendants have retained some of the most skilled lawyers in the nation to represent them in this case. These lawyers and their firms are quite capable of adhering to a schedule that proposes a trial over a year and a half after filing, as Interval proposes (20 months from August 2010 until April 2012).

Finally, defendants announce that one or more of them will submit a request for reexamination on one or more of the asserted patents, and accordingly request that this Court stay all discovery until they have time to prepare and file their motions for reexamination. Again, defendants are inviting needless delay into the schedule. The parties held their Rule 26(f) conference over two months ago and yet formal discovery has commenced only in the last week with Interval serving its first set of document requests and interrogatories. Formal discovery should not be further delayed, especially where defendants have not even submitted a request for reexamination, and the Court remains in the dark as to the basic details of those (possible) requests for reexamination, including which parties will request a reexamination,

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which patents, which claims, and the type of reexamination requested. See, e.g., F5 Networks, Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc., 2010 WL 5138375, *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 2010) (denying motion to stay pending reexamination based in part because "the Court remains in the dark" as to basic details concerning the reexamination). "A court is under no obligation to delay its own proceedings by yielding to ongoing PTO patent reexaminations, regardless of their relevancy to infringement claims which the court must analyze." Esco Corp v. Berkeley Forge, 2009 WL 3078463, *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2009). And "[t]here is no per se rule that patent cases should be stayed pending reexaminations, because such a rule 'would invite parties to unilaterally derail' litigation." Id. (citation omitted); see also F5 Networks, 2010 WL 5138375 at *2 (noting that this Court is "is unaware of any 'policy' which favors the granting of such stays."). This Court has referenced USPTO statistics that "show that in only 13% of all ex parte reexaminations were all claims cancelled." F5 Networks, 2010 WL 5138375 at *2. In addition, a stay pending reexamination would create incredible delay. The USPTO website shows that a record number of requests for ex parte reexaminations were filed in 2010-over 18% more than the number of requests filed in 2009.¹ And the same website shows that ex parte reexaminations take on average more than two years to complete. Id. As this Court recognized,

[S]ince it is unlikely that the reexamination request will resolve *all* of the claims and causes of action, the parties will be back in front of this Court in another two to three years, with another 18 months after that before they get to trial. If no stay is granted, all issues are resolved less than 18 months from now.

F5 Networks, 2010 WL 5138375 at *3 (emphasis in original).

Moreover, the case has been on file since August. In fact, many Defendants were contacted by Vulcan/Interval in the Spring of 2010. Thus, the Defendants' current claim that

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¹ http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/EP_quarterly_report_Sept_30_2010.pdf.

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they need even more time in order to prepare their reexamination requests – and that the schedule should be delayed as a result – should be rejected.

Finally,² if the Court is considering granting a stay pending reexamination, Interval respectfully requests an opportunity to brief the issue fully. Thus, at a minimum, this issue should not affect setting the current schedule, and any Defendant can move to stay pending a reexamination at the appropriate point. Interval intends to vigorously oppose any stay pending reexamination.

Defendants' Contention:

As this Court directed, Defendants have identified the issues common to the case and have proposed a case schedule that provides for streamlined and joint discovery and motion/briefing practice on those common issues. Defendants' proposal would consolidate the proceedings, identify one set of claim terms for construction, present one set of claim construction briefs, and streamline discovery on invalidity issues and invalidity briefs/motions.

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC") and infringement contentions, which for the first time shed any light on what is accused, make clear that Defendants' Motions for Severance were well founded. Plaintiff makes no allegation of any common transaction or occurrence related to its infringement allegations. In effect, Plaintiff has brought what should have been 11 separate actions in a single case. Although it would be appropriate for the Defendants to renew their severance motions at this time, Defendants are mindful of the Court's request to attempt to identify common issues that can be resolved first. Thus, rather than renew their request for severance at this time, Defendants have done their best, based on the limited information Plaintiff has provided concerning its infringement allegations, to identify the potentially common issues that the Court may address in a first phase of the case.

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² Defendants also criticize the way in which Interval defined the term "Accused Products" in its recent discovery requests. But the Joint Status Report is not the proper document to engage in a discovery dispute. To the extent Defendants believe that the definition is inappropriate, Interval is happy to meet and confer with them during discovery to discuss the issue.

Defendants propose to handle the common issues concerning validity, enforceability and claim construction together in a first phase of the litigation ("validity issues"). This approach will pose significantly less burden on the parties and the Court than proceeding with 11 separate cases. Defendants are not proposing to unduly delay this litigation, but simply to recognize the practical realities created by Plaintiff choosing to assert in one case more than sixty claims from four patents against 11 defendants and at least 175 accused instrumentalities and 145 different websites.

As explained in Defendants' respective severance motions, Plaintiff's allegations of infringement, whether or not they rest on some "common theory" (as asserted by Plaintiff), are directed to disparate websites and functions that are necessarily subject to different proofs and a wide variety of evidence. Plaintiff will be required to prove infringement in a particularized manner and with separate evidence for each accused instrumentality of each Defendant. By phasing the litigations, the potentially massive amount of infringement evidence (and potential disputes concerning discovery on infringement) will only be necessary for the infringement issues that remain viable following claim construction and dispositive motion practice concerning validity issues.

Therefore, Defendants propose that, rather than diving headlong into discovery regarding the widely disparate infringement and damages issues, the parties and the Court be permitted to focus their efforts on invalidity discovery, claim construction and dispositive motions concerning invalidity.

Defendants' phased approach offers the realistic possibility of narrowing the issues in the overall litigation to a more manageable scope. Defendants' approach, both through phasing and placing limits on asserted claims, provides the most feasible mechanism to rein in an unwieldy litigation.

In contrast, Plaintiff's approach makes no effort to address the very real prejudice that Plaintiff has created by lumping together disparate Defendants. Nor does Plaintiff respond to SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT -9-(10-cv-01385-MJP) -9-KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP 121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 1600

the Court's request that the parties identify the common issues that might be resolved jointly. Plaintiff's allegations of "common theories" only serve to demonstrate the prejudice that Defendants will face. For example, notwithstanding that Plaintiff contends to have the same "general theories" of infringement, it has accused, for example, 69 websites for just one Defendant on one patent and 43 websites of another Defendant on the same patent. Plaintiff has made no showing that these websites operate in the same manner or are subject to overlapping evidence. Plaintiff's own explanation suggests that it will try to prove its case against one website or service, and then attempt to argue that every other purportedly "similar" accused instrumentality infringes for the same reasons. This approach is improper and highly prejudicial to Defendants since there is no reasonable way for a jury to assess the merits of the claims against 11 different defendants at least 175 accused instrumentalities. Defendants' proposal addresses this prejudice and lack of common evidence by taking the common invalidity and claim construction issues first. Afterwards, depending on the issues that remain, the parties may seek separate trials as appropriate.

Plaintiff's recently served discovery requests, excerpts of which are attached as Defendants' Exhibit A, further support Defendants' proposal that this litigation should be phased. Plaintiff's requests demonstrate the overreaching nature of discovery that Plaintiff plans to seek and the many disputes Plaintiff's overreaching will cause, none of which need to be addressed in the first phase of this litigation, or perhaps ever. For example, Plaintiff has not even limited its discovery requests to what it has accused of infringement or for which it has provided infringement contentions. As one example, in the requests provided to Google, Plaintiff has defined terms "Accused Products" more broadly than those for which it has served contentions and added another category of what it calls "Relevant Products," which it defines even more broadly. Thus, rather than propose a solution to make managing the unwieldy litigation it created by joining 11 disparate Defendants in a single case with multiple patents,

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Plaintiff has demonstrated that it will only seek to further complicate matters and make this a litigation about discovery disputes and attrition.

Plaintiff's criticism that Defendants are seeking to delay the case is unfounded. Plaintiff first provided an amended Complaint that contained even minimal notice of what was accused in the last days of December 2010. As this Court already found, Plaintiff's original Complaint failed to meet the requirements of the Federal Rules. Only after this Court's Order [Dkt. No. 147], did the Plaintiff file its FAC, adding some substance to the bare bones of its initial pleading. The FAC also newly asserted the '507 Patent against Facebook, which had previously only been accused of infringing the '682 Patent. Thus, the delay, if any, in getting this litigation started was of Plaintiff's own making by refusing to even attempt to clarify its allegations until the Court ordered it to do so.

This is a very complex case. Based on Plaintiff's allegations, this case involves:

- 11 separate Defendants;
- 4 asserted patents;
- 67 asserted claims; and

• At least 175 accused instrumentalities and 145 different websites.

The case's complexity is compounded by shortcomings in Plaintiff's infringement contentions, leaving Defendants *still* guessing in certain instances as to what is accused. For example, Plaintiff provides no information regarding most of the method claims, but rather suggests that Defendants should simply look to non-method claims to divine what Plaintiff's infringement contentions will be. In addition, many of the asserted claims contain means-plus-function terms, yet Plaintiff has failed to provide any indication of the accused functions or the structures in the accused instrumentalities where these limitations are alleged to be found. Plaintiff has also failed to provide any claim charts for several accused websites, in violation of the local patent rules. These are but a few examples of the shortcomings in Plaintiff's allegations that will likely only lead to more extensive discovery disputes on the issues of infringement; issues **SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT** -11- KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP

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which may be avoided, or at least narrowed, by addressing claim construction and invalidity first.

In particular, Defendants request a schedule – set forth in detail in Section 6(B) – that first addresses validity/standing/enforceability issues ("validity issues") on all four asserted patents. This schedule includes invalidity contentions, claim construction, validity issues discovery, and dispositive motions on validity issues, and stays discovery on other issues during the first phase. Because the nature and scope of any claims that remain may change significantly after the claim construction and invalidity phase of this litigation, Defendants request that the Court hold a Case Management Conference, after the first phase of the litigation is completed, to set the schedule and structure for the remaining parts of the case. As part of that Case Management Conference, Defendants expect to seek to sever the cases because the common issues (i.e., the validity issues) will have been addressed at least up through dispositive motions and the remaining issues (i.e., infringement and damages issues) present little or no overlap between the parties.

This Court has broad discretion to phase the case. Defendant's recommended first phase has the potential to resolve the case or greatly simplify it before the parties expend resources on discovery regarding infringement (and damages) issues, which is often expensive, invasive and burdensome. As the Court is well aware, this case is not "normal" because plaintiff chose to tie together 11 different Defendants, on four patents and a host of accused instrumentalities. Phasing validity issues first is an approach that has been adopted by other Courts to handle the complexity introduced by a plaintiff suing multiple, unrelated Defendants in the same case. *See General Patent Corp. Int'l v. Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc.,* 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1954,1997 WL 770874, (C.D. Cal. 1997); cf. *Quito v. Netflix, et al* (Ex. B) (initial phase of case limited to issues regarding summary judgment of invalidity); *55 Brake, L.L.C. v. Audi of America, Inc.,* 2009 WL 35343 (D. Idaho Jan. 5, 2009) (initial phase of discovery

limited issues regarding *Markman*, as "part of the Court's initiative to lower the costs of discovery by making that process more efficient.").

By contrast, Plaintiff's proposal accomplishes little to no streamlining of the case. Although Plaintiff suggests it is splitting a single case by patent, some of which are not even related, Plaintiff's allegations create what should be 11 separate cases at least. This approach does not limit briefing and disputes on common issues as does Defendants' proposal nor does it provide any staging of the litigation that would allow the Court to narrow the issues by addressing common issues first, as does Defendants' proposal. In fact, Plaintiff's proposal, as compared to Defendants' proposal which combines all common issues, doubles the various filings related to the common issues, yet does nothing to address the prejudice it created by lumping 11 disparate Defendants together or narrow the issues by phasing.

Defendants' proposed phasing is also particularly appropriate for this case, as Defendants have begun to identify prior art, and one or more Defendants plan to seek reexamination of one or more of the asserted patents, as soon as possible. One or more Defendants are expeditiously preparing for reexamination now and plan to move by March 11, 2011 to stay this action with respect to one or more of the patents-in-suit pending reexamination. This Court has regularly recognized the benefits of staying litigation pending reexamination. See e.g., Order Granting Mot. to Stay Proceedings Pending Reexamination of U.S. Pat. No. 7,573,706, National Prods., Inc. v. Gamber-Johnson LLC, No. 09-cv-1212 MJP (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2009); Order Granting Def. Mot. to Stay Case Pending Reexamination of U.S. Pat. No. 7,467,229, Direct Route, LLC v. Onoffline, Inc., No. 09-cv-1509 MJP (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2010); Minute Order, Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., Inc., No. 06-cv-1711 MJP (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2007); Order Granting Def. Mot. to Stay, Prokop Labs, LLC v. Staples, Inc., No. 07-cv-1094 MJP (W. D. Wash. Feb. 22, 2008). A stay pending the Patent Office's reexamination of the patents-in-suit is particularly appropriate in this highly complex case. Rather than embroiling the parties in the far-reaching litigation that Plaintiff has created SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT - 13 -KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP (10-cv-01385-MJP)

by accusing 11 Defendants and more than 100 accused instrumentalities, reexamination provides the opportunity to address the validity of Plaintiff's patents and thereby conserve the resources of both the Court and the parties by avoiding potentially unnecessary litigation concerning a host of patent claims and products. By setting a time by which one or more Defendants plan to request a stay pending reexamination, it is clear that Defendants are not seeking to delay this case indefinitely as Plaintiff suggests.

Finally, Defendants' proposed schedule is reasonable given that Plaintiff has effectively only properly begun this complex litigation in the last days of 2010 with the filing of its FAC. Defendants' proposal would complete the common issues in this 11-defendant, four patent case in less than a year from Plaintiff's proper initiation of this case. By this stage, the parties will have completed claim construction and dispositive motion briefing on invalidity. Thereafter, the parties would be in a position to set an appropriate schedule for any remaining issues.

2. **ADR Method**: The parties believe that a party appointed mediator as described in Local Rule 39.1(b)(3) should be the initial method of alternative dispute resolution.

3. **ADR Scheduling**: The parties will continue to discuss the appropriate scheduling of non-binding mediation after *Markman* briefs have been filed.

4. **Deadline to Join Additional Parties**: The parties propose March 4, 2011.

5. **Proposed Discovery Plan**:

(A - 1) FRCP 26(f) and Local Rule CR 16 Conference:

A telephonic meeting was held on October 25, 2010, and was attended by representatives of all parties; these individuals are identified in the Joint Status Report filed by the Parties on November 8, 2010 [Dkt. No. 124]. The parties have further conferred on some issues subsequent to the service of the First Amended Complaint.

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(A - 1) FRCP 26(a)(I) Initial Disclosures:

As required by the Court's orders, the parties served Initial Disclosures on November 1, 2010.

(B) Scope of Discovery:

Plaintiff's Contention:

As described above, Interval respectfully requests that asserted patents be divided into two groups: the '507 and '682 patents in one group, and the '314 and '652 patents in the other group. Each group of patents would be tried separately. Although Interval proposes the same discovery schedule for both groups of patents, if unforeseen events delay discovery relating to one group, the other group could proceed on a separate discovery track. Discovery on all issues including infringement, validity, and damages should continue concurrently.

Accepting defendants' proposal of limiting discovery to validity issues will not only delay the trial and consequently increase the cost of the litigation, but it will also impose an undue burden on non-parties during discovery. For example, defendants contend that they intend to seek discovery as to the "inventors' knowledge of prior art" during this first phase of discovery relating to validity, which likely will include a deposition of each of the 19 inventors. Yet defendants will no doubt request another deposition of each of the 19 inventors during the later phases of discovery, causing multiple depositions of the same inventor. The same holds true for other non-parties. To the extent that a non-party would have documents relevant to validity of the asserted patents, the same non-party would likely have documents relevant to the other issues in the case such as infringement. Defendants' proposed bifurcation would require that multiple rounds of Rule 45 subpoenas be issued to the same non-parties, which not only increases the discovery expenses for the parties but places an undue burden on non-parties. Accordingly, such bifurcation should be rejected because it would not "streamline" the case nor would it encourage the "speeding and inexpensive determination of" this action. *See* LPR 101; FRCP 1.

Defendants' Contention:

As described above, Defendants request that discovery be phased to focus on the common validity issues first, with discovery on the broad and unrelated infringement and damages issues being deferred until after the common issues are addressed. Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, this would not necessarily lead to multiple depositions of the same parties, particularly the inventors. Plaintiff has provided no basis for its assertion that inventors will have relevant testimony concerning issues of infringement and at this time, there is no reason to believe that is the case. Rather, inventors are most likely to have discoverable information limited to the common issues. Further, Plaintiff provides no reason why a third party with information concerning prior art would have information concerning infringement. Such an eventuality seems unlikely given that a third party is not likely to have direct first-hand knowledge concerning the accused instrumentalities (at least no such information that is not more readily obtained from operation of the accused instrumentalities and the Defendants themselves).

As for subjects of the first phase of the case, Defendants are likely to need discovery related to claim construction, invalidity, enforceability, patent ownership, inventorship, patent prosecution, development of the alleged inventions, potential prior art, and Plaintiff's and inventors' knowledge of prior art.

(C) **Discovery Limitations**:

The parties propose the following changes to the limitations on discovery imposed under the Federal and Local Civil Rules.³

• Inventor Depositions:

• <u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: As discussed in more detail below in the section for all nonparty depositions, Interval proposes that each inventor be deposed not more than

³ Defendants provide limitations based upon the planned phasing of the litigation, but recognize that these limitations may need to be revisited.

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once and that each deposition not exceed seven hours. Defendants' proposal of 12 hours per inventor on the '314 and '652 patents and 18 hours per inventor on the '507 and '682 patents is entirely unreasonable. That would amount to a total of 342 hours that defendants would be deposing the inventors during the validity phase. Three of the inventors are on both the '507 and the '314 and '652 patents, which means that under defendants' proposal, each of them would be deposed for 30 hours during the validity stage alone, which is nearly 5 days of depositions each.

 <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: Defendants propose a default for inventor depositions that Defendants may depose each inventor of the '314 and '652 patents for a total of 12 hours to be allocated among the four Defendants accused of infringing the '314 and '652 patents and each inventor of the '682 and '507 patents (which all Defendants are accused of infringing) for a total of 18 hours to be allocated among all of the Defendants. Defendants also propose that the parties will meet and confer should adjustments to these time limits be appropriate for any given inventor. These limitations represent a significant decrease in the collective amount of time Defendants would be entitled to if Plaintiff had brought these as separate actions (nearly 1500 hours), or if the actions were severed.

• Third-Party Depositions:

<u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: Each third party (including but not limited to inventors) should be deposed not more than once absent a showing of good cause and leave of court. The duration of each non-party deposition shall not exceed 7 hours. To the extent that one side notices the non-party deposition, the other side is entitled to an equal amount of time to question the non-party witness. Defendants' proposal of each defendant taking up to 35 hours of third-party depositions is unreasonable. That would mean that defendants could collecitvely take up to 385

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hours of non-party depositions, or 55 days of depositions assuming a 7-hour deposition day.

- <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: Each Defendant may take up to 35 hours of third-party depositions (excluding inventors); Plaintiff may take up to 70 hours of third party depositions. Defendants have no desire to take unnecessary depositions or unduly prolong depositions. The separate hour limit per Defendant is merely an attempt to account for the fact that some Defendants may have greater need to take third-party depositions and a collective limitation would be unfairly prejudicial to those Defendants.
- Party Depositions:
 - <u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: The officers, directors, employees, and representatives of the parties should not be deposed more than once absent agreement by the parties or a showing of good cause and leave of court. Defendants propose a set number of depositions rather than a number of hours. But that does not encourage efficiency with respect to the deposition of any individual witness. To the extent that a certain witness has focused information, a deposition could last less than an hour, and therefore should not count as one of five total party depositions.
 - <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: Each Defendant may take 7.5-hours of 30(b)(6) depositions of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff may take 7.5-hours of 30(b)(6) depositions of each Defendant. Each Defendant may take up to 5 individual depositions of Plaintiff's employees. Plaintiff may take up to 5 individual depositions of each Defendant's employees. Plaintiff's unlimited proposal would put Defendants at risk of having Plaintiff call a parade of witnesses (even if only for a short deposition) and thereby greatly increase Defendants' expense. Defendants have no intention of being unreasonable, but propose the foregoing

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limits to reasonably focus discovery, which Plaintiff's discovery requests suggest it has no intention of doing.

• Depositions After Fact Discovery Deadline:

- <u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: Each party may depose witnesses after the fact discovery deadline to the extent that the witness appears on another party's witness list and the party has not previously deposed that witness. Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, each such deposition should be limited to not more than three hours.
- <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: Each party may depose witnesses after the fact discovery deadline within two weeks of service of the trial witness list to the extent that the witness appears on another party's trial witness list and the party has not previously deposed that witness. Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, each such deposition should be limited to not more than three hours.
- Time Limit on Depositions:
 - <u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: Absent agreement of the parties or a showing of good cause and leave of court, the total deposition time for each party shall not exceed 30 hours for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, and each side shall have no more than 100 hours for all other depositions. The 100 hour time limit should encompass all depositions in the case other than the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, whether party or non-party depositions.
 - <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: Defendants believe the limitations on depositions for parties, inventors and third parties outlined above adequately address the issue of deposition limits. Plaintiff's proposal severely disadvantages Defendants, allowing Plaintiff to take a full case worth of depositions, while leaving each Defendant with less than 10 hours of total deposition time for all parties, inventors and non-parties a Defendant may need to depose (outside of Rule 30(b)(6)

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depositions). In addition, Plaintiff's proposal would not even permit the Defendants to take one day of deposition with each of the named inventors.

• Interrogatories:

- <u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: Each side may serve no more than 30 written interrogatories without a showing of good cause and leave of court. Defendants' proposal leaves Plaintiff answering up to 185 separate interrogatories. If Defendants want Plaintiff to have 25 interrogatories, then they should face the same limitation. Plaintiff is fine limiting all parties to 25 interrogatories per party, so long as a question that goes to a common issue (i.e., that is not Defendant-specific) counts as an interrogatory used by each Defendant. In other words, Defendants should not be able to use their "individual" interrogatories as cover to ask "common interogatory" type questions. Thus, based on Defendants' proposal, Plaintiff proposes that Defendants have 20 "common" interrogatories, plus 5 individual interrogatories that must be limited to a particular issue only in dispute between Plaintiff and that specific Defendant.
- <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: Plaintiff's proposal to limit interrogatories by side in a case involving 11 Defendants, four patents and a multitude of products is prejudicial to Defendants. Defendants may serve up to 20 common interrogatories. Each Defendant may serve up to an additional 15 interrogatories. Plaintiff may serve up to 25 interrogatories on each Defendant.

• Requests for Admission:

<u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: Requests for admission should be used solely to authenticate documents and not for any other issue. If Requests for Admission are used, they should be applied per side, not per party. As the interrogatory issue above, Defendants should not be permitted to skirt around the Rules by having each Defendant ask a Request for Admission that goes to a common issue.

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- <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: The parties may serve Requests for Admission in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff's artificial limitation on the use of Requests for Admission prevents the parties from using this discovery device to narrow the issues in dispute. Provided the Plaintiff agrees that any response to a Request for Admission served by any Defendant may be used by any other Defendant, Defendants will endeavor to avoid serving duplicative Requests for Admissions.
- Number of Claim Terms to Construe:

- <u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: The parties should select ten total terms to construe at the Markman hearing, consistent with this Court's Standing Patent Order. *See also* 12/13/2010 Schedule Conference at 22 (COURT: "You need to come up with a common set of terms, what are the ten best that are going to get you the furthest in the litigation."); 16 (COURT: "So if you pick carefully, pick the ones that you think are going to make the most impact or give you the biggest bang for your buck in coming up with a solution to viewing whether or not there is, in fact, infringement."). Limiting the number of terms will force the parties to focus on those terms that give the parties the "biggest bang for your buck" and therefore those that are most important to the outcome of the case.
 - <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: Plaintiff has asserted 16 independent claims in four patents against 11 defendants and over 175 different instrumentalities. Limiting the disputed terms to 10 would prevent Defendants from even presenting one claim term per independent claim or one claim term per Defendant. The risk of prejudice to the Defendants based on Plaintiff's proposal is extraordinarily high because, notwithstanding Plaintiff's claims to common infringement theories, the multiple accused instrumentalities of each Defendant no doubt operate differently and may present unique issues for claim construction. Typically, there are several

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disputed terms per independent claim and there may be some additional terms. Defendants propose that the parties be permitted to present up to 10 terms per patent group: 10 terms each for the unrelated '682 and '507 patents, and 10 terms in total for the related '314 and '652 patents, for a total of 30 terms. Further, any limit on the number of terms to be construed should not limit the parties' ability in claim construction or thereafter to argue that a claim term is indefinite.

- Number of Claims Asserted:
 - <u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: Interval believes that as discovery progresses and after defendants serve invalidity contentions and non-infringement contentions, it will likely be able to narrow the number of claims asserted. Interval submits that any narrowing of the claims is without prejudice.
 - <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: Defendants propose that within two weeks of Defendants' service of their invalidity contentions on any of the patents-in-suit, Plaintiff should elect no more than 2 independent claims per patent and no more than 10 claims total for any patent to pursue in this case. This approach provides the greatest possibility to focus the parties' disputes and present a manageable number of claims and claim construction disputes to the Court. The selection of claims to pursue must be binding; otherwise, it will likely only result in the parties presenting further claim construction disputes to the Court.
- Number of Prior Art References Identified:
 - <u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: Defendants should be required to limit the number of prior art references in the interest of efficiency. The exact number of prior art references per claim or per patent can be determined after defendants serve their invalidity contentions.

• <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: Again, the best way to limit the number of prior art references the Defendants may seek to rely upon would be to have the Plaintiff

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limit the number of asserted claims. With four patents and more than sixty asserted claims against more than 100 products, it would be inappropriate to limit the number of prior art references Defendants may identify at this stage of the case. Further, Plaintiff has only recently provided any notice of the basis for its allegations and the Court has not yet construed the asserted claims. Defendants have no desire to present unnecessarily duplicative references and would necessarily expect to streamline their selection of prior art as the litigation progresses.

- Non-Infringement Contentions:
 - <u>Plaintiff's Proposal</u>: Consistent with LPR 121, Interval respectfully requests that the Court order defendants to serve non-infringement contentions. Noninfringement contentions will allow the parties and the Court to identify precisely the disputed issues and permit the parties to avoid discovery on issues that are not in dispute, thereby minimizing discovery costs and burdens.
 - <u>Defendants' Proposal</u>: Consistent with this Court's practice, Defendants believe that non-infringement contentions are unnecessary and burdensome. Moreover, in many of its infringement contentions, Plaintiff has failed to set forth how the claim limitations are allegedly met, making non-infringement contentions impossible. Further, as stated above, Defendants propose that infringement issues be stayed until after the common invalidity phase.

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(D) Minimizing Expense in Discovery:

The parties agree to attempt to minimize discovery expenses on each party by attempting to cooperate on various discovery issues.

• The parties agree that if there is a discovery dispute, they will attempt to resolve it by phone or email, and not engage in letter-writing campaigns. If the disputes are not

resolved, the parties also agree, in appropriate circumstances, to take advantage of the Court's offer of telephonic conferences to resolve routine discovery disputes.

- Depositions will be taken by agreement and through agreeing upon dates for depositions if possible.
- The parties will try to agree on the same court reporter/videographer company for depositions, to obtain a discounted rate.
- All papers not publicly filed electronically will be served by email where feasible, which shall count as regular service, if sent by midnight Pacific Time, and three days would not be added as would normally be the case for service by electronic mail under FRCP 6(d).
- The parties will discuss an agreed common form of document exchange (ie -- electronic, OCR, etc.).
- The parties do not have to include on their privilege log any communications/materials generated after the filing of the Complaint.
- Consistent with FRCP 26(b)(4), neither side will be entitled to discovery of communications between counsel and expert witnesses or to drafts of expert reports.
 Expert communications shall be deemed work-product privileged unless the expert relies on any communication.

Interval's Position: Adopting an aggressive and rigorous discovery schedule is paramount in minimizing expense in discovery and in ensuring that parties and non-parties are not unduly burdened. Interval proposes that expert reports and expert depositions for claim construction should not occur, as expert testimony is marginally relevant at best for claim construction issues given Federal Circuit caselaw. Moreover, the discovery limitations that Interval proposed above will streamline the discovery process and will focus the parties' discovery efforts on those truly important issues that will get the case ready for trial. Interval also proposes the following:

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 a. The parties will try to reach agreement on a protective order. If we cannot reach agreement, we will each submit our proposed version without argument and ask the Court to select one or the other.

 b. Documents that the other side claims are privileged can be snapped back when discovered they were produced without any need to show that the production was inadvertent.

Interval is also open to other ideas for shortening or simplification.

Defendants' Position: To conserve the resources of the parties and to avoid wasteful discovery, the initiation of discovery should be stayed until the date on which one or more Defendants plan to file for a stay pending reexamination, as set forth in section 6 below. Defendants need this time to draft their reexamination requests in light of the large number of claims asserted, as well as the unexpected addition of an entire patent to the case against Facebook, Inc. If one or more Defendants do not file for a stay pending reexamination by the date set forth in this schedule, discovery on invalidity issues may be initiated the following day. If one or more Defendants do file for a stay pending reexamination by the date set forth in this schedule, discovery on invalidity issues will continue to be stayed until the Court issues a decision on the motion to stay the case. Discovery on infringement and damages issues will be stayed until completion of the invalidity phase, as described further herein.

Regarding Plaintiff's proposals a and b immediately above, Defendants believe these matters are more appropriately addressed in the context of a protective order. Defendants also propose that to the extent the parties cannot reach final agreement on a protective order, the parties submit a protective order that identifies the disputed issues and be permitted to present argument (although perhaps without briefing) to the Court to resolve any disputes.

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(E) FRCP 26(c) Orders: The parties request that the Court enter a protective order, to be negotiated between the parties before the beginning of discovery. Interval respectfully submits that until this Court rules on a

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proposed protective order, the parties are to proceed with discovery and that any confidential documents produced are to be treated on a "confidential—attorneys eyes only" basis. Defendants do not agree to a default treatment of documents prior to entry of a protective order. There may be very highly confidential documents requested for which such default treatment will not be adequate and the availability of such default will disincentivize the parties to negotiate a protective order for the case in a timely manner. Additionally, to the extent the parties are not able to negotiate a mutually agreeable protective order, Defendants request the ability raise the disputed issues and arguments with the Court.

Date by Which Remainder of Discovery Can Be Completed:

(A) <u>Plaintiff's Contention</u>:

Interval submits that a fair discovery schedule will minimize costs without sacrificing the quality of the parties' presentations. The most certain way to increase cost and burden is to have a discovery schedule that lasts for years, as Defendants propose. Interval believes that fact discovery can be complete on all issues by **October 26, 2011**. Below is Interval's proposed discovery schedule, which substantially tracks the time frames set forth in the Court's Standing Order for Patent Cases (Dkt. # 26):

Event	Date	
Disclosure of Preliminary Invalidity Contentions and Non-Infringement Contentions	1/28/11	
Terms for Construction	2/9/11	
Claim Construction-related Expert Report Deadline (if necessary)	2/18/11	
Deadline to Join Parties	3/4/11	
Deadline by which Defendants shall produce source code that is responsive to document requests that Interval served on 1/13/11.	3/17/11	
Claim Construction Rebuttal Expert Report Deadline (if necessary)	3/18/11	
SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT - 26 - (10-cv-01385-MJP)	KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP 121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 1600 Portland, OR 97204 Tel: (503) 595-5300; Fax: (503) 595-530	

6.

Event	Date
Preliminary Claim Chart	4/1/11
Joint Claim Chart and Prehearing Statement	4/29/11
Opening Briefs (term limits should remain at 10, and page limits should remain at 24)	5/13/11
Response Briefs (page limits should remain at 24)	5/27/11
Submit <i>Markman</i> DVD Tutorial (not to exceed one hour in length per side)	6/10/11
Markman Hearing	Week of 6/27/11
Close of Fact Discovery on All Issues	10/26/11
Opening Expert Reports (Burden of Proof) on All Issues	11/16/11
Rebuttal Expert Reports on All Issues	12/16/11
Completion of Expert Discovery on All Issues	1/11/12
Deadline for Filing Dispositive Motions on All Issues and Daubert Motions	2/3/12
Deadline for Filing Responses to Dispositive Motions on All Issues and Daubert Motions	2/24/12
Summary Judgment and Daubert Hearing	Week of 3/9/12
Trial Date on '507 and '682 Patent Group	Week of 4/2/12
Trial Date on '314 and '652 Patent Group	Week of 6/4/12

(B) <u>Defendants' Contention</u>:

Defendants set forth the proposed schedule for common issues below, the reasons for which are more fully explained above in Section 1. Fact discovery can be complete on validity issues by November 18, 2011. As described in Section 1, above, Defendants propose phasing the case to address common validity issues first. Given the likely narrowing of issues through

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phasing the common issues first, Defendants' proposed schedule sets a common schedule through claim construction and dispositive motions on common issues.

Focusing the case on validity issues is the most efficient way to streamline this complicated, multi-party, multi-patent litigation. Defendants also propose slightly phased dates for the Preliminary Invalidity Disclosures, as we expect the disclosures will be voluminous.

Event	Date
Deadline to Join Parties	3/4/11
Date by which one or more Defendants plan to move for stay pending reexamination ⁴	3/11/11
Disclosure of Preliminary Invalidity Contentions	4/8/11 for '314/'652 Patents 4/12/11 for '682 Patent 4/15/11 for '507 Patent
Terms for Construction	5/3/11
Claim Construction-related Expert Report Deadline (if necessary)	5/10/11
Preliminary Claim Chart	6/10/11
Claim Construction Rebuttal Expert Report Deadline (if necessary)	6/10/11
Joint Claim Chart and Prehearing Statement	7/13/11
Opening Briefs (page limit increased to 50 pages; term limit increased to 20)	7/22/11
Response Briefs (page limit increased to 50 pages)	8/24/11
Markman Tutorial	Week of 9/19/11

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⁴ Although such patent reexamination requests may very well lead to cancellation of all of the asserted patents, such requests by statute are more limited in scope than any invalidity contentions to be developed in this case, and thus the reexamination requests can be filed substantially sooner than those invalidity contentions are fully prepared. For example, the reexamination requests cannot address several categories of prior art, such as public use, on sale, and prior invention prior art, and cannot address invalidity under the Section 112, para. 1 disclosure requirements of written description, enablement, etc., or the Sec. 112, para. 2 claiming requirements, or the Sec. 101 patentability requirements, etc.

Event	Date
Markman Hearing (2 non-concurrent days)	Week of 9/19/11
Close of Fact Discovery on Validity Issues ⁵	11/18/11
Deadline for Filing Dispositive Motions on Validity Issues	12/23/11
Deadline for Filing Motions to Sever	3/9/12
Case Management Conference to decide the schedule and structure for the remaining parts of the case, which are infringement and damages discovery and dispositive motions, pretrial, and trial ⁶	3/30/12

7. **Magistrate Judge**: Interval consents that a full-time Magistrate Judge may conduct all proceedings. At least one Defendant does not consent to referral to a full-time Magistrate Judge.

8. **Bifurcation**:

(A) <u>Plaintiff's Contention</u>: As discussed in Section 1 and the proposed schedule above, Interval believes that the greatest efficiencies will be gained by dividing the asserted patents into two groups: the '314 and '652 patents in the first group; and the '507 and '682 patents in the second group.

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⁵ Facebook reserves the right to approach the Court about the possibility of adding invalidity expert reports at this stage, should it become obvious that they would be beneficial.

⁶ Depending on the outcome of the first phase, which may substantially narrow the issues that remain, Defendants have proposed setting a schedule for the remaining issues after the first phase of the litigation, at which time Defendants make seek additional phasing by first focusing any remaining liability issues (e.g., non-infringement issues) and then on damages issues, if any,

<sup>that remain relevant following the earlier phases. See, e.g., StreamServe AB v. Exstream
Software LLC, et al., 1-08-cv-00343 (D. Del. August 26, 2009) (Robinson, J.) ("Bifurcation is appropriate, if not necessary, in all but exceptional patent cases in my experience, discovery disputes related to document production on damages and the Daubert motion practice related to damages experts are a drain on scarce judicial resources").</sup>

(B) <u>Defendants' Contention</u>: As set forth above in Section 1 and Defendants' proposed schedule, Defendants propose phasing the litigation to address common claim construction and validity issues first will provide the most efficient approach.

9. **Pre-Trial Statements and Orders**: The parties were not able to agree on ways to shorten or simplify the Pre-Trial Statements or Pre-Trial Order at this time. The parties agree that Pre-Trial Statements and Orders called for by Local Rules CR 16(e), (h), (i), and (l), and 16.1 should not be dispensed with in whole or in part.

10. Suggestions for Shortening or Simplifying the Case:

Interval's Position: Interval's proposed discovery limitations in section 5(C) and proposals for minimizing expense in discovery in section 5(D) both will simplify the case. In addition, Interval proposes that the parties forego claim construction experts. With a tutorial, experts would likely add little if any benefit because the focus during claim construction is on intrinsic evidence from the patent itself rather than extrinsic evidence. To the extent that extrinsic evidence is needed, the parties can submit it from a source other than an expert report and rely on it in their briefing. Interval also respectfully suggests that the parties submit a DVD tutorial two weeks before the Markman hearing instead of an in-person tutorial. Each side's DVD tutorial should not exceed an hour in length.

Interval also is open to other ideas, such as a mediator supervising a non-binding, joint focus group early in the case for settlement purposes only under Rule 408 that would remain confidential among the parties.

What will not simplify or shorten the case is spending two years on the case focusing solely on validity and enforceability of the patents, as Defendants propose.

<u>Defendants' Position</u>: Defendants' phasing of the case will significantly assist the simplification of this case. Defendants agree that the parties may forego calling experts in connection with claim construction. Defendants believe that a live tutorial (potentially presented by an expert), rather than the DVD proposed by the Plaintiff may better assist the Court.

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Defendants suggest that this could be presented in a classroom style setting, rather than by questioning and cross examination. Presenting the tutorial live would allow the Court to ask questions that might otherwise remain unanswered in a recorded tutorial.

11. Trial Date:

<u>Plaintiff's Contention</u>: As set forth in paragraph 6(A) above, Interval respectfully submits that this case will be ready for trial on all issues for the '507 and '682 patents by April 2, 2012, and for the '314 and '652 patents by June 4, 2012. The proposed trial date on the first group of patents is approximately 20 months after this case was filed, and is therefore consistent with the district's practice of setting trials 12-24 months out, as this Court noted at the December 2010 scheduling conference.

Under Defendants' proposal, the Court would not even convene a hearing to set the trial date until nearly 18 months after the filing of the case.

Defendants' Contention: As set forth in paragraph 6(B) above, Defendants believe that, given the complexity of the case, including the number of Defendants and patents, this case should be phased and will require more time to litigate to trial. Under Defendants' proposed schedule, the end of the first phase focused on invalidity would conclude with dispositive motions. After such motions are heard, Defendants recommend a Case Management Conference on or around March 30, 2012 to set a schedule for any remaining issues. Setting a schedule at that time will be more effective as the issues in dispute will likely have been narrowed by the first phase of the case addressing claim construction and common validity issues.

12. **Jury Trial**: The Parties have requested a jury trial on all non-equitable issues.

13. Trial Days: The parties were not able to agree on the number of trial days.
(A) <u>Plaintiff's Contention</u>: Interval believes that between 6-8 trial days are needed to complete the trial for each of the two groups of patents, for a total of 12-16 trial days.

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(B) Defendants' Contention: Defendants believe that setting and length for trials is better reserved until after the first phase of the litigation is completed, but Plaintiff's proposal concerning the length of trial is not realistic given the present scope of the litigation.

14. The names, addresses and telephone numbers of all trial counsel:

5	PARTY	COUNSEL
6	INTERVAL	Justin A. Nelson
7	LICENSING	Edgar Sargent Matthew R. Berry
8		SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
0		1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3800
9		Seattle, Washington 98101 Tel: (206) 516-3880
10		Max L. Tribble, Jr.
11		SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
12		1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100 Houston, Texas 77002
13		Tel: (713) 651-9366
14		Michael F. Heim
15		Leslie V. Payne Nathan J. Davis
16		Eric Enger
		HEIM PAYNE & CHORUSH 600 Travis, Suite 6710
17		Houston, Texas 77002
18		Tel: (713) 221-2000
19	AOL INC.	Molly A. Terwilliger
20		SUMMIT LAW GROUP PLLC 315 Fifth Avenue S., Suite 1000
21		Seattle, Washington 98104 Tel: (206) 676-7000
22		
		Gerald F. Ivey - (202) 408-4110 FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
23		GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
24		901 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001
25		
26		Robert L. Burns - (571) 203-2736 Elliot C. Cook - (571) 203-2738
27	PLEMENTAL JOINT STATU v-01385-MJP)	US REPORT - 32 - KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP 121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 1600 Portland, OR 97204 Tel: (503) 595-5300; Fax: (503) 595-5301

	FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
	GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
	Two Freedom Square
	11955 Freedom Drive
	Reston, Virginia 20190
	Cortney S. Alexander - (404) 653-6409
	FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
	GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
	3500 SunTrust Plaza
	303 Peachtree Street N.E.
	Atlanta, Georgia 30308
APPLE, INC.	Scott Wilsdon
	Jeremy Roller
	YARMUTH WILSDON CALFO PLLC
	818 Stewart Street, Suite 1400
	Seattle, Washington 98101
	Tel: (206) 516-3800
	George Riley - (415) 984-8741
	David Almeling - (415) 984-8959
	O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
	Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor
	San Francisco, California 94111
	Brian Berliner - (213) 430-7424
	Neil Yang - (213) 430-8227
	O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
	400 South Hope Street
	Los Angeles, California 90071
EBAY, INC.	Chris Carraway
	Kristin Cleveland
NETFLIX, INC.	John Vandenberg
	KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP
OFFICE DEPOT,	One World Trade Center
INC.	121 S.W. Salmon Street
	Portland, Oregon 97204
STAPLES, INC.	Tel: (503) 595-5300
	Christopher Wion
	Arthur Harrigan, Jr.
	DANIELSON HARRIGAN LEYH & TOLLEFSON LLP
L EMENTAL JOINT STA T 01385-MJP)	TUS REPORT - 33 - KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP 121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 160 Portland, OR 97204 Tel: (503) 595-5300; Fax: (503) 595-5

	999 Third Avenue, Suite 4400
	Seattle, Washington 98104 Tel: (206) 623-1700
FACEBOOK, INC.	Christopher B. Durbin
FACEBOOK, INC.	COOLEY LLP
	719 Second Avenue, Suite 900
	Seattle, Washington 98104
	Tel: (206) 452-8700
	Michael G. Rhodes
	COOLEY LLP
	101 California St., 5th Floor San Francisco, California 94111
	Tel: (415) 493-2000
	Heidi L. Keefe
	Mark R. Weinstein
	Christen M.R. Dubois
	Elizabeth L. Stameshkin
	COOLEY LLP
	3175 Hanover St. Palo Alto, California 94304
	Tel: (650) 843-5000
GOOGLE INC.	Shannon M. Jost
	Scott A. W. Johnson
YOUTUBE, LLC	Aneelah Afzali STOKES LAWRENCE, P.S.
	800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4000
	Seattle, Washington 98104
	Tel: (206) 626-6000
	Kevin X. McGann - (212) 819-8312
	Dimitrios T. Drivas - (212) 819-8286
	John Handy - (212) 819-8790
	Aaron Chase - (212) 819-2516 WHITE & CASE LLP
	1155 Avenue of the Americas
	New York, New York 10036
	Warren S. Heit - (650) 213-0321
	Wendi Schepler - (650) 213-0323
	WHITE & CASE LLP
EMENTAL JOINT STAT 01385-MJP)	

PARTY	COUNSEL
	3000 El Camino Real
	Building 5, 9th Floor
	Palo Alto, California 94306
OFFICEMAX	Kevin Baumgardner
	Steven W. Fogg
	CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER &
	PREECE
	1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
	Seattle, Washington 98154 Tel: (206) 274-8669
	161. (200) 274-8009
	John S. Letchinger - (312) 201-2698
	Douglas S. Rupert - (312) 201-2720
	WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP
	225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60606
	Cincago, minors 00000
	Jeffrey D. Neumeyer
	OFFICEMAX INCORPORATED
	1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 510
	Boise, Idaho 83702
	Tel: (208) 388-4177
YAHOO! INC.	Mark P. Walters - (206) 336-5690
	Dario A. Machleidt - (206) 336-5690
	FROMMER LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP
	1191 Second Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, Washington 98101
	Seattle, washington 98101
	Francis Ho
	Richard S.J. Hung
	Michael Jacobs
	Matthew Kreeger Eric W. Ow
	MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
	425 Market Street
	San Francisco, California 94105
	Tel: (415) 268-7000
15. Service: De	efendants have been duly served with the First Amended Com
LEMENTAL JOINT ST	
-01385-MJP)	121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 160 Portland, OR 97204

16. Scheduling Conference:

Interval's Contention: There already has been one in-person scheduling conference in this case. Interval is at the Court's pleasure on whether to hold another scheduling conference. Any such conference, however, should not delay the schedule.

Defendants' Position:

Given the significant disputes identified above, Defendants believe that a scheduling conference may be helpful.

17. **Tutorial:**

Interval's Contention: As discussed above in section 10, Interval respectfully suggests that the parties submit a DVD to serve as the tutorial. The DVD tutorial should not exceed one hour in length per side.

<u>Defendants' Contention</u>: As discussed above in Section 10, Defendants respectfully suggest that the parties provide the Court with a live, classroom style tutorial. Defendants have proposed that this occur at or near the time of the Markman hearing as this will allow the parties to focus on the tutorial on issues in dispute for claim construction.

18. **Neutral Expert:** At this point, the parties do not believe that a neutral expert is necessary in this case.

19. **Defendant "Whip"** (per Order of December 14, 2010 [Dkt. No. 149]): Kevin McGann. For a particular issue, should the Court need a local contact, Mark Walters, would also be available in this "whip" capacity.

20. **Motions to Sever** (per Order of December 14, 2010 [Dkt. No. 149]): Defendants may file motions to sever on or before March 9, 2012.

21. Scheduling Conferences: Per the Court's Order of December 14, 2010 [Dkt. No. 149], the first periodic telephonic scheduling conference shall be on March 28, 2010 at 1:00 PM,
Pacific, subject to the Court's availability, and scheduled at each such conference for an additional conference approximately 90 days thereafter.

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SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT (10-cv-01385-MJP)

DATED this 14th day of January 2011.

/s/ Justin A. Nelson (with permission)

Justin A. Nelson, WSBA No. 31864 jnelson@susmangodfrey.com Matthew R. Berry. WSBA No. 37364 mberry@susmangodfrey.com SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P. 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3800 Seattle, Washington 98101 Tel: (206) 516-3880 Max L. Tribble, Jr. (*pro hac vice*) mtribble@susmangodfrey.com SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P. 1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100 Houston, Texas 77002 Tel: (713) 651-9366 Michael F. Heim (*pro hac vice*) mheim@hpcllp.com Eric J. Enger (*pro hac vice*) eenger@hpcllp.com Nathan J. Davis (*pro hac vice*) ndavis@hpcllp.com HEIM, PAYNE & CHORUSH, L.L.P. 600 Travis, Suite 6710 Houston, Texas 77002 Tel: (713) 221-2000

Attorneys for Plaintiff Interval Licensing LLC

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SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT (10-cv-01385-MJP)

/s/ Cortney S. Alexander (with permission)

1

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14

15

16

18

19

26

27

Gerald F. Ivey (*pro hac vice*) 2 gerald.ivey@finnegan.com 3 Robert L. Burns (*pro hac vice*) robert.burns@finnegan.com 4 Elliot C. Cook (*pro hac vice*) elliot.cook@finnegan.com 5 FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP 6 901 New York Avenue, N.W. 7 Washington, D.C. 20001-4413 Tel: (202) 408-4000 8 Cortney S. Alexander (*pro hac vice*) 9 cortney.alexander@finnegan.com FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, 10 GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP 11 3500 SunTrust Plaza 303 Peachtree Street, NE 12

Molly A. Terwilliger, WSBA No. 28449 mollyt@summitlaw.com SUMMIT LAW GROUP PLLC 315 Fifth Avenue S., Suite 1000 Seattle, Washington 98104 Tel: (206) 676-7000

Attorneys for Defendant AOL Inc.

/s/ Brian M. Berliner (with permission)

Brian M. Berliner (pro hac vice) bberliner@omm.com Neil L. Yang (*pro hac vice*) 17 nyang@omm.com O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP 400 South Hope Street Los Angeles, California 90071 Tel: (213) 430-6000 20

Atlanta, Georgia 30308-3263

Tel: (404) 653-6400

George A. Riley (pro hac vice) 21 griley@omm.com 22 David S. Almeling (pro hac vice) dalmeling@omm.com 23 O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor 24 San Francisco, California 94111 Tel: (415) 984-8700 25

Scott T. Wilsdon, WSBA No. 20608 wilsdon@yarmuth.com Jeremy E. Roller, WSBA No. 32021 jroller@yarmuth.com YARMUTH WILSDON CALFO PLLC 818 Stewart Street, Suite 1400 Seattle, Washington 98101 Tel: (206) 516-3800

Attorneys for Defendant Apple Inc.

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SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT (10-cv-01385-MJP)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	<u>/s/Kristin L. Cleveland</u> J. Christopher Carraway, WSBA No. 37944 chris.carraway@klarquist.com Kristin L. Cleveland (<i>pro hac vice</i>) kristin.cleveland@klarquist.com John D. Vandenberg, WSBA No. 38445 john.vandenberg@klarquist.com KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP 121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 1600 Portland, Oregon 97204 Tel: (503) 595-5300 <i>Attorneys for Defendants eBay Inc., Netfle</i>	Christopher T. Wion, WSBA No. 33207 chrisw@dhlt.com Arthur W. Harrigan, Jr., WSBA No. 1751 arthurh@dhlt.com DANIELSON HARRIGAN LEYH & TOLLEFSON LLP 999 Third Avenue, Suite 4400 Seattle, Washington 98104 Tel: (206) 623-1700
 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	Michael G. Rhodes (<i>pro hac vice</i>) mrhodes@cooley.com COOLEY LLP 101 California St., 5th Floor San Francisco, California 94111 Tel: (415) 693-2000 Heidi L. Keefe (<i>pro hac vice</i>) hkeefe@cooley.com Mark R. Weinstein (<i>pro hac vice</i>) mweinstein@cooley.com Christen M.R. Dubois (<i>pro hac vice</i>) cdubois@cooley.com Elizabeth L. Stameshkin (<i>pro hac vice</i>) lstameshkin@cooley.com COOLEY LLP 3175 Hanover St. Palo Alto, California 94304 Tel: (650) 843-5000	<u>/s/ Christopher Durbin (with permission)</u> Christopher B. Durbin, WSBA No. 41159 cdurbin@cooley.com COOLEY LLP 719 Second Avenue, Suite 900 Seattle, Washington 98104 Tel: (206) 452-8700
24 25 26	Attorneys for Defe	ndant Facebook, Inc.
27	SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT (10-cv-01385-MJP)	- 39 - KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP 121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 1600 Portland, OR 97204 Tel: (503) 595-5300; Fax: (503) 595-5301

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1	Kevin X. McGann - (212) 819-8312 (<i>pro hac vice</i>)	/s/ Shannon M. Jost (with permission)
2	kmcgann@whitecase.com	Shannon M. Jost, WSBA No. 32511
3	Dimitrios T. Drivas - (212) 819-8286	shannon.jost@stokeslaw.com
3	(pro hac vice)	Scott A.W. Johnson, WSBA No. 15543
4	ddrivas@whitecase.com John Handy - (212) 819-8790 (<i>pro hac vice</i>)	scott.johnson@stokeslaw.com Aneelah Afzali, WSBA No. 34552
	jhandy@whitecase.com	aneelah.afzali@stokeslaw.com
5	Aaron Chase - (212) 819-2516 (pro hac vice)	STOKES LAWRENCE, P.S.
6	achase@whitecase.com	800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4000
0	WHITE & CASE LLP	Seattle, Washington 98104
7	1155 Avenue of the Americas	Tel: (206) 626-6000
0	New York, New York 10036	
8		
9	Warren S. Heit - (650) 213-0321	
1.0	(pro hac vice)	
10	wheit@whitecase.com	
11	Wendi Schepler - (650) 213-0323 (<i>pro hac vice</i>)	
	wschepler@whitecase.com	
12	WHITE & CASE LLP	
13	3000 El Camino Real	
15	Building 5, 9th Floor	
14	Palo Alto, California 94306	
15	Attorneys for Defendants G	oogle Inc. and YouTube, LLC
	Attorneys for Defendants G	Google Inc. and YouTube, LLC
16	Attorneys for Defendants G	Google Inc. and YouTube, LLC
16 17	John S. Letchinger (pro hac vice)	Google Inc. and YouTube, LLC <u>/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission)</u>
16 17 18	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com	
16 17	John S. Letchinger (pro hac vice)	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission)
16 17 18 19	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528
16 17 18	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP	<u>/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission)</u> Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com
16 17 18 19	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON
 16 17 18 19 20 21 	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60606	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP
 16 17 18 19 20 	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3900
 16 17 18 19 20 21 	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60606	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3900 Seattle, Washington 98154
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60606	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3900
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60606	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3900 Seattle, Washington 98154
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Tel: (312) 201-2698	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3900 Seattle, Washington 98154 Tel: (206) 625-8600
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Tel: (312) 201-2698	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3900 Seattle, Washington 98154
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Tel: (312) 201-2698 <i>Attorneys for Defendan</i>	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3900 Seattle, Washington 98154 Tel: (206) 625-8600
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Tel: (312) 201-2698	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3900 Seattle, Washington 98154 Tel: (206) 625-8600 *t OfficeMax Incorporated •40 - KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP 121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 1600
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 	John S. Letchinger (<i>pro hac vice</i>) letchinger@wildman.com Douglas S. Rupert (<i>pro hac vice</i>) rupert@wildman.com WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON LLP 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Tel: (312) 201-2698 <i>Attorneys for Defendan</i> SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT	/s/ Kevin C. Baumgardner (with permission) Kevin C. Baumgardner, WSBA No. 14263 kbaumgardner@corrcronin.com Steven W. Fogg, WSBA No. 23528 sfogg@corrcronin.com CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3900 Seattle, Washington 98154 Tel: (206) 625-8600 t OfficeMax Incorporated

1	Michael A. Jacobs (pro hac vice)	/s/ Mark P. Walters (with permission)
2	mjacobs@mofo.com Matthew I. Kreeger (<i>pro hac vice</i>)	Mark P. Walters, WSBA No. 30819
3	mkreeger@mofo.com Richard S.J. Hung (<i>pro hac vice</i>)	mwalters@flhlaw.com Dario A. Machleidt, WSBA No. 41860
4	rhung@mofo.com Francis Ho (<i>pro hac vice</i>)	dmachleidt@flhlaw.com FROMMER LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP
5	fho@mofo.com	1191 Second Avenue Suite 2000
6	Eric W. Ow (<i>pro hac vice</i>) eow@mofo.com	Seattle, Washington 98101 Tel: (206) 336-5684
7	MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 425 Market Street	
8	San Francisco, California 94105 Tel: (415) 268-7000	
9	Attornaus for	Defendant Yahoo! Inc.
10	Autorneys jor	Defendum Tunoo! Inc.
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
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19		
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27	SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT (10-cv-01385-MJP)	- 41 - KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP 121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 1600 Portland, OR 97204
		Tel: (503) 595-5300; Fax: (503) 595-5301

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 14, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following counsel of record:

Attorneys for AOL Inc.

′	Molly A. Terwilliger	mollyt@summitlaw.com
8	Gerald F. Ivey	gerald.ivey@finnegan.com
Ŭ	Robert L. Burns	robert.burns@finnegan.com
9	Cortney S. Alexander	cortney.alexander@finnegan.com
	Elliot C. Cook	elliot.cook@finnegan.com
0		
1	Attorneys for Apple, Inc.	
1	David Almeling	dalmeling@omm.com
2	Brian Berliner	bberliner@omm.com
	George Riley	griley@omm.com
3	Jeremy Roller	jroller@yarmuth.com
	Scott Wilsdon	wilsdon@yarmuth.com
4	Neil Yang	nyang@omm.com

Attorneys for eBay, Inc., Netflix, Inc., Office Depot, Inc. and Staples, Inc.

16	Christopher Carraway	chris.carraway@klarquist.com
	Kristin Cleveland	kristin.cleveland@klarquist.com
17	John Vandenberg	john.vandenberg@klarquist.com
		chrisw@dhlt.com
18	Arthur Harrigan, Jr.	arthurh@dhlt.com
		_

Attorneys for Facebook, Inc.

20	Christen Dubois	cdubois@cooley.com
	Heidi Keefe	hkeefe@cooley.com
21	Michael Rhodes	mrhodes@cooley.com
22	Elizabeth Stameshkin	lstameshkin@cooley.com
22	Mark Weinstein	mweinstein@cooley.com
23	Chris Durbin	cdurbin@cooley.com

Attorneys for Google, Inc. and YouTube, LLC

	Aneelah Afzali	aneelah.afzali@stokeslaw.com achase@whitecase.com	
25	Aaron Chase		
26	Dimitrios Drivas	ddrivas@whitecase.com	
	John Handy	jhandy@whitecase.com	
27	SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT	- 42 - KLARQUIST SPARKMAN	I, LLP
	(10-cv-01385-MJP)	121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suit	te 1600
		Portland, OR 97204	
		Tel: (503) 595-5300; Fax: (503)	595-5301

	Wenner Heit		
1	Warren Heit Kevin McGann	wheit@white	ecase.com vhitecase.com
2	Scott Johnson		n@stokeslaw.com
	Shannon Jost		@stokeslaw.com
3		-	
4	Attorneys for OfficeMax, Inc. Kevin Baumgardner	khaumaardn	er@corrcronin.com
-	Steven Fogg	sfogg@corrc	
5	John Letchinger		wildman.com
6	Douglas Rupert	rupert@wild	
7	Jeff Neumeyer	jeffneumeye	r@officemax.com
	Attorneys for Yahoo! Inc.		
8	Francis Ho	fho@mofo.c	
9	Richard S.J. Hung Michael Jacobs	rhung@mofe	
10	Matthew Kreeger	mjacobs@m mkreeger@r	
10	Dario Machleidt	dmachleidt@	
11	Eric Ow	eow@mofo.	
12	Mark Walters	mwalters@f	lhlaw.com
13			
14			s/ Kristin L. Cleveland in L. Cleveland
		IXI15t	
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27	SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT STATUS REPORT (10-cv-01385-MJP)	- 43 -	KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP 121 S.W. Salmon Street, Suite 1600
			Portland, OR 97204
			Tel: (503) 595-5300; Fax: (503) 595-5301