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4	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5	FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
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9	THE SCO GROUP,
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11) Plaintiff,)
12	vs.) Case 2:03-CV-294
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14	INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES) CORPORATION,)
15	Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff)
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18	BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE BROOK WELLS
19	DECEMBER 20, 2005
20	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
21	MOTION HEARING
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23	
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25	Reported by: KELLY BROWN, HICKEN CSR, RPR, RMR

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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, DECEMBER 20, 2005 1 2 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 2 We're here this morning to address two outstanding motions. 4 The first one would be SCO's renewed motion -- well, that 5 would be the second one -- SCO's renewed motion to compel 6 7 discovery. The first one we'll address is IBM's motion to compel production of documents from SCO's privileged log. 8 Counsel, if I could ask you to make appearances for 9 10 the record, please. 11 MR. MARRIOTT: Good morning, Your Honor. 12 David Marriott for IBM. MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Todd Shaughnessy for IBM. 13 MR. NORMAND: Good morning, Your Honor. 14 Ted Normand for SCO. 15 MR. HATCH: Brent Hatch for SCO. 16 THE COURT: All right. We will begin with IBM's 17 18 motion to compel production of documents. I have reviewed all of the submissions including the transcript of the case that 19 20 was presented by Judge Boyce some years ago and would specifically ask that that be addressed. 21 22 All right. Mr. Marriott? 23 MR. MARRIOTT: Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning, Your Honor. SCO has withheld from 24 25 production in this litigation somewhere in the order of 1,000

documents from the files of AT&T, Novell and the Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. The documents are, so far as we can tell, Your Honor, plainly relevant to the issues in the case based on descriptions of them in SCO's privileged log. And, indeed, I would submit that SCO has acknowledged the relevance by even listing them on the log.

To properly withhold the documents as privileged, SCO bears the burden to show the documents are, in fact, privileged. It contends that the documents here are privileged because SCO and it contends its predecessors acquired certain Unix assets from one another with which the documents in question were apparently associated. And according to SCO, the transfers of assets from one of these entities to another represented the transfer of an entire line of business. In SCO's view, that justifies the privilege passing from one entity to the next.

Respectfully, Your Honor, we think that is 17 18 incorrect, that the privilege did not pass in each of the two transactions that matter here, and that for that reason, that 19 any privilege that may have existed with respect to those 20 documents, which, of course, we haven't seen and can't 21 evaluate the privilege of, would in any event have been 22 waived. And for that reason, we would ask Your Honor to 23 compel the production of the documents. 24

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I would like to, if I may, in the few minutes that

I have to make just a couple of points. First point, Your Honor, addresses the issue that Your Honor flags the one which you would like us to address, and that is Judge Boyce's decision. In our view, Your Honor, the rule here is that the privilege passes where there is a sale of assets from one entity to another where control passes with the assets. And if it is a mere asset sale even if those assets represented a line of business, as SCO contends is the case here, the privilege doesn't pass.

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Now, in its papers, SCO criticizes the cases cited by IBM as not standing for the proposition that the privilege does not pass in an asset sale. What SCO omits, however, Your Honor, is reference to the decision by Magistrate Judge Boyce which squarely addressed the issue presented here.

In that case, Caldera, which was the predecessor in 15 16 interest here of -- the predecessor, rather, of SCO asserted 17 that it was entitled to claim privilege with respect to a collection of documents which apparently transferred from 18 Novell to Caldera in an asset sale. And SCO argued that the 19 20 documents in that case were entitled to the protections of the privilege because they argue, quote, there was a fully 21 22 operational business division, close quote, that passed from Novell to Caldera. 23

In fact, Your Honor, Caldera in that case made a much stronger presentation as to why the privilege should

attach than does the SCO Group here, because in the case in front of Judge Boyce, it was argued that Novell and Caldera had a continuing joint interest in defense of the IP that was apparently involved in that transaction.

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Notwithstanding that additional fact, which is not present here, and notwithstanding the argument that the assets that transferred in the Novell-Caldera situation were an independent line of business, Magistrate Judge Boyce rejected precisely the argument that is made here. And he did so at Pages 18 and 19 of the transcript, which we provided to the Court as Exhibit 1 to the Shaughnessy declaration. And I think, though I understand Your Honor's looked at it, that it bears examination. Magistrate Judge Boyce says:

I do not think I really need argument on the 14 15 attorney-client privilege matter. I've done a lot of work on that, and I'm satisfied that the claim 16 17 of attorney-client privilege is not valid. When Novell documents were turned over to Caldera, that 18 destroyed the privilege. Caldera is not the 19 20 alter-eqo or successor in interest in the legal context of those materials. The analogies to the 21 22 Supreme Court's decision with regard to its successor in interest such as a trustee in 23 bankruptcy are an imperfect analogy. That case 24 simply does not apply. It's a simple waiver 25

situation. You have separate entities, and one entity hands over to the other all the technology and information and materials covered by attorney-client privilege. Without some type of additional protection, that privilege is gone. So the motion to compel will be granted with regard to those documents.

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Now, when Judge Boyce finishes ruling, counsel for Caldera then acknowledges, Your Honor, that, in fact, they made the determination that they were going to concede the issue in that case. Subsequently, Novell attempted to intervene in the case and assert a privilege of its own, and Judge Boyce there re-affirmed his decision here. He said that the only interest that Caldera had with respect to the documents at issue in that subsequent matter was to preclude discovery.

And that frankly, we submit, Your Honor, is the only interest that SCO had here. As I think we indicate in our reply papers, SCO offered to produce the documents to us in this litigation so long as we did not -- we agreed not to argue that there was a subject matter waiver, which, of course, we can't do without actually seeing the document and know what we might be talking about.

None of the cases that are cited by SCO as authority for a rule different from the rule adopted by

Magistrate Judge Boyce are applicable here. Three of them were attorney disqualification basis in which there was no issue about whether certain documents should be produced because there had been a waiver. Two of the cases are cases in which the assertion of privilege was rejected, and at least two of the other cases are cases in which -- that arose in the context of bankruptcy and turned in significant part on bankruptcy consideration, which, of course, Judge Boyce in his decision expressly distinguishes from the case here.

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So we think, Your Honor, for that reason alone, that is to say, that the rule is simply not as SCO suggests, Your Honor ought to grant IBM's motion and require the production of these documents.

14 Now, even if the rule were as SCO suggests, we 15 think also that Your Honor should require the production of the documents. SCO contends that the document privilege 16 passes because an entire business, the Unix business, as they 17 call it, passed from AT&T to Novell, from Novell to Santa 18 Cruz, from Santa Cruz to Caldera. And that, Your Honor, is 19 20 not a proposition as to which we think they can sustain their burden of proof. 21

Let me, if I may, focus just on two of the transactions that I think matter here. First is the Novell transaction, that is, the transaction in which Novell transferred certain Unix assets to the Santa Cruz Operation,

Inc. That transaction, Judge, was governed by an asset purchase agreement dated September 19th, 1995. That agreement had two schedules. One of the schedules listed the exhibits which were included in the transaction, that is, that was passed from Novell to Santa Cruz; and the other schedule listed those assets which did not pass.

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7 And I refer Your Honor in particular to Exhibit 4 to the Sorenson declaration which was submitted in connection 8 9 with our motion. That is Schedule 1.1B of the asset purchase 10 agreement between Novell and Santa Cruz. The assets listed here are those which were excluded from the transaction. 11 And listed here, Your Honor, are Novell code contained in 12 UnixWare 2.01. Netware Unix Client. UnixWare TSA. All 13 14 copyrights and trademarks except for the trademarks in 15 UnixWare. And we dropped the footnote and come back to the copyright question. All patents, all accounts receivable to 16 rights or payments concerning the assets arising prior to the 17 18 closing date. And then finally, all rights, title and interest in the SVR-X or System V royalties less a 5-percent 19 administration fee. 20

Let me just say two things further about this, Your Honor, one with respect to copyrights and the other with respect to the licensing distributing. There's a dispute as to whether or not Caldera or SCO here or Novell owns the Unix copyrights which are at issue both in this case and in SCO's

litigation with Novell. What I think is undisputed, Your Honor, is that Schedule 1.1B of the asset purchase agreement excluded from the transaction copyrights.

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Now, as I understand SCO's argument, they contend that a subsequent amendment to this agreement, an Amendment 2, transferred the copyrights to them. We don't think that's right, Your Honor. But assuming for the sake of this discussion that it is, that transfer occurred a year or so after this transaction. So whatever privilege that was associated with the documents at the time waived and can't be resuscitated or resurrected by the execution of an amendment a year down the line relating to copyrights.

But you can put the copyright question completely 13 14 aside, Your Honor, because entirely independent of that question, and this is undisputed, Schedule 1.1B makes 15 perfectly clearly that Novell did not transfer the portion of 16 its business that concerned revenues from SVR-X royalties. 17 In other words, Novell retained 95 percent of the royalties --18 actually retained 100, and it remitted back a 5-percent 19 administration fee to SCO. It simply cannot be that one can 20 21 say that Novell transferred its entire Unix business to Santa Cruz when Novell retained 95 percent of the royalty 22 stream related to that business. 23

Now, let me say this just briefly with respect tothe other transaction, which is the Santa Cruz-Caldera

transaction. Similarly there, Your Honor, the agreement that governs that relationship makes clear and SCO's securities filings make clear that it did not acquire from the Santa Cruz Operation, Inc., all of the assets or control of Santa Cruz. Santa Cruz continued to exist subsequent to the transaction. It renamed itself Tarantella and had subsequently been bought by Sun, but it continued to exist.

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Moreover, Santa Cruz did not sell anything other than assets from two divisions, so far as we can tell, to Caldera. It sold some but not all of the assets of its professional services division, and it sold some but not all of the assets of its server software division. It appears, Your Honor, from the documents which have been produced to us that Santa Cruz did not transfer even all of its Unix assets or at least assets related to the Unix assets.

Now, let me endeavor to correct what I think may be an error in IBM's reply papers. In our reply papers, we indicated that it appeared from the documents which had been produced to us that Santa Cruz had not transferred to Caldera the open server products, which was the Santa Cruz Unix product. That's what the documents that were provided to the Court, which were provided to us indicate.

Last evening when preparing for this argument, we came upon, Your Honor, a securities filing of Santa Cruz and/or SCO which seems to indicate that the open server

product itself was, in fact, transferred in and around about the same time period. That notwithstanding an error for which if it is, in fact, an error, we apologize, is nevertheless immaterial to the resolution of this motion because the important point is that even if SCO's own rule is right, what's clear is that not all of these assets of the two divisions of Santa Cruz that transferred, transferred just some. Even if it's substantially all, not all of the assets transferred. That the documents make clear, and that's where the subsequent amendment changes, even if the open server transferred to SCO as it contends that they did.

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12 But the truth is, Your Honor, there is really no such thing to outline as the Unix business as SCO describes in 13 14 its papers. AT&T had a different Unix business from Novell. 15 Novell had different Unix businesses from Santa Cruz, and 16 Santa Cruz has a different Unix business than does SCO. In 17 fact, so far as we can tell from SCO's public filings, SCO does not maintain the two separate divisions that Santa Cruz 18 19 did with respect to Unix. It doesn't appear to have a server 20 software division, and it doesn't appear to have a professional server division, at least by those names. 21

In any event, Your Honor, I think it's fair to say that the Unix business that SCO runs today is nothing like the Unix businesses that its predecessors ran.

Now, the final point I'd like to make in this

connection, Your Honor, is that the declaration on which SCO relies in support of its position in this case, that of Mr. Broderick, is simply not sufficient to carry its burden of proof, and that's true for at least two reasons. The first reason is that it fails to dispute the facts critical to the motion. It does not establish, Mr. Broderick does not purport to say that control transferred from Novell to Santa Cruz or from Santa Cruz to Caldera. Mr. Broderick does nothing other than assets, although he considers them to be entirely business assets transferred.

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He does not dispute, also, Your Honor, that not all of the assets of Novell transferred to Santa Cruz or that all the assets of Santa Cruz transferred to Caldera. He acknowledges in his deposition that Novell retained a piece of that business.

And second, Mr. Broderick's declaration falls short 16 in any event because it is in critical respect lacking in 17 18 foundation full of testimony as to which Mr. Broderick is not a competent witness, and it's contradicted by SCO's SEC 19 filings and Mr. Broderick's deposition. For example, 20 Mr. Broderick speaks in his declaration about the transactions 21 involved here, but acknowledged in his deposition that he 22 wasn't personally involved in the transactions. He speaks for 23 other state of minds, employees of AT&T and USL and Novell to 24 what they understood, and, of course, can't state for the mind 25

of others. He is not a lawyer, does not pretend to be a lawyer, and yet in his declaration he speaks about what transferred, a legal question; what didn't transfer, a legal question; and speaks to the form of these various transactions. For those reasons, Your Honor, we respectfully submit that Mr. Broderick's declaration doesn't carry the day.

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In summary, IBM's motion should be granted. At issue are 1,000 documents which should have been produced some time ago. Whatever privilege may attach to those documents no longer attaches today. It was waived. It was waived under the rule articulated by Magistrate Judge Boyce, which we think flows out of other precedent. And for that reason, Your Honor should follow Magistrate Judge Boyce and grant IBM's motion.

> THE COURT: Mr. Marriott, let me ask you one thing. MR. MARRIOTT: Sure.

16 THE COURT: And this would be a question posed to 17 both sides.

How does my ruling today affect the required infringement disclosures due on the 22nd?

20 MR. MARRIOTT: Well, that's a very difficult 21 question for me to answer, Your Honor, because I haven't seen 22 the documents. That said, I don't imagine that it should 23 impact it much. It shouldn't impact SCO's disclosures at all 24 because, of course, SCO has the documents. And without seeing 25 them, I can't say for certain whether it affects IBM's

1 disclosures as to the material, which we contend was misused. But I don't have any reason as I stand here to think it 2 3 necessarily would without seeing the documents, as I said. 4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. MR. MARRIOTT: Thank you, Your Honor. 5 6 MR. NORMAND: Good morning, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Good morning. MR. NORMAND: May it please the Court, on the issue 8 of the relevance or not of the documents over which we claim 9 10 privilege to the December 22nd submission, I don't have the 11 documents committed to memory, but I don't think it bears on 12 that submission in any way. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. NORMAND: And I'll address Your Honor's 14 particular focus on Judge Boyce's oral ruling in context of my 15 16 larger efforts to respond to Mr. Marriott's points. The two themes are, one, the particular facts at issue before Judge 17 Boyce including the very important fact that Novell retained a 18 contingent interest, i.e., was cooperating in the continued 19 operation of the business essentially. That is not the fact 20 21 that supports IBM's argument. That is a fact that hurts IBM's argument. It suggests that Novell had not really committed 22 the transfer of the business where it retained that interest. 23 24 Second, I think Your Honor would concede it is a little risky 25 to put too much weight on an oral ruling. I don't think it's

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entirely fair what Judge --

THE COURT: You didn't know Judge Boyce.

MR. NORMAND: I've been told by our local counsel that he was prone to do that. But he did mention specifically in the ruling the legal context. And I think it's important that he himself acknowledged that he was making this ruling in particular legal context. And in addition to the difference in facts, we think the law has evolved to some extent in the last seven or eight years since that ruling. And that's where I would like to start with my arguments, Your Honor.

The most recent decisions under the relevant case law show that the question is whether the practical consequences of the transactions at issue are that SCO is a successor to the Unix business. The question is one of control, not a question of the percentages of assets transferred, as Mr. Marriott has sought to frame the question. And second, as I mentioned, Your Honor, both the transaction documents here and the facts that we've submitted in support of our opposition show that SCO maintains control over the relevant part of the Unix business.

So the first point is the most recent case law, Your Honor. And I won't go into this too much detail because I know you've said you've seen the briefs. But let me highlight the two cases in particular, if I could.

First case from last year, 2004, the most recent

case to address this issue is the Soverain case, in which Soverain retained three patents, and the business appended to those patents and continued to operate the business with the same personnel and with the same engineering support, very similar to what SCO has done. The Court in that case rejected the bright-line rule that:

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The mere transfer of assets does not transfer the privilege and found that the rule does not apply equally to the myriad ways to control of the corporation that changed hands. If the practical consequences of the transaction results in the transfer of control of the business in continuation of the business under new management, I'm reading from the opinion, of course, then the authority or privilege will follow. And the relevant facts include whether the successor continued to operate the business at issue and whether the same personnel continued to support the business.

18 And I think the evidence supports that, as I will19 get into a little bit more detail.

The second case, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1999, the Graco case. In that case, Graco acquired a play yard business from a company called Century Products. And Graco argued that the attorneys who had represented Century Products could not be averse to Graco in litigation at issue relating to the patents for the play yard

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Mr. Marriott suggests that a case like this is irrelevant because it doesn't involve the production of documents. But at issue in that case as here is whether the privilege applies to the successor or the predecessor company. It's the very same issue necessarily decided in litigation.

The Court in Graco held that:

The relevant question is whether the assets purchased while not all of the predecessor's assets were those pertaining to the subject matter of the claimed privilege.

Which is what we're claiming, privilege over that Unix business that we control.

It does not matter -- and this is from the Court's language -- how much or what percentage of the assets were transferred.

In addition, Your Honor, we don't believe that any court has actually reached a different holding than the ones in Soverain and Graco, and that includes Judge Boyce's oral ruling, given the context in which he made that ruling. IBM cites cases holding that upon a change in management of a corporation, privilege transfers, but those cases don't say that's the only way the privilege can transfer.

In the Grand Jury that IBM cites, for example, from the Eastern District of Virginia, this is 1990, prior to the

two opinions in which we place most of the weight of our 1 argument, the Court said: 2 A transfer of assets without more is not 3 sufficient to effect a transfer of the privilege. 4 IBM omits the "without more" language from its 5 brief. I think the subsequent cases make clear what the 6 "more" is; i.e., if there is a transfer of assets in a 7 concomitant transfer of control over the business and assets 8 at issue, then the privilege travels with the assets in the 9 business --10 11 THE COURT: But it doesn't say that. None of the 12 opinions say that. MR. NORMAND: No. I agree that the opinions don't 13 say. We're citing to the Eastern District case, and this is 14 what we think "more" is. Our position is that the case law 15 has evolved, though, to reflect that the case as last year 16 17 myriad ways in which the transfer can occur. THE COURT: So are you suggesting, then, that given 18 the fact that these are somewhat the same parties, that had 19 Judge Boyce had the benefit of these newer rulings, his ruling 20 would have been different? 21 MR. NORMAND: Well, I think my first position, Your 22 Honor, would be it's not entirely clear what law Judge Boyce 23 is relying on in his oral ruling and what the interpretation 24 of that law was. I think the short answer to your question 25

is, I think Judge Boyce would have found these relevant, and I think Judge Boyce would also recognize the difference in facts between the case before him in which Novell had retained a contingent interest in which there was no reasonable argument in his view that Novell had disassociated itself from the business transfer; whereas here, there is a disassociation, and there is -- you know, SCO and its predecessors have been the ones with control of the assets in the business at issue.

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9 So my second main point, Your Honor, is that the 10 transaction documents and the evidence we have submitted 11 support our argument about SCO being the entity that controls 12 the Unix business related to the privilege that we claim. 13 I'll go through this briefly because we summarized the 14 highlights of the transactions in our brief that you've read. 15 But let me re-visit them very quickly.

16 With respect to the APA, which Mr. Marriott 17 mentioned, Recital A of the APA describes the transfer of 18 business as follows:

The business of developing a line of software products currently known as Unix and UnixWare, the sale of binary and source code licenses to various versions of Unix and UnixWare, the support of such products, and the sale of other products which are directly related to Unix and UnixWare.

And then the APA says right at the beginning:

1 All of the Novell's right, title and interest 2 in and to the assets and properties of seller relating to the business as transferred. 3 And the document actually says, I think in the 4 preamble, it is the intent of the parties to transfer all of 5 the business. 6 With respect to Santa Cruz' divestment of its Unix 7 business, its divestment was so complete that it actually 8 changed its name to the name of the only division that it 9 retained following the transfer of assets. That is 10 11 Tarantella. 12 Under the agreement issue between Santa Cruz and Caldera, the transfer of the following assets: 13 All rights and ownership of Unix and UnixWare 14 including all intellectual property rights appurtenant 15 thereto. 16 As Mr. Marriott conceded, IBM was incorrect about 17 18 open server. Open server was transferred. And I submit, Your Honor, that the fact that IBM has interpreted the document 19 20 doesn't point out how detailed the documents are, in that it places focus on the question as framed in the most recent 21 cases that the question as a practical consequence of the 22 23 transfer. And let me re-emphasize because Your Honor has 24 asked about Judge Boyce's ruling the difference of facts. 25

Whereas, Santa Cruz transferred to Caldera in 2001 over 90 percent of Santa Cruz' business and all of Unix business with some exceptions, Caldera acquired from Novell about \$400,000 worth of Novell's multi-million dollar business. We're talking about a much different transaction. And again, Your Honor, Novell never retained any interest.

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THE COURT: But there was a 10 percent that wasn't transferred.

9 MR. NORMAND: That's correct, Your Honor. And to 10 be clear, our position is that we are asserting privilege over that portion of the Unix business, which is virtually all of 11 12 the Unix business that has been transferred. Our position is 13 that Unix business that we control and our predecessors have 14 controlled through the line of succession, any documents relating to that aspect of the Unix business that virtually 15 all of the Unix business, that is privileged. That is our 16 17 position, and that is what we think the most recent case law 18 supports.

Let me turn briefly to Judge Boyce's actual ruling,oral ruling. The main language in his ruling is this:

When the Novell documents were turned over to Caldera, that destroyed the privilege. Caldera is not the alter-ego or successor in interest in the legal context of those materials.

And I think there is ambiguity in that language. I

think if nothing else, it reflects Judge Boyce's decision is based on the particular context and the particular documents in front of him, and those facts are different than the facts here.

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In short, Your Honor, under those cases we believe that it is undisputed that as a practical matter, SCO owns and operates the Unix business as predecessors in interest. IBM has taken issue with Mr. Broderick's affidavit, which I will highlight for Your Honor. Mr. Broderick said in relevant part:

In each instance -- that is, in the instance of each transfer -- the company selling the Unix technology also transferred control of the commercial enterprise that developed, marketed and licensed that technology. In each instance, the makeup and operation of the Unix business continued as constituted through and after each transition.

19 IBM does not take issue with that portion of his 20 testimony, nor do they take issue with the following portions 21 of his testimony:

In each instance, the transfer of the Unix business included office space, leaseholds, furniture and equipment. In each instance, the transfer of the Unix business also included all or

many of the people who managed and operated the business, including senior-level managers, engineers, sales people, support staff and other employees. It also included customer, supplier and vendor relationships.

These facts are all different than the Novellaction that Judge Boyce addressed.

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Through and after each transaction -- this is Mr. Broderick -- my colleagues and I almost universally kept doing the same work with the same people from the same offices and buildings, developing and delivering the same Unix products and services to the same customers.

14 THE COURT: But he later admits in his deposition 15 that he himself didn't remain an employee for the entirety of 16 the period.

MR. NORMAND: That's correct, Your Honor, he didn't. But he did remain an employee through the asset transactions at issue.

THE COURT: And he also uses, doesn't he, I just want to make sure that I have your opinion on this, he uses modifiers when he makes those statements. He says, we all know its universe. He doesn't make fully declarative propositions or statements there. He reserves something. MR. NORMAND: I think that's right, Your Honor.

And our position, again to be clear with Your Honor, is both with respect to the formal transaction documents and with respect to the operation of the business, there clearly are in the transaction documents some assets reserved. There are excluded asset sections. We can't take issue with that. We do take issue on the APA front, that the copyrights weren't transferred. As Mr. Marriott has said, that is actually an issue and is subject of another litigation and actually an issue which Judge Kimball has already denied IBM's motion for summary judgment. That is an issue of fact.

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But there's no question that some assets were reserved, and there is no question that, as Mr. Broderick concedes, he can't say that absolutely every person remained, because when there's a transaction or a transfer of assets, some people leave. Not everyone stays.

I don't think we have to meet that standard, though, Your Honor, because if that were the standard, I think you'd see in the cases some attribution of that being particularly relevant that says unless everybody remained from the successor corporation, the privilege can't possibly transfer. And I think the Graco case and the Soverain case don't set forth that kind of standard.

Mr. Broderick concludes that:

In each instance, after each transaction, neither the seller nor its employees remained

involved in managing or operating the business.

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That's in stark contrast -- IBM does not dispute that statement, and that fact is in stark contrast with what happened with the facts before Judge Boyce when Novell had maintained its contingent interest and as a functional matter, was continuing to help prosecute the litigation involving the assets transfer.

8 I'll have to take a look at the note that's been 9 handed to me, Your Honor, but that's all I have now. Thank 10 you.

MR. MARRIOTT: Just very briefly, Your Honor. Mr. Normand suggests the fact that Caldera argued in the case in front of Judge Boyce that Novell had some continuing interest cuts against the finding that Judge Boyce's decision somehow applies here, and I would submit just the opposite is true.

17 The law here, Your Honor, also has not evolved in our view in the way that Mr. Normand suggests. He refers Your 18 Honor to three decisions, two cited by SCO and one cited by 19 20 IBM, Mr. Normand takes to distinguish. The Soverain case, the 21 first of the cases that Mr. Normand mentions, was a bankruptcy-related case. Judge Boyce expressly dealt with the 22 23 bankruptcy context. It is also not a case from the district. And neither is the Graco case, which Mr. Normand cites, which 24 is an attorney disqualification case. And, yes, there was 25

privilege issues involved in the case. What was not at issue in the case were questions whether the passage of certain documents constituted a waiver of privileges to those documents.

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Moreover, the Graco case, which SCO cites, is distinguished by one of their other cases, the Pilates case, a case cited by SCO which rejects the finding of privilege in that case.

Mr. Normand refers to the Grand Jury case cited by IBM and suggests that we mis-cite that case, Your Honor, because we omitted words "without more" from the footnote and suggests that somehow that language support SCO's position.

I would refer Your Honor to that portion of the Grand Jury case and to the immediately proceeding sentence, which is omitted form the SCO cite. The footnote says:

A transfer of assets without more is not sufficient to effect a transfer of the privileges. Control of the entity possessing the privileges must also pass for the privilege to pass.

The "without more," Your Honor, if it has any meaning is that meaning which is informed by the immediate preceding sentence where reference is made to the Supreme Court's decision in Weintraub. And there the Court of the Grand Jury says, quote:

The principal in Weintraub, therefore, is that

emotional waiving a corporation's privileges is an incident of control of the corporation, close guote.

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So the "without more" reference as we read that language is the reference to the issue of there being a passage about this plus control. And that, therefore, we think doesn't support the distinction that SCO seeks there to make.

9 Mr. Normand makes reference as a factual matter to 10 Exhibit 1.1A of the Novell asset purchase agreement. 11 Exhibit 1.1A is subject to 1.1B, which is that exhibit which 12 expressly carves out what things which do not pass. And 13 again, 95 percent of the revenue stream from Novell did not 14 pass in that transaction.

The SCO position here, Your Honor, is the 15 equivalent of saying that the privilege necessarily attaches 16 17 to assets. And that whenever an asset is passed, the privilege attaches to that. And if you look at their 18 opposition papers at Page 8, you'll see where they make 19 reference to the privilege that passes to what they call legal 20 and economic interests. The Supreme Court decision in 21 22 Weintraub, in cases repeatedly, Your Honor, have held that the privilege attaches to, in a corporate context, to the 23 corporation, not to the corporation's economic interests or 24 assets. 25

And for that reason we think also, Your Honor, 1 based solely on Judge Boyce's decision and solely on the 2 simple legal question on whether the privilege passes, Your 3 Honor can and should find for IBM. Thank you. 4 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Marriott. 5 Anything further, Mr. Normand? 6 7 MR. NORMAND: Just to clarify one point, Your In the interest of time, we've set forth both of our Honor. 8 arguments in our briefs and my initial presentation. If I 9 wasn't clear as to the Tarantella transaction, I wanted to 10 11 clarify that. The Tarantella division was a completely different 12 division from the Unix division that was transferred. And the 13 name Tarantella was retained to reflect the fact that that 14 15 different business was now the focus of the newly named 16 Tarantella business. That was the 90 percent of the assets 17 transferred in that transaction were the Unix assets. The approximately 10 percent that were retained had nothing to do 18 with Unix, and I don't think IBM argues otherwise. And I'm 19 sorry if I was unclear on that point. 20 Thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 23 I'm prepared to rule on this matter at this time. First, I find that the Novell to Santa Cruz 24 transaction did not transfer the entirety of the business, nor 25

did the Santa Cruz to Caldera transaction. I further find 1 that the Broderick affidavit is insufficient in and of itself 2 as well as is contrary to statements made during the course of 3 Mr. Broderick's deposition; and that, therefore, SCO does not 4 5 carry its burden, then adopt the reasoning that was stated by Judge Boyce at the time of the Caldera matter and would 6 deny -- or grant IBM's motion to produce those documents. Ι 7 believe that the privilege was waived. 8 All right. Is there any question about that? 9 Anybody have any questions or clarifications as to that 10 11 portion of the ruling? MR. MARRIOTT: I do not, Your Honor. 12 MR. NORMAND: I do not, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: All right. Let's go on to the second 14 motion, and that relates to SCO's renewed motion to compel 15 discovery. 16 Now, let me indicate something at the beginning 17 that I think may serve or I hope will serve to focus your 18 arguments. SCO's interpretation of my previous order in this 19 matter was correct, and I think that IBM has read perhaps that 20 order too narrowly. And it was my intention that SCO be 21 allowed to withdraw the motion that was pending at the time 22 related to the documents that were requested from IBM's upper 23 management and to refile that motion or renew it based upon 24 what had been delivered to them in the interim. 25

1 So I don't think we need to argue about the meaning of the order. What we need to talk about now is what it is 2 that is requested and what is allowable. All right? 3 MR. NORMAND: Thank you, Your Honor. For my own 4 purposes, you were clarifying your October order from this 5 year; is that right? 6 THE COURT: That's correct. 7 MR. NORMAND: In which case, Your Honor, I'm going 8 9 to focus on the March 2004 order. 10 Frankly, Your Honor, we've walked through the precise chronology that was relevant in our reply brief, and 11 that reply brief sets forth our efforts to take a step back to 12 walk the Court through how we think we got to where we are, 13 and it sets forth our principal arguments. And to the extent 14 that the argument carries any weight with Your Honor, I want 15 to go quickly through the highlights. 16 Our motion concerns what we interpret to be what 17 Your Honor intended in the March 2004 order. Because Your 18 Honor knows what it intended better than either of the parties 19 do, I won't focus on that. Let me describe this. 20 In February of 2004, it is SCO's position that 21 counsel for SCO raised the argument that included within the 22 scope of SCO's document requests ought to be IBM's senior 23 executives. We interpret the Court's March 2004 order to 24 agree with that proposition, to state that IBM is to include 25

among the documents responsive to SCO's document requests, which IBM itself has described as broad relating to Linux, that IBM ought to include in the files that are responsive to those document requests the files of the senior executives. We interpret the Court's March 2004 order to set forth as an example documents that would bear on IBM's decision to embrace Linux as set forth in a particular *New York Times* article. And I think that's the point of departure between IBM and ourselves.

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We understand IBM to interpret the March 2004 to say, senior executives like Paul Palmisano and Mr. Wladawsky-Berger should produce any documents from their file that specifically relate to that decision in time to embrace Linux or specifically relate to that decision as set forth in the article that Your Honor cited in the March 2004 order.

Again, we think Your Honor meant something a little bit broader, which is, any document requests that SCO has served as to which documents in the files of Palmisano, Wladawsky-Berger or any other senior executive that are responsive, those are to be produced, as well.

THE COURT: Let me end this concern now. SCO'sinterpretation of that is correct.

24 MR. NORMAND: In which case, Your Honor, the only 25 question is a bit of a metaphysical one, which is, we can't

1 know, we don't know and don't claim to know whether Mr. Palmisano has X-number of e-mails or X-number of documents 2 3 that are in his files that are responsive. But we draw what we think are reasonable inferences from the following pieces 5 of information. One, we have found an e-mail publicly 6 available from Mr. Palmisano in which he described to IBM's employees IBM's decision to move towards Linux. And that 7 e-mail was not in the production and from what we can tell is 8 not listed as part of the six or seven Palmisano documents 9 10 over which IBM claims a privilege. In contrast, Your Honor, as an aside, we've produced over 3,000 e-mails in which 11 Mr. McBride, SCO's CEO, is the recipient or sender. So we 12 infer from the fact that we did find an e-mail linked to Linux 13 in Mr. Palmisano's e-mail files that there must be more. 14

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Mr. Wladawsky-Berger said in his deposition, yes, I 15 16 have sent and received e-mails regarding Linux, and I believe 17 he said regarding Mr. Palmisano, in particular. And Steven Mills, another IBM senior executive and vice-president, 18 also said, I sent and received e-mails regarding Linux, and I 19 received e-mails from Mr. Palmisano. 20

And so for all of those reasons and just as a 21 22 practical business matter, given that Linux is a multi-million dollar business and IBM's investment business is 23 multi-million dollar, we infer that there must be more 24 responsive documents. 25

As a last thought, Your Honor, Your Honor addressed this issue last year. We interpreted Your Honor's order last year to require senior executives at issue and IBM's board of directors to offer us an explanation for why there was an absence of documents in the production. That's how we interpreted Your Honor's order.

THE COURT: Weren't there affidavits provided?

MR. NORMAND: They were. And I don't want to focus 8 on the issue at length, but they were fairly cursory, and they 9 10 said essentially, we've opened our files to the attorneys, which is not an improper practice. That is how production 11 12 occurs. But my only point is those affidavits provided us no more basis for arguing that there must be or must not be 13 14 responsive documents. So in the absence of any discussion to that effect in those documents, I can see that all we can say 15 is we infer that there must be more responsive documents.

THE COURT: But based upon my clarification, doesn't that change the posture? And we'll ask Mr. Marriott to address that.

20 MR. NORMAND: I agree, Your Honor. It does change. And perhaps I was unclear. Perhaps I also assumed something I 21 shouldn't. But I think what Mr. Marriott should be asked to 22 address is whether there are more responsive documents, given 23 Your Honor's clarification. 24

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THE COURT: We're saying the same thing.

MR. NORMAND: Thank you, Your Honor.

2 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Actually I'll be addressing this 3 motion.

THE COURT: Mr. Shaughnessy?

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MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Your Honor, very briefly, the shortest, simplest response to this motion is that we can't produce something that we can't find. Now, when Your Honor talked about your March 2004 order, what I understood you to be saying, what we have always understood you to be saying in that order is that we are to include in our search for the documents that SCO requested from us IBM's executives.

We've done that. That's exactly what we've done. We did that long ago. We understood that's what the order required, and that's the reason that we did it.

Now, what I understand SCO to be arguing today is 15 actually different than that. What I understand SCO to be 16 arguing today is that the March 4th order required something 17 beyond that, that the March 4th order required us to produce 18 documents that SCO had never requested. We did not read the 19 20 March 4th order as requiring us to produce something that SCO had never asked for. And yet, I think at the end of the day, 21 22 that's what SCO's position is.

We have, Your Honor, undertaken a reasonable search for documents. We have produced all of the documents that we were able to identify based on that reasonable search. We

1 have been asked by SCO to update that search. We have 2 likewise asked SCO to update that search. We expect that that 3 process will yield additional documents which will be 4 produced, and those will be produced consistent with when SCO 5 is required to produce. But the bottom line is, Your Honor, we have undertaken a reasonable search. We have endeavored to 6 locate those documents. 7 THE COURT: Did you attempt to locate the entirety 8 of the documents or the documents that SCO believes you 9 10 limited your search to? MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Let me -- maybe I can address it 11 12 this way, Your Honor. May I approach? THE COURT: Sure. 13 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: This is a notebook I think along 14 the lines of what we handed out at the last hearing. And the 15 16 easiest thing to do I think is kind of walk through what we're talking about. Maybe before I do that, I ought to just make 17 18 clear exactly what it is before the Court. We are talking 19 about documents from three custodians: Sam Palmisano, Irving 20 Wladawsky-Berger, IBM's board of directors. 21 THE COURT: Correct. 22 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: There are various suggestions in 23 the briefs about senior executives and executives involved in the Linux. But as we understand the motion before the Court, 24 it's limited to documents from those three custodians. 25 And

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just a word about each of them.

Mr. Wladawsky-Berger is an executive of IBM in the 1999-2000 time frame. He had some responsibility for Linux activities. He has since moved on to a new position in the company in which he does not have Linux responsibilities.

We submitted a declaration in response to the Court's request regarding Mr. Wladawsky-Berger's efforts to locate documents responsive to the document request. Mr. Wladawsky-Berger was deposed at length about documents that have been produced. He was deposed at length about e-mails and other documents in which he was copied. And there was no discussion by SCO at that time that the production from him was inadequate. At least there was no follow-up after that deposition to suggest the production was inadequate.

The second individual is Sam Palmisano. He is currently the chief executive officer and chairman of the board of IBM. In the 1999-2000 time frame, he was ahead of IBM Software Group. He has changed positions, as I understand it, two times since that occurred.

20 And the last group that we're talking about is 21 IBM's board, and just a word about IBM's board. As I'm sure 22 the Court is aware, IBM's board is composed of individuals largely with the exception of one who don't work for IBM. 23 These are people who are, for example, the chairman and CEO of 24 25 American Express and the chairman and CEO of United Parcel

Service. These people have day jobs. They don't full-time sit on IBM's board and do nothing else.

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IBM has a file or has a series of files in which we maintain copies of the materials that are provided to the Those are the sets of files that we searched. We did board. not search the files of American Express, and we did not search the files of UPS, and we did not go to these individual board members' homes and search their computers, nor do we believe that we should in any event be required to do that.

10 Mr. Bonzani in his declaration outlined the efforts to search those files and locate documents. And, you know, 11 one other word I ought to mention on the board, SCO keeps 12 talking about how implausible it is to them that there would 13 14 be so few documents from IBM's board. And I simply don't understand that position. I mean, SCO has not identified any 15 transactions relating to IBM's Unix business that would have 17 required board approval or any particular issue that would have out of necessity have gone to IBM's board. So, therefore, it is not the least bit surprising that IBM's board would not have tremendous volume of information relating to Linux activities.

Getting back to Your Honor's question, what did we 22 look for? In the very first brief that was filed on this 23 24 motion, SCO identified four document requests, and only four 25 document requests, that it contends that IBM should have

searched for in producing these documents. And on the first page of the handout I've just given to you, those are the requests that SCO identified. Requests 35 and 42 from their June 24th, 2003, document requests, and 56 and 53 from their December 4, 2003, document requests. These according to SCO are the operating document requests which we should have reviewed and looked at in collecting documents from these three custodians.

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Now, request Numbers 35 to 42 asks for documents concerning contributions for Linux or open source made by IBM or Sequent, and documents concerning IBM's contribution to development of the 2.4 and 2.5 Linux Kernel.

None of the custodians, Your Honor, that we were 13 14 talking about here are computer programmers. None of the custodians we're talking about here supervised or even supervised supervisors of people who make Linux contributions. It should come as no surprise to the Court or to SCO that 17 Mr. Palmisano's files don't have postings to source force which contain Linux contributions. Having said that, if there were Linux contributions or documents relating to Linux contributions that were in the filings that we collected, we produced them.

23 The second document request they point to, all 24 business plans for Linux. IBM has business plans for Linux. 25 Those are not documents that any of these three custodians

maintain. They were maintained by someone else within the company. We went to that person. We made a reasonable search for IBM's Linux business plans, and we produced those documents. To the extent there were Linux business plans in any of these three custodian files, we produced them. We collected them, and we produced them.

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And finally, Your Honor, they're left with request 7 Number 53, and this really is the only request that 8 9 specifically targeted any of these three custodians. And it 10 asks for documents concerning IBM's decision to adopt, embrace 11 or otherwise promote Linux, including but not limited to the following, and then it identifies documents in the possession 12 13 of Mr. Palmisano, Mr. Wladawsky-Berger and others, presentations made to the board and documents from the board 14 15 of directors meetings.

Those are the document requests, the documents that SCO asked us to look for. Those are the documents, Your Honor, that we looked for. And to the extent we found documents that were responsive to those requests, we produced those documents.

Now, it's important to note that request Number 53 pertains to IBM's decision to adopt, embrace or otherwise promote Linux. As has been widely reported, including in the *New York Times* article that Your Honor is familiar with, that decision was made in the 1999-2000 time frame. Documents

relating to that would be in the 1999-2000 time frame. Those are the documents in specific that we looked for. If there happen to be documents later than that that were responsive to this topic, we searched for them and we endeavored to produce them.

Now, I don't think that there is a disagreement, and I apologize if the Court misunderstood our brief. We understood that SCO was to do what it has done, which is that it was to withdraw its motion and it was to refile its motion if it determined that it was necessary. And I don't mean to suggest that SCO has done anything improper in that regard.

Likewise, we assumed that the Court's March 3, 12 2004, order, which is Page 3 of the document that you've got 13 in front of us, was intended, as I said earlier, to make sure 14 15 that IBM was not excluding from its search senior executives, including Mr. Palmisano and Mr. Wladawsky-Berger, which we 16 were not doing, but which the Court made clear we should not 17 be doing. We did not understand that the Court's March 3, 18 2004, order was an effort by the Court to write a discovery 19 20 request for SCO. We did not mean -- in litigation normally, 21 the parties send their discovery requests to one and another. 22 And when there is a fight about them, the judge decides how to rule. Normally the judge doesn't endeavor to write a document 23 request for one of the parties. 24

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We did not understand Your Honor to have done that

here. We don't believe the Court did that here, and yet that's really what SCO's argument is. I mean, it's telling Your Honor that there's a reference in the very, very first brief filed in connection, we're now on our third motion to compel on this issue. But the opening brief that they filed on the first renewed motion to compel way back in July of 2004, that's where we have an articulation by SCO, here are the documents, here are the document requests that we served and the ones you should have responded to.

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Since that time and through the two successive motions that have followed, we have heard nothing about those document requests and what it was they said we should have responded to. Instead, all we've heard about is the Court's various orders, efforts by SCO to suggest that this Court was endeavoring somehow to require IBM to produce documents that the Court -- that SCO never requested that we provide.

17 Now, to ensure that there was no doubt about what 18 it was that we were required to do with respect to the 19 March 3, 2004, order, and so that it was perfectly clear to 20 SCO what we were doing with respect to that order, we sent them letters. And copies of those letters are included in the 21 binder I've just given you at Tab B. And I won't read through 22 23 them, except to say this. We made it perfectly clear that what we were doing and what we understood we were required to 24 25 do was to do a reasonable search of these executives' files

for documents concerning the projects to develop IBM's Linux strategy as reported in the *New York Times*, consistent with the Court's order, consistent with document request Number 53, which we just talked about.

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We also made it perfectly clear to them that we were not limiting our search to just that, that we were also looking for and would produce documents that were responsive to SCO's other document requests. We never, Your Honor, said that we would look for every single document that may contained the word "Linux." We never agreed that we would look for every single document in the files that contains the word "Linux" for at least three basic reasons. Number one, SCO's never made that request and never even came close to making that request; number two, the Court, as we understood the Court's order, did not require us to do that; and number three, it would be a ridiculous undertaking.

What SCO is suggesting we are obligated to do is sit down and with Mr. Palmisano's files, presumably starting in his file cabinet at A, and read the entire content of every single piece of paper in every single file looking for the word "Linux." And if the word "Linux" appears, we have to produce the document. That, Your Honor, is absurd. That is not a reasonable search for documents.

24 THE COURT: Mr. Shaughnessy, going back, though, to 25 your statement that they never have requested this or that

extensive of search, looking at 53:

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All documents concerning IBM's decision to adopt, embrace or otherwise promote Linux including but not limited to the following, all such documents in the possession of the three entities.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: That's correct. And let me make clear what I'm saying, Your Honor. What we understood we were required to do was to search for and produce, make a reasonable search and produce, documents concerning IBM's decision to adopt, embrace or otherwise promote Linux, including but not limited to reading that entire paragraph.

12 That's the search that we undertook. That's the 13 very search that we undertook. What they're asking this Court 14 to do now in connection with this current motion is something 15 very different than this. What they're asking the Court to do 16 now in connection with this current motion is to go back to 17 these files and to read every single one and to produce every 18 single document that may have the word "Linux" in it.

19THE COURT: All right. But what you're saying is20that is their request. Now, that is a fairly broad request.

21 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: It's an enormously broad request,22 I think.

THE COURT: Yes, it is a broad request. And it was, as I want to make clear, my intention that the order was meant to encompass that request. I thought that that was

clear. And I believe that their interpretation, and yours is not that far off, is what I'm getting at. If, in fact, you are saying and your affidavits support a search of the broad nature that you have just described it, then I'm going to hear more from SCO as to what they think was not produced.

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MR. SHAUGHNESSY: And that, Your Honor, is the search we undertook. That's precisely the search we undertook. A reasonable search. We did not, Your Honor, sit down, nor I submit did SCO, I mean, if Mr. Normand stands up and tells you otherwise, I'll be shocked. But I can't imagine that SCO sat down in Mr. McBride's files and sat down with A and read every single piece of paper in every single file that Mr. McBride has to produce documents. That's not the way it's done. I'm absolutely confident that's not the way that SCO did it. That's not the way we do it, and that's not what the rules require. What the rules require you to do is make a reasonable search.

You may recall Mr. Singer at the last hearing we 18 had before Your Honor, Mr. Singer's view was that a reasonable 19 search for documents means send somebody an e-mail and tell 20 them to send the documents. That's not what we did. We don't 21 22 think that's a reasonable search. Certainly that's a far extreme of a reasonable search. That's not what we did. We 23 detailed in these affidavits that IBM attorneys met with the 24 25 people involved, they explained to them what documents were

required to be produced, anything that might remotely fall within those categories was copied. And then IBM's lawyers sat down and reviewed all of the documents that were copied to determine if they were responsive to these requests within the scope of what Your Honor just said.

THE COURT: Let me ask what may appear to be a simplistic question. But the 10-page report, that has been produced.

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MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Absolutely. I'm actually told 9 10 it's not a 10-page report. I'm told it's something other than 10 pages. The report has been produced. The documents 11 concerning that report has been produced. The e-mails that 12 were exchanged between the various parties relating to that 13 report has been produced. Anything that we have been able to 14 15 locate after a reasonable search relating to that 10-page report have been produced. 16

Now, SCO filed its first renewed motion in July of 17 2004, as Your Honor will recall. And in its reply brief filed 18 on August 26th of 2004, SCO asked for two alternative reliefs. 19 20 They said, number one, the Court should order IBM to, quote, 21 produce the entire files of Sam Palmisano, Irving Wladawsky-Berger and the board, close quote; or alternative, 22 two, require IBM to provide affidavits from Mr. Palmisano, 23 Mr. Wladawsky-Berger and the board. So they served up to Your 24 25 Honor an alternative, require them to produce their entire

files, or alternatively require IBM to provide affidavits.

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Your Honor's October 20th, 2004, order, which I've included in the notebook at Tab F, I've cited it all on page 5, declined to require IBM to produce the entire files of Mr. Palmisano, Mr. Wladawsky-Berger and the board and instead require IBM to submit declarations.

We submitted declarations. From our point of view, we thought that the issue was resolved. We thought the issue was over. SCO, however, filed its second renewed motion to compel in December of 2004. And in that motion, Your Honor, they make the exact same arguments they made in the first motion. They say they just simply can't believe that there aren't more documents and that IBM's counsel must not be candid with the Court or with counsel. The arguments are the same. And, Your Honor, effectively the relief they seek is exactly the same as the first motion.

In the prior motion, they asked the Court to order 17 the production of the entire files of these individuals, and 18 in the current motion they effectively ask for the same thing. 19 They style it a little differently, but they say, we want all 20 documents with the word "Linux." Of course, to get to all 21 documents that contain the word "Linux" you have to look under 22 the entire files. Under SCO's interpretation, someone has to 23 sit down and read every single document and every single file 24 and search for the word "Linux." And if it appears, produce 25

it. So the relief they're requesting in connection with the second renewed motion, which was withdrawn and is now the third renewed motion that you have before you, is exactly the same as the relief that they sought before.

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It is notable, Your Honor, that they did not pick up on what the Court said in the first order, which is, I'm not going to require IBM to produce the entire files. I'm going to require IBM to submit declarations.

9 I could perhaps understand this motion if this 10 motion were, we don't like the declarations that IBM 11 submitted. The declarations that IBM submitted are in some 12 fashion inadequate.

THE COURT: I thought they said that.

They have. But that's not the 14 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: relief they're asking. They're not asking you to require us 15 to submit new or different affidavits or declarations. 16 I submit that would be a useless exercise because they've 17 already deposed Wladawsky-Berger. There's no need to submit 18 another declaration from him. They've had an opportunity to 19 ask their questions under oath about his declaration and 20 21 about the documents that were produced. They're going to depose Mr. Palmisano. They can do the same thing with 22 Mr. Palmisano. And we've agreed to make a 30(b)6 witness 23 24 available to testify with respect to the collections of the 25 documents from the board.

So there's -- I mean, there's a reason they haven't asked for additional affidavits, because they know there's no point in that. But what they've done instead, Your Honor, is they have basically asked for the same thing they had asked before which Your Honor in the October 20th, 2004, order declined to give them. It's the same issue. We submit -- and according to SCO, nothing has changed. According to the papers that SCO has filed, nothing has changed since that point in time. There's nothing new that's happened.

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10 So effectively, what they're asking Your Honor to do is to reconsider your October 20th, 2004, order and to 11 require us to do something that the Court declined to require 12 13 us to do in that order. We don't think that's proper. They 14 have not shown there's been a change in circumstances. They have not shown that the Court's prior order was clearly 15 erroneous, and the Court should deny this motion on that basis 17 alone.

18 Now, I have to say a brief word, Your Honor, about 19 e-mails because they occupy so much of the briefing. We made 20 a reasonable search for e-mails. To the extent that we've 21 been able to locate them, we've produced them. The examples that Mr. Normand mentioned earlier and the examples that are 22 cited in the briefs are examples of the e-mails that would 23 24 have been sent in the 1999-2000 time frame. Those are the examples of the e-mails they've given to you, which they can't 25

understand why they are not in Mr. Wladawsky-Berger's or Mr. Palmisano's files.

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That was three years before this lawsuit was filed. Those individuals have changed jobs within the company, sometimes multiple times. It is hardly surprising that Mr. Palmisano and Mr. Wladawsky-Berger would not have e-mails or certainly a large volume of e-mails going back to this period.

More important, Your Honor, we have produced 9 numerous e-mails either to or from Mr. Palmisano or 10 Mr. Wladawsky-Berger. In the case of Mr. Palmisano, we 11 produced over 100 e-mails that were either to Mr. Palmisano or 12 13 from Mr. Palmisano. Now, those are e-mails that were produced 14 from someone's files, but they show Mr. Palmisano of someone 15 who either sent the e-mail or received the e-mail, and there are well over 100 of those. 16

So the question is, why would this person have the e-mail in his files but Mr. Palmisano not? And there are any number of reasonable explanations for that, the most basic of which is this person kept it and Mr. Palmisano didn't, or Mr. Palmisano sent the e-mail, therefore, it left his computer and it went to this person's e-mail box, and therefore, they kept it.

This, of course, should come to absolutely no
surprise to SCO. We have found in SCO's production literally

dozens and dozens of e-mails that were either to or from Mr. McBride that do not appear in his files. Other employees have copies of e-mails either to or from Mr. McBride. They're not in Mr. McBride's files. Presumably, if the shoe were on the other foot, SCO would be standing up here making the exact same argument I'm making to you, which is it is hardly surprising that one person would have an e-mail in their file and the other would not.

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Now, I'd like to suggest to the Court that the 9 solution to this problem that SCO has presented, which really 10 isn't a problem, is that SCO should do what lawyers in these 11 circumstances normally do, and that is you take a deposition. 12 You ask for documents. You try to get documents. If someone 13 14 is ordered to produce documents and they tell you they've produced them and we've assured them that we've produced them 15 16 or we will produce them in connection with their request for 17 supplementing, what a lawyer normally does in those circumstances is you go out and you take a deposition, and you 18 test, well, did you, in fact, produce all of this person's --19 all of these persons' e-mails or all of this person's 20 documents? 21

SCO has an opportunity to do that. That's what SCO has done in the case of Mr. Wladawsky-Berger. They deposed him. They asked him about his documents. They've asked him about e-mails. Tellingly, Your Honor, we did not get a letter

from SCO after his deposition saying, you know, he's identified a whole bunch of documents that you guys didn't produce to us, and we'd like them.

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They have leave to take Mr. Palmisano's deposition. They're welcome to ask him these asks. As I indicated earlier, we've agreed to put up a witness on the issue of the collection of documents from IBM's board. I respectfully submit, Your Honor, that what the Court should do is permit those depositions to take place and then determine if there is any issue regarding any deficiency in IBM's production of documents from these individuals.

12 If the Court does anything other than that, I fear, reasonably I believe that we will have a fourth renewed motion 13 to compel and a fifth renewed motion to compel and a sixth 14 renewed motion to compel and so on. The Court should simply 15 let SCO do what the rules contemplate SCO doing, and that is 16 17 take a deposition. Test the strength of my representations 18 that we produced these documents. If you find that something hasn't been produced, write a letter about it. 19

The best example of this, Your Honor, is again this very case. We had some doubts and reservations about whether SCO had produced all of the documents from Mr. McBride's files. We communicated those to SCO. They assured us that they had produced the documents. We took them at their word, and we took Mr. McBride's deposition.

During Mr. McBride's deposition, we find that there are potentially dozens of e-mails between Mr. McBride and Microsoft that have not been produced despite having been specifically requested. So after his deposition, we write a letter to counsel and we say, we want those documents.

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And I'm not accusing counsel of being -- of bad faith or engaging in bad faith in connection to not producing those documents, but that's the way it normally works. Normally if you don't think somebody has produced all of the documents, you take a deposition, and during that deposition you find out that, in fact, the documents haven't been produced, you send a letter.

And if they send us a letter after these depositions that indicates that we have not produced all the documents or that there other places that we haven't searched, we'll do that. That's our obligation, Your Honor, and we'll do that.

But as I say, if the Court does anything other than stop this motion in its tracks now, I fear that it will never end. Thank you, Your Honor.

> THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shaughnessy. Mr. Normand?

23 MR. NORMAND: Thank you, Your Honor. If we were at 24 war with IBM, I think you would call what Mr. Shaughnessy just 25 did is strafing, including taking issue with competence of

counsel and not having requested what he thinks is the obvious 1 solution of his problem. 2 3 THE COURT: I didn't take it that way. MR. NORMAND: Let me take a step back and try to 4 simplify this, because I think it's simpler than what 5 Mr. Shaughnessy has presented it as. 6 We served document requests, including requests 7 that Mr. Shaughnessy has pointed to. In 2003, one was: 8 All documents concerning any contributions to 9 10 Linux. No technological limitation. No technical 11 limitation. No limitation in terms of being limited to 12 programmers, it being limited to people who actually made 13 contributions. All documents concerning contributions to 14 Linux. IBM objected on the grounds that it was overly broad. 15 Now they come to the Court and say it's actually guite narrow. 16 The second request is request Number 53, which by 17 the way not only mentioned Mr. Palmisano or 18 19 Mr. Wladawsky-Berger, but two other IBM senior executives. Specifically: 20 All documents concerning IBM's decision to 21 adopt, embrace or otherwise promote Linux. 22 23 IBM objected on the grounds that it was overly Now they argue that it's much narrowly. 24 broad. Let me step back further. This motion has been 25

pending in one form or another, as Mr. Shaughnessy concedes, for I think over 20 months. The notion that we haven't pursued these documents diligently or sought to get them is not well taken. And during the course of the pending 20 months, we have taken depositions, and we have taken discovery that we think deal directly on our request for relief. Mr. Wladawsky-Berger conceded that there were e-mails to himself and Mr. Palmisano relating to Linux. Mr. Mills said the same thing. We have not yet deposed Mr. Palmisano, but he's scheduled to be deposed on January 11th, and we would like any responsive documents that exist for purposes of the deposition rather than trying to identify the documents during the deposition and then having to come back to the Court and say, we need Mr. Palmisano for more time now that we have responsive documents.

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16 Your Honor has interpreted Mr. Shaughnessy to say 17 that, you know, we should have taken the deposition first. 18 Then I think we're all in agreement that it's reasonable for us to try to get the documents first and then take the 19 deposition. We didn't do that with Mr. Wladawsky-Berger 20 21 because at the time we took his deposition, we thought we were up against the discovery deadline. That's why we took his 22 deposition when we did. Of course, it would have been 23 preferable and I think reasonable to take his deposition with 24 25 relevant documents in hand.

During the course of the discovery during that 20 months what we learned is the public documents suggest Mr. Palmisano and Mr. Wladawsky-Berger oversee and made the decision to implement a multi-billion dollar Linux-related business, a business that IBM has said publicly, we're making billions.

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Now, it's hard to believe that given the scope of the business, whether a formal or informal level the board the directors hasn't been exposed to the decision, hasn't had any say in the decision, hasn't been exposed to the documents relating to the decision. And it's hard to believe that given what I think IBM concedes is its obligation if there are e-mails relating to the litigation and relating to Linux beginning at least in March 2003 that there are not more responsive documents that exist.

THE COURT: Aren't you engaging in -- you've indicated that they've questioned the competency of counsel, for lack of a better term, for not doing something. Aren't you doing the same thing by supposing or presuming that there has to be more when they told you there isn't?

MR. NORMAND: Yeah. I understand Your Honor's concern. One thing we've been very careful never to do in our briefing, and if I've suggested it, I do not mean to suggest it, is take issue with counsel's good faith execution of their interpretation of the document process. Where we impart is

their interpretation of the document requests. I don't doubt that they think they have found all of the responsive documents as they interpret the request. But I think they originally interpret the request to be very broad, and now they interpret them to much narrower.

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THE COURT: Then why wouldn't the alternative suggested by Mr. Shaughnessy be an effective one, where you go and you depose Mr. Palmisano and you make a determination as to whether or not there are or exist documents that have not been produced to you? Isn't it ultimately or potentially easier to set another deposition date for him than for us to continue on in the kind of ever turning wheel that we've got ourselves on here?

MR. NORMAND: I don't think that's unreasonable. 14 But I think I have two main points that I would like to make 15 16 in that regard, Your Honor. First is with respect to e-mails, 17 I think Mr. Shaughnessy is overstating the difficulty of the search. He challenged, I suppose, myself to come up and 18 explain how we've done searches. One thing we've done with 19 20 e-mails, which is electronically searchable, is use keywords. So Unix, Linux, those are keywords that we put in. If an 21 22 e-mail came up including the word "Linux" or "Unix," we looked at the e-mail. 23

24 THE COURT: But do you dispute what was stated
25 during Mr. McBride's deposition that there were identified a

1 number of e-mails that referred to Linux, but didn't exist in his file? 2 MR. NORMAND: I don't dispute that. 3 THE COURT: All right. Then the keyword search 4 isn't necessarily the answer here, is it? 5 MR. NORMAND: Well, it may not be the complete 6 It is the first of two points I wanted to make. answer. 7 But what I understand Mr. Shaughnessy to say is even with respect 8 9 to e-mails, at least in the case of SCO that are 10 electronically searchable, they have not undertaken to look for the word "Linux" in their e-mails, whether it's 11 Mr. Palmisano's files or anyone who received an e-mail from 12 Mr. Palmisano's files. They have not taken and looked for 13 that word and then looked at the e-mail and then decide 14 whether it was relevant, which actually is the way we did our 15 16 production. 17 The second point, Your Honor, if we can agree that we would get Mr. Palmisano back, that there wouldn't be a 18 19 problem of getting him back technically after the end of our 20 fact discovery period. 21 THE COURT: I can help with that. MR. NORMAND: I understand that, and I appreciate 22 23 that. And that the subsequent deposition wouldn't count as a 24 second day because we face a limit of 50 depositions, I don't

think that's an unreasonable approach.

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But my main argument is I think there are ways to execute the search that we propose. And to be clear, the reason we propose a search involving the word "Linux," because, one, we thought it was easily electronically searchable. Typically what a corporation in the position of IBM or SCO will do is load up a lot of documents so that they can search for the responsive ones.

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If it is truly a burden as Mr. Shaughnessy said 8 because apart from e-mails it can't be electronically 9 searched, then I agreement we have a different issue. And 10 11 maybe the Palmisano approach and the other senior executives 12 is the appropriate approach. But it is not just Mr. Palmisano. We also mentioned in our request Mr. Paul 13 Horn, Mr. Bowen. We didn't intend to depose them. If we 14 15 could depose them to determine that there are relevant documents and not have the depositions count against the 50, 16 17 that's the another thing. But we don't want to over reach. 18 Then we take three depositions and argue they don't even count as depositions and we've done that in lieu of a document 19 20 production that we think could be done in a pretty straight-forward fashion. 21

The relief that we requested was documents related to Linux because, frankly, we don't understand exactly how IBM has implemented its search of documents as it has interpreted the Court's order and our request. We thought the simplest

thing was just if it's related to Linux, IBM ought to look at it, and it is almost --

THE COURT: But, Mr. Normand, I think I said at the beginning of this litigation that I take what counsel says at face value, and I assume good faith. Now --

MR. NORMAND: I agree.

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THE COURT: -- it's been stated once again that the reasonable search has been conducted, and they produced what is there. There's also indication that you have undertaken a reasonable search that may have come up a little short in some respects that wasn't discovered until Mr. McBride was deposed.

So I guess I'm asking you, tell me why I shouldn't adopt the approach as suggested to take this matter under advisement until such time as you have conducted the depositions to determine if an additional deposition day is necessary and there exist documents that have not been provided despite the good faith statements on both sides that they have.

MR. NORMAND: Very good, Your Honor.

Two points in response. One is, I think what you proposed is reasonable, with the caveat that what we would want to do is depose, not only Mr. Palmisano for the purpose of trying to identify documents, but Mr. Wladawsky-Berger, whom we've already deposed, also Mr. Horn, also Mr. Bowen. Do we need to depose a number of the board of directors, or do

need to depose a custodian of the board of directors to talk to him about responsive documents?

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I'm concerned that as to Mr. Palmisano what Your 3 4 Honor proposes is very reasonable, but what we would want to 5 do, especially because I think Your Honor has established 6 today that IBM interpreted your March order more narrowly than you intended, given my understanding that that is Your Honor's 7 conclusion, given that what we would want at least do is 8 depose all of those people that I just identified, and we 9 would not want them to count as depositions. And against all 10 of this, we've been concerned that we not be accused by IBM of 11 trying to move back the discovery deadline. We're trying 12 earnestly to meet this late January deadline. 13

With all of those caveats, if Your Honor would agree that we can depose those individual in order to identify responsive documents and that it wouldn't be problem to come back to them after January 27th if necessary, then I don't disagree with Your Honor's proposal. I think that would be workable.

THE COURT: Mr. Normand, thank you.
MR. NORMAND: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Shaughnessy?
MR. SHAUGHNESSY: May I speak just briefly to that
issue, Your Honor?

I told you at the outset that we were dealing on

this motion with Mr. Palmisano, Mr. Wladawsky-Berger and the IBM board. That is all we've ever been talking about. Now Mr. Normand would like you to expand that to other individuals. If SCO wishes to depose those individuals, it can certainly depose those individuals. And I don't think, contrary to what Mr. Norman has said, that there is any disagreement between what we understood the March order to require and what the Court has said that it requires. I think we're on the same -- we are on the same sheet, that the standard that we've used in searching for documents. And I believe, Your Honor, that the simplest solution to the problem is to simply do what we on our side have done, and that is if we have questions or doubts about some witnesses, documents or whether they're complete, we asked them in their deposition, and we send a follow-up letter.

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16 And, Your Honor, if during Mr. Palmisano's deposition or some other witness' deposition SCO identifies 17 for us documents that we missed that are not privileged and 18 19 are not responsive, they send us a letter and we produce them. It's just that simple. That's what we do in litigation. Ι don't play games. If they send us a letter and they legitimately identify something, then we produce it.

They took Mr. Wladawsky-Berger's deposition. 23 They asked him about this very issue, and we got no such letter, no 24 indication from them that Mr. Wladawsky-Berger was in any way 25

inadequate or the documents produced from him are in any way inadequate.

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So I think what the Court should do, respectfully, 3 is deny the motion, allow the deposition to proceed, allow the 4 parties to do what we always do, which is provide documents. 5 And if there is a dispute, if there is a dispute about whether 6 a document wasn't produced and should have been produced, if 7 there's a dispute about whether a witness needs to be brought 8 back because a document was produced after their deposition, 9 that we deal with those disputes when they arise. Hopefully 10 we resolve them among counsel. If we don't, we ask for your 11 12 assistance.

> MR. NORMAND: Your Honor, could I speak briefly? THE COURT: Certainly.

MR. NORMAND: The proposal as Mr. Shaughnessy has just outlined it confirms that we still have a disagreement as to the scope of what IBM thought for the last two years they had to produce.

19THE COURT: I'm looking at the March 3rd, 2004,20order. It says:

21IBM is to include materials and documents22from executives including Sam Palmisano and23Irving Wladawsky-Berger.

24 MR. NORMAND: No one can pronounce it. 25 THE COURT: I certainly cannot. Those are the

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named individuals, Mr. Normand.

2 MR. NORMAND: I have two responses. One, Your Honor knows better than anyone your interpretation. 3 But you did say, including, meaning that it was a broad request, but 5 it ought to include the senior executives. The other one is Mr. Marriott said in October that he interpreted the 6 March 2004 order to mean that IBM was to include senior 7 executives in its search for documents responsive to our 9 requests. And one of our requests, request Number 53, clearly 10 identifies more than just Mr. Wladawsky-Berger and Mr. Palmisano. Your Honor knows better than I do. I think Your Honor mentioned Mr. Palmisano and Mr. Wladawsky-Berger because they were specifically mentioned during the February hearing.

15 But my point is, I fear that in his request that you deny our motion, Mr. Shaughnessy is glossing over the fact 16 that as I understood it, they have interpreted Your Honor's 17 order in our document requests more narrowly than Your Honor 18 interprets them, and that the plain language we request makes 19 clear that we intended them. 20

21 So I would be surprised if the net result of the discussion we've had today is that our motion should be 22 denied, because I think that there's been an interpretation of 23 24 the order and an interpretation of the request, and it's more 25 narrow than what they intended to be.

But with those caveats, Your Honor, I fall back to 1 the position about being willing to take these the 2 depositions. We think we are entitled to more than just 3 4 Mr. Palmisano and Mr. Wladawsky-Berger. And we would like 5 them not to count against the depositions again, the 50 that 6 we face. THE COURT: I'm going to take a short recess on 7 this matter. And if you will all just wait. 8 9 MR. NORMAND: Thank you, Your Honor. (Recess.) 10 THE COURT: Going back on the record now. 11 I first want to make a finding, and the finding 12 13 that I want to make is that IBM has acted in good faith in terms of its reasonable search for documents as they relate to 14 Mr. Palmisano and Mr. Wladawsky-Berger. I have looked back 15 16 over the notation from the February 6, 2004, hearing 17 transcript, wherein SCO's counsel said: We have had specific conversations with 18 Christine Arena at Cravath asking specifically for 19 20 Mr. Palmisano stuff, for Mr. Wladawsky-Berger, Paul Horn, Nick Bowen, those people's information. 21 That is followed by the March 3rd order in which I 22 say as follows: 23 IBM is to provide documents and materials 24 generated by and in possession of the employees 25

that have been and that are currently involved in the Linux project. IBM is to include materials and documents from executives including, inter alia, Sam Palmisano and Irving Wladawsky-Berger. Such materials and documents are to include any reports, materials or documents from IBM's ambitious Linux strategy.

Looking at those two, or the notation from the transcript and the order, I believe that the order should more have explicitly indicated that IBM undertake the search as to Paul Horn and Nick Bowen. And to the extent that those are still requested by SCO, they will be required.

Mr. Shaughnessy?

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MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Maybe I can help, Your Honor. We produced documents from both of those individuals.

16 THE COURT: All right. Have affidavits been 17 provided?

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: We have not provided affidavits.
THE COURT: All right. Then if they have been
provided, then you will be required to produce affidavits
indicating the nature of the reasonable search that has been
conducted with regard to those two.

With that having been said, I suppose that the conclusion is that SCO's motion is granted in part and denied in part in the respect that there will not be further

requirements beyond those individuals that are listed in the February 4th request.

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Now, we need to discuss dates here and also the status of other motions. Let's first look with regard to the other motions. There is a SCO motion to compel discovery which was filed on October the 27th. It appears to me that based upon Judge Kimball's ruling in that matter that that is moot now, Judge Kimball having upheld my initial ruling on that matter.

So does anyone disagree with that?

MR. NORMAND: No, Your Honor.

MR. MARRIOTT: No, Your Honor.

13 THE COURT: All right. And there is also a new 14 motion for protective order that was filed by SCO on 15 December the 14th, and we haven't received the response for 16 that yet.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: You haven't, Your Honor; although we have resolved, I believe, the issue. I prepared an order, which I've given to Mr. Normand. I can provide the order. I guess if he has a problem, he can advise The Court. I don't believe he does.

MR. NORMAND: Your Honor, we don't object to the order, with the caveat that I don't think the order suggests otherwise, with the caveat that we're not waiving any claims to work product being privileged with respect to the

responsive documents here. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: May I approach, Your Honor? 4 THE COURT: Sure. With regard to the motion to compel production of 5 the documents in the privileged log, how long will it take SCO 6 to respond to that? 7 MR. NORMAND: Well, there are four subpoenas 8 9 outstanding, Your Honor, one with respect to KB&G. We can 10 produce the documents today or tomorrow. 11 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: She's talking about the -- she's 12 not talking about the subpoenas. She's talking about the 13 production of the privilege log. 14 MR. NORMAND: I'm sorry. I jumped ahead. 15 THE COURT: That's okay. MR. NORMAND: I think there are 1,000 documents. I 16 would think within six or eight business days we can do that. 17 THE COURT: I don't have a calendar here. 18 Why don't we make that -- I don't have a calendar, and with the 19 20 holidays --MR. MARRIOTT: Would you like my calendar? 21 22 THE COURT: We have a made-up calendar, a hand-done 23 calendar. I'm going to require that those be produced by the 24 25 2nd of January -- or the 3rd of January, which is Friday

1 (sic). 2 MR. MARRIOTT: Can I just ask one thing, Your Honor? 3 4 THE COURT: Sure. 5 MR. MARRIOTT: Mr. Normand has just suggested that 6 he believes the documents are on a disk and could be provided much more quickly. We just ask that if they can be provided 7 more quickly that they do so. 8 THE COURT: Sure. But the outside date would be 9 January 3rd -- wait. The 6th of January, Friday. And if you 10 can do it sooner than that --11 12 MR. NORMAND: We will do it sooner than that. THE COURT: -- on disk. All right. Thank you. 13 When, Mr. Shaughnessy, do you anticipate being able 14 to provide the affidavits? 15 16 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: We can do it by the same time, 17 same date, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. That will be fine. 18 MR. MARRIOTT: And again there, we would do it 19 sooner if we can. 20 THE COURT: Sure. All right. 21 I have signed the order that's been presented to 22 It takes care of the other matter. 23 me. Is there anything else we need to address this 24 morning? 25

1 MR. NORMAND: I guess I just want clarification, 2 Your Honor. On the issue we discussed, both counsel and I, at some length, further depositions and using depositions to 3 identify documents, is that a procedure that Your Honor wanted 4 us to explore? 5 That is up to. That's up to counsel THE COURT: 6 how you handle that. And I should have made that part of the 7 order. And I'm going to have Mr. Shaughnessy and Mr. Marriott 8 9 prepare the order with regard to the privileged log issue and 10 Mr. Normand with regard to the other one, that the depositions, should they be taken, the two additional people 11 that remain for whom the affidavits will be submitted, those 12 two, you may take those depositions, and they would not be 13 counted towards your 50; all right? 14 MR. NORMAND: I think I understand. 15 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: I'm happy, Your Honor, if the 16 Court would prefer, to put it altogether in one order, that we 17 18 take a stab at it and provide it to Mr. Normand. THE COURT: That's fine. 19 20 MR. NORMAND: Your Honor, could I take your time 21 with one additional issue that I think is ripe to resolve? THE COURT: Sure. 22 23 MR. NORMAND: Both parties, of course, are going to be serving requests for admission, as you know, at the end of 24 discovery, March in this case. But we have a bifurcated 25

discovery period in which SCO's discovery for purposes of its affirmative claims would end in late January. SCO has been operating under the belief that if it serves requests for admissions with respect to not only its own claims but its counterclaims in the period up to the end of fact discovery, which I think counsel would agree is typical, near the end of the fact discovery to do our request of admissions.

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We didn't finish the discussion when Your Honor was in chambers, but I think, and they'll correct me if I'm wrong, I think IBM's position is that SCO would have to serve its requests for admissions relating to it affirmative claims essentially by the end of December because they need to be filed 30 days before the end of our discovery period.

That's not my experience with respect to any discovery period, and here where we have the bifurcated discovery period, it's SCO's position that it would be a lot simpler to serve all of its request for admissions at once with respect to both its claims and IBM's counterclaims toward the end of the fact discovery period.

20THE COURT: So by the end of January?21MR. NORMAND: No. The end of fact discovery for22all of the claims and counterclaims.

THE COURT: Which is when?

MR. NORMAND: Mid March, I think.

MR. MARRIOTT: March 17th.

MR. NORMAND: We would serve them -- if this is IBM's position, we could serve them 30 days before the end of that period. I mean, in my experience, request for admissions aren't even part of discovery. They're often served after discovery. But if IBM wants to see them all 30 days before the end of their discovery period, we'll serve them all by then.

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MR. MARRIOTT: Your Honor, there are two discovery periods, one that closes on the 27th of January, and what exactly that discovery -- what exactly discovery after that the parties are allowed to take are subject to a separate order by stipulation that Judge Kimball signed.

13 So there are two discovery periods. And our 14 position is to the extent that parties want to serve requests 15 for admission, they should serve their requests for admission 16 so that they could be responded to before the end of each 17 discovery period. And discovery would be allowed and permissible during those periods. So if SCO, for example, 18 19 wished to serve us related to discovery permissible during the period ending on January 27th, then they should serve RFAs 30 20 days before January 27th for responses by the end of the 21 period. If SCO wants to serve discovery to serve our RFA's 22 23 relating to the discovery permissible during the period 24 between January 27th and March 17th, then it should serve RFAs 30 days before March 17th for responses by March 17th. 25

Otherwise, that will allow discovery that is supposed to be limited to period A and allow that to go into period B. And, therefore, we think the parties ought to do it 30 days before.

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MR. NORMAND: Two points, Your Honor. One, I don't think it's true that you have to serve the requests for admission within the periods of discovery so that will be responded to before the formal discovery ends. So the very least we would have the end of January to do our requests for admissions with respect to our claims.

But more importantly and second, Your Honor, IBM is 10 entitled to take discovery, as Mr. Marriott says, to some 11 scope as set forth in the stipulation, IBM is entitled to take 12 discover through mid March. If we served our RFAs even in 13 14 late January, we don't need to respond to them before late January. And IBM will receive them at the end of January and 15 16 can take discovery on them if they'd like in that two-month period. But even that isn't fair because parties don't 17 typically take discovery on requests for admissions. 18 They 19 either deny or they admit that the document is as it 20 appears or as a legal issue as it appears or factual issues as it appears. 21

22 THE COURT: Are either of you relying on any 23 particular rule?

24 MR. NORMAND: It's bad for me, Your Honor. I don't 25 have cases with me. I know there are cases that say RFAs are

1	not part of discovery. There are other cases that say they
2	are part of discovery. I don't have anything to cite.
3	THE COURT: Is there any rule or procedure that
4	you're relying on?
5	MR. MARRIOTT: Your Honor, I think as to the timing
6	of RFAs is within Your Honor's discretion, and I think
7	practices vary. We would be agreeable to talking with counsel
8	about a scenario under which the RFAs were served prior to the
9	close of each of the fact discovery periods, so long as the
10	RFAs relate to the permissible discovery in that period.
11	Mr. Normand's concern is it does come after his
12	time to respond 30 days before. We're agreeable to that
13	THE COURT: I'm going to leave that to counsel to
14	work out and submit in a stipulation.
15	MR. NORMAND: Thank you, Your Honor. Just by way
16	of example, I would not expect IBM to have to serve its RFAs
17	on its counterclaims on us by mid February.
18	THE COURT: I understand.
19	MR. NORMAND: I understand it's the end of its
20	discovery period.
21	THE COURT: I understand. You can all work that
22	out and submit it.
23	MR. NORMAND: Thank you.
24	THE COURT: All right. Anything further?
25	MR. MARRIOTT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We're in recess. Thank you. MR. NORMAND: Thank you, Your Honor. (Whereupon, the court proceedings were concluded.) * *

1 STATE OF UTAH) 2) ss. 3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) I, KELLY BROWN HICKEN, do hereby certify that I am 4 a certified court reporter for the State of Utah; 5 That as such reporter, I attended the hearing of 6 the foregoing matter on December 20, 2005, and thereat 7 reported in Stenotype all of the testimony and proceedings 8 had, and caused said notes to be transcribed into typewriting; 9 and the foregoing pages number from 3 through 75 constitute a 10 full, true and correct report of the same. 11 That I am not of kin to any of the parties and have 12 no interest in the outcome of the matter; 13 And hereby set my hand and seal, this ____ day of 14 JEhrnan 20062 15 16 17 18 19 20 BROWN HICKEN, CSR, RPR, RMR 21 22 23 24 25